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Ethiopia: The Corruption Game

 corruptionHouse cleaning or window dressing?

Are they playing us like a cheap fiddle again? For a while, it was all about the Meles Dam and how to collect nickels and dimes to build it. That kind of played itself out. (Not to worry. That circus will be back in town. The public has the attention span of a gold fish. So they think.)  It’s time to change the flavor of the month. Time for a new game, a new hype. How about “corruption”? It’s a chic topic. The World Bank is talking about it. Everybody is talking about it. Even the corrupt are talking about corruption. Imagine kleptocrats calling corruptocrats corrupt? Or the pot calling the kettle black?

I have been talking and writing about corruption in Ethiopia for years. After dozens of commentaries on some aspect of corruption in Ethiopia, I am still drumbeating anti-corruption. I have been “lasing” corruption in my  commentaries in 2013. I was flabbergasted by the World Bank’s 448-page report, “Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia”. I am still reeling from the shocking findings in that report. In my commentary last week, “Educorruption and Miseducation in Ethiopia”, I focused on corruption in the education sector. It is one thing to steal an election or pull off a gold heist at the national bank, but robbing millions of Ethiopian youth of their future by imprisoning them in the bowels of a corrupt educational system is harrowing, downright criminal. Aarrgghh!

“The Administration of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn made the full might of its power known last Friday, after ordering the arrest of 10 high and medium ranking officials of the Ethiopian Revenues & Customs Authority (ERCA), along with six businessmen, some of whom are well known… Hailemariam wants to prove that there are no holy-cows…” tooted the opening sentence of an online media outlet. My initial reaction was a bemused, “You don’t say!?” (To be perfectly frank, I exclaimed, “Holy cows? Holy _ _ _ t!!”)

The two dozen “corruption” suspects nabbed in the “investigation” include ERCA “director general” with the “rank of minister”, his deputies and the “chief prosecutor” along with other customs officials. A number of prominent businessmen and some of their family members were also snagged in the dragnet. “Ethiopia’s top anti-corruption official” Ali Sulaiman told the Voice of America Amharic program last week  “the suspects had been under surveillance for over two years.”

The anti-corruption crusaders put on quite a show-and-tell on their television service. They put up dramatic footage of wads and stashes of greenbacks and Eurodollars in suitcases allegedly seized at a suspect’s residence. They displayed allegedly fraudulent land records from another suspect and gave interviews on how the suspects engaged in their corrupt practices. (The show-and-tell was reminiscent of the “terrorist” suspects they paraded in “Akeldama” and “Jihadawi Harakat” with caches of guns and explosives.  For the “corruption” suspects, it was stashes of cash.)

The regime’s public relations machine kicked into overdrive. Comments by unnamed “Ethiopian activists   praising efforts by the government to crackdown on corruption in the East African country” were reported. One  anonymous activists declared, “Ethiopia is pushing forward on efforts to help end the rampant corruption within government and business in the country…. We need to clean up our government…” Other anonymous commentators were quoted proclaiming moral victory on corruption. “The arrests are the beginning of a new Ethiopia free from the politics and past craziness and greed that had been part of the country for far too long.”

Divergent viewpoints on the “investigation” and arrest of the suspects were bandied in the Ethiopian Diaspora. Some offered muted praise for “Hailemariam’s government” for launching a “war” on “corruption”. They said the bagging of the two dozen or so suspects represents a shot across the bow for all “corruptitioners” (a neologism to describe professional practitioners of corruption). Others were convinced the suspects were guilty “because everybody knows they are corrupt. They shakedown every businessman importing goods into the country…” They were glad to see these “bad guys” bagged. There were many who dismissed the whole investigation as a sham, a public relations charade. It is political theater staged for the World Bank, the IMF and other donors who are demanding anti-corruption action as a precondition for handouts.

Some even suggested it was a special show staged for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry who is expected to visit Ethiopia to attend an African Union summit. The regime bosses can bob and weave against any Kerry punches on human rights and the jailing of dissidents, journalists and opposition leaders by touting their “anti-corruption” efforts.  Others viewed the arrests as a fallout of the post-Meles power struggle that is raging among ruling party factions. For the suspects to be arrested, their protector “god fathers” must have been vanquished or purged out in the power play. Still others said the arrest of these particular suspects is the low hanging fruit of corruption in Ethiopia. Going after officials of the customs authority, an agency historically stained with corruption, provides the regime an aura of credibility and magnifies its purported anti-corruption efforts.

I see the whole things with a jaded eye. I am convinced the cunning regime power players are gaming corruption. They are showboating and grandstanding. They are trying to kill two birds with one stone. Nail their opponents and get public relations credit and international handouts at the same time. They are desperately trying to catch some positive publicity buzz in a media environment where they are being hammered and battered everyday by human rights organizations, NGOs, international media outlets and others. It is a public relations stunt and political theatre without much substance or seriousness of purpose. It is standard operating window dressing procedure for the regime. It is red meat for the local population to make themselves look good and drum up support. It is a calculated strategy to reinvent “Hailemariam’s government” with smoke and mirrors.  After repeated public cathartic confessions that he is the handmaiden of Meles, Hailemariam now wants to show the world he is Mr. Clean, not Mr. Clone (of Meles). He is no longer part of the corrupt-to-the-core ancien regime of Meles. Mr. Clean is going to clean house and he has already bagged his first “Dirty 2 Dozen”. (Reminds one of Pinocchio telling Geppetto he dreams of becoming a real boy. Hailemariam, a real prime minister?!) What better agitprop to mobilize and capitalize on the infamy of a long reviled and hated agency. If they can’t hoodwink and drum up public support by talking ad nauseam about the Meles Dam, perhaps they can pull it off with a “corruption investigation”  of the customs authority.  It is sleazy investigating greasy and cheesy.

To say the corrupt Meles regime has no credibility with me is an understatement. The anti-corruption crusaders want us to believe only their side of their story and their silly show-and-tell. But every story has two sides or more. In telling a story, credibility is everything. The regime convicted Eskinder Nega, Reeyot Alemu, Woubshet Taye and so many others on lies, fabrications and tall tales. They have no credibility.

I believe those corruptoids  are interested in clinging to power, not good governance or stamping out corruption. The only reason they are able to remain in power is because corruption courses in their bloodstream. Corruption is the hemoglobin that delivers life-sustaining oxygen to their nerve center. Without corruption, the tyrannical regime will simply wither away.

I take a dim view of the regime’s “anti-corruption” efforts” not because I am its relentless critic or because I will not miss an opportunity to ding them or make them look bad. I make no apologies for my trenchant criticisms. But the truth of the matter is that if I believed in the slightest that they were serious and genuine about rooting (instead of tooting) out “corruption”, I would be the first to raise my pen and lavish them with praise. I would be rooting and tooting for them.

As I have often remarked, corruption is the malignant cancer that has metastasized throughout Ethiopia’s body politic. That’s why the World Bank’s voluminous report was aptly titled, “Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia.” It is a “clinical” diagnosis which has determined the cancer cells of  corruption are not confined to one organ of state (customs authority) which can be surgically removed and treated with the penal equivalent of chemotherapy  and radiation. The corruption cancer has spread throughout all organs of state.

The chemotherapy for the cancer of corruption in Ethiopia is a free press that can aggressively and doggedly investigate and report corrupt officials and practices for public scrutiny. The radiation therapy for the cancer of corruption is an independent prosecutorial office that could catch not only the small winnows in the pond but most importantly the big whales and sharks swimming at the highest levels of government. An independent judiciary that is capable of adjudicating corruption cases with due process of law is also very much needed. The preventive care for the cancer of corruption involves vigilant civil society institutions which can work freely at the grassroots levels and provide anti-corruption awareness, education, training and monitoring. It also involves a genuinely competitive multiparty system that can hold the ruling party and its officials accountable.

None of these “medicines” exist in Ethiopia today. That is why I believe the cancer of “corruption” in due course will destroy the regime though it is the very source of its survival now. More on my views on the “anti-corruption efforts” of the regime later; but a word or two about due process, the rule of law and the “corruption” suspects.

Due process and the rights of the accused

As I was drafting this commentary, I was advised by some learned colleagues that any statement I make that seems remotely sympathetic to the suspects accused of “corruption” could send the wrong message and create the misimpression that I would stoop low to defend even the manifestly corrupt just to make political points against the regime. I was told not to bother because “everybody knows the suspects are corrupt…” One of my feisty friends in a moment of rhetorical impetuosity was compelled to ask, “Why should you care if these S.O.B’s get a fair trial? Everyone knows they are guilty. Let them hang!”

That is where I part ways with my learned friends. The last time I parted ways with them was when I defended Meles Zenawi’s right to speak at Columbia University in September 2010. At the time, I was roundly criticized by friends and some of my regular readers. “How could you defend the ‘monster’ who had denied millions of Ethiopians the right to speak and even breath?” I insisted I was not defending a “monster” but the principle of free expression. My defense was simple, “If we don’t believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don’t believe in it at all.” My position is no different now. If we don’t believe in a fair trial for those we despise as corrupt, then we do not believe in fair trial at all.

I believe in fairness and justice. I do not believe in revenge or retribution. I take no position on the factual guilt or innocence of those accused of “corruption”. If they did the crime, they have to do the time. However, I believe they have a constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair trial. In other words, I make no exceptions or compromises when it comes to taking a position in defending the principle and practice of due process of law and respect for fundamental human rights. Those accused of “corruption” now (and those who will certainly face accusations of crimes against humanity and other crimes in the future) are entitled to full due process of law, which includes not only the  presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination but also the rights to counsel, adequate notice of charges, an impartial and neutral fact-finder, speedy trial and adjudication by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

My deep concern over the arbitrary administration of justice or denial of fair trial to anyone accused of “corruption”, “terrorism”, “treason”, etc.,  is rooted in the manifest absence of the rule of law in Ethiopia and the harsh realities of Meles’ officialdom. Any petty “law enforcement” official of the regime has the power to arrest and jail an innocent citizen. As I argued in my February 2012 commentary, “The Prototype African Police State”, a local police  chief in Addis Ababa felt so arrogantly secure in his arbitrary powers that he threatened to arrest a Voice of America reporter stationed in Washington, D.C. simply because that reporter asked him for his full name during a telephone interview. “I don’t care if you live in Washington or in Heaven. I don’t give a damn! But I will arrest you and take you. You should know that!!”, barked police chief Zemedkun. If a flaky policeman can exercise such absolute power, is it unreasonable to imagine those at the apex of power have the power to do anything they want with impunity. The regime in Ethiopia is living proof that power corrupts and an absolute power corrupts absolutely.

In my view, denial of due process (fair trial) is the highest form of “corruption” imaginable because its denial  results in the arbitrary deprivation of a person’s life, liberty and property. I am unapologetic in my insistence  that the suspects accused of “corruption” are entitled to full due process of law under the country’s Constitution and international human rights conventions. The question is: Could they get a fair trial in the regime’s kangaroo courts? Do these “corruption” suspects have the same chance of getting a fair trial today as those accused of “treason”, “terrorism”, “subversion” yesterday?

Article 20 (3) Ethiopian Constitution provides, “During proceedings accused persons have the right to be presumed innocent.” The same right is secured under the Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 7(b) of the  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). Disrespect for the presumption of innocence has been the hallmark of the Meles regime. To be accused of a crime by the Meles regime is to be convicted and sentenced to a long prison term. That is why I have often caricatured the Meles’ judicial system as kangaroo court justice. The courts are corrupted through political manipulation, intimidation and domination. The 2012  U.S. State Department Human Rights report concluded, “The law provides for an independent judiciary. Although the civil courts operated with a large degree of independence, the criminal courtsremained weak, overburdened, andsubject to political influence.” One of the “corruption” suspects during his first court appearance complained of prejudicial pretrial publicity because “state television showed his house being searched.”

There is a long and predictable pattern and practice of disregard for the constitutional right to presumption of innocence and wholesale abuse and denial of a panoply of constitutional rights to those accused of political crimes in Ethiopia. Following the 2005 election, Meles publicly declared that “The CUD (Kinijit) leaders are engaged in insurrection — that is an act of treason under Ethiopian law. They will be charged and they will appear in court.” They were charged, appeared in “court” and were convicted. In December 2008, Meles railroaded Birtukan Midekssa, the first female political party leader in Ethiopian history, without so much as a hearing let alone a trial. He sent her straight from the street into solitary confinement and later declared: “There will never be an agreement with anybody to release Birtukan. Ever. Full stop. That’s a dead issue.”   In 2009, Meles’ right hand man labeled 40 defendants awaiting trial as “desperadoes” who planned to “assassinate high ranking government officials and destroying telecommunication services and electricity utilities and create conducive conditions for large scale chaos and havoc.” They were all “convicted” and given long prison sentences.

Meles proclaimed the guilt of freelance Swedish journalists Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye on charges of “terrorism” while they were being tried and he was visiting Norway in 2011. He emphatically declared the duo “are, at the very least, messenger boys of a terrorist organization. They are not journalists.” Persson and Schibbye were “convicted” and sentenced to long prison terms.

Violations of the constitutional rights of those accused of crimes by the regime are not limited to disregard for the presumption of innocence. Internationally-celebrated Ethiopian journalists including Reeyot Alemu, Woubshet Taye and many others were denied access to legal counsel for months. Ethiopian Muslim activists who demanded an end to religious interference were jailed on “terrorism” charges and denied access to counsel.  They were mistreated and abused in pretrial detention. Scores of journalists, opposition members and activists arrested and prosecuted (persecuted) under the so-called anti-terrorism proclamation were also denied counsel and speedy trials and languished in prison for long periods.

Article 20 (2) provides, “Any person in custody or a convicted prisoner shall have the right to communicate with and be visited by spouse(s), close relatives and friends, medical attendants, religious and legal counselors. In an interview given to the Voice of America Amharic program last week, a lawyer for one of the suspects  complained that he and a bunch of other lawyers were denied access to their clients accused of “corruption” after waiting for five hours. They were told to return the following day because the “suspects were undergoing interrogation.” Yet, Article 19 (5) provides, “Everyone shall have the right not to be forced to make any confessions or admissions of any evidence that may be brought against him during the trial.”

Article 19 (1) provides, “Anyone arrested on criminal charges shall have the right to be informed promptly and in detail… the nature and cause of the charge against him… Article 20 (2) provides, “Everyone charged with an offence shall be adequately informed in writing of the charges brought against him. The “corruption” suspects have yet to be “informed promptly and in detail the charges against them”. “Ethiopia’s top anti-corruption official” Ali Sulaiman told Voice of America Amharic last week that the “suspects have been under surveillance for two years”. Yet at the suspect’s first court appearance, the prosecutors requested a 14-day continuance to gather more evidence. The “court” ruled the suspects can be held in custody “until the Federal Ethics & Anti-”corruption” Commission (FEACC) could collect additional evidence to bring charges against them.”

If it took them 2 years to investigate the case, but couldn’t wait another 14 days to gather the last pieces of vital evidence before arresting and publicly parading the suspects? This is a trick they have used before. It is called arrest and jest. Put the suspects in jail, crucify them in the press and laugh at them as they languish in prison for months on end. There will be endless delays and continuances “to collect more evidence” and the “court” will allow it because the “court” does what it is told by their political bosses.

There is no judicial system in the world where suspects are arrested of committing crimes after being investigated for 2 years and then the prosecution asks for two more weeks to gather additional evidence. The regime’s trial by publicity and demonization will go on. They will keep pumping out unrebutted damaging information in flagrant disregard of the suspects’ constitutional rights to create hostile pretrial publicity. They talk with a loose tongue about the suspects crimes of “tampering with loan-sharking investigations”, “illegal trading and tax evasion”, “improprieties especially involving imports of steel”, etc. Such is the sad fact of corruptoid justice in the regime’s kangaroo courts. Arrest persons presumed to be innocent and go out and look for evidence of their guilt! What a crock of _ _ _ t!

Fall guys or grand fall

There is something strange about the regime’s current “corruption” narrative; and I must say it reflects very badly on Meles himself. According to reports, the “director general” (the alleged kingpin of the “corruption” ring) was appointed by Meles in 2008. He is a “senior cabinet member”. He is credited for “overseeing several tax reforms including widening the tax base, by requiring businesses to install cash registration machines and to become registered for Value Added Tax (VAT).”  According to one report, “Under [the “director general”], the amount of revenues the federal government mobilized has reached 71 billion Br in 2011/12, a dramatic increase from the 19 billion Br collected before he took the position.”

Something is not right with that picture. Was Meles so blind and incompetent to select such a “corrupt man” to take the helm of his money making machine? Did Meles select him to oversee his corrupt empire because he knew the “director general” was the just right man for the job? Is it possible that the “director general” is a victim in a political power play? In any case, the arrest of the “director general” and the smear on his character and reputation reflects very poorly on Meles judgment, common sense and integrity. In my view, if the “director general” is truly the corruption ringleader, then he cannot possibly be the capo di tutti capi (boss of all bosses), perhaps an underboss or a consigliere.

The anticorruption warriors should be mindful of the law of unintended consequences. If they succeed in their corruption crusade, Meles’ legacy may be at extreme risk. When it came to corruption, Meles had a double standard. For instance, when 10,000 tons of coffee vanished from the warehouses, Meles forgave the coffee thieves and others “because we all have our hands in it”.  He threatened to cut the hands of coffee thieves if they steal again. Meles was content to rail against “government thieves” without doing much more. Now Hailemariam wants a single standardof corruption applicable to all. For someone who worships Meles, Hailemariam’s move is downright heresy!

It is noteworthy that the last time Meles mounted a “corruption” investigation was over a decade ago when he rounded up some of his former comrades and their business associates and charged them with “corruption” and railroaded them to prison. Back in the mid-1990s, he jailed the   “prime minister” of the “transitional government” on charges of corruption. That “prime minister” ate 12 years in Meles’ prisons. Hailemariam now, without warning, wants to go after all corruptitioners and cut off their hands? Is it going to be the legacy of corruption of Mr. Crook against the promise of good governance by anti-corruption crusader Mr. Clean?

Going after corruption, inc. (unlimited) — the real “holy cows” of “corruption”

In 2011, Meles publicly stated that 10,000 tons of coffee earmarked for exports had simply vanished from the warehouses. He called a meeting of commodities traders and in a videotaped statementtold them that he will forgive them this time because “we all have our hands in the disappearance of the coffee”. He threatened to “cut off their hands” if they should steal coffee in the future.  In 2011, a  United Nations Development Program (UNDP) commissioned report from Global Financial Integrity (GFI) on “illicit financial flows” (money stolen by government officials and their cronies and stashed away in foreign banks) from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) revealed the theft of US$8.4 billion from Ethiopia. In 2009, over US $3 billion illicitly left  Ethiopia. “The vast majority of the rise in illicit financial flows is a result of increased corruption, kickbacks, and bribery while the remainder stems from trade mispricing.”

