The pre- and post-elections political activities of Ato Lidetu Ayalew require serious examination and analysis by political scientists and historians. ER’s intention here is not to do that, because we do not have all the facts. What ER wishes to accomplish in this commentary is to try to give a more complete picture of circumstances surrounding Lidetu’s fall from grace. ER believes that our political leaders and those of us who are closely following our country’s politics can benefit from such a discussion.
It is a well established fact that Lidetu had a major role in Ethiopian politics in the past decade as a leading opposition figure. No one can deny the fact that he was instrumental in the defeat of the Meles regime at the ballot box in May 2005. In a series of televised debates before the elections, he delivered a knockout blow to the TPLF brain trust with his rhetorical firepower that was unmatched by any current Ethiopian political leader. One week before the May 15 elections, he received a hero’s welcome at a huge rally in Meskel Square that was attended by over a million people. The other CUD leaders received little or no attention from the crowd at the rally. Every where he traveled, he was received with admiration and respect. His photos were posted on walls and utility poles in cities around the country. He was THE most popular politician in the country and a leading figure in the movement against the Meles dictatorship. In a matter of few months, all that has changed. Currently, Lidetu is one of the most hated politicians in Ethiopia. Any one who says any thing positive about him, or even seen talking with him is called a traitor. ER itself received a lot of grief for interviewing Lidetu a few days ago. How did this happen? How could a man who was so loved and admired by millions of people becomes one of the most vilified politicians in a matter of days? Is the onslaught against him warranted?
ER believes that although Lidetu may not deserve to be called a traitor, and definitely not a Woyanne, he has brought all this on himself. How?
1. Timing
There were four parties, but three power centers inside the Coalition for Unity & Democracy (CUD) when it was formed in February 2005. The first one was the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) led by Ato Hailu Shawel. The second one was Kestedamena led by Dr Berhanu Nega, and the third was UEDP-Medhin led by Lidetu–although the chairman was Dr Admasu Gebeyehu. The fourth member of the coalition, Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL), the smallest of the four parties, had an insignificant role in the coalition. Its leaders mostly sided with Dr Berhanu Nega and acted as Kestedamena members. After the elections, the UEDP-Medhin chairman Dr Admasu Gebeyehu began to identify himself more with the CUD than his own party. He even stopped attending UEDP-Medhin’s meetings. So it was Lidetu who tried to represent the UEDP-Medhin in the coalition.
Lidetu’s party, UEDP-Medhin, had more members and its candidates won more seats in the 2005 elections than any of the other parties in the CUD. But after the elections, UEDP-Medhin, particularly its younger leaders, were sidelined by the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders with the help of the UEDP-Medhin chairman. The UEDP-Medhin chapters and committees inside the country and around the world stopped receiving any direction on how to proceed as members of the CUD. The older officials of the UEDP-Medhin–particularly the chairman, Dr Admasu Gebeyehu and vice-chairman Dr Hailu Araya–were coopted by the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders. They found to have more in common with the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders than the young turks (Lidetu et al) in their own party. They often voted against Lidetu and Mushe inside the CUD executive committee while the others voted party line. By July 2005, an alliance of AEUP, Kestedamena and the older members of the UEDP-Medhin emerged against Lidetu & Company inside the CUD.
The CUD troika–Hailu Shawel, Berhanu Nega and Lidetu Ayalew–that defeated the Meles dictatorship in the ballot box transformed into two warring factions–one led by Hailu Shawel and the other by Lidetu Ayalew. Berhanu Nega, who has his own strong following, joined the Hailu Shawel camp. He might have seen the popular Lidetu as a long-term threat to his own political ambition. The AEUP-Kestedamena leaders, who are much older, much wealthier, and had much more advanced education, did not see the young leaders of UEDP-Medhin as their equals. They looked down on them more as rabble-rousers than level-headed politicians. Most of Lidetu’s and Mushe Semu’s ideas and proposals were dead on arrival at the CUD Council meetings. It seemed that some times they rejected Lidetu’s ideas just to irk him. He in turn did not respect their approach to politics, and forcefully challenged them. His style was confrontational, and blunt, antagonizing many of the CUD leaders who are sensitive to diplomatic niceties. He was particularly disrespectful towards Ato Hailu Shawel. The two disliked each other.
During the heated internal debates inside the CUD leadership regarding how to react to the gross election fraud that the Meles regime committed, Lidetu and allies pushed for a more populist approach. They opposed going to the courts and the diplomatic community to protest the vote fraud. They wanted to confront the Meles regime through rallies, general strikes and other popular actions. They vociferously argued that going to the courts, which are controlled by the Meles regime, was useless.
