Since the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader of the opposition to the military rule, Burma’s (Myanmar) political evolution has become an important discussion topic for political observers and analysts. Detecting a promising shift toward democratic opening, Hillary Clinton recently visited Burma and held talks with political leaders. The hope is that, after decades of a dictatorial military rule and deferred promises of democratization, Burma is finally engaging in the serious path of political reforms and transition to democratic government. On the other hand, Ethiopia, which had a fleeting experiment with free and fair elections in 2005, is going through the reverse process of a repressive and dictatorial government whose notable outcome was the holding of an election in 2010 that was anything but fair and free and resulted in the regime claiming 99.66 % of parliamentary seats. The purpose of my analysis is to compare the two countries with the hope of clarifying the reasons why they took divergent political paths and assessing the implications of Ethiopia’s democratic retreat, together with the political options offered to opposition forces as well as to the ruling party.
Many Similitudes
Lest of being accused of comparing oranges with apples, I must begin by showing that the two countries are indeed comparable. Notably, one immediate and weighty counterargument would be to say that the Ethiopian regime has all the characteristics of a civilian government while that of Burma is a military rule, itself the result of a coup in 1958 against the then legitimate civilian government. I grant the difference but also remind that, while open military regimes indeed materialize the hegemony of military elites in the form of a direct or indirect rule––the latter often done through the conversion of military rulers to civilian politicians––there is an intermediate form in which the military elite forms a tight coalition with a ruling civilian elite. My contention is that the latter applies to Ethiopia, there being no doubt that both the history of the TPLF as a guerrilla organization and the privileged treatment that the Meles’s government accords to the military produce a de facto alliance between the civilian leadership and the repressive apparatus of the regime. Since the regime has lost any legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of Ethiopians, the use of military and police forces alone ensures its survival.
There is more to the matter than the above similarity. Though belonging to different continents and histories, Ethiopia and Burma share many striking similarities. To begin with, not only in a way similar to Burma Ethiopia was subjected to a repressive military rule for an extended period subsequent to a coup that overthrew a civilian government, but also the military rule in both countries was coupled with the implementation of a socialist policy. Just as the Derg traded its initial nationalist platform for a socialist agenda, so too the military junta that ruled Burma announced in 1974 the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.
As a result, both countries suffer from a legacy of economic mismanagement imparted by the nationalization of the means of production and the subsequent spread of corruption and lack of accountability. What is more, after the disavowal of socialism, a skewed policy of privatization of state-owned enterprises has led in both countries to the formation of conglomerates owned by ramifications of the ruling parties or their closest cronies. Just as in Ethiopia privatization meant the corrupt practices of passing ownership to extended organs of the TPLF, in Burma, too, denationalization changed state property into the private property of generals or their cronies. Unsurprisingly, the prevention of a healthy and open competition and the drainage of the financial resources by the monopolistic and corrupt practices of the conglomerates failed to improve economic outputs so that real economic progress has remained elusive in both countries.
Another noticeable similitude is that both countries have suffered and still suffer from ethnic quarrels and insurgencies. Like Burma, Ethiopia is an ethnically diverse country with a history of armed insurgencies fuelled by a longstanding grudge against a dominant ethnic group. In Burma, ethnic groups have complained about the dominance of Burmans, who constitute 60% of the population, and the policy of Burmanization that resulted in minority groups being economically and culturally marginalized. We know that the source of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia is the complaint about the dominance of the Amhara and the policy of Amharization. In the face of ethnic insurgencies, the central state in both countries has assumed the responsibility of defending national unity through the formation of a strong military force.
In terms of ethnic conflicts and their outcomes, there are, however, notable differences. Contrary to Burma, the Amhara dominance was not the hegemony of a majority, since the Oromo ethnic group can claim to be as populous (if not more) as the Amhara, not to mention that today’s dominance of a Tigrean group has plunged Ethiopia into the uncharted course of the ascendency of a minority group. Above all, the military in Burma were able to contain ethnic insurgencies, whereas armed insurgent groups defeated and destroyed the Ethiopian army. The clear outcome of this was that in Ethiopia the military junta lost power and was replaced by a guerrilla elite while Eritrea became independent. But as stated earlier, some such difference does not remove the fact that the TPLF’s rule is the result of one military force replacing another military force.
Most characteristically, the existing regimes in Burma and Ethiopia are similar in the way they react to electoral defeats. Both like to brag about the opening of the political field, which however they are quick to repudiate at the slightest challenge. Thus, in 1990 the military regime in Burma announced the holding of the long promised free election whose outcome was that the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, won a landslide victory. The reaction of the military leaders was typical: they refused to hand over power to the victorious party and put Suu Kyi and other leaders under house arrest.
Restarting the opening process, Burma’s military rulers announced in 2003 a seven-step roadmap to democracy that would culminate in the holding of free elections. The promised elections were held in 2010, but which were far from being free and fair since, in addition to the electoral process being marred with widespread frauds and irregularities, the National League for Democracy was banned from participating and its leader still under house arrest. Even so, the ruling junta announced a complete victory by stating that the party representing it, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, had won 80% of the votes.
We remember a similar scenario in Ethiopia. The relatively free and fair election held in 2005 resulted in the opposition gaining a substantial victory. The reaction of the TPLF was the rejection of the results, the imprisonment of the main leaders of the opposition, and the violent crackdown on protesters. A blatant intensification of repression followed, even as the holding of free elections in 2010 was reaffirmed. The promised elections were held amidst intimidation, repression, and restrictive rules. The ruling party unashamedly claimed to have won 99.66 % of parliamentary seats even if opposition parties and external observers spoke of votes being rigged and voters and candidates being intimidated and harassed.
It should be noted that the upgrading of repressive policy had comparable effects on the opposition forces. In both countries, opposition groups have failed to either force the existing ruling elites into dialogue or ease in any way the repressive policy. This failure has led to fragmentations over the right approach, some opposition groups turning more and more to armed struggles while others prefer to rely on the likelihood of a popular uprising. Thus, powerlessness has resulted in the split within the National League for Democracy, some groups having decided not to boycott the elections and work with the ruling party. Though Ethiopian opposition groups present a different aspect, still the inability to force change on the regime has caused splits and strategic reassessments.