In 2008 “USD16 million dollars” worth of gold bars simply walked out of the bank in broad daylight never to be seen again. According to a Wikileaks cablegram, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the current ruling party in Ethiopia, “Upon taking power in 1991… liquidated non-military assets to found a series of companies whose profits would be used as venture capital to rehabilitate the war-torn Tigray region’s economy…[with] roughly US $100 million… Throughout the 1990s…,  no new EFFORT  [Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray owned and operated by TPLF] ventures have been established despite significant profits, lending credibility to the popular perception that the ruling party and its members are drawing on endowment resources to fund their own interests or for personal gain.” According to the World Bank, roughly half of the Ethiopian national economy is accounted for by companies held by a business group called the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) cloasely allied with the ruling EPDRF party. EFFORT’s freight transport, construction, pharmaceutical, and cement firms receive lucrative foreign aid contracts and highly favorable terms on loans from government banks. “Generals” and other military leaders have managed to accumulate properties worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Last year, a regime general told Voice of America Amharic that he was able to build a number of multistory buildings worth tens of millions of dollars because he was “given bank loans”.

There is an old Ethiopian saying which roughly translates as follows: “There is no beauty contest among monkeys.” A pig with lipstick at the end of the day is still a pig as the old saying goes. There are no good corruptoids. In any power struggle, it is not uncommon for one group of power players to accuse another of being corrupt. Bo Xilai (once touted to be the successor to President Hu Jintao in China) Liu Zhijun and other high level Chinese communist cadres are facing criminal and political sanctions for alleged abuses of power and accepting bribes. Mikhail Khodorkovsky (once considered the “wealthiest man in Russia”) was jacked up on “corruption” charges and given a long prison sentence. Corruption show trials are a powerful weapon in the arsenal of dictators who seek to neutralize their opponents. As I argued in my commentary “Africorruption”, Inc.”, the business of African “governments” including the Ethiopian regime in the main is corruption. Those who seized political power in Ethiopia in 1991 may have believed they were fighting for freedom and democracy, but once they got absolute power, they became absolutely corrupt. They began to function as sophisticated criminal enterprises with the principal aim of looting the national treasury and operating government as a criminal syndicate and a racket. If the regime is serious about corruption, it should go after the real “holy cows” of corruption, not just the unholy cows that have been forced to become scapegoats.

Scapegoating or “anti-corruption”?

The so-called “corruption investigation” appears to be a case of scapegoating. Tradition has it that on the day of atonement a goat would be selected by the high priest and loaded with the sins of the community and driven out into the wilderness as an affirmative act of symbolic cleansing. It made the people feel purged of evil and guiltless. The “corruption” suspects were supporters, defenders and handmaidens of the  regime. Now they are made out to be loathsome villains. The sins and crimes of the regime are placed  upon their heads and they are driven out into the wilderness. The high priests of the regimes are telling the people they  have been cleansed and the community is free from evil. In this narrative, the regime “anti-corruption warriors” become the white knights in shining armor. But no amount of scapegoating can divert attention from the real situation. It is wise for those who live in glass houses not to throw stones.

How to deal with “horruption”

I am compelled to invent a new word to describe the horrible “corruption” in the ruling regime in Ethiopia. That  word is, “horruption” (horrible corruption).  The extended definition of this word is found in the World Bank’s corruption report on Ethiopia referenced above.

What is the best way to deal with horruption in Ethiopia? Simple. Line up the right social forces to fight corruption. Allow the free press to flourish so that it can aggressively and doggedly investigate and report corrupt officials and practices for public scrutiny. Establish an independent prosecutorial office properly budgeted and staffed (supported by certified international anti-corruption experts) to go after not only the small winnows but most importantly the big whales and sharks splish splashing in a sea of corruption. Take comprehensive measures to increase the transparency of all public institution and translate into action the mandate of Article 12 of the Ethiopian Constitution (Functions and Accountability of Government). Reduce the regime’s involvement in the economy. Allow the functioning of an independent judiciary that is capable of adjudicating corruption cases with full due process of law. Let civil society institutions flourish so that they can maintain ongoing vigilance and work at the grassroots levels to provide anti-corruption awareness, education, training and monitoring. Let there be a genuinely competitive multiparty system that can hold the ruling party and its officials accountable. In short, institutionalize the rule of law. Then we can act against “horruption” instead of talking about corruption.

The regime thinks they can distract attention by talking about  “corruption” and selectively arresting a few of their own members and supporters and putting them on show trials. That is nice political theater but it will not solve the problem of horruption unless one believes, to paraphrase H.L. Mencken, “Nobody ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the Ethiopian people.”

Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino and is a practicing defense lawyer.

Previous commentaries by the author are available at:

http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/

www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/

Amharic translations of recent commentaries by the author may be found at:

http://www.ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/category/al-mariam-amharic

http://ethioforum.org/?cat=24

Keep your eyes on the prize.

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Keep your eyes on the prize. By Yilma Bekele

We are witnessing a flurry of news from the TPLF party that calls itself the Ethiopian government. Why is the Woyane party so busy and why is the party pushing its cadres to be super active is a good question. That is what piqued my interest and I was forced to look around to figure out what exactly is happening both in Ethiopia and the Diaspora community to make the illegal regime work overtime.

I did not have to look far to see why the government is acting very nervous. It looks like for a change the progressive forces are on the attack and the reactionary regime is on the defense. Believe me this is a rare occurrence and shows the realignment of forces in our country. I will try to explain why later on but let us look at what is causing this shift. A few weeks back the regime carried out its ‘ethnic cleansing’ activity in the Beneshangul Gumuz Kilil. It was not the first time the TPLF led regime has done this criminal act but what was different this time around was our collective indignation. We were able to carry out a sustained and well organized push back from around the world. The opposition in Ethiopia cooperated by boldly demanding action and tried to collect evidence from the affected areas.

First the hapless regime paraded its toy PM and made him give some half ass explanation and dumped the crimes on their Kilil dog. The fact that the previous ‘ethnic cleansing’ activity was carried out in the South Kilil where the PM originated from was not lost on us. This rehearsed mea culpa did not impress anyone. It was back to the drawing board for the regime. Next In the clueless regime tried to divert our attention by planting rumors about the death of that other tyrant in Zimbabwe. We did not bite. After the failure of that story they again tried to engage us by removing the monument dedicated to our Holy Father Abune Petros. Again we showed our unhappiness but did not take our eyes of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ crime. We were focused and relentless. We were just simply not crying but talking about taking the matter to the International Court of Justice and the UN.

After lots and lots of postponements and dragging the regime brought our political prisoners and decided to hand down their useless justice. We were supposed to drop all other activity and concentrate on Eskinder Nega and Andulalem’s miscarriage of justice. Something odd happened here. We did not follow the script. For the first time we were able to connect the dots and see the whole picture. The progressive forces decided to link ethnic cleansing, Abune Petros and our Political prisoners’ situation as one.

I was waiting for the next drama with heightened anticipation. What would they try now was a common question asked by students of Woyane theatre. Invading Somalia was out of the question since they have already learned their lesson. The demonization of Eritrea was becoming stale. Playing the ethnic card is what brought about the problem in the first place so that was a no go zone. What would the ‘great visionary’ leader do under the circumstances was in the mind of all TPLF cadres in leadership position. They dug deep, traveled back in their criminally ladened history and came up with ‘cannibalism’ as the way out.

So with great fanfare they went about arresting anything anybody they could find. The injustice Minister was hauled away. The guy with dark glasses that sat behind the tyrant in Parliament was arrested. The Revenue and Customs guys were escorted to their won prison with a few selected business people to add flavor to the drama.

I guess all this activity is supposed to impress us. A criminal arresting another criminal is meant to fill our soul with hope for the future. They are so clueless they don’t even know that the news is taken with such amusement that a soccer game between Buna and Giorgis garners more anticipation than their cheap drama. Why would anyone think that Melaku Fenta that spineless individual sitting under Gebrewhaid Giorgis is capable of making any decision let alone steal big? Like most sycophants that are serving as the face of their departments Melaku was just another mannequin for show while the TPLF boss under him runs the outfit. That game is played all over Ethiopia and in the Embassy’s outside. I bet you cannot find any worthwhile governmental body without a TPLF deputy in charge.

This new drama is meant to keep us guessing what in the world is going on inside the TPLF party. We are supposed to guess which faction is up and who is down. The disinformation campaign by Debretsion keeps manufacturing different versions of their supposedly internal turmoil and some of us love nothing more than being instant experts in the inner workings of the mafia group. To hear some of our people go on the minute details of the party is mind boggling and a testimonial to the hopelessness of a few of our family and friends. They might have their own differences but do you really think that will stop them from their common goal of staying in power no matter what? Do you for second think they will not close ranks when threatened? Then why in the world are you wasting time and energy whether Azeb is fighting with Berket and if Sebhat is is not in good terms with Seyoum? Now if they really want our attention the best way to do it will be arrest Azeb or Abay Woldu not Sebhat or Seyoum since they already are near death.

The biggest joke of all is the claim that Hailemariam Desalgne was cleaning house. Let us see the PM that was handpicked by the dead tyrant and schooled in the art of servitude to TPLF, the PM that does not have a power base, the same PM that cannot even pick the guards outside his office is exercising authority on TPLF officials? Who would swallow such Mamo Kilo bed time story is a good question. Yes there are a few especially here in the Diaspora that are trying to put some lipstick on this pig of a story.

Some opined ‘EPDRF supporters speaking out’ while others declared ‘EPDRF undergoing profound changes.’ Well, well let see us what is giving these Woyane coddlers new life? What is different today that was not there yesterday is a good question. I read their writings very closely and tried to see what they were basing their new found euphoria on. I wanted to know what arguments they were bringing to the table to see if there was any validity to their conclusions. I couldn’t find any. It is all wishful thinking, self fulfilling prophesy and confused theories that is trying hard to fit a square peg in a round hole. The ones that are trying to see light at the end of the tunnel are the same people that advised wait and see attitude when Woyane conquered our capital and were willing and ready to serve the criminal organization. Their last miscalculation caused twenty years of misery to our people and country and here they are again advising us the presence of a non entity called EPDRF that is supposed to usher a new era of peace and prosperity. Give it a rest gentlemen and do not waste our time with your unfounded optimism. Why peddle a worn out theory this late in the game?

I am emboldened by three factors that have been added to the equation of fighting injustice in our dear country. The first and very significant addition to our arsenal of fighting for freedom and democracy is no other than our beloved ESAT. It has given voice to the voice less and opened our eyes to the reality that is what is ailing us. ESAT is the main reason Woyane misinformation campaign is falling on deaf ears. ESAT is the main reason the cry of our people in Ethiopia is getting a hearing. No matter what no sane Ethiopian can ignore the voice of our people coming thru the airwaves loud and clear. The tenacity and diligent reporting by ESAT that refused to fall for Woyane diversion kept the ‘ethnic cleansing’ criminal act in focus and thwarted their attempt to derail us.

The second factor is the gallantry of our Moslem citizens that have against all odds persevered for over a year their quest for freedom and independence. The many attempts to divide and splinter them by the illegal Woyane regime has been repulsed and the Moslem community is still standing together with one voice and one aim of protecting their right to run their religion free of government interference. It is a lesson to the rest of us to keep our eyes on the prize and not to let our organizations be the play ground of Woyane operatives.

The third factor that is emerging from Ethiopia is the beautiful new voice of Semayawi Party that is clear, clean and void of any clutter of the past that has been hindering our forward movement. From what I can observe from afar Semayawi is not encumbered by our past failures, weighed down by unnecessary dogma and geared to act and try newer stuff. That is what the doctor ordered. Why use beige and gray to paint when you can use bright blue and bring warmth to the canvas. The call by Semayawi Party to dress in black and show the discontent of our people during African Unions 50th anniversary is a bold and timely call. That is all peaceful resistance is about. It is our duty to follow the advice of the Party and tell our family and friends to cooperate in showing their grief by dressing in black. Those of us that believe in peaceful resistance this is our chance to practice what we preach.

As times go by it is becoming clear that the regime is feeling the loss of the evil person in charge. For over thirty years the prince of darkness Meles Ashebari Zenawi has been the brain and body of the mafia outfit that has been masquerading as a political party. I am willing to give him the credit as the personification of Satan on earth. He has earned the title. His death has left the TPLF party void of someone to fill his shoes no matter how small it is. It is not the absence of idiots or sycophants that is lacking in their midst but they just seem to suffer from the mistrust the evil one has left them with. That deficiency coupled with the emergence of new and daring Ethiopians schooled in the art of confronting the regime head on is what is causing headaches to the downgraded TPLF.

Life is beautiful. Our new found unity and purposeful march to the future is a hard won victory. The fact that it is Woyane in disarray and we are becoming hip to their many attempts to distract us is testimonial to our ability to learn and apply the lesson. There are still many voices that are constantly trying to derail our movement but the fact that we have matured and are able to separate the chaff from the wheat is our new found strength. We are not there yet but with all those strong and tested groups and individuals joining our movement there is no reason to doubt we are bringing the dark days to an end and new bright sun will rise up over our mountains and valleys. A luta continua-the struggle continues.

በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የሚፈጸም የመሬት ነጠቃ በኢትዮጵያ

የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

 

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smneለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

May 14, 2013

በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የአገር ሃብትና ትውልድን እየበላ ስላለው የመሬት ነጠቃ አስመልክቶ የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ድርጅታችን ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ በጋራ ያዘጋጁት ጥናታዊ ዘገባ ይፋ ሆነ። የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ዋና ዳይሬክተር ጥናቱ በትክክለኛ ጭብጥ ላይ ተመስርቶ እንዲዘጋጅ ለህይወታቸው ሳይሳሱ መረጃ በመስጠት ለተባበሩ ዜጎች “ታላቅ ክብር ይሁንላችሁ። አሁን አትታወቁም። ግን ከቶውንም አትረሱም። ክብር ለማትታወቁት ግን ለማትረሱት የአገር ጀግኖች” በማለት ምስጋና አቅርበዋል።

ኢህአዴግን በደፈናው መቃወምን ዓላማው ያላደረገው ይህ ጥናታዊ ዘገባ ዜጎችን ካደጉበት፣ ከኖሩበት፣ ከቀያቸው፣ ከህልውናቸው፣ ከርስታቸው፣ ወዘተ ያለ አንዳች ውይይት፣ ምክክርና ንግግር በማፈናቀል ለውጪ ኩባንያዎችና ለራሱ ለባለጠመንጃው አገዛዝ ሰዎችና ባለሟሎች መሬት ማከፋፈሉን በማስረጃ ያሳያል። የራሱ የኢህአዴግ አካላትም በሪፖርቱ ውስጥ በአግባቡ ድምጻቸው ተካትቷል። የሚጠቀሙባቸው አዋጆችና ህጎችም አልተዘለሉም።

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“የውጪ ባለሃብቶችና ኩባንያዎች ወደ አገር ውስጥ መግባታቸው ለቴክኖሎጂ ዝውውር፣ በአገሪቱ ያለውን የምግብ እጥረት ለማስወገድ ይረዳል” የሚሉ ምክንያቶች እያቀረበ ያለው ኢህአዴግ በተግባር ሲፈተሽ ተግባሩና ዓላማው ምን እንደሆነ የሚያመለክተው ጥናቱ የስርዓቱ ሰለባዎች፣ የኢህአዴግ ባለስልጣናት፣ ኢንቨስተሮች፣ ጉዳዩ የሚመለከታቸው ክፍሎች፣ የቅርብ ምስክሮች፣ የተለያዩ ከዓለምአቀፍ ተቋማት የተገኙ መረጃዎች፣ አገዛዙ ራሱ ይፋ ያደረጋቸው መረጃዎችና ለጥናቱ አስፈላጊ የተባሉ አኻዞች የተካተቱበት በመሆኑ እውነታውን ህዝብና ማናቸውም ወገኖች እውነቱን ለመረዳት ያስችላቸዋል ተብሎ በጉልህ ታምኖበታል።

በምሳሌ ለማሳያነት የተጠቀሰው የሳዑዲ ስታር ኩባንያ የሚያመርተውን ሩዝ ደብረዘይት በገነባው ተቋሙ አማካይነት ሩዙን የመለየትና ለኤክስፖርት የማዘጋጀት ስራ ይሰራል። የተመረጠውና መለኪያውን የሚያሟላው ሩዝ ኤክስፖርት የሚደረግ ሲሆን፣ ደቃቃውና በሚሊሜትር ተለክቶ ለኤክስፖርት ደረጃ የማይበቃው አገር ቤት እንዲቀር ይደረጋል። ከዚህ አንጻር እንኳ ቢታይ የመሬት ኢንቨስትመንት የተባለው ዓለም ጠንቅቆ ለሚያውቀው የአገራችን የምግብ እጥረት ችግር መፍትሄ ሊሆን አይችልም። በጥናቱ ዝርዝር ጉዳዩ አለ።

ኢህአዴግ በፖለቲካው ውድማ ላይ ቆሞ የሚያወራውና በተግባር የሚሆነውን እውነት ከሰለባዎቹ አንደበት በመቅዳት ሊስተባበል በማይችልበት ደረጃ ያቀረበው ጥናት፣ ዜጎች ከቀያቸው  ከመፈናቀላቸው በፊት ምክክርና የስነልቦና ዘግጅት እንዲደረግ ጊዜ እንደሚሰጥ በህግ የተደነገገ ስለመሆኑ፣ ነግር ግን እውነታው የተገላቢጦሽ መሆኑንን ጥናቱ በማስረጃ ያትታል። ዜጎች ነገ ስለሚሆነው እንኳ ሊያውቁ በማይችሉበት ደረጃ ማለዳ ካረፉበት ሲነቁ ዶዘር ማሳቸውን፣ የጓሮ አትክልታቸውን፣ የኑሯቸው መሰረት የሆነውን ደናቸውን፣ ቤታቸውን ሲጠርግ እንደሚያዩ እነዚሁ መከረኞች ለህይወታቸው ሳይሳሱ መናገራቸውን ጥናቱ ትኩረት ሰጥቶ አቅርቦታል።

