It all seems unreal. Four months into the Transitional Government’s administration, Addis Ababa still remains an enigma. Apart from the removal of the disgraced top echelons of the former Derg regime, and the wholesale incarceration of the remnants of what used to be “the mighty” armed forces of Ethiopia at various concentration camps around the city, little seems to have changed. Addis Ababa still maintains the air and trappings of a drab and gloomy Marxist city. The outdated and faded slogans and banners are still in display on old and dilapidated arches and public buildings. These are the silent and symbolic legacies of the Mengistu era.
In a way this is not at all uncharacteristic of the administrative life of the country since the EPRDF takeover. Virtually none of the Derg laws, edicts or decrees, however unjust or offensive, have been lifted or repealed. The bureaucracy is paralyzed and uncertain about what is expected of it in the absence of clear and decisive instructions. The courts, municipalities, local and provincial offices are in a state of suspended animation.
The sense of jubilance and euphoria that was clearly visible 3 months ago is now gone. Skepticism, pessimism and cynicism are overtaking public attitude. The EPRDF is slowly learning that it is much easier to fight a war than administer a nation.
The question of Eritrean secession has been a catalyst of public opinion. There is considerable controversy surrounding the Charter, the organic document, adopted by the Council of Representatives. It is an open secret that the Meles administration regards Eritrea’s secession as an accomplished fact, and treats the matter as closed, “as it was already decided by the 30 years war.” To the administration the planned referendum in 2 years is a mere formality. They are intolerant to suggestions that the matter might legitimately concern the rest of Ethiopia. Such views are dismissed as “warmongering.”
The Charter for the Transitional government contains a clause which grants all ethnic groups in Ethiopia the right of self-determination, including total independence. This clause is borrowed from the Stalinist constitutions of the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European allies. It has never been actually practiced in those countries. Most Ethiopians regard the clause as a direct invitation and blatant encouragement of secession and national fragmentation.
Needless to say, this particular provision of the Charter has offended the sensitivities of many mainstream national political groups. All of the political parties that recently mushroomed into existence in Addis Ababa in preparation for the projected general elections have categorically rejected the Charter on account of this clause. They have called for a total boycott of all those who approved and signed the Charter. They have also refused to have anything to do with all those who were signatories to the charter, and have gone to the extent of calling on the original signatories to disassociate themselves with it as a condition for their cooperation and collaboration.
On the other hand, the Oromos and other ethnic groups who are clearly favored by the EPRDF seem to have gone somewhat overboard on the issue. These leaders are busy conducting vigorous campaigns interspersed with divisive and inflammatory speeches attacking other ethnic groups, especially the Amharas. In some cases this has triggered serious intercommunal violence. All this, of course, is blamed on the EPRDF, the principal authors of the Charter.
Now, the main challenge to the EPRDF administration in this regard comes from the National Democratic Unity Party (NDU) led by Ato Tsegaye Abiye. Ato Tsegaye, who was born in Eritrea, has emerged as one of the most articulate and dynamic leaders in the Ethiopian political horizon. Ato Tsegaye’s party stands for one, undivided Ethiopia. It strongly opposes and condemns any attempt at dismembering the country through what they regard as underhanded and manipulative machinations. Ato Tsegaye openly accuses the EPRDF administration of not living upto its promises of maintaining a free climate conducive to exercising full democratic rights, especially in the area of free speech, access to the media and freedom of assembly. So far, he claims to have been twice refused permission to hold public meetings and mass rallies in Addis Ababa. His rallies attract huge crowds and his ideas seems to have a wide appeal among the general public. The authorities are clearly alarmed by Ato Tsegaye’s personal popularity and wide appeal. His public rally recently attracted over 10,000 people. EPRDF troops dispersed the crowed by shooting firearms in the air. Ato Tsegaye’s popularity is rising so fast, it is rumored that the EPRDF government will disallow him from participation in the process. If this should happen it will be a sad day for the fledgling democracy in Ethiopia. Others are following EPRDF’s actions against Ato Tsegaye’s party with keen interest. Similarly, General Jaggamakello’s party, unlike his other fellow Oromos, strongly stands for Ethiopia’s unity and integrity.
Ethiopia’s present officialdom is threatened by the “U” word. For the government and those in the circle of the administration “Unity” is a subversive word. And anyone advocating it is regraded as a suspect. No wonder a few had the courage of their convictions to come out openly and talk about the age old unity and integrity of Ethiopia. It is, however, clear where the people of Ethiopia stand on the issue unity. The main problem is EPRDF’s monopoly of the mass media. Despite the government’s claim to the contrary, press censorship is still very much a fact of life.
In such a climate it is impossible to show the overwhelming support that the forces of unity and national cohesion generally enjoy in the population. Foremost among the forces enjoying a central and unique position is, of course, the Ethiopian Monarchy whose time has now come. This is recognized by all sides, which is both a source of joy and worry, depending on which side of the fence you are on. In pursuit of its goals, Mo Anbessa continues to make considerable strides in maintaining close links with all mainstream national parties. To this end Mo-Anbessa has already acquired pledges of support from most of them, based on unequivocal mutual commitments, and binding common interests and principles. But it is a long process which demands a lot of patience, hard work and sacrifice.
In other developments, in a recent press release President Meles Zenawi strenuously denied Libyan President Qaddafi’s “allegation” that Meles was a Yemeni, and that Ethiopia was an Arab state. The irrepressible Qaddafi’s riposte to that is no doubt being anxiously awaited.
The former regime’s top officials (with the exception of Tesfaye Gebrekidan, Addis Tedla and Berhanu Bayih, who are still enjoying the hospitality of the Italian Embassy as “uninvited guests”) are all undergoing interrogation and indoctrination at the Yekatit 12 Political School under the Derg (the former Crown Prince’s compound) near Sidist Killo. Interestingly, most had managed to send their wives and children abroad before the collapse of the regime. The task of hauling food and other essentials to them had fallen on the shoulders of relatives and mistresses, who apparently were overdoing it by lavishing them with luxury items such as whiskey, choice beef, and other delicacies at the start of their incarceration. However, when Addis Ababa residents expressed their outrage, the authorities tightened the condition of their imprisonment. No date has been set for their trial.
Tollei, Tatek, (Gaffarasa), Sendaffa, Holetta and Urso are among the scores of places which have become notorious overnight. Detainees, former soldiers and officers, in their tens of thousands are held at these locations. Relatives voice bitter complaints about conditions at these camps. Inadequate food and water for drinking or washing, poor sanitary conditions, wide spread illness and even outbreaks of epidemics resulting in deaths are reported in this camps. From the general outcry it appears every family in Addis Ababa and other major towns seems to have someone (usually the breadwinners) detained in one of these congested concentration camps.
On a recent T.V. interview given on two separate occasions Ato Seye Abraham, the Defense Minister, talked in detail about the military situation prior to the collapse of the Derg, and leading to spectacular victory of the EPRDF forces. Among other things, Ato Seye gave some highly interesting statistics, and provided an insight into EPRDF policy for the future defense posture of Ethiopia.