The tension between these two camps continued to threaten the survival of the CUD. Some how the coalition survived through the elections, but break up was inevitable as the differences in ideology, strategy, and style of leadership were too wide apart for the two groups to remain together. With all the distrust, lack of mutual respect, and built up resentment, the only way for the CUD to survive was for one of the two camps to give in, or be destroyed by the other. The stubborn Lidetu, by then organizationally a lot weaker, was not about to give in. So, first the Hailu Shawel camp carried out a divide and conquer policy on UEDP-Medhin. They successfully brought many of the UEDP-Medhin leaders to their side. Then they gave a green light to their supporters to politically destroy Lidetu. As young politicians who are new to intraparty battles, Lidetu and allies lost out to the more experienced politicians. In politics, timing is every thing–none more so than in intra party battles. So instead of accepting defeat, and waiting for the right time to wage another battle, Lidetu and allies went on a kamikaze (suicide) mission.
2. Not responding to false rumors and fabricated stories
Knowing the rhetorical firepower of the Lidetu camp, his opponents in the CUD made sure than Lidetu is politically dead and buried. None of his opponents believed that Lidetu was a Woyanne or a traitor. In a number of discussions ER held with the top CUD leaders, their complaint about Lidetu had never been that he is a Woyanne. Their main worry was that he is a populist and a reckless leader who could have them all killed. Accusations of recklessness and hotheadedness was not enough to defeat Lidetu in the court of public opinion. So rumors started surfacing about Lidetu meeting with Sebhat Nega and other Woyanne leaders. Fabricated stories were published in newspapers, such as Lidetu received money from Al Amoudi, took up residency in Sheraton Hotel free of charge, etc. Confident that no body would believe such rumors, Lidetu failed to respond. In our culture, any thing written down is taken seriously, no matter how false the story is. But Lidetu simply brushed off the flood of rumors and negative newspaper reports about him. At the time, ER had asked Lidetu several times to interview him so that he could refute the damaging stories against him. He refused to do so saying that it is not necessary. He said that the people would not trust any of the negative stuff that was being said about him. How wrong he was! His silence gave credence to the rumors.
3. Sycophant supporters
Lidetu made a series of blunders, all of them as a result of his unwillingness to listen to the advise of others. This is a major flaw in his character. But how did he came to be like that? The answer lies in the sycophantic support he was getting from his friends and followers. Blind supporters have destroyed the careers of a number of promising leaders. Lidetu is one of their victims. They made him out to be an all-knowing, omnipotent leader. For a young politician in his 30s, such adulation and flattery no doubt had a corrupting effect on his character. Surrounded by an army of sycophants and zealots who worshipped him, Lidetu thought that he could not do any thing wrong, and he didn’t need advise from any one.
ER views sycophantic followers of political leaders with contempt. They are a scourge on Ethiopian politics.
4. Unwise words and decisions
Lidetu’s popularity and credibility with the people remained intact even after he was expelled by the CUD executive committee in late October 2005. He was expelled because he refused to surrender UEDP-Medhin’s official stamp he was keeping as secretary of the party after the four parties have merged to make CUD a unitary party. At the meeting of UEDP-Medhin executives, he was outvoted in favor of giving up the stamp that was needed to finalize the merger. But he refused, arguing that only the general meeting of the party can decide on such an issue. His legalistic stand did not have a strong foundation since at a previous general meeting the members had given the executives a mandate to make all merger-related decisions on their behalf. Politically, too, his decision was suicidal, because he was going against a strong desire by the people to make CUD a unitary party. Lidetu was portrayed as a divisive figure who was an obstacle to unity. If he wanted to take a principled–and what he believed was a legal–position, he should have resigned and gone home, instead of dragging himself and his allies through the ugly fight that was to follow. His irrationally stubborn stand caused so much unnecessary pain to so many people, particularly his supporters.
Lidetu didn’t stop there. When Meles unleashed his Federal Police and Agazi death squads on CUD leaders and members, he was not heard uttering any word of condemnation. To make matters worse, he wrote a book that condemns the jailed leaders and spoke out against them on radio and newspaper interviews while they were languishing in jail. What he was saying in the book and the interviews could be factual, but the timing was not right. It was also politically and morally incorrect to attack those who cannot defend themselves.
When the Meles regime unleashed a brutal attack on CUD leaders and supporters, Lidetu should have put aside his political differences and expressed solidarity with his former colleagues, no matter how much unfairly he felt they treated him. The least he could have done was to distance himself as far away as possible from the fascist regime that is brutalizing the people whose votes it has stolen. Instead, what Lidetu did was to show up in the parliament in the same stage with Woyanne mass murderers who had gunned down some of his own supporters just a few weeks ago. No wonder why his supporters felt betrayed. The Woyanne propaganda machine that used to demonize Lidetu for the past ten years jumped on the opportunity to exploit his appearance in the parliament a short distance away from the tyrant.