የመሬት ካሳ እንኳ ባግባቡ የማያገኙት ወገኖች በራሳቸው አንደበት፣ በግብር የደረሰባቸውንና ከፊት ለፊታቸው ያለውን አደጋ አስመልክቶ በዝርዝር ሚዛናዊ በማድረግ ያቀረበው ጥናት ኢህአዴግ ለማስተባበል ከፈለገ በዜናና በተራ ጩኸት ሳይሆን በመረጃ የተደገፈ፣ ሁሉንም ወገኖች ያካተተ  ሚዛናዊ ሪፖርት ካቀረበ ብቻ ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ (አኢጋን) በማስተባበያነት እንደሚቀበለው አስቀድሞ ለመግለጽ ይወዳል።

በአገርና በግለሰብ ደረጃ መረጃ ለማዳረስ፣ በተመሳሳይ ኢህአዴግ የሚያሰራጨውን የሃሰት ፕሮፓጋንዳ ማጋለጥ፣ የሰብአዊ መብት ጥሰቱን ማሳየት፣ የተሳሳተውን ፖሊሲ ማስቀየር ዋናው የጥናቱ ዓላማ ነው። በጥናቱ በቀረበው ጭብጥ መሰረት የዓለም ባንክ፣ ወዳጅ አገሮች፣ አበዳሪ አገሮች ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች ወዘተ አካሄዳቸውን እንዲመረምሩ ለማስቻል ሰፊ ስራ የተሰራ መሆኑንን በዚህ አጋጣሚ እንጠቁማለን። በተለያዩ አጋጣሚዎች የተለያዩ የውጪና የአገር ውስጥ ሚዲያዎች እንደዘገቡት ሰፊ ስራ የተሰራ ቢሆንም፣ በዋናነት የጉዳዩ ባለቤት የሆነው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ምን እየተሰራ እንደሆነ ሲረዳ ትግሉን ማቅለል፤ ውጤቱንም ማቅረብ ይቻላል የሚል እምነት አለን።

በዚህና በሌሎችም ተዛማጅ ምክንያቶች በከፍተኛ የሃላፊነት ስሜት፣ ረዥም ጊዜ ተወስዶ የተሰራው የትርጉም ሰራ ሰውን የሚያክል ክቡር ፍጥረት ከማደሪያው እንዲወጣ ተደርጎ እንዴት ወደ ጉድጓድ እንደሚወረወር ለመጪው ትውልድ በታሪክነት፣ አሁን ላለነው በመረጃነት፣ ከሁሉም በላይ ከጩኸትና ከመረጃ አልባ ክስ የምናገኘው ጥቅም አለመኖሩን በመረዳት አቋቋምን ለማስተካከል ይረዳል፣ ታላቅ ምሳሌም ይሆናል ብለን እናምናለን።

ጥናቱን በማሰራጨትና ዜጎች እጅ እንዲደርስ በማድረጉ በኩል የሁሉም ወገኖች ያልተቆጠበ ጥረት እጅግ አስፈላጊ እንደሆነ ለመግለጽ እንወዳለን። በዚህ አጋጣሚ እናወጣዋለን ብለን ካሰብንበት ጊዜ በማለፍ ተጨማሪ ሳምንታት በማዘግየታችን ታላቅ ይቅርታ እንጠይቃለን፡፡ በአገራችን ካለው የመረጃ አፈና አኳያ የጥናቱ መጠን ሰብሰብና አጠር ባለ መጠን በኢሜይል እንደሚሰራጭ ሆኖ በአዲስ መልክ ሲቀናበር ተጨማሪ ሳምንታትን መውሰዱ የግድ ሆኗል፡፡

የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ጽሁፉን የማሰራጨቱ ስራ በጨዋነት፣ ለጽሁፉ ባለቤቶች (ለእንግሊዝኛው የኦክላንድ ተቋም ለአማርኛው ደግሞ አኢጋን) አስፈላጊውን እውቅና በመስጠት እንዲሆን በዚህ አጋጣሚ አበክረን እንሳስባለን። ከመሬት ነጠቃ በላይ የከፋ ወንጀል የለም። ዜጎችን በምድራቸው ወደ ባርነት የሚያሸጋግረው የመሬት ነጠቃ የአገሪቱን ሃብትና ንብረት እየበላ ነው። ይህንን ወደር የሌለው ወንጀል ለማጋለጥ፣ ለመታገል፣ ለመቃወምም ሆነ ተዛማጅነት ያላቸው ተግባራት ለማከናወን ለሚፈልጉ ተቋማት፣ ግለሰቦችና ሚዲያዎች ይረዳ ዘንድ (Land Grabhttp://landgrabsmne.wordpress.com) የሚባል ብሎግ እንዲሁም በፌስቡክ Land Grab/መሬት ነጠቃ መከፈቱን ለማሳወቅ እንወዳለን። በቅርቡ የሚሻሻለው ይህ ብሎግና የፌስቡክ ገጽ ከመሬት ወረራ ጋር በተያያዘ ሁሉም ዓይነት ማስረጃዎች የሚታተሙበት ስለሚሆን መረጃ ለሚፈልጉ ወገኖች ሁሉ መልካም አጋጣሚ ይሆናል። ጥናታዊ ዘገባውን ከድረገጻችን ላይ ለማግኘት እዚህ ላይ ይጫኑ፡፡ በኢሜይል ለማግኘት የሚፈልጉ በሙሉ በሚከተለው አድራሻ ([email protected]) ቢጠይቁን በቀጥታ የምንልክ መሆናችንን እናሳውቃለን፡፡

በመጨረሻም የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ዋና ዳይሬክተር ለተርጓሚው ከሁሉም በላይ ግን የስርዓቱ ላንቃ ስር ሆነው የህይወት ዋጋ በመክፈል መረጃ ለሰጡት ወገኖች የአክብሮት ምስጋና አቅርበዋል። አቶ ኦባንግ በመልዕክታቸው “በቦታው ላይ ሆናችሁ ለህይወታችሁ ሳትፈሩ ይህንን መረጃ የሰጣችሁ ሁሉ የአገር ጀግኖች ናችሁ፤ አሁን አትታወቁም። አሁን ልንገልጻችሁ አንችልም። ጊዜና ወቅት ጀግንነታችሁን እስኪገልጹት ግን አትረሱም። ልትረሱም አትችሉም። ብዙ ባይነገርላችሁና ባይዘመርላችሁም ታላቅ ስራ ሰርታችሁዋልና ክብር ይሁንላችሁ” ብለዋል፡፡

ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

የሚዲያና ሕዝብ ግንኙነት ግብረኃይል

የ ሙሉውን ጥናት ትርጉም በአማርኛ ለማንበብ እዚህ ይጫኑ Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa (Ethiopia)

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ለዚህ ደብዳቤ ምላሽም ሆነ ለተጨማሪ መረጃ ዋና ዳይሬክተሩን ለሚዲያ ክፍሉ ([email protected]) በመጻፍ ወይም ድረገጻችንን (www.solidaritymovement.org) በመጎብኘት ለመረዳት ይችላሉ፡፡

Edu-corruption and Mis-education in Ethiopia

educEducorruption and the miseducation of Ethiopian youth

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world,” said Nelson Mandela. For the late Meles Zenawi and his apostles (the Melesistas) in Ethiopia, the reverse is true: Ignorance is the most powerful weapon you can use to prevent change and cling to power. They have long adopted the motto of George Orwell’s Oceania: “Ignorance is Strength”. Indeed, ignorance is a powerful weapon to manipulate, emasculate and subjugate the masses. Keep ‘em ignorant and impoverished and they won’t give you any trouble.

For the Melesistas education is indoctrination. They feed the youth a propaganda diet rich in misinformation, disinformation,  distortions, misguided opinions, worn out slogans and sterile dogmas from a bygone era. Long ago, Dr. Carter G. Woodson, “Father of African-American History”, warned against such indoctrination and miseducation of the oppressed: “When you control a man’s thinking you do not have to worry about his actions. You do not have to tell him not to stand here or go yonder. He will find his proper place and will stay in it. You do not need to send him to the back door. He will go without being told. In fact, if there is no back door, he will cut one for his special benefit. His education makes it necessary.” The rulers in Ethiopia continue to use higher educational institutions not as places of learning, inquiry and research but as diploma mills for a new breed of party hacks and zombie ideologues doomed to  blind and unquestioning servility.  “Zombie go… zombie stop… zombie turn… zombie think…,” sang the great African musician Fela Kuti. I’d say, “zombie teach… zombie learn… zombie read… zombie dumb… zombie dumber.”

For over two decades, Meles and his gang have tried to keep Ethiopians in a state of blissful ignorance where the people are forced at gunpoint to speak no evil, see no evil and hear no evil.  Meles and his posse have spent a king’s ransom to jam international radio and satellite transmissions to prevent the free flow of information to the people. They have blocked internet access to alternative and critical sources of information and views. According to a  2012 report of  Freedom House, the highly respected nongovernmental research and advocacy organization established in 1941, “Ethiopia has one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile telephone penetration on the continent. Despite low access, the government maintains a strict system of controls and is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa to implement nationwide internet filtering.” They have shuttered independent newspapers, jailed  reporters, editors and bloggers and exiled dozens of journalists in a futile attempt to conceal their horrific crimes against humanity and vampiric corruption. They have succeeded in transforming Ethiopia from the “Land of 13 Months of Sunshine” to the “Land of Perpetual Darkness”.

But my commentary here is not about the Benighted Kingdom of Ethiopia where ignoramuses are kings, queens, princes and princesses. I am concerned about the systemic and rampant corruption in Ethiopia’s “education sector”.  The most destructive and pernicious form of corruption occurs in education. Educorruption steals the future of youth. It permanently cripples them intellectually by denying them opportunities to acquire knowledge and transform their lives and take control of the destiny of their nation. As Malcom X perceptively observed, “Without education, you are not going anywhere in this world.” Could Ethiopia’s youth go anywhere in this world trapped and chained deep in the belly of a corrupt educational system?

I will admit that in the hundreds of weekly commentaries I have written over the last half dozen or so years, I have not given education in Ethiopia the critical attention it deserved. I have no excuse for not engaging the issue more intensely. In my own defense, I can only say that when an entire generation of Ethiopian scholars, academics, professors and learned elites stands silent as a bronze  statute witnessing the tyranny of ignorance in action, the burden on the few who try to become the voices of the voiceless on every issue is enormous.

I have previously commented on the lack of academic freedom in Ethiopian higher education and the politicization of education in Ethiopia. In my February 2008 commentary “Tyranny in the Academy”, I called attention to the lack of academic freedom at Mekelle Law School. I defended Abigail Salisbury who was a visiting professor at that law school when she was summarily fired by Meles after she published an academic commentary on her experiences at that law school:

…I was absolutely shocked, then, when I started reading my students’ work. Out of the hundred third-year students I teach, probably forty of them had inserted a special section, right after the cover page, warning me of what might happen to them were their paper to leave my hands. A number of students wrote that they would never give their real opinions to an Ethiopian professor because they fear being turned in to the government and punished. Others begged me to take their work back to America with me so that people would know what was going on…

In my September 2010 commentary, “Indoctri-Nation”, I criticized the Meles regime for politicizing education. The “Ministry of Education” (reminds one of Orwell’s “Ministry of Truth” (Ignorance)) at the time had issued a “directive” effectively outlawing distance learning (education programs that are not delivered in the traditional university classroom or campus) throughout the country.  The regime had also sought to corner the disciplines of law and teaching for state-controlled universities, creating a monopoly and pipeline for the training of party hacks to swarm the teaching and legal professions. I demonstrated that “directive” was in flagrant violation and in willful disregard of the procedural safeguards of the Higher Education Proclamation No. 650/2009. It did not faze them. (It was time to mint a new legal maxim: “The ignorant are entitled to ignore their own law and invoke ignorance of their own law as a defense.”)

The “directive” was at odds with the recommendations of the World Bank (which has been assisting the regime in improving education administration and delivery of services)  for increased emphasis on the creation of a network of “tertiary educational” institutions (e.g. distance learning centers, private colleges, vocational training services, etc.,) to help support the “production of the higher-order capacity” necessary for Ethiopia’s development. In its 2003 sector study “Higher Education Development for Ethiopia”, the World Bank had recommended “a near term goal [of] doubl[ing]  the share of private enrollments from the current 21% to 40% by 2010.” By 2010, the Meles regime had decided to reduce private tertiary institutions, particularly the burgeoning distance learning sector, to zero!

In my October 2010 commentary, “Ethiopia: Education Unbanned!”, I was pleasantly surprised but unconvinced by the Meles regime’s apparent change of strategy to abandon its decision to impose a blanket ban on distance learning and reach a negotiated resolution of instructional quality issues with distance learning providers. I pointed out a few lessons Meles and his crew could learn from the bureaucratic fiasco. (Is it really possible for the closed- and narrow-minded to learn?)

I focus on educational corruption in Ethiopia in this commentary for four reasons: 1) I was appalled by the corruption findings in the recent World Bank 448-page report “Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia”. That  report, with bureaucratic delicacy and hesitancy, demonstrates the cancer of corruption which afflicts the Ethiopian body politic has metastasized into the educational sector putting the nation’s youth at grave risk. 2) There is widespread acknowledgement that education in Ethiopia at all levels is in a pitiful condition. For instance, a 2010 Newsweek “study of health, education, economy, and politics” showed Ethiopia with a population of 88 million had a literacy rate of 43.3 percent, and ranked 98 out of 100 countries on education. 3)  Few Ethiopian educators and scholars are examining the issue of educational corruption and its implications for the future of the country and its youth.  Hopefully, this commentary could spur some of them to investigate corruption in education (and other areas) and conduct related policy research and analysis. 4) I had promised in my first weekly commentary of 2013 to pay special attention to youth issues in Ethiopia during the year. Nothing is more important to Ethiopia’s youth than education. Youth without education are youth without a future and without hope. Youth without education are emblematic of a nation in despair.

World Bank findings on corruption in the Ethiopian education sector

The WB report on the education sector alludes to an Ethiopian proverb in assessing the culture of corruption and impunity: “Sishom Yalbela Sishar Ykochewal” — roughly translates into English as follows: “One who does not exploit to the full his position when he is promoted will lament when he no longer has the opportunity.”

Ethiopia’s education sector has become a haven and a refuge for prebendalist (where those affiliated with the ruling regime feel entitled to receive a share of the loot) party hacks and a bottomless barrel of patronage. The Meles regime has used jobs, procurement and other opportunities in the education sector to reward and sustain loyalty in its support base. They have been handing out teaching jobs to their supporters like candy and procurement opportunities to their cronies like cake.  “In Ethiopia’s decentralized yet authoritarian system,considerable powers exist among senior officials at the federal, regional, and woreda levels. Of particular relevance to this study is the discretion exercised by politically appointed officials at the woreda level, directly affecting the management of teachers.”

In “mapping corruption in the education sector in Ethiopia”, “the World Bank report cautions that “corruption in education can be multifaceted, ranging from large distortions in resource allocation and significant procurement-related fraud to smaller amounts garnered through daily opportunities for petty corruption and nontransparent financial management.” Corruption in the education sector is quadri-dimensional “affecting the selection of teachers for training, recruitment, skills upgrading, or promotion; falsification of documents to obtain qualifications, jobs, or promotions and fraud and related bribery in examinations and conflict of interest in procurement.”

The “selection of candidates for technical training colleges (TTCs)” is the fountainhead of educational corruption in Ethiopia. According to the WB report, “students do not generally choose to become teachers but are centrally selected from a pool of those who have failed to achieve high grades.” In other words, the regime’s policy is to populate the teaching profession with, for lack of a better word, the “dumber” students. Such students also make the most servile party hacks. But it is a spectacular revelation that the future of Ethiopia’s youth — the future of Ethiopia itself — is in the hands of “those who have failed to achieve high grades”. Ignorant teachers and ignorant students= Ignorance is strength. Could a greater crime be committed against Ethiopia’s youth and Ethiopia?

To add insult to injury, the selection of underachieving students to pursue teacher training institutes is itself  infected by “bribery, favoritism and nepotism.” The most flagrant corrupt practices include “manipulation of the points system for selection of students to higher education.” The “allocate[on] of higher percentage points for results from transcripts and national exams than for entrance exams” has “enabled a large number of inadequately qualified students to join the affected institutes, sometimes with forged transcriptsThis practice has affected the quality of students gaining entry to higher education and eroded the quality of the training program.” In other words, even among underachievers seeking to become teachers, it is the washouts, the duds and flops that are likely to become teachers!

Fraud and related corrupt practices in matriculation are commonplace. According to the WB report, there is

a significant risk of corruption in examinations…The types of fraudulent practices in examinations include forged admission cards enable students to pay other students to sit exams for them, collusion allowing both individual and group cheating in examinations, assistance from invigilators (exam monitors) and school and local officials (during exams), higher-level interference [in which] regional officials overturned the disqualification of cheaters, fraudulent overscoring of examination papers [by] teachers are bribed by parents and students, fraudulent certification of transcripts and certificates to help  students graduate.

Although there are public officials who have considered reporting corrupt practices, they have refrained from doing so because there was “a strong sense that there is no protection to guard against possible reprisals directed at those who report malpractice.” There is no place for whistle blowers in Ethiopia’s edu-corruptocracy.

Recruitment and management of teachers is a separate universe of corrupt practices. “In Ethiopia, the overwhelming bulk of expenditure in education is taken up by salaries of teachers” and there is a “high risk of bribery, extortion, favoritism, or nepotism in selecting teachers for promotion, upgrading, or grants.” The WB report found “nepotism and favoritism in recruitment were broad and frequent—namely that, in some woredas, the recruitment of teachers (and other community-based workers) is based on political affiliation, including paid-up membership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).”

What is shocking is not only the culture of corruption in education but also the culture of impunity — the belief  that there are no consequences for practicing corruption. The WB report shows not only the “prevalence of fraud and falsification of teaching qualifications and other documents, reflecting weak controls, poor-quality documents (that are easily falsified), [but also] the widespread belief that such a practice would not be detected… For such falsification to go unnoticed, there is a related risk of the officials supporting or approving the application being implicated in the corrupt practice.”