Main Differences
As concerns differences, a notable factor appears in the relations of both countries with the West. Since 1996, Burma is under international sanctions organized by Western countries, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Such is not the case with Ethiopia, since despite widespread violations of human rights, Western governments have been reluctant to economically punish the Woyanne regime, mainly because the regime is considered as an ally in the fight against terrorism and appears as the only stable state in a highly volatile region. However, the difference is somewhat decreased when we note that the international sanctions against the Burmese regime are far from being efficient, given that the sanctions were not strictly enforced and that the two neighboring countries, namely, China and India as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, proved reluctant to support Burma’s economic and political isolation.
Where the difference becomes major is that the military regime in Burma, admitting its undemocratic nature, proposed in 2003 a roadmap that traces out a step-by-step progression to democratic government, which, it is true, many observers found painstakingly slow and unreliable. By contrast, the Woyanne regime has never been sincere enough to recognize its lack in democratic credentials, and so never offered any transitional arrangement on the grounds that Ethiopia is provided with a blossoming democracy since the overthrow of the Derg and the capture of state power by the TPLF. Some such attitude allows the holding of a bizarre discourse in which the regime interprets its crackdown on political dissents, not as an opposition to democracy, but as the defense of the democratic order against nondemocratic forces.
From the above disparity follows the Ethiopian regime’s constant game of deception, which blocks the need for a transitional process and whose consequence is the establishment of a political deadlock cornering many Ethiopians into rejecting the idea of evolution of the regime, thereby giving them no other choice than passivity or the resource to violent methods. Needless to say, to the extent that the impasse deprecates nonviolent opposition, it promises nothing but uncertain outcomes for Ethiopia as well as for those who control power.
Burma’s Incentives for Change
To understand why Burma engaged into a transitional process, it is necessary that we delve into the reasons why the military junta thought that gradual democratization is the best option for all. I have already indicated that the decision to open the political competition was not caused by the pressure of opposition forces. Then, what could impel a well-established dictatorship to open a political system that so durably and efficiently defended its hegemony? It must be said here that analysts differ in their explanation of the change of political direction.
Many observers maintain that the planned democratization is simply a fake promise designed to perpetuate military rule under civilian disguises. Others, however, are more cautious, arguing that there are some compelling reasons for democratization, however slow and unsteady the process may be. For such commentators, economic interests are the driving force behind the timid push for democratization. The first commanding point is the geographical situation of Burma, notably that it is part of a region that is going through an unprecedented economic boom. The realization that Burma, far from participating in the boom, is falling behind is incentive enough for the military to think about change.
The awakening includes the recognition that the dictatorial system in place stifles free and fair competition and encourages corruption and embezzlement, and so stands in the way of economic improvement. A dynamic market economy requires that the political apparatus be unlocked so that excluded and educated people inject their expertise, their dream of prosperity, and their social ambition into the economic system. In other words, political opening became appealing to the ruling junta in Burma, not because of internal threats to the dictatorial system, but because of the understanding that economic progress is conditional on political reforms.
A related incentive to political change toward democratization is the need to lift the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries and international financial institutions. What this means is that, once the military junta had decided to engage the country in the path of economic development, the lifting of international sanctions through slow but palpable political changes became an integral part of the new direction of the country.
Political opening became all the more attractive because of the involvement of many army generals in the sector of private business following the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The corrupt practice of privatization, which favored senior officers, had the unintended consequences of creating a business-military group with some leaning for a healthy private economy. This group of generals, retired or not, was likely to use its influence and power to bring about those changes necessary to accelerate the pace of personal enrichment. Stated otherwise, the fact that many generals privately owned businesses encouraged the gradual shift of their interests from political power to the management of their businesses.
One other reason for political overture advanced by some observers is the development of a generational conflict within the military. As the senior officers who established the dictatorial system became old, younger officers aspired to replace them. The best way to avoid generational conflicts that would undermine the unity of the armed forces is to transit to a civilian government, while protecting the interests of the military as well as of the old and retiring guard. A civilian government friendly to the military could be established if the military initiate and control the democratization process. Since the people owe democratization to the military, they would express their gratitude and their recognition of the military as the protector of democracy by favoring the party representing military interests.
Meles’s Kryptonite
Insofar as the Burmese evolution is triggered by the understanding that the establishment of a free market economy cannot come about without political reforms, it provides an important lesson for Ethiopia’s ruling clique. Meles’s government survival depends on its ability to control the repressive forces of the state. This ability, in turn, depends on Meles’s success in keeping the repressive forces materially satisfied and using them in a moderate way, given that an excessive recourse to the violent means of the state to suppress recurring riots caused by economic crises would be troubling to them. These two conditions point to nothing else but the need to realize a steady economic growth in the country. Meles understands this quite well, as evidenced by his flirtation with the idea of developmental state. To quote Addis Fortune, “having rejected democracy, the Revolutionary Democrats only have their ability to deliver economic growth as their source of legitimacy.”
Meles’s dream to bring about a developmental state must confront one undeniable fact: neither the pursuit of one’s interests nor the gratitude and the loyalty or fear of clients, still less moral exhortations, can nurture a sustained achieving drive, alone able to launch Ethiopia in a real path of economic development. A sustained productive appetite requires the challenge of a social system rejecting the ascriptive protection of clients, cronies, and ethnic associates, that is, it demands the exposure of the business community to the constant challenge of a competitive market. And since economic progress is necessary to remove the threat of popular uprisings, it springs to mind that political reforms should be an essential component of the survival strategy of the Woyanne regime.