According to Ato Seye, even though his Ministry’s record books show a figure of a million and a half for the total number of Ethiopia’s armed fores, the actual figure never exceeded 530,000. The Derg allegedly pocketed millions of dollars paid out by way of salaries to this nearly million-strong non-existent fanthom army for over 15 years! The Derg allegedly inflated the number to justify the overhead in order to loot and plunder the already over strained resources of the national treasury.
Another piece of information provided by Ato Seye was that out of the 530,000 soldiers, nearly 250,000 were now under custody as prisoners. Nearly 200,000 are presumed dead. The remaining 80,000 are unaccounted for (presumably they are still in the bush scattered all over the place). Questions about the possible inclusion of these surviving forces into a reconstituted future Ethiopians armed forces dismissed by Ato Saye who said he saw no possible future role for an army of “cowards, mercenaries, and killers and butchers of brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers!” “They are a totally demoralized lot, and they have proved themselves useless as a fighting force.” He said, as Ethiopia “has no external enemies, the country, has no need for a large standing army anyway.”
Asked as to what he would do in case of external aggression from any quarter, the young and cocky defense minister confidently assured his T.V. audience that after they saw how easily his forces had crushed the bloated Derg army, none of Ethiopia’s neighbors “would dare to challenge our awesome
power.”
Ato Seye also said that the total cost of the war was nearly 20 Billion dollars, out of which 18 billion birr was spent on “salaries” alone, and another 9 billion dollars was spent on imported military hardware and equipment. He concluded his comment with a sad but painfully true observation that “it would have been much better to throw all this money into the sea, rather than spend it on decimating
our people and wasting our nation.”
________________
Dr. Getachew Mekasha is currently in Ethiopia.
The following piece is taken from a lengthy article written by Alex Shoumatoff for the November 1991 issue of VANITY FAIR magazine. Mr. Shoumatoff is a visiting scholar at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque. Recently Alex Shoumatoff and Harold Marcus, “the noted American Ethiopianist,” have attempted to reach former dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in Zimbabwe.
Marcus and I spent a week in Zimbabwe tracking down Mengistu. We begin by taking a cab out to Norton, a rural community thirty miles southwest of the capital, where The New York Times had reported he had bought a farm. Not only does this prove to be a baseless rumor, picked up by the paper’s Harare stringer from an Ethiopian exile in the Europa Cafe, but the Nortonians we ask for directions denounce us to the local police. For four hours we sit waiting in the office of Chief Inspector Mabuto, a giant in khaki shorts and knee-socks, who phones in the vital statistics on our passports to his superior and awaits instructions. The problem, we later discover, is that rich Ethiopian exiles in the United States have offered a big reward — in one version $4 million — to whoever bumped off Mengistu, and we are being mistaken for Tony and Luigi, two hit men from New Jersey who bought the contract. At last the chief inspector says, “You are free to go, but I don’t want to see you around here without the proper accreditation.”
So now there is nothing to do but go through official channels. Everyone, for once, is incredibly helpful. The American ambassador provides us with a letter that says we have “legitimate reasons” for seeing Mengistu, which we take to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I give it and a letter for Mengistu I have drafted on Vanity Fair Stationery — a masterfully ingenuous, I-want-to-be-your-buddy presentation in which I even offer to hit some tennis balls with him — to Deputy Secretary Goche, who promises to see that it gets to him.
While awaiting Mengistu’s decision, we infiltrate the local scene and, after sifting through half a dozen rumored whereabouts, figure out where he is hiding: at a government guesthouse in Gunhill, a plush suburb of Harare, a tropical Scarsdale. His son attends St. John’s College, an exclusive Anglican boys’ school in the even tonier suburb of Borrowdale.
At an Italian restaurant three high-spirited Russians invite us to their table. Their business cards identify them as exporters of computer software. After killing a bottle of Stolichnaya, the senior member of the threesome confesses sheepishly that they are K.G.B.
“So what are you doing here?” I ask.
“We’ve come to make sure Mengistu does his farming,” he says with a twinkle.
The next evening, at a private bar, we meet Charlie, a former Vietnam helicopter pilot, D.E.A. agent, colonel in the Southern Rhodesian army, and C.I.A. spook. Charlie is willing to bet a hundred bucks that Mengistu will be “taken out” in the next six months by local Ethiopians. He’s heard the contract is for $500,000. “The wife was in Cuthbert’s this afternoon,” he confides. “She bought tekkies [tennis shoes] for her son.”
Charlie is definitely plugged into the Harare rumor mill. He has also heard that Mengistu brought Haile Selassie’s Rolls convertible into exile with him, and that President Mugabe, who has been taking a lot of flak for giving him asylum, is considering an extradition request from the new Ethiopian government. But Marcus thinks this is highly unlikely. “That would open a can of worms no one wants to deal with.”
At closing time on Friday afternoon we troop into Deputy Secretary Goche’s office, and the word is: at this moment Mengistu is not prepared to talk to anyone. Though chagrined, we aren’t exactly surprised. We leave our phone numbers in case he changes his mind.
On the plane out of Harare, Marcus runs into an Ethiopian woman named Yeshi, whom he has known for thirty years. “In the beginning, it looked and sounded like it was going to be a bright future,” she tells us. “But it turned out to be seventeen years of nothing but bloodshed.” Even so, Yeshi is not in favor of Mengistu’s extradition and trial. “The best thing is to let him live with his conscience. What is death anyway.”
EPRDF’s so-called “National Conference” of July 1991, attended by hand-picked individuals who had no popular mandate, approved the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia.
EPLF’s Secretary General Issayas Afeworki, who had attended the meeting as an observer, had accepted to hold a “referendum” in Eritrea within two years. But what kind of a referendum is this?
A referendum presupposes the existence of divergent views and opinions on important public issues. Existing differences of views and opinions are expected to be debated freely among the public and representative organizations before voting on the issue.
EPLF’s Issayas Afeworki denies these essential attributes of referendum. Issayas and other EPLF leaders proclaim that everybody in Eritrea wants independence. Why call for a referendum where there is no opposition? EPLF has a monopoly on power for two years leading to the referendum. No other party or political organization will be allowed inside Eritrea in preparation for the referendum. Why fear other political parties if all Eritreans favor independence? What is the sense of a “referendum” in the absence of freedom of opinion, of organization and a free press? What is the meaning of a referendum in a one-party dictatorial system?
Referenda are incompatible with dictatorships. A referendum under a dictatorship does not express the wishes of the people but the orders of the dictator. Unionists both inside Eritrea and in the rest of Ethiopia should be able to engage in free political activity and to express their deep sentiments regarding the free union of the people of Eritrea with the rest of Ethiopia.