The types of corrupt practices that occur at the management level are stunning. Managers manipulate access to “program of enhancing teacher qualifications through in-service training during holiday periods by using their positions to influence the selection of candidates. Hidden relationships are used in teacher upgrading, with officials at the zonal or woreda level taking the first option on upgradation programs.” The appointment of local education officials is not “competitive” but “politically assigned”. Collusion between local managers and teachers over noncompliance with curriculum, academic calendar, and similar practices is a relatively common practice and “reduces the provision of educational services.” This situation is made worse by “teacher absenteeism [which] is tolerated by head teachers, within the context of staff perceiving a need to supplement their income through private tutoring or other forms of income generation.” Poorly paid teachers supplement their incomes by “private tutoring [which] is widespread, with 40 percent of school officials reporting it as a practice.”  Corruption also extends to “teachers paying bribes or kickbacks to management, mostly school directors, to allocate shorter work hours in schools so that they can use the freed-up time to earn fees as teachers in private schools.” The payola is hierarchically distributed: “Bribes received are likely to be shared first with superiors, then with a political party, and then with colleagues, in that order.

Falsification of documents including forged transcripts and certificates occurs on an “industrial” scale and is “most prevalent in the provision of certification for completing the primary or secondary school cycles” and in generating bogus “documents in support of applications for promotion”.

Procurement (official purchases of goods and services from private sources) is the low hanging fruit. “In the education sector, a number of public actors maybe involved [in procurement], depending on the size and type of the task. These include national and local government politicians and managers.” Some people have a lock on the procurement system. Successful “tendering companies” are likely to have “family or other connections with officials responsible for procurement”. Procurement corruption also takes the forms of “uncompetitive practices” “including the formation of a cartel, obstruction of potential new entrants to the market, or other forms of uncompetitive practices that may or may not include a conspiratorial role on the part of those responsible for procurement.” Other procurement related corruption includes “favoritism, nepotism, or bribery in the short-listing of consultants or contractors or the provision of tender information.” There are some “favored contractors and consultants” who have a “dominant market position” and are “awarded contracts for which they were not eligible to bid.” Corruption also occurs in the form of defective construction, substandard materials and overclaims of quantities.

Construction quality issues are considered a significant problem in the construction of educational facilities, particularly in the case of small, remote facilities where high standards of construction supervision can be difficult to achieve. For example, a toilet block in a school collapsed a month after completion. The contractor responsible for building the facility was not required to make the work good or repay the amount paid, nor was the contractor sanctionedThe matter was not investigatedSuch problems are a significant indicator of corrupt practices, particularly when the contractor is not ultimately held to account for its failures…

There is corruption in the “purchase of substandard or defective supplies or equipment. For this to go unchallenged by those responsible for procurement strongly suggests either a lack of capacity, corrupt practices, or both.” According to an example cited in the WB report, “a large fleet of buses purchased by the MOE [“Ministry of Education”] using Teacher Development Program funds and distributed to TTCs were found to be defective. The TTCs complained that the MOE had dumped the buses on them. The MOE subsequently sent auditors to determine whether the complaint was genuine.”

The amazing fact is that the regime reflexively decided to investigate those who filed the complaint, and not the reported crooks. They automatically assumed the technical training colleges were lying and sent their auditors to investigate them for possible false reporting of defective buses!! (Orwelliana: The criminals are the victims and the victims are the criminals.)  There is evidence of theft and resale of school supplies or equipment. “One such indication relates to the alleged illegal sale of education facilities, with related allegations of nepotism. A city education office is alleged to have sold valuable heritage buildings in a secondary school to a private developer and then to have requested land to rebuild the school facilities.

Changing the culture of corruption and impunity

The culture of corruption and impunity in Ethiopia must be changed. The WB report observes,

In Ethiopia, the pattern of perception suggests that outright bribery is perceived to be more corrupt than, for example, favoritism or the falsification of documentation. There is also a sense that some practices, such as expressing gratitude to a client through the giving of a small gift, are normal business practice and not necessarily corrupt. Finally, there is an underlying acceptance among many that the state has the right to intervene in the market if that is considered to be in the national interest, and there is little sense that such interventions could be at variance with ongoing efforts to promote the level playing field needed for effective privatization of service provision, including in the education sector.

It is unlikely that a corrupt regime has the will, capacity or interest to change its own modus operandi. As I have argued elsewhere, having the “Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission” (FEAC) investigate the architects and beneficiaries of corruption in Ethiopia is like having Tweedle Dee investigate Tweedle Dum. It is an exercise in futility and an absurdity. FEAC is a toothless, clawless and feckless make-believe do-nothing bureaucratic shell incapable of investigating corruption in its own offices let alone systemic corruption in the country.

Pressures for accountability and transparency could come from domestic civil society institutions, but as the WB report points out, a 2009 “civil societies law” has decimated such institutions. The only practical and effective mechanism for accountability and transparency in the education sector is the institutionalization of an independent and energetic teachers’ union. But the regime has destroyed the real teachers’ union. According to the WB report,

Teachers in Ethiopia have historically been represented by the Ethiopian Teachers’ Association (ETA), founded in 1949. Following a long legal battle, a 2008 court ruling took away the right of the ETA to its name and all of its assets, creating a different organization with an identical name. Most teachers are now members of this replacement organization, for which dues are deducted from teachers’ salaries. The original ETA, now reorganized as the National Teachers Association (NTA), considers the new ETA to be unduly influenced by the government and has complained of discrimination against its members. Such concerns have in turn been expressed internationally through a range of bodies including the International Labour Organization (ILO 2009).

The mis-edcuation of Ethiopia’s youth and stolen futures

Education of Ethiopia’s youth is a human rights issue for me and not just a matter of professional concern as an educator. Corruption in the education sector is so severe that the future of Ethiopia’s youth is at grave risk.   As Transparency International admonishes,

Stolen resources from education budgets mean overcrowded classrooms and crumbling schools, or no schools at all. Books and supplies are sometimes sold instead of being given out freely. Schools and universities also ‘sell’ school places or charge unauthorised fees, forcing students (usually girls) to drop out. Teachers and lecturers are appointed through family connections, without qualifications. Grades can be bought, while teachers force students to pay for tuition outside of class. In higher education, undue government and private sector influence can skew research agendas.

It is true “ignorance is strength”. The Meles regime seeks to create an army of ignorant youth zombie clones who will march lockstep and follow their orders: “Zombie go, zombie stop, zombie think… zombie learn… zombie dumb… zombie dumber…” If ignorance is strength, then knowledge is power. When “ignorant” youth gain knowledge, they become an unstoppable force.

It may not be manifest to many but Ethiopia’s mis-educated youth are on the rise. A quiet riot is raging among the youth debilitated by overwhelming despair and anguish. The youth look at themselves and their lost futures under a corrupt tyranny. They know things are not going to get better. For now the despair simmers but it will reach a boiling point. Mohamed Bouazizi was a 26 year old Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire in December 2010. Dictator Ben Ali did not see it coming, but the fire that consumed Bouazizi also consumed and transformed not only Tunisia but also led to an Arab Spring. Moamar Gadhafi, the great “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya” died at the hands of youth he miseducated for 42 years. Informed, enlightened and interconnected Egyptian youth brought down the Mubarak regime in less than two weeks!

Ethiopia’s youth will rise because there is no force that can keep them down. The only question is when not if. That is the immutable of law of history. In the end, I believe Ethiopia’s youth will remember not the deeds and misdeeds of those who miseducated them and robbed them of their futures, but the silence of the scholars, intellectuals, academics, professors and learned men and women who watched the tyranny of ignorance like bronze statutes. I am confident in my conviction that there will come a time when Ethiopia’s youth will stand up collectively, and each one pointing an index finger, shout out, “J’accuse!”

Ignorance is strength but knowledge is power! Fight the tyranny of ignorance. Educate yourself!

Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino and is a practicing defense lawyer.

Previous commentaries by the author are available at:

http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/

www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/

Amharic translations of recent commentaries by the author may be found at:

http://www.ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/category/al-mariam-amharic

http://ethioforum.org/?cat=24

Ethiopia: Shadowboxing Smoke and Mirrors

 shadowMeles Zenawi when he was alive and his apostles today (“Melesistas”) keep playing us in the Diaspora like a cheap fiddle. They make us screech, shriek, scream and shout by simply showing their mugs in our cities. How do they do it? Every now and then, the Melesistas suit up a few of their bumbling and bungling zombies from central casting and unleash them into the Ethiopian Diaspora to “sell bonds” for the “Grand Meles Dam” to be built over the Blue Nile. Anytime these zombies show up to panhandle chump change from their supporters, a welcoming committee of defiant and patriotic Ethiopian activists show up to chase them out of town like campers at a national park chasing coyotes scrounging at the trash bin. For the past several weeks, Diaspora activists have been routing these imposters across European and American cities; but incredibly, these brazen con artists show up in the next city like snake oil salesmen at a carnival. That really piqued my curiosity. Why do these scammers show up in city after city knowing that they will be confronted and chased out by young patriotic Ethiopians? Are they really fundraising by “selling bonds” in the Diaspora or are they using “fundraising” as a cover for something altogether different? Ummm!!! 

First, the irrefutable facts about the Meles Dam hogwash.  As I demonstrated in my March 11 commentary, “Rumors of Water War on the Nile?”, the Meles Dam on the Blue Nile (Abay River) was  the exquisite figment of Meles’ imagination, and now the phantasmic idol of worship for his discombobulated apostles. Anyone who bothers to study the facts of this so-called dam project will readily conclude that it is pie in the sky. It is “self-funded” because the multilateral lending institutions and private investors who normally bankroll such major infrastructure projects wouldn’t touch it with a ten foot pole standing a mile away. They have determined it is a white elephant. Egypt has also used its leverage to block funding sources.  Egypt has contingency military plans to undam the dam if it ever comes on line.

The fact of the matter is that it is impossible for the bumbling regime in Ethiopia, which sustains itself  through international panhandling, to raise the USD$6-10bn needed from the people of the second poorest country in the world. The regime does not even have sufficient foreign reserves to cover the cost of imports for three months. Its foreign debt exceeds USD$12bn; and despite windbagging about an 11 percent annual growth, the “fifth fastest growing economy in the world”, yada, yada, unemployment, inflation, mismanagement and corruption have put on life support an economy addicted to international handouts. The idea that nickels and dimes collected from Ethiopians in the country by staging “musical concerts, a lottery and an SMS campaign” and a buck or two from Diaspora Ethiopians could build such a project is simply nutty. Because the dam builders live in a fool’s paradise, they think Diaspora Ethiopians are all “fools and idiots” who will buy fantasy dam bonds. (Just as an aside, those who are buying Meles Dam junk bonds should first consider buying the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City.)  Anyway, the Diaspora “bond sales” effort has been a total failure. The regime recently announced that it had collected $43,160 from its latest bond sales in San Diego, CA. Yeah! Right!

For domestic public relations purposes, the Melesistas’ strategic objective in pushing the Meles Dam hoax is to create patriotic fervor and galvanize the entire population around an object of national pride while deifying Meles and generating political support for themselves to prolong their lease on political power. The Meles Dam would at once be a hydrological temple to worship  “Meles the Great Leader and Visionary” and a symbolic object of national unity that could rally massive support for the regime. The Melesistas have convinced themselves that by talking about the Meles Dam 24/7, 365 days, they can convince the people that the dam is actually under construction.  They blather about building the “largest dam in Africa” and Ethiopia becoming a middle income country and a formidable regional economic power in just a few years. They talk about their “visionary leader” and how they will blindly follow his vision to the end of the rainbow where they will collect their pot of gold in the form of Meles Dam bonds. They march on chanting their mantra: “We will follow Meles’ vision without doubt or question.”

They must really think the people are “fools and idiots” (to borrow a phrase from Susan Rice) to be fooled by their silly dog and pony show and talk of pie in the sky.  The Ethiopian people may not know about a “pie in the sky”, but they certainly know about the “cow they have in the sky whose milk they never see.”  But careful analysis shows the Melesistas have pulled this one right out of Joseph Goebbel’s bag of tricks: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” Isn’t this exactly what the Melesistas  are doing in Ethiopia now – repeat the dam lie, development lie and repress dissent and persecute journalist who tell the truth?

The Melesistas think they are so smart that they can hoodwink not only Ethiopians in the country but also those in the Diaspora. They put on a dam “bond selling” show to convince Diasporans that the Meles Dam is real and that it is the panacea to Ethiopia’s economic woes. “Buy dam bonds! Ethiopia will be rafting on a river of milk and honey once the Blue Nile is dammed.” But only a damned fool would believe that.  According to the World Bank, Ethiopia’s “power sector alone would require $3.3 billion per year to develop” in the next decade. Currently, power tariffs are so underpriced that they range between “$0.04-0.08 per kilowatt-hour” and are “low by regional standards and recover only 46 percent of the costs of the utility.” For every dollar they spend supplying power, they lose 54 cents! In other words, these guys hawking the Meles Dam junk bonds and promising billions in profits are losing their shirts on the power they are selling right now! Why would anyone trust and buy dam bonds from those who can’t even make a damn profit from existing dams? Why would anyone buy dam junk bonds when the outlook for the energy sector in Ethiopia is so damn bleak? The Melesistas fantasize that they can pay off bondholders by selling power from the dam to the Sudan, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. Why the hell would Egypt or the Sudan buy power from a dam that damns them by effectively reducing their water supply for agriculture and their own production of power?

The real aim of the Meles Dam is not the construction of a dam over the Blue Nile but to use the specter of the construction of a gargantuan dam on the Nile to inspire fear, loathing and dread of an imminent regional water war. Simply stated, the dam idea is an extortion scheme to scam the international community and downstream countries for more aid and loans as a price for continued regional stability, avoidance of conflict and maintenance of the status quo. Suffice it to say, one has to be a damned “fool and an idiot” to believe the Meles Dam will ever be built or buy Meles Dam junk bonds and expect a return. (Buying the Brooklyn Bridge is a much better investment.)

Shadowboxing Smoke and Mirrors

So, why do the Melsistas send zombies into the Diaspora on a fool’s errand? They know they will be shamed and disgraced and chased out of every American and European city like stray dogs at a bazaar. They know they will be lucky to squeeze a few hundred dollars at a Diaspora “bond selling” event. Do they do it because they are professional beggars and panhandlers?

There is a deceptively simple method to their madness. They send their zombies in the Diaspora to make us shadowbox smoke and mirrors. They are playing a simple but clever psychological game.

The Melesistas are getting hammered everyday by bad publicity. Hardly a day passes without some report by an international human rights, press or research organization documenting their monumental crimes against humanity. Just in the past few months, there have been numerous reports and press releases by Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists and a host of newspaper and television outlets, including Al Jazeera and CNN, on massive human rights violations, land grabs, ethnic cleansing, suppression of religious freedom and other issues in Ethiopia. Recently, the World Bank made public a 448-page corruption report on Ethiopia. A couple of weeks ago, the U.S. State Department released its annual Human Rights Report on Ethiopia documenting the regime’s “arbitrary killings, torture, beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees by security forces, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, detention without charge and lengthy pretrial detention, illegal searches, “villagization” (pillagization) program, restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and movement, interference in religious affairs…” This past week, they got clobbered in the international press for a kangaroo appellate court affirmance of the 18-year sentences of the internationally-acclaimed journalist Eskinder Nega and dynamic opposition leader Andualem Aragie.

The Melesistas have become international pariahs and desperately want to change the topic from Eskinder Nega, Reeyot Alemu, Woubshet Taye, Andualem Aragie…, corruption, ethnic cleansing, land giveaways, suppression of religious freedom and interference in religious affairs and critical human rights reports. They want to take control of the international public relations agenda. They want to shed off their international image as corrupt thugs who trample on human rights and steal elections. They want to reinvent themselves as anti-poverty warriors and statesmen of economic development. They want to be seen as the new “new breed of African leaders” toiling indefatigably to eradicate poverty and promote economic development and democracy.

In a Machiavellian maneuver, they have, to some extent, succeeded in getting Diaspora Ethiopians, particularly the activists, to promote their “dam development” agenda for them in America, Europe and elsewhere. Every time Diaspora activists confront the zombie junk bond dealers and brokers, they are seen talking (but saying nothing) about development, growth, infrastructure projects and how the Meles Dam will transform Ethiopia into an economic powerhouse. (They never mention the massive foreign debt, the USD$12bn that has left the country illegally since 2001, the massive youth unemployment, accelerating population growth, etc.). They always sheath their bloody hands in the glove of development talk. When activists protest and confront these zombies, they appear to be anti-development obstructionist agitators. That’s is the exquisite trick of the Melesistas. They want the world to see Diaspora  Ethiopians as a bunch of rowdy, wild, disorderly, loudmouthed, raucous, uncivil and intolerant bunch who will not even allow civil discussions of “development”. They aim to create and nurture the image of a few combative “Diaspora extremists” and an overwhelming number of silent (as a church mouse) regime supporters who are afraid to come forward (or attend their “bond selling” events) and show their support for fear of attack by the “extremists.” In the mix are the hapless Diasporans who have to go back and forth to Ethiopia to secure their property and business interests. Those guys are toast; either they pay protection money (buy dam bonds) or get jacked up on some trumped up charge and lose their properties or worse.

The Melesistas’ strategy to counter bad publicity and capture the domestic and international public relations commanding heights is based on three principles: Distract, distract and distract some more. Distract Ethiopians inside the country from critical political, social and economic issues by bombarding them with inane development propaganda. State television (which is watched by virtually no one in the country) is filled with ceaseless barrages of nauseating and mind numbing amateur development propaganda. It is vintage police state propaganda aimed at convincing a largely illiterate population that famine is plenty, decline is development, poverty is wealth, dictatorship is democracy and the man who destroyed the country is its savior.

The second strategy is to distract Diaspora Ethiopians from vigorously pursuing an agenda that promotes democracy freedom and human rights. They unleash a few smooth-talking empty suits with empty heads and let them wander from one city to another in the U.S. and Europe just to get Ethiopian activists emotionally worked up about a fantasy dam and lose their focus on issues of  human rights violations, abuse of political prisoners, ethnic cleansing, suppression of religious freedoms, and myriad economic problems.  Some Diaspora activists react vigorously whenever they see these hapless empty suits at “bond selling” events believing they are confronting the master criminals. Therein lies the trick. The Melesistas are so clever that they have succeeded in making some of us believe that the puppets are actually the puppet masters. We need to be aware that the empty suits they send into the Diaspora to sell the dam bonds are just schmucks and buffoons who do what they are told; or “zombies” as the great African musician Fela Kuti would have called them (“Zombie go… zombie stop…zombie turn…zombie think…” ) They are bait and are offered as scapegoats to the Diaspora.  By chasing the puppets out of town, some of us feel we have chased out the puppet masters. But the puppet masters laugh at us because our victory is the victory of the shadow boxer who knocked out the shadow.

