Aklog Birara, PhD

“Ethiopia’s long-awaited democracy has stalled over the last half decade…Today; there are fewer constraints on the EPRDF’s power than at any time in its 20 year rule.”

Leonardo Arriola, Countries at the Cross-roads, 2011

The above sums up the status of political and economic power in today’s Ethiopia. For long, experts presented convincing evidence linking political, economic, and social capture through a web of state, party and endowment enterprises as well as favored individuals strengthened by administrative and official (state corruption) in one of the least developed and poorest countries on the planet. Those who are disempowered and disenfranchised need no additional proof than those provided by ordinary Ethiopians who live with the system each day and by global indices each year for more than a decade. They endure hunger, hyperinflation, low incomes, unemployment, the indignity of dependency on international emergency food aid, immigration out of the country for lack of opportunities at home and so on. Here are indices that the top leaders of the TPLF/EPRDF cannot deny. The 2011 UN Human Development Index places Ethiopia 174th out of 184 countries. The Legatum Prosperity 2011 Index places Ethiopia at the bottom of five poorest countries in the world. The 2011 Global Hunger Index with IFPRI identifies Ethiopia as one of five countries with extremely alarming hunger indices. The 2011 Foreign Policy of Failed States Index places Ethiopia 20th of 60 countries in terms of de-legitimacy of state, gross human and economic rights violations and the like. Transparency International confirms that Ethiopia as one of the most corrupt among the least developed and poorest countries in the world.

As I suggested in my book, Waves last year, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in Washington disclosed massive illicit outflow of funds in excess of US$11 billion that the UNDP validated this year. Corruption and illicit outflow of monies from one of the poorest, hungriest and aid dependent countries on this planet could not have taken place without official collusion and knowledge. Corruption and illicit outflow penalize the current and future generations. Ethiopia cannot afford theft amidst hunger, destitution and technological backwardness. Imagine that these stolen monies could build factories that would produce fertilizer, for instance, to boost smallholder agricultural productivity; textile and other industries that would employ hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian youth and put the economy on a sustainable basis. Corruption and illicit outflow is loss of precious financial capital the country needs.

Ordinary Ethiopians know that this massive illicit outflow of precious resources is a consequence of poor, authoritarian and unrepresentative governance. The minority ethnic elite that rules Ethiopia has been relentless and un-bashful in using state power to amass and to transfer resources within the country and to channel monies out of the country. These elites cannot deny the fact that Ethiopia lost US$ 16 million worth of gold bullion. Persons stole it from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) in 2008. Under a chapter entitled “Should the route to wealth creation and asset accumulation (at the national level) be state capture,” I documented the sudden formation of at least 58 Tigrean owned enterprises between the period 1991 and 1995. This was the height of TPLF initiated and sponsored privatization. Among the major beneficiaries it is appropriate to include TPLF endowment firms such as EFFORT, family owned enterprises such as Mesfin Engineering. These and numerous party owned, endowed and favored enterprises are now dominant players in national transport, cement, textile and pharmaceutical production, road and other public sector construction, export and domestic trade. Where did the initial capital come from? It cannot come from the sky.

Initial capital for these and similar enterprises that are now worth billions of Ethiopian Birr came from the proceeds of nationalized firms, the banking system, foreign aid and other transfers. The political culture of shifting national resources for private gain began in earnest during this formative period. Mega construction projects such as roads, schools, dams, telecommunications and other public projects served and still serve as conduits in amassing and shifting national resources for private gain. Among the inevitable consequences is uneven development and concentration of wealth and incomes into a few hands. I assert with full confidence that the primary sources of corruption, shift of monetary and other resources and illicit outflow are primarily administrative management and state (official) manipulation and control of the sources of wealth and asset creation. Merger of ethnicity, party and state reinforce resource capture, misallocation, diversion and capital flight.

Opponents of the governing party may think that the top leadership of the TPLF/EPRDF does not know the disastrous nature of its socioeconomic and political governance including corruption and illicit outflow of funds. Prime Minister Meles’s open dialogue with the business community last year says it all. Like the gold bullion stolen three years ago, 10,000 tons of coffee slated for export just disappeared without a trace under the watch of TPLF leadership. Galling is what the Prime Minister said to his audience. “We all have our hands in the disappearance of the coffee.” His regime failed to make anyone accountable for this multimillion US dollar theft. Why is that? Admission suggests that top party and government officials and allies benefit directly from this continued plunder of the national economy.

My sense is that the top leadership knows what it is doing and does it intentionally and strategically by focusing on a nation-wide network of beneficiaries, mostly ethnic elites at the top of the political and economic power pyramid. To make the system work effectively, the single minority ethnic party must provide financial and economic incentives in order to survive. Mobilization of millions, especially youth, and the spread of a network of spies across the country at all levels suggest a determination on the part of the governing elite to amass more and to prolong single party governance. This is the reason for expert assertions that in Ethiopia, political power is business; and the business of political power is to amass wealth and assets. One cannot sustain it without incentives. Granting jobs and other sources of income is part of the story. How else would one explain the phenomenon that policy and decision making, including resource allocation, is done by a small Tigrean elite at the center and the rest simply follow? How else would ethnic elites propagate the notion that ethnic-federalism has devolved policy and decision making to regions and localities when the center is the decisive force in the country? Who at the regional or local level has policy and decision making authority. Concrete evidence I would offer is the visible difference between the level of investment and growth of towns and cities in Tigray within a short time compared to towns and cities in other regions. Compare Harrar with Mekele and Jijiga with small towns in Tigray and assess. Another is the predominance of party owned, endowed and favored individuals all over the country. Ask yourself who really owns what and where and you will arrive at the same conclusion. Preponderance must be assessed in its totality.