Both Ato Meles Zenawi and Ato Issayas Afeworki have attempted at the July 1991 Conference to undermine the aspirations of the Unionists in Eritrea. Ato Issayas Afeworki claims to have a mysterious document which will prove that the majority of Eritreans wanted independence and not federation with Ethiopia:
We have hard facts, historical facts… The fact that the population was not consulted on its right and destiny and the findings which prove that all the political groups within the Independence Bloc represented more than 75 percent of the population prove that their rights were trampled upon. These historical truths are recorded in historical archives and could be consulted…”
The historical documents on the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea tell a different story. They show Mahbere Fekri Hager, (Association of Love of Country) the Eritrean Unionist movement which championed union with Ethiopia, later named Ye-Ertrana Ye-Ethiopia Andinet Mahber (Association of Union of Eritrea with Ethiopia) established as early as 1941, was by far the earliest political movement in Eritrean history. The Unionist Association had its headquarters in Asmera and a number of branch offices in different parts of Eritrea. Further, Mahbere Fekri Hager had its own newspaper called “The Voice of Eritrea” published in Tigrigna and circulated throughout Eritrea. According to one authoritative source:
By 1942 every [Orthodox Christian] priest [in Eritrea] had become a propagandist in the Ethiopian cause; every village Church had become a center of Ethiopian nationalism, and popular religious feast days such as “Maskal” (the feast of the Cross) had become occasions for open displays of Ethiopian patriotism. The Cathedral, monasteries, and village churches would be festooned with Ethiopian flags, and the sermons and prayers would be delivered in unequivocal political language…
British Military Administration (1941-1952)
Mussolini decided to join the war on the side of Hitler on June 10, 1940. British Somaliland had always been concerned by the establishment and military expansion of Fascist Italian imperialism in the Horn of Africa since 1935. Hence the attack by British forces (joined by Ethiopian patriots including Eritreans) against Fascist Italian troops in Eritrea in 1941. The British had won the war and occupied Asmera on April 1, 1941. This ended 50 years of Italian colonial rule in Eritrea. The British military administration of Eritrea lasted until 1952.
The British had several projects for Eritrea in order to advance their own colonial schemes in East Africa. Whatever Issayas and Meles may say, the British were not pro-Ethiopia or pro-Unionist. Following British occupation Eritrea and a good part of Ethiopia, there were serious clashes that lasted several years between the restored Emperor’s government at Addis Abeba and the British. The clashes occurred in Eritrea, Ogaden, Harer and Tigrai. Indeed British colonial circles coveted Ethiopian independence and wanted to treat the Emperor a puppet protege thus creating bitter resistance and friction. John H. Spencer, who was the Foreign Affairs adviser of the Ethiopian Government during those crucial years and who had personally participated at the negotiations with the Big Four in London, Paris, and later at the United Nations and whose book, Ethiopia at Bay (1987) deals mainly with this subject, has written: “The Military Administration in Eritrea was by no means sympathetic to the Unionist movement there.” Documents supporting similar arguments are found in the British Foreign Office archives at the Public Records Office of Kew Gardens (London).
The Four Power Commission
On September 3, 1943 Italy pulled out of the Second World War by signing an armistice with the Four Big Powers. Article 23 of the peace treaty contained three important provisions:
1) Italy agreed to renounce its rights in all her former colonies in Africa, including Eritrea;
2) The fate the former Italian colonies will be taken by the US, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union within a year of the coming into force of the peace treaty; and
3) If the Four Powers were unable to agree the matter will be taken by the United Nations.
Eventually, a Four Powers Commission of Investigation was established in order to visit Eritrea and ascertain the political wishes of the people regarding the future of Eritrea. The principal procedures the commission adopted to assess the wishes of the Eritreans were to invite organizations and individuals to present written declarations about the future of Eritrea and then conduct interviews with the principal organizations and individuals including representatives of the political parties which then numbered five –the Unionist Party, the Muslim League, the Progressive Liberal Party, the Pro-Italian Party, the National Moslem Party of Massawa). The procedures also included interview with leaders of social, religious and professional organizations; and visits to villages and industrial plants to interview the populations directly in order to ascertain declarations made by leaders or representatives.
The Commission and later the United Nations Commission for Eritrea have observed the poor level of political consciousness of Eritrea’s peasant society which had been subjected to centuries of feudal oppressive obscurantism and then fifty years of an equally oppressive and racist colonial regime. This was the first time in the whole history of the region that a people had ever been asked to participate democratically in shaping their own future without ever having had any previous experience at democratic processes.
This pioneering process had its short-comings. It would not have been much different if the Four Power Commission or that the United Nations called their investigation a “referendum,” as Meles Zenawi and Issayas are now pointing out. Under the circumstances and with all their shortcomings the investigations of the Four Power Commission and later of the United Nations Commission were certainly much freer and much more democratic, with so varied political and social organizations allowed to air their opinions freely, than the present so called “referendum” conducted in the absence of elementary liberties of expression and of organization.
The Four Powers disagreed on the interpretation of the voluminous material collected in the process of investigation. There were differences between the West and the USSR. The Soviet Union’s position regarding the disposal of Eritrea has not always been pro-independence. Trevaskis wrote:
The Russians were cynically opportunists. At first they proposed quite simply that the spoils of the war should be divided between the victors. They demanded a trusteeship of Tripolitania for themselves, and suggested that the US and Britain should have trusteeships in other territories…
The French opposed the Unionists. This had nothing to do with Eritrea but with French opposition to Ethiopia having its own sea ports following union with Eritrea. Whereas even the Soviets accepted Ethiopia’s right of access to the Red Sea, the French who in their colony of Djibouti controlled the Ethiopian import-export trade through the Addis Abeba-Djibouti railway. They wanted to see Ethiopia remain land- locked and dependent on Djibouti.
The United Nations Commission for Eritrea (1950-1952)
Following the failure of the Four Powers Commission to reach agreement on the Eritrean issue, the U.N. took up the issue. Bringing the Eritrean issue to the United Nations meant introducing new elements, particularly Italy, but also the Muslim-Arab countries. To the disappointment of the Ethiopian delegation, the Fourth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Autumn 1949) was unable to reach agreement on the basis of the findings of the Four Powers Commission, mainly due to Italian opposition. Italian colonial interest had been revived since the Peace Treaty of 1947 (article 23) by which it had accepted “to renounce all rights and titles to all her former colonies in Africa.”
Italy was now fighting for a return of Libya, Somalia, and possibly to Eritrea in one form or another. The so called Bevin-Sforza agreement between Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister and Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister had been adopted by a U.N. Committee in May 1949. According to that proposal Italy was to be granted trusteeships in Somalia and Tripolitania (part of Libya); that Cyrenaica (the remaining part of Libya) should become independent after a period of British trusteeship. Eritrea was to be partitioned between Ethiopia and Sudan. The western Moslem lowlands were to go to Sudan and the Eritrean highlands as well as the eastern maritime coastal plains were to merge in complete union with Ethiopia as demanded by the Unionists. An anti-Italian riot in Tripolitania buried the Bevin-Sforza plan at the U.N. Italy now concentrated its attention on Somalia and Eritrea. And although it was not even a member of the United Nations, Italy was canvassing large support particularly among the Latin American countries. Through such lobby Italy had finally been allowed to return to Somaliland as a U.N. trustee.