The third strategy of the Melesistas is to distract donors and human rights organizations from criticizing them on their atrocious human rights record. They want to justify and convince them that the masses of ordinary Ethiopians are interested in the politics of the belly and not the politics of the ballot. Meles declared, “My view is that there is no direct relationship between economic growth and democracy historically or theoretically.” They want to convince donors and human rights organizations that the masses do not care about human rights or democracy; they are concerned only about filling their bellies. To them, the masses of poor, illiterate, hungry and sick Ethiopians are too dumb and too damn needy to appreciate “political democracy.”

Legacy of the great manipulator

Manipulation of the Diaspora is one of the chief legacies of Meles. Wikileaks cablegrams portray Meles as a slick, scheming, crafty and cunning hombre. He could have achieved greatness but undid himself because he was unable to tame his voracious appetite for extreme vindictiveness and revenge and could not bridle his bottomless capacity for maliciousness, viciousness and obduracy. Those who claim to know Meles say he knew his opposition better than the opposition knew itself. Distraction, diversion, misdirection, hoodwinking, chicanery, paralogy and sophistry were the hallmarks of Meles’ strategy. The cunning dictator was able to shroud his corrupt empire for two decades by pursuing a propaganda policy of mass distraction and by staging one farcical political theatre after another. As I have long maintained, Meles’ “attitude was that he can outwit, outthink, outsmart, outplay, outfox and outmaneuver boatloads of Ph.Ds., M.Ds., J.Ds. Ed.Ds or whatever alphabet soup of degrees exist out there any day of the week. He seemed to think that like the opposition leaders, Ethiopian intellectuals are dysfunctional, shiftless and inconsequential, and will never be able to pose a real challenge to his power.” In a rare moment of candor responding to a journalist’s question about Diaspora Ethiopians protesting his overseas visits,  Meles confessed, “We may be at fault in some way. I am sorry. That maybe we didn’t communicate well enough to those Ethiopians living abroad what is happening, what we are doing here.” Meles’ apostles keep making the same mistake. Like shepherd, like sheep!  Like Meles, like Melesistas!

Criminal violations in selling unregistered securities in the U.S.

There have been questions raised about the legality of the sale of Meles Dam bonds as “securities” in the U.S.  Under federal and most state laws, a “security” is broadly defined and includes stocks, bonds, debt and equity securities, notes, investment contracts, etc. Unless exempted, all securities must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or relevant state agencies prior to selling or offering for sale to the public. A security which does not have an effective registration statement on file with the SEC and/or the relevant state agency is considered an unregistered security. Buying or selling unregistered securities is a crime under federal and state laws. The SEC can prosecute issuers and sellers of unregistered securities under section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (which regulates original issuers) and seek injunctions if the Securities Act has been violated, or if a violation is imminent. Section 8A also allows the SEC to issue orders to issuers of unregistered securities to cease and desist and seek civil penalties under Section 20(d) if an issuer violated the Securities Act, an SEC rule, or a cease-and-desist order.

Like most states, California Corporations Code sections 25110-25118 set strict guidelines for any securities sold in that state. Any person or entity who willfully sells or transports unregistered securities through interstate commerce or buys such securities  could face serious criminal liabilities under California Corporations Code section 25540, subd. (a) with penalties of incarceration for up to three years and a fine up to $1 million. California prosecutors, like their federal counterparts, could also seek injunctive relief and civil penalties.

There are a few limited  exemptions to the registration requirement. One of them is an exemption “for certain foreign government securities brokers or dealers”.  Pursuant to 17 CFR 401.9, “A government securities broker or dealer (excluding a branch or agency of a foreign bank) that is a non-U.S. resident shall be exempt from the provisions of sections 15C(a), (b), and (d) of  the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o–5(a), (b) and (d)) and the regulations of this subchapter provided it complies with the provisions of 17 CFR 240.15a–6…” In other words, the bond “brokers and dealers” sent to the U.S. to sell the Meles Dam bonds must meet the multifarious requirements of  federal securities law and other regulatory requirements including full disclosure, proof of maintenance of required books and records relating to the bond issues and written consent to service of process for any civil action arising from disputes in bond related transactions. It is highly unlikely that the “brokers and dealers” selling the Meles Dam bonds in the United States qualify under 17 CFR 240.15a–6 and 15 U.S.C. 78o–5(a).

Fight the Power, not the smoke and image in the mirror

Diaspora activists should keep their eyes on the prize, not on the smoke and mirrors of the Melesista Road Show, Carnival and Circus.

Ethiopian Americans are fortunate to live under a Constitution that guarantees our right to free expression and peaceful protest. As citizens, it is our moral duty to exercise our constitutional rights. We have recently seen Americans using their right to protest by launching the “Occupy” protest movement. Historically, the civil rights movement relied on sit-ins, sit downs, teach-ins, rallies and marches as a form of direct nonviolent action to bring about change. Nonviolent mass protests eventually led to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which ended racial segregation, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which removed barriers to voting. The anti-war and free speech movements relied on non-violent protests to defend expressive freedoms and end the war in Vietnam. Nonviolent protests were also used in the anti-Apartheid movement in the U.S. resulting in boycotts, divestments in corporations  and spurring legislative and diplomatic action which hastened the end of Apartheid.

The main point is that Diaspora Ethiopians should be laser-focused on the prize and make sure that democracy will in the end triumph over dictatorship in Ethiopia; human rights are vindicated and human rights abusers are held accountable and any government in Ethiopia shall fear the people and the people shall never fear their government. We should not be distracted by empty suits with empty heads lurking in and out of town to scrounge up chicken feed. We should not be angry at programmed zombies at “bond selling” events because they are just wretched flunkies and bootlickers, who given the opportunity will make a beeline to the immigration office to file for political asylum. We should not mistake the puppets for the puppet masters. We should not confuse shadow for reality.

We should be aware not only when we are being abused but also used. We should never let them make us do their dirty jobs because they can cleverly manipulate our psychological disposition to righteous indignation. We should never react because that allows them to take control of our emotions and reactions.  We should always act and never react. Most importantly, we should engage in proactive activism instead of reactive activism. When we are proactive, we plan things out carefully and strategically. Nonviolent protest is a highly disciplined effort. Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. taught, “In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self-purification; and direct action.” We should educate and train ourselves in the ways of nonviolent protest. When confronting the zombies, we should maintain a high degree of composure and display self-dignity in our expressions of defiance. At dam “bond selling ” events, protesters should adequately prepare pre-event publicity. Serious attention should given to the development of press kits and talking points. Press  and law enforcement liaisons should be trained and designated. Well informed and articulate spokespersons should be selected to give press interviews. Adequate attention should be given to post-event follow up activities.

It is a great disservice to oneself and to our great cause to engage in nonviolent protest without reading and understanding Gene Sharp’s extraordinary work, “From Dictatorship to Democracy”available online for free.  An Amharic translation of Gene Sharp’s book is also available online free of charge (here) for anyone to download or print. Ignorance cannot drive out ignorance, only knowledge can. We must educate ourselves in the ways of peaceful protest, or our efforts will produce few results. We are less likely to be manipulated if we keep ourselves informed and develop critical analysis skills that cut through the blather of our adversaries.

While those of us in the older generation (“Hippos”) wallow in self-pity and cynicism, it is inspiring to see young patriotic Diaspora Ethiopians (“Cheetahs”) using their right to peaceful protest to resist the zombies of tyranny. Just as the task of building a fantasy dam belongs to the Melesistas, the construction of the new Ethiopia is a task reserved for the young Cheetahs. It is painful to admit that we Hippos have not been much of a role model for the Cheetahs. We have unkindly criticized the Cheetahs for their lack of engagement, apathy and single-minded pursuit of flash and cash. We grumble that the Cheetah generation is the lost generation and there is no one to save Ethiopia (but it has been a long time since we Hippos looked into the mirror without smoke).

I am afraid there is little that Ethiopian Cheetahs could learn from Ethiopian Hippos. Perhaps Ethiopian Cheetahs can get inspiration from other Cheetahs. In the past 2 years, we have seen inexperienced youth using social media bring down dictators or force them to make radical changes in governance in North Africa and the Middle East. The key to their success was their ability to get in tune and on the same wavelength with each other, and to be able to speak the same beautiful language of peaceful change and protest. As always, I believe Ethiopian youth united — across ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender, and regional lines — can never be defeated!

“Get up, stand up, stand up for your rights. Get up, stand up, don’t give up the fight.” Bob Marley

Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino and is a practicing defense lawyer.

Previous commentaries by the author are available at:

http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/

www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/

Amharic translations of recent commentaries by the author may be found at:

http://www.ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/category/al-mariam-amharic

http://ethioforum.org/?cat=24

Arbitrary arrests, torture and killings common in Ethiopia – US State Department

U.S. State Department 2012 Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ethiopia is a federal republic. On August 20, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) elected then deputy prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn to take Meles’s place as chairman of the party. The EPRDF subsequently nominated him for the post of prime minister. On September 21, parliament elected Hailemariam as prime minister. In national parliamentary elections in 2010, the EPRDF and affiliated parties won 545 of 547 seats to remain in power for a fourth consecutive five-year term. Although the relatively few international officials allowed to observe the elections concluded technical aspects of the vote were handled competently, some also noted that an environment conducive to free and fair elections was not in place prior to the election.

Security forces generally reported to civilian authorities; however, there were instances in which special police and local militias acted independently of civilian control.

The most significant human rights problems included restrictions on freedom of expression and association through politically motivated trials and convictions of opposition political figures, activists, journalists, and bloggers, as well as increased restrictions on print media. In July security forces used force against and arrested Muslims who protested against alleged government interference in religious affairs. The government continued restrictions on civil society and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities imposed by the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO).

Other human rights problems included arbitrary killings; allegations of torture, beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees by security forces; reports of harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; detention without charge and lengthy pretrial detention; a weak, overburdened judiciary subject to political influence; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights, including illegal searches; allegations of abuses in the implementation of the government’s “villagization” program; restrictions on academic freedom; restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and movement; alleged interference in religious affairs; limits on citizens’ ability to change their government; police, administrative, and judicial corruption; violence and societal discrimination against women and abuse of children; female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); exploitation of children for economic and sexual purposes; trafficking in persons; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; clashes between ethnic minorities; discrimination against persons based on their sexual orientation and against persons with HIV/AIDS; limits on worker rights; forced labor; and child labor, including forced child labor.

Impunity was a problem. The government, with some reported exceptions, generally did not take steps to prosecute or otherwise punish officials who committed abuses other than corruption.

Factions of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnically based, violent, and fragmented separatist group operating in the Somali Region, were responsible for abuses. Members of the separatist Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF) claimed responsibility for a January attack on a group of foreign tourists in the Afar Region.

 

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

Members of the security forces committed killings and used lethal force to quell protests (see section 2.b.). During the year, scattered fighting continued between government forces, primarily regional government-backed militia, and residual elements of the ONLF. Also, clashes between ethnic groups during the year resulted in 100 to 150 deaths (see section 6).

Ethiopian security forces reportedly killed as many as six persons in retaliation for an April 28 attack by armed gunmen that killed at least five persons and injured numerous others at the Saudi Star compound in the Gambella Region.

On February 12, members of the Somali Region Special Police allegedly opened fire on a local assembly in the Ogaden area of the Somali Region, killing 20 persons. The villagers reportedly were gathered to discuss the murder of a village elder the previous day. Many others were detained during the same incident.

Members of the ARDUF claimed responsibility for a January 18 attack on a group of foreign tourists in the Afar Region. The attack resulted in the deaths of five Europeans and the kidnapping of two Europeans and two Ethiopians. The kidnapped Europeans later were released; the whereabouts and well-being of the Ethiopian hostages remained unknown at year’s end.

b. Disappearance

There was a reported case of a politically motivated disappearance of two persons in which security officials detained opposition activists and held them temporarily incommunicado.

On June 15, in the North Gondar area of the Amhara Region, federal police reportedly arrested Meles Ashire, deputy chairman of the opposition All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP) for the Chilga District, and Tadlo Tefera, an AEUP executive member for the North Gondar zone. Following their arrest, Meles and Tadlo’s whereabouts were reportedly unknown; however, authorities released them in August.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, there were numerous reports security officials tortured and otherwise abused detainees.

Authorities reportedly tortured Ahmedin Jebel, an editor and a columnist with Muslim Affairs magazine (see section 2.a.).

In 2010 the UN Committee Against Torture reported it was “deeply concerned” about “numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations” concerning “the routine use of torture” by police, prison officers, and other members of the security forces–including the military–against political dissidents and opposition party members, students, alleged terrorists, and alleged supporters of violent separatist groups like the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The committee reported that such acts frequently occurred with the participation of, at the instigation of, or with the consent of commanding officers in police stations, detention centers, federal prisons, military bases, and unofficial or secret places of detention. Some reports of such abuses continued during the year.

Sources widely believed police investigators often used physical abuse to extract confessions in Maekelawi, the central police investigation headquarters in Addis Ababa. Authorities continued to restrict access by diplomats and NGOs to Maekelawi.

According to a Human Rights Watch report, soldiers arbitrarily arrested and raped persons following the April 28 attack by armed gunmen at the Saudi Star compound in the Gambella Region (see section 1.a). There was no additional reporting to corroborate the report of rape.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and pretrial detention center conditions remained harsh and in some cases life threatening. There were numerous reports of authorities beating prisoners. Medical attention following beatings reportedly was insufficient in some cases.

Physical Conditions: As of September there were 70,000-80,000 persons in prison, of whom approximately 2,500 were women and nearly 600 were children incarcerated with their mothers. Juveniles sometimes were incarcerated with adults, and small children were sometimes incarcerated with their mothers. Male and female prisoners generally were separated.

Severe overcrowding was common, especially in sleeping quarters. The government provided approximately eight birr ($0.44) per prisoner per day for food, water, and health care. Many prisoners supplemented this amount with daily food deliveries from family members or by purchasing food from local vendors, although there were reports of some prisoners being prevented from receiving supplemental food from their families. Medical care was unreliable in federal prisons and almost nonexistent in regional prisons. Prisoners had limited access to potable water, as did many in the country. Also, water shortages caused unhygienic conditions, and most prisons lacked appropriate sanitary facilities. Many prisoners had serious health problems in detention but received little treatment. Information released by the Ministry of Health during the year reportedly stated nearly 62 percent of inmates in various jails across the country suffered from mental health problems as a result of solitary confinement, overcrowding, and lack of adequate health care facilities and services.

The country has six federal and 120 regional prisons. There also are many unofficial detention centers throughout the country, including in Dedessa, Bir Sheleko, Tolay, Hormat, Blate, Tatek, Jijiga, Holeta, and Senkele. Most are located at military camps.

Pretrial detention often takes place in police station detention facilities, where the conditions varied widely. Reports regarding pretrial detention in police stations indicated poor hygiene, lack of access to visitors (including family members and legal counsel), and police abuse of detainees.

Administration: It was difficult to determine if recordkeeping was adequate due to the lack of transparency regarding incarceration. Authorities did not employ alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders. Prisons did not have ombudspersons to respond to complaints. Legal aid clinics existed in some prisons for the benefit of prisoners. Authorities generally permitted visitors. In some cases family visits to prisoners were restricted to a few per year. Family members of prisoners charged with terrorist activity alleged instances of blocked access to the prisoners; there were also reports those charged with terrorist activity were denied visits with their lawyers or representatives of the political parties to which they belonged. Prisoners generally were permitted religious observance, but this varied by prison, and even by section within a prison, at the discretion of prison management. There were some allegations that while in custody, detainees were denied adequate locations in which to pray. Prisoners were permitted to voice complaints about prison conditions or treatment to the presiding judge during the trial.

Monitoring: During the year the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited regional prisons throughout the country. The visits occurred after a general assessment by the government reopened the path to regular ICRC access; the government had limited such access since 2004.

Regional authorities allowed government and NGO representatives to meet regularly with prisoners without third parties present. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) monitored federal and regional detention centers and interviewed prison officials and prisoners in response to allegations of widespread human rights abuses. The domestic NGO Justice For All-Prison Fellowship Ethiopia (JFA-PFE) was granted access to various prison and detention facilities.

Improvements: The government and prison authorities generally cooperated with efforts of the JFA-PFE to improve prison conditions. The JFA-PFE ran model prisons in Adama and Mekele, with significantly better conditions than those found in other prisons. The government undertook renovations to prisons in the Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia regions and in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (SNNPR) during the year.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

Although the constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, the government often ignored these provisions in practice. There were multiple reports of arbitrary arrest and detention by police and security forces.

Civilians, international NGOs, and other aid organizations operating in the Somali Region reported government security forces, local militias, and the ONLF committed abuses such as arbitrary arrest.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The Federal Police reports to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which is subject to parliamentary oversight. The oversight was loose in practice. Each of the country’s nine regions has a state or special police force that reports to the regional civilian authorities. Local militias operated across the country in loose coordination with regional and federal police and the military, with the degree of coordination varying by region. In many cases these militias functioned as extensions of local EPRDF political bosses.

Security forces were effective, but impunity remained a serious problem. The mechanisms used to investigate abuses by the federal police were not known. Numerous complaints of human rights abuses were lodged against the Somali Region Special Police. Several of its members reportedly were arrested for acts of indiscipline. The government rarely publicly disclosed the results of investigations into abuses by local security forces, such as arbitrary detention and beatings of civilians.

The government continued its efforts to provide human rights training for police and army recruits. During the year the government continued to accept assistance from the JFA-PFE and the EHRC to improve and professionalize its human rights training and curriculum by including more material on the constitution and international human rights treaties and conventions. The JFA-PFE and the EHRC conducted human rights training for police commissioners, prosecutors, judges, prison administrators, and militia in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar, SNNPR, Gambella, and Addis Ababa.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

Although the constitution and law require detainees be brought to court and charged within 48 hours of arrest, sometimes this requirement was not respected in practice. With court approval, persons suspected of serious offenses can be detained for 14 days without being charged and for additional 14-day periods if an investigation continues. Under the antiterrorism proclamation, police may request to hold persons without charge for 28-day periods, up to a maximum of four months, while an investigation is conducted. The law prohibits detention in any facility other than an official detention center; however, local militias and other formal and informal law enforcement entities used dozens of unofficial local detention centers.