It is not only the democratization process that “has stalled,” it is also the capacity of the national economy to produce and supply goods and services to the vast majority of the population. This condition emanates from closure of access to economic and social opportunities that would offer ordinary people to move from hunger, poverty and dependency to prosperity and the freedom this entails that have literally stopped. This is the essential message from the UN Human Development Index. Poverty and freedom have direct correlations. Without freedom, ordinary people cannot assert their rights. Discrimination and favoritism are taking huge tolls on the majority of people and regions. The fortunate thing is that the vast majority of the Ethiopian people are politically sophisticated enough to understand that these relationships between a system that differentiates and discriminates against them; and holds them back suggest the urgent need for a new, peaceful and democratic alternative that will empower them. Divided and weak, opposition groups cannot do much except shout. This is why the Ethiopian people are literally fed-up with opposition political and civic groups that make it a life time chore to quarrel among one another ad infinitum rather than respond to the need of the population by collaborating and by working together.

Only 21 percent of Ethiopia’s 90 million people have faith and confidence in the TPLF/EPRDF. What about the 80 percent? Who represents their urgent needs? If the 93 mostly ethnic-based political parties within and outside the country represented the hopes and aspirations of the Ethiopian people as a whole, things would have been different by now. I wonder if these ethnic-based political parties and their extended civic arms are, in content, any different from the ethnic-based TPLF and the largely ethic oriented umbrella organization that it dominates, the EPRDF? It is they who should answer the question; and it is time that well-meaning Ethiopians within and outside the country poses this question directly to them? It is for this reason that I suggest that civic movements in the Diaspora can no longer act as extensions of ethnic-based political parties. They need to distance themselves from ethnic-based political organization and behaviors that keep the Ethiopian people disempowered, marginalized, poor, dependent, disillusioned and increasingly dispossessed. Let us reflect on inequality and impact.

Anyone and everyone who has patience and determination to learn the reality on the ground within Ethiopia has ample opportunity to do so. The Ethiopian people see and witness the growing and alarming gap or chasm between the few rich and the vast majority poor whether it is Addis Ababa or Mekele. The physical manifestations are all over: condominiums, villas and palatial homes bestowed by the governing party. The difference in wealth and incomes concentration in a few individuals and families, and destitution among the vast majority in Mekele alone is telling about this growing gap. The same is true in other parts of the country.

Political power and the determination to maintain it by any means necessary is a function of this economic and natural resource capture within the 20 percent party membership and support base of the governing party. Within this cluster are huge differences in incomes, assets and power that will eventually surface and push those who are less well to do and vulnerable toward the 80 percent of the population that is not getting any benefit from the system. There is nothing permanent and durable about this discriminatory and exclusionary system that survives by ‘bribing’ innocent people, especially youth, and forcing them to be loyal in order to survive. The poor, youth and the small middle class are essentially stuck in a vicious cycle of coping with hyperinflation, hunger and unemployment because they do not have the political power to influence public policy and to claim resources and gain accesses to opportunities. Believe it or not, young women and men are postponing marriage because they cannot afford the marriage itself, and more important to have children. Family is the social foundation of Ethiopian society regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation. It is an Ethiopian and not an ethnic problem. These types of incidents suggest that ethnic-based political organization and leadership are, today, barriers to rapid, cohesive and national transformation to achieve peace, national reconciliation, justice, human and economic rights and democratic governance. These aspirations are indivisible.

The 93 largely ethnic based parties and the numerous civic groups that advocate democratic change have wasted and continue to waste their political and social capital without making any meaningful contribution in support of the Ethiopian people, especially activist youth within the country. It is they who demand a change in vision and political organization and leadership. My overall sense from the post 2005 general elections that the governing party refused to accept is this. Ethiopia’s’ diverse population accepts and shares the fundamental principle and value inherent in a common country—Ethiopia—and, demands fair, just and equitable access to opportunities to improve their own livelihoods and the status of their country. I accept this fundamental principle and believe that the Ethiopian people would share a common destiny.

The illusive search for unity

The failed state indicator that I identified earlier suggests enormous dangers for the independence, territorial integrity, stability, security unity within diversity, and prosperity of Ethiopia and its mosaic. No ethnic or religious group can insulate itself from this danger. My continued plea for unconditional unity is none other than the sheer survival of this country that offers enormous promise and possibilities for all Ethiopians. This survival cannot be guaranteed with 93 largely ethnic-based parties operating against one another, competing with one another and bowing to pressures from the governing party and persuaded by external forces that there is a short cut to justice, the rule of law and political pluralism. The foundation for durable peace, national reconciliation, security, stability prosperity is nothing less than the establishment and institutionalization of individual freedom, equality for all stakeholders, human and economic rights anchored in the rule of law. These noble objectives cannot be rooted without unity of purpose and action. Members and supporters of the governing party must feel secure that they have a future in a newly constituted democratic Ethiopia in which the supremacy, power and sovereignty of the electorate is respected. It is this foundation that will avert terrorism; and that will lead to prosperity for all Ethiopians.