My guess is that Meles dismisses the idea of political opening because he has in mind the Chinese model of economic growth without democratic opening. Yet, he should realize that the Chinese model is off the table for Ethiopia. To start with, Ethiopia is saddled with conflicts of all kinds, especially with ethnic rivalries, mostly nurtured by the TPLF itself. The proliferation of competing elites representing various ethnic groups places Ethiopia far away from the homogeneous nature of the Chinese elite. One of the consequences of the Maoist class war has been the elimination of elite diversity in favor of a uniformized leadership structure. Such is not the case in Ethiopia where elites have tended to disperse around competing interests, made particularly exclusive by identity politics. Witness even the EPRDF is a coalition of diverse ethnic groups, and so has nothing to do with the monolithic character of Chinese political elite fashioned by decades of ideological uniformity, Spartan alignment, and an internalized sense of hierarchical discipline.
Nothing that resembles even remotely the Chinese uniformization characterizes the formation of modern elites in Ethiopia. The Chinese characteristic of the political class, the military elite, and the bureaucracy being for decades under the control of a disciplined, united, and omnipresent political party is to be found nowhere in Ethiopia. Again, take the EPRDF. In addition to being an alliance of disparate groups, the main uniting force of the political front, namely, the TPLF, assuming that it has been somewhat disciplined, fragmented in 2001. The split and its subsequent developments opened the door to an influx of arrivistes, yes-men, and opportunists of all varieties. The consequence was that recruitments into the political, economic, and bureaucratic elites were based more on loyalty to Meles and his close associates than on ideological commitment and competence. All these people associated with the ruling clan for the unique purpose of personal enrichment through political protection and illicit means. It is therefore a divagation to assume that economic progress can be achieved with so many corrupt, incompetent, and self-serving people infecting the entire political and economic apparatuses.
The Transitional Process
However compelling the need for political opening has become to accelerate Burma’s economic progress and the very interests of the Burmese military, it must not be made to seem that the military are ready to hand over power to an elected body. As already indicated, the democratization process must promote their long-interests, and so must remain under their control for a foreseeable future. How could it be otherwise when we know the corrupt source of their enrichment and the absence of a serious threat to their continued rule? For them, democratization must guarantee, not their marginalization, but their integration into the emerging system and the preservation of their privileged place.
The means to ensure the above result is to place restrictions on the democratization process such that the military still command a political leverage that gives them assurance against political exclusion. In effect, the 2008 Constitution reserves 25 percent of legislative seats and all government posts associated with defense and security to the members of the military. In addition, the Constitution allows autonomy to the military in their own affairs, just as it puts them in charge of the protection of the Constitution, security, and unity of the country.
No mistake about it, the military still have extensive power and the political opening allows anything but a fair and free contest. Nonetheless, compared to the Woyanne regime, it has the advantages of clarity and the avoidance of deception and betrayal of one’s own Constitution, such as it happens to Meles’s government every time it transgresses the promised respect of the democratic rights of all Ethiopians. Above all, the Burmese Constitution has the advantage of promising a gradual democratization while the Woyanne’s attitude of denying rights permitted by the Constitution blocks political evolution, giving Ethiopians no other option than violent uprisings.
Granted that good reasons exist to characterize the transition process set by the military as nothing but a sham, a disguised means to preserve the status quo, the fact remains that other Asian countries have progressed into multiparty systems after decades of military or civilian dictatorships. All these countries have started with slow and incremental reforms whose effect was to create a growing middle class that became interested in supporting deeper economic reforms and political changes.
It is worth noticing here that opposition forces in Burma have evolved toward the acceptance of a transitional phase and abandoned their “full democracy now or nothing” approach by participating in the electoral contest of 2010, despite the many restrictions imposed by the military. Most significantly, after her release, Suu Kyi admitted the need for a transitional phase when she said: “I don’t want to see the military falling. . . . I want to see the military rising to dignified heights of professionalism and true patriotism.” Even if we assume that the military want to consolidate their power rather than to support democratization, it is undeniable that the opening of the political system and the participation of opposition forces can lead to gradual change reconciling the interests of the military with those of the nation.
Contrary to what is in gestation in Burma, the Woyanne retractions of democratic rights as a result of election defeat in 2005 creates nothing but a deadlock and a further deterioration of the political and economic life of the country. The only way out is political opening, as shown by the evolution of the Burmese military rulers, who came back to political opening after effecting a similar crackdown on the winning opposition party. The lesson that the Woyanne should learn is that the retraction of democratic rights is a recipe for economic mismanagement and stagnation and hence is not even in line with their own long-term interests.
The initiation of political opening is, moreover, the best way to argue for and make acceptable the setting of some rules to avoid a total loss of power. The deal should be the opening of the political system in exchange for some guarantees against marginalization, which is exactly what the military in Burma have proposed. Everything is possible in due time, and the Woyanne regime should use its hegemony to do what is possible instead of using its power to repress the opposition. The good usage of power is not repression, but the implementation of reforms that have the long-term outcome of integrating its own sectarian interests into the national interests. Since this process of integration is the sure way of avoiding revolutionary uprisings, which sound the end of reformism in favor of the overthrow of the existing regime, my question is: Why wait until things get out of hands with animosity reaches a boiling point even as solutions able to reconcile all interests can be worked out?
Opposition parties as well as the ruling party should know that their goals must be based on what is achievable. To do otherwise is to raise problems that they cannot solve for the simple reason that solvable problems are those that already implicitly contain their solutions. To project goals that do not contain their solutions is to plunge into a destructive utopianism, as illustrated by the mistakes and subsequent demise of the Ethiopian leftist forces after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974. Meles’s government cannot stifle the deep discontent of Ethiopians and the challenge of opposition parties; as things stand now, the latter (I am speaking of those committed to a nonviolent strategy) cannot force the ruling party to play the game of fair and free election. What remains but that which protrudes as reasonable and feasible by default, namely, the path of mutual accommodation.