In spite of the activities of the Pro-Italy Party formed just in time for interviews with the Four Power Commission, the Italo-Eritrean Association (largely made up of half-castes) and the Veterans Association of former banda or soldiers who had enrolled within the Italian Fascist army, the dimension of anti-Italian sentiments in Eritrea were so obvious that Italy had to abandon any idea of return as a trustee power. Italy had therefore to find a formula which would win international favor as well as attract support in Eritrea, against the Unionists and Ethiopia. And that is how the Italian government, supported by the colonial circles and the press both in Italy as well as in Eritrea started to fight for the immediate “independence” of Eritrea, with the idea, as Trevaskis wrote, of a nominally “independent” Eritrea dependent on Italian political control. With this in mind the Italian government had been instrumental in arranging for the Moslem League, the Pro-Italy Party (later named New Eritrea Party) the Italo- Eritrean Association and the Veterans Association to meet in New York during the U.N. sessions in the Spring of 1949 to form the “Independence Bloc.” It was only upon their return to Eritrea that the Liberal Progressive Party and two new parties, the Independent Eritrea Party and the Intellectual Association of Eritreans, joined the Bloc in order to fight the Unionists and union of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Subsequently, the United Nations established a Commission of Investigation. The Ethiopian delegation at the United Nations felt that the UN should have decided the issue on the basis of the findings of the Four Powers Commission. It opposed the constitution of another commission of investigation which it felt, according to John H. Spencer, was a “brazen attempt to gain time for creating a demand to reinstall Italy in Eritrea under the guise of independence.” The Ethiopian delegation was also opposed to the selection of the delegates that made up the Commission of Investigation because four out of the five members (Pakistan, Guatemala, Burma and South Africa) had opposed Eritrea’s union with Ethiopia at the United Nations.
The Unionists were disillusioned by the U.N. in 1949. But they were not discouraged. The United Nations Commission of Investigation stayed in Eritrea between February 14 and April 10, 1950. Its method of investigation followed practically the same method as the Four Power Commission. The contest was normally going to be between the Unionist Party and the “Independence Bloc.” But no sooner had the delegates of the United Nations Commission arrived in Eritrea than the Bloc started to break into its component parts. The force that had contributed to its birth, Italian hegemony, was also the fear that brought about its collapse. As Trevaskis wrote:
Within a few days of the Commission’s arrival it [the Independence Bloc] was disrupted, losing more than half of its member as a result of a serious splits in the Moslem League and Liberal Progressive Party… The cause of dissension was the severe distaste with which the anti-Italian wings in each party…
With the break-up of the Independence Bloc the Unionist party was by far the strongest organization during the investigation of the United Nations Commission in Eritrea. So where is the 75 percent vote which the United Nations Commission, according to Issayas Afeworki, chose to disregard? The Independence Bloc had practically evaporated by the time the U.N. Commission of Investigation had arrived in Eritrea!
At the end of its investigation in Eritrea, the Commission was unable to accept one common report. The delegates from Burma and South Africa submitted a report recommending federation of an autonomous Eritrea with Ethiopia of Emperor Haile Selassie. The delegate from Norway, who was opposed to the idea of federation, recommended the immediate union of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The Guatemala and Pakistani delegates opposed the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The U.N. General Assembly had, on December 14, 1950, voted in favor of the so called “compromise” Resolution 390 — the Federation with Ethiopia of an autonomous Eritrea with its own democratic constitution, elected parliament and government under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown, by a vote of 46 to 10. The UN Resolution 390 provided that all home affairs were to be the responsibility of the Eritrean government while the powers of the Federal government with its seat in Addis Abeba will be over foreign affairs, currency and finance, internal and foreign trade, external and interstate communications, including ports, as well as defense. The Eritrean government had power to establish a home police force, to raise taxes and establish its own budget. Customs and duties on goods entering or leaving Eritrea were to be paid to Eritrea itself. Once accepted by the contracting parties, the Resolution of the United Nations was therefore a legal, binding and valid decision to all parties concerned, and remains so.
The compromise “resolution” did not please any party in Eritrea, not even the Unionists or the Government of Ethiopia both of which sought “union” and not “federation” of an autonomous Eritrea. To the Ethiopian Government of the Emperor, according to John H. Spencer, federation appeared … to have been a concession to the dictates of pre-war Fascism. It was a Fascist formula which, at all costs, must be undone… ” And it was undone. But neither this nor the crimes of the Derg, nor the dictates of the EPLF-TPLF today in power, could invalidate the strong bond of union which bind the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
__________________
Aleme Eshete, Ph.D., has been Associate Professor at Addis Abeba University. He currently resides in Italy.
A New Beginning
On May 29 Meles Zenawi telephoned me in Washington with an invitation to come to Addis Ababa to observe the transition to a new political system. With the support of RAND and the National Endowment for Democracy, I spent three weeks in the capital and two weeks in travel.
Remarkable changes have taken place in Ethiopia during the past three months. Ethiopians are rejoicing in the knowledge that the country is at peace after long years of seemingly endless civil war. There is widespread support for the principles and policies the new leaders have enunciated. There are high expectations that real democracy will now prove possible. As in Eastern Europe, there appears to be very little misunderstanding of democracy as a basic principle.
Changes in mood from sullen depression, then anxiety and finally to optimism about the future is apparent in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country. People talk without looking over their shoulders. Political groups meet publicly and several political parties are in the process of coalescing. Writers are planning new newspapers and magazines. President Meles has held long discussion sessions with critical intellectuals on prime-time evening TV. Evening newscasts in Tigrinya and Orominya have been introduced on TV and precede evening programming in Amharic. Ethiopian citizens can now obtain passports on demand without having to pay bribes. Political exiles (who until a few weeks ago would have been jailed on arrival in the country) circulate in full freedom and host cocktail parties at major hotels.
Political dialogue in Ethiopia is now characterized by a strong interest in Western democracy, federalism and open economic systems. EPRDF leaders have committed themselves to establishing multi-party democracy within two years, to a pluralist society with a free press, to a free-market economy, and to respect for human rights and the rule of law with equal status for all peoples of the country. Random violence, arrogance, and officious behavior of government functionaries toward citizens have quickly gone out of style. EPRDF leaders speak of keeping the future Ethiopian army within the range that prevailed during Haile Selassie’s time — about 45,000 men in all. They show little interest in a reconstituted air force.
Rains have been abundant so far this “kremt” season. Farmers are plowing and planting with confidence, traders are expanding their activities, and prospects for a good harvest seem excellent. International relief operations have greatly eased the threat of famine in most food-deficiency areas. Churches are full, as are mosques. There is embarrassment over the $35 million payment Israel made to Ethiopia to facilitate Felasha emigration, but satisfaction that it did not actually fall into the hands of Mengistu or Kassa Kebede. The money was transformed by Israel into an Ethiopian government account in Citibank in New York during the last half hour of the banking business day on Saturday, May 25, 1991. By Monday, the Provisional Government established by the EPRDF came into control of Ethiopian government accounts abroad. One body of opinion within the new government favored returning the money to Israel on the grounds that it represented “blood money” paid for the export of Ethiopian citizens. Kassa Kebede was smuggled out of the country with one of the last Falasha flights, carried on the plane on a stretcher under a blanket — supposedly a Falasha too ill to be disturbed. He carried a passport with an Israeli visa. After a brief stay in Israel, he departed for Switzerland.