The question that we each need to ask then is why opposition groups whether political or civic, whether within the country or abroad, failed over and over again to iron out minor differences and forge unity to advance the common interests of the Ethiopian people as a whole regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation? It is this void in political wisdom and courage that generates mistrust among the Ethiopian people. Critical in this void is lack of mutual trust and confidence among opponents of the regime and among one another and their inability to apply rigor, discipline and consistency in advancing and institutionalizing the interests of the Ethiopian people ahead of self and group interest. It is also their lack of genuine commitment in siding with the people who struggle within the country to unseat a repressive regime peacefully, systematically and in sustainable ways. Freedom, justice, human and economic rights, the rule of law and political pluralism cannot be advanced unless we deal squarely with the voids in trust, confidence, individual and organizational discipline and genuine commitment to what ultimately matter the most: the fate of Ethiopia and the interests of Ethiopia’s diverse population. Otherwise, we will sustain minority ethnic-based single party governance in perpetuity whether we admit it or not.

Back to material arguments that support the above thesis. Last week, I diagnosed Ethiopia’s political economy under the grip of minority-ethnic elite and showed the adverse, and in some areas, devastating impacts on the country’s future and on the wellbeing and incomes of its diverse population.

In this century more than in any other, transformation for the better requires that we equip ourselves with ample knowledge and credible data and information. The era of gossip filled (shimut) based and personalized accusations and mutual suspicions of one another will not work. Activists and ‘talking heads’ must grasp the compelling socioeconomic and political reasons of the whys any meaningful change to affect all of the Ethiopian people in real and positive ways; and the alternative the day after. This is why the social motives for change must be anchored in Ethiopia and solely with the Ethiopian people. The rest of us in the Diaspora can and should contribute consistently and in sustainable ways to advance the causes of political pluralism, freedom, the rule of law, justice and fairness and equitable access to opportunities. This can only be done if we believe in diversity and unity of one country and one society expressed as Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Understanding the adverse consequences of ethnic-based single party governance is therefore not enough. The alternative must be compelling.

One ought to ask the question of why political and civil opponents of the governing party within and outside the country continue to fail in establishing the requisite organizational and leadership response to the problem. I take opposition to the governing party as a given. This opposition and rejection of a system must not be perceived as identical to opposing persons or a specific nationality group.

However and irrespective of how often we convene and shout it is not a solution by and on itself. To call and urge opponents to unite while advancing hidden agendas is a recipe for disaster. For example, one does not typically see an appreciation of external forces that would love to see Ethiopia disintegrate into pieces. For this reason, I suggest that Ethiopia’s long-term interests and the real interests of the Ethiopian people should not, ever again, be subjected to negotiated settlements among political elites with aspirations to take political power at any cost, including the “Balkanization” of Ethiopia. The TPLF has done enough damage to the country and its people. One cannot afford to repeat the same mistake. Opponents have all the information they need to forge unity of purpose and action based on core principles presented earlier, and without preconditions today. The following analysis is intended to offer additional insight why unity now may have a chance in averting disaster later.

The 2011 UN Human Development Index tells us how severe and worrisome the society’s wellbeing and livelihood are; and the vulnerability this and future generations will face. The Legatum Prosperity Index shows that the TPLF/EPRDF led developmental state develops itself and its allies and rewards itself and its allies. It is not the same as Korea or Taiwan or Singapore of China or Vietnam. It suffocates the emergence of a dynamic and competitive domestic (national) entrepreneur class and private sector. The regulatory system is discriminatory, unfair and unjust. Its direct effect is that setting-up private enterprises, choice and mobility of labor and capital, fair and open competition, creativity and innovation are stifled. The economic consequence is low productivity, continued hyperinflation, unemployment, corruption and illicit outflow of resources including foreign exchange, and the erosion of values and morals that emphasize hard work, love of and dedication to country and unreserved service to Ethiopia’s diverse population. Ethnic-based political and socioeconomic organization and allocation of scarce resources reinforces this low productivity path. It reinforces market fragmentation. For this reason alone, it is inefficient and costly for the vast majority of the population. This is why the domestic market cannot expand and middle class is not growing. It is an economy for a few and by a few. It is a form of rent seeking crony capitalism camouflaged as a developmental state.

Take corruption as an example. Corruption, discrimination, favoritism and exclusion associated with administrative and state capture (power) allow manipulations and mismanagement of the entire economy. This has a crippling effect on employment, expanding income generating opportunities, self and societal confidence. Corruption is corrosive and a way of life. A determined and nationalist government would make it a priority to promulgate laws and regulations of zero tolerance at any and all levels. For this to happen, the top leadership and its close allies must be clean. This will be a tall order for the governing party which benefits hugely from state capture. Brazil is a good example of a country that suffered most from corruption, nepotism and discriminatory policies for decades. It is not entirely clean yet. But, there are changes similar to Rwanda which has a zero tolerance policy.