Hundreds of Ethiopians who took part in the 2011 Great Ethiopian Run in Addis Ababa two weeks ago Sunday turned the annual event into a protest rally against Meles Zenawi’s dictatorship as the video below shows. The Federal Police arrested over 50 of the runners and released 27 by Friday. Their crime is peacefully voicing their opinion. The fate of those who are still in detention is not known. The runners chanted:
Woyanne Leba, Leba Leba, Woyanne Leba, Leba, Leba (Woyanne thief)
Ende Gaddafi Aykeriletim Tifi (He [Meles] will be slapped like Gaddafi)
Sanifeligachew 20 ametachew (They stayed 20 years without our wish)
Lately, the portrait of Ethiopia painted in the reports of Transparency International (Corruption Index) and Global Financial Integrity shows a “Land of Corruption”. That contrasts with an equally revolting portrait of Ethiopia painted in a recent broadcast of a fear-mongering three-part propaganda programentitled “Akeldama” (or Land of Blood) on state-owned television. The program aired on November 26-28 was intended to be a moral, and to some extent legal and political, justification of dictator Meles Zenawi’s “anti-terrorism law”. The program begins with a doleful narrator setting a doomsday scenario:
Terrorism is destroying the world. Terrorism is wrecking our daily lives, obstructing it. What I am telling you now is not about international terrorsim. It is about a scheme that has been hatched against our country Ethiopia to turn her into Akeldama or land of blood. For us Ethiopians, terrorism has become a bitter problem. In this regard, I have three consecutive programs prepared for you my viewers.
Displaying photos of alleged terrorist carnage and simulated blood droplets falling from the title of the program — dead bodies of babies and little children lying on the ground, fly-infested corpses of adults oozing blood on the asphalt, severed limbs scattered in the streets, burned vehicles, bombed buildings, doctors treating injured victims, a crowd of wailing women mourning at a gravesite, an old man crying his eyes out over the death of his wife at the hand of “terrorsits” and footage of the imploding Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2011 and on and on — the narrator accuses “ruthless terrorists” for having “destroyed our peace” and “massacring our loved ones”. In a plaintive tone the narrator exhorts:
“Let’s look at the evidence. In the past several years, there have been 131 terrorist attacks; 339 citizens killed; 363 injured and 25 kidnapped and killed by terrorists.
By displaying grisly spectacles of acts of alleged terrorist atrocity, cruelty, brutality and inhumanity from years past and by describing those acts with deceitful, deceptive and distorted narrative, “Akeldama” hopes to tar and feather ALL of Ethiopia’s opposition elements, inflame public passions and offer moral justification for Zenawi’s recent crackdowns and massive and sustained human rights violations.
The propaganda objective of “Akeldama” cannot be mistaken: Zenawi aims to vanquish from the active memory of the population any traces of popular support or sympathy for his opposition and critics by demonizing, brutalizing, dehumanizing, “villainizing” and virtually cannibalizing them. He wants the population to view the opposition as bloodthirsty gangs of conspirators blowing up defenseless babies, children, women and innocent citizens and unleashing terror and mayhem in every street corner in Ethiopia. The revolting and gruesome scenes and sequences of carnage and destruction stitched into the video are intended to lump together all of Zenawi’s opponents with Al Qaeda and Al Shabbab terrorists in Somalia.
“Akeldama”: Dictatorship, Lies and Videotapes
On the surface, few inquiring minds would disagree that “Akeldama” is sleazy melodrama. It has an exalted hero, dictator Meles Zenawi, the knight in shining armor, waiting in the shadows armed and ready to impale the wicked terrorists with his piercing lance. There is a damsel in distress, Lady Ethiopia. There are an assortment of scheming villains, conspirators, mischief-makers, subversives, foreign collaborators, and of course, terrorists who are cast in supporting roles as opposition leaders, dissidents and critics. It has a sensational and lurid plot featuring cloak-and-dagger conspiracies by neighboring countries, clandestine intrigues by Diaspora opposition elements, sedition and treason by local collaborators, and of course terrorism. Naturally, in the end, good triumphs over evil. Sir Meles Zenawi, knight errant, political wizard, archer and swordsman extraordinaire, delivers Lady Ethiopia from the clutches of the evil and sinister Al Qaeda, Al Shabbab and their minions and flunkeys, namely Ethiopia’s opposition leaders, dissidents and critics. Hollywood’s worst horror shows have nothing on “Akeldama”.
It is easy to dismiss “Akeldama” as dimwitted and ill-conceived horror melodrama. But that would be a mistake because as lame and as cynical as it is, its manifest propaganda aim is to present a morality play for the masses in an attempt to drum up support for Zenawi and preempt, prevent or stall the dawn of an “Ethiopian Spring”. Careful review of “Akeldama” suggests that Zenawi aims to accomplish a number of propaganda objectives: 1) tar and feather all who oppose him as terrorists, terrorist sympathizers and fellow travelers, war mongers, blood-letters and genocidal maniacs, and inflame public passions, promote hatred and incite distrust and suspicion against them; 2) create a climate of fear, loathing and intolerance and trigger mass hysteria against the opposition by concocting a crude propaganda brew of mass deception, mass distraction and mass demoralization; 3) divert the attention of the population from the pressing economic, social and political issues of the day by feeding their fears, accentuating their anxieties and concerns and encouraging them to passively accept Zenawi’s rule, and 4) provide justification why Zenawi has a moral imperative to ruthlessly crackdown and clampdown on his opposition.
The fact of the matter is that every major international human rights and other independent organizations dedicated to good governance has condemned Zenawi’s regime for gross human rights violations, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability and suppression of press freedoms. Zenawi understands that he has no moral legs to stand on and that he is running out of options. He rules by fear, intimidation, lies and deceit. Lacking any moral standing and little public support in the country, Zenawi now seeks to capture the moral high ground by presenting a pathetic and cynical melodrama.
His strategy is simple: To canonize himself, he demonizes his opposition and critics. By casting the opposition in the moral sewer, he hopes to capture the moral commanding heights. By portraying the opposition as bloodthirsty terrorists and baby killers, he hopes to mask his own bloody hands. By showing gruesome pictures of alleged atrocities by his opponents and by creating a message of fear and loathing, he aims to manipulate and frighten the population into supporting him. Ultimately, he hopes to create the public impression that all of the crackdown and clampdown on dissent, the violence against opponents and the complete closure of political space is morally defensible and necessary as measures needed to protect the population from “terrorism that has destroyed our daily peace” and “killed our loved ones”. Simply stated, “Akeldama” is Zenawi’s slick moral justification for his two decades of dictatorial rule, shutting down every independent newspaper and exiling journalists, jailing dissidents, muzzling critics and thumbing his nose at the rule of law and international human rights conventions.