With all the complaints against Lidetu until that time, had he boycotted the parliament, his popularity as a political leader would not have significantly changed. The false rumors and fabricated newspaper reports against Lidetu had a negative impact on his popularity, but what hurt him the most and probably irreparably damaged his political career were his own unwise words (attacking the jailed leaders), and his own unwise decision (entering the fake parliament).
Can Lidetu revive his political career?
There is no doubt that Lidetu can revive his political career if he takes some steps to address the grievances against him. Ethiopians are the most forgiving people. If Lidetu wants to get back in the people’s good graces, he is well advised to do the following:
1. Organize and lead a boycott of the Woyanne parliament until all the opposition leaders and members are released
2. Demand the immediate resignation of the Meles regime for stealing the people’s votes, murdering unarmed civilians, illegally detaining tens of thousands of innocent civilians, etc.
3. As a political leader, listen what the people are saying
4. Admit mistakes and apologize
Individuals like Lidetu come one in a million. He is a gifted orator and has a brilliant mind. With experience and age, he has the potential to be a great political leader. It would be a great loss and a tragedy for our country if all the contributions Lidetu made and the sacrifices he paid for freedom and democracy in the past 10-15 years are discounted because of a few ill-advised decisions he made and unwise words he spoke. What Lidetu went through in the past ten months can only make him a better person and a better politician if he does what needs to be done. But if he thinks that he didn’t make any mistake, refuses to tune in to the heartbeat of the people, and continues to show up in the same stage with the number one terrorist in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, he would be digging his own political grave deeper and deeper.
The pre- and post-elections political activities of Ato Lidetu Ayalew require serious examination and analysis by political scientists and historians. ER’s intention here is not to do that, because we do not have all the facts. What ER wishes to accomplish in this commentary is to try to give a more complete picture of circumstances surrounding Lidetu’s fall from grace. ER believes that our political leaders and those of us who are closely following our country’s politics can benefit from such a discussion.
It is a well established fact that Lidetu had a major role in Ethiopian politics in the past decade as a leading opposition figure. No one can deny the fact that he was instrumental in the defeat of the Meles regime at the ballot box in May 2005. In a series of televised debates before the elections, he delivered a knockout blow to the TPLF brain trust with his rhetorical firepower that was unmatched by any current Ethiopian political leader. One week before the May 15 elections, he received a hero’s welcome at a huge rally in Meskel Square that was attended by over a million people. The other CUD leaders received little or no attention from the crowd at the rally. Every where he traveled, he was received with admiration and respect. His photos were posted on walls and utility poles in cities around the country. He was THE most popular politician in the country and a leading figure in the movement against the Meles dictatorship. In a matter of few months, all that has changed. Currently, Lidetu is one of the most hated politicians in Ethiopia. Any one who says any thing positive about him, or even seen talking with him is called a traitor. ER itself received a lot of grief for interviewing Lidetu a few days ago. How did this happen? How could a man who was so loved and admired by millions of people becomes one of the most vilified politicians in a matter of days? Is the onslaught against him warranted?
ER believes that although Lidetu may not deserve to be called a traitor, and definitely not a Woyanne, he has brought all this on himself. How?
1. Timing
There were four parties, but three power centers inside the Coalition for Unity & Democracy (CUD) when it was formed in February 2005. The first one was the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) led by Ato Hailu Shawel. The second one was Kestedamena led by Dr Berhanu Nega, and the third was UEDP-Medhin led by Lidetu–although the chairman was Dr Admasu Gebeyehu. The fourth member of the coalition, Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL), the smallest of the four parties, had an insignificant role in the coalition. Its leaders mostly sided with Dr Berhanu Nega and acted as Kestedamena members. After the elections, the UEDP-Medhin chairman Dr Admasu Gebeyehu began to identify himself more with the CUD than his own party. He even stopped attending UEDP-Medhin’s meetings. So it was Lidetu who tried to represent the UEDP-Medhin in the coalition.
Lidetu’s party, UEDP-Medhin, had more members and its candidates won more seats in the 2005 elections than any of the other parties in the CUD. But after the elections, UEDP-Medhin, particularly its younger leaders, were sidelined by the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders with the help of the UEDP-Medhin chairman. The UEDP-Medhin chapters and committees inside the country and around the world stopped receiving any direction on how to proceed as members of the CUD. The older officials of the UEDP-Medhin–particularly the chairman, Dr Admasu Gebeyehu and vice-chairman Dr Hailu Araya–were coopted by the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders. They found to have more in common with the AEUP and Kestedamena leaders than the young turks (Lidetu et al) in their own party. They often voted against Lidetu and Mushe inside the CUD executive committee while the others voted party line. By July 