As a developmental state with market orientation, Brazil has managed to transform its society for the better. It is home to the largest population of African origin in the world. Its political leadership is nationalist enough and wise enough to recognize that discrimination and exclusion is costly to the entire society and to businesses. It initiated social (education and health) and economic programs (investments and employment in excluded areas) and created the foundation for social mobility. In the process, it began reducing poverty. More important, the poor and lower classes moved to middle class status in millions: 32 million of them over less than a decade. In 2003, Brazil’s middle class was 45 percent of the population, mostly of European origin. Today, it is more diverse and constitutes 66 percent of the population. Experts agree that it will rise to at least 70 percent by early 2012. The same phenomenon occurred in Malaysia, one of the most diverse countries in the world. Mobility raises domestic demand for locally produced goods and services. Concentration of wealth and assets, discrimination and exclusion do not. This is why I would argue that the current system is punitive. This is why it must change radically.

This leads me to assess the distinctions and linkages between growth and development.

Growth and development

Members of the Diaspora, who travel to and from Ethiopia, and especially those with physical assets such as villas, convey the impression that the country is growing at a rapid pace. The 2011 UN Human Development Index confirms what the Economist said in the summer of 2010 when it reported that “Ethiopia (better yet, Ethiopians) are not better off today than they were a quarter of a century ago.” These temporary visitors fail to see growth from the human side. That is to say, they take visible ‘physical glitz’ in the form of villas, apartments, skyscrapers, eating and dancing places, traffic jams and roads as primary indicators of development and change. As the cases mentioned illustrate, the single most important measurement of positive transformation associated with growth is substantial improvements in the lives of the vast majority of the population. Incomes must rise and benefit as many people as possible. As incomes rise, people buy more; and contribute to the larger economy. The argument of the developmental state that the pie should expand first before it spreads to a larger group of people is self-serving. The pie is being gorged by a small and largely minority ethnic elite at a level that is scandalous and immoral. Top officials of the governing party propagate the notion of trickledown economics in the US which resulted in the concentration of incomes and wealth in the one percent of the population. It is this concentration that triggered the anti-Wall Street movement and youth –led revolts that may reshape economic and social thinking across the globe.

In sum, improvements in the standards of living and wellbeing of ordinary Ethiopians measure whether or not massive investments and deficit financing lifted them from poverty and dependency to self-sufficiency and sustainability. It is this lift that gives ordinary people a sense of pride and self-confidence in them, in their government and its leaders and in state institutions. One measurement is food. Agriculture is fundamental to poverty reduction, sustainable and equitable transformation. People must eat before anything else. The glitz story of growth that shows that eating places in Addis Ababa and other urban areas buzz with activities masks the disconnect in growth between government assertions that there is no famine but only ‘hunger’ and its failure to meet the basic needs of the vast majority of the population. On the other side of this story of two societies is conspicuous consumption by those who can afford to enter eating places in the first place: the governing elite, foreigners and visitors from the Diaspora. The poor, the unemployed, those with low wages and the middle class can only gaze at glitz. One single enjera with wott costs 25 Birr. Believe it or not, the poor and youth buy what Ethiopians call a single gursha for one Birr or more. It is that bad. The Diaspora cannot afford to measure wellbeing and livelihood using its higher incomes and its acquired standards.

Government officials claim that agriculture has actually been growing at rates higher than population growth. Is this credible? It is not. Stephen Dercon, Ruth Vargas and Andrew Zeitin of the World Bank wrote a provocative research paper entitled “In Search of a Strategy: rethinking agriculture-led growth in Ethiopia.” They concluded that the 20 year old TPLF/EPRDF Agriculture Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) has practically failed; and dispute official claims that agriculture has been growing at a rapid pace. In particular, they point out that cereal production has not kept-up with demand. “Some economists note that the country’s reported increases in cereal production during the past decade are not plausible unless Ethiopia has seen the fastest “green revolution” in history.” This is sheer fantasy as is the government’s contention of life transforming overall growth for the vast majority of the population. In fact, it is this failure and the political need to do something dramatic that forced the governing party to introduce what I call “water and arable land colonization by invitation.”

Ethiopia’s agriculture faces crisis in part because of state (increasingly single party) ownership of lands and other natural resources; and in part because of primitive farming and other land resource management practices. It is not my intent in this short paper to diagnose the policy and structural causes for low productivity, hunger and poverty. What I like to do here is show the systemic reasons as well as linkages to explain “why Ethiopia is still poor.” The country suffers from poor, discriminatory, exclusionary and non-participatory governance in all sectors of the economy.

In summary, the Ethiopian economy suffers from at least seven major hurdles:

a) Hyperinflation that is making poor people even poorer and is driving the middle class into poverty.

b) Legendry hunger, malnourishment and ill-health in urban and rural areas that prompted the 2010 Hunger Index group to conclude that “Ethiopia is one of the hungriest nations in the world” and compelled the UNDP 2011 Human Development Index to report that “Ethiopia’s HDI is 0.363 which gives the country a rank of 174th out of 187 countries with comparable data,” far below the African average.