The Strategic Use of Propaganda by Dictators
Hateful depiction of opposition elements by dictators is nothing new. In fact, all dictatorships in modern history have employed the media — everything from posters and newspapers to films, radio programs and now internet technologies — to moralize and pontificate about their rule while demonizing and mobilizing against their opposition, dissidents and critics. Joseph Goebbles, the grand master of propaganda, undertook a massive media campaign of fear and smear against the Jews which led directly to the Holocaust. The communists used “agitprop” (agitation and propaganda using drama, film, art, music) to win the support of the masses and to rail against the evils of liberal democracy (“neo-liberalism”), capitalism, human rights and so on. Agosto Pinochet’s coup against Salvador Allede in 1974 was followed by massive media propaganda campaigns depicting the liberal opposition as a bunch of communists and terrorists. Over 130 thousand Chileans and foreigners were tortured, imprisoned, killed or disappeared by Pinochet’s security forces.
For decades, South Africa’s Apartheid regime successfully used a slick propaganda campaign against the African National Congress (ANC) by “convincing” Western governments that the only choice to be made was between ANC communists and terrorists and freedom-loving Apartheid racists. Both John Vorster and P. W. Botha had the mindboggling audacity to portray the Apartheid system as a victim of terrorism, turning logic and facts on their heads, in their efforts to build and maintain Western support. They succeeded for a long time, but in the end their propaganda effort to delegitimize the ANC by legitimizing their illegitimate Apartheid system failed totally. “Akeldama” is no different. Zenawi portrays his regime as the victim of terrorism unleashed by the opposition, neighboring countries, Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab to bolster domestic and international support. He undertakes a fear and smear campaign aimed at tarring and feathering specific journalists, opposition party leaders, critics and dissidents as terrorists and enemies of the state while seeking to conceal and absolve himself of any culpability for massive and comprehensively documented human rights violations over two decades.
Dictators and Propaganda
But why do immoral and amoral dictators seek moral redemption? Political psychologists who have studied dictators point to a number of factors. One major reason is that all dictators are self-delusional and narcissistic (afflicted by morbid self-absorption and an over-inflated sense of self-importance). They believe their own PR (press release). They conveniently “convince” themselves that they are loved and venerated by their people, destined by Providence to save their nations and usher in a new era of freedom and prosperity (some call it a “Renaissance”). Gadhaffi swore until his last breath, “They love me. All my people with me, they love me. They will die to protect me, my people.” Gadhaffi was so narcissistically delusional that he declared, “I am the creator of tomorrow, I am here, I am here, I am here…. Libya is my country. I created it, and I can destroy it.” Rarely, if ever, was it about Gadhaffi’s love for Libya or Libyans.
All dictators see outside conspiracies being hatched against them every day. If there are protests, it is not because “my people no longer love me” or “they have come to outright hate me”, rather it is because outside agitators are making them do it. Gadhaffi was so detached from reality that he claimed the young people protesting against him were doing so because they were taking drugs. Mubarak, Gadhaffi, Ben Ali, Assad and Gbagbo claimed the protests in their countries were guided and manipulated by evil outside forces. Before his swift fall from power, Mubarak appeared on state television and accused foreign journalists, human rights activists, and foreign hands for fomenting the unrest. Assad in Syria blamed “saboteurs” backed by foreign powers for fomenting widespread civil unrest and chaos. He claimed the unrest were the result of “conspiracies designed outside and perpetrated inside Syria.” Gbagbo accused foreign envoys of seeking to turn the military aganist him. Ali Saleh of Yemen accused foreign agitators for protests that were taking place in the country. In a speech on Libyan state television, Gadhaffi declared al-Qaeda was responsible for the uprising in Libya. Likewise, Zenawi’s message in “Akeldama” is that the people love him, and the mischief-makers are primarily outside agitators, namely Diaspora opposition leaders, neighboring countries, Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab terrorists and their local minions and collaborators.
As I have previously argued,
Dictators see only what they want to see; and to avoid what they don’t want to see, they create their own convenient world of illusions cut out of the whole cloth of their personal beliefs, opinions and fantasies. As they continue to abuse power without any legal restraints and convince themselves that they are above the law and accountable to no one but themselves, they transform their world of illusion into a world of delusion. In their delusional world, they become both the “lone ranger” of the old American West “cleaning up bad towns and riff-raff” and the only custodians of the Holy Grail, with miraculous powers to save their nations. In their delusional world, there is room only for themselves and their cronies….
“Akeldama” II: Let Us See All of the Evidence of Atrocities Committed in Ethiopia
If “Akeldama” is indeed an accurate depiction of Ethiopia as the “Land of Blood”, it is manifestly lacking in evidence. That is why we MUST follow the exhortation of the narrator in “Akeldama” to take a “look at the evidence in the past several years.” It may be true that there were “131 terrorist attacks in which 339 citizens were killed; 363 injured and 25 kidnapped and killed by terrorists.” But is that all the body count? Let us really look at the evidence — not in bits and pieces, not in slivers and shreds, not in fragments and scraps — but the whole body of evidence, the totality of the evidence. Let us have an “Akildama II” and examine
the status of numerous detainees in three documented secret jails where they were held without due process of law and in flagrant violation of international human rights conventions;
Let the truth be told about ALL atrocities committed in Ethiopia, without exception. Let the chips fall where they may!
Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity
Instead of wasting time and resources hate-mongering and demonizing the opposition, critics and dissidents, Zenawi could have used the opportunity to highlight and brag about his achievements and accomplishments over his two decades at the helm. Instead of showing mayhem, dismembered bodies, dead babies and destruction, he could have showed the people what he is doing (and has done) to bring down inflation and eliminate economic privation. Instead of promoting national enmity by depicting brutality, he could have used the opportunity to promote national unity. Instead of spreading a propaganda of hate, he could have been a peace and reconciliation advocate. Instead of demonizing his opponents, he could have humanized them. He could have showcased all of his achievements in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, establishing universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowerment of women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases and ensuring environmental sustainability. Exhibition of such achievement could discredit any opposition claims and actions to legitimacy than the display of gratuitous horror, carnage, mayhem and destruction. But it seems Zenawi never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity to do good, the right thing, the moral thing, the compassionate and humanistic thing.