There are many unhappy people in Ethiopia. The damage a degenerated authoritarian system does cannot be repaired overnight. The new leaders have committed themselves to privatization of much of the state- run economy. The most difficult things to privatize will be the state farms that are losing money and industrial establishments with outdated or Soviet-supplied equipment.
“The whole Derg system became a network of corruption — corruption that reached fantastic levels,” Meles Zenawi said to me as we discussed economic problems, “and we face a huge job in rooting it out and setting things right.” The new government has to grapple with a maze of urgent tasks all at once: getting transport moving, restoring communications within the country and with the outside world, getting schools ready to open in September, obtaining medical supplies and restoring rudimentary social services.
When EPRDF leaders took over the government in Addis Ababa, they found that the Derg had left behind a mere $3.6 million. The Treasury contained only 96 million birr. An EEC consortium set up a $38 million credit for fuel imports.
The center and north of the country are littered with incredible quantities of wrecked tanks, trucks rocket launchers, armored vehicles, and other military debris. Some roads are still mined. I was unable to drive to Alem Ketema. Two vehicles had been blown up the day before I attempted the route. Vast quantities of ammunition remain to be disposed of in many parts of the country.
Despite the widespread sense of relief at the changes which have brought peace and the promise of a better future, the country looks shabbier than it did 20 years ago. Infrastructure is run-down. Just about everything needs refurbishing and repair.
New EPRDF officials seldom occupy Derg quarters or offices, either in the capital or in provincial towns. In both Mekelle and Gondar, I found the EPRDF administrators of the province working out of modest houses.
There are many kinds of unhappy people in Ethiopia. There are the destitute and the beggars. There seem to be more of them than ever before. There are divided and bereaved families. Hundreds of thousands of wives still do not know where their husbands and sons are, or if they are alive at all. There are students who have missed two, three or more years of education. There are Shoan centrists who resent the end of their era of dominance. Amharas are not being discriminated against as such, however. There are many northern Amharas in the EPRDF.
The new leaders talk of smaller and honest government. They use no titles but Ato and Woizero. They talk of federalism, local responsibility, and encouraging local initiative. It will take time to educate the population in these concepts and to establish effective local institutions. Some Ethiopians fear that no matter how good their intentions and how sincere their promise, new leaders may not be able to deliver. They fear the residual effects of Marxism on guerrillas who once claimed to admire Albania. Can the idealism that the new leaders profess be put into practice? What alternatives is there to giving new leaders the opportunity to prove their good intentions and live up to their promises? They won internal struggle under the slogan Selam ba tigil (Peace through Struggle). Throughout the north this slogan can be seen on posters and painted on walls.
Ethiopians recognize that Derg policies–and Mengistu’s inability to change–brought the country to the brink of disintegration. The insurgents had far fewer resources than the Derg. There is widespread realization that if EPRDF forces had not entered Addis Ababa on 28 May, an appalling bloodbath might have ensued, for law and order in the capital had broken down. The “Acting President” General Tesfay Gebre Kidan telephoned American charge d’affaires, Mr. Houdek, on May 26 and told him he could no longer control his troops or even his own bodyguards. It was in response to this information that Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen in London concurred in Meles Zenawi’s proposal to bring EPRDF forces into the capital without further delay. No one in Addis Ababa any longer expresses resentment of alleged U.S. facilitation of EPRDF takeover of the capital.
Human Victims of the Recent Past
Mengistu’s communist party (the WPE) has been dissolved. Leaders who did not flee are interned in the Yekatit ’66 party school under circumstances that contrast with those that prevailed in Derg prisons. All other WPE members and certain categories of former officials are required to report their whereabouts to local authorities every week. In some provincial areas, party members and former officials (including in some cases heads of peasant associations) have been interned and assigned to work on clean-up and reconstruction projects. The Ministry of State Security has been abolished and its personnel are interned at Sendafa. The new government plans to sort serious offenders from the rest, put them on trial in the presence of international observers and release the rest.
The fate of hundreds of thousands of ex-soldiers and expellees from Eritrea is a much more urgent problem. I saw thousands of conscripts, mostly young southerners, being transported southward by Red Cross trucks to camps at Nazreth and Debre Zeit for processing and release. But available transport has been inadequate to handle the exodus. Perhaps as many as two hundred thousand ex-soldiers and civilians had been gathered in makeshift camps in Tigre, Wollo, Gondar and Bahr Dar as of mid-July. During the same period, I drove among further tens of thousands trekking along highways in Tigre and on routes to Gondar and Bahr Dar. Some retained their uniforms and boots. Many did not. Some walked barefeet.
The condition of some of the civilians in northern camps was sometimes worse than that of the soldiers. The outpouring of civilian expellees from Eritrea was still continuing as of the 3rd week of July (when I left Ethiopia) and more than 50,000 soldiers who had fled to Sudan were scheduled to be sent back across the border soon.
Eritrea
I did not visit Eritrea, but hope to do so before the end of the year. Isaias Afewerki, leader of the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) undertook a commitment in February 1991 to defer a referendum on the future of Eritrea for two years. The EPRDF provisional leadership in Addis Ababa also declared its readiness to accept the results of an internationally supervised plebiscite on the future of Eritrea. In respect to all international agreements and arrangements, Eritrea still remains part of the Ethiopian state. When I left Ethiopia on July 19, air, telephone, and postal services with Eritrea had not been reestablished. In contrast to other parts of Ethiopia, there were no reports of moves toward political democratization in Eritrea. This had caused disquiet among Ethiopians, including Eritreans living in the capital and other parts of the country, especially the large Eritrean business community.
The Flag and Amharic
Except in Eritrea, the green-yellow-red traditional flag flies throughout Ethiopia. The proceedings of the National Conference were in Amharic. The Charter the Conference agreed upon has definitive texts: in English and in Amharic. Meles impressed participants and television audience with his command of Amharic.
Food and Famine
Many foreign and international agencies continue to be active in providing famine relief. Noteworthy is the work of the Joint Relief Partnership (JRP), a consortium of three Ethiopian churches (Orthodox, Catholic and Mekane Yesus) with the Catholic Relief Service and Lutheran World Federation. This group was set up to cross combat lines and supply food to needy areas in the center and north of the country. Cross-border food operations from Sudan have ceased. Most parts of the north were still being supplied with petroleum products from Sudan in July. Some of the international relief agencies have had difficulties in their relations with the EPLF administration in Eritrea.