I suggest again that access to adequate food is a fundamental human right. The first priority of the Ethiopian government is to satisfy the food and other basic needs of the population. Before they did anything else, successful economies transformed the policies and structures of their economies and overcame famine, hunger and malnourishment and averted the deaths of millions of their citizens. Transformation of the agriculture sector by boosting the capabilities of smallholders and others and by promoting Ethiopian owned commercial agriculture is the foundation for sustainable and equitable growth and development. Heavy and sustained investment in the sector, including investments in industries to produce fertilizer and other inputs is thus critical for Ethiopian society. The billions stolen from the poor should have been channeled to raise these capabilities. Who is accountable for this failure? It is the governing party.

c) High unemployment among youth estimated at between 30 to 40 percent. Millions of youth waste their productive lives without meaningful or no employment. The economic, social and psychological costs of this persistent problem are incalculable. This is why only 21 percent of the population is satisfied with the Ethiopian government’s capacity and commitment in addressing the formidable problems they face each day.

d) Glaring income inequality, with a concentration of wealth and income in a few hands. Today, only a handful of party-owned and endowed enterprises such as EFFORT and MIDROC, and a few privileged individuals with political connections command incomes and wealth beyond description. This is among the reasons why only four out of 10 Ethiopians are satisfied with their lives. The glitz economy has not benefitted them.

e) Pervasive corruption that infects the entire society and corrodes traditional national values such as honesty and integrity. Today, Ethiopian society suffers from widespread administrative (permits, licenses, credits, lands) and state capture corruption (abuse of aid resources, land leases, banking and financial instruments, flooding the economy with cheap money, large scale procurements and contracts). The regulatory framework favors state; party owned and endowed enterprises and foreign investors. It crowds out the domestic private sector. The cost of doing business is among the highest in the world. Freedom House and the Wall Street Journal identify the Ethiopian economy as one of the “un-freest.” This happens in a country where there is no rule of law.

f) Illicit outflow of foreign exchange is estimated at US$8.345 billion by UNDP and US$11 billion by Global Financial Integrity. Corruption and illicit outflow of massive amounts of monies from one of the two poorest countries in Africa contributes to persistent poverty. It is discriminatory, repressive, exclusionary and single party governance, systems and linkages that created and sustained corruption and illicit outflow of billions from one of the poorest countries in the world. The system condones and or ignores practices that make high officials in the government and outside; their families and friends super rich.

g) Single party, endowment and foreign dominance of the pillars of the economy are among the greatest risks facing Ethiopian society. This averts, and in fact suffocates opportunities for aspiring national entrepreneurs. It is among the reasons why the domestic market is constricted despite a large potential consumer and productive base. “In addition to its complete dominance of local and national government institutions, a number of large businesses are linked to the ruling party either directly or through family members.” Politics and economics are intertwined and operate in tandem. Human Rights Watch noted that “Party affiliated non-governmental organizations such as the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) are major channels of developing funding,” capturing national resources and investing them in favored firms, persons and regions. A leading expert on Ethiopian political economy, Terrence Lyons, suggests that “Membership in the party is essential for obtaining a civil service job and development assistance and key agricultural inputs are denied to members of the opposition.” In short, both the public and private sectors suffer from ethnic-based single party discrimination and exclusion; and from the preponderance of party owned, endowed and favored enterprises and persons, including foreign firms and individuals. This suggests that convergence of multiple economic, social and political crises is inevitable. Experts and institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF now suggest that “Beyond the question of rates of growth in the past (that are often doctored), the TPLF/EPRDF will face increased political tensions if economic stagnation or high levels of inflation (now among the world’s worst), constrict the regime’s resource base.” Hyperinflation in 2011 has been particularly severe for the urban poor and the middle class, youth and the unemployed; retirees and low wage civil servants.

Command of the pillars of the economy by party owned, endowed and favored enterprises and individuals have direct impact on the hurdles described above. In short, these critical hurdles represent the heart or center of what is wrong with the Ethiopian economy; and illustrate the lead reasons why Ethiopia is still poor.

I believe that opponents cherish the prospect of contributing to the Ethiopian people so that they do not have to live with the indignities of hunger, poverty and international emergency food aid forever. If that is the case, they have another social and human reason as Ethiopians for pursuing unity over unhealthy rivalry among themselves.

Article five of this series will give prominence to one of the largest natural resource transfers in history: “The Great Land Giveaway” or what is commonly known as land grab. I will highlight the major implications for the country, and especially for Ethiopia’s youthful population, and for the rural poor.

(AFP) – Ethiopian authorities The Woyanne junta charged 24 people with terrorism offenses Thursday including an opposition politician and a journalist, a government spokesman said.

“They are accused under the anti-terrorism law of being members of a terrorist network and abetting, aiding and supporting a terrorist group,” Shimeles Kemal told AFP.

Prominent opposition leader Andualem Arage and journalist Eskinder Nega were among those charged, the latest in a string of opposition supporters to be accused of plotting against the state.

They were arrested on September 14 on suspicion of being involved in “terrorist activities that would likely wreak havoc” added Shimeles.

The maximum sentence for supporting a terrorist group is 15 years, according to Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism legislation.

The suspects are accused of receiving support from neighboring Eritrea to carry out attacks in Ethiopia, according to the charge sheet.

“They have received from the Eritrean government weapons and explosives for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities in Ethiopia,” Shimeles said, reading from the court-issued document.

Eritrea and Ethiopia are long time foes, with both accusing each other of supporting proxy rebel forces to destabilise each other.