It is not clear if “Akeldama” is the first in an endless series of melodramas calculated to demonize and dehumanize the opposition. It would be great to have an “Akeldama II”. But that is unlikely. There is little evidence to show that the lame and cynical piece of propaganda has gained any traction in the public. There is substantial anecdotal evidence which suggests most viewers in Ethiopia and the Diaspora are turned off by the gory scenes and deceitful exhortations of “Akeldama”. Even friends of Zenawi are said to have raised eyebrows by the excessive and extravagant display of gratuitous violence in the program.
At any rate, Tamagn Beyene’s masterful review of “Akeldama” delivers a totally devastating critique by pointing out numerous lies, factual errors, wholesale fabrications, distortions, exaggerations and fallacies. But credit must be given where it is due. Zenawi has once again succeeded in distracting us all from the real issues. Now, can we get on with the discussion of the issues that really matter such as of inflation, corruption, arbitrary detention, intimidation, maladministration, truth adulteration, balkanization, and the need for better collaboration, improved harmonization, effective communication and, most of all, genuine reconciliation….?
Land of Corruption or Land of Blood?
This past Summer, Zenawi, responding to an interviewer’s question about his feelings concerning the use of the word “famine” by the Oxford Dictionary synonymously with Ethiopia, said:
It is a mixed up situation. On the one hand, like any citizen, I am very sad. I am ashamed. It is degrading. A society that built the Lalibela churches some thousand years ago is unable to cultivate the land and feed itself. A society that built the Axum obelisks some 2-3 thousand years ago is unable to cultivate the land and feed itself. That is very sad. It is very shameful. Of all the things, to go out begging for one’s daily bread, to be a beggar nation is dehumanizing. Therefore, I feel great shame.
It is a crystal clear situation for me. I feel great shame that a society that built the magnificent Lalibela churches (one of the great wonders of the ancient world) and the obelisks of Axum should be known throughout the world not only as a “beggar nation” but also as land of corruption, land of blood, land of famine and land of living lies.
Previous commentaries by the author are available at:
(VOA) — North Korea’s official news agency reported Monday that Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il has died at the age of 69.
The Korean Central News Agency said the {www:reclusive} dictator died Saturday of a heart attack while on a train for one of his “field guidance” tours. The agency attributed his death to “physical and mental over-work.”
KCNA said his funeral will be held on December 28 in Pyongyang. A period of national mourning was declared from December 17 to 29.
Kim Jong Il came to power after his father, North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung, died in 1994. Reliable biographical information about Mr. Kim is scarce. He rarely appeared in public and his voice was seldom broadcast.
He may be best remembered for defying the international community and boosting North Korea’s nuclear program, while millions of his countrymen and women were starving.
Late last year, Mr. Kim promoted his youngest son Kim Jong Un to the rank of four-star general, in what was seen as a bid to extend the world’s only communist family dynasty to a third generation.
The KCNA on Monday urged people to follow Kim Jong Un, who is believed to be around 28 years old.
Ethiopians Can Indeed Unite if they are Willing, Part Six (b) of Six—continuation
Aklog Birara, PhD
In Part Six (a), I offered a set of suggestions about our individual and group behaviors that must change in order to advance the human condition in Ethiopia. The tendency of my own generation to see issues in “black and white” and the inability to separate the person from the issue led to unfortunate consequences. Wisdom would have suggested that we reflected on unintended consequences (the concept of thorough diagnosis) before we made declarations. This tendency persists among Ethiopia’s elites today.
Ethiopian political and civic opposition groups do not lack talent and concepts. There is a plethora of both. What we lack is the will, determination, discipline, flexibility, organization and leadership to translate concepts and recommendations into concrete actions. In this continuation, I shall offer a series of additional suggestions for further debate, and more important, for action. The items are identified because they are within our control and can be done. If we do them in a strategic and persistent manner, these steps will further undermine the legitimacy of an illegitimate regime that thrives on our division more than on its strength.
4. Let us all campaign against corruption and nepotism
I and others have provided ample evidence that show the economic, social and political costs of tribalism and ethnic based discrimination and exclusion. The governing party’s claim that its developmental state advances the common good is totally misleading and false. In fact, it has strengthened administrative and state capture based corruption to the tune of between US$8.345 and US$11 billion since the TPLF/EPRDF took power. The latest from Global Financial Integrity reveals that the Ethiopian people are being “milked dry.” In other words, the country’s resources are being plundered by members of the governing elites.
In 2011, Ethiopia ranked 116th from 60th in 2000, a substantial decline. The country is more corrupt; and increases in aid flow aggravate the situation. Corruption is so rampant that nothing is done without greasing someone in the hierarchy and at all levels of government. Moral decay that reached an alarming level is a consequence of corrupt practices. The cost to the society is incalculable.
Compounding corruption is concentration of incomes and wealth in a few hands; and a monopolistic economy that is dominated by the party, its endowments and favored individuals including foreigners. One of TPLF’s creations is EFFORT, a dominant player in all sectors of the economy. It epitomizes ethnic affliction and undermines confidence and trust in the economic system of the country. It curtails fair and open competition.
Therefore, political and civic activists in the Diaspora as well as ordinary persons who care about their country and its starving poor can and should come together and campaign against corruption and illicit outflow. If they agree on a common cause, there is nothing to prevent them from working together against a suffocating system that affects most Ethiopians. They have the human, financial, material and diplomatic potential within their hands to shame the regime. Here is where, good will, determination, discipline, commitment, cooperation, collaboration and a unity of purpose to do something good and concrete will go a long way to show the world that Ethiopians in the Diaspora do really care about their home country and its poor and hungry millions. Those who support the governing party should recognize that the ethnicization and concentration of income and wealth, and the monopoly over the pillars of the economy will undermine national unity and cohesion. Foreign organizations and governments that support the governing party will be much more sympathetic to the causes of justice, the rule of law, political pluralism and governance that is accountable if opponents show wisdom by cooperating and collaborating rather than fighting and undermining one another.