The reforms Mengistu reluctantly decreed in March 1990 had a rapid and favorable impact in the parts of the south. In Arsi and southern Shoa, producer cooperatives quickly dissolved and peasants began to leave the odious villages into which they had been herded a few years before. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation’s authority to levy delivery quotas was abolished and farmers were freed to sell as they pleased as private traders resumed operations. In northern regions the EPRDF told farmers that they were free to do as they pleased. Meles Zenawi described the new government’s approach to me in the following words shortly after I arrived in June: “We don’t have the means to provide much assistance to the farmers yet, and we hope eventually to attract foreign help to speed up development. Meanwhile we will apply what we learned in Tigre: to listen to the farmers. They know best how to plant and cultivate. Agriculture is not a field where bureaucrats should give orders. We are going to stay off the backs of the farmers of this country, encourage them to plant as they wish and sell without hindrance. This should bring us through the next couple of years successfully. By following this course, we can feed ourselves and start accumulating a surplus for export.”
Belg rains were good in 1991 in most parts of the central highlands. I watched energetic farmers cutting and threshing fields of barley, wheat and teff with good yields. Markets throughout the north are well supplied with dried peas, beans, corn, vegetables and potatoes. There are still great price disparities, especially between rural areas and Addis Ababa. Chickens sell for 2.50 birr in Tigre and Gondar but cost 15 birr in Addis Ababa. Teff was 140 birr per quintal in Gojjam in mid-July but almost twice as high in Tigre and Shoa. Salt is still expensive in the center and south. Livestock are in oversupply in most parts of the country.
Exports and the Need for Foreign Exchange
The problem of finding exports to generate a rapid inflow of foreign exchange is urgent. Coffee sales were delayed by the government change and transport to ports can still be a serious obstacle to rapid shipment. Except for coffee and livestock, Ethiopia has little else to export until the next harvest is brought in.
In spite of heavy requirements for support of Derg military operations in Eritrea, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) appears to have finished up its 1991 fiscal year in the black. EAL’s new general manager, Captain Zeleke Demissie has a clear set of goals: expansion of international services and revival of tourism to Ethiopia as a major foreign exchange earner.
At Lalibela and Axum I inspected the splendidly designed hotels built ten years ago when the Derg still had illusions of being able to earn money from tourism. They have been looted and their fittings wrecked, but the attractive stone buildings are intact. The National Tourists Organization, a bureaucratic monstrosity, is unlikely to survive for long. Six private tour companies have been reactivated and are preparing for operations. Addis Ababa Hilton remains one of the finest hotels in the Third World.
The U.S. Embassy
After three years of distinguished service, Robert Houdek was replaced by Marc Baas as Charge d`Affaire in Addis Ababa at the end of June. Charge Baas met with President Meles and is in frequent and direct contact with senior officials of the Transitional Government. He hosted almost 1000 guests at this year’s Fourth of July reception. The long period when the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa was the object of harassment and petty slights by Derg officialdom is clearly past. There is talk of expanded AID and USIS operations as well as the possible assignment of Peace Corps volunteers again.
Travel in Shoa and the North
On day trips I visited several parts of Shoa: Tegulet, Jirru, Ensaro, Selale and Minjar. Everywhere farmers were busy and happy, market towns were lively and new local officials who had been popularly elected were carrying out their functions with a light hand. A few EPRDF fighters (generally called Woyane in the south, Tagays in the north) were maintaining security in country towns without friction or tension with the inhabitants.
During a ten-day trip through four northern provinces I visited Dessie, Lalibela, Alamata, Korem, Makelle, Adigrat, Axum, and Aduwa and then crossed via Debre Tabor and Addis Zemen to Woreta and up through beautiful green, hilly countryside to Gondar. From Gondar I went to Bahr Dar and back to Addis Ababa via Mota, Bichena, Fiche and Debre Libanos. The monuments of Lalibela and Axum have suffered no molestation. I attended morning services in St. Mary of Zion at Axum and observed the priests and monks carrying the tabot through the town in a ceremony of prayer for rain. I met with the EPRDF provincial administrators in both Mekelle and Gondar and was impressed with their dedication to the same policy principles the EPRDF has proclaimed in Addis Ababa.
Conclusion
After five weeks in the new Ethiopia I left feeling more optimistic about the country’s future than it has been possible to feel at any time in the past 17 years. Now political life is open. The new leaders are known and accessible. They hold press conferences and appear on TV in natural circumstances. Political and economic discourse takes place across a broad spectrum. The country is quickly opening up to the world.
President Meles Zenawi is already the most popular public figure in Ethiopia. He is a sociable, intelligent human being who is widely read, likes to meet people and talk openly, and avoids mouthing dogma or pontificating. Whatever his earlier beliefs, and whatever his intentions when he setup the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigre a few years ago, he makes no concessions to Marxism now in public utterances or private conversation.
The Provisional Government that is now being formed under the umbrella of the 83-member Council of Representatives will face difficult challenges. Among them will be the problem of coming to terms with ethnicity. Another will be the crucial problem of economic policy. At medium and lower levels, the EPRDF appears to contain people still sympathetic to radical nationalist ideas. Their influence could complicate the task of coming to terms with the World Bank and the lending and development institutions with whom cooperative relations are going to be essential for the success of new government and for the establishment of real democracy in the country.
It will be surprising if the Provisional Government performs with a high degree of efficiency in all the tasks it undertakes. But if it retains the spirit of openness and common sense with which it has begun, it will learn quickly from experience. It will include professionals as well as insurgent leaders. Ethiopia remains fortunate in having large numbers of well trained technocrats and specialists who are dedicated to work for the good of the country. If a fair proportion of those who left during the Derg era return from abroad, bringing their talents and their money with them, they will give an enormous boost to the peace of recovery and development.
Suddenly, in the wake of what appeared likely to be a disastrous bloodbath, Ethiopia has emerged into an era of hope and expectation. In spirit, the Provisional Government is by far the most democratic the country has known in its 3000-year history. The best way friends of Ethiopia on the outside can ensure its transformation into a stable democratic system is to help it implement its commitments and to call it to account if there is backsliding.
________________________________________________________ Paul Henze is an expert in Ethiopian affairs with Rand Corp. This article is condensed from a longer report prepared by the author for Rand Corp.
FORMAL STATEMENTS
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public declarations
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions
COMMUNICATIONS WITH A WIDER AUDIENCE
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting
GROUP REPRESENTATIONS
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections
SYMBOLIC PUBLIC ACTS
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures
HONORING THE DEAD
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places
PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins
WITHDRAWAL AND RENUNCIATION
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honours
54. Turning one’s back
THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION OSTRACISM OF PERSONS
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict
NONCOOPERATION WITH SOCIAL EVENTS, CUSTOMS, AND INSTITUTIONS
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOCIAL SYSTEM
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. “Flight” of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)
ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION ACTION BY CONSUMERS
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott
ACTION BY WORKERS AND PRODUCERS
78. Workers’ boycott
79. Producers’ boycott
ACTION BY MIDDLE-PEOPLE
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott
ACTION BY OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ “general strike”
ACTION BY HOLDERS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money
ACTION BY GOVERNMENTS
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo
THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOOPERATION SYMBOLIC STRIKES
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)
MULTI-INDUSTRY STRIKES
116. Generalised strike
117. General strike
COMBINATION OF STRIKES AND ECONOMIC CLOSURES
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown
THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION REJECTION OF AUTHORITY
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance
CITIZENS’ NONCOOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from governmental educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported institutions
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions
CITIZENS’ ALTERNATIVES TO OBEDIENCE
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws
ACTION BY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny
DOMESTIC GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organisations
THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast (fast of moral pressure, hunger strike, satyagrahic fast)
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment
SOCIAL INTERVENTION
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theatre
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system
ECONOMIC INTERVENTION
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions
POLITICAL INTERVENTION
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government
This is available in Gene Sharp’s book: “The Politics of Nonviolent Action”, available fromThe War Resisters League, 339 Layfayette St. New York, N.Y. 10004 (212) 228-0450 for $13.25, including postage.