Eskinder and Andualem were arrested on September 14 on suspicion of being involved in “terrorist activities.”

Opposition member Berhane Nega, a former mayor of Addis Ababa currently living in exile in the United States, was also charged with terrorism.

“He is being charged in absentia,” Shimeles said.

But opposition member Negassa Gidada, a former president of Ethiopia, called the charges “laughable.”

“What they’ve tried to do is make the people shut their mouths. Unacceptable. Unacceptable,” he told AFP.

Ethiopia’s media is among the most repressed in Africa, according to the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists, which calls the country’s anti-terrorism law “far-reaching.”

The watchdog reports six journalists have been arrested since June.

By Aklog Birara, Ph.D.

(Part two of five)

In part one, I provided basic socioeconomic arguments of why unity of purpose and action among opponents of the TPLF/EPRDF is no longer an option for those who wish to see a unified, diverse and prosperous Ethiopia whose institutional foundation is grounded in fundamental principles of human dignity and freedom for the individual to choose, speak, associate and move; in the rule of law and a level playing field for each and all; in genuine equality, justice, fairness, inclusion and participation; and in political pluralism that allows and encourages peaceful competition.

For the above to take roots, the struggle for justice and freedom must be anchored in Ethiopian society, and especially youth, taxi-drivers, shop owners and the rest of the middle class of professionals, bureaucrats and the poor in rural and urban areas. It is these social forces that brought dictatorial regimes to their knees. Those on the outside can provide material, financial, technical and diplomatic support.

These and other {www:lofty} principles assume that ultimate power and the authority to determine legitimacy to govern reside with Ethiopian citizens and not with political elites. It is only when the institutional and leadership architecture that empowers ordinary citizens takes solid roots that there would be a respectful relationship between ordinary people, the state and government and the leadership that administer it on their behalf. In this sense, future change must be dramatically different from the past. Ordinary citizens will exercise this potential power through free, fair, transparent, open and competitive elections. This is why it is important to remember that opposition to the governing party is only one and necessary component of change; but not the only component.

Equally important is the ability to envision an appropriate transition toward meaningful and people centered change and to frame the alternative system that will replace the old order. Both the transition and the alternative must reflect the interests of the Ethiopian people as a whole and neither can be an afterthought.

Why people revolt

The ongoing Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East exploded because dictatorial and or authoritarian regimes refused to give-up their privileged political and economic positions peacefully. It is the pursuit of economic power and better social status that motivated them to assume political power by any means necessary in the first place. Once they assumed political power that offered them wealth beyond their imagination, they cling to it regardless of costs to any person or to any group. The tolerate greed, nepotism, corruption and exclusion because they created them. It is this that leads experts to conclude that dictatorial regimes encourage and rationalize income inequality and wealth concentration directly or indirectly. It is part of the architecture of running the state as a business enterprise. At most, those with political and economy power are likely to persecute and jail only small fish to appease the public and donors. The big fish at the top are always protected from the regulatory and legal system. It is they created the very system that benefits them and their core allies whether foreign or domestic. It is they that must protect ‘the goose that lays the golden egg,’ so to speak.

Reflect on what social and political forces drove Ethiopia’s Emperor and the dictator Mengistu HaileMariam out of power in disgrace? What forces compelled Ben Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his family to flee with an estimated 1.5 tons of gold that belongs to the people of Tunisia? What compelled Mubarak and his cohorts to cause massive carnage and to face the humiliation of court proceedings in the country he ruled for crimes against humanity and for stealing billions of money that belongs to the Egyptian people? Why did Gadhafi and his die-hards refuse to submit to the will of the Libyan people peacefully and get caught, hauled from a sewage pipe, humiliated and killed by liberation fighters as young as 19 years old that he had called “rats”? The manner and brutality and ‘savagery’ of his death will be a subject that will haunt millions of people for decades to come. For Libyans and other people who seek and deserve freedom and justice, saving Gadhafi’s life and subjecting him to the meaning of the rule of law would have sent a better omen. Instead, it sent chills accusations of the opposition itself is “lawless.” This may or may not be unfair. Only the future evolution of governance will tell.

Would other dictators in the rest of Africa including Ethiopia draw lessons from these shameful experiences and allow peaceful change through genuine free, fair, open and competitive elections? Listening to the Ethiopian Prime Minister in the aftermath of what happened in Libya; one concludes that dictators have no ear for human dignity, justice, freedom, equality, the rule of law and accountability. They feel invincible. In light of this, simple indignation will not be adequate.

I highlighted the major similarities and differences that characterize these diverse regimes in previous articles on the Arab Spring. In each case, and in today’s Ethiopia, those who govern failed and still fail to open up opportunities for the vast majority of the population, especially youth. For example, the TPLF/EPRDF regime runs an economic empire that has made a few individuals super rich, and is leading the vast majority to greater depths of poverty. The governing party failed to level the playing field in the economy. Party owned and endowed enterprises such as EFFORT, GUNA and others dominate the national economy. Believe it or not EFFORT owns at least 30 diverse and dominant companies. It started with little or no capital and now serves the economic and social interests of the top leadership of the TPLF and their extended families.