A functioning bail system was in place. Bail was not available for murder, treason, and corruption. In one high-profile case, a judge denied bail for Feteh editor in chief Temesgen Dessalegn due to concerns the defendant might continue to write articles offending the government if he was released. The judge also based the denial on concerns he posed a flight risk, although he had been free for more than a month during the pretrial phase. Authorities dropped the charges against him on August 28 (see section 2.a.); they reopened the case in December, and it continued at year’s end. In most cases authorities set bail between 500 and 10,000 birr ($28 and $550), which was not affordable for most citizens. Police officials did not always respect court orders to release suspects on bail. The government provided public defenders for detainees unable to afford private legal counsel, but only when their cases went to court. While detainees were in pretrial detention, authorities sometimes allowed them little or no contact with legal counsel, did not provide full information on their health status, and did not provide for family visits.

Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities regularly detained persons without warrants and denied access to counsel and in some cases to family members, particularly in outlying regions.

Pretrial Detention: Some detainees reported being held for several years without being charged and without trial. Trial delays were most often caused by lengthy legal procedures, the large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, and staffing shortages.

Amnesty: On September 11, in keeping with a long-standing tradition of issuing pardons at the Ethiopian New Year, the federal government pardoned 1,993 prisoners. Regional governments also pardoned persons during the year. For example, the SNNPR regional government pardoned 5,395 prisoners, the Oromia regional government pardoned 4,700 prisoners, and the Amhara regional government pardoned 2,607 prisoners.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary. Although the civil courts operated with a large degree of independence, the criminal courts remained weak, overburdened, and subject to political influence. The constitution recognizes both religious and traditional or customary courts.

Trial Procedures

By law accused persons have the right to a fair public trial by a court of law within a “reasonable time,” a presumption of innocence, the right to be represented by legal counsel of their choice, and the right to appeal. The law gives defendants the right to present witnesses and evidence in their defense, cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and access government-held evidence. In practice the government did not always allow defendants the right of access to evidence it held. The court system does not use jury trials. Judicial inefficiency and lack of qualified staff often resulted in serious delays in trial proceedings and made the application of the law unpredictable. The government continued to train lower court judges and prosecutors and made effective judicial administration the primary focus of this training. Defendants were often unaware of the specific charges against them until the commencement of the trial; this also caused defense attorneys to be unprepared to provide adequate defense.

The Public Defender’s Office provided legal counsel to indigent defendants, although its scope and quality of service remained limited due to the shortage of attorneys. Numerous free legal aid clinics around the country, based primarily at universities, provided advice to clients. In certain areas of the country regional legislative bodies passed laws allowing volunteers, such as law students and professors, to represent clients in court on a pro bono basis.

During the year the government concluded trials against 31 persons who had been charged with terrorist activities under the antiterrorism proclamation. These trials included cases against12 journalists, opposition political figures, and activists based in the country, as well as an Ethiopian employee of the UN. All were found guilty. Eighteen persons living abroad were convicted in absentia. The government also invoked the antiterrorism proclamation in charging 28 Muslims identified with protests and one Muslim accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy. Several international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions raised concerns over the conduct of the trials. Observers found the evidence presented at trials to be either open to interpretation or indicative of acts of a political nature rather than linked to terrorism. Human rights groups also noted the law’s broad definition of terrorism, as well as its severe penalties, its broad rules of evidence, and the discretionary powers afforded police and security forces.

In some sensitive cases deemed to involve matters of national security, notably the high-profile trials of activists in the Muslim community, detainees stated authorities initially denied them the right to see attorneys. The trial of the 28 Muslims identified with protests and one Muslim accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy was not fully open to family and supporters, although it was initially open to the press and diplomats. The trial of 11 persons (including six persons in absentia) charged on May 19 with being members of the terrorist organizations al-Qa’ida and al-Shabaab was not open to the public.

Many citizens residing in rural areas generally had little access to formal judicial systems and relied on traditional mechanisms of resolving conflict. By law all parties to a dispute must agree to use a traditional or religious court before such a court may hear a case, and either party can appeal to a regular court at any time. Sharia (Islamic law) courts may hear religious and family cases involving Muslims. Sharia courts received some funding from the government and adjudicated the majority of cases in the Somali and Afar regions, which are predominantly Muslim. In addition other traditional systems of justice, such as councils of elders, continued to function. Some women stated they lacked access to free and fair hearings in the traditional justice system because they were excluded by custom from participation in councils of elders and because there was strong gender discrimination in rural areas.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

Estimates by human rights groups and diplomatic missions regarding the number of political prisoners varied. Domestic and international NGOs estimated there were up to 400 political prisoners and detainees at year’s end. The government did not permit access by international human rights organizations.

Twelve of the journalists, opposition members, and activists convicted under the antiterrorism proclamation during the year remained in prison. Several international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions raised concerns about the conduct of the trials.

On January 19, a court convicted journalists Woubishet Taye and Reyot Alemu and opposition figure Zerihun Gebre-Egziabher Tadesse on terrorism charges. It also convicted Hirut Kifle Woldeyesus, who denied the prosecution’s claim she was an opposition political figure. Journalist and blogger Elias Kifle was tried and convicted in absentia in the same case. On January 26, Woubishet and Reyot were each sentenced to 14 years in prison, while the other two defendants present received sentences of 17 and 19 years. Reyot appealed her case to the Supreme Court, which later overturned two of the three charges and reduced her sentence to five years. She subsequently appealed the Supreme Court’s decision to the Court of Cassation, arguing a fundamental error of law had been made in her trial. The other defendants chose not to appeal.

On June 27, the Federal High Court found journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega, vice chairman of the opposition front Medrek Andualem Arage, and Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) official Natnael Mekonnen guilty on all counts of terrorism and treason. On July 13, Eskinder and Natnael were each sentenced to 18 years in prison, while Andualem received a life sentence. Eskinder and Andualem appealed their conviction to the Supreme Court; the case remained ongoing at year’s end. In September the government announced it had asked the Federal High Court to freeze the assets of Eskinder and Andualem while investigating whether their assets had been used in conjunction with the commission of the crimes for which they were convicted. Court proceedings regarding the assets also remained ongoing at year’s end.

Bekele Gerba and Olbana Lelisa, two well-known political opposition figures from the Oromo ethnic group, as well as seven other individuals, were convicted under the criminal code of conspiracy to overthrow the government and incite unrest. Bekele was sentenced to eight years in prison; Olbana was sentenced to 13 years. A separate trial of 69 members of Oromo political opposition parties, charged in 2011 under the criminal code with “attacking the political or territorial integrity of the state,” remained ongoing at year’s end.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

The law provides citizens the right to appeal human rights violations in civil court; No such cases were filed during the year.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law requires authorities to obtain judicial warrants to search private property; in practice police often ignored the law, and there were no records of courts excluding evidence found without warrants. Opposition political party leaders reported suspicions of telephone tapping and other electronic eavesdropping.

The government reportedly used a widespread system of paid informants to report on the activities of particular individuals. During the year opposition members reported ruling party operatives and militia members made intimidating and unwelcome visits to their homes.

Security forces continued to detain family members of persons sought for questioning by the government. There were reports unemployed youths who were not affiliated with the ruling coalition sometimes had trouble receiving the “support letters” from their kebeles (neighborhoods or wards) necessary to get jobs.

The government interfered with citizens’ family rights. Medical abuses to facilitate international adoption were documented. This included the diagnosis of new mothers as mentally unfit by unqualified medical professionals and the subsequent forced relinquishment of children.

The national government and regional governments continued to put in place “villagization” plans in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, SNNPR, and Somali regions. These plans involved the relocation of scattered rural populations from arid or semiarid lands vulnerable to recurring droughts into designated clusters by regional governments. The stated purposes of villagization are to improve the provision of government services (i.e., health care, education, and clean water), protect vulnerable communities from natural disasters and attacks, and change environmentally destructive patterns of shifting cultivation. Some observers stated the purpose was to enable the large-scale leasing of land for commercial agriculture, a claim the government denied. The government described the villagization program as strictly voluntary.

Assessments by international donors continued to find no systematic evidence of human rights violations in this program. They did find problems such as delays in establishing promised infrastructure from rushed program implementation. Communities and individual families appeared to have agreed to move based on assurances from authorities of food aid, services, and land, although in some instances communities moved before adequate basic services and shelter were in place in the new locations. For example, an early August visit to a site in South Omo in the SNNPR suggested the process was voluntary but found that promised infrastructure, such as access to water, education, and healthcare, were not in place by the time persons moved. A subsequent October visit to the same site revealed improved conditions, including installation of a water pump, a newly built school, and a health services tent stocked by UNICEF. A January Human Rights Watch report that drew upon information gathered in 2011 characterized the process as “far from voluntary.” The report described a process in which security forces and local militia attended meetings with those communities that initially had indicated they did not want to move and later went with villagers to the new locations, where they oversaw the construction of tukuls (traditional huts) by the villagers. According to the report, security forces beat (sometimes to death), threatened, arrested without charge, and detained persons who were critical of the planned villagization of their communities. Additional Human Rights Watch reporting stated the government harassed, mistreated, and arbitrarily arrested persons in South Omo in order to clear or prepare land for commercial agriculture; development partners did not find evidence to support this claim during visits.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Status of Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and press; however, authorities arrested, detained, and convicted journalists and other persons whom they perceived as critical of the government.

Freedom of Speech: Authorities arrested and harassed persons for criticizing the government. The government attempted to impede criticism through various forms of intimidation, including detention of journalists and opposition activists and monitoring and interference in the activities of political opposition groups. Some villagers continued to report local authorities threatened retaliation against anyone who reported abuses by security forces.

In July authorities charged Jemal Kedir with “fomenting dissent, arousing hatred, and stirring up acts of political, racial, or religious disturbances” for sending text messages on his cell phone stating “Allahu Akbar, seventeen times our voice should be heard and prisoners who are in jail should be released.” He was also charged with sending messages claiming police had prevented Muslims from entering the Grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa, calling for additional protests, and calling for a boycott of the elections to the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) until detainees were released. On September 13, a court found him guilty. The judge referred to the crime as “rumor mongering with his cell phone,” and sentenced him to one year in prison.

In October police arrested seven individuals after they gave radio interviews regarding reported land grabs in Lega Tofo in the Oromia Region. The individuals stated they were forced off their land without adequate compensation. The police later released them.

Freedom of Press: Ethio-Channel, Negadras, Feteh, and two Muslim newspapers closed due to government pressure. The remaining 15 newspapers had a combined weekly circulation in Addis Ababa of more than 100,000, down from 150,000 in 2011. Most newspapers were printed on a weekly or biweekly basis, with the exception of the state-owned Amharic and English dailies.

The government controlled the only television station that broadcast nationally, which, along with radio, was the primary source of news for much of the population. Three private FM radio stations broadcast in the capital city, and at least 13 community radio stations broadcast in the regions. State-run Ethiopian Radio has the largest reach in the country, followed by Fana Radio, which is affiliated with the ruling party.

Government-controlled media closely reflected the views of the government and the ruling EPRDF. The government periodically jammed foreign broadcasts, including after the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The broadcasting law prohibits political and religious organizations and foreigners from owning broadcast stations. The investment law also prohibits foreigners from owning broadcast stations.

Violence and Harassment: The government continued to arrest, harass, and prosecute journalists. Several UN special rapporteurs and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the government’s use of the antiterrorism proclamation against journalists and opposition members.

On August 9, the Ministry of Justice filed three charges against Feteh editor in chief Temesgen Dessalegn. These charges included inciting and agitating the country’s youth to engage in violence, defamation of government, and destabilizing the public by spreading false reports, based on articles published between December 2011 and August. Temesgen was detained on August 23, but the charges were dropped on August 28 and he was released the same day. The government reopened its case against Temesgen on December 11, and the case remained ongoing at year’s end.

On July 20, authorities arrested Muslim Affairs editor Yusuf Getachew and Muslim Affairs columnist Ahmedin Jebel. Ahmedin Jebel reportedly was tortured. At year’s end, they remained imprisoned along with 27 other Muslim activists accused of terrorist activity.

Also in July two editors from Muslim Affairs, Akmel Negash and Yishak Eshetu, left the country, citing fear of arrest. After these arrests and departures, the publication ceased operation.

Courts found journalists Woubishet Taye, Reyot Alemu, and Eskinder Nega, who were arrested in 2011, as well as six journalists/bloggers tried in absentia, guilty of charges under the antiterrorism proclamation in separate cases (see section 1.e.).

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Government harassment of journalists caused them to avoid reporting on sensitive topics. Many private newspapers reported informal editorial control by the government through article placement requests and calls from government officials concerning articles perceived as critical of the government. Private sector and government journalists routinely practiced self-censorship.

In April the state-run Berhanena Selam Printing Press, which accounted for approximately 90 percent of newspaper printing in the country, instituted a new standard printing contract with its private publisher clients. The contract stipulated the printing press had the right to refuse to print newspapers containing material deemed “illegal.” Editors of privately owned newspapers refused to sign the contract, deeming it censorship and in violation of the constitutional protection of press freedom. Berhanena Selam stopped printing publications that did not sign the updated contract.

On July 20, the Ministry of Justice banned the distribution of that week’s issue of the Feteh newspaper via court order. Reports indicated the ban was based on the issue’s contents–which authorities deemed objectionable and sensitive–which dealt with the late prime minister’s health and the ongoing protests by some members of the Muslim community. Although the Ministry of Justice issued no further injunctions, Berhanena Selam refused to print subsequent issues of Feteh.

Berhanena Selam refused to print the August 31 edition of Finote Netsanet, the newspaper of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party, one of the largest opposition political parties, citing complaints filed against the newspaper by the public related to coverage of the death of the prime minister in the previous issue. In September Berhanena Selam refused to print the UDJ newspaper, claiming the printer was too busy to do the work. The newspaper resumed publication in October after reaching an agreement with a private publisher, but ceased publication by November.

Libel Laws/National Security: The government used the antiterrorism proclamation to suppress criticism. Journalists feared covering five groups designated by parliament in June 2011 as terrorist organizations (Ginbot 7, the ONLF, the OLF, al-Qaida, and al-Shabaab), citing ambiguity on whether reporting on these groups might be punishable under the law. Several journalists, both local and foreign correspondents, reported an increase in self-censorship.

In September the government pardoned Swedish freelancers Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye. In December 2011 a court convicted them of rendering support to a terrorist organization and illegally entering the country.

The government used libel laws during the year to suppress criticism.

Internet Freedom

The government restricted access to the Internet and blocked several Web sites, including blogs, opposition Web sites, and Web sites of Ginbot 7, the OLF, and the ONLF. The government also temporarily blocked news sites such as the Washington Post, the Economist, and Al Jazeera, and temporarily blocked links to foreign government reporting on human rights conditions in the country. Several news blogs and Web sites run by opposition diaspora groups were not accessible. These included Addis Neger, Nazret, Ethiopian Review, CyberEthiopia, Quatero Amharic Magazine, Tensae Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Media Forum. A foreign government news Web site was only available periodically, although users could generally access it via proxy sites. Authorities took steps to block access to Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers that let users circumvent government screening of Internet browsing and email. According to the government, 4 percent of individuals subscribed to Internet access.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government restricted academic freedom, including through decisions on student enrollment, teachers’ appointments, and the curriculum. Speech, expression, and assembly frequently were restricted on university and high school campuses.

According to sources, the ruling party, via the Ministry of Education, continued to give preference to students loyal to the party in assignments to postgraduate programs. While party membership was not as common at the undergraduate level, some university staff members commented priority for employment after graduation in all fields was given to students who joined the party.

The government also restricted academic freedom in other ways. Authorities limited teachers’ ability to deviate from official lesson plans. Numerous anecdotal reports suggested non-EPRDF members were more likely to be transferred to undesirable posts and bypassed for promotions. There were some reports of teachers not affiliated with the EPRDF being summarily dismissed for failure to attend nonscheduled meetings. There continued to be a lack of transparency in academic staffing decisions, with numerous complaints from individuals in the academic community alleging bias based on party membership, ethnicity, or religion.

According to multiple credible sources, teachers and high school students in grade 10 and above were required to attend training on the concepts of revolutionary democracy and EPRDF party ideology.

There were no changes to the 2010 Ministry of Education directive prohibiting private universities from offering degree programs in law and teacher education. The directive also requires public universities to align their curriculum offerings with the previously announced policy of a 70-to-30 ratio between science and social science academic programs. As a result the number of students studying social sciences and the humanities continued to decrease and private universities focused heavily on the social sciences. Ministry officials originally cited a need to maintain quality standards as the reason for the directive.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly; however, the government restricted this right. On several occasions during the year, authorities injured and arrested protesters who reportedly were demonstrating without a permit. Security forces used lethal force against civilians (see section 1.a.).

Organizers of large public meetings or demonstrations must notify the government 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit. Local government officials, almost all of whom were affiliated with the EPRDF, controlled access to municipal halls, and there were many complaints from opposition parties local officials denied or otherwise obstructed the scheduling of opposition parties’ use of halls for lawful political rallies. There were numerous credible reports of owners of hotels and other large facilities citing unspecified internal rules forbidding political parties from utilizing their space for gatherings, for example, claiming that hotel meeting space could only be used for weddings.

Regional governments, including the Addis Ababa regional administration, were reluctant to grant permits or provide security for large meetings.

Beginning in late 2011 and continuing throughout much of the year, some members of the Muslim community, alleging government interference in religious affairs, held peaceful protests following Friday prayers at several of Addis Ababa’s largest mosques, the Aweliya Islamic Center in Addis Ababa, and at other locations throughout the country. Most demonstrations occurred without incident, although some were met with arrests and alleged use of unnecessary force by police.

In late July authorities arrested as many as 1,000 Muslim demonstrators, including members of a self-appointed committee claiming to represent the interests of the Muslim community, for protesting alleged government interference in religious affairs. The majority of the protesters subsequently were released without charge. On October 29, authorities charged 29 individuals under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation; 28 of the individuals were identified with the protest movement, while one was accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy.

On October 21, in the South Wollo Zone of the Amhara Region, police and protesters clashed during a gathering during elections for the local Islamic council. Accounts of the event differed. One report indicated protesters threw stones at the houses of Muslims who participated in the election. In response to the stone throwing, police arrested the protest organizer. A crowd then marched on the police station, demanding his release. Protesters reportedly entered the police station by force, killing one police officer and seriously injuring another. Police reportedly killed two protesters, including the detained protest organizer.

Freedom of Association

Although the law provides for freedom of association and the right to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity, the government limited this right in practice.

