Editor’s Note:
Condoleezza Rice sounds completely ignorant of the issues at hand in this interview with Ethiopian Woyanne TV. It seems that she did not even read H.R. 2003, which was passed unanimously by the U.S. House of Representatives. She would do Ethiopians and all the people of Africa a big favor by staying out of African politics and focus on her area of expertise — the “Soviet Union.” As a former admirer of Dr Rice, I am shocked by her shallowness and cold-bloodedness (lack of compassion) toward the victims of Woyanne. Read the embarrassing interview below:
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Interview With Tefera Gedamu of Ethiopia Woyanne TV
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
December 5, 2007
QUESTION: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for offering to sit for this interview. It’s a pleasure.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, pleasure to be with you.
QUESTION: You had a fairly busy day.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: You came this morning and you’re leaving tonight.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: And — but you’re basically running into very big issues in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia. Does it concern you? Do you know —
SECRETARY RICE: Well, yes, of course. Somalia is very concerning. Of course, Ethiopia has troops deployed in Somalia to try and help bring stability, but the real answers to Somalia will lie in a peaceful resolution, the broadening of the government base. I plan later to meet with the Prime Minister to talk about the need to broaden the basis for leadership in Somalia. And of course, Ethiopian forces need to be relieved by peacekeeping forces. And so I have just had a chance to meet with Chairman Konare and with others to talk about — and I’ll have a ministerial in a little bit — to help talk about the need to get peacekeeping forces into Somalia.
QUESTION: But we had the issue of peacekeeping force — it was a very serious issue a year ago and a year since, nothing is happening.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: Yes, indeed, Ban Ki-moon said this very clearly to deploy international peacekeeping force. What is happening? I mean, the Ethiopians are there and the Prime Minister said he already told him many times —
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: — we’d rather be replaced by any multinational force.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: It wasn’t happening.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, and I fully understand that Ethiopia needs and wants to redeploy and it should be able to redeploy. We appreciate very much the Ugandan forces who are there. We appreciate that Burundi has said that it will deploy and we have tried to help — the United States is trying to help with the Burundi deployment. But I am working hard, we’re all working hard to find other forces to supplement the Ugandan and Burundi forces.
QUESTION: Who are going to be those forces?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I’m talking to a number of countries. I think there are a number of possibilities, but it’s going to help if there’s also a sense of growing stability for the Somali Transitional Government, because after all, no one really wants to be in a circumstance in which the violence is increasing. And so there’s a lot of work to do, but we are — that’s one reason that I’m here, is to raise awareness of it and to see if we can come to some solutions.
QUESTION: Are there any green lights out there?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I do think we have to solve this problem. I felt in talking with Ban Ki-moon earlier and now in talking with Chairman Konare, that people know that there’s a problem to be solved; we just have to — we have to find a way to actually — to actually implement the solution.
QUESTION: But the new prime minister is for it, just that he wants to —
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, he does, and by all accounts, he is a good man. By all accounts, he is a respected man. This is going to be an issue, though, of not just one person. It’s going to be an issue of finding a base for the government in Somalia that can bring the widest group of people into governance, people who are not in any way tainted by terrorism.
QUESTION: That, you’re sure, is not going to include the Islamic Courts, even the liberal element of the —
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it can include, I think, people who can be a part of Somalia’s future who have not been compromised by terror and that means anyone who hasn’t and isn’t still committed to terror. And so I will talk with the Prime Minister about how he plans to do that.
QUESTION: Well, so does it mean that — is there any possibility that the — some of the elements who have participated in a conference in Asmara, Eritrea, was it two — two months ago?
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, yes.
QUESTION: Is there any —
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, I would hope that we could bring those elements back. That conference was, frankly, not very successful and we have to analyze why it was not successful. We have to bring more elements to the table. But I think it starts with a commitment by the Somali leadership to be inclusive and that’s what I want to gauge and to assure with the Prime Minister today.
QUESTION: But it had several elements in (inaudible) Asmara, Eritrea (inaudible) and they have — they seem to have a very strong voice.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: Is that a concern to the peace processes (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, this is not going to be easy. Somalia has not had stability for almost two decades. And it’s not going to be easy to find the right political formula. It’s not going to be easy to deploy peacekeepers. It’s not going to be easy for Ethiopian forces to redeploy and not leave a vacuum, but that’s the task before us, is to achieve those elements. And so I hope by having the ministerial here today with the concerned parties, I hope by going back and working hard on our troop contributors and as the United States has done in helping Burundi, also helping to — at the end, that we can make some progress.