The top leadership of the TPLF/EPRDF is one of the most rigid and dismissal of any in the world. It really believes that its assault on human rights is to protect the public from all forms of “terrorism.” It continues to get away with violations in part because it has powerful Western backers; and in part the opposition is divided and weak. In light of this, the regime failed to hold anyone accountable for atrocities following the 2005 elections; for massacres in Gambella, and in the Ogaden; and jailing and killing an untold number of Ethiopians under the pretext of defending the state and the Constitution. The regime is the judge, jury and executioner. Do not expect it to change any time soon.

Economic and social injustice is widespread and there is nothing the public or dissenters can do about it. Donors and others are stunned of corruption and illicit outflow in excess of US$11 billion from one of the poorest and emergency food aid dependent countries in the world. They will not do anything unless opponents in the Diaspora close ranks and work collaboratively against corruption and {www:illicit} outflow in donor capitals everywhere. Corruption is an economic crime against the poor and the future of Ethiopian youth. In North Africa and the Middle East, we note corruption, cronyism, illicit outflow, and other economic and social ills constituted the material reasons of why people continue to die for justice, human dignity and freedom.

Here is the bottom line. People do not revolt out of hate for their fellow man or woman. They revolt out of desperation that the system in which they live is totally broken and that those who govern are not or will not be accountable to them. Escalating food prices, income inequality, corruption, nepotism and massive unemployment were among the material reasons why hundreds of thousands of youth and others revolted against repression, economic and social injustice and inequality. When a system is impervious to change, they have no option. Tunisian youth, professionals and the middle class arrived at the conclusion that the system under which they lived was intolerant of reform. This is similar to Ethiopia but took a more peaceful route. Citizens, especially youth, took matters into their own hands and gave real meaning to citizen voice, participation and popular revolt. The rest is history. Today, 110 political parties are in the process of competing in what is projected to be the freest and fairest election in Tunisia.

For Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni youth, the battle cry could be termed as ‘inequality and corruption stupid.’ Gross inequality in incomes and wealth arise when a system allows economic and social preponderance for one group over the rest, and discriminates deliberately and systematically. Tunisia was and still is more market friendly than Ethiopia. Yet, inequality was pronounced as was corruption. Egypt was worse. Gaddafi and his large family run the country as a family business. He lost his life and perhaps all his wealth and the wealth of his family. Freedom leads to the inevitable demand for accountability. But who in the top echelons of the Ethiopian government party is listening?

In Ethiopia, the economic and social system tends to emulate the worst features of crony capitalism and dictatorial ‘socialism.’ I say the worst features of capitalism because cronyism is rampant. Greed and corruption are widespread and punishing for the society. Humanitarian and other forms of aid are politicized and skew the allocation of resources along ethnic and party lines. If aid that saves lives is distorted, one will have little confidence that the rest of the economy and financial system is not distorted either. Ethiopia is neither farmland nor water resource poor. Yet, it is one of the ‘hungriest and unhealthiest” countries in the world. Take food self-sufficiency and security and investments in agriculture under the so-called Agriculture Development-led Industrialization (ADLI) approach–a strategy intended to boost the capabilities of smallholders and other rural folk–and assess outcomes.

Why did the regime fail to boost the capabilities of smallholders by providing them tenure security? As I document in my latest book, “The Great Land Giveaway: yemeret neteka ena kirmit in Ethiopia,” the country is not able to achieve a level of agricultural productivity per hectare that it had attained in 1973 or 38 years ago? Believe it or not, the governing party no longer believes that Ethiopian smallholders and other domestic entrepreneurs can modernize and commercialize agriculture or anything else for that matter. In 2009, 22 percent of Ethiopia’s rural poor depended on some form of international emergency foreign aid to survive. I conclude from these facts and from skyrocketing food prices that the governing party’s strategy was not to release the productive potential of Ethiopian smallholders and to make the country food self-sufficient. Rather, it was to control the ‘peasantry’ and to make the rural population dependent and an appendage. A pro poor economic and social policy would have resulted in a smallholder Green Revolution in Ethiopia. Generous donors such as USAID, the World Bank and others share the blame in that they did not invest in smallholder commercial farming. Some donors perpetuate dependency by focusing on relief rather than on sustainable and participatory development.

It is a fact that twenty years ago, people could afford to buy food. Today, millions survive on one meal a day. Forty years ago, the educated and others aspired to join the middle class and expected to build and own their own home. Today US$50,000 cannot buy you a decent home in Addis Ababa or other major urban areas. The façade of villas, apartment and office buildings and other construction in Ethiopia’s capital and other urban centers is glitz at its worst. Rent seeking and corrupt culture produced the glitz. Who owns major buildings anyway? Who rents them to foreigners? It certainly is not the Ethiopian middle class. They worry about their next meal. These investments are owned by few powerful individuals, families and monopolies. The direct link between business monopolies and political power is a firm indicator of the merger of party, state and ethnicity. It is this merger that enables the governing party to misallocate national resources; and to transfer waters and farmlands and other pillars of the economy from the Ethiopian people to a selected few domestic allies and to foreign governments and businesses.

These economic and social distortions and adverse impacts on ordinary Ethiopians are essential to grasp in promoting a culture of collaboration and unity among opposition groups whether civic or political; and whether within the country or abroad.