In accordance with the CSO law, anonymous donations to NGOs are not permitted. All potential donors were therefore aware their names would be public knowledge. The same was true concerning all donations made to political parties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs screens registration applications from international NGOs and submits a recommendation on whether to approve or deny registration.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

Although the law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, the government restricted some of these rights in practice.

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

In-country Movement: The government continued to relax but did not completely remove restrictions on the movement of persons into and within the Ogaden area of the Somali Region, continuing to argue the ONLF posed a security threat (see section 2.d., Internally Displaced Persons). Deliveries of food and medicine were halted temporarily in the limited areas affected by fighting due to security concerns.

The government expanded an out-of-camp policy allowing Eritrean refugees to live outside of a camp to all refugees. According to the Administration for Returnees and Refugee Affairs (ARRA), which managed the out-of-camp program, 3,412 refugees lived outside of the camps during the year, compared with 1,294 in 2011 and 723 in 2010. Prior to this policy, such permission was given primarily to attend higher education institutions, undergo medical treatment, or avoid security threats at the camps.

Exile: Several citizens sought political asylum in other countries or remained abroad in self-imposed exile (see section 2.a.).

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The total number of IDPs in the country during the year was not known. Many persons who had been displaced due to conflict in the Gambella, Oromia, SNNPR, and Somali regions remained displaced. Drought also caused displacements during the year.

A land rights dispute in the Bench Maji Zone of the SNNPR spurred ethnic conflict, causing the displacement of 463 ethnic Amharas in March. These IDPs were sent to Addis Ababa, where the government provided them with food and essential items. Shortly after their arrival, the regional government informed the IDPs they should return to their areas of origin–referring not to where they had been living before being displaced, but to the Amhara Region, which their families had left during the time of the Derg (1974-91). The regional government later decided to relocate most of the IDPs to Tsegede in North Gondar Zone of the Amhara Region.

Temporary displacements due to flooding were reported from parts of Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR between mid-July and August. Most of those displaced later returned to their homes.

In July communal conflict in the Moyale area in the south of the country displaced tens of thousands of persons. Following an initial response by the Federal Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS), Moyale town was put under federal control while the conflict was mediated, leading to deployment of a team from the Ministry of Federal Affairs to help coordinate the humanitarian response. According to the results of a joint assessment conducted by the DRMFSS and development partners, most of those displaced returned home by early September, although some 1,000 households remained without shelter. Some 58,000 persons required food assistance due to the impact of the conflict, and more than 78,000 required provision of potable water.

During the year, drought caused displacements in the Somali Region, a situation exacerbated in some cases by the continuing conflict.

The government at the federal level did not recognize IDPs as a distinct group, and there was no specialized office charged with managing matters such as IDP protection, return, resettlement, or durable solutions. The government did not maintain data on IDPs. The DRMFSS, under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, is the main government agency responsible for emergencies, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Water and Energy, and has responsibility for coordinating the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons.

Restrictions limiting the access of human rights organizations, the media, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic missions to conflict-affected areas continued, particularly with regard to the Somali Region conflict zones of Fik, Degahbur, Korahe, and parts of Warder. The partial relaxation of those restrictions that began the previous year continued, with humanitarian access in the Somali Region improving in particular. Journalists were required to register before entering conflict regions. The government lacked a clear policy on NGO access to sensitive areas, leading regional government officials and military officials frequently to refer requests for access to the federal government. There were isolated reports of regional police or local militias blocking NGOs’ access to particular locations on particular days, citing security concerns.

Protection of Refugees

Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees.

According to the UNHCR, the country hosted 376,410 refugees at year’s end. The majority of refugees were from Somalia (223,243), with others coming from Sudan and South Sudan (66,177, in addition to an estimated 20,000 unregistered refugees residing along the South Sudan-Ethiopia border), Eritrea (62,996), and other nations (3,994), particularly Kenya. New arrivals from Somalia numbered approximately 50,000 for the year, a significant decrease from 100,000 in 2011.

The UNHCR, the government, and humanitarian agencies continued to care for Sudanese arrivals fleeing from conflict in Sudan’s Blue Nile State.

Eritrean asylum seekers continued to arrive at the rate of approximately 700 new arrivals per month, according to the UNHCR. Hundreds of Eritrean refugees reportedly departed monthly on secondary migration through Egypt and Sudan to go to Israel, Europe, and other final destinations. The UNHCR and ARRA assisted in the reception and transportation back to My Ayni or Adi Harush camps of approximately 700 Eritrean refugees in 2011 and 952 during the year who had been detained in Egypt and deported by the Egyptian authorities. The UNHCR reported the population of unaccompanied minors who fled Eritrea into the country was 1,200 at year’s end. Unaccompanied minors in the 15- to17-year-old age group represented more than 75 percent of the total population of such minors.

Employment: The government does not grant refugees work permits.

Access to Basic Services: Refugees in camps were provided with schooling and health services. For those outside of camps, there were no reports of discrimination in access to public services.

Durable Solutions: The government granted refugee status to asylum seekers from Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. The government welcomed refugees to settle permanently in the country, but did not offer a path to citizenship. During the year approximately 5,543 refugees departed the country for resettlement.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The constitution and law provide citizens the right to change their government peacefully. In practice the ruling party’s electoral advantages limited this right.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: On August 20, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died. The ruling EPRDF elected Hailemariam Desalegn, the deputy prime minister, to take Meles’s place as chairman of the party and subsequently nominated him for the post of prime minister. On September 21, parliament elected Hailemariam as prime minister.

In the 2010 national parliamentary elections, the EPRDF and affiliated parties won 545 of 547 seats to remain in power for a fourth consecutive five-year term. Independent observation of the vote was severely limited due to government restrictions. Although the relatively few international officials allowed to observe the elections concluded technical aspects of the vote were handled competently, some also noted an environment conducive to free and fair elections was not in place prior to election day. Several laws, regulations, and procedures implemented since the 2005 national elections created a clear advantage for the EPRDF throughout the electoral process. There was ample evidence unfair government tactics, including intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters, influenced the extent of the EPRDF victory. In addition, voter education was limited to information about technical voting procedures and was done only by the National Electoral Board just days before voting began.

The African Union, whose observers arrived one week before the vote, deemed the elections to be free and fair. The European Union, some of whose observers arrived a few months before the vote, concluded the elections fell short of international standards for transparency and failed to provide a level playing field for opposition parties. The EU observed a “climate of apprehension and insecurity,” noting the volume and consistency of complaints of harassment and intimidation by opposition parties was “a matter of concern” and had to be taken into consideration “in the overall assessment of the electoral process.”

Political Parties: Political parties were predominantly ethnically based. EPRDF constituent parties conferred advantages upon their members; the parties directly owned many businesses and were broadly perceived to award jobs and business contracts to loyal supporters. Several opposition political parties reported difficulty in renting homes or buildings in which to open offices, citing visits by EPRDF members to the landlords to persuade or threaten them not to rent property to these parties.

During the year, there were credible reports teachers and other government workers had their employment terminated if they belonged to opposition political parties. According to Oromo opposition groups, the Oromia regional government continued to threaten to dismiss opposition party members, particularly teachers, from their jobs. Government officials made allegations many members of legitimate Oromo opposition political parties were secretly OLF members and more broadly that members of many opposition parties had ties to Ginbot 7. At the university level members of Medrek and its constituent parties were able to teach.

Registered political parties must receive permission from regional governments to open and occupy local offices.

In early 2010 a system of public campaign finance was announced. Under this system parties are to receive public funds from the National Electoral Board based in part on the number of parliamentary seats they hold. In 2011 the EPRDF decided to redistribute its share of the funds, which accounted for approximately 75 percent based on its dominance of the parliament and regional councils, to other political parties that were members of the Joint Council of Political Parties, whether or not they had seats in parliament. Because of an ongoing dispute with the EPRDF, Medrek, the largest opposition front, remained outside the Joint Council. Despite this Medrek was offered a small amount of funds, which it refused to accept.

Participation of Women and Minorities: No laws or cultural or traditional practices prevented women or minorities from voting or participating in political life on the same basis as men or nonminority citizens. The Tigray Regional Council held the highest proportion of women nationwide, at 48.5 percent.

The government policy of ethnic federalism led to the creation of individual constituencies to provide for representation of all major ethnic groups in the House of People’s Representatives. There were more than 80 ethnic groups, and small groups lacked representation in the legislature. There were 24 nationality groups in six regional states (Tigray, Amhara, Beneshangul-Gumuz, SNNPR, Gambella, and Harar) that did not have a sufficient population to qualify for constituency seats based on the 2007 census result; however, in the 2010 elections, individuals from these nationality groups competed for 24 special seats in the House of People’s Representatives. Additionally, these 24 nationality groups have one seat each in the House of Federation.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; despite the government’s prosecution of numerous officials for corruption, some officials continued to engage in corrupt practices. Corruption, especially the solicitation of bribes, remained a problem among low-level bureaucrats. Police and judicial corruption also continued to be problems. Some government officials appeared to manipulate the privatization process, and state- and party-owned businesses received preferential access to land leases and credit.

The Ministry of Justice has primary responsibility for combating corruption, largely through the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC).

On September 5, five members of the Dire Dawa City Administration Council were sentenced in connection with corruption charges filed by the FEACC. The council members, found guilty of crimes including illegally giving away government land, manipulating tender processes, and accepting bribes, received prison sentences ranging from one to seven years.

The law requires that all government officials and employees officially register their wealth and personal property. The president, prime minister, and all cabinet-level ministers had registered their assets. By year’s end a total of 32,297 federal government officials had registered their assets, according to the FEACC.

The law provides for public access to government information, but access was largely restricted in practice. The law includes freedom of information provisions.

The government publishes its laws and regulations in the national gazette prior to their taking effect. The Government Communications Affairs Office managed contacts between the government, the press, and the public; the private press reported the government rarely responded to its queries.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A few domestic human rights groups operated, but with significant government restrictions. The government was generally distrustful and wary of domestic human rights groups and international observers. State controlled media were critical of international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch. The government strongly criticized Human Rights Watch on several occasions during the year for what it described as biased and inaccurate reporting. The government also criticized an International Crisis Group (ICG) report that analyzed the impact of the death of Prime Minister Meles, claiming the ICG applied “very questionable standards” and did not reflect the reality on the ground.

The CSO law prohibits charities, societies, and associations (NGOs or CSOs) that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources from engaging in activities that advance human and democratic rights or promote equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, genders, and religions; the rights of children and persons with disabilities; conflict resolution or reconciliation; or the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services. There were 3,522 organizations registered before the CSO law was adopted, although not all were active. Upon enactment of the CSO law, all charities were required to reregister with the government’s Charities and Societies Agency (ChSA). The implementation of the law continued to result in the severe curtailment of NGO activities related to human rights. In July the UN high commissioner for human rights expressed concern that civil society space “has rapidly shrunk” since the CSO law came into existence.

As of October 2,852 CSOs, both old and new, had been registered under the law. Of these, 389 were foreign charities, 491 were “resident” charities, 1,865 were “local” charities, 60 were adoption agencies, and 47 were consortia. The government maintained that the majority of organizations that did not reregister were not functional organizations prior to the passage of the law. Some human rights defender organizations adjusted to the law by registering either as local charities, meaning they could not raise more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign donors but could act in the specified areas, or as resident charities, which allowed foreign donations above 10 percent but prohibited activities in those areas.

One of several sets of implementing regulations under the law, the so-called 70/30 rule, caps administrative spending at 30 percent of an organization’s operating budget. The regulations define training of teachers, agricultural and health extension workers, and other government officials as an “administrative” cost, contending the training does not directly affect beneficiaries, thus limiting the number of training programs that can be provided by development assistance partners who prefer to employ train-the-trainer models to reach more persons. After discussions with development assistance partners, the government agreed to address application of this regulation on a case-by-case basis. A Civil Society Sector Working Group cochaired by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and a representative of the donor community convenes periodically to monitor and discuss challenges that arise as the law is implemented.

In October the ChSA announced it had closed 10 CSOs over the past two years because of improper payment of taxes and lack of adherence to the CSO law and related regulations. The agency also reportedly issued warnings to an additional 476 CSOs.

On October 19, the Supreme Court upheld the ChSA’s 2010 freezing of funds received by the Human Rights Council (HRCO) and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA) from foreign sources.

The government denied NGOs access to federal prisons, police stations, and political prisoners, with the exception of JFA-PFE, one of only three organizations granted an exemption enabling them to raise unlimited funds from foreign sources and engage in human rights advocacy. JFA-PFE was permitted to visit prisoners and played a positive role in improving prisoners’ chances for clemency.

Restrictions that limited the access of human rights organizations, the media, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic missions to conflict-affected areas continued, particularly with regard to the Somali Region conflict zones of Fik, Degahbur, Korahe, and parts of Warder. The partial relaxation of those restrictions that began in the previous year continued, with humanitarian access in the Somali Region improving in particular. Journalists were required to register before entering conflict regions. The government lacked a clear policy on NGO access to sensitive areas, leading regional government officials and military officials frequently to refer requests for access to the federal government. There were isolated reports of regional police or local militias blocking NGOs’ access to particular locations on particular days, citing security concerns.

There were credible reports security officials intimidated or detained local individuals to prevent them from meeting with NGOs and foreign government officials who were investigating allegations of abuse.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The government-established EHRC, which is funded by the parliament and subject to parliamentary review, is a semiautonomous body that investigates human rights complaints and produces annual and thematic reports. The commission operated 112 legal aid centers in collaboration with 17 universities and two civil society organizations, the EWLA and the Ethiopian Christian Lawyers Fellowship. The commission also completed the preparatory measures to sign collaborative agreements with two additional universities. The EHRC reported its Addis Ababa headquarters resolved 90 percent of the 952 complaints submitted to it during the year.

The Office of the Ombudsman has authority to receive and investigate complaints with respect to administrative mismanagement by executive branch offices. The office received 2,094 complaints in Addis Ababa from September 2011 to September 2012. Of these, the ombudsman opened investigations into 784, and the office reported it resolved the remaining cases through alternative means. The majority of complaints dealt with social security, labor, housing, and property disputes. The Office of the Ombudsman did not compile nationwide statistics. The Ombudsman’s Office opened five new offices around the country during the year.

In May the government completed drafting of a National Human Rights Action Plan, with an implementation coordinating office to be housed at the Ministry of Justice.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The constitution provides all persons equal protection without discrimination based on race, nation, nationality or other social origin, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth, or status. However, in practice the government did not fully promote and protect these rights.

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape and provides for penalties of five to 20 years’ imprisonment, depending on the severity of the case; however, the law does not expressly address spousal rape. The government did not fully enforce the law, partially due to widespread underreporting. Recent statistics on the number of abusers prosecuted, convicted, or punished were not available. Anecdotal evidence suggested reporting of rapes had increased since the 2004 revision of the criminal code but the justice system was unable to keep up with the number of cases.

Domestic violence, including spousal abuse, was a pervasive social problem. The government’s 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) found that 68.4 percent of women believe wife beating was justified. The previous survey, conducted in 2005, found 81 percent approval, showing a downward trend. The 2011 DHS revealed 45 percent of men felt that wife beating was justified, down from 52 percent found in the 2005 DHS data.

Although women had recourse to the police and the courts, societal norms and limited infrastructure prevented many women from seeking legal redress, particularly in rural areas. The government prosecuted offenders on a limited scale. Domestic violence is illegal, but government enforcement of laws against rape and domestic violence was inconsistent. Depending on the severity of damage inflicted, legal penalties range from small fines to imprisonment for up to 10 to 15 years.

Domestic violence and rape cases often were delayed significantly and given low priority. In the context of gender-based violence, significant gender gaps in the justice system remained, due to poor documentation and inadequate investigation. During the year, “child friendly” benches were established specifically to hear cases involving violence against children and women. Police officers were required to receive domestic violence training from domestic NGOs and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. There was a commissioner for women’s and children’s affairs in the EHRC.

Women and girls experienced gender-based violence, but it was underreported due to cultural acceptance, shame, fear, or a victim’s ignorance of legal protections.

The government established a National Commission for Children’s and Women’s Affairs in 2005, as part of the EHRC, to investigate alleged human rights violations against women and children.

Harmful Traditional Practices: The most prevalent harmful traditional practices, besides FGM/C, were uvulectomy (cutting or removal the uvula, the piece of flesh that hangs down at the rear of the mouth), tonsillectomy (cutting or removal of the tonsils), and marriage by abduction.

Marriage by abduction is illegal, although it continued in some regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR, despite the government’s attempts to combat the practice. Forced sexual relationships accompanied most marriages by abduction, and women often experienced physical abuse during the abduction. Abductions led to conflicts among families, communities, and ethnic groups. In cases of marriage by abduction, the perpetrator did not face punishment if the victim agreed to marry the perpetrator.

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): One of the most prevalent harmful traditional practices, FGM/C, is illegal, but the government did not actively enforce this prohibition or punish those who practiced it. The practice was still widespread; however, according to a 2010 Population Council survey the rates continued to fall. Eighty percent of women ages 40 to 49 reported they were subjected to FGM/C, while 58 percent of girls and women ages 15 to 19 reported the same. The prevalence of FGM/C was highest in the Afar, SNNPR, and Oromia regions.

Sexual Harassment: Sexual harassment was widespread. The penal code prescribes penalties of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment; however, authorities generally did not enforce harassment laws.

Reproductive Rights: Individuals have the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of children and to have the information and means to do so free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. The 2011 DHS indicated a contraceptive prevalence of 29 percent nationwide among married women, a twofold increase from the survey done six years earlier. The 2011 DHS indicated the maternal mortality rate was 676 per 100,000 live births as compared with 673 per 100,000 reported in the 2005 DHS. Principle causes of maternal mortality included excessive bleeding, infection, hypertensive complications, and obstructed labor, with the underlying cause being the prevalence of home births. Only 9 percent of women reported delivering in a health facility or with a skilled birth attendant. According to the Federal Minister of Health, a government program known as the Health Development Army resulted in this figure reaching approximately 50 percent in the Tigray Region.

Discrimination: Discrimination against women was most acute in rural areas, where an estimated 85 percent of the population lives. The law contains discriminatory regulations, such as the recognition of the husband as the legal head of the family and the sole guardian of children more than five years old. Courts generally did not consider domestic violence by itself a justification for granting a divorce. Irrespective of the number of years the marriage existed, the number of children raised, and joint property, the law entitled women to only three months’ financial support if a relationship ended. There was limited legal recognition of common-law marriage. A common-law husband had no obligation to provide financial assistance to his family, and as a result, women and children sometimes faced abandonment. Notwithstanding progressive provisions in the formal law, traditional courts continued to apply customary law in economic and social relationships.

