SUBJECT: VOA’S AMHARIC SERVICE CONDEMNED BY GOE – NEED FOR PROOF
¶1. This cable contains an action request. See paragraph
¶12.
¶2. SUMMARY: On November 8, Charge d’Affaires met with local
and London-based Voice of America correspondents. She used
the meeting to discuss U.S. policy regarding Ethiopia, the
role the VOA is playing in Ethiopia at a time when its
listenership is likely at record levels, and Government of
Ethiopia concerns regarding the objectivity of the VOA
Amharic service. She provided them with background
information on the country’s evolving political situation
and a brief on-the-record quote. Government of Ethiopia
unhappiness with the VOA Amharic service is well known and
increasingly loudly expressed — and now threatens to result
in the loss of vital coverage to Ethiopians. The most
recent flare-up in GOE anger at VOA results from a VOA
bulletin that calls for a stay-at-home strike and asks
security forces to refuse to follow orders. Post requests
confirmation on whether this item did in fact run on VOA and
if so, please provide guidance on how to respond. An
independent analysis of VOA’s Amharic reporting is badly
needed in order to respond to GOE concerns and ensure that
VOA is not jammed or receives interference. END SUMMARY.
———————————
SETTING AN AGENDA FOR COOPERATION
———————————
¶3. On November 8, Charge met with London-based VOA English
service correspondent Michael Drudge, along with local
stringers Iskender Firew and Meleskachew Amaha (the latter
still wearing bandages as a result of an October 26 beating
by unidentified assailants). Joining the meeting were the
Embassy’s A/DCM, PA Counselor, IO, PolOff, and FSN
Information Specialist.
¶4. Charge welcomed the journalists and consoled Meleskachew
on his injuries, telling him she had raised her concerns
about his assault with the Government. She noted the very
real need for VOA reporting at a time when Ethiopians are
unable to hear other independent voices — and that both the
Ethiopian people and the government were listening. She
expressed hope that, as a part of the U.S. Government, VOA
would be sensitive to U.S. policy issues and uphold its
history of fair and balanced reporting. Referring to
unconfirmed reports that the Government of Ethiopia may be
attempting to interfere with the reception of VOA, she noted
that, if true, it was a sign of how seriously VOA’s
reporting is taken. She cited a recent specific GOE
complaint (see below) and used it as an example of how
perceived bias can further impede the relationship between
the GOE and VOA. [NOTE: Since November 7, VOA reception in
Ethiopia has been increasingly unintelligible because of an
overlay to its frequency of Government-owned Radio Fana,
which has successfully reduced VOA’s ability to be heard.
END NOTE.]
¶5. Noting that she was well aware of the GOE’s blanket
reluctance to interact directly with the Amharic service,
the Charge said that it was still possible to report on
known GOE positions and important to present as broad a
spectrum of opinion as possible. COMMENT: One of the
problems is that VOA provides more news about the opposition
and its activities than any other news. Even if VOA does
not report GOE views, it could provide more news about other
events in the country. END COMMENT.
¶6. During a lively and positive Q&A, the Charge drew on
points presented to international correspondents at a
background briefing earlier in the day to explain U.S.
policy on the current situation. She described Ethiopia’s
current political situation and outlined the role the U.S.
and the broader international community are playing to
resolve the crisis and re-focus all sides on moving forward,
including the November 6 joint EU/U.S. statement. She
recapped what had taken place since internationally brokered
negotiations began in early October (and subsequently ended)
and noted her optimism that progress was still possible.
She said that dialogue — and a democratic future — is not
possible without renunciation of violence and cooperation
between the government and the opposition.
¶7. She called for the VOA’s help in focusing on the way
forward, citing the absence of other voices and Ethiopians’
always keen and increasing interest in VOA reporting
guarantee it a crucial place in getting balanced, accurate
information to them.
——————-
THE VOA IN ETHIOPIA
——————-
¶8. The current clampdown on private newspapers (in place
since November 2), combined with the state’s monopoly on
broadcast media and its content, has meant that Ethiopians
are increasingly relying on short-wave, local-language radio
broadcasts by the VOA (and, to a lesser extent, by Deutsche
Welle) for information on the rapidly evolving political
situation in the country. A side effect of this increased
prominence of VOA reporting has been ever-closer scrutiny of
its coverage, especially through the Amharic service, by the
government and its supporters. (NOTE: coverage by VOA’s
Tigrigna and Afaan Oromo services have escaped such
criticism of late, although the former came under fire
during the border war for alleged pro-Eritrean bias. Given
that the opposition is heavily based in the Amhara region,
the problem is specifically the Amharic service. END NOTE.)
¶9. The GOE’s perception of bias was demonstrated this week
by a November 7 letter to the Charge from State Minister of
Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu, who decried “the very
destructive role that the VOA Amharic service has been
playing in its broadcast to Ethiopia.” The letter goes on
to call the broadcast “one of the major sources of
instability…an instrument for stoking violence as well as
for advancing and propagating the policies of the most
hardliner section of the CUDP,” and “a transmitter of the
most destabilizing messages imaginable.”
¶10. Accompanying the letter was the Amharic text and an
English transcription of an excerpt from the news in the
Saturday, November 5 broadcast, during the height of the
violence in Addis Ababa, that gave the direct text from a
leader of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUDP).
This bulletin called for a stay-at-home strike beginning
November 7, to continue until CUDP leaders are released from
prison and the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) agreed to negotiations. The
Ministry’s English translation of the excerpt closed with
what appeared to be a free-standing, unsourced statement:
“The law enforcement agencies and the defence forces who are
supposed to safeguard the safety of the public should
immediately refrain from implementing orders.” [NOTE: At
the time that VOA broadcast this information the CUDP leader
quoted was in hiding and was being sought by the Ethiopian
authorities. He was not authorized to speak for the CUDP.
But more worrisome still is the call for security and
defense forces to disobey orders. END NOTE.]
¶11. COMMENT: Government and EPRDF dissatisfaction with and
allegations of bias in VOA Amharic reporting are
longstanding. The last such round took place in June, when
VOA and DW local reporters lost their Ministry of
Information accreditation (and at least one VOA stringer
fled the country) and the state media carried denunciations
of the reporting of both. Whether or not actual reporting
carries biased or inaccurate information (and in general
that seems not to be the case), recent Post review of the
Amharic service does indicate that much coverage focuses on
opposition activities, both in the country and in the
Diaspora, with comparatively little illustrating other
points of view. The very reluctance of the GOE and its
supporters to engage with what it perceives as an opponent
may in fact be a substantial contributing factor in the
imbalance they perceive. END COMMENT.
¶12. ACTION ITEM: In order to reply to the Foreign
Ministry’s complaint, Post needs the complete text of the
VOA broadcast and specifically wishes to know if the item
calling on the armed forces to disobey orders was included.
Post also requests guidance on how to reply to this specific
complaint. Post would like independent data that would
allow provide a better window into VOA Amharic reporting,
allowing a better ability to evaluate allegations of bias.
Given that a strong perception of actual bias exists, and
that at least some imbalance may be demonstrable, Post
suggests an impartial review of VOA Amharic reporting over
the past six months. This suggestion is not made with the
intent of pointing fingers, but to better enable Post to
respond appropriately to the VOA’s vehement detractors in
Ethiopia and to ensure that VOA lives up to its reputation
for fair and balanced reporting.
[Ambassador Vicky] HUDDLESTON
==========================
2005-11-22 13:53
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: VOA ON THE HOT SEAT
REF: ADDIS ABABA 3852
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: A November 15 meeting with State Minister
of Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu provided the opportunity for
the Charge to discuss the Government of Ethiopia’s concerns
regarding reporting by the VOA’s Amharic Service, as
well as larger issues of GOE press outreach and its
relationship with the private media (other topics discussed
reported SEPTEL). The State Minister’s views on both issues
do not indicate that quick fixes are likely on either. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) During a meeting called by State Minister Tekeda,
the Charge raised GOE concerns about VOA Amharic service
reporting; the State Minister hat send two letters on the
subject within the past two weeks (the first reported
REFTEL). The Charge said that the Embassy takes charges of
biased reporting by the VOA seriously; she added that she
also remains concerned that perceptions of bias may have
spilled over into outright harassment of local VOA
stringers, noting the October 26 attack on one.
¶3. (SBU) The State Minister responded that he knows that
freedom of speech and of the press make GOE complaints on
the subject “a delicate matter,” and that he hoped his
letters did not convey a message not intended, namely that
the USG should in some way control or manage VOA reporting.
Instead, he said, they were intended to alert the Charge
that the VOA is “not working as a news outfit,” but was
instead “carrying out political activities intended to
damage the EPRDF and the Ethiopian people with no sense of
embarrassment or proportion.” He characterized VOA Amharic
reporting as deeply imbalanced, saying that it intentionally
sought out interlocutors who would comment negatively on the
GOE; as an example, Tekeda cited recent stories that
included accounts by weeping family members of those killed
and detained in recent unrest. He said that only an Amharic
speaker could understand how deeply embedded the VOA’s
partisanship was in the Amharic language.
¶4. (SBU) The Charge answered that she looked on his
letters as a call for action; she said that she had already
sent a request (REFTEL) seeking an impartial review of VOA
Amharic reporting. She added that the Embassy had already
reviewed in detail the instance of perceived bias included
in the State Minister’s first letter, and noted that the
English translation provided by the Ministry did not fully
reflect the Amharic used in the broadcast, which did (unlike
the Ministry translation) source a call for security forces
to disobey orders to an opposition leader interviewed, and
so was not a direct call from the VOA for such action.
¶5. (SBU) The Charge said that the increasing controversy
over VOA Amharic reporting had indicated to her two
problems, one the GOE’s and one the USG’s. The GOE’s
problem, she said, was that internal efforts to control the
flow of information paradoxically magnify the importance of
VOA Amharic reporting; the lack of non-state media,
especially electronic media, guarantee the VOA an audience.
That so much VOA reporting focuses on opposition activities
is a result not only of VOA having good sources among
opposition leaders, but also GOE inaccessibility. The GOE,
she said, does not do well in getting its side of the story
out, making the appearance of one-sided reporting to some
extent inevitable. Perhaps, she posited, the GOE needs a
spokesperson who could persuasively and proactively present
its policy and actions.
¶6. (SBU) The USG problem, the Charge said, is that there
may in fact be a balance issue, but that, if so, much of it
comes from lack of access and the resulting inability to
report the GOE side. She urged the State Minister to
“really think about how you get your message out.”
¶7. (SBU) The Minister said he did not “disagree that the
Government and the ruling party do not do well,” but
attributed it, not to an apparent inability to present its
case, but to letting private papers “have their way for 14
years,” and not more actively moving forward on longstanding
plans for a state-run press council and journalistic code of
conduct. As a result, he said, “they have been free to
wreak havoc.” In regard to the VOA, he lamented that the
Amharic service “could have played an important role” in
inspiring Ethiopians, but was instead “part of the very ugly
scene in Addis Ababa.”
¶8. (SBU) The State Minister lamented that “a few people”
in the Diaspora have been playing a “zealous,” negative role
“with no inhibition.” He said that this was not isolated to
the U.S., and cited examples in South Africa of opposition
supporters there intimidating pro-government Ethiopians and
Ethiopian-owned businesses. Speaking of oppositionist
members of the U.S. Diaspora, he said, “they provoked us,”
adding that their support empowered the hardest-line
elements among the opposition and that “the Hailu [Shawel]
types are beyond the pale.” He praised USG statements on
Ethiopia, but said he felt recent ones “have been watered
down a little,” and added that he hoped that, despite
pressure from within the U.S., they would not become less
balanced.
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The question of VOA Amharic reporting,
along with the flow of information to and within Ethiopia
more generally, is clearly much on the minds of those in
official circles here. The GOE remains focused on issues of
control and restraint, however, rather than positive
engagement and outreach. END COMMENT.
On December 21, 1987, Time Magazine on its cover page featured a downcast and crestfallen young Ethiopian mother as a symbol of famine victims in that country. Time asked two timeless questions: “Why are Ethiopians starving again? What should the world do and not do?”
In its analysis, Time wrote something that should strikes us all as déjà vu today.