QUESTION: Interesting. Where do you stand on the issue of Eritrea? Secretary Frazer several months ago said that you are planning — that the U.S. Government is planning to put Eritrea on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. What are you —
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we are looking at exactly that because we are very concerned about the efforts of Eritrea and what it is doing. And in fact, we have taken some steps because the support for irregular forces, for terrorist forces is simply unacceptable. We hope, at the same time, that there can be efforts for Eritrea and Ethiopia to keep open dialogue or, I should say, to open dialogue about their problems. But the support of Eritrea for forces that are destabilizing is problematic and we’ve made that very clear.
QUESTION: And so do you have a timetable to —
SECRETARY RICE: We are working. We don’t put these things on timetables, but I think it’s just extremely important.
QUESTION: But was that before your government (inaudible) office?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, before my — we only have the time until we are out of office. And so we will take as many steps as we can while we’re in office.
QUESTION: It’s very interesting. Let me bring you down here to Ethiopia. Apparently, there is the H.R. 2003 in the pipeline and it’s going to — soon it’s going to be on the table in the Senate?
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: How would that —
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the Administration is against this proposal, this resolution,
and we’ve made that very clear. We don’t think this is the way to solve the problem.
Look, it would help and I will say to the Ethiopian leaders with whom I meet, it will help if there is attention to humanitarian circumstances and conditions in the Ogaden and in other regions on the borders. It — there really does need to be support for people who are caught in the most difficult circumstances, displaced people, refugees. And humanitarian quarters really do need to be maintained.
I understand the security concerns, but we can’t allow this to get in the way of helping innocent people who have just been caught in the basis of the conflict. And that will help the Administration to make very clear that the — we are resolving these problems with Ethiopia voluntarily and that there is no need for something like this particular House resolution.
QUESTION: So if this bill passes, some critics of the bill say that – the United States is going to repeat the same mistake, indeed, way back in 1979, (inaudible).
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it is why we — one of the reasons that we are close to it. We don’t think that separation from the Ethiopian Government, we don’t think that isolation from the Ethiopian Government is going to help at this point. We do think that good, honest, candid discussion and action about what can be done about some of the problems that have arisen do — admittedly, due to conflicts, but there are innocent people who are involved here and the humanitarian situation needs to be dealt with.
QUESTION: Let me take you to the Ogaden. Have you had reports coming from out there?
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, we have had — we have had reports and we’ve been very clear that we believe that the opening of humanitarian corridors is absolutely essential and the maintenance of those humanitarian corridors is absolutely essential. I understand, again, the security threat and concern. I understand the concern. But we’ve worked very, very diligently to try and help relief agencies, nongovernmental agencies to be able to deal with the humanitarian situation there and we need the cooperation of the Ethiopian Government.
QUESTION: One last question. Do you think that the ONLF is a terrorist organization?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, certainly a — what we’d call a negative force and these organizations need to be dealt with. I had a very good discussion this morning about this kind of problem in the — and the problem of irregular forces that are causing instability. But in all these cases, the real answer is that we’ve got to, in all of these areas where we have a post-conflict situation, we’ve got to establish credible, political, and peace processes so that those who wish to be a part of the future can be a part of the future and those who do not can be dealt with.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, thank you very much for your time today. It was a pleasure.
SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you.
Source: State Department
The H.R 2003 is not something to be afraid of. If you allow these changes in your country, then a peacful life will follow. It will help lead you to the truth.
The bill was introduced: April 23, 2007
Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. HONDA, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Ms. WATSON, and Mr. CLAY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
A BILL
To encourage and facilitate the consolidation of peace and security, respect for human rights, democracy, and economic freedom in
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007′.
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to–
(1) Support the advancement of, democracy, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, peacekeeping capacity building, and economic development in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia;
(2) Seek the unconditional release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia;
(3) Foster stability, democracy, and economic development in the region;
(4) Collaborate with Ethiopia in the Global War on Terror; and
(5) Strengthen United States-Ethiopian relations based on the policy objectives specified in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The people of Ethiopia have suffered for decades due to military conflicts, natural disasters, poverty and diseases, regional instability, and the brutal dictatorship of the military junta under Mengistu Haile Mariam. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were brutally murdered by the Mengistu regime, including women and children. Many more sacrificed their lives fighting for freedom, respect for human rights, and to bring an end to the brutal dictatorship of the Mengistu regime. Members of that murderous regime are currently living in Europe, the United States, and Africa.
(2) In May 1991, the brutal dictatorship of the Mengistu regime came to an abrupt end when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) defeated the Mengistu army. In July 1991, the EPRDF and a coalition of other political groups established a transitional government in Ethiopia. A number of liberation movements joined the transitional government in a spirit of a new start and the building of a democratic Ethiopia. These groups included the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and many others.
(3) Since the ouster of the Mengistu regime in 1991, the EPRDF-led government instituted a multiparty system and organized 3 regional and national and a number of local elections. The 1995 and 2000 elections were largely boycotted and judged to be neither free nor fair. Some opposition groups participated in the 2000 elections, giving such groups 12 seats in the 546-seat parliament.
(4) The May 2005 pre-election period and the conduct of the elections in Ethiopia were seen by observers to be transparent, competitive, and relatively free and fair, although there were a number of problems reported. More than 90 percent of registered voters participated and dozens took part in the elections. Moreover, some international groups observed the elections, unprecedented access to the mass media was given to the opposition, and there were televised debates between the government and the opposition. Some political parties and armed political groups boycotted the 2005 elections. However, trained local groups were barred from observing the elections.
(5) Despite apparent improvement in the electoral process, preliminary election results announced by the Government of Ethiopia shortly after the May 15, 2005, elections were seen by observers as questionable. The opposition accused the Government of Ethiopia of stealing the elections and called for civil disobedience, which resulted in the killing of demonstrators and detention of opposition leaders and thousands of their followers, including 11 elected members of parliament and the elected mayor of Addis Ababa.
(6) The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), and the ruling EPRDF reached an agreement to resolve disputed election results peacefully with the help of the National Electoral Board (NEB). The NEB investigated more than 299 complaints and later agreed to hold reruns in 31 constituencies. In late August 2005, the NEB held reruns in the 31 constituencies as well as in all 23 constituencies in the Somali region, where elections had been postponed due to insecurity.
(7) Election results show that opposition parties won 170 seats in the national parliament, a significant increase from the 12 seats they won in the last elections. Opposition parties also won the city council in Addis Ababa, giving them control over the capital. An estimated 150 of the 170 opposition members of parliament have taken their seats. In early May 2006, the Government of Ethiopia appointed a caretaker government in the capital. Members of parliament from the CUD walked out of parliament in protest. The CUD won the city, but the designated mayor has been in detention since November 2005.
(8) Human rights conditions deteriorated significantly after the May 15, 2005, elections in Ethiopia and overall human rights conditions in the country remain poor. The Department of State, in its 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, noted a myriad of human rights abuses by the Government of Ethiopia. Moreover, journalists and editors of the independent press have been and continue to face harassment and prosecution for alleged violations of press laws in Ethiopia. Dozens of journalists have fled the country, and some are currently in exile fearing prosecution or harassment.
(9) In June 2005, more than 35 demonstrators were killed by Ethiopian Government security personnel and in November 2005 an estimated 53 people were killed, including 7 policemen, according to Human Rights Watch and several other reports. The violence against these victims occurred after pro-opposition groups went to the streets of the capital to protest government actions in handling the elections results of May 2005. Tens of thousands of people suspected of being opposition supporters were detained over the past months, although many of these detainees were released. Nonetheless, government security forces continue to abuse opposition leaders, supporters, and family members.
(10) An estimated 112 political leaders, human rights activists, community leaders, and journalists, including the chairman of the CUD (Hailu Shawel), the newly elected Mayor of Addis Ababa (Berhanu Nega), and the founder of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam), were imprisoned and charged with treason and genocide. These measures were deliberately taken to stifle and criminalize opposition party activity in the country. The measures also were intended to intimidate and silence independent press and civil society, raising serious question about the Ethiopian Government’s commitment to democracy and good governance.
(11) According to Department of State’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, `human rights abuses [in Ethiopia] reported during the year included: limitation on citizens’ right to change their government during the most recent elections; unlawful killings, and beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees and opposition supporters by security forces; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention . . .’.
(12) Whereas the Ethiopian Parliament established an 11-member Commission of Inquiry to `investigate the disorder and report to the House of People’s Representatives in order to take the necessary measure’. The Commission was tasked to investigate whether government security forces used excessive force, caused damage to life and property, or showed a lack of respect for human rights. The Commission was mandated to investigate the June 8, 2005, and November 1-10, 2005, violence in different parts of the country.
(13) Whereas members of the Commission of Inquiry visited several regions, reviewed police reports, met with prisoners and government officials, made 122 radio and TV announcements to the public, examined 16,990 documents, and took testimonies from 1,300 people.
(14) Whereas the Commission of Inquiry concluded that 763 civilians were injured and 193 killed. The Commission also reported that 71 police officers were injured and 6 killed. Damage to property was estimated at $512,588. The Commission also reported that more than 30,000 civilians were detained, some were tortured, and prisoners in Kaliti were killed.
(15) Whereas the Commission of Inquiry reported that security forces fired 1,500 bullets at prisoners, killing 17 and injuring 53. The Commission stated that civilians did not use weapons and reported bank robberies by demonstrators did not take place. The Commission’s deliberations were video-taped and votes were taken on key findings on July 3, 2006.
(16) Whereas shortly after the Commission of Inquiry reached its decision, the Ethiopian Government reportedly began to put pressure on Commission members to change their report. The Chairman of the Commission, a former Supreme Court President of the Southern Region of Ethiopia, was told by a senior advisor of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to call for an emergency meeting of the Commission in order to change the Commission’s report.
(17) Whereas the Commission of Inquiry was scheduled to give its report to the Ethiopian Parliament on July 7, 2006, but the Parliament was adjourned a day early. Several Commission members, including the Chairman and the Deputy Chair, left the country with the final report, other documents relevant to the investigation, and several video tapes of the Commission deliberations.
(18) Whereas in November 2006, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and another Commission member presented the Commission’s report and briefed Members of the United State Congress.
(19) Whereas in November 2006, at a congressional briefing with members of the Commission of Inquiry, a young women named Alemzuria submitted her testimony about what happened to her mother, Etenesh Yemam. Alemzuria’s father was elected in May 2005 as Council Member of in Addis Ababa. Subsequently security personnel came to arrest him at his home and then shot Etenesh Yemam as she pleaded for her husband’s release.
(20) Whereas the Commission of Inquiry investigated the killing of Etenesh Yemam and confirmed beyond doubt what happened on that dreadful day. Etenesh Yemam’s husband still languishes in prison while Alemzuria remains a refugee in another African country.
SEC. 4. SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA.
The Secretary of State shall–
(1) Establish a mechanism to provide financial support to local and national human rights groups and other relevant civil society organizations to help strengthen human rights monitoring and regular reporting on human rights conditions in Ethiopia;
(2) Establish a victims support network to provide legal support for political prisoners and prisoners of conscience and to assist local groups or groups from outside Ethiopia that are active in monitoring the status of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia;
(3) Seek to increase the independence of the Ethiopian judiciary through facilitation of joint discussions for court personnel, officials from the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, relevant members of the legislature, and civil society representatives on international human rights standards;
(4) Create and support a judicial monitoring process, consisting of local and international groups, to monitor judicial proceedings throughout Ethiopia, with special focus on unwarranted government intervention on strictly judicial matters, and to investigate and report on actions to strengthen an independent judiciary.
(5) Establish a program to strengthen private media in Ethiopia, provide support for training purposes, offer technical and other types of support as necessary, and expand programming by the Voice of America to Ethiopia; and
(6) Establish a mechanism to identify and extradite members of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime and the current government residing in the United States who were engaged in gross human rights violations and work with other governments to identify and extradite such persons, including Mengistu Haile Mariam.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN ETHIOPIA.
(a) Strengthening Local, Regional, and National Democratic Processes- The Secretary of State shall–
(1) Provide assistance to strengthen local, regional, and national parliaments and governments in Ethiopia through training in consultation with government authorities, political parties, and civil society groups;
(2) Establish a program focused on reconciliation efforts between the Government of Ethiopia and peaceful political and civil society groups, including in minority communities, in preparation for negotiation and for participation in the political process;
(3) Strengthen training for political parties in Ethiopia in areas such as organization building and campaign management; and
(4) Provide training for civil society groups in election monitoring in Ethiopia.
(b) Democracy Enhancement-
(1) ASSISTANCE- United States technical assistance for democracy promotion in Ethiopia should be made available to the ruling party as well as opposition parties in Ethiopia.
(2) RESTRICTION-
(A) IN GENERAL- Nonessential United States assistance shall not be made available to the Government of Ethiopia if the Government of Ethiopia acts to obstruct United States technical assistance to advance human rights, democracy, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, economic development and economic freedom in Ethiopia.
(B) DEFINITION- In this paragraph, the term `nonessential United States assistance’ means assistance under any provision of law, other than humanitarian assistance, assistance under emergency food programs, assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, and other health care assistance.
SEC. 6. ENSURING GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA.
(a) Limitation on Security Assistance; Travel Restrictions-
(1) LIMITATION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE-
(A) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subparagraph (B), security assistance shall not be provided to Ethiopia until such time as the certification described in paragraph (3) is made in accordance with such paragraph.
(B) EXCEPTION- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to peacekeeping or counter-terrorism assistance. Peacekeeping or counter-terrorism assistance provided to Ethiopia shall not be used for any other security-related purpose or to provide training to security personnel or units accused of human rights violations against civilians.
(2) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS- Beginning on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and until such time as the certification described in paragraph (3) is made in accordance with such paragraph, the President shall deny a visa and entry into the United States to–
(A) any official of the Government of Ethiopia who–
(i) has been involved in giving orders to use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators in Ethiopia; or
(ii) has been accused of gross human rights violations;
(B) security personnel of the Government of Ethiopia who were involved in the June or November 2005 shootings of demonstrators;
(C) security personnel responsible for murdering Etenesh Yemam, as described in paragraphs (20) and (21) of section 3; and
(D) security personnel responsible for murdering prisoners at Kaliti prison in the aftermath of the election violence.
(3) CERTIFICATION- The certification described in this paragraph is a certification by the President to Congress that the Government of Ethiopia is making credible, quantifiable efforts to ensure that–
(A) all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia have been released, their civil and political rights restored, and their property returned;
(B) Prisoners held without charge or kept in detention without fair trial in violation of the Constitution of Ethiopia are released or receive a fair and speedy trial, and prisoners whose charges have been dismissed or acquitted and are still being held are released without delay;
(C) The Ethiopian judiciary is able to function independently and allowed to uphold the Ethiopian Constitution and international human rights standards;
(D) Security personnel involved in the unlawful killings of demonstrators, Etenesh Yemam, and Kaliti prisoners are punished;
(E) Family members, legal counsel, and others have unfettered access to visit detainees in Ethiopian prisons;
(F) Print and broadcast media in Ethiopia are able to operate free from undue interference and laws restricting media freedom, including sections of the Ethiopian Federal Criminal Code, are revised;
(G) Licensing of independent radio and television in Ethiopia is open and transparent;
(H) Access in Ethiopia is provided to the Internet and the ability of citizens to freely send and receive electronic mail and otherwise obtain information is guaranteed;
(I) the National Election Board (NEB) includes representatives of political parties with seats in the Ethiopian Parliament and guarantees independence for the NEB in its decision-making;
(J) representatives of international human rights organizations engaged in human rights monitoring work in Ethiopia are admitted to Ethiopia without undue restriction; and
(K) Ethiopian human rights organizations are able to operate in an environment free of harassment, intimidation, and persecution.
(4) WAIVER-
(A) IN GENERAL- The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) or (2) on a case-by-case basis if the President determines that–
(i) the Government of Ethiopia has met the requirements of paragraph (3); and
(ii) such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States.
(B) NOTIFICATION- Prior to granting a waiver under the authority of subparagraph (A), the President shall transmit to Congress a notification that includes the reasons for the waiver.
(b) Treatment of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience-
(1) IN GENERAL- The President, the Secretary of State, and other relevant officials of the Government of the United States shall call upon the Government of Ethiopia to immediately release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, especially prisoners held without charge.
(2) TORTURE VICTIM RELIEF- While it is the responsibility of the Government of Ethiopia to compensate the victims of unlawful imprisonment and torture and their families for their suffering and losses, the President shall provide assistance for the rehabilitation of victims of torture in Ethiopia at centers established for such purposes pursuant to section 130 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2152).
(c) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that the Government of the United States should–
(1) encourage the Government of Ethiopia to enter into discussions with peaceful political groups in order to bring such groups into full participation in the political and economic affairs of Ethiopia, including their legalization as a political party; and
(2) Provide such assistance as is warranted and necessary to help achieve the goal described in paragraph (1).
SEC.7. SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA.
(a) Resource Policy Assistance- The President, acting through the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall provide assistance for sustainable development of Ethiopia’s Nile and Awash River resources, including assistance to help Ethiopia with the technology necessary for the construction of irrigation systems and hydroelectric power that might prevent future famine.
(b) Health Care Assistance- The President, acting through the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall provide material support in hospitals and health care centers in Ethiopia, especially hospitals and health care centers in rural areas.
SEC. 8. REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on the implementation of this Act, including a description of a comprehensive plan to address the security, human rights, democratization, and economic freedom concerns that potentially threaten the stability of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia .
SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General- There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act $20,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
(b) Availability- Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.
It is with the implementation of the above references that will bring about true change in our country. It is time to build a foundation that we as fore-fathers of a new beginning can leave to our children. It is time to bring human justice to its rightful place in our society. We can no longer hide behind the lies that we have been forced to live with. It is are duty and our right to bring peace among us. It will define who we are in history and will give us the life we so rightly deserve.
ESAC
