In his sour and vile commentary (Ethiopian Review, August 1991) projecting his parochialism and ethnocentric resonances, Ato G.E. Gorfu displayed his difficulty in distinguishing between fact and fantasy. He accused Menelik and the Shoans of treason and deceit. Surely, if he is a historian even without the credentials and the gift of masterfully narrating his subject as does Dr. Getachew Mekasha, one might forgive him. However, not only is his essay malicious but every word he wrote is untrue. Hence our urge as students of Ethiopian history, to wield our pens in dissent, both to delineate the “truth” in public interest and as a duty to our conscience. And if we may add, the remains of some seven of our ancestors and their brothers from Borana, Gojam, Menz, and Selale lie beneath the arid earth of Adowa, having fallen defending the forbearers of Ethiopia’s present tormentors. In the veins of one of us also flows abundant patriotic Tigrean blood, for that matter.
A Misplaced Assault
Gorfu portrays Menelik as a villain who did everything for sordid motives. He implicates him in the assassination of Emperor Yohannes and charges him for trading Bahr Midir (Eritrea) in exchange for arms. He is entitled to his views. But judgment requires rectitude and a critical faculty of discernment. It is dangerously easy to look for and discover links between otherwise isolated incidents and one’s own figments of hostile imagination if one is struggling to establish or support a theory in which one has more than a passing interest. Should Gorfu, with the advantage of hindsight attack Menelik for crimes of treason, it is merely a misplaced assault that rather befits the Tigrean
king, Yohannes. Was it not Yohannes who found it expedient to serve the enemy flag for gadgets and gold when Britain invaded Ethiopia and breached the nation’s sovereignty for the first time? Was it not his venality and humiliating servility that prompted him to spearhead the British invasion? Did he not give the British his blessings when they looted Ethiopia’s invaluable relics and emptied the national treasury? Above all, did he not facilitate the untimely demise of Tewodros, the valorous emperor who chose to defiantly turn his gun on himself rather than surrender to the enemy?
Menelik was a magnanimous monarch who led a consensus government. His cabinet included gallant men such as Balcha, Gobena, Habte-Giorgis, Mekonnen, Mulugeta, and his wife Taitu, to name but a few of the proud and patriotic mortals who could not be accused of treason. Wheeling and dealing is rather in character with the Tigrians whom Gorfu implicitly adores, at least judging by their own description of themselves. Without sounding irreverent to Tigrinya-speakers, the literal meaning of the word “Tigre” is after all “trader.”
Casting Aspersions
However much Gorfu dislikes him, it was Menelik who having trounced Italian aggressors and their Tigre-speaking mercenaries at the battle of Adowa, that guaranteed Tigrai’s freedom. In falsely accusing Menelik of treason, Gorfu is enviously casting aspersions on Shoans perhaps to redeem the contemptible mercenaries of the North.
Menelik’s alleged submission to Yohannes is a frank delusion too. The latter, an ex-bandit who had emerged emperor by brute force, was disposed to fits of jealousy and suspicion. He had never, for instance, entrusted a single non-Tigrean to high office. He saw potential enemies even among the rank and file of his own long-serving army. A case in point is the fear Alula’s victory at Dogali evoked. Yohannes replaced the legendary commander with his own cousin. Yet, eager to test a solo triumph and outdo Alula, he marched towards the remaining Italian forces. But the sheer size and force of the Italian force prompted the Emperor’s unceremonious retreat. Thus, Italy occupied the coastal province unchallenged.
Instead, he set out to harass his loyal subjects whom he conveniently accused of “defiance”. Emboldened by the arms he received from the British for his errand duties, Yohannes unleashed terror by plundering and burning Begemdir, Gojam and Wollo in 1988. He personally tortured and blinded Wollo’s king by plunging a red-hot knife in his eyes. The following dirge of aggrieved men and women from Gojam just about sums up the callous conduct of the supposedly pious guardian of his country:
“Pious”, he was. But for no other reasons than his unrelenting prayers even while he was in his killing fields and the missionary zeal with which he aspired to convert the “infidels”, the Muslims, whom he rendered landless by decree:
He then moved southwards to also lay Shoa waste. But his advances were halted by the forces of Beshah Aboye, Menelik’s rather junior army officer. Against the better judgment of his brilliant advisers (Mekonnen, Habte Giorgis, and Balcha) who had opted to rudely rebuff the challenge, Menelik went along with the Archbishop’s intervention to arbitrate. The negotiated settlement between Menelik and the bullying Yohannes hence averted a bloody civil war. It was with the following well-chosen reconciliatory phrase that Menelik concluded the
treaty with Yohannes:
Without any domestic excuses available to him now, Yohannes could no longer defer the external challenges he had hitherto evaded. Abandoning the hope of driving the Italians out, he accepted their incursions in Eritrea as fait accompli. Instead, he sought victory against the Mahdists whom he had considered an easy prey. As fate would have it, he was made to take his last breath in the hands of the Dervish, the “infidels” that he had hoped to beat.
Menelik Inherited Occupied Eritrea
So, Menelik in effect had the misfortune of inheriting an occupied Eritrea which Yohannes had relinquished to Italy lacking the nerve to pursue Alula’s victory at Dogali. At Adowa, Menelik competently performed the homework his predecessor had not even dared to venture. He devastated the Italian army and its Tigrean Shumbash and Buluqbash contingent (well over 300,000 strong), frustrating the enemy’s grand design of colonizing the rest of Ethiopia.
A man of noble character, Menelik was devoid of the nepotistic and ethnocentric dispositions of the `pious’ emperor. Most of Menelik’s illustriously brave commanders, Balcha, Gebeyehu, Gobenna, Habte, and Mekonnen, all came to the highest positions on merit. Not only were they not related to him, but they were men from three distinct linguistic groups. Adowa endeared Menelik in both liberated Tigrai and occupied Eritrea. The high frequency of his name among the forbearers of the generation that today vilifies him, certainly could not have been a reflection of a hostile sentiment.
If the ungrateful lot lampoon Menelik for not having purged Eritrea of its white masters, the allegation is unfounded. For not only did Britain and France threaten to attack Menelik if he did not stop at Adowa, but they had already made incursions on Ethiopia’s southern regions. Replenishing the supply of food in arid Tigrai and combating epidemics which had already left the army enfeebled, were the other formidable problems which stood in Menelik’s way to reclaim the occupied coastal province. Why accountability is shifted from the `culprit’ to the blameless king amply reveals the fine sense of justice of the likes of Gorfu.
A Qauntum Leap Into Ethnology
Gorfu then makes a quantum leap into ethnology, deriding Mengistu and Fisseha Desta’s regime as “Shoan” in direct reference to the alleged trade of Felashas for money. However, Fisseha Desta is a Tigre, and whatever else Mengistu may well be, he is not a Shoan either. At any rate, brutality, betrayal, cowardice, and venality have no nationality, and neither have nobility of spirit and courage. The fact that the region that had the dubious distinction of producing Africa’s most ruthless mercenaries also bred Alula Aba Nega, Lorenzo Taezaz, and Zerai Deres, to mention only a few patriots who died defending Ethiopia, proves the point.
Like the current Ethiopian “rulers”, the learned commentator is as well unleashing insult against “Shoans”, a veiled term to mean Amhara. It is an irony of fate that Tigreans who refer to Amharas as “adgi” (donkeys) and other Ethiopians as “baria” (slaves), are today heard championing equality and fraternity. Judgment is reserved to the Ethiopian people.
Shoans certainly differ from Gorfu’s heroes. They are like great oaks who have fought a long and testing battle for the unity, instead of the fragmentation of their country. Like their kins inhabiting the heart of Ethiopia and beyond, the fiercely independent lot have resisted and conquered the storms of enemies from within and out. They have bowed out never broken even before seemingly insurmountable forces. By subordinating their ethnic interest to that of Ethiopia, Amharas have singularly borne untold suffering and humiliation. Over the last 17 years, thousands of peasant Amharas in the South have been brutally murdered by the Derg. Only two years age, the Eritrean Liberation Front in conjunction with its instruments in Wollega, burned alive over 300 fugitive Amhara peasants in a resettlement camp for being native Amharas. Having subdued their legitimate indignation, Amharas still refused to be seen to be drawn in an ethnic strife.
The flirtation of the OLF with the TPLF is profoundly humiliating for those Ethiopians who by blood and nurture consider Oromo culture their own. The people of Balcha and Abdisa Aga have never been known to betray their country.
Today, the Tigrean oligarchy calling itself EPRDF to elude the gullible Westerners and appease its foreign pay-masters, is waging a relentless campaign of malice to divide Ethiopians along ethnic lines. A third of the nation’s population, the Amharas, are objects of media insults. Not surprisingly, the majority of Ethiopians have rejected the call for ethnic strife. True, as a result of EPRDF-incited anti- Amhara propaganda many unarmed peasants have been killed and violently evicted from their ancestral homes in the South.
Glory be to all brave Ethiopians who transcend vile ethnocentrism and fight it tooth and nail, despite its dignified status as an official ideology of the EPRDF, more correctly the TPLF. Playing one group against another is perfectly within the scheme of things of the foreign-sponsored EPRDF.
However much we wish to differ, many believe that Amhara liberalism will doom itself to impotence until such time as it acknowledges itself to be Amhara and nationalist. Historically, Amhara liberalism was a richer and more radical tradition than is admitted by the current tribal potentates in Addis Ababa. We trust, however, that the indomitable Amhara spirit would stand above the temptation of using national sentiment to punish the traitors and their equally contemptible accomplices by tarring them with the same brush in revenge.
_______________________________________ Dr. Araya D. Negash is an Associate Professor of Aeronautic Engineering, Maarsen, The Netherlands. Dr. Afrasa M. Zamanel is an Anthropologist, London, Great Britain.
The thirty years of civil war, including seventeen years of brutal Communist dictatorship have ended in Ethiopia. At last, Ethiopia has the opportunity to concentrate on forming a government that will enable its people to earn a livelihood and have a say in the political and economic decisions which affect their lives. While Ethiopia needs and will probably receive substantial assistance from the international community, the issue of whether or not permanent peace and stability are achieved will be up to the Ethiopian people themselves.
The task ahead is formidable. Ethiopia has never had a democratic form of government. Ethiopian politics are still very volatile, and a legacy of ethnic and political rivalry remains. However, Ethiopia has many assets, including a long and noble history, a talented people, and abundant physical resources. The commitment to democracy that has been expressed by all political factions in Ethiopian politics gives cause for hope that Ethiopia has made the first steps in the direction of a society in which its people are free to make their own political and economic choices.
The broad-based transitional government in Ethiopia has made great progress in the few months it has been in existence. The Representative Council has adopted a charter of basic principles to guide the government, to promote fundamental human rights, and to hold free elections within two and a half years. Real political debate is heard in Addis Ababa for the first time in years, and political life — which atrophied under Mengistu — is beginning again. In September, an independent weekly newspaper began publication. Local and regional elections will probably be held before the end of the year.
While there is much to be done to develop institutions and practices which will ensure democracy and respect for human rights, the government appears to be moving in the right direction. However, we are concerned about the large number of officials from the Mengistu regime who are being detained. We continue to urge the transitional government either to charge these persons with an offenses and give them a fair trial or release them.
The Ethiopian government has wisely decided upon a two-year transition phase in which it will seek to revive the economy, rebuild infrastructure, and establish a democratic government and society. During this time, the international community should more quickly assist Ethiopian refugees outside Ethiopia to return to their homes.
After the transition phase, Ethiopia should be able to undertake projects to achieve sustainable economic growth and provide effective social services for all its citizens.
To help Ethiopia revive its economy and rebuild its infrastructure, the international community can assist Ethiopia in acquiring essential commodities and spare parts to get trucks rolling and factories working. Thirty to forty percent of the nation’s industries are now closed for lack of raw materials and spare parts and the vital transport sector is operating at less than half of capacity. Many of the country’s roads, bridges, telecommunications, schools, and clinics were destroyed or damaged by the war. Returnees, displaced persons, and ex- soldiers will need a range of assistance, such as seeds and tools, oxen, and job training, in order to reintegrate productively into Ethiopian society.
While Ethiopia will continue to require emergency assistance, consisting ostly of food, the United State’s goal is to move gradually out of emergency assistance programs and into development assistance programs. The United States government will support, and will encourage other donors to support, UNHCR’s efforts to promote voluntary repatriation for long-time Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti and Somali refugees in eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti. This would effect a durable solution for over one million refugees in these countries, both lessening the refuge burden on asylum countries and promoting stability in the Horn of Africa.
Also during the transition period, Ethiopia may need assistance as its officials develop new strategies, policies, and options for fostering political, economic, and social development. Areas in which such assistance could be provided are privatizing the economy, decentralizing the government, creating an environment in which freedom of expression and association can flourish, and establishing the rule of law.
At the present time, U.S. legislation enacted during the Mengistu regime is still in effect, restricting the type of assistance we can provide to Ethiopia. We are seeking the repeal of, or enactment of exception to, legislative restrictions on aid to Ethiopia. The U.S. no longer opposes loans and grants to Ethiopia by international financial institutions on human rights policy grounds.
As soon as we are legally able to do so, the United States will coordinate with the international donor community to provide development assistance to help Ethiopia during the transitional phase and over the long term, as long as it continues to progress in democracy and human rights.
_____________________________ Ambassador Herman J. Cohen is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the United
States State Department. He was the mediator at the London Peace Conference
that was held in May.
It all seems unreal. Four months into the Transitional Government’s administration, Addis Ababa still remains an enigma. Apart from the removal of the disgraced top echelons of the former Derg regime, and the wholesale incarceration of the remnants of what used to be “the mighty” armed forces of Ethiopia at various concentration camps around the city, little seems to have changed. Addis Ababa still maintains the air and trappings of a drab and gloomy Marxist city. The outdated and faded slogans and banners are still in display on old and dilapidated arches and public buildings. These are the silent and symbolic legacies of the Mengistu era.
In a way this is not at all uncharacteristic of the administrative life of the country since the EPRDF takeover. Virtually none of the Derg laws, edicts or decrees, however unjust or offensive, have been lifted or repealed. The bureaucracy is paralyzed and uncertain about what is expected of it in the absence of clear and decisive instructions. The courts, municipalities, local and provincial offices are in a state of suspended animation.
The sense of jubilance and euphoria that was clearly visible 3 months ago is now gone. Skepticism, pessimism and cynicism are overtaking public attitude. The EPRDF is slowly learning that it is much easier to fight a war than administer a nation.
The question of Eritrean secession has been a catalyst of public opinion. There is considerable controversy surrounding the Charter, the organic document, adopted by the Council of Representatives. It is an open secret that the Meles administration regards Eritrea’s secession as an accomplished fact, and treats the matter as closed, “as it was already decided by the 30 years war.” To the administration the planned referendum in 2 years is a mere formality. They are intolerant to suggestions that the matter might legitimately concern the rest of Ethiopia. Such views are dismissed as “warmongering.”
The Charter for the Transitional government contains a clause which grants all ethnic groups in Ethiopia the right of self-determination, including total independence. This clause is borrowed from the Stalinist constitutions of the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European allies. It has never been actually practiced in those countries. Most Ethiopians regard the clause as a direct invitation and blatant encouragement of secession and national fragmentation.
Needless to say, this particular provision of the Charter has offended the sensitivities of many mainstream national political groups. All of the political parties that recently mushroomed into existence in Addis Ababa in preparation for the projected general elections have categorically rejected the Charter on account of this clause. They have called for a total boycott of all those who approved and signed the Charter. They have also refused to have anything to do with all those who were signatories to the charter, and have gone to the extent of calling on the original signatories to disassociate themselves with it as a condition for their cooperation and collaboration.
On the other hand, the Oromos and other ethnic groups who are clearly favored by the EPRDF seem to have gone somewhat overboard on the issue. These leaders are busy conducting vigorous campaigns interspersed with divisive and inflammatory speeches attacking other ethnic groups, especially the Amharas. In some cases this has triggered serious intercommunal violence. All this, of course, is blamed on the EPRDF, the principal authors of the Charter.
Now, the main challenge to the EPRDF administration in this regard comes from the National Democratic Unity Party (NDU) led by Ato Tsegaye Abiye. Ato Tsegaye, who was born in Eritrea, has emerged as one of the most articulate and dynamic leaders in the Ethiopian political horizon. Ato Tsegaye’s party stands for one, undivided Ethiopia. It strongly opposes and condemns any attempt at dismembering the country through what they regard as underhanded and manipulative machinations. Ato Tsegaye openly accuses the EPRDF administration of not living upto its promises of maintaining a free climate conducive to exercising full democratic rights, especially in the area of free speech, access to the media and freedom of assembly. So far, he claims to have been twice refused permission to hold public meetings and mass rallies in Addis Ababa. His rallies attract huge crowds and his ideas seems to have a wide appeal among the general public. The authorities are clearly alarmed by Ato Tsegaye’s personal popularity and wide appeal. His public rally recently attracted over 10,000 people. EPRDF troops dispersed the crowed by shooting firearms in the air. Ato Tsegaye’s popularity is rising so fast, it is rumored that the EPRDF government will disallow him from participation in the process. If this should happen it will be a sad day for the fledgling democracy in Ethiopia. Others are following EPRDF’s actions against Ato Tsegaye’s party with keen interest. Similarly, General Jaggamakello’s party, unlike his other fellow Oromos, strongly stands for Ethiopia’s unity and integrity.
Ethiopia’s present officialdom is threatened by the “U” word. For the government and those in the circle of the administration “Unity” is a subversive word. And anyone advocating it is regraded as a suspect. No wonder a few had the courage of their convictions to come out openly and talk about the age old unity and integrity of Ethiopia. It is, however, clear where the people of Ethiopia stand on the issue unity. The main problem is EPRDF’s monopoly of the mass media. Despite the government’s claim to the contrary, press censorship is still very much a fact of life.
In such a climate it is impossible to show the overwhelming support that the forces of unity and national cohesion generally enjoy in the population. Foremost among the forces enjoying a central and unique position is, of course, the Ethiopian Monarchy whose time has now come. This is recognized by all sides, which is both a source of joy and worry, depending on which side of the fence you are on. In pursuit of its goals, Mo Anbessa continues to make considerable strides in maintaining close links with all mainstream national parties. To this end Mo-Anbessa has already acquired pledges of support from most of them, based on unequivocal mutual commitments, and binding common interests and principles. But it is a long process which demands a lot of patience, hard work and sacrifice.
In other developments, in a recent press release President Meles Zenawi strenuously denied Libyan President Qaddafi’s “allegation” that Meles was a Yemeni, and that Ethiopia was an Arab state. The irrepressible Qaddafi’s riposte to that is no doubt being anxiously awaited.
The former regime’s top officials (with the exception of Tesfaye Gebrekidan, Addis Tedla and Berhanu Bayih, who are still enjoying the hospitality of the Italian Embassy as “uninvited guests”) are all undergoing interrogation and indoctrination at the Yekatit 12 Political School under the Derg (the former Crown Prince’s compound) near Sidist Killo. Interestingly, most had managed to send their wives and children abroad before the collapse of the regime. The task of hauling food and other essentials to them had fallen on the shoulders of relatives and mistresses, who apparently were overdoing it by lavishing them with luxury items such as whiskey, choice beef, and other delicacies at the start of their incarceration. However, when Addis Ababa residents expressed their outrage, the authorities tightened the condition of their imprisonment. No date has been set for their trial.
Tollei, Tatek, (Gaffarasa), Sendaffa, Holetta and Urso are among the scores of places which have become notorious overnight. Detainees, former soldiers and officers, in their tens of thousands are held at these locations. Relatives voice bitter complaints about conditions at these camps. Inadequate food and water for drinking or washing, poor sanitary conditions, wide spread illness and even outbreaks of epidemics resulting in deaths are reported in this camps. From the general outcry it appears every family in Addis Ababa and other major towns seems to have someone (usually the breadwinners) detained in one of these congested concentration camps.
On a recent T.V. interview given on two separate occasions Ato Seye Abraham, the Defense Minister, talked in detail about the military situation prior to the collapse of the Derg, and leading to spectacular victory of the EPRDF forces. Among other things, Ato Seye gave some highly interesting statistics, and provided an insight into EPRDF policy for the future defense posture of Ethiopia.
According to Ato Seye, even though his Ministry’s record books show a figure of a million and a half for the total number of Ethiopia’s armed fores, the actual figure never exceeded 530,000. The Derg allegedly pocketed millions of dollars paid out by way of salaries to this nearly million-strong non-existent fanthom army for over 15 years! The Derg allegedly inflated the number to justify the overhead in order to loot and plunder the already over strained resources of the national treasury.
Another piece of information provided by Ato Seye was that out of the 530,000 soldiers, nearly 250,000 were now under custody as prisoners. Nearly 200,000 are presumed dead. The remaining 80,000 are unaccounted for (presumably they are still in the bush scattered all over the place). Questions about the possible inclusion of these surviving forces into a reconstituted future Ethiopians armed forces dismissed by Ato Saye who said he saw no possible future role for an army of “cowards, mercenaries, and killers and butchers of brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers!” “They are a totally demoralized lot, and they have proved themselves useless as a fighting force.” He said, as Ethiopia “has no external enemies, the country, has no need for a large standing army anyway.”
Asked as to what he would do in case of external aggression from any quarter, the young and cocky defense minister confidently assured his T.V. audience that after they saw how easily his forces had crushed the bloated Derg army, none of Ethiopia’s neighbors “would dare to challenge our awesome
power.”
Ato Seye also said that the total cost of the war was nearly 20 Billion dollars, out of which 18 billion birr was spent on “salaries” alone, and another 9 billion dollars was spent on imported military hardware and equipment. He concluded his comment with a sad but painfully true observation that “it would have been much better to throw all this money into the sea, rather than spend it on decimating
our people and wasting our nation.”
________________
Dr. Getachew Mekasha is currently in Ethiopia.
A New Beginning
On May 29 Meles Zenawi telephoned me in Washington with an invitation to come to Addis Ababa to observe the transition to a new political system. With the support of RAND and the National Endowment for Democracy, I spent three weeks in the capital and two weeks in travel.
Remarkable changes have taken place in Ethiopia during the past three months. Ethiopians are rejoicing in the knowledge that the country is at peace after long years of seemingly endless civil war. There is widespread support for the principles and policies the new leaders have enunciated. There are high expectations that real democracy will now prove possible. As in Eastern Europe, there appears to be very little misunderstanding of democracy as a basic principle.
Changes in mood from sullen depression, then anxiety and finally to optimism about the future is apparent in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country. People talk without looking over their shoulders. Political groups meet publicly and several political parties are in the process of coalescing. Writers are planning new newspapers and magazines. President Meles has held long discussion sessions with critical intellectuals on prime-time evening TV. Evening newscasts in Tigrinya and Orominya have been introduced on TV and precede evening programming in Amharic. Ethiopian citizens can now obtain passports on demand without having to pay bribes. Political exiles (who until a few weeks ago would have been jailed on arrival in the country) circulate in full freedom and host cocktail parties at major hotels.
Political dialogue in Ethiopia is now characterized by a strong interest in Western democracy, federalism and open economic systems. EPRDF leaders have committed themselves to establishing multi-party democracy within two years, to a pluralist society with a free press, to a free-market economy, and to respect for human rights and the rule of law with equal status for all peoples of the country. Random violence, arrogance, and officious behavior of government functionaries toward citizens have quickly gone out of style. EPRDF leaders speak of keeping the future Ethiopian army within the range that prevailed during Haile Selassie’s time — about 45,000 men in all. They show little interest in a reconstituted air force.
Rains have been abundant so far this “kremt” season. Farmers are plowing and planting with confidence, traders are expanding their activities, and prospects for a good harvest seem excellent. International relief operations have greatly eased the threat of famine in most food-deficiency areas. Churches are full, as are mosques. There is embarrassment over the $35 million payment Israel made to Ethiopia to facilitate Felasha emigration, but satisfaction that it did not actually fall into the hands of Mengistu or Kassa Kebede. The money was transformed by Israel into an Ethiopian government account in Citibank in New York during the last half hour of the banking business day on Saturday, May 25, 1991. By Monday, the Provisional Government established by the EPRDF came into control of Ethiopian government accounts abroad. One body of opinion within the new government favored returning the money to Israel on the grounds that it represented “blood money” paid for the export of Ethiopian citizens. Kassa Kebede was smuggled out of the country with one of the last Falasha flights, carried on the plane on a stretcher under a blanket — supposedly a Falasha too ill to be disturbed. He carried a passport with an Israeli visa. After a brief stay in Israel, he departed for Switzerland.
There are many unhappy people in Ethiopia. The damage a degenerated authoritarian system does cannot be repaired overnight. The new leaders have committed themselves to privatization of much of the state- run economy. The most difficult things to privatize will be the state farms that are losing money and industrial establishments with outdated or Soviet-supplied equipment.
“The whole Derg system became a network of corruption — corruption that reached fantastic levels,” Meles Zenawi said to me as we discussed economic problems, “and we face a huge job in rooting it out and setting things right.” The new government has to grapple with a maze of urgent tasks all at once: getting transport moving, restoring communications within the country and with the outside world, getting schools ready to open in September, obtaining medical supplies and restoring rudimentary social services.
When EPRDF leaders took over the government in Addis Ababa, they found that the Derg had left behind a mere $3.6 million. The Treasury contained only 96 million birr. An EEC consortium set up a $38 million credit for fuel imports.
The center and north of the country are littered with incredible quantities of wrecked tanks, trucks rocket launchers, armored vehicles, and other military debris. Some roads are still mined. I was unable to drive to Alem Ketema. Two vehicles had been blown up the day before I attempted the route. Vast quantities of ammunition remain to be disposed of in many parts of the country.
Despite the widespread sense of relief at the changes which have brought peace and the promise of a better future, the country looks shabbier than it did 20 years ago. Infrastructure is run-down. Just about everything needs refurbishing and repair.
New EPRDF officials seldom occupy Derg quarters or offices, either in the capital or in provincial towns. In both Mekelle and Gondar, I found the EPRDF administrators of the province working out of modest houses.
There are many kinds of unhappy people in Ethiopia. There are the destitute and the beggars. There seem to be more of them than ever before. There are divided and bereaved families. Hundreds of thousands of wives still do not know where their husbands and sons are, or if they are alive at all. There are students who have missed two, three or more years of education. There are Shoan centrists who resent the end of their era of dominance. Amharas are not being discriminated against as such, however. There are many northern Amharas in the EPRDF.
The new leaders talk of smaller and honest government. They use no titles but Ato and Woizero. They talk of federalism, local responsibility, and encouraging local initiative. It will take time to educate the population in these concepts and to establish effective local institutions. Some Ethiopians fear that no matter how good their intentions and how sincere their promise, new leaders may not be able to deliver. They fear the residual effects of Marxism on guerrillas who once claimed to admire Albania. Can the idealism that the new leaders profess be put into practice? What alternatives is there to giving new leaders the opportunity to prove their good intentions and live up to their promises? They won internal struggle under the slogan Selam ba tigil (Peace through Struggle). Throughout the north this slogan can be seen on posters and painted on walls.
Ethiopians recognize that Derg policies–and Mengistu’s inability to change–brought the country to the brink of disintegration. The insurgents had far fewer resources than the Derg. There is widespread realization that if EPRDF forces had not entered Addis Ababa on 28 May, an appalling bloodbath might have ensued, for law and order in the capital had broken down. The “Acting President” General Tesfay Gebre Kidan telephoned American charge d’affaires, Mr. Houdek, on May 26 and told him he could no longer control his troops or even his own bodyguards. It was in response to this information that Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen in London concurred in Meles Zenawi’s proposal to bring EPRDF forces into the capital without further delay. No one in Addis Ababa any longer expresses resentment of alleged U.S. facilitation of EPRDF takeover of the capital.
Human Victims of the Recent Past
Mengistu’s communist party (the WPE) has been dissolved. Leaders who did not flee are interned in the Yekatit ’66 party school under circumstances that contrast with those that prevailed in Derg prisons. All other WPE members and certain categories of former officials are required to report their whereabouts to local authorities every week. In some provincial areas, party members and former officials (including in some cases heads of peasant associations) have been interned and assigned to work on clean-up and reconstruction projects. The Ministry of State Security has been abolished and its personnel are interned at Sendafa. The new government plans to sort serious offenders from the rest, put them on trial in the presence of international observers and release the rest.
The fate of hundreds of thousands of ex-soldiers and expellees from Eritrea is a much more urgent problem. I saw thousands of conscripts, mostly young southerners, being transported southward by Red Cross trucks to camps at Nazreth and Debre Zeit for processing and release. But available transport has been inadequate to handle the exodus. Perhaps as many as two hundred thousand ex-soldiers and civilians had been gathered in makeshift camps in Tigre, Wollo, Gondar and Bahr Dar as of mid-July. During the same period, I drove among further tens of thousands trekking along highways in Tigre and on routes to Gondar and Bahr Dar. Some retained their uniforms and boots. Many did not. Some walked barefeet.
The condition of some of the civilians in northern camps was sometimes worse than that of the soldiers. The outpouring of civilian expellees from Eritrea was still continuing as of the 3rd week of July (when I left Ethiopia) and more than 50,000 soldiers who had fled to Sudan were scheduled to be sent back across the border soon.
Eritrea
I did not visit Eritrea, but hope to do so before the end of the year. Isaias Afewerki, leader of the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) undertook a commitment in February 1991 to defer a referendum on the future of Eritrea for two years. The EPRDF provisional leadership in Addis Ababa also declared its readiness to accept the results of an internationally supervised plebiscite on the future of Eritrea. In respect to all international agreements and arrangements, Eritrea still remains part of the Ethiopian state. When I left Ethiopia on July 19, air, telephone, and postal services with Eritrea had not been reestablished. In contrast to other parts of Ethiopia, there were no reports of moves toward political democratization in Eritrea. This had caused disquiet among Ethiopians, including Eritreans living in the capital and other parts of the country, especially the large Eritrean business community.
The Flag and Amharic
Except in Eritrea, the green-yellow-red traditional flag flies throughout Ethiopia. The proceedings of the National Conference were in Amharic. The Charter the Conference agreed upon has definitive texts: in English and in Amharic. Meles impressed participants and television audience with his command of Amharic.
Food and Famine
Many foreign and international agencies continue to be active in providing famine relief. Noteworthy is the work of the Joint Relief Partnership (JRP), a consortium of three Ethiopian churches (Orthodox, Catholic and Mekane Yesus) with the Catholic Relief Service and Lutheran World Federation. This group was set up to cross combat lines and supply food to needy areas in the center and north of the country. Cross-border food operations from Sudan have ceased. Most parts of the north were still being supplied with petroleum products from Sudan in July. Some of the international relief agencies have had difficulties in their relations with the EPLF administration in Eritrea.
The reforms Mengistu reluctantly decreed in March 1990 had a rapid and favorable impact in the parts of the south. In Arsi and southern Shoa, producer cooperatives quickly dissolved and peasants began to leave the odious villages into which they had been herded a few years before. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation’s authority to levy delivery quotas was abolished and farmers were freed to sell as they pleased as private traders resumed operations. In northern regions the EPRDF told farmers that they were free to do as they pleased. Meles Zenawi described the new government’s approach to me in the following words shortly after I arrived in June: “We don’t have the means to provide much assistance to the farmers yet, and we hope eventually to attract foreign help to speed up development. Meanwhile we will apply what we learned in Tigre: to listen to the farmers. They know best how to plant and cultivate. Agriculture is not a field where bureaucrats should give orders. We are going to stay off the backs of the farmers of this country, encourage them to plant as they wish and sell without hindrance. This should bring us through the next couple of years successfully. By following this course, we can feed ourselves and start accumulating a surplus for export.”
Belg rains were good in 1991 in most parts of the central highlands. I watched energetic farmers cutting and threshing fields of barley, wheat and teff with good yields. Markets throughout the north are well supplied with dried peas, beans, corn, vegetables and potatoes. There are still great price disparities, especially between rural areas and Addis Ababa. Chickens sell for 2.50 birr in Tigre and Gondar but cost 15 birr in Addis Ababa. Teff was 140 birr per quintal in Gojjam in mid-July but almost twice as high in Tigre and Shoa. Salt is still expensive in the center and south. Livestock are in oversupply in most parts of the country.
Exports and the Need for Foreign Exchange
The problem of finding exports to generate a rapid inflow of foreign exchange is urgent. Coffee sales were delayed by the government change and transport to ports can still be a serious obstacle to rapid shipment. Except for coffee and livestock, Ethiopia has little else to export until the next harvest is brought in.
In spite of heavy requirements for support of Derg military operations in Eritrea, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) appears to have finished up its 1991 fiscal year in the black. EAL’s new general manager, Captain Zeleke Demissie has a clear set of goals: expansion of international services and revival of tourism to Ethiopia as a major foreign exchange earner.
At Lalibela and Axum I inspected the splendidly designed hotels built ten years ago when the Derg still had illusions of being able to earn money from tourism. They have been looted and their fittings wrecked, but the attractive stone buildings are intact. The National Tourists Organization, a bureaucratic monstrosity, is unlikely to survive for long. Six private tour companies have been reactivated and are preparing for operations. Addis Ababa Hilton remains one of the finest hotels in the Third World.
The U.S. Embassy
After three years of distinguished service, Robert Houdek was replaced by Marc Baas as Charge d`Affaire in Addis Ababa at the end of June. Charge Baas met with President Meles and is in frequent and direct contact with senior officials of the Transitional Government. He hosted almost 1000 guests at this year’s Fourth of July reception. The long period when the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa was the object of harassment and petty slights by Derg officialdom is clearly past. There is talk of expanded AID and USIS operations as well as the possible assignment of Peace Corps volunteers again.
Travel in Shoa and the North
On day trips I visited several parts of Shoa: Tegulet, Jirru, Ensaro, Selale and Minjar. Everywhere farmers were busy and happy, market towns were lively and new local officials who had been popularly elected were carrying out their functions with a light hand. A few EPRDF fighters (generally called Woyane in the south, Tagays in the north) were maintaining security in country towns without friction or tension with the inhabitants.
During a ten-day trip through four northern provinces I visited Dessie, Lalibela, Alamata, Korem, Makelle, Adigrat, Axum, and Aduwa and then crossed via Debre Tabor and Addis Zemen to Woreta and up through beautiful green, hilly countryside to Gondar. From Gondar I went to Bahr Dar and back to Addis Ababa via Mota, Bichena, Fiche and Debre Libanos. The monuments of Lalibela and Axum have suffered no molestation. I attended morning services in St. Mary of Zion at Axum and observed the priests and monks carrying the tabot through the town in a ceremony of prayer for rain. I met with the EPRDF provincial administrators in both Mekelle and Gondar and was impressed with their dedication to the same policy principles the EPRDF has proclaimed in Addis Ababa.
Conclusion
After five weeks in the new Ethiopia I left feeling more optimistic about the country’s future than it has been possible to feel at any time in the past 17 years. Now political life is open. The new leaders are known and accessible. They hold press conferences and appear on TV in natural circumstances. Political and economic discourse takes place across a broad spectrum. The country is quickly opening up to the world.
President Meles Zenawi is already the most popular public figure in Ethiopia. He is a sociable, intelligent human being who is widely read, likes to meet people and talk openly, and avoids mouthing dogma or pontificating. Whatever his earlier beliefs, and whatever his intentions when he setup the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigre a few years ago, he makes no concessions to Marxism now in public utterances or private conversation.
The Provisional Government that is now being formed under the umbrella of the 83-member Council of Representatives will face difficult challenges. Among them will be the problem of coming to terms with ethnicity. Another will be the crucial problem of economic policy. At medium and lower levels, the EPRDF appears to contain people still sympathetic to radical nationalist ideas. Their influence could complicate the task of coming to terms with the World Bank and the lending and development institutions with whom cooperative relations are going to be essential for the success of new government and for the establishment of real democracy in the country.
It will be surprising if the Provisional Government performs with a high degree of efficiency in all the tasks it undertakes. But if it retains the spirit of openness and common sense with which it has begun, it will learn quickly from experience. It will include professionals as well as insurgent leaders. Ethiopia remains fortunate in having large numbers of well trained technocrats and specialists who are dedicated to work for the good of the country. If a fair proportion of those who left during the Derg era return from abroad, bringing their talents and their money with them, they will give an enormous boost to the peace of recovery and development.
Suddenly, in the wake of what appeared likely to be a disastrous bloodbath, Ethiopia has emerged into an era of hope and expectation. In spirit, the Provisional Government is by far the most democratic the country has known in its 3000-year history. The best way friends of Ethiopia on the outside can ensure its transformation into a stable democratic system is to help it implement its commitments and to call it to account if there is backsliding.
________________________________________________________ Paul Henze is an expert in Ethiopian affairs with Rand Corp. This article is condensed from a longer report prepared by the author for Rand Corp.
The July Conference Objectives
Just three months ago few would have predicted the downfall of the Derg or the sneaky departure of its brutal chieftain to Zimbabwe. The suggestion that Ethiopia’s warring factions would assemble for a dialogue in Addis Ababa would have been equally fanciful. However improbable this might have seemed, Ethiopia now appears to be opening a new chapter in its history.
The much-awaited political conference was held in Addis Ababa during July 1-5. Twenty-one domestic groups and organizations fifteen countries and international organizations were reportedly present (See list below). Meles Zenawi, acting president and general secretary of the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), presided over the conference.
In his opening speech, Meles declared that the central aim of the conference was to “establish lasting peace and democracy in Ethiopia” and set up a “transitional government reflecting the differences of opinion, interests and aspirations of the peoples of the country.” He noted that Ethiopia’s problems stemmed from “denial of democratic rights” and pronounced the end of an “unjust system that relegated the people to the status of second-class citizens in their own country.” He pledged to promote peace and democracy in the country which he said could be obtained “only by guaranteeing the rights and equality of the nations and nationalities.” He proclaimed the “dawn of a new life” for the people of Ethiopia.
Meles blamed the Derg’s “war machine” for bankrupting the country and for “pushing the people further into a miserable existence.” He praised his organization, the EPDRF, for its role in “dealing a decisive blow to the Derg army and … establishing a Provisional Government in the country.” He underscored EPDRF’s commitment to democracy observing that his organization has avoided “monopolizing power and implementing its own ideas.”
Meles acknowledged that the identification and selection of conference participants was “fraught with its own problems.” He said that the EPDRF identified those “forces who stand for peace and democracy, and in truth, represent the people…” He indicated that the factors considered in the invitation of participants included political and ethnic diversity, military participation in the struggle against the Derg and the practical need for an effective working forum. Meles assured participants “that this conference is only the first and would not be the last one.”
Conference Agenda
The conference agenda was drawn by the EPDRF. Agendas presented by other groups were reportedly voted down. Conference participants considered various issues relating to the structure and process of the transitional government and the question of Eritrean secession. The transitional government will consist of an 87 member assembly. EPDRF will retain 32 seats and the various Oromo organizations will have 27 seats. Six seats will be left open for “unrepresented groups.” The remaining seats are divided among 15 groups and organizations. On the question of Eritrean secession, the Conference participants reportedly agreed on a referendum
within 2 years. Sultan Ali Mirah reportedly made strong statements opposing Eritrean secession.
Participants reported that there was vigorous debate and an open exchange of views. There was apparently some problems in translating conference proceedings. Each group was allowed to provide its own translators. The conference atmosphere was described as cordial and stimulating.
Charter of the Transitional Government
The Charter of the Transitional Government appears to be comprehensive. Section 1 consists of declarations on “democratic rights.” Each nationality has the right to self-determination and self-government. It has the right to insure preservation of its own culture, language and history. The right to participate in national government is also granted to each nationality.
The Transitional Government will observe all UN declarations on human rights. Individuals shall enjoy the right to free speech, assembly and conscience. They shall also have the right to organize and establish political parties.
Section 2 deals with foreign policy. Ethiopia will follow a policy of nonintervention and observe its international treaty and obligations. Local governments shall have the right to contact international aid organizations independently of the national government to secure humanitarian assistance.
Section 3 defines the structural and process of the transitional government.
There shall be a representative Assembly of 87 persons and a ministerial body. The Assembly will operate as a legislative body. It will also pass the state budget. The Assembly will elect the president for the transitional government. The president will appoint the prime minister and the cabinet with the concurrence of the Assembly. The president, prime minister and vice-chairperson of the Assembly will be from different nationalities. There will be an “independent” judiciary. A constitutional commission will be established along with defense and public security committees. Labor laws and legislation promoting free press will be duly enacted.
Section 4 of the Charter deals with the political programs of the transitional government. The Assembly will establish a constitutional commission which will draft and present a draft constitution for consideration by the Assembly.
Following debate in the Assembly the draft document will be presented to the public for debate and comment. The final draft will be presented to a popularly elected government for ratification. Popular election will be held in less than 30 months. The transitional government will yield to the political party wining the most votes.
The Charter provides for the passage of legislation to establish local representative bodies. Assistance to war-ravaged areas, resettlement of involuntary Derg army inductees and reconstruction of basic infrastructures will be given top policy priority. Special effort shall be made to counter divisive sectarian and communal activities.
Criticism of the Conference
The Conference has been criticized by groups claiming to have been excluded by EPDRF. The Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), purportedly representing several groups including the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), elements of the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Alliance (EPDA) and the Tigrean People’s Democratic Movements (TPDM), criticized the conference as a sham forum and a brazen attempt by EPDRF to legitimize and entrench itself. COEDF charged that its members and other legitimate groups in the country were excluded by express orders of Meles. It claims that the participants invited to the Conference were handpicked EPDRF lackeys. COEDF argues that the Conference did not represent the diversity of political views in the country.
COEDF believes that the conference should have been conducted under international auspices outside of the country. COEDF argues that such a conference would have insured a free and open exchange of ideas and avoid possible EPDRF intimidation and retribution against disobedient participants. It claims that the agreement on a referendum in Eritrea is a desperate deal made to facilitate access to the port in Assab. COEDF also expressed grave concern over EPDRF’s reconstitution of the country’s armed forces by Front troops.
An Economic Charter?
The failure of the Conference to take any meaningful steps on economic issues was a major shortcoming. This is particularly worrisome in view of Meles’s statement in his opening speech that “the transitional government inherits a devastated economy which will have to be somehow revived side by side with the task of insuring a democratic system.”
EPDRF sources confirm that there is no official view on the country’s economic orientation. They indicate that the Conference has neither adopted nor rejected socialism, free market approaches or any other economic forms. EPDRF sources stress that the relief work and political organization must precede economic planning.
Missed Opportunity?
Indeed one may rightfully wonder why the Conference agenda completely ignored consideration of even broad economic goals and aspirations. The omission of economic issues raises questions at two levels: 1) Is there a `hidden’ agenda? 2) How sophisticated are EPDRF’s leaders, and equally, the Conference participants?
By excluding economic issues from the Conference agenda, the EPDRF seems to presuppose that political forms must precede economic forms. Despite Meles’s admission that the political and economic problems are coterminous, apparently the solutions need not be concurrent.
The EPDRF formulation of the agenda suggests that democratic institutions and practices can flourish and thrive even in a chaotic and barren economic landscape. The lack of a democratic government was not the only reason
why Ethiopia remains impoverished. Ethiopia became a global symbol of poverty precisely because its people were denied economic freedom by a repressive military junta which was hellbent on pursuing bankrupting socialist policies.
It would have been appropriate and logically compelling for the Conference to have considered and issued a general economic manifesto compatible with the putatively democratic political charter for the transitional government. If indeed the political charter recognizes individual liberties, permits free and unfettered political association and so on, it follows that a complementary economic charter which declares a commitment to free enterprise and guarantees the right to engage in private entrepreneurship could have been fashioned with little difficulty.
In failing to make a clear statement of economic policy, the Conference organizers seriously misperceived the urgent and critical needs of the common people. After seventeen years of war, repression and socialist indoctrination, the Ethiopian “masses” want to be left alone to pursue their meager lives in peace, dignity and with minimum government interference.
They want to know when they can own their own land, till it and feed their families. They want to know when and where they can get credit to buy seeds and farm implements and livestock. They want to be assured that they can sell their harvest on the market without government commodity prices. They are eager to send their children to school so they could have a better life. Enterprising Ethiopians want to know that they are now free to unleash their creative powers to improve themselves and their society. Ethiopians are least interested in promises for more political meetings, discussion groups and indoctrination sessions.
Death and Resurrection of Socialism?
There may be tentative answers why economic issues were excluded from the agenda altogether. Recently, in an opinion piece widely circulated in the American print media, Meles sketched his organization’s program for
saving Ethiopia from “15 years of darkness.” He stated:
The Democratic Front’s program envisions a system that combines state and private ownership. Those sectors of the economy that play a key role in upholding the independence of the country — such as factories, banks, energy and mining — should continue to be state-owned. Those services, wholesale and retail trade sectors, that don’t play a decisive national role but are currently state-owned should be set up, as worker cooperatives or rented top private capitalists. Ownership rights would be guaranteed, and there would be no restrictions on the use of capital…. Although we believe all land should be owned by the state, the state should provide free land to all those who want to use it. Land should not be bought, sold or used as collateral.
Meles pledged: “Ownership rights would be guaranteed, and there would be no restrictions on the use of capital.” If the state owns all these, what is left to own or guarantee?
EPDRF’s economic program is alarming and disheartening. Meles seems to forget that the “darkness of the past 15 years” is merely the gloomy shadow the now vanishing socialist star. Mengistu promised the very same program Meles is now offering when he made a deathbed conversion to a “mixed economy” in the twilight of his regime. Socialism by any other name is still socialism. It is dead in Eastern Europe and is in its death throes in the Soviet Union. There is no place in the world where socialism offers hope, dignity and progress. Today’s Ethiopia is the wreckage of socialism.
Why is the EPDRF reinventing the warped wheel of socialism? Can socialism save Ethiopia? Unlikely. Ethiopia is stuck in a socialist blind alley. It can not be saved by a mismatched shotgun marriage of socialism and capitalism. The Ethiopian people know from hard experience that socialism is a synonym for poverty, despair, corruption and degradation. The Western countries who have preconditioned economic aid and cooperation on progress towards a market economy and the establishment of democratic institutions are also not beguiled by nostrum of “mixed economy.” Ethiopia’s leaders must realize the simple fact that political pluralism demands commensurate economic liberalism.
Ethiopia’s problems inhere in the very prescriptions advocated by the acting president. State ownership of land in Ethiopia led to inefficient state and collective farms. State control of commodities prices contributed to production disincentives. The result was severe and recurrent food shortfalls. State ownership of industries prevented the growth of indigenous capital and warded off foreign investment.
Over the past 15 years agricultural and industrial output declined sharply. There was virtually no foreign investment in the country. Worker cooperatives lost both capital and productive capacity running up huge debts. State control of the services sector spawned a thriving underground economy. One American dollar could fetch up to eight birr on the black market. The government banks could offer only 2.07 birr.
State control and ownership of the means of production has rarely paved the path to economic development or democracy. The state crafted many of Ethiopia’s problems. Haile Selassie’s autocratic state left a legacy of
underdevelopment. His policy of divide and rule spawned ethnic and communal strife. Mengistu’s Marxist-Leninist state oversaw 15 years of famine, civil war and repression. An estimated eight million people died during Mengistu’s husbandry of socialism. The EPDRF, the dominant power contender, now offers a reformed and virtuous Marxist state to solve Ethiopia’s ills. How ironic!
The acting president’s overtures for the reestablishment of Marxism in Ethiopia is at best misguided and futile. Socialism has been discredited throughout the world. Just a month ago a dispirited communist party in Albania voluntarily surrendered power to democratic elements. This is especially poignant because the EPDRF once adulated the Albanian model. The Soviet government is selling off states enterprises and discarding state planning. Eastern Europe is forging ahead with privatization and political pluralism. In these countries the state is yielding to market forces and actively facilitating the conversion to a market economy. The EPDRF’s retrogressive attachment to socialism is puzzling.
Socialism has died a natural death in Ethiopia. The EPDRF and the “forces who stand for peace and democracy” should take pride in bringing about its overdue demise. Meles should boldly step forward and present the Ethiopian
people with a death certificate for socialism. If the EPDRF should insist on resurrecting socialism, it will be doing so at the risk of digging its won grave.
Free Enterprise and a Brighter Future
Ethiopia must be energized out of 15 years of Marxist darkness. This can be done only if its leaders embrace free enterprise. A free market economy is necessary to revive and boost the national economy. Market forces should be allowed to determine supply and demand with minimal government intervention. The state should refrain from direct economic activity. It should divest itself from its land holdings. It should sell of state-owned factories, banks and other enterprises.
The state should play a positive role in the economy by facilitating the interplay of market forces, fostering competition, providing individual and corporate incentives and attracting external capital to invest and team up with local capital. This is not a particularly original proposal. The Eastern European and the Soviets are doing it!
The free enterprise system is natural for Ethiopians. It will reignite the Ethiopian ethos of individual effort, competitiveness and self- reliance. It will afford a generation of deprived Ethiopian youth infinite opportunities for individual effort and excellence. It will help Ethiopia accumulate national wealth.
The free enterprise system is no doubt imperfect. There will be some disparity in wealth. There is a tendency for concentration of economic power in private hands. But this should be balanced against the limitless opportunities that will be available for individual achievement and fulfillment.
Ethiopians need to be unchained from 15 years of Marxist bondage. They are weary of sanctimonious Marxists whose best offer for change consists of paternalism and perpetual servility.
History shows that the most dynamic and successful societies are those that have imposed rigorous limitations on state involvement in the individual’s affairs. The Ethiopian people need to be free not only from political repression but equally from stifling government economic policies. Ethiopia’s new leaders should heed Lenin’s wise advice: “While the state exists there is no freedom; when there is freedom there will be no state.”
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Alemayehu Gebre Mariam, Ph.D., J.D., is a professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino. He is also a contributing editor of Ethiopian Review.
Power and Legitimacy
One of the main issues that were never addressed properly is the legitimacy of government power in Ethiopia. This article attempts to clear the confusions that have arisen around this fundamental issue throughout our history, and explore means for instituting a legitimate power in Ethiopia.
God: The Basis of Ethiopian Monarchy
Like in most monarchies, the kings and queens of Ethiopia never questioned the divine origin of their power: they were the elects of God (Seyoome E’gziabher) chosen to guide their people. In fact they were the gift of God to the people and they were to be accepted as such by the people. Evidently, contractual presupposition between monarch and people were excluded beforehand: as elects of God, monarchs were above the people, they did not receive their titles from the people; monarch and people were on different levels. The people were subjects and as such they had no word in their governance. The monarchs commanded, directed, ruled and willed; the people obeyed, were led, administered and ruled. On such vertical premises, there was no theoretical foundation to challenge the monarchs’ basis for power. They had every right to feel entitled to their post and there was no reason for them to abandon it. The question here is, can a power instituted on such premises be considered legitimate? The monarch is ever free to feel entitled to his position, but can he claim legitimacy by referring to the divine origin of his post?
First of all, in order to make the above position plausible, one has to believe unreservedly in the existence of God, then accept that He chose this particular individual for the post. We may quickly say that such endeavors are quite impossible to achieve in a state such as modern Ethiopia where so many religions and so many creeds coexist, not to mention so many ethnic groups. It was, and would have remained an impossible tenet to uphold for much longer, let alone to perpetuate.
But monarchy might want to save itself by referring to the famed three thousands years of succession. But can succession legitimize such institution? Is inheritance a sufficient reason for legitimacy?
Even if the succession in those three thousand years was as smooth as any monarchy would have loved to picture it, it is by no means a legitimizing force in itself. Actually by referring to succession, one is only removing the problem in time. The question requires a philosophical solution, not a historical one. When legitimizing his power, the first Ethiopian monarch would have been in the same position as the very last one.
Again monarchists may base legitimacy of monarchy on expediency, saying it appears the only form of government that has existed for the longest period and the most suited to many nations. It must, therefore, be natural to legitimize it. We may reply that expediency is no basis for legitimacy. Monarchists and traditionalists alike should perceive monarchy like any other form of government, and as such proposable to public approval. They would make an incalculable mistake if they try to re-introduce it in its original theocratic mold.
The Military Power
When in 1974 the military took over, it was seen as an inevitable outcome. In fact, the military being the only organized body capable of maintaining order, was seen as the natural inheritor of state power. The opposition had no consistency and every bit fractious; the best it could have hoped for was to share limited position of influence.
In the euphoric and confusing years that followed, very few asked about the legitimacy of the revolutionary council’s power. The most enlightened individuals of the day demanded insistently that the new government should hand over power to civilians. The process by which such transfer should take place was never understood clearly and uniformly. To some, it simply meant handing over administrative power to the few well known revolutionaries of the left. To others, it meant selecting the most experienced and upstanding administrators of the previous government and having them collaborate with new members in shaping a more modern state. What many did not realize was that the country had to be restructured from bottom up.
The military did not wast time to exploit such confusion. Since the country had no clear road to follow, the military felt it had a mission to accomplish. Given the precarious condition of the region and of the country in particular, and given its effectiveness to enforce its own decrees, and supposedly avoid fragmentation and civil war, the military felt more than entitled to consolidate its power. It continued to define its government as provisional for over ten years until it finally decided to make it permanent by simply changing nomenclature.
Can any organized power, that happens to fill the power vacuum left by a previous administration, claim legitimacy on the basis of presumed effectiveness in maintaining order?
Even if it has not defined its real intentions in such terms, the military acted on such premises. Instead of engaging itself to offer the people an appropriate climate to organize universal political consensus, it systematically destroyed all forces that questioned and threatened its power in the name of stability and order. We may even venture to say that it exacerbated some of the main national problems in order to preserve and justify it wielding of power.
Like all power instituted through the wish of those at the helm, the military could have claimed legitimacy. The Derg was the creation of the moment by a very restricted group of people totally detached from the majority of the population. It is no wonder that it developed into such a monstrous machinery: it understood its effectiveness in imposing its will and making the people comply as the ultimate ground for legitimizing its power. Even if the military had been effective in solving all the major problems of the country, and successful in directing it on the way to prosperity, it would have continued to be an illegitimate power. There should not be any mistake in our perception: the military is not an illegitimate power because it failed miserably, but because it never had a popular mandate to continue in the position of power. The most noble thing it could have done for the country was to step down after making possible the creation of a popular civilian power structure. It appears that the military lost its historic chance to do so.
Mengistu’s Power
No one was so naive to believe that the military was going to fulfill its promises; and no one had the illusion about the true ambitions of the main figures at the top. During the turbulent years that followed Haile Selassie’s fall, few men as Mengistu must have felt that history had chosen them to determine the course of the country. Future historian might eviscerate the psychology of this man, but it is intuitively perceived that he must have considered himself “the man of the hour,” a kind of “elect of destiny.” Surely a man that literally came from nowhere; that inspired only contempt in his past, to wield in his hands the future of the country must have given him a sense of mission; and consequently of entitlement to his position. Can we call destiny a good reason to legitimize such kind of power? History may provide us with illustrious examples of men who, out of nothing, rose to supreme power, but does it mean that achieving power constitutes its own ground for legitimacy?
Believing that history has its own designs, or that destiny plays a part in selecting individuals for certain roles amounts to believing to some kind of secular religion. Thuc, we may treat the matter much the same way we did with monarchy: No one knows the laws of history, and we have no reason to believe that there is such a thing as destiny. And it is unfounded to base legitimacy to govern on such pure assumption. We should, on the contrary, ask ourselves if it is destiny that multitudes should suffer or die at the hands of its chosen one? It is far more “meaningful” to accept natural disaster than to let destruction take place at the hand of a supposed elect of destiny. Even if the chosen one were to produce much good for humanity, his power would be an imposition.
Mengistu was no usurper of legitimate power, since there was no legitimacy before him; nor has he legitimized his position through popular consent. He should not have deceived himself into believing that he was elected by some mysterious force. He is only a specimen of that anomalous species that pure chance installed in a position of power without giving him the intelligence to govern, blinding him to all human suffering.
The Seat of Legitimacy
One may appeal to the long line of succession of kings and queens, one may appeal to revered customs and uses, one may simply and instinctively grab power and hold to it as the ultimate prize; one may claim it in the name of Equality and Fraternity and Superior Reason; but at the stage of self-knowledge humans have arrived in these closing years of the century and millennium, the only power or authority that can justify and legitimize itself is the one willed by the people. No erudite traditionalist, no military strongman, no enlightened intellectual should have the illusion to thwart this fundamental principle. All legitimate power begins with the people!
It cannot be gainsaid that human history has known very few societies in which power was legitimized by the people as a majority. It is true much of the known human history was dominated by forms of government that did not even remotely resemble modern democracies. The history we learn talks more of people that were ruled, led, governed, punished and even massacred; but little that they chose, voted or instituted. Should this be taken to signify that people are better off reverting to more established forms of government? And, since legitimacy based on popular will is a recent phenomenon, the result of a long and uncertain evolution, wouldn’t it be more reasonable and more justifiable to simply follow the traditions on one’s own culture what ever that may be?
What traditionalists should know is that certain principles transcend race, culture and even history. Legitimacy or power through popular will is one of them. If we agree that no one wants to be led without being consulted; that it is instinctive for all human associations to abide by the majority’s will when several alternatives arise; that most often persuasion is the preferred method over coercion; that people long to be heard and not ignored; then it seems reasonable to affirm that popular will has always been, even though not recognized as such, a principle that human beings have cherished and will always cherish.
A group of people led by the theory that they are chosen by the laws of history to be vanguards of the oppressed would no doubt feel entitled to fill the power vacuum they have made possible through their incessant struggle. Fatalists may welcome as God’s will any personality that succeeds in securing power. But no one should be allowed to remain in power without the consent of the people.
What should we do?
In the past few weeks we have seen changes that we haven’t witnessed in almost seventeen years (changes perhaps more significant for Ethiopia’s future than the ones we lived through in the years 1974-75): the political demise and ignominious flight of interim government which will long be remembered more for allowing Israel to carry out swiftly the airlift of more than 14,000 Ethiopian Jews than its unleveraged peace talks in London; the complete disarray of a military machine once known in Africa for its gargantuan size and weaponry; the takeover of Addis Ababa by the guerrilla forces which, so far, have acted with much restraint and self control. Events all, though linked in close succession, have each a great historical significance worth taking into consideration. They are indeed bound to become memorable reminders for the future leaders of Ethiopia.
The coalition power in Addis Ababa will not form a government until July this year; but its observers are still besieged by questions and dilemmas: who are going to be the members of the provisional government? Can the coalition power afford to or should it exclude opposition or non-coalition groups from the projected government? What would it be its criteria or motives for excluding other political entities? The coalition forces, through their representatives, have made a quasi-pledge to follow democratic guidelines in matters of government, but can we be sure that they have completely abandoned their ideological stance? Is it a strategic move on their part, or a genuine act of new converts? a marriage of convenience? After all, we are well aware of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism on this particular issue not to continue doubting. Whatever the outcome, the present forces and their projected government have until election, which by the way should be given an exact date, to show their true mettle.
Most of us have been troubled and concerned about the future of Ethiopia in the hands of a coalition power that had shifting ambitions and ideological posture; but this should not in any way lead us to linger to some of the remnants of the recently defunct regime, who, except for every exiguous exceptions are responsible of some criminal act. Not only have they lost all credibility to govern, but they have been part of a system that can only be described as criminal. They have once been part of a government that ignored its provisionality in the name of national security; that had lent deaf ear to the many voices that asked for a new free Ethiopia; committed the most heinous crime against a whole generation of young citizens and decreed laws unwarranted by the people; acted in the most cynical manner by calling its own version of perestroika as though people can be commanded to simply forget the suffering and death of their loved ones just because the regime needed to redeem itself, thus also showing blatantly its ultimate contempt for a people known for its fierce pride. What they had considered a clever move to extricate themselves from the political impasse should be equally considered a condemnable historical act.
The remnants of Mengistu’s regime should not be allowed to negotiate their way with impunity. We have suffered too much and cannot afford to risk history repeating itself. Whatever the cost, whatever the emotional burden, we should have those responsible for the many crimes committed against the people, stand trial in the tribunal of law. It might be our best chance for a national catharsis, and the beginning of a new Ethiopia. This evidently required a high level of stability: we are unlikely to achieve the proper atmosphere for this, with new factions beginning to emerge, and the guns resuming to pound.
Powers and Duties of a Provisional Government
In order to execute daily affairs of government, and of administration, and to preserve law and order for the normal functioning of the state, the provisional government should be given effective powers. However, it should be within the people’s power and not in the provisional government’s to call to trial all those members of the previous administration known to have committed crimes against citizens. The provisional government may provide temporary detention of those indicted until a new constitution, new laws and a new government are installed. Attempting to do otherwise would lead us to the same errors committed by the former regime after the fall of Haile Selassie.
The primary task of a provisional government should be the organization of a Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly, to gain credibility and effectiveness should, represent all citizens from all walks of life: all ethnic groups, all classes and sectors of labor should be present in it. The provisional government would best serve the people by allowing them to use existing infrastructures, and re- modeling them if necessary, to conduct the election of the members of the Constituent Assembly.
Once the constituent Assembly is formed, it will proceed to select a committee of citizens known for its working knowledge of laws, integrity and political insight to draft the very essential constitutional laws. To fulfill its task the committee may be aided by groups of scholars of constitutional law. The initiative for constitutional laws, however, should not exclusively derive from the drafting committee: the Assembly as a whole may share the task or the prerogative. And although this might cause a longer process in the creation of laws, it has the benefit of assuring the exploration of all issues that are at the source of our problems. For once it may give us the confidence of starting with a sure foot.
The adoption of a new constitution should accelerate further the creation of traditional institution of power: the legislative, the judiciary and the executive.
The Constituent Assembly is not part, per se, a permanent institution, but if it proves to be beneficial for the stability of the country, there is no reason not to preserve it as the legislative branch of government. But in all probability it will dissolve itself once a new assembly of legislators is elected under the new constitution. Its ultimate fate lies in the hand of the electorate.
_________________________ Samuel W. Yohannes resides in Pasadena, California