Three years ago [1984], a famine began to strike Ethiopia with apocalyptic force. Westerners watched in horror as the images of death filled their TV screens: the rows of fly-haunted corpses, the skeletal orphans crouched in pain… Today Ethiopia is in the midst of another drought… Ethiopia, which has earned the unhappy honor of being rated the globe’s poorest country by the World Bank (average annual per capita income: + $110; infant mortality rate: 16.8%), is on the brink of disaster again. At least 6 million of its 46 million people face starvation, and only a relief effort on the scale of the one launched three years ago will save them… As the cry [for aid] goes out once more for food and money, the sympathetic cannot be faulted for wondering why this is happening all over again. Is the latest famine wholly the result of cruel nature, or are other, man-made forces at work that worsen the catastrophe?…
In 2011, Ethiopia is the second poorest country in the world despite fanciful claims of 15 a percent annual economic growth and fantasies of building the largest hydroelectric dams in all of Africa by dictator Meles Zenawi. According to official statements of the Zenawi regime, 4.5 million of the estimated 90 million Ethiopians need 380 metric tons of food at a cost of USD$400 million. Jason Frasier, mission director of USAID in Ethiopia recently cautioned that Zenawi’s regime “may be underestimating the country’s needs in its drought crisis, even as the government announced that 4.5 million Ethiopians need food aid, 40 percent more than last year. We are concerned that we are underestimating the situation, especially in the southern provinces.” We are back to the future in 1984!
On August 17, 2011, Wolfgang Fengler, a lead economist for the World Bank, weighed in with a definitive answer to Time’s question: “The [famine] crisis is man made. Droughts have occurred over and again, but you need bad policymaking for that to lead to a famine.” In other words, it is bad governance that is at the core of the famine problem in Ethiopia, not drought. This is a rare and refreshing departure from the all-too-common bureaucratic mumbo jumbo about the causes of famine often spouted by international aid agencies and multilateral organizations.
TEN REASONS WHY ETHIOPIANS ARE STARVING AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN…
Reason #1: Famine is not merely a humanitarian catastrophe in Ethiopia; it is a powerful political and military weapon.
There is a long and ignoble history of political and military weaponization of famine in Ethiopia. In the mid-1980s, the military junta government of Mengistu Hailemariam used famine to punish civilian populations perceived to support rebels in the northern part of the country. The junta prevented delivery of food aid in rebel-held areas (as did the rebels themselves) and implemented a cruel policy of forced migration of civilians in an effort to drain recruits and deny support to the rebels. Zenawi’s regime pursued the same policy to defeat alleged rebels in the Ogaden region and has further used humanitarian aid to consolidate power and starve out his opposition as documented recently in a BIA/BIJ report. Mao Zedong taught that “Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which fish swim.” Both Zenawi and Megistu understood that by militarily and politically weaponizing famine, they can poison and drain the water in the lake. No water! No fish! No problem!
Reason # 2: Famine is a recurrent fact in Ethiopia because that country has been in an endless cycle of dictatorship for decades.
Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen argues that “there has never been a famine in a functioning multi-party democracy.” In a competitive political process with a functioning free press, there is a much higher degree of political accountability. No freely elected government could afford to ignore famine or abstain from doing all it can to prevent it. Opposition politicians will make famine a major political issue to win elections. A free press will mobilize public opinion to hold those in power accountable for letting “famine occur on their watch.” In Ethiopia, opposition political parties are non-existent. In 2005, Zenawi jailed the entire leadership of the opposition for nearly two years. He even jailed the first woman political party leader in Ethiopian history, Birtukan Midekssa, and with sadistic indifference declared, “there will never be an agreement with anybody to release Birtukan. Ever. Full stop. That’s a dead issue.” No opposition, no multiparty democracy, no free press, no accountability equals recurrent famines.
Reason # 3: Famine in Ethiopia is an annual crisis because dictators do not give a damn if the people die one by one or by the millions.
The current rulers of Ethiopia, like their junta predecessor, continue to derive spiritual guidance from their patron saints: Stalin and Mao (Chinese financial support today is one of the cornerstones of Zenawi’s regime). Stalin was blasé and arrogantly dismissive of the Ukraine famine of the early 1930s. He said, “A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.” In 1959 during China’s Great Famine, Mao was equally matter-of-fact: “When there is not enough to eat, people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill.” Mengistu said there was no famine when millions of Ethiopians dropped like flies from starvation in 1984-85. But Zenawi is more cunning and pretty slick when it comes to public relations. He said there are emergencies, but no famines. “Famine has wreaked havoc in Ethiopia for so long, it would be stupid not to be sensitive to the risk of such things occurring. But there has not been a famine on our watch – emergencies, but no famines.”
Reason #4. Famine is a structural part of the Ethiopian economy because the “government” owns all the land.
It is said of the golden rule that he who controls the gold makes the rules. The same can be said of land in Ethiopia. Those who own the land makes the rules for those who till the land. Article 40 (1) of the Ethiopian Constitution provides that “the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia.” For all intents and purposes, that means the ruling regime and its supporters own the land. The regime controls who gets what plot of urban or farm land. The regime sells, leases or otherwise traffics in land without any accountability. Recently, the regime sold a large chunk of the country’s most fertile land to Indian companies for pennies: “For £150 a week (USD$245), you can lease more than 2,500 square kilometres of virgin, fertile [Ethiopian] land – an area the size of Dorset, England – for 50 years, plus generous tax breaks.” The bottom line is that those who own the land are more interested in meeting the needs of other people in other places than the Ethiopian people. Zenawi has condemned Ethiopian developers who were transferring their leaseholds in urban land in Addis Ababa as “land grabbers” and “speculators” who should be “locked up”. The old feudal landlords are today replaced by new landlords in designer suits.
Reason # 5: Famine persists in Ethiopia because massive human rights abuses persist.
The Zenawi regime is well-known for trashing the human and constitutional rights of Ethiopian citizens. Perhaps unknown to many is the regime’s flagrant violation of its affirmative legal duty to provide a “standard of living adequate for the health and well-being… including food for its citizens.” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 25(1); The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 11(2) [“fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”]; Ethiopian Constitution, Article 90 of the Constitution, [“provide all Ethiopians with access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social insurance”]. Weaponizing hunger to decimate one’s opposition is a crime against humanity. But hunger is the new weapon of choice in human rights violations in Ethiopia. Those who oppose the regime are not only denied humanitarian food and relief aid, they are also victimized through a system of evictions, denial of land or reduction in plot size as well as denial of access to loans, fertilizers, seeds, etc. In the case of the people of Gambella, entire communities are forced off the land to make way for Indian investors in violation of conventions that protect the rights of indigenous peoples. Zenawi’s regime believes that the most effective way of crushing the hearts and minds of the people is by keeping their stomachs empty.
Reason #6: Famine persists in Ethiopia because Zenawi has succeeded in keeping the famine hidden.
Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 pretended there was no famine until the documentary “the Hidden Famine” by Jonathan Dimbleby was aired to a shocked and angry Ethiopian public. Former junta leader Mengistu was arrogantly dismissive during the 1984-85 famine. He asked, “What famine?” Zenawi is far more cunning. His solution is to clampdown on the press and shut the country down to all foreign journalists and media representatives. If any foreign journalists should somehow manage to get through, jail them. That is exactly what he did recently to two Swedish journalists, photojournalist Johan Persson and reporter Martin Schibbye, who were arrested in the Ogaden region where the regime has committed massive human rights violations for years. Regime representative Dina Mufti explained that the two journalists “will be tried according to the national law … for the terrorist activities they were planning to undertake.” Woubshet Taye, deputy editor of Awramba Times (a struggling weekly paper) and one of the few female journalists in the country, Reyot Alemu of Feteh (another struggling weekly paper) newspapers were recently jailed on bogus charges that they were “organizing a terrorist network.” Since there is no independent press in the country and those trying to offer an alternative voice are subject to intimidation, arrest and detention, the famine remains hidden not unlike the days of Emperor Haile Selassie.
Reason #7: Famine persist in Ethiopia because there is a “conspiracy of silence” by Western aid agencies and timid NGOs.
Zenawi has made it clear that anyone who disputes his claim of 15 percent annual economic growth and rosy picture of the country will be thrown out of the country, vilified or not allowed to operate. Recently, when Ken Ohashi, the World Bank Country Director for Ethiopia said Zenawi’s economic plan (“Growth and Transformation Plan”) is unsustainable, Zenawi unleashed his legendary vitriol on him: “The World Bank [country] director is used to having other developing nations simply listen to his orders and is not used to nations refusing implement policy based on their wishes. He left here after we refused to let him tell us what to do and wrote this article to get back at us.” In other words, attack the man’s integrity savagely to divert attention from the man’s message.
But all NGOs and international aid agencies know never to use the “F” word, unless of course they use it to deny there is no famine. That is precisely what USAID Deputy Administrator Gregory Gottlieb did last week on a VOA broadcast. He said, “There is no famine in Ethiopia.” The strange thing is that it does not seem Gottlieb had spoken about the “situation” to Jason Fraser, mission director of USAID in Ethiopia, before making his glib declaration. Fraser said, “We are concerned that we are underestimating the situation, especially in the southern provinces [in Ethiopia].” So the conspiracy of silence goes on to keep the famine hidden by using euphemisms. It is not FAMINE, it is the “situation”, severe malnutrition, food insecurity, food crisis [when Zenawi recently visited China, Premier Wen Jiabao called the famine “crisis”], green drought and so on. The “crisis” is not the result of lack of preventive or long-range planning, official incompetence, corruption, criminal negligence, etc., but the effect of “erratic rains damaged or delayed crops, deforestation overgrazing” and other ecological, environmental, and climatic disasters.
The international poverty mongers are so slick that they have even invented a “scientific” classification system for famine: “Acute Food Insecurity, Stressed, Crisis, Emergency and Catastrophe.” They want us to believe that famine is some sort of neatly-staged transitional process. For a mother and child who have not eaten for days or scrimp on ten kilograms of grain a month, the famine taxanomy is meaningless. It would be interesting to hear what famine victims would say when they are told that they will not be in a famine state until they drop dead! The fact of the matter is that a famine by any other name is still famine and just as deadly!
On the other hand, the international agencies and NGOs have a manifest conflcit of interest because by revealing the truth aboout the famine, they are likely to run the risk of a severe tongue-lashing (See Ohashi above), exoposure that their programs are a waste, or if an NGO, deceritifcation and expedited removal from the country. They would rather turn a blind eye and remain silent than use the “F” word.
Reason # 8: Famine persist in Ethiopia because the regime in power for 20 years has failed to devise and implement an effective family planning policy.
In 1993, Zenawi’s “Transitional Government of Ethiopia” in its “National Population Policy of Ethiopia” (NPPE) declared that “its major goal [was] the harmonization of the rate of population growth and the capacity of the country for the development and rational utilization of natural resources thereby creating conditions conductive to the improvement of the level of welfare of the population.” It aimed to reduce “total fertility rate of 7.7 children per woman to approximately 4.0 by the year 2015 by mounting an effective country wide population information and education programme, expanding clinical and community based contraceptive distribution services, raising the minimum age at marriage for girls and removal of unnecessary restrictions pertaining to the advertisement, propagation and popularization of diverse conception control methods.” In 1993 Ethiopia’s population was estimated at 53 million. In 2011, the population is estimated at 91 million. The numbers speak for themselves!
Reason # 9: Famine in Ethiopia is good business.
There are many who profit from economic emergences created by famines. There is much money to be made from trafficking in famine relief aid. According to FAO’s Global Food Monitor for August 2011, in Ethiopia and other Horn countries “prices of cereals have reached record levels… well above their levels a year earlier, substantially reducing access to food by large numbers of population and aggravating the food insecurity in the subregion.” Who benefits from the high prices? Regime-allied middlemen buy massive amounts of grains from farmers at low prices (by offering what appears to be a generous price at the time) and eliminate legitimate small businesses that deal in grain. The same middlemen have an absolute monopoly on the acquisition, sale and distribution of agricultural commodities, and it is not hard to imagine how profitable famines could be. It makes perfect economic sense from the perspective of famine profiteering to place low policy priority on famine prevention and control. It’s the old supply and demand curve. High demand for food and less supply and a chokehold monopoly on the market, and complete control on the distribution of international food aid equals to “mo’ money, mo’ money, and mo’ money” for those in power. Grotesque as it may sound, famine is good for business.
Reason # 10: It is true “a hungry man/woman is an angry man/woman.” Is it not?
The great Bob Marley sang:
Them belly full, but we hungry;
A hungry mob is a angry mob.
…
Cost of livin’ gets so high,
Rich and poor they start to cry:
Now the weak must get strong;
…
Now the weak must get strong.