The July Conference Objectives
Just three months ago few would have predicted the downfall of the Derg or the sneaky departure of its brutal chieftain to Zimbabwe. The suggestion that Ethiopia’s warring factions would assemble for a dialogue in Addis Ababa would have been equally fanciful. However improbable this might have seemed, Ethiopia now appears to be opening a new chapter in its history.
The much-awaited political conference was held in Addis Ababa during July 1-5. Twenty-one domestic groups and organizations fifteen countries and international organizations were reportedly present (See list below). Meles Zenawi, acting president and general secretary of the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), presided over the conference.
In his opening speech, Meles declared that the central aim of the conference was to “establish lasting peace and democracy in Ethiopia” and set up a “transitional government reflecting the differences of opinion, interests and aspirations of the peoples of the country.” He noted that Ethiopia’s problems stemmed from “denial of democratic rights” and pronounced the end of an “unjust system that relegated the people to the status of second-class citizens in their own country.” He pledged to promote peace and democracy in the country which he said could be obtained “only by guaranteeing the rights and equality of the nations and nationalities.” He proclaimed the “dawn of a new life” for the people of Ethiopia.
Meles blamed the Derg’s “war machine” for bankrupting the country and for “pushing the people further into a miserable existence.” He praised his organization, the EPDRF, for its role in “dealing a decisive blow to the Derg army and … establishing a Provisional Government in the country.” He underscored EPDRF’s commitment to democracy observing that his organization has avoided “monopolizing power and implementing its own ideas.”
Meles acknowledged that the identification and selection of conference participants was “fraught with its own problems.” He said that the EPDRF identified those “forces who stand for peace and democracy, and in truth, represent the people…” He indicated that the factors considered in the invitation of participants included political and ethnic diversity, military participation in the struggle against the Derg and the practical need for an effective working forum. Meles assured participants “that this conference is only the first and would not be the last one.”
Conference Agenda
The conference agenda was drawn by the EPDRF. Agendas presented by other groups were reportedly voted down. Conference participants considered various issues relating to the structure and process of the transitional government and the question of Eritrean secession. The transitional government will consist of an 87 member assembly. EPDRF will retain 32 seats and the various Oromo organizations will have 27 seats. Six seats will be left open for “unrepresented groups.” The remaining seats are divided among 15 groups and organizations. On the question of Eritrean secession, the Conference participants reportedly agreed on a referendum
within 2 years. Sultan Ali Mirah reportedly made strong statements opposing Eritrean secession.
Participants reported that there was vigorous debate and an open exchange of views. There was apparently some problems in translating conference proceedings. Each group was allowed to provide its own translators. The conference atmosphere was described as cordial and stimulating.
Charter of the Transitional Government
The Charter of the Transitional Government appears to be comprehensive. Section 1 consists of declarations on “democratic rights.” Each nationality has the right to self-determination and self-government. It has the right to insure preservation of its own culture, language and history. The right to participate in national government is also granted to each nationality.
The Transitional Government will observe all UN declarations on human rights. Individuals shall enjoy the right to free speech, assembly and conscience. They shall also have the right to organize and establish political parties.
Section 2 deals with foreign policy. Ethiopia will follow a policy of nonintervention and observe its international treaty and obligations. Local governments shall have the right to contact international aid organizations independently of the national government to secure humanitarian assistance.
Section 3 defines the structural and process of the transitional government.
There shall be a representative Assembly of 87 persons and a ministerial body. The Assembly will operate as a legislative body. It will also pass the state budget. The Assembly will elect the president for the transitional government. The president will appoint the prime minister and the cabinet with the concurrence of the Assembly. The president, prime minister and vice-chairperson of the Assembly will be from different nationalities. There will be an “independent” judiciary. A constitutional commission will be established along with defense and public security committees. Labor laws and legislation promoting free press will be duly enacted.
Section 4 of the Charter deals with the political programs of the transitional government. The Assembly will establish a constitutional commission which will draft and present a draft constitution for consideration by the Assembly.
Following debate in the Assembly the draft document will be presented to the public for debate and comment. The final draft will be presented to a popularly elected government for ratification. Popular election will be held in less than 30 months. The transitional government will yield to the political party wining the most votes.
The Charter provides for the passage of legislation to establish local representative bodies. Assistance to war-ravaged areas, resettlement of involuntary Derg army inductees and reconstruction of basic infrastructures will be given top policy priority. Special effort shall be made to counter divisive sectarian and communal activities.
Criticism of the Conference
The Conference has been criticized by groups claiming to have been excluded by EPDRF. The Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), purportedly representing several groups including the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), elements of the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Alliance (EPDA) and the Tigrean People’s Democratic Movements (TPDM), criticized the conference as a sham forum and a brazen attempt by EPDRF to legitimize and entrench itself. COEDF charged that its members and other legitimate groups in the country were excluded by express orders of Meles. It claims that the participants invited to the Conference were handpicked EPDRF lackeys. COEDF argues that the Conference did not represent the diversity of political views in the country.
COEDF believes that the conference should have been conducted under international auspices outside of the country. COEDF argues that such a conference would have insured a free and open exchange of ideas and avoid possible EPDRF intimidation and retribution against disobedient participants. It claims that the agreement on a referendum in Eritrea is a desperate deal made to facilitate access to the port in Assab. COEDF also expressed grave concern over EPDRF’s reconstitution of the country’s armed forces by Front troops.
An Economic Charter?
The failure of the Conference to take any meaningful steps on economic issues was a major shortcoming. This is particularly worrisome in view of Meles’s statement in his opening speech that “the transitional government inherits a devastated economy which will have to be somehow revived side by side with the task of insuring a democratic system.”
EPDRF sources confirm that there is no official view on the country’s economic orientation. They indicate that the Conference has neither adopted nor rejected socialism, free market approaches or any other economic forms. EPDRF sources stress that the relief work and political organization must precede economic planning.
Missed Opportunity?
Indeed one may rightfully wonder why the Conference agenda completely ignored consideration of even broad economic goals and aspirations. The omission of economic issues raises questions at two levels: 1) Is there a `hidden’ agenda? 2) How sophisticated are EPDRF’s leaders, and equally, the Conference participants?
By excluding economic issues from the Conference agenda, the EPDRF seems to presuppose that political forms must precede economic forms. Despite Meles’s admission that the political and economic problems are coterminous, apparently the solutions need not be concurrent.