According to the constitution all land belongs to the government. Both men and women have land-use rights, which they can pass on as an inheritance. Land law varies among regions. All federal and regional land laws empower women to access government land. Inheritance laws also enable widowed women to inherit joint property they acquired during marriage.

In urban areas women had fewer employment opportunities than men, and the jobs available did not provide equal pay for equal work. Women’s access to gainful employment, credit, and the opportunity to own or manage a business was further limited by their generally lower level of education and training and by traditional attitudes.

The Ministry of Education reported female participation in undergraduate and postgraduate programs increased to 144,286 during the 2011-12 academic year, compared with 123,706 in 2010-11, continuing the trend of increasing female participation in higher education.

Children

Birth registration: Citizenship is derived from one’s parents. The law requires that all children be registered at birth. In practice children born in hospitals were registered while most children born outside of hospitals were not. The overwhelming majority of children, particularly in rural areas, were born at home.

Education: As a policy, primary education was universal and tuition-free; however, there were not enough schools to accommodate the country’s youth, particularly in rural areas. The cost of school supplies was prohibitive for many families, and there was no legislation to enforce compulsory primary education. The number of students enrolled in schools expanded faster than trained teachers could be deployed.

Child Abuse: Child abuse was widespread. In March a YouTube video of a young girl being repeatedly abused by a female caretaker went viral, spurring the establishment of a Facebook group called Ethiopians Against Child Abuse. A 2009 study conducted by the African Child Policy Forum revealed prosecuting offenders for sexual violence against children was difficult due to inconsistent interpretation of laws among legal bodies and the offender’s right to bail, which often resulted in the offender fleeing or coercing the victim or the victim’s family to drop the charges. During the year, “child friendly” benches were established specifically to hear cases involving violence against children and women.

Child Marriage: The law sets the legal marriage age for girls and boys at 18; however, this law was not enforced uniformly, and rural families were sometimes unaware of this provision. In several regions it was customary for older men to marry young girls, although this traditional practice continued to face greater scrutiny and criticism.

According to the 2011 DHS the median age of first marriage among women surveyed between the ages of 20 and 49 was 17.1 years. The age of first marriage appeared to be rising. In 2005 the median age of marriage for women surveyed between 20 and 24 was 16.5 years, and while 39 percent of women between 45 and 49 reported being married by age 15, only 8 percent of young women between 15 and 19 reported being or having been married.

In the Amhara and Tigray regions, girls were married routinely as early as age seven. Child marriage was the most prevalent in the Amhara Region, where the median first marriage age was 15.1 years per the 2011 DHS, compared with 14.7 years in 2005. Regional governments in Amhara and, to a lesser extent, Tigray offered programs to educate young women on issues associated with early marriage.

Harmful Traditional Practices: Societal abuse of young girls continued to be a problem. Harmful practices included FGM/C, early marriage, marriage by abduction, and food and work prohibitions. A 2006 African Child Policy Forum retrospective survey indicated 68.5 percent of girls surveyed in the country had been abused sexually and 84 percent had been abused physically.

The majority of girls in the country had undergone some form of FGM/C. FGM/C was much less common in urban areas, where only 15 percent of the population lived. Girls typically experienced clitoridectomies seven days after birth (consisting of an excision of the clitoris, often with partial labial excision) and faced infibulation (the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM/C) at the onset of puberty. A 2008 study funded by Save the Children Norway reported a 24 percent national reduction in FGM/C cases over the previous 10 years, due in part to a strong anti-FGM/C campaign. The campaign continued to have an effect in the SNNPR and Afar regions during the year, although reliable sources in SNNPR reported infibulation still was administered on most girls. The penal code criminalizes practitioners of clitoridectomy, with imprisonment of at least three months or a fine of at least 500 birr ($28). Infibulation of the genitals is punishable with imprisonment of five to 10 years. However, no criminal charges have ever been brought for FGM/C. The government discouraged the practice of FGM/C through education in public schools, the Health Extension Program, and broader mass media campaigns.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The minimum age for consensual sex is 18 years, but this law was not enforced. The law provides for three to 15 years in prison for sexual intercourse with a minor. The law provides for one year in prison and a fine of 10,000 birr ($550) for trafficking in indecent material displaying sexual intercourse by minors. The law prohibits profiting from the prostitution of minors and inducing minors to engage in prostitution; however, commercial sexual exploitation of children continued, particularly in urban areas. Girls as young as age 11 reportedly were recruited to work in brothels. Customers often sought these girls because they believed them to be free of sexually transmitted diseases. Young girls were trafficked from rural to urban areas. They also were exploited as prostitutes in hotels, bars, resort towns, and rural truck stops. Reports indicated family members forced some young girls into prostitution.

Infanticide: Ritual and superstition-based infanticide continued in remote tribal areas, particularly the South Omo Valley. Local governments worked to educate communities against the practice.

Displaced Children: According to a 2010 report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, approximately 150,000 children lived on the streets, of whom 60,000 were in the capital. The ministry’s report stated families’ inability to support children due to parental illness or insufficient household income exacerbated the problem. These children begged, sometimes as part of a gang, or worked in the informal sector.

A 2010 Population Council Young Adult Survey found that 82.3 percent of boys who lived or worked on the streets had been to or had enrolled in school, 26.4 percent had lost one parent, and 47.2 percent had lost both parents. Among these boys, 72 percent had worked for pay at some point in their lives. Government and privately run orphanages were unable to handle the number of street children.

Institutionalized Children: There were an estimated 5.4 million orphans in the country, according to a 2010 report by the Central Statistics Authority. The vast majority lived with extended family members. Government orphanages were overcrowded, and conditions were often unsanitary. Due to severe resource constraints, hospitals and orphanages often overlooked or neglected abandoned infants. Institutionalized children did not receive adequate health care, and several infants in SNNPR died due to lack of adequate medical attention.

International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

Anti-Semitism

The Jewish community numbered approximately 2,000; there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

Persons with Disabilities

The constitution does not mandate equal rights for persons with disabilities. However, two laws prohibit discrimination against persons with physical and mental disabilities in employment and mandate access to buildings. It is illegal for deaf persons to drive.

The Right to Employment of Persons with Disabilities Proclamation prohibits employment discrimination based on disability. It also makes employers responsible for providing appropriate working or training conditions and materials to persons with disabilities. The law specifically recognizes the additional burden on women with disabilities. The government took limited measures to enforce the law, for example, by assigning interpreters for hearing-impaired civil service employees.

The Building Proclamation mandates building accessibility and accessible toilet facilities for persons with physical disabilities, although specific regulations that define the accessibility standards have not been adopted. Buildings and toilet facilities were usually not accessible. Landlords are required to give persons with disabilities preference for ground-floor apartments, and this was respected in practice.

Women with disabilities were more disadvantaged than men with disabilities in education and employment. An Addis Ababa University study from 2008 showed that female students with disabilities were subjected to a heavier burden of domestic work than their male peers. The 2010 Population Council Young Adult Survey found young persons with disabilities were less likely to have ever attended school than young persons without disabilities. The survey indicated girls with disabilities were less likely than boys with disabilities to be in school; 23 percent of girls with disabilities were in school, compared to 48 percent of girls without disabilities and 55 percent of boys without disabilities. Overall, 47.8 percent of young persons with disabilities surveyed reported not going to school due to their disability. Girls with disabilities also were much more likely to suffer physical and sexual abuse than girls without disabilities. Thirty-three percent of sexually experienced disabled girls reported having experienced forced sex. According to the same survey, some 6 percent of boys with disabilities had been beaten in the three months prior to the survey, compared to 2 percent of boys without disabilities.

There were several schools for hearing and visually impaired persons and several training centers for children and young persons with intellectual disabilities. There was a network of prosthetic and orthopedic centers in five of the nine regional states.

Several domestic associations, such as the Ethiopian National Association of the Blind, Ethiopian National Association of the Deaf, and Ethiopian National Association of the Physically Handicapped, like other civil society organizations, continued to be affected negatively by the CSO law.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The country has more than 80 ethnic groups, of which the Oromo, at approximately 35 percent of the population, is the largest. The federal system drew boundaries roughly along major ethnic group lines. Most political parties remained primarily ethnically based.

Clashes between ethnic groups during the year resulted in 100 to 150 deaths and the displacement of persons. Water shortages contributed to interethnic conflict.

On March 12, armed gunmen ambushed a passenger bus in Bonga, near the capital of the Gambella Region. After stopping the vehicle, the gunmen forced passengers off the bus and divided “highlanders” from locals (the term “highlanders” generally referred to persons from the Tigray or Amhara regions, although in Gambella the term also was applied more broadly to refer to those from outside the region). The gunmen opened fire on the highlanders, killing 21 persons and wounding nine.

Early in the year, around Moyale town, on the country’s border with Kenya, long-standing ethnic tensions erupted into large-scale violence as rival groups vied for resources. A series of retaliatory attacks on the Kenyan side of the border forced thousands of ethnic Borena (Borana) and Gebre (Gabbra) to flee into Ethiopia. In July rival Borena, Gebre, and Garre groups clashed on the Ethiopian side of the border, leading to as many as 85 deaths and displacing tens of thousands before federal forces contained the fighting.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Societal stigma and discrimination against persons living with or affected by HIV/AIDS continued in the areas of education, employment, and community integration. Despite the abundance of anecdotal information, there were no statistics on the scale of the problem.

Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

The constitution and the law provide workers, except for certain categories of workers, with the right to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively; however, such rights are severely restricted or excessively regulated by other laws. The 2003 Labor Proclamation specifically excludes managerial employees, teachers, and civil servants (including judges, prosecutors, and security service workers) from organizing unions. The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations noted that the CSO law gives the government power to interfere in workers’ right to organize, including through the registration, internal administration, and dissolution of organizations.

A minimum of 10 workers is required to form a union. While the law provides all unions with the right to register, the government may refuse to register trade unions that do not meet its registration requirements. The law stipulates a trade union organization may not act in an overtly political manner. The law allows administrative authorities to appeal to the courts to cancel union registration for engaging in prohibited activities, such as political action. Seasonal and part-time agricultural workers cannot organize into labor unions. While the law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers and provides for reinstatement for workers fired for union activity, it does not prevent an employer from creating or supporting a workers’ organization for the purpose of controlling it.

While the law recognizes the right of collective bargaining, this right is severely restricted. Negotiations aimed at amending or replacing a collective agreement must be completed within three months of its expiration, or the provisions on wages and other benefits cease to apply. Civil servants, including public school teachers, have the right to establish and join professional associations, but are not allowed to negotiate for better wages or working conditions. Furthermore, the arbitration procedures in the public sector are more restrictive than those in the private sector.

Although the constitution and law provide workers with the right to strike to protect their interests, it contains detailed provisions prescribing excessively complex and time-consuming formalities that make legal strike actions difficult to carry out. A minimum of 30 days’ advance notice must be given before striking when the case is referred to a court or a labor relations board. The law requires aggrieved workers to attempt reconciliation with employers before striking and includes a lengthy dispute settlement process. These provisions applied equally to an employer’s right to lock workers out. Two-thirds of the workers involved must support a strike for it to occur. If a case has not already been referred to a court or labor relations board, workers retain the right to strike without resorting to either of these options, provided they give at least 10 days’ notice to the other party and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and make efforts at reconciliation.

The law also prohibits strikes by workers who provide essential services, including air transport and urban bus service workers, electric power suppliers, gas station personnel, hospital and pharmacy personnel, firefighters, telecommunications personnel, and urban sanitary workers. Such a discretionary list of essential services exceeds the ILO definition of essential services. The law prohibits retribution against strikers, but also provides for excessive civil or penal sanctions for unions and workers involved in nonauthorized strike actions. Unions can be dissolved for carrying out strikes in “essential services.”

The informal labor sector, including domestic workers, is not unionized and is not protected by labor laws. Lack of adequate staffing prevented the government from effectively enforcing applicable laws during the year. Court procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were not respected in practice. Although the government permits unions, the major trade unions were government-established and -controlled entities. The government continued to use its authority to refuse to register the National Teachers’ Association (NTA) during the year on the grounds a national teacher association already existed. According to the Education International report to the ILO in 2011, members of the NTA were subjected to surveillance and harassment by government security agents, with the goal of intimidating teachers to abandon the NTA and forcing them to give up their long-standing demand for the formation of an independent union. In November the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association expressed its concern with regard to serious violations of the NTA’s trade union rights, including continuous interference in its internal organization that prevented it from functioning normally and interference by way of threats, dismissals, arrest, detention, and mistreatment of NTA members. The committee urged the government to register the NTA without delay; to ensure the CSO law was not applicable to workers’ and employers’ organizations; and to undertake civil service reform to fully ensure the right of civil servants to establish and join organizations of their own choosing.

While the government allowed citizens to exercise the right of collective bargaining freely, representatives negotiated wages only at the plant level. It was common for employers to refuse to bargain. Unions in the formal industrial sector made some efforts to enforce labor regulations.

Despite the law prohibiting antiunion discrimination, unions reported that employers frequently fired union activists. For example local government backed management at Balcha Hospital, Addis Ababa, that reportedly made efforts to establish a “yellow union” or employer-controlled union and to force workers to join it with the purpose of weakening the existing union. The chairperson of the factory workers’ union at a sugar factory in East Wellega in the Oromia Region was reportedly dismissed due to his union activities. There were reports most Chinese employers generally did not allow workers to form unions and often transferred or fired union leaders, as well as intimidated and pressured members to leave unions. Lawsuits alleging unlawful dismissal often take years to resolve because of case backlogs in the courts. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination were required to reinstate workers fired for union activities and generally did so in practice. While the law prohibits retribution against strikers, most workers were not convinced the government would enforce this protection. Labor officials reported that, due to high unemployment and long delays in the hearing of labor cases, some workers were afraid to participate in strikes or other labor actions.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, the law also permits courts to order forced labor as a punitive measure. The government did not effectively enforce the forced labor prohibition, and forced labor occurred in practice. Both adults and children were forced to engage in street vending, begging, traditional weaving, or agricultural work. Children also worked in forced domestic labor. Situations of debt bondage also occurred in traditional weaving, pottery, cattle herding, and other agricultural activities, mostly in rural areas.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

By law the minimum age for wage or salary employment is 14 years. The minimum age provisions, however, only apply to contractual labor and do not apply to self-employed children or children who perform unpaid work. Special provisions cover children between the ages of 14 and 18, including the prohibition of hazardous or night work. The law defines hazardous work as work in factories or involving machinery with moving parts or any work that could jeopardize a child’s health. Prohibited work sectors include passenger transport, electric generation plants, underground work, street cleaning, and many other sectors. The lack of labor inspectors and controls prevented the government from enforcing the law, leading to increasing numbers of children working in these sectors, particularly construction. The law expressly excludes children under age 16 attending vocational schools from legal protection with regard to the prohibition of young workers from performing hazardous work. The law does not permit children between the ages of 14 and 18 to work more than seven hours per day or between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., on public holidays or rest days, or overtime.

The government did not effectively enforce these laws in practice. The resources for inspections and the implementation of penalties were extremely limited. Despite the introduction of labor inspector training at Gondar University in 2011, insufficient numbers of labor inspectors and inspections resulted in lax enforcement of occupational safety and health measures and prohibitions against child labor.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) covers child labor issues, with support from the Ministry of Women, Children, and Youth Affairs. Cooperation, information sharing, and coordination between the ministries improved during the year. The National Action Plan (NAP) to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor was signed at the end of the year. The government conducted activities to raise awareness regarding child labor and piloted a child labor-free zone.

To underscore the importance of attending school, joint NGO and government-led community-based awareness raising activities targeted communities where children were heavily engaged in agricultural work. During the year the government invested in modernizing agricultural practices and constructing schools to combat the problem of children in agricultural sectors.

Child labor remained a serious problem, in both urban and rural areas. In both rural and urban areas, children often began working at young ages. Child labor was particularly pervasive in subsistence agricultural production, traditional weaving, fishing, and domestic work. A growing number of children worked in construction. Children in rural areas, especially boys, engaged in activities such as cattle herding, petty trading, plowing, harvesting, and weeding, while other children, mostly girls, collected firewood and fetched water. Children in urban areas, including orphans, worked in domestic service, often working long hours, which prevented many from attending school regularly. They also worked in manufacturing, shining shoes, making clothes, portering, directing customers to taxis, parking, public transport, petty trading, and occasionally herding animals. Some children worked long hours in dangerous environments for little or no wages and without occupational safety protection. Child laborers often faced physical, sexual, and emotional abuse at the hands of their employers.

Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm.

d. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no national minimum wage. Some government institutions and public enterprises set their own minimum wages. Public sector employees, the largest group of wage earners, earned a monthly minimum wage of approximately 420 birr ($23); employees in the banking and insurance sector had a minimum monthly wage of 336 birr ($18). The official estimate for the poverty income level is approximately 315 birr ($17) per month.

Only a small percentage of the population, concentrated in urban areas, was involved in wage-labor employment. Wages in the informal sector generally were below subsistence levels.

The law provides for a 48-hour maximum legal workweek with a 24-hour rest period, premium pay for overtime, and prohibition of excessive compulsory overtime. The country has 13 paid public holidays per year. The law entitles employees in public enterprise and government financial institutions to overtime pay; civil servants receive compensatory time for overtime work. The government, industries, and unions negotiated occupational safety and health standards. Workers specifically excluded by law from unionizing, including domestic workers and seasonal and part-time agricultural workers, generally did not benefit from health and safety regulations in the workplace.

The MOLSA’s inspection department was responsible for enforcement of these standards. The country had 380 labor inspectors. However, due to lack of resources, these standards were not enforced effectively. The MOLSA’s severely limited administrative capacity; lack of an effective mechanism for receiving, investigating, and tracking allegations of violations; and lack of detailed, sector-specific health and safety guidelines hampered effective enforcement of these standards. In addition penalties were not sufficient to deter violations.

Compensation, benefits, and working conditions of seasonal agricultural workers were far below those of unionized permanent agricultural employees. Although the government did little to enforce the law, in practice most employees in the formal sector worked a 39-hour workweek. However, many foreign, migrant, and informal sector workers worked more than 48 hours per week.

Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment. Despite this law most workers feared losing their jobs if they were to do so. Hazardous working conditions existed in the agricultural sector, which was the primary base of the country’s economy. There were also reports of hazardous and exploitative working conditions in the construction and fledgling industrial sectors.

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204120#wrapper