Previous commentaries by the author are available at: www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ and http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/
Part one identified similarities and differences between the Egyptian and Tunisian popular revolutions on the one hand and conditions in Ethiopia on the other. Differences aside, the Ethiopian admiration for an interest in the Arab Spring is relentless. In particular, Ethiopia’s democratic and nationalist leaning elites, the majority of whom live scattered around the globe as part of country’s 2 million relatively well-to-do Diaspora, spend inordinate amounts of time analyzing and debating the similarities and differences among North African and Middle Eastern revolutions and their relative merits and relevance to Ethiopia. Regardless of country situations, recurrent themes that resonate with Ethiopians include political repression, violation of human rights and suppression of civil liberties, 60 percent youth unemployment, escalating prices of staples including foods, gaping inequality, corruption, nepotism and ethnic-based discrimination.
Ethiopians agree that the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni regimes are among the most repressive in the world. Given his prominent role in African politics and in the African Union, Colonel Gaddafi is more familiar to Ethiopians than are President Assad of Syria and President Salah of Yemen. Colonel Gaddafi has been in power for 41 years. Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian Prime Minister has been in power for more than 20 years. Even in Libya, Syria and Yemen, youth and the middle class tried to close ranks. Their battle cries of “We are all Libyans, Syrians or Yemenis and we are not afraid” appeal to Ethiopians. Ethnic, sectarian and ideological conflicts are pronounced in Libya, Syria and Yemen as they are in Ethiopia. For example, President Assad’s regime is accused of representing a religious minority of the Alawite consisting 12 percent of the population in a country that is 70 percent Sunni. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s Tigray People’s Liberation Party (TPLF) represents a mere 6 percent of the Ethiopian population currently estimated at 90 million. More than 90 percent of the military command of Ethiopia’s defense forces is represented by this minority ethnic group; as are security forces. Democratic activists in Syria contend that President Assad’s government supports the business elite who are beneficiaries of his regime. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi favors the new wealthy urban and Tigrean elite that benefit hugely from his government’s policies and investments. In Syria and Ethiopia, access to wealth and wealth-making assets is dependent on loyalty to the governing party and government.
In Libya, Syria and Yemen opposition groups tried to debunk Gaddafi’s, Assad’s and Salah’s divisive ethnic and sectarian policies. However, success in these countries is taking longer compared to Egypt and Tunisia. While the sizes and sheer determination of opposition groups seem to indicate that the vast majority of their respective populations want freedom and democracy, their struggles are more protracted. In Libya, almost similar to Ethiopia, the few who benefit from the Gaddafi regime and his ethnic group stand on his side. This reality and the security and military organization as well as defense equipment amassed over decades enables him to wage war against his own population. Class, ethnic and sectarian division prolongs the agonizing and costly struggle for freedom in Libya. A commentator said that Colonel Gaddafi and his core supporters and political base “own the city of Tripoli.” Libya’s wealthiest and most powerful families live there. Out of fear or self interest or both, this social base seems to “side with him.” Because it is heavily vested in the regime, it seems to disregard that the country is in a state of siege and that Libyans are killing Libyans. Gaddafi feels that a prolonged war is an indicator of legitimacy. He seems to be clueless that at least half of the country is up in arms against his regime; that he and his core supporters are accused of “war crime and crimes against humanity;” and that most of the global community wants to see regime change. Change is therefore costly but inevitable in Libya. The difference comes from the unity and common purpose of Libya’s home-based opposition and not it relatively small Diaspora. This is a critical lesson I would draw.
If one peels the Ethiopian socioeconomic and political onion, one will find numerous similarities between Libya under Gaddafi and Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi. The TPLF core leaders succeeded in recruiting and incentivizing cadres and others from different ethnic groups using ethnic and party loyalty and defense of key institutions through periodic political assessments (in Amharic, gimigema). Inherited from the Soviet system, periodic assessments are management tools to get rid-off individuals who are suspect and to bring in others into the fold. While Addis Ababa may not be “owned” by the Ethiopian Prime Minister in contrast to Gaddafi who owns Tripoli in Libya, there is ample documentary evidence that shows that “Mekele and the rest of Tigray–the ethnic home of the ruling party– may be owned by his party,” as one Ethiopian academic opined. I suggest that in contrast to what I tried to show in part one of this series, Libya comes closer to Ethiopia than the Egyptian and Tunisian cases. Leaders in both Ethiopia and Libya manage their societies based on ethnic and sectarian loyalty. Wealth, assets and influence are acquired on the basis of loyalty and not merit. It is clear that in Libya, ethnic, sectarian and class division have taken a toll on the society and on the uprising. The initial battle cry “We are all Libyans” has not penetrated the entire society. This battle cry of people fighting together against oppression would have overwhelmed the regime peacefully and relatively quickly. Further, the international community did not initially live up to the expectations of the democratic forces in Libya, Syria and Yemen. In part, the community may have felt that “division” would bring a failed state. In part, it may be the Libyan oil factor; and in the case of Yemen, the so-called Al-Qaida factor. A similar situation is still simmering in Bahrain, with a dose of external influence from key regional countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. What Ethiopians learn from these experiences is that the democratic path in each country will be different, with one caveat. Ethiopians need to recognize that the failed state of Somalia and “terrorism in the Horn of Africa” legitimizes Western support to the current regime.
The nature of democratic change
Regardless of unique country situations, success of any uprising in a country the size and complexity of Ethiopia would depend entirely on unequivocal commitment from all opposition groups that that they share an identical destiny and not a marriage of convenience to topple the regime. It would also depend on an uprising’s appeal to and active engagement of millions of ordinary Ethiopians from all ethnic and other persuasions. Most informed and well educated Ethiopians underscore that change must involve millions of people from all ethnic, religious, social and demographic groups over a sustained period of time. Some suggest that even those who “profited” from the regime must not feel threatened by change. They must be assured that they too have a future. In Libya, those who are vested in the current system feel “threatened” by the democratic upheaval. Those unhappy with the system continue to sacrifice their lives and comforts. This is the reason for the characterization of the civil war as the “Battle for Libya.” In this battle, the international community resolved that it won’t allow a senseless and careless dictator to “slaughter his own people.” NATO strikes against Gaddafi’s forces would not have been politically and strategically feasible if it were not for the valiant positions of the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Libyan opposition. It would have been disastrous for Western democracies not to respond to these regionally orchestrated and led demands by the Arab world for the Arab world. More critical, it would have affected the democratic momentum sweeping the region. Here, I want to inject my own intellectual assessment of the new human rights doctrine that would have been unimaginable in the 20th or in the first decade of this century. The UN system never anticipated the kinds of world changing events as those sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. My sense is that international relations won’t be the same again. A new world is being shaped by new civil forces such as youth and the middle class that demand to be heard; and want access to economic and social opportunities consistently bestowed upon those who capture political power and assume economic hegemony. Africans are used to all forms of injustices: from Slavery to Colonialism and Apartheid to horrific civil wars and genocide. Africa’s current dictators including the Ethiopian Prime Minister manifest these behaviors and actions.
An emerging doctrine: “The response to protect”
Horrific ethnic genocide in Rwanda taught the world community a cardinal lesson of man’s inhumanity to man. At the time, the UN and major powers kept silent only to grasp the magnitude and implications later. Retrospectively, the UN recognized that its relevance and credibility will depend on averting all forms of genocide including those perpetrated by cruel and repressive regimes against their own people. In the process, the welcomed doctrine of “The response to protect” emerged. It is this doctrine that the UN Security Council applied in Libya. For the first time in world history, dictators and other groups can no longer get away murdering their own. It will be harder for the UN and major Western powers to cherry pick dictators who should be removed and those who should be retained. Going forward, the question for those who support uprisings for democracy and human rights is the extent to which this unprecedented principle and intervention on behalf of the Libyan opposition that has been sanctioned by the Security Council would serve as a precedent. Ethiopians seem to be excited about the prospect that a similar situation could occur in Ethiopia. My own prediction is that it will be much harder in the future not to apply the same doctrine in similar situations. However, intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa would take sustained popular resistance and the severity or response from repressive regimes. In my mind, Ivory Coast and Darfur in the Sudan are reminders that neither the inept African Union nor the UN took meaningful stands. In Ethiopia, the principle of one voice for one cause and one destination will be critical. Governments that support the Ethiopian regime know that Ethiopia’s opposition is fractured and harbors elements that will dismember the country. Equally, important is the readiness and willingness of opposition groups and civil society to set aside differences and build on policy themes that unite them rather than on those that divide them. If they do not, they will prolong the life of the regime. This is the most important lesson one draws from the “Battle for Libya.” Commonalities that are genuine and not fabricated differences drive successful changes.
Gaddafi does not see the fracturing of his country and the animosity towards his regime as long-term liabilities. In this sense too, his regime mimics Ethiopia’s. There is no sense of humility. Both regimes characterize dissenters as enemies of the state and the constitution. Neither regime has compassion for human beings or a vested interest in the common future of their respective societies. What drives Gaddafi is staying in power irrespective of costs to the population. The same is true for the Ethiopian regime. In a boastful and arrogant broadcast mid-March, 2011, Gaddafi announced that his defense forces including the Air Force were ready to crush the “enemy” in Benghazi, the second largest city in the country. He urged the one million inhabitants of the city to come to their senses and demanded that those with weapons turn them over to his regime. He said that there will be no “mercy against those who resist.” It is this threat against opponents that outraged the world; and frightened innocent civilians of massacres to come. What occurred in Ethiopia in the aftermath of the 2005 elections is identical. For both regimes, those who defend freedom and democracy for everyone are “enemies.” Both use the ethnic and sectarian cards in their respective countries to squash any opposition. Both are merciless.
The Arab League and the African Union: contrasts in courage
I believe regional institutions are important for Africans and Arabs in asserting their voices in a changing world. Equally important is the notion that African and Arab intellectual and opinion leaders must be heard and must play the vital role of conducting research and expressing their views on matters that affect their homelands and regions. The anachronistic view that Eurocentric and Pro Western scholars should continue to command the airwaves does not go with the democratic aspirations and hopes of hundreds of millions of people including educated youth and middle classes who are part and parcel of the Internet and social media revolution. The same is true for regional organizations. They can and should play prominent roles in resolving conflicts and in promoting greater economic and political integration and freedom. For the first time in its existence, the Arab League took the unprecedented step of asking the United Nations to impose a “no fly zone” in Libya, one of its members. This is precedent setting. When this happened, many Ethiopians wondered if the African Union would ever have the stamina to go against members accused of gross human rights violations including genocide. The Arab League’s announcement provided moral courage to the opposition that fought against the odds, especially in cities such as Benghazi. The opposition set-up and publicized an alternative council that performs state functions; and conducts active diplomacy. In turn, these developments and the sheer determination of the opposition encouraged the world community to pay closer attention. Gaddafi’s brutality against his own people; the threat that he will be “merciless;” and the resolve of the ill-equipped opposition provided pro opposition countries such as Qatar, France, the United Kingdom and the United States the diplomatic platform they needed to isolate and de-legitimatize Gaddafi. On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 endorsing a “no fly zone.” This resolution allowed the UN to protect civilians against “bombardments and massacres.” The decision restores faith and confidence among Libyan opposition groups and offers hope in the rest of Africa and the Middle East to those who wish to achieve democratic change. It is true that the struggle has taken longer than most observers had predicted. What is the lesson here?
On March 19, 2011, a coalition led by the United States begun dismantling Gaddafi’s strategic military bases. In announcing implementation of the “no fly zone” resolution, President Obama announced that this was not his first or preferred “choice.” Gaddafi’s arrogance that bordered on madness forced the community of nations to take bold actions before massacres took place. The French, British, Italians, Spaniards, Moroccans, Saudis, Qataris and other Arab League countries joined the campaign at different levels. This, in my view, is genuinely one of the most important global initiatives in stopping massacres and empowering freedom seeking people anywhere. For repressive regimes out there who get away with crimes against humanity, the Libyan case sets a precedent that can’t be denied to other freedom seeking people anywhere in the world. The uprising in Libya has a better chance of success because of unprecedented steps taken by the Arab League, the United Nations Security Council; and more importantly, by Libyans who reject oppression. The opposition translated a declaration of intent into practice. Gaddafi illustrated the tragic face of tyrants who will go to the extent of killings thousands when they face threats. There is no substitute to the principle that the work of mobilizing empathy and support from the international community comes from the extraordinary work of ordinary people willing and ready to sacrifice their lives for a better tomorrow. Libyans, Syrians, and Yemenis die for freedom and for a better tomorrow. They do not suffer from the prospect of dismemberment of their respective societies regardless of the duration of conflict. Here is the reason why? They rejected sectarianism and the notion of “tribes with flags” that lead to dismemberment.