This recommendation to the Ethiopian Diaspora in general and to activists in particular is not done in a vacuum. Anti-corruption campaigns have gone global. This “globalized spring” that began in North Africa and the Middle East has spread to India, 900 cities and towns in the USA, Europe and Africa. Ethiopian activists should exploit this trend that has gone ballistic. The key is to understand the trend and act and not just react and moan. Greed, income and wealth concentration and inequality drive these spontaneous uprisings. What seems to be leaderless and virtual indignations and popular uprisings can be unstoppable force that will change Ethiopia too. Even in the authoritarian state of China, there were 87,000 incidents of popular unrest in 2005 alone. What are common among these protests are social and economic, injustice, greed and corruption.
5. Let us insist on aid that meets human needs.
The TPLF/EPRDF regime has received more aid than any in the country’s history. The question is whether or not this massive aid flow estimated in excess of US$40 billion, US$3.5 billion this past year, has made a dent in boosting incomes, reducing poverty and in creating domestic capabilities that will create the foundation for sustainable and equitable development. By all accounts, the answer is no. Sustainable and equitable development will not take place as long as billions of American dollars are stolen each year. Aid and Diaspora transfers are fairly easy monies to steal and to divert.
There is no independent institution to stop this mismanagement of national resources. The 2011 UN Human Development Index ranked Ethiopia 174th out of 185 countries. This alone suggests that the primary beneficiaries from aid and growth are party favored individuals and families, the governing party and its endowments. Aid has, often, been used to punish opponents and to reward loyalists.
Political parties, civic groups, followers of different faiths, academics, professional groups and the rest can play a prominent role by campaigning actively and systematically in donor capitals, in front of foundations, Non-governmental organizations, human and economic rights groups, churches, state capitals, tax payers and so on that donor monies should go directly to the poor and should no longer be used to enrich the few; to reward friends and to punish opponents. They should insist on independent oversight either by donors themselves or by neutral groups. They should be guided by the tested principle that equitable access to social and economic opportunities is one of the most powerful tools toward national unity, cohesion, peace and stability.
I will provide a simple human example why this is doable, practical and essential. Think of a child in Gambella who is forced to work on an Indian commercial farm for less than US$1 per day; below the poverty wage. Imagine if aid money was channeled to the poor in his community. This child would go to school and will have the possibility of becoming an engineer, a lawyer, a medical doctor, a teacher, a mechanic and so on.
The Diaspora must appreciate the devastating impact of hunger on millions of children, hundreds of thousands of who are stunted. UNICEF reports that “a child in Ethiopia that is stunted is less able to fulfill its potential. Its ability to learn at school and later earn a living and contribute to the nation’s wealth is forever held back.” The TPLF/EPRDF regime has no empathy for these children. We should make it our business to care. Corruption that diverts aid monies and illicit outflow of funds deprives the child from Gambella and millions of others of opportunities.
The developmental state’s claim that the benefits of growth will, ultimately trickle down to this child and to millions of other children is sheer madness. I wonder how many of us in the Diaspora give credence to the popular phrase “Ediget kale dabo yet ale?” (If there is growth, where is the bread?) Growth is about enough food to eat. If most of the aid money is stolen, it is this and other children who will pay a price for decades.
The pursuit of an uneven development strategy in a country where a single party dominates politics and economics does not at all advance fair and equitable investments. The chance of the child escaping poverty is almost zero. Born poor; he will die poor. The national outcome of the model is alarming disparity in development, incomes and wealth. Aid that is not governed by an independent oversight tends to aggravate inequality and uneven development. More aid means more corruption and more illicit outflow. In turn, this will lead to insecurity and instability. The business of aid should not be to perpetuate dependency and to enrich a few. It is to make the aid business obsolete by boosting domestic capabilities, including the domestic private sector and smallholders. Aid that does not advance human potential and freedom is dependency.
Here is another dilemma the society will face if the current trend continues. Uneven investment, income and wealth concentration in a few hands and in selected ethnic regions will lead to civil unrest and conflict that no one can contain. For this reason, each of us in the Diaspora: business women and men, teachers, medical professionals, taxi drivers, artists and so on has an obligation to let our voice heard as the opportunity arises. What is required is good will to cooperate. If we speak with a single voice, we can change minds. Look at the brave women and men, girls and boys in the “Occupy Wall Street Movement.”
Ethiopia is in worse shape than the USA; but here young people fight for a cause. The Diaspora has all the freedom in the world to do the right same thing. Is it not reasonable for those who are in the forefront of the struggle within the country to expect that those of us who live in freedom sacrifice time, money and labor to advance their cause? Is it not time for us to be bold enough to question one another how hundreds and sometimes thousands would go to a musical concert for hours but cannot spare time for a common social and humanitarian cause: Human and economic rights? Love of country and the diversity of people for which it is home require that we devote some time and spare some monies and expend know-how to advance the need of a child regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. Unity and national cohesion does not just happen; it takes people to make it happen. It takes collaboration.
6. Let us promote freedom of the press in Ethiopia.
A quote from Ralph Barton Perry is most appropriate for this recommendation. “Ignorance deprives men of freedom because they do not know what alternatives there are. It is impossible to choose what one has never heard of.” The governing party arrests, sentences and jails journalists because it does not want the Ethiopian public to know alternatives to repression and oppression. Those of us who enjoy freedom know that a free press is the cornerstone of civil society. This fundamental right contained in the Ethiopian Constitution does not exist in practice. The governing party knows well that an informed public, especially youth, demands transparency, the rule of law, fair treatment, a level playing field in accessing opportunities and accountability. Ethiopia today is “one of the un-freest societies in the world.”
