Book Review: Tadesse Tele Salvano’s Ay Massawa!
Reviewed by Messay Kebede
The book presents an encircled army defending with courage and determination the port of Massawa against the ferocious attacks of the EPLF’s military forces assisted with units of the TPLF. This army unit of 17,000 men resisted for ten long days even though it had no other choice than death or mere surrender: it could neither retreat as the Red Sea blocked any backward move, nor receive reinforcements, given that the EPLF firmly controlled the road to Asmara. The book is all together an epic, an immense tragedy, and a great tribute to Ethiopian nationalism. Many combatants were killed on both sides although the book does not offer figures of the dead, the wounded, and the prisoners.
The central figure of this military saga is Brigadier General Techome Tessema, the commander of the 6th Nebelbal Division. He is the hero in that he magnificently incarnates a forceful leadership and the determination to fight to the end. Ultimately, preferring death to capture, he killed himself. His death led to a collective suicide of 150 of his men, including his close associates.
The author, Tadesse Tele Salvano, is not wanting in heroic feats, either. A sergeant performing political functions, he had already fought many battles in Eritrea and was injured 5 times. During the battle of Massawa, he was wounded and made prisoner by the EPLF. He was taken to the Sahel but escaped after killing his guard. He fled to the Sudan with military secrets and reached the Ethiopian Embassy, which flew him back to Addis Ababa where he was received by Mengistu Haile Mariam for a long talk.
Before going further, I want to indicate that I wrote this review with two purposes in mind.
First is the importance of understanding why the huge, well-equipped, and ideologically pumped up Ethiopian army lost against forces that were operating as only guerrilla groups for many years. Ethiopians cannot confidently commit themselves to their projected undertakings unless they understand the reasons for the colossal defeat of their national army, thereby reconstituting their shattered self-image.
Second is the challenge that Tadesse’s book presents, for his testimony markedly differs from others on the same topic. The description of an army unit fighting with such determination and willingness to die makes the defeat of the Ethiopian army even more incomprehensible. Witness: the Ethiopian resistance was so fierce that the EPLF was forced to use two generals that it had captured as a propaganda instrument. Using a powerful megaphone, the captured generals urged the troops to surrender in exchange for a safe trip to places of their choice.
That the army was still willing to fight with such a remarkable determination even after the massacre of 30 generals and colonels and the arrest of 250 senior officers following the attempted coup of May 1988 is indeed stupefying. It only adds to the puzzle of knowing how the army gradually descended into a situation where it had to fight a conventional war against two armies of equal if not superior strength, both in size and equipment. According to Tadesse, when the EPLF attacked Massawa, with the exception of air power, it had clearly acquired military superiority over the Derg’s army in armament, recruitment, and training.
Though Tadesse’s intent is less to explain defeat than to narrate a saga, he cannot avoid the issue. And this is where his approach is different. He does not mention––at least in this book––those reasons by which other authors have explained the Ethiopian defeat. Among the most important ones, we find leadership incompetence, especially the erratic and inept influence of its commander-in-chief, the lack of adequate training, the politicization of the army with the subsequent institution of what is known as a triangular command system in which the commander shares power with a political commissar and a security officer, the outcome of which was a serious deterioration of discipline, and last but not least, the insurmountable topographic obstacles inherent in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia.
In this particular book, Tadesses seems to dismiss the above reasons by portraying a military unit in which the commander, General Techome, works in perfect harmony with political commissars and shows no animosity toward Mengistu Haile Mariam. Since he is not among the plotters of the attempted coup, we can even assume that the General was committed to Mengistu. The way the resistance is described discloses no lack of discipline and commitment to fight. On the contrary, Ethiopian nationalism is revealed in its full strength with military men ready to die for the integrity of the country.
Naturally, Tadesse cannot discount that the killing, imprisonment, and dismissal of so many senior officers accused of being involved in the coup attempt had significantly reduced the fighting ability of the army, even though he does not expressly blame Mengistu for destroying the army to safeguard his power. Whatever criticisms of Mengistu that the book contains, they all emanate from the captured two generals whose treacherous behavior casts doubt upon their judgments.
The other important reason that Tadesse underlines for the defeat in Massawa is that both the army and the Ethiopian government were fooled by the peace negotiations that were taking place in Kenya under the mediation of Jimmy Carter, all the more so as a year had passed––since the debacle in Afabet––without any major clash between the Ethiopian army and the EPLF. Little did the Ethiopians know that the EPLF was actually using the break to recruit, train, and prepare its army for massive attacks.
Tadesse reveals the extent to which the army in Eritrea was heedless of the attacks on a grand scale that the EPLF was preparing. The assault on Massawa came as a surprise for everybody, including Major General Hussein Ahmed, the commander of the Second Revolutionary Army. The state of unpreparedness for large attacks is baffling, as shown by the fact that the navy was calmly preparing its 33th graduation ceremony when Massawa was attacked.
Is the explanation for the Massawa defeat credible? Can we assume that the leadership did not expect massive attacks, especially after the capture of huge stocks of heavy weapons and tanks in Afabet? What is more, was Mengistu himself negotiating in good faith? These questions lead the reader to doubt Tadesse’s assumption that the Ethiopian government decreased its war effort because of ongoing peace negotiations. The truth is that the government had already reached its absolute limits in terms of recruitment and war preparations.
The second issue about Tadesse’s book is its reliability. I am not saying that the epic dimension of the testimony is an invention: the detailed and graphic presentation of events clearly rules out this possibility, even if here and there exaggerations do transpire. My concern with reliability wonders whether the resolution to tell a saga did not cover up the other components of this tragedy, without which it is not comprehensible. The more Tadesse highlights the determination and commitment of the Ethiopian army, the more the question of knowing what drove this army to this desperate situation becomes a burning issue. It is not clear to the reader why, unlike other authors, he is obviously reluctant to put the blame of the defeat on Mengistu and his leadership. Nor does he endorse the view of the winners according to which they were able to defeat a much bigger army because of higher determination and efficient leadership.
So analyzed, Tadesse’s book does not provide any better insight into the reasons for the Ethiopian defeat. However, it does challenge those works that easily explain the defeat by contrasting the dedication and efficiency of the insurgents with the lack of determination and competence on the Ethiopian side. Not only is competence a relative term as reflected in the saying that “the one-eyed person is a beauty in the country of the blind,” but also the Massawa epic of the Ethiopian army disputes the alleged lack of determination. Scholars are hereby asked to come up with a more complex and comprehensive explanation of Ethiopia’s complete defeat. Seeing that the defeat brought such dire calamities on the country as the loss of Eritrea and the fragmentation of ethnic federalism, the effort is worth the price.
(The writer, Dr Messay Kebede, can be reached at [email protected])
SARGODHA, Pakistan – Five Americans detained in Pakistan told a court Monday they intended to cross the border into Afghanistan to wage jihad against Western forces but denied any links to al-Qaida or plans to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan.
The admission could be a prelude to possible U.S. conspiracy charges but might also draw sympathy from an increasingly anti-American Pakistani public. Such feelings have complicated U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to do more to crack down on militants carrying out cross-border attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan.
“We are not terrorists,” one of the five men, Ramy Zamzam, told The Associated Press as he entered the courtroom in the eastern Pakistani city of Sargodha, where they were arrested in December.
“We are jihadists, and jihad is not terrorism,” said Zamzam, a 22-year-old Egyptian American who was a dental student at Howard University in Washington, D.C.
Jihad has several different meanings in Islam, but Zamzam seemed to be referring to the duty to fight against foreign forces viewed as occupying a Muslim country.
Zamzam and another member of the group, Ethiopian American Ahmed Minni, insisted the men had no links with al-Qaida and were focused only on Afghanistan, according to court documents.
“They said that they only intended to travel to Afghanistan to help their Muslim brothers who are in trouble, who are bleeding and who are being victimized by Western forces,” said the group’s lawyer, Ameer Abdullah Rokhri.
It was the first time the men, aged 19 to 25 and all from the Washington area, have addressed a court since their arrest. They arrived wearing a mix of Western clothes, such as jeans and tracksuits, and traditional shalwar kameez robes. They were handcuffed as they entered and exited the hearing, which was closed to media. A couple of them laughed and smiled as they left.
Pakistani police have not filed formal charges but say they plan to seek life sentences under the country’s anti-terrorism law.
“We have told the court that police have completed their investigation and have enough evidence against the five suspects to try them under anti-terrorism law,” said police officer Matiullah Shahani.
The court remanded the men to prison for 14 days Monday to give police time to prepare the case.
FBI agents have questioned some of the men and are working to see if there is enough evidence to charge any of them with conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, officials have said. Another possible U.S. charge — and one that could be more difficult to bring — would be conspiracy to maim or kill people overseas.
Besides Zamzam and Minni, the other members of the group are Pakistani Americans Umer Farooq and Waqar Hussain and Egyptian American Aman Yamar. Farooq’s father, Khalid, was also detained, but the court ordered him released Monday because of a lack of evidence that he committed any crime, said police officer Amir Shirazi.
The five young men were reported missing by their families in late November after one of them left behind a farewell video showing scenes of war and casualties and saying Muslims must be defended. The case has sparked fears that Westerners are increasingly traveling to Pakistan to join militant groups.
Pakistani police accuse the men of using the social networking site Facebook and the Internet video site YouTube while they were in the U.S. to try to connect with extremist groups in Pakistan.
The Taliban recruiter the men contacted may have planned to take the men to Mianwali, a district near Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, where al-Qaida and the Taliban have proliferated, according to police.
“if you are stoppd and questnd by govt on ur way 2 miawali say that u r going 2 chesma atomic power plant visiting ur uncle who is a technical engineer,” said an e-mail from the Yahoo account which police said the men used to communicate with their militant contact.
“you should be wearing paki garments bright color 2 blend in,” said the e-mail, which was provided to the AP by police investigators Monday.
The message was apparently referring to the Chasma Barrage — a complex located near nuclear power facilities that includes a water reservoir and other structures. Pakistan has a nuclear weapons arsenal, but also nuclear power plants for civilian purposes.
Authorities say the five men had a map of the barrage in Punjab province about 125 miles (200 kilometers) southwest of the capital, Islamabad.
They are alleged to have met representatives from the al-Qaida-linked Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group in the southeastern city of Hyderabad and from a related group, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in Lahore, but were said to have been turned away because they were not trusted.
Their attorney, Rokhri, denied those allegations Monday, saying they didn’t “have any link with al-Qaida or any banned organization like Jaish-e-Mohammed.”
In Washington, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman declined comment on the possibility that the presence of U.S. forces across the border was the magnet that drew the men.
State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said staff from the U.S. Consulate in Lahore were present at Monday’s hearing and that consular officials have visited the men three times, most recently on Dec. 22.
“It’s my understanding that they have been treated well so far,” said Kelly.
Officials in both countries have said they expect the men eventually to be deported back to the United States, though charging them in Pakistan could delay that process. A Pakistani court ruled last month the men cannot be deported until judges review the case.
Ishtiaq Ahmad, a professor of international relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, said anti-American sentiment could complicate efforts to deport the five men, especially now that Pakistan has a democratically elected civilian government after nine years of military rule.
“When you have a non-democratic setup, issues which involve international cooperation are relatively simpler to handle,” Ahmad said. “If Pakistan delays any cooperation in instantly handing over these suspects to the United States as was the history before, it’s because we are in a qualitatively different political environment.”
(Source: AP)
By Elias Kifle
A holiday greetings that was posted here earlier this week from Prof. Ephraim Isaac, a world renowned Ethiopian scholar, has generated some harsh criticisms and even insults. Many of the criticisms point out that the professor has not been speaking out against the Woyanne junta’s brutality against the people of Ethiopia. Some have also expressed anger that Prof. Ephraim did not support HR 2003.
It seems a lot of Ethiopians have misunderstood Prof. Ephraim’s recent involvements in mediating the release of political prisoners in Ethiopia and his approach to finding solutions for the political crisis.
I have known Prof. Ephraim personally for over 16 years and known about him much longer than that. He is one of the most honorable Ethiopians I have ever met in my life. I disagree with him on how he approaches the problems in Ethiopia. I believe that good people must speak out against evil. It would have been great for a person of his caliber to expose the unspeakable crimes that are being committed by the Woyanne junta in Ethiopia. His approach is different and has been consistent through out his life. He believes in mediation and reconciliation than exposition of injustice. He believes that for mediation to work, mediators should not take side or criticize any one. In traditional Ethiopian mediation, shimagilwoch (elders) who engage in shimgilina (mediation) do not point out the wrong doings of either party to the other. Instead they focus on forgiveness and reconciliation.
Such elders among past generations of Ethiopians were highly respected citizens. Elders were able to prevent wars and clashes between ethnic and religious groups in Ethiopia for centuries.
From all the unfair criticisms directed at Prof. Ephraim, it seems that the role of elders (shimagilewoch) has no respect any more in today’s Ethiopia. That is a tragedy by itself.
What makes Prof. Ephraim uniquely qualified as an elder and mediator is that he never utters any negative word about any one. It is not in his nature to do that. He is in good terms with every government, political party and leader in the Horn of Africa.
Just because he doesn’t talk in public about the human rights abuse and political prisoners in Ethiopia, it doesn’t mean he is not concerned. His own brother died in Woyanne prison several years ago as a political prisoner. A close friend of the professor told me a while ago that when Woyanne officials asked him why he didn’t tell them about his brother, his response was “how can I talk about my brother when there are thousands of others like him who are also in jail? All of them are my brothers.” He appealed to them to release all those who are unjustly imprisoned.
Individuals like Prof. Ephraim Isaac have an important role in any society, but particularly in a traumatized nation such as ours. Every body cannot be an activist or a freedom fighter. I personally cannot be like the professor. The role I chose for myself is to expose injustice, not to try to reconcile with perpetrators of crimes against humanity. I believe genocidal criminals like Meles and Bereket should be hanged in a public square. Prof. Ephraim’s approach is different, but it is a necessary one. When we acquire more guns than Woyanne, we need a mediator to talk Meles and gang into signing our terms of surrender.