Elites say that if Ethiopians wish to achieve a democratic future, they must collaborate and accept the notion that freedom from oppression is indivisible; and that people will succeed if they unite for a greater cause. If this is the case, I take it that they agree that they will struggle as Ethiopians with a common future. It is true that the Ethiopian regime is brutal and governs through fear and ethnic division. It is possible that, in any uprising in Ethiopia, thousands may die. We see in the behaviors and actions of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, President Assad of Syria and President Salah of Yemen and the rulers of Bahrain that brutal regimes do not give up power easily. Evidence in 2005 shows that, in an uprising, the Ethiopia regime will resort to the same tactics as Gaddafi, the ruling families of Bahrain, dictators in Syria and Yemen: apply brute force and use the military to assault the population. Libya’s Gaddafi offers the prospect that the International Court of Justice in Geneva will find him and his team guilty of crimes against humanity. Yet, he does not seem to care that his families would not find a safe haven anywhere. Ethiopians feel that the same will happen to Meles Zenawi. Despite this hope, there are differences between Libya and Ethiopia that I feel is ignored by Ethiopian dissidents. For example, opposition groups are as divided as ever; and civil society is in the first phases of formation. The road ahead is tougher and harder in Ethiopia than in Libya, Syria or Yemen or Bahrain. Before the opposition camp can do well, it must accept the notion that Ethiopians share a common problem and will be heading towards a common destiny.
The history of brute force against opponents under the military and current dictatorship is so fresh in the minds of the older generation that Ethiopia’s “bulging youth” has no model to emulate. Mothers and fathers sacrificed their sons and daughters in the 1960s, 1970s and throughout the 1990s and in this century. Youth fought courageously to bring democratic change. Ethiopian society is not new to popular uprisings. The notion itself started with activist Ethiopian youth more than a half century ago. One of the biggest and youth led popular uprisings took place against the Imperial regime in the 1970s. Ethiopian youth have been relentless in their struggle against oppression since then. These uprisings are internal; and are rooted in youth and middle class elites. In the information age, Ethiopian youth does not have the tools to stimulate change within the country compared to Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans, Syrians and Yemenis. This does not mean that the potential does not exist. For this reason, Ethiopian experts I approached feel that leadership for change must come from the country’s large Diaspora. I do not share this view. Sustainable change must come from the Ethiopian population itself, especially youth. I know that the majority of Ethiopians do not want to live in misery, destitution, and repression. What they resent most is that Ethiopian opposition groups continue their tradition of acrimony among one another and give little time to the commonalities the Ethiopian people deserve. Ethiopians resent the fact that elites sit back and looking at events, afraid to challenge authority and make meaningful contributions toward freedom and democracy. As much as those of us on the outside make a mockery of democracy in Ethiopia, I am obliged to suggest that we should also soul search if we practice democratic behaviors among ourselves. I do not believe we do. Our ability to tolerate dissent and differences is among the lowest imaginable.
The façade of elections and the rest
Similar to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, the façade of periodic elections is a joke in Ethiopia. In 2010, the governing party declared that it won 99.6 percent of the votes. How is this possible? Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, the Ethiopian regime plants spies even among students and in the Ethiopian Diaspora. It threatens voters and the opposition. Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, many give up and leave the country in search of alternatives abroad or are silent. Corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and cronyism make business entry in Ethiopia prohibitive. William Dobson did a marvelous piece in the Washington Post on January 6, 2011, that captures the essence of what dictators do regardless of country. In “Dictatorship for Dummies, Tunisia edition,” Dobson identifies 7 themes from which dictators could learn but don’t. One, “Be repressive, but don’t over do it.” Dictators are least amenable in adopting to change. They have a vested interest in preserving the system that offers them wealth and riches beyond their wildest dreams. Two, “Don’t try to be Singapore.” It is interesting to note that intellectual supporters of the Ethiopian government believe that rapid growth and development occur under an exclusive and repressive environment. This is a preference for dictatorial rather than democratic governance. I do not subscribe to this view. These folks are quick to point out lessons from countries such as China, Singapore, and Korea-during their formative stage of development. Comparatively speaking, China has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world. China is as dissimilar to Ethiopia as is the US in terms of development. Aside from everything else, advocates of the dictatorship model fail to recognize enormous cultural differences and political patterns that are unique to each. Differences between Ethiopia and Singapore are night and day regardless of the misapplication of the developmental state.1/
Dictatorships may seem the same. In my view they differ from country to country. Benevolent dictators like Emperor Haile Selassie are not the same as the head of State under the Military Dictatorship that replaced him. The current Prime Minister is not the same as the head of state he replaced. For sure their respective governances were or are consistently rated poor. There are value differences among dictators around the globe. President Suharto of Indonesia was one of the most ruthless and corrupt dictators in the world. He distinguished himself as a nationalist and helped to build Indonesia’s economy. When I worked there in the early 1990s, Indonesian friends told me that the country was corrupt. However, the “money was kept in the country. Corrupt officials built schools, hospitals, bridges and other infrastructure, factories” and so on. Lee Kuan Yew, President of Singapore was a dictator. He built one of the most successful economies in the world. He was, first and foremost, a Singaporean nationalist who built outstanding national institutions, designed and implemented economic and social policies that boosted domestic capabilities and made the country an economic powerhouse. I am not justifying corruption or dictatorship of any type. I merely want to show differences among a sample of dictators. Competence, dedication to national institutions and equitable development make enormous difference to societies. Singapore became part of what is commonly known as the “East Asian Miracle” and Indonesian is on its way. Among the distinguishing features of the “East Asian Tiger” countries are diversification of their national economies and investments in human capital. Empowerment of the population was central to their development. They each emphasized diversification of their national economies, including manufacturing and export of industrial and manufactured goods, highly educated workforces, modern infrastructure, banking and finance and competitive markets. None relied on a single product or service to develop. None gave up sovereignty. In this regard, Egypt’s economy is diverse and Tunisia is more like Ethiopia.
Tunisia depends on “wealthy European vacationers” to keep it growing. Today, Ethiopia depends heavily on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in its fertile farmlands to achieve its development and transformation agenda. In doing this, the regime leaves policies, cultures, and structures almost intact. Both Ethiopia and Tunisia fail to see the critical role of diversification, broad-based, integrated, and homegrown institutions and development policies and programs in reducing poverty and in attaining sustainable development. Three, “Give young people passports” and they will find jobs abroad and send remittances. Dobson is absolutely right. “If you can’t get everyone a job, encourage emigration. It is the best way to get rid of educated young people who will only cause you headaches when they realize that they can’t find work or must live with their parents.” This is exactly what the Ethiopian regime has done and continues to do. It forces nationalist technical and professional people to leave the country in droves. Its ethnic policy serves a similar purpose. Dobson could have added that a repressive government can’t afford to massacre or jail all of its young people when they dissent and revolt. They face world condemnation and eventual fall. None of the “East Asian Tiger” countries resorted to forceful expulsions of their young and highly educated people. They created conditions to stimulate creativity, innovation and productivity. Some went further and invited their Diasporas back. Unlike leaders of these successful economies, the TPLF core has no love for country or empathy for people outside its ethnic circle. In this sense, the regime is not any different from other dictatorships except for its ethnic policy. Take the Saudi Arabian regime and look into its soul. Many poor Ethiopians, especially young girls, immigrate to Saudi Arabia in search of jobs. Astonishing as it may seem, the Saudi government does not encourage its young people to emigrate. It keeps them at home without jobs. In one of the richest countries in the world where those below 18 years old constitute 60 percent of the population, 40 percent live in poverty. Seventy percent of Saudis can’t afford to buy a home. Ninety percent of public and private sector employees are foreigners, such as those from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Philippines and India. Foreign employees are cheaper and do not demand political or civil rights. They just work for wages that are better than those in their home countries. The Saudi regime is among the most corrupt and according to an article in the Wall Street Journal dated February 15, 2011, “inept.” It is run by an extended royal family network, almost similar to the ethnic network of high level decision-makers in Ethiopia. The face of corruption is the same whether in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, or Ethiopia. 2/
Four, “Let the opposition exist-just don’t let it win.” Ethiopians have heard Prime Minister Meles Zenawi– in power for close to 21 years– opine repeatedly that a strong opposition is good for the country. He says that he welcomes peace and reconciliation. Evidence shows that both have to be done under his terms and conditions. The All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) was humiliated because its leaders accepted a Code of Conduct dictated by the governing party. It lost public confidence and suffered in the elections in 2010. The governing party squashed opposition parties in 2005 and made them totally non-existent by the next election in 2010. In the early 1990s, the TPLF had vowed that it will never allow opposition parties to win “even once.”So, the rhetoric of wanting a strong opposition is a sham. I agree with Dobson that when faced with challenge, a dictatorial regime “faces a choice-retreat or lash out.” In Ethiopia, the regime prefers to “lash out.” In Egypt, President Mubarak lashed out and caused an untold number of deaths and injuries. In the end, he lost with disgrace. 3/
Five, “Give them newspapers.” The Ethiopian press is largely government owned and run. The few independent news organizations operate within strict boundaries. There is no free and independent press. The media propagates government propaganda. Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, dissidents are not allowed to conduct investigative reports. The regime intimidates websites, news organizations and even individuals who live and work abroad. It bans foreign broadcasts critical of the regime. It uses information technology to spy and to intimidate. The case of Ethiopian Review, one of the most consistent and passionate critics of the governing party comes to mind. Not only is the Ethiopian government committed to cyber warfare against this media, it encourages Sheikh al-Amoudi, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Ethiopian political system, to bring a civil suit against the Editor. This audacity to intimidate Ethiopian free and independent press abroad would not have been possible without encouragement from the regime and tolerance from Western countries. The West fails to see that its long-term interests reside in its willingness and readiness to support the democratic aspirations of the majority and not the dictatorship in power. President Obama’s–post-Egypt protests at Tahrir Square that is changing political thinking–repeated comments that people have fundamental rights to peaceful protest, access to information and political organization. These are most encouraging for those who seek freedom. I hope this positive posture will repeat itself in Africa too. 4/
Six, “Never negotiate with an angry mob,” reminds me of what happened in the aftermath of the 2005 elections in which hundreds of Ethiopians, mostly youth, were massacred. The regime never entertained to seek forgiveness from the families of the victims or from the Ethiopian people. Its ethos is to blame others and stay in power at any cost and by any means necessary. Innocent lives do not matter. They are just numbers and not human beings. This leads me to Dobson’s most important seventh point, namely, “The people actually matter.” I have always argued that development is about people. It is their effective and consistent participation that would move mountains. Growth happens for a variety of reasons, including pumping billions of dollars in foreign aid. As a recipient of generous aid to the tune of over $3.2 billion in 2010 and more than $30 billion over the past 20 years, the regime had to show concrete results on the ground. It had to build roads and other infrastructure; increase school enrollments; provide better access to health care; and reduce poverty. Donors won’t lend or grant large sums of money each and every year unless they see some results. They are accountable to tax payers. It is their business. For those who claim that the Ethiopian economy is changing, I say yes. However, who benefits the most from growth? What is its depth and breadth? Has the fundamental structure changed? Has hunger become history? Is there substantial diversification? Have the lives of the vast majority improved dramatically? Why is there another famine that is killing an untold number of children and mothers in the Ogaden and other locations? Have girls achieved equity? Why are 46 percent of fairly well educated Ethiopians interested in emigrating? It is ordinary Ethiopians who must be asked whether growth has changed their lives materially or not. The fact that the regime is an ally of the United States or the United Kingdom or China does not change the dire picture on the ground. 5/
I am obliged to add an eighth theme namely, ‘Justify income inequality as the price of pursuing growth’. I like to start with a positive note. Conceptually, I share the regime’s goal of transforming the Ethiopian economy into middle income status over the coming five years or so. I support investments in infrastructure and endorse substantial investments in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. Transforming the Ethiopian economy is a noble objective. The problem is that this growth strategy is top-down and does not involve the population. It is growth by elites and for elites. I also differ substantially how these goals could be achieved without radical structural and policy changes. The Ethiopian people deserve to be at the center of the growth and development process.
I would go further than Dobson. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, ordinary people are telling regimes that they can no longer accept oppression and socioeconomic exclusion. They seem to say that people and not elites at the top are the motive forces for investments, growth and development. FDI that does not recognize national aspirations and interests of ordinary people is exploitative–even when invited by a regime such as in Ethiopia. It is broad–based participation of people that distinguishes a competent and nationally oriented regime such as Singapore from Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Without people, growth expands opportunities only for elites and a few loyalists who are willing to trade conscience and principle for wealth. Without people, regimes invite foreigners to exploit their natural resources. These models of economic development leave the rest of the population out of the growth process. Without people, powerful elites eventually fail, as the Egyptian and Tunisian cases illustrate. The current socioeconomic and political system in Ethiopia is not sustainable for one simple reason. The population is outside the development process entirely. This non-participatory, discriminatory, and exclusionary process will contribute to an uprising in Ethiopia. How this plays out is not the purpose of this article. 6/
Part III of this series will unravel the contending positions of Egypt and Ethiopia concerning the development and use of the Nile or Abay River. It is one the most explosive policy matters of the 21st century on which Ethiopian opposition groups should discuss and present alternative positions in support of the Ethiopian people.
(The writer, Aklog Birara, PhD, is an Adjunct Professor at Trinity University, Washington DC, and Senior Advisor at the World Bank, retired)
Notes:
1. Dobson, W. “Dictatorship for dummies.” The Washington Post. January 6, 2011.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. “African Presidents and Prime Ministers: performance index for 2010-2011.” East African Journal. January, 2011.
Reuters is reporting that Eritrea’s president Isaias Afwerki is heading to Ugandan capital Kampala this week for a 3-day state visit. There is a wide-spread speculation that Uganda’s dictator has invited Isaias to broker a peace deal with Ethiopia’s khat-addicted tyrant Meles Zenawi. It’s highly doubtful, but if the speculation is true, and if Yoweri Musseveni succeeds in normalizing relations between Woyanne and Eritrea, it will be a big blow to Ethiopia. Fueling the speculation is a “breaking news” by Meskerem.net today that Woyanne’s boss Meles Zenawi has called Eritrean opposition groups for urgent meeting in Addis Ababa on Wednesday. Meles and his Woyanne thugs will be gone soon one way or another. Eritrea’s government needs to take the long-term view and build strong relationship with the people of Ethiopia, instead of making peace with the Woyanne junta that is barely surviving. Read the Reuters report below:
Uganda invites Eritrea leader for visit
KAMPALA (Reuters) – Uganda has invited Eritrea’s leader, President Isaias Afewerki, accused by the West of stoking Somalia’s Islamist rebellion and destabilising the east African region, to a state visit next week, Uganda’s State House said.
Eritrea rejoined the East African bloc IGAD last month, four years after it walked out on the body in protest at arch-foe Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia to oust an Islamist administration the United States said had ties to al Qaeda.
“Eritrea is one of the strategically vital countries to the stability of the region, especially in the Horn of Africa and the wider global agenda,” State House said in a statement late on Thursday.
A U.N. Monitoring Group report on Somalia and Eritrea said in late July that Asmara was bankrolling al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab militants in Somalia. Al Shabaab claimed they were behind a twin suicide bomb attack on the Ugandan capital, Kampala, last year.
Horn of Africa experts say that Isaias has become increasingly diplomatically isolated. Leader of one of the world’s most secretive states, Isaias makes few state visits.
The U.N. has imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea, as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze on Eritrean political and military leaders who it says are violating an arms embargo on Somalia.
Asmara denies the charges, and accuses the United States and neighbouring Ethiopia of “irresponsible interference”. (Reporting by Elias Biryabarema; Writing by Richard Lough; Editing by Giles Elgood)
I tend to think that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopian fascination with the Tunisian and Egyptian popular revolutions exceeds any other. This admiration emanates from wishes and aspirations among Ethiopia’s youth and the small middle class to see similar changes in their homeland. I admit that it is too early to draw conclusive parallels between the “Jasmine Revolution,” Tahrir Square and the popular “Arab Spring” youth and middle class-led revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and the rest of North Africa and the Middle East on the one hand and aspirations in Ethiopia on the other. However, I contend that the core social, economic and political triggers are almost the same. These include repressive governance, growing income inequality, endemic corruption, illicit outflow of resources, bulge in the youthful population that sees no hope for the future, poverty, hunger, food price inflation and shortages, dependency on external funding, and a government that is completely out of touch from the needs of the population.
Most Ethiopians in the Diaspora appreciate the huge differences between Ethiopia on the one hand and Tunisia and Egypt on the other. At the same time, they feel that there are similarities. The Egyptian popular uprising has been in the making for at least three decades, Ethiopia’s for 20 years. Ethiopian intellectuals assert that popular revolts in Egypt and Tunisia benefitted hugely from unique internal conditions that are not prevalent in Ethiopia. Some have difficulty recognizing differences that are likely to determine the fate of the country. Nevertheless, they identify at least six important attributes as instrumental in both countries that differ from Ethiopia. These unique country identities do not in any shape underestimate ideological and sectarian or class differences that exist. Over the past two months, we saw manifestations of sharp class and values differences among political leaders in one of the most mature democracies in the world, the United States. Differences are thus a way of life. How they are resolved is the critical factor that determines political wisdom and maturity in any country. A successful uprising does not necessarily mean that normalcy follows soon after. The day after is as important as the day before an uprising. Lingering differences in class and ideology surfaced when former President Mubarak came to Cairo on August 4, 2011 and sat on a stretcher to face charges for crimes against humanity, embezzlement, and corruption and operation against the interests of the Egyptian people. Clearly, Mubarak has his supporters who benefitted enormously from his dictatorial regime. The fact that he is facing trial in his own country by his own people is one of the most extraordinary achievements of the Egyptian revolution. Some Ethiopians genuinely believe that a similar situation is tenable in Ethiopia. I am doubtful that all Ethiopians are willing and ready to work collaboratively for the good of the country and its diverse population for a similar situation to emerge. The fact that one of the most powerful and oppressive leaders in the Arab world had to face the humiliation of being caged in as if he is a common criminal is remarkable. This should embolden Ethiopians to close ranks and focus on one core principle that makes sense: organize and strive to achieve a people or citizen-led and centered change of freedom that will serve the interests of all of the Ethiopian people, and not elites. In my assessment, the culture of division among all sorts of opposition groups is the single most critical barrier to change than the regime itself. Division for all sorts of reasons prolongs the longevity of the regime.
With this backdrop, I shall discuss the key differences between Ethiopia on the one hand and Egypt and Tunisia on the other.
First and foremost is that the two Arab countries share a common thread of overall {www:homogeneity}of their population. Ethiopia’s population estimated at 90 million this year is composed of 80 different ethnic groups. Diversity is an asset as long as the socioeconomic and political system empowers each member and recognizes the fundamental right to engage and participate fully, freely, and peaceably.
Second, Tunisia and Egypt possess a critical national institution in the composition and role of their defense establishments. They are national and highly respected. In Ethiopia, a minority ethnic clique transformed a liberation movement into a defense establishment to protect the party and state by dismantling its national or Ethiopian characteristics. The lack of fair and balanced representation in the armed forces reinforces the dictatorial and {www:exclusionary} nature of the regime commanded by the Tigrean minority that dominates the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Most Ethiopians feel that the defense establishment’s predominantly minority ethnic-composition in the command structure weakens its national character and role. The regime expects that the defense establishment will come to its rescue In the event of an uprising. It did it in 2005 and there is no guarantee that it will not do it again. Ethiopians appreciate the fact that Egypt’s defense establishment represents the country as a unified whole. Despite sectarian, class and ideological differences, there is no indication that Egypt suffers from ethnicity or {www:irreconcilable} ideology. Ethiopians admire the fact Egyptians and Tunisians fight as nationals of their respective countries. Politically designed ethnic divide and rules undermine the Ethiopian body politic in that it pities one group against another. Elites fall into this trap almost all the time. They hope that this corrosive culture does not spread to religion. Muslims and Christians have an established tradition of peaceful co-existence that the governing party now manipulates to maintain permanent suspense.
Third, the populations in Tunisia and Egypt show enormous respect for their national institutions. Political elites do not revise their histories. Many are not so sure if Ethiopian elites are uniformly patriotic and bound by the same national spirit and respect for their national institutions, heritage, cultures, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. If there is no sense of commonness, the struggle forward will be much harder if not impossible.
Fourth, both Tunisia and Egypt have larger middle and highly educated classes that are cohesive than Ethiopia’s. This attribute is decisive in any uprising. Egyptians and Tunisians benefited enormously from representation of cross-sections of their populations: teachers, mechanics, doctors, street vendors, the poor, and the middle class were involved. This type of mobilization and determination makes a difference. In these countries, youth denied those used to petty jealousies, rivalry, and hatreds political space and embraced those who were inclusive and forward-looking. Can one say the same about Ethiopians? I am not so sure. 1/
Fifth, Tunisians and Egyptians enjoy more access to information technology than Ethiopians do. This is a critical difference. Ethiopia is among the least technology-friendly countries in the world. This is not by choice but by government design. In North Africa and the Middle East, the technological tools activists need—Internet, Mobile phones, Face Book, You Tube, Twitter, and newspapers are more readily available than to Ethiopians. In this century, it will be much harder to initiate popular uprisings without these tools.
Sixth, Tunisians and Egyptians used banners, flags, and symbols that mirror national identities. “We are Tunisians and Egyptians.” These themes {www:resonate} with the vast majority of Ethiopians who feel that the governing party uses ethic divide and rule to govern the country without the participation of the population. The general sentiment is that when people unite as one, no power can stop them. Ethiopians admire these attributes about Egypt and Tunisia. They just need to reflect on what it takes to translate lessons into tools.
Egypt has a special appeal for Ethiopians for two reasons: Ethiopia and Egypt share the Nile River and have a long history in terms of religious, cultural, and political interactions that go back thousands of years. The Ethiopian and Egyptian Coptic faiths have a great deal in common. Ethiopians watched attentively various media on February 1, 2011 when close to two million Egyptians from diverse backgrounds gathered at Tahrir Square to pray and protest together for a common purpose. Ethiopians with access to the media admired civility, national pride, and unity among Egyptians. The message that came across was this: Egyptians did not suffer from irreconcilable ideological, political, and tribal, gender, and demographic, religious, and social, differences. They subordinated differences to the greater quest of freedom, the rule of law, human rights, and political pluralism. The Egyptian flag served as a symbol of national identity and unity. The vast majority of protestors displayed levels of discipline and camaraderie unparalleled anywhere. In doing this, they took away the legitimacy and moral authority of the state that had kept them in chains. In particular, Ethiopians admired the Egyptian defense establishment that refused to “kill” its own citizens. This contrasts with Ethiopia where hundreds were killed and more than 40,000 people jailed by security and police forces in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. The defense establishment stood silent. Had the situation deteriorated, it would have taken sides. The parallel that seems similar to Egypt is the grassroots-based popular revolution in Ethiopia that brought down the Imperial regime in the 1970s, and the huge protests in support of democratization in 2005. In both instances, Ethiopians struggled and protested as one people. Differences and similarities aside, Ethiopians continue to feel that Egypt and Tunisia offer them tantalizing lessons in peaceful change. As recently as June 12, 2011, Ethiopians in the Diaspora held various forums on the “Ethiopian Awakening and the Arab Spring” at which prominent Egyptians shared lessons of experience from people-led and grassroots revolutions. Emphasis is “Be bold and resolute.”
The search for freedom, justice, the rule of law and people-centered governance is the same in all three countries and in many Sub-Saharan African countries governed b y dictatorial governments. These aspirations for hope and freedom should not at all mask substantial differences between multi-national Ethiopia and Egypt and Tunisia. Recognition of these differences will help anchor the quest for freedom anchored in Ethiopia within context. Tunisia has an expanding and highly educated youth, and a rising and urbanized middle class with a cadre of professionals within the country and a Diaspora that is politically connected. This is the same for Egypt. Both countries are more urbanized and integrated with developed nations than Ethiopia. Repression, oppression, concentration of wealth in a few hands, corruption, high youth unemployment, food price inflation, and income inequality are deep in all three countries. Unmet expectations in employment, income inequality, suffocating bureaucracy and corruption are hallmarks in all three. The outside world, including the aid and humanitarian factory businesses portray all three as generally stable and growing. For example, “The IMF’s last country report on Egypt published in April 2010” noted that “sustained and wide-ranging reforms since 2004 had reduced fiscal, monetary, and external vulnerabilities, and improved the investment climate.” I recall the IMF representative to Ethiopia said the same thing commending the Ethiopian government for improving the lives of the population. Hunger, famine, seven million orphans, the flight of talent out of the country, skyrocketing food prices, and restrictions on the private sector do not bother the IMF or other financial and aid institutions. Their role is to lend and to defend their activities by siding with governments, and not with the population.
Ethiopia is one of the “hungriest and unhealthiest countries” on this planet. Those with wealth and power do not suffer from these national ailments and live by defending a rotten system that keeps poor people poor and forces the middle class to join the poor. The governing party and its zealous, fanatic, and irrational supporters deny the existence of hunger, famine, and destitution in the country. Sixty to seventy percent of Ethiopian youth is unemployed. There are 7 million orphans. Today, more than 4.5 million Ethiopians face famine. Despite these facts, the IMF finds nothing wrong with chronic inflation stimulated through deficit financing and aid. It commends the regime for improving the standard of living of the population. Ethiopian academics say that the IMF finds nothing wrong with youth unemployment, endemic corruption, and illicit outflow of funds from one of the poorest countries on this planet. In its previous report on Egypt, the IMF had said that, “economic performance was better than expected, although headline inflation remains elevated.” I wonder if this commendation took account of the lives of ordinary Egyptians including youth. Most Ethiopian elites feel that multinational agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank do injustice to the poor and youth by presenting rosy pictures of countries that face social crisis. “There were imminent, overwhelming problems that either evaded the IMF’s attention or it chose not to report. The risk of a social explosion would have been obvious to observers, right. Not to the IMF.” 2/
High youth unemployment in all three countries is a common thread as are the sizes of their youth populations that need jobs, incomes, and homes. Almost 40 million Ethiopians were born after 1991 and the millions of orphans for which Ethiopia is famous are consequences of poverty. Youth have experiences only with one ruling party and one leader in their lifetime. The Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, rules with an iron-fist and has been in power for 20 years. The same is true for millions of Tunisian and Egyptian youth whose rebelled and overthrew theirs. Bloomberg estimates that Tunisia must create 1 million jobs per year to keep up with those entering the labor market each year. Ethiopia seems to have given up on the prospect of creating jobs for millions. The economy has stalled and the private sector is not expanding at a rate that corresponds to domestic demand. Thousands of youth immigrate to all corners of the world each month because they do not see their future in the country. If Ethiopia cannot meet the demands of food self-sufficiency and security today with 90 million people, most of them young, what economic and social miracle does the government expect to cope with 278 million by 2050? The social and economic situation in Ethiopia is direr than the situations in Tunisia and Egypt.
“The worsening economy, combined with repression and resentment of corruption around President Ben Ali, set Tunisia up for a fall. The protests started when a 26 year old fruit and vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi, set fire to himself on December 17, 2010.” Ethiopians were awed and moved by a death that led to the “Jasmine Revolution.” Ethiopians contend that the level oppression and repression by the one party state and the gross inequality brought by the system are far worse than anything is in North Africa and the Middle East. The Tunisian uprising and its ramifications seem moved the hearts and minds of a growingly restive, and youth population in Ethiopia. The country’s double-digit growth masks structural and policy distortions and imbalances in Ethiopia the same way as they did in Tunisia, Egypt, and the same way as they are manifesting in several countries in the Middle East. Similar to Ethiopia–non-oil producing economy–, growth in Tunisia disguised high unemployment, skyrocketing prices, and gross income inequality between the have and the have-nots. Ethiopia’s gaping inequality and stark life differences between those who control the state and the economy and the majority who find it difficult to eat two meals a day is a time bomb waiting to explode. This, I predict with confidence. No person accepts a verdict by someone in power who blurts out in a private setting in Addis Ababa, “let them eat dirt and stone; they did not vote for our party.” In Ethiopia, life and death are very dependent on ethnic and political loyalty. Increasingly, poverty is partial. 3/
What motivates youth to die for and change systems?
Ethiopia is poorer and less developed than Egypt and Tunisia. At the end of 2010, Bloomberg estimated that Tunisia had a per capita income of US9, 500 compared to Ethiopia at US$370, a staggering difference. Sixty-seven percent of the Tunisian population is urbanized. Eighty percent of Ethiopians live in rural areas. Tunisia has one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world and Ethiopia one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. High levels of literacy, an educated and rising middle class, urbanization, and technology savvy youth with easy access to television, the Internet, mobile phones, You Tube, Twitter, and newspapers eased communication during the uprising. Contrast these assets to Ethiopian youth with low incomes who rent newspapers to seek jobs. The communication tools that are abnormal in Ethiopia are standards in other parts of the world. Modern communication tools are prerequisites in strengthening social networking, and in stimulating change. I am not saying that peaceful change cannot take place without information technology (IT). It will be much harder though. Repression and fear did not deter Tunisia’s urban and integrated population from organizing and sharing information quickly and effectively.
In contrast, Ethiopia is one of the world’s least networked and urbanized countries in the world. The governing party designed this dysfunctional social architecture deliberately to keep the population disconnected from one another. High illiteracy among the rural population reinforces control, a sense of detachment and sheer isolation. The country’s young adults defined as those aged between 15 and 29 years exceed 50.3 percent, almost similar to Tunisia. This is why demographers call this age cluster a “bulge” that may explode anytime anywhere. This group demands and deserves unrestricted political rights, civil liberties and equitable access in education, health care, housing, information technology, employment and creation of enterprises. Just think of one simple example Ethiopia’s haves and have-nots face each day. A hard working Ethiopian who faces economic hurdles each day is unlikely to continue to watch his child starve while those with political and economic power feed their children with ease. No one will continue to tolerate a socioeconomic and political system in which a privileged few amass wealth and live well, and the majority work hard but cannot afford food to eat. The difference between those in powers and with ill-gotten wealth and those on the periphery are stark enough that officials and their supporters are widely accused of economic and social crimes. I suggest that anyone who denies the face of famine and starvation looks at the heart-wrenching faces of children and women in the Ogaden and the poorest of the poor in the streets of Addis Ababa and other major cities. Senior officials and their supporters in the Diaspora continue agonizing economic and social life as the new normal, as if the Ethiopian poor and most vulnerable are born to die poor. The Ethiopian government relies on continued exodus of the country’s youthful age group to foreign countries as a permanent solution to its poor and repressive governance and economic mismanagement. Like Tunisians and Egyptians, Ethiopians say that the government must open opportunities and allow unrestricted freedoms to harness information technology and to create small and medium size enterprises that would employ millions. 4/
In contrast to Tunisia, isolation is a way of life in rural Ethiopia. This sector of the society is practically shutout of the information revolution that has swept the rest of the world including the rural poor in countries such as Bangladesh and India. This, compounded by fear and regime reinforcement of ethnic and religious differences is a self-reinforcing closed system. Ethiopia’s poor has minimal or no education. Representation of females in schools and public positions is among the lowest in Africa. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Ethiopia’s poor have no time to reflect and to protest. They are largely isolated from one another and fragmented along ethnic and religious lines, and cannot share information with one another. Denial of access to information that is standard in the rest of the world allows the regime and ethnic elites to manipulate, divide, coerce, entice, and keep the poor and the disconnected under permanent fear and control. The regime knows that information is power; and it denies it because of its potency. Illiteracy, restrictive access to information and near total isolation of the rural poor from one another and from the world beyond makes them weak and vulnerable. This is why Ethiopians in the Ogaden or in Gambella suffer silently and in isolation from the rest. The regime’s draconian measures against the population in 2005 are still fresh in the minds of people. The regime perfected the instruments of command and control by placing a premium on ethnic and ideological loyalty over common and shared public interest. Ethiopians say that the regime uses ethnic fear to bolster divisions, mutual suspicion, and disempowerment, and to create an astrosphere of permanent suspense. The regime bribes the poor, educated alike, and forces them to its side. It uses humanitarian and other forms of aid as instruments of control and division.
Whether one believes it or or not, Ethiopia is the largest aid recipient in Africa and the third largest in the world after Afghanistan and Iraq. Donors know that the regime uses aid as a political instrument to punish opponents and to reward supporters. Donors know that, unlike youth in Tunisia and Egypt, Ethiopians do not enjoy unrestricted access to information. They know that fear permeates the society, and breeds more fear rather than bold and daring response to repression, oppression, and poverty. Accepting this fear culture is thus a self-fulfilling prophecy. If one wants freedom and choice, one must fight for it. The governing party boasts that this is how it arrived at state power. One does not need to accept its challenge. Tunisians and Egyptians teach us that change is inevitable as long as millions are ready to fight and die for political freedom and economic opportunity. Here is a huge hurdle Ethiopians need to cross if they want peaceful change. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, most talented intellectuals hide behind the mask of anonymity waiting for miracles to occur. They want freedom for the Ethiopian people and are ashamed to see recurring famine and chronic hunger. However, they think that someone should offer freedom to them on a silver platter. Egyptians and Tunisians showed the world that no power in the world could stop an outraged and angry population. Almost 1,000 Egyptians lost their lives fighting for freedom and dignity. Hundreds are dying for similar causes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Senegalese are fighting for the same; and there will no doubt be more. Most highly educated Ethiopians say that the two North African nations teach us the cardinal lesson that those who wish to establish a people-centered society of freedom—political liberties and human rights—must set aside minor differences and struggle in unison.
Ethiopians remind one another that the country’s youth are not novices to uprisings. They are among the pacesetters of change in Africa. In the 1970s, they closed ranks and brought down the Imperial regime. Repression and brutality by the Socialist Dictatorship from 1974-1991 prompted all segments of society and especially youth to come together as Ethiopians. Popular opinion is that in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian people sowed the whole world commitment to political liberties, human rights and the rule of law. This is generally true. Many say that this remarkable history of popular struggle against oppression for which thousands of innocent Ethiopians sacrificed their lives may serve as a gentle reminder of the potential that exists. Political leaders squandered a rare opportunity for political change because they were shortsighted and self absorbed with power. Well-informed international and domestic experts agree with the Ethiopian public sentiment that the Ethiopian government must respond to five major social and economic problems:
a) Skyrocketing food prices and shortages in urban areas;
b) Persistent hunger in rural areas that requires recurring international emergency food assistance that involves thousands of non-governmental agencies that have made it a source of their own livelihood;
c) High and chronic youth unemployment and underemployment;
d) Gaping income inequality, corruption, and illicit outflow of funds estimated at between US$8.345 to US$11 billion over the last 20 years of TPLF/EPRDF rule; and
e) Closure of political, social, and economic spaces for the vast majority of the population.
These, they argue, constitute the objective social and economic conditions for peaceful revolution in Ethiopia similar to Egypt and Tunisia. The reader should seek no additional material evidence than the current economic {www:turmoil} in the country that afflicts ordinary people, and the famine in the Ogaden and other parts of Southern and Eastern Ethiopia. Behind these staggering economic and social facts are, however, substantial disagreements among Ethiopians on the end vision and alternative, method, organization, and leadership of the democratization process. One is obliged to admit that there is an enormous vacuum in alternative vision, political organization, and leadership. My own view is that social change is inevitable. People will not accept to live and die poor while a limited few with political power and connections enjoy opulent lives in one of the poorest countries in the world. Change can and should be stimulated and led by Ethiopia’s youth, the middle class, and poor resident within the country, with those in the Diaspora providing the requisite material, intellectual and diplomatic support.
Recent experience shows that, in any uprising, the governing party in Ethiopia will react mercilessly and cruelly against citizens irrespective of nationality or age configuration. TPLF and EPRDF supporters genuinely believe that the only way to maintain peace, stability, and security in the country is through brute force that will compel the defense establishment to take sides. This argument, they feel, appeals to Western backers of the regime. Unlike Egypt, my sense is that the politicized and ethnicized defense establishment will defend the regime and Constitution. If you are among those like me who receives some of the most asinine e-mails from hard-core defenders of the TPLF/EPRDF regime, you will appreciate the fact that the top leaders of the government do not believe in negotiation and compromise. They believe in continued dominance of the political and economic system indefinitely. While those who want peaceful change draw hope and inspiration from the Egyptian and Tunisian youth-led and people anchored revolutions, realists, me among them, say that the two countries are different from Ethiopia. They contend rightly that the TPLF/EPRDF regime headed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is much closer to Libya, Syria, and Yemen than Egypt or Tunisia. Just see continued assaults and atrocities on innocent civilians in these countries and deduct implications for Ethiopian society. The TPLF’s basic documents on the economic front reveal how far it has come in negating its own commitment to the Ethiopian people, reinforcing the contending view that its primary objective was not to serve the entire population but to capture political power and with it to assert dominance over the national economy and its natural resources. For example, a newly released document of the TPLF “meglecha” written in Yekatit 1968 Ethiopian calendar states the TPLF will pursue “land reform and bring all of the commanding heights of the economy under national or state control for the benefit of all of the Ethiopian people.” What did it do instead? It transferred national resources from the society to the party and to its core supporters. It invited foreign investors to take over the manufacturing sectors and the most arable lands of the society. It created a corrupt system that facilitates the transfer of billions of dollars out of the country. IN short, political capture of the state led to economic capture of the commanding heights of the national economy. 5/
Accordingly, I would conclude that the objective conditions that trigger popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are similar to those that prevail in Ethiopia. At the same time, I appreciate substantial and substantive differences between Ethiopia on the one hand and Egypt and Tunisia. In Part two of this series, I will identify and diagnose North African and Middle Eastern popular uprisings that come closer to the Ethiopian reality.
*Aklog Birara, PhD is a former Senior Advisor with the World Bank Group. His forthcoming book, The Ethiopian Great Land Giveaway will shed light on yemeret neteka ena kirimit and its implications for the country. [email protected]
Part I identified similarities and differences between the Egyptian and Tunisian popular revolutions on the one hand and conditions in Ethiopia on the other. Differences aside, the Ethiopian admiration for and, interest in the Arab Spring is relentless. In particular, Ethiopia’s democratic and nationalist leaning elites, the majority of whom live scattered around the globe as part of country’s 2 million relatively well-to-do Diaspora, spend inordinate amounts of time analyzing and debating the similarities and differences among North African and Middle Eastern revolutions and their relative merits and relevance to Ethiopia. Regardless of country situations, recurrent themes that resonate with Ethiopians include political repression, violation of human rights and suppression of civil liberties, 60 percent youth unemployment, escalating prices of staples including foods, gaping inequality, corruption, nepotism and ethnic-based discrimination.
Ethiopians agree that the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni regimes are among the most repressive in the world. Given his prominent role in African politics and in the African Union, Colonel Gaddafi is more familiar to Ethiopians than President Assad of Syria and President Salah of Yemen. Colonel Gaddafi has been in power for 41 years. Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian Prime Minister has been in power for more than 20 years. Even in Libya, Syria and Yemen, youth and the middle class tried to close ranks. Their battle cries of “We are all Libyans, Syrians or Yemenis and we are not afraid” appeal to Ethiopians. Ethnic, sectarian and ideological conflicts are pronounced in Libya, Syria and Yemen as they are in Ethiopia. For example, President Assad’s regime is accused of representing a religious minority of the Alawite consisting 12 percent of the population in a country that is 70 percent Sunni. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s Tigray People’s Liberation Party (TPLF) represents a mere 6 percent of the Ethiopian population currently estimated at 90 million. More than 90 percent of the military command of Ethiopia’s defense forces is represented by this minority ethnic group; as are security forces. Democratic activists in Syria contend that President Assad’s government supports the business elite who are beneficiaries of his regime. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is accused of favoring new wealthy urban and Tigrean elite that benefit hugely from his government’s policies and investments. In Syria and Ethiopia, access to wealth and wealth-making assets is dependent on loyalty to the governing party and government.
In Libya, Syria and Yemen opposition groups tried to debunk Gaddafi’s, Assad’s and Salah’s divisive ethnic and sectarian policies. However, success in these countries is taking longer compared to Egypt and Tunisia. While the sizes and sheer determination of opposition groups seem to indicate that the vast majority of their respective populations want freedom and democracy. In Libya, almost similar to Ethiopia, the few who benefit from the Gaddafi regime and his ethnic group stand on his side. This reality and the security and military organization as well as defense equipment amassed over decades enables him to wage war against his own population. A commentator said that Colonel Gaddafi and his core supporters and political base “owns the city of Tripoli.” Libya’s wealthiest and most powerful families live there. Out of fear or self interest or both, this social base seems to “side with him.” Because it is heavily vested in the regime, it seems to disregard that the country is in a state of siege and that Libyans are killing Libyans. Gaddafi feels that a prolonged war is an indicator of legitimacy. He seems to be clueless that at least half of the country is up in arms against his regime; that he and his core supporters are accused of “war crime and crimes against humanity;” and that most of the global community wants to see regime change.
If one peels the Ethiopian socioeconomic and political onion, one will find numerous similarities between Libya under Gaddafi and Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi. The TPLF core leaders succeeded in recruiting and incentivizing cadres and others from different ethnic groups using ethnic and party loyalty and defense of key institutions through periodic political assessments (in Amharic, gimigema). Inherited from the Soviet system, periodic assessments are management tools to get rid-off individuals who are suspect and to bring in others into the fold. While Addis Ababa may not be “owned” by the Ethiopian Prime Minister in contrast to Gaddafi in Libya, there is ample documentary evidence that shows that “Mekele and the rest of Tigray–the ethnic home of the ruling party may be owned by his party,” as one Ethiopian academic opined. Libya comes closer to Ethiopia than the Egyptian and Tunisian cases. Both systems are founded on ethnic and sectarian loyalty. Wealth, assets and influence are acquired on the basis of loyalty and not merit. It is clear that in Libya, ethnic, sectarian and class division have taken toll on the society and on the uprising. The initial battle cry “We are all Libyans” has not penetrated the entire society. It would have been this battle cry of people fighting together against oppression that would have overwhelmed the regime peacefully. Further, the international community did not initially live up to the expectations of the democratic forces in Libya, Syria and Yemen. In part, the community may have felt that “division” would bring a failed state. In part, it may be the Libyan oil factor; and in the case of Yemen, the so-called Al-Qaida factor. A similar situation is still simmering in Bahrain, with a dose of external influence from key regional countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. What Ethiopians learn from these experiences is that the democratic path in each country will be different, with one caveat.
The nature of democratic change
Regardless of unique country situations, success of any uprising in a country the size and complexity of Ethiopia would depend entirely on its appeal to and active engagement of millions of ordinary Ethiopians from all ethnic and other persuasions. Most informed and well educated Ethiopians underscore that change must involve millions of people from all ethnic, religious, social and demographic groups over a sustained period of time. Those who “profited” from the regime must not feel threatened by change. They must be assured that they too have a future. In Libya, those who are vested in the current system feel “threatened” by the democratic upheaval. Those unhappy with the system continue to sacrifice their lives and comforts. This is the reason for the characterization of the civil war as the “Battle for Libya.” In this battle, the international community resolved that it won’t allow a senseless and careless dictator to “slaughter his own people.” NATO strikes against Gaddafi’s forces would not have been politically and strategically feasible if it were not for the valiant positions of the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Libyan opposition. It would have been disastrous for Western democracies not to respond to these regionally orchestrated and led demands by the Arab world for the Arab world. More critical, it would have affected the democratic momentum sweeping the region. Here, I want to inject my own intellectual assessment of the new human rights doctrine that would have been unimaginable in the 20th or in the first decade of this century. The UN system never anticipated the kinds of world changing events as those sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. My sense is that international relations won’t be the same again. A new world is being shaped by new civil forces such as youth and the middle class that demand to be heard; and want access to economic and social opportunities consistently bestowed upon those who capture political power and assume economic hegemony. Africans are used to all forms of injustices: from Slavery to Colonialism and Apartheid to horrific civil wars and genocide.
An emerging doctrine: “The response to protect”
Horrific ethnic genocide in Rwanda taught the world community a cardinal lesson of man’s inhumanity to man. At the time, the UN and major powers kept silent only to grasp the magnitude and implications later. Retrospectively, the UN recognized that its relevance and credibility will depend on averting all forms of genocide including those perpetrated by cruel and repressive regimes against their own people. In the process, the welcomed doctrine of “The response to protect” emerged. It is this doctrine that the UN Security Council applied in Libya. For the first time in world history, dictators and other groups can no longer get away murdering their own. It will be harder for the UN and major Western powers to cherry pick dictators who should be removed and should be retained. Going forward, the question for those who support uprisings for democracy and human rights is the extent to which this unprecedented principle and intervention on behalf of the Libyan opposition that has been sanctioned by the Security Council would serve as a precedent. Ethiopians seem to be excited about the prospect that a similar situation could occur in Ethiopia. My own prediction is that it will be much harder in the future not to apply the same doctrine in similar situations. However, intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa would take sustained popular resistance and the severity or response from repressive regimes. In my mind, Ivory Coast and Darfur in the Sudan are reminders that neither the inept African Union nor the UN took meaningful stands. In Ethiopia, the principle of one voice for one cause and one destination will be critical. Equally, important is the readiness and willingness of opposition groups and civil society to form a viable transitional framework. This is the most important lesson one draw from the “Battle for Libya.”
Gaddafi does not see the fracturing of his country and the animosity towards his regime as long-term liabilities. In this sense too, his regime mimics Ethiopia’s. There is no sense of humility. Both regimes characterize dissenters as enemies of the state and the constitution. Neither regime has compassion for human beings or a vested interest in the common future of their respective societies. What drives Gaddafi is staying in power irrespective of costs to the population. The same is true for the Ethiopian regime. In a boastful and arrogant broadcast mid-March, 2011, Gaddafi announced that his defense forces including the Air Force were ready to crush the “enemy” in Benghazi, the second largest city in the country. He urged the one million inhabitants of the city to come to their senses and demanded that those with weapons turn them over to his regime. He said that there will be no “mercy against those who resist.” It is this threat against opponents that outraged the world; and frightened innocent civilians of massacres to come. What occurred in Ethiopia in the aftermath of the 2005 elections is identical. For both regimes, those who defend freedom and democracy for everyone are “enemies.” Both use the ethnic and sectarian cards in their respective countries to squash any opposition. Both are merciless.
The Arab League and the African Union: contrasts in courage
I believe regional institutions are important for Africans and Arabs in asserting their voices in a changing world. Equally important is the notion that African and Arab intellectual and opinion leaders must be heard and must play the vital role of conducting research and expressing their views on matters that affect their homelands and regions. The anachronistic view that Eurocentric and Pro Western scholars should continue to command the airwaves does not go with the democratic aspirations and hopes of hundreds of millions of people including educated youth and middle classes who are part and parcel of the Internet and social media revolution. The same is true for regional organizations. They can and should play prominent roles in resolving conflicts and in promoting greater economic and political integration.
For the first time in its existence, the Arab League took the unprecedented step of asking the United Nations to impose a “no fly zone” in Libya, one of its members. This is precedent setting. When this happened, many Ethiopians wondered if the African Union would ever have the stamina to go against members accused of gross human rights violations including genocide. The Arab League’s announcement provided moral courage to the opposition that fought against the odds, especially in cities such as Benghazi. The opposition set-up and publicized an alternative council that performs state functions; and conducts active diplomacy. In turn, these developments and the sheer determination of the opposition encouraged the world community to pay closer attention. Gaddafi’s brutality against his own people; the threat that he will be “merciless;” and the resolve of the ill-equipped opposition provided pro opposition countries such as Qatar, France, the United Kingdom and the United States the diplomatic platform they needed to isolate and de-legitimatize Gaddafi. On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 endorsing a “no fly zone.” This resolution allowed the UN to protect civilians against “bombardments and massacres.” The decision restores faith and confidence among Libyan opposition groups and offers hope in the rest of Africa and the Middle East to those who wish to achieve democratic change. What is the lesson here?
On March 19, 2011, a coalition led by the United States begun dismantling Gaddafi’s strategic military bases. In announcing implementation of the “no fly zone” resolution, President Obama announced that this was not his first or preferred “choice.” Gaddafi’s arrogance that bordered on madness forced the community of nations to take bold actions before massacres took place. The French, British, Italians, Spaniards, Moroccans, Saudis, Qataris and other Arab League countries joined the campaign at different levels. This, in my view, is genuinely one of the most important global initiatives in stopping massacres and empowering freedom seeking people anywhere. For repressive regimes out there who get away with crimes against humanity, the Libyan case sets a precedent that can’t be denied to other freedom seeking people anywhere in the world. The uprising in Libya has a better chance of success because of unprecedented steps taken by the Arab League, the United Nations Security Council; and more important by Libyans who reject oppression that translated a declaration of intent into practice. Gaddafi illustrated the tragic face of tyrants who will go to the extent of killings thousands when they face threats. There is no substitute to the principle that the work of mobilizing empathy and support from the international community comes from the extraordinary work of ordinary people willing and ready to sacrifice their lives for a better tomorrow. Libyans, Syrians and Yemenis die for freedom and for a better tomorrow.
Elites say that ff Ethiopians wish to achieve a democratic future, they must collaborate and accept the notion that freedom from oppression is indivisible; and that people will succeed if they unite for a greater cause. It is true that the Ethiopian regime is brutal and governs through fear and ethnic division. It is possible that, in any uprising in Ethiopia, thousands may die. We see in the behaviors and actions of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, President Assad of Syria and President Salah of Yemen and the rulers of Bahrain that brutal regimes do not give up power easily. Evidence in 2005 shows that, in an uprising, the Ethiopia regime will resort to the same tactics as Gaddafi, the ruling families of Bahrain, dictators in Syria and Yemen: apply brute force and use the military to assault the population. Libya’s Gaddafi’s offers the prospect that the International Court of Justice in Geneva will find him and his team guilty of crimes against humanity. He does not seem to care that his families would not find a safe haven anywhere. Ethiopians feel that the same will happen to Meles Zenawi. Despite this hope, there are differences between Libya and Ethiopia that I feel is ignored by Ethiopian dissidents. For example, opposition groups are as divided as ever; and civil society is in the first phases of formation. The road ahead is tougher and harder than in Libya, Syria or Yemen or Bahrain. Before the opposition camp can do well, it must accept the notion that Ethiopians share a common problem. The history of brute force against opponents under the military and current dictatorship is so fresh in the minds of the older generation that Ethiopia’s “bulging youth” has no model to emulate. Mothers and fathers sacrificed their sons and daughters in the 1960s, 1970s and throughout the 1990s and in this century. Youth fought courageously to bring democratic change. Ethiopian society is not new to popular uprisings. The notion itself started with activist Ethiopian youth more than a half century ago. One of the biggest and youth led popular uprisings took place against the Imperial regime in the 1970s. Ethiopian youth have been relentless in their struggle against oppression since then. These uprisings are internal; and rooted in youth and middle class elites. In the information age, Ethiopian youth does not have the tools to stimulate change within the country compared to Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans, Syrians and Yemenis. This does not mean that the potential does not exist. For this reason, Ethiopian experts I approached feel that leadership for change must come from the country’s large Diaspora. I do not share this view. Sustainable change must come from the population, especially youth. The majority of Ethiopians want to live in misery, destitution and repression. What they resent most is that Ethiopian elites are sitting back and looking at events, afraid to challenge authority.
The façade of elections and the rest
Similar to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, the façade of periodic elections is a joke in Ethiopia. In 2010, the governing party declared that it won 99.6 percent of the votes. How is this possible? Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, regime plants spies even among students and in the Ethiopian Diaspora. It threatens voters and the opposition. Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, many give up and leave the country in search of alternatives abroad. Corruption, nepotism, favoritism and cronyism make business entry prohibitive. William Dobson did a marvelous piece in the Washington Post on January 6, 2011, that captures the essence of what dictators do regardless of country. In “Dictatorship for Dummies, Tunisia edition,” Dobson identifies 7 themes from which dictators could learn but don’t. One, “Be repressive, but don’t over do it.” Dictators are least amenable in adopting to change. They have a vested interest in preserving the system that offers them wealth and riches beyond their wildest dreams. Two, “Don’t try tobe Singapore.” It is interesting to note that intellectual supporters of the Ethiopian government believe that rapid growth and development occur under an exclusive environment. This is a preference for dictatorial rather than democratic governance. It does not. These folks are quick to point out lessons from countries such as China, Singapore and Korea-during their formative stage of development. Comparatively speaking, China has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world. China is as dissimilar to Ethiopia as the US in terms of development. Aside from everything else, advocates of the dictatorship model fail to recognize enormous cultural differences and political patterns that are unique to each. Differences between Ethiopia and Singapore are night and day. 5/
Dictatorships may seem the same. In my view they differ from country to country. Benevolent dictators like Emperor Haile Selassie are not the same as the head of State under the Military Dictatorship that replaced him. The current Prime Minister is not the same as the head of state he replaced. For sure their respective governances were or are consistently rated poor. There are value differences among dictators around the globe. President Suharto of Indonesia was one of the most ruthless and corrupt dictators in the world. He distinguished himself as a nationalist and helped to build Indonesia’s economy. When I worked there in the early 1990s, Indonesian friends told me that there was massive corruption. However, the “money was kept in the country. Corrupt officials built schools, hospitals, bridges and other infrastructure, factories” and so on. Lee Kuan Yew, President of Singapore was a dictator. He built one of the most successful economies in the world. He was, first and foremost, a Singaporean nationalist who built outstanding national institutions, designed and implemented economic and social policies that boosted domestic capabilities and made the country an economic powerhouse. I am not justifying corruption or dictatorship of any type. I merely want to differences among a sample of dictators. Competence, dedication to national institutions and equitable development make enormous difference to societies. Singapore became part of what is commonly known as the “East Asian Miracle” and Indonesian is on its way. Among the distinguishing features of the “East Asian Tiger” countries are diversification of their national economies and investments in human capital. This included manufacturing and export of industrial and manufactured goods, highly educated workforces, modern infrastructure, banking and finance and competitive markets. None relied on a single product or service to develop. In this regard, Egypt is more diversified and Tunisia is more like Ethiopia.
Tunisia depends on “wealthy European vacationers” to keep it growing. Today, Ethiopia depends heavily on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in its fertile farmlands to achieve its development and transformation agenda. In doing this, the regime leaves policies, cultures and structures almost infract. Both fail to see the critical role of diversification, broad-based, integrated and home grown institutions and development policies and programs in reducing poverty and in attaining sustainable development. Three, “Give youngpeople passports” and they will find jobs abroad and send remittances. Dobson is absolutely right. “If you can’t get everyone a job, encourage emigration. It is the best way to get rid of educated young people who will only cause you headaches when they realize that they can’t find work or must live with their parents.” This is exactly what the Ethiopian regime has done and continues to do. It forced nationalist technical and professional people to leave the country in droves. Its ethnic policy serves a similar purpose. Dobson could have added that a repressive government can’t afford to massacre or jail all of its young people when they dissent and revolt. None of the “East Asian Tiger” countries resorted to forceful expulsions of their young and highly educated people. They created conditions to stimulate creativity, innovation and productivity. Some went further and invited their Diasporas back. The TPLF core has no love for country or empathy for people outside its ethnic circle. In this sense, the regime is not any different from other dictatorships except for its ethnic policy. Take the Saudi Arabian regime and look into its soul. Many poor Ethiopians, especially young girls, immigrate to Saudi Arabia in search of jobs. Astonishing as it may seem, the Saudi government does not encourage its young people to emigrate. It keeps them without jobs. In one of the richest countries in the world where those below 18 years old constitute 60 percent of the population, 40 percent live in poverty. Seventy percent of Saudis can’t afford to buy a home. Ninety percent of public and private sector employees are foreigners, such as those from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Philippines and India. Foreign employees are cheaper and do not demand political or civil rights. They just work for wages that are better than those in their home countries. The Saudi regime is among the most corrupt and according to an article in the Wall Street Journal dated February 15, 2011, “inept.” It is run by an extended royal family network, almost similar to the ethnic network of high level decision-makers in Ethiopia. The face of corruption is the same whether in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia or Ethiopia. 6/
Four, “Let the opposition exist-just don’t let it win.” Ethiopians have heard Prime Minister Meles Zenawi– in power for close to 21 years– opine repeatedly that a strong opposition is good for the country. He says that he welcomes peace and reconciliation. Evidence shows that both have to be done under his terms and conditions. The All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) was humiliated because its leaders accepted a Code of Conduct dictated by the governing party. It lost public confidence and suffered in the elections in 2010. The governing party squashed opposition parties in 2005 and made them totally non-existent by the next election in 2010. In the early 1990s, the TPLF had vowed that it will never allow opposition parties to win “even once.”So, the rhetoric of wanting a strong opposition is a sham. I agree with Dobson that when faced with challenge, a dictatorial regime “faces a choice-retreat or lash out.” In Ethiopia, the regime prefers to “lash out.” In Egypt, President Mubarak lashed out and caused an untold number of deaths and injuries. In the end, he lost with disgrace. 7/
Five, “Give them newspapers.” The Ethiopian press is largely government owned and run. The few independent news organizations operate within strict boundaries. There is no free and independent press. The media propagates government propaganda. Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, dissidents are not allowed to conduct investigative reports. The regime intimidates websites, news organizations and even individuals who live and work abroad. It bans foreign broadcasts critical of the regime. It uses information technology to spy and to intimidate. The case of Ethiopian Review, one of the most consistent and passionate critics of the governing party comes to mind. Not only is the Ethiopian government committed to cyber warfare against this media, Sheikh al-Amoudi, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Ethiopian political system, brought a civil suit against the Editor. This audacity to intimidate Ethiopian free and independent press abroad would not have been possible without encouragement from the regime and tolerance from Western countries. The West fails to see that its long-term interests reside in its willingness and readiness to support the democratic aspirations of the majority and not the dictatorship in power. President Obama’s–post-Egypt protests at Tahrir Square that is changing political thinking–repeated comments that people have fundamental rights to peaceful protest, access to information and political organization are most encouraging for those who seek freedom. I hope this positive posture will repeat itself in Africa too. 8/
Six, “Never negotiate with an angry mob,” reminds me of what happened in the aftermath of the 2005 elections in which hundreds of Ethiopians, mostly youth, were massacred. The regime never entertained to seek forgiveness from the families of the victims or from the Ethiopian people. Its ethos is to blame others and stay in power at any cost and by any means necessary. Innocent lives do not matter. They are just numbers and not human beings. This leads me to Dobson’s most important seventh point, namely, “The people actually matter.” I have always argued that development is about people. It is their effective and consistent participation that would move mountains. Growth happens for a variety of reasons, including pumping billions of dollars in foreign aid. As a recipient of generous aid to the tune of over $3.2 billion in 2010 and more than $30 billion over the past 20 years, the regime had to show concrete results on the ground. It had to build roads and other infrastructure; increase school enrollments; provide better access to health care; and reduce poverty. Donors won’t lend or grant large sums of money each and every year unless they see some results. They are accountable to tax payers. It is their business. For those who claim that the Ethiopian economy is changing, I say yes. But, what is its depth and breadth? Has the fundamental structure changed? Has hunger become history? Is there substantial diversification? Have the lives of the vast majority improved dramatically? If yes, why did the regime ban exports of cereals? Have girls achieved equity? Why are 46 percent of fairly well educated Ethiopians interested in emigrating? It is ordinary Ethiopians who must be asked whether growth has changed their lives materially or not. The fact that the regime is an ally of the United States or the United Kingdom or China does not change the dire picture on the ground.
I am obliged to add an eighth theme namely, ‘Justify income inequality as the price of pursuing growth’. I like to start with a positive note. Conceptually, I share the regime’s goal of transforming the Ethiopian economy into middle income status over the coming five years or so. I support investments in infrastructure and endorse substantial investments in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. Transforming the Ethiopian economy is a noble objective. Where I differ substantially is how these goals could be achieved without radical structural an
I would go further than Dobson. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, ordinary people are telling regimes that they can no longer accept oppression and socioeconomic exclusion. They seem to say that people and not elites at the top are the motive forces for investments, growth and development. FDI that does not recognize national aspirations and interests of ordinary people is exploitative–even when invited by a regime. It is broad–based participation of people that distinguishes a competent and nationally oriented regime such as Singapore from Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Without people, growth expands opportunities only for elites and a few loyalists who are willing to trade conscience and principle for wealth. Without people, regimes invite foreigners to exploit their natural resources. These models of economic development leave the rest of the population out of the growth process. Without people, powerful elites eventually fail, as the Egyptian and Tunisian cases illustrate.
Yemeret neteka ena kirimit (land grab) is defined as the forcible takeaway and transfer of common lands to foreign wealthy individuals, companies, governments and domestic supporters. The Amharic terms neteka ena kirimit refer to the notion of governing party expropriation, allotment and licensing of fertile farmlands through an estimated 8,400 to 9,000 different transactions, all foreign owned and managed at huge costs to Ethiopians. Yemeret neteka enakirimitis equivalent to a modern “invasion or worera,” as the Reporter newspaper put it. Stunned and outraged, ordinary Ethiopians ask “yemin gud meta?” This popular Amharic expression external imposition induced by the governing party; and is repulsive to me and most Ethiopians.
(The author, Aklog Birara, Ph.D., is Adjunct Professor at Trinity University, Washington DC, and former Senior Advisor, the World Bank, retired)