Have you ever wondered if the rest of the world knows the shameful and tragic conditions of Ethiopian girls and women? In a country where human life has been degraded and devalued, girls and women fare far worse than boys and men. Thousands are shipped to the Middle East each month to work as domestic workers. As someone put it in an Ethiopian newspaper, “They move from one form of death (poverty) to another (servitude).” When and if they die (as is too often the case) from physical and mental abuse, their government does not protest. Prime Minister Meles was asked about the deteriorating and humiliating condition of girls and women under his watch. He was told of the unprecedented case of five and six year old girls putting acid on their bodies and dying. He said that he did not know. Clearly, the Prime Minister cares only about his own and his extended family and not for the rest of Ethiopians. If your own government does not care about you, why would a Saudi or any other master care? It is the same thing that he said about hunger. “There is drought but not hunger” in a country that is home to “one of the hungriest populations on the planet.”
The bottom line is this. Ethiopian life, especially those of females, has become cheap at home and abroad. Increasingly, foreigners with resources get away with any human rights violation on commercial farms and in factories. Ethiopians cannot command respect in their own homeland. Those who hire and abuse Ethiopian girls and women in the Middle East, North Africa and other places know the priorities of the Ethiopian government: it is not to defend the rights of its citizens. This is why a free and independent press is so vital. This is why the rest of us should care and defend freedom of the press and human rights with vigor and consistency. If we do not value ourselves, no one in the world will respect or value us. How hard is it to collaborate and cooperate on press freedom and human rights?
Opposition groups, civil organizations, academics and youth in the Diaspora can and should take the lead and shame the regime by championing these themes. There are numerous specific social and economic cases one can cite. For example, they can use the shameful and degrading situation of girls and women who are brutalized at home and abroad to rally supporters across the globe. Their situation is underreported because there is no independent and free press in the country.
There is a second area of opportunity for the Diaspora as a whole and activists to cooperate and scale up communication to Ethiopia. I propose that advocates of freedom and democracy and the rest pool their talent, monies and know-how together and support all forms of media including satellite television and short wave radio transmissions to Ethiopia relentlessly. ESAT is an excellent model. The Diaspora can boost the capacities of other modern communication technologies such as websites, Internet penetration and social media through Facebook and others by providing funds and knowledge. This too takes good will to collaborate and cooperate.
I admire the efforts of activists around the globe who spend their scarce resources and time to keep the Diaspora informed about the home country. It shows an indomitable spirit to keep connected with the home country. This collective know-how and experience should, equally, zero in singularly on the home front. This is where the greatest gap for information and knowledge resides. It is time that we fill this gap. We cannot fill this gap until and unless we are willing to set aside minor differences and focus on the bigger picture of saving the country and supporting its vast and diverse population.
7. Let us empower the youthful generation to lead.
We still accept the traditional model of leadership that is totally hierarchical and top down. The struggle for democratization requires that we mentor, coach and prepare a new generation of leaders that live and breathe democratic values. These values place premium on cooperation rather than rivalry and personality cult. Roles and responsibilities rather than personalities are critical today than they have ever been. The Arab Spring teaches us that it is young people with passion, technological savvy and commitment to country, people and cause that brought down dictators. In Syria, at least 5,000 died for the cause of justice. Ethiopians are pace setters. Ethiopian youth possess these attributes and more. Youth in North Africa and the Middle East worked closely with all sectors of society and attracted millions to their side. They died in the streets fighting for a better day; and a promising future for themselves and for their society. Ethiopian youth have the same potential as we see among those the regime arrests and jails in droves. However, there is a gap. I am not convinced that my generation has done much that is meaningful to transfer knowledge and experience; and to equip the young generation with leadership and management skills. My generation has been totally insular and preoccupied with individual and parochial interests. This is the reason why we have failed in creating sustainable grassroots movements of any kind. We cannot create a democratic society without civil engagement and without creating and a strong and robust civil society.
Ethiopia’s demographic composition suggests that the social wave of the future resides in its youth age population. It is this social group within the country that receives no quality education that will lead to jobs or the ability to set up new enterprises that poses challenge and opportunity. It must have a promising future. Otherwise, it is a potential time-bomb waiting to explode any time, as in North Africa and the Middle East. It is this same age group that triggered and led peaceful and popular uprisings in Indonesia, the Philippines and Central Europe. These young ‘Turks’ did not lead revolts without training and preparation.
The older generation in the Diaspora has a wealth of knowledge and experience to transmit to the new generation within and outside the country. Among other things, it can launch a systematic and well-designed program of leadership training and mentoring in public service, civic engagement and other leadership skills. Political and civic organizations have the capability and capacity to integrate youth, especially females, in leadership roles. This is within their control and is cost effective. In turn, youth must reach out to and learn from their elders. They must appreciate the need to anchor their efforts in their peers within Ethiopia. Leadership training I have in mind must serve a social common purpose. It is a partnership between youth and their elders that has enormous promise; and we cannot afford to squander it.
(VOA) — Amnesty International issued a report today saying that the Ethiopian authorities Woyanne junta have been using anti-terror laws as a pretext to arrest and silence politicians and journalists who criticize government policies.
In a report released Friday, the human rights group said at least 114 opposition politicians and six journalists have been arrested since March.
Amnesty said, in many cases, calls for peaceful protests or attempts to conduct investigative journalism have been interpreted as acts of terrorism or other criminal wrongdoing.
While journalists and politicians in Ethiopia have been subject to arrests in the past, the report said the recent increase in terror charges represents “a new level of repression” in the government’s efforts to stifle political dissent.
Amnesty also criticized several senior Ethiopian government Woyanne officials, including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, for making public comments that imply that all terror suspects are guilty. The group says it does not believe they will receive a fair trial.
Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s broad anti-terrorism laws went into effect earlier this year. Activists have complained the new provisions have led to a new wave of politically-motivated arrests that have netted dozens of journalists and prominent opposition politicians.
The Korean Central News Agency said the {www:reclusive} dictator died Saturday of a heart attack while on a train for one of his “field guidance” tours. The agency attributed his death to “physical and mental over-work.”