(Part three of this series will highlight the dangers that emanate from massive transfers of water basins and farmlands and other pillars of the economy to foreign governments and businesses. The piece will continue to reinforce why unity of purpose and action is critical, urgent and everyone’s business.)

Review by Prof. Theodore M. Vestal

The book ‘Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution, by Prof. Messay Kebede, is the best and most thorough analysis of the causes and implications of the Ethiopian Revolution to date. Prof. Messay has written a {www:tour de force} of the political theory of the Ethiopians who overthrew the imperial regime of Emperor HaileSelassie and instigated a program of socialism that endured for 18 years (from 1974 through 1991) before utterly collapsing. In a carefully researched and logically crafted book, the author touches on a {www:plethora} of significant topics related to a {www:seminal} period in Ethiopian history and presents them in new and important ways. The arguments and insights presented are cogent.

From the start, Messay defines {www:trenchant}ly his terms and lays out the objectives of the book. Noteworthy is the examination of current theories of revolution, making a distinction between social and political revolutions, and positing discrepancies in the Ethiopian experience. Messay does a masterly job of reviewing the ideological and sociopolitical origins of HaileSelassie’s regime with its history of political {www:cooptation}, social blockage, and creation of discontent leading to crises that brought about its demise. In evaluating the Emperor’s quest for personal glory and his success in foreign policy, he correctly notes that Haile Selassie’s international reputation enhanced his internal authority and absolutism sufficient to postpone the modern development of his country. It was in consolidating his centralized power and in rejecting limits to such power that the Emperor set up the very instruments (a national army, a system of education, and a modern bureaucracy) that would bring the imperial absolutism to an end. As the monarchy lost legitimacy with the people, it lost authority over its own guardians—especially the military.

Messay skillfully traces the precipitating factors that led to the collapse of the imperial regime and the political ascent of the military. Chief among these factors was the miscalculation of the educated and reform-minded members of the ruling elite who thought they would assume leadership of the social protests with an ensuing radical revolution without drawing in the Armed Forces into the center of the political battle. With Western educations proving of little value in getting around the blockage of social mobility, the educated elite found itself marginalized. In desperation, it turned to the then dominant ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This very disfranchisement of the educated elite became quite inspirational to the rebellious junior officers and NCOs of the military, who adopted the perspective of the outcast elite to justify their power. In 1974, it became apparent that the government could not effectively deal with the crises that engulfed the nation. As the author notes, without clear civilian leadership in the opposition, the military officers filled the vacuum and soon were making political instead of corporate demands. To oversee the implementation of these demands, the military formed a representative committee, the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army—the Derg, that took over the reins of government. There followed a bitter power struggle among individuals and opposing groups that resulted in the radicalization of the Derg which imposed a socialist revolution upon the country. Thus, the Derg hijacked the political revolution using a commitment to utopian ideas that originated from the students and intellectuals. The Derg adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology because if justified the absolute power that it needed to eliminate all other contending groups.

While this was occurring, Cold War politics intruded into the Horn of Africa: Soviet-armed Somali troops invaded Ethiopia, and the United States proved reluctant to provide military support to the nascent Derg. The Soviets, encouraged by the Derg, quickly abandoned the Somali government, their former allies, and gave massive support to Ethiopia, which appeared to be a more reliable client implementing a genuine socialist revolution. Somali forces were driven out of the country, and the radicals of the Derg led by Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged under the protective wing of the Soviets with absolute power. During Mengistu’s reign civil war was continuous. Large numbers of people either lost their lives or were forced to flee the country.

At the heart of Messay’s analysis is the use of {www:psychobiography} in finding Mengistu’s narcissism essential in understanding the revolution. In a significant contribution to the study of the revolution, the author delves into the double-edged nature of the dictator’s narcissism: on the one hand, his decisiveness, authoritarianism, cunning, and manipulative ability so suited for seizing power; but on the other hand, his negative paranoia, quick temper, cruelty, and sense of invincibility that impeded his winning the civil war. Like Haile Selassie before him, the very measures that Mengistu took to safeguard his absolute rule turned out to be those that most weakened him.

Messay is also incisive in analyzing the rise of ethnonationalism leading to the concept of a nation within Ethiopia possessing the right to self-determination either in the form of self-rule or, if need be, independence. Ethnonationalism became the rallying point for the Tigrean elite in resisting government intrusions into its territory. Together with the Eritreans who sought independence, the two northern ethnic movements scored decisive military victories that brought about the collapse of the Derg. Troops of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) marched into Addis Ababa while the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front captured Asmara. The TPLF then dominated the transitional government that adopted a system of ethnic federalism and supervised a referendum on Eritrean independence that created a new nation and left Ethiopia without an outlet to the sea. The TPLF’s rule ever since continues under the shadow of the Derg’s socialist revolution.

In his concluding analysis of the Ethiopian revolution using both a narrative method and ideological factors, Messay synthesizes a philosophic perspective that is excellent political theory and a major contribution to the literature of Ethiopian Studies. The narrative history of Haile Selassie’s era and of the Derg’s reign are splendidly presented. I strongly recommend this book to all who seek to understand Ethiopia’s turbulent transformation from a monarchy into a socialist nation during the 1970s.

(Prof. Theodore M. Vestal, author of The Lion of Judah in the New World: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Shaping of Americans’ Attitudes toward Africa.)