The EPDRF formulation of the agenda suggests that democratic institutions and practices can flourish and thrive even in a chaotic and barren economic landscape. The lack of a democratic government was not the only reason
why Ethiopia remains impoverished. Ethiopia became a global symbol of poverty precisely because its people were denied economic freedom by a repressive military junta which was hellbent on pursuing bankrupting socialist policies.
It would have been appropriate and logically compelling for the Conference to have considered and issued a general economic manifesto compatible with the putatively democratic political charter for the transitional government. If indeed the political charter recognizes individual liberties, permits free and unfettered political association and so on, it follows that a complementary economic charter which declares a commitment to free enterprise and guarantees the right to engage in private entrepreneurship could have been fashioned with little difficulty.
In failing to make a clear statement of economic policy, the Conference organizers seriously misperceived the urgent and critical needs of the common people. After seventeen years of war, repression and socialist indoctrination, the Ethiopian “masses” want to be left alone to pursue their meager lives in peace, dignity and with minimum government interference.
They want to know when they can own their own land, till it and feed their families. They want to know when and where they can get credit to buy seeds and farm implements and livestock. They want to be assured that they can sell their harvest on the market without government commodity prices. They are eager to send their children to school so they could have a better life. Enterprising Ethiopians want to know that they are now free to unleash their creative powers to improve themselves and their society. Ethiopians are least interested in promises for more political meetings, discussion groups and indoctrination sessions.
Death and Resurrection of Socialism?
There may be tentative answers why economic issues were excluded from the agenda altogether. Recently, in an opinion piece widely circulated in the American print media, Meles sketched his organization’s program for
saving Ethiopia from “15 years of darkness.” He stated:
The Democratic Front’s program envisions a system that combines state and private ownership. Those sectors of the economy that play a key role in upholding the independence of the country — such as factories, banks, energy and mining — should continue to be state-owned. Those services, wholesale and retail trade sectors, that don’t play a decisive national role but are currently state-owned should be set up, as worker cooperatives or rented top private capitalists. Ownership rights would be guaranteed, and there would be no restrictions on the use of capital…. Although we believe all land should be owned by the state, the state should provide free land to all those who want to use it. Land should not be bought, sold or used as collateral.
Meles pledged: “Ownership rights would be guaranteed, and there would be no restrictions on the use of capital.” If the state owns all these, what is left to own or guarantee?
EPDRF’s economic program is alarming and disheartening. Meles seems to forget that the “darkness of the past 15 years” is merely the gloomy shadow the now vanishing socialist star. Mengistu promised the very same program Meles is now offering when he made a deathbed conversion to a “mixed economy” in the twilight of his regime. Socialism by any other name is still socialism. It is dead in Eastern Europe and is in its death throes in the Soviet Union. There is no place in the world where socialism offers hope, dignity and progress. Today’s Ethiopia is the wreckage of socialism.
Why is the EPDRF reinventing the warped wheel of socialism? Can socialism save Ethiopia? Unlikely. Ethiopia is stuck in a socialist blind alley. It can not be saved by a mismatched shotgun marriage of socialism and capitalism. The Ethiopian people know from hard experience that socialism is a synonym for poverty, despair, corruption and degradation. The Western countries who have preconditioned economic aid and cooperation on progress towards a market economy and the establishment of democratic institutions are also not beguiled by nostrum of “mixed economy.” Ethiopia’s leaders must realize the simple fact that political pluralism demands commensurate economic liberalism.
Ethiopia’s problems inhere in the very prescriptions advocated by the acting president. State ownership of land in Ethiopia led to inefficient state and collective farms. State control of commodities prices contributed to production disincentives. The result was severe and recurrent food shortfalls. State ownership of industries prevented the growth of indigenous capital and warded off foreign investment.
Over the past 15 years agricultural and industrial output declined sharply. There was virtually no foreign investment in the country. Worker cooperatives lost both capital and productive capacity running up huge debts. State control of the services sector spawned a thriving underground economy. One American dollar could fetch up to eight birr on the black market. The government banks could offer only 2.07 birr.
State control and ownership of the means of production has rarely paved the path to economic development or democracy. The state crafted many of Ethiopia’s problems. Haile Selassie’s autocratic state left a legacy of
underdevelopment. His policy of divide and rule spawned ethnic and communal strife. Mengistu’s Marxist-Leninist state oversaw 15 years of famine, civil war and repression. An estimated eight million people died during Mengistu’s husbandry of socialism. The EPDRF, the dominant power contender, now offers a reformed and virtuous Marxist state to solve Ethiopia’s ills. How ironic!
The acting president’s overtures for the reestablishment of Marxism in Ethiopia is at best misguided and futile. Socialism has been discredited throughout the world. Just a month ago a dispirited communist party in Albania voluntarily surrendered power to democratic elements. This is especially poignant because the EPDRF once adulated the Albanian model. The Soviet government is selling off states enterprises and discarding state planning. Eastern Europe is forging ahead with privatization and political pluralism. In these countries the state is yielding to market forces and actively facilitating the conversion to a market economy. The EPDRF’s retrogressive attachment to socialism is puzzling.
Socialism has died a natural death in Ethiopia. The EPDRF and the “forces who stand for peace and democracy” should take pride in bringing about its overdue demise. Meles should boldly step forward and present the Ethiopian
people with a death certificate for socialism. If the EPDRF should insist on resurrecting socialism, it will be doing so at the risk of digging its won grave.
Free Enterprise and a Brighter Future
Ethiopia must be energized out of 15 years of Marxist darkness. This can be done only if its leaders embrace free enterprise. A free market economy is necessary to revive and boost the national economy. Market forces should be allowed to determine supply and demand with minimal government intervention. The state should refrain from direct economic activity. It should divest itself from its land holdings. It should sell of state-owned factories, banks and other enterprises.
The state should play a positive role in the economy by facilitating the interplay of market forces, fostering competition, providing individual and corporate incentives and attracting external capital to invest and team up with local capital. This is not a particularly original proposal. The Eastern European and the Soviets are doing it!
The free enterprise system is natural for Ethiopians. It will reignite the Ethiopian ethos of individual effort, competitiveness and self- reliance. It will afford a generation of deprived Ethiopian youth infinite opportunities for individual effort and excellence. It will help Ethiopia accumulate national wealth.
The free enterprise system is no doubt imperfect. There will be some disparity in wealth. There is a tendency for concentration of economic power in private hands. But this should be balanced against the limitless opportunities that will be available for individual achievement and fulfillment.
Ethiopians need to be unchained from 15 years of Marxist bondage. They are weary of sanctimonious Marxists whose best offer for change consists of paternalism and perpetual servility.
History shows that the most dynamic and successful societies are those that have imposed rigorous limitations on state involvement in the individual’s affairs. The Ethiopian people need to be free not only from political repression but equally from stifling government economic policies. Ethiopia’s new leaders should heed Lenin’s wise advice: “While the state exists there is no freedom; when there is freedom there will be no state.”
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Alemayehu Gebre Mariam, Ph.D., J.D., is a professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino. He is also a contributing editor of Ethiopian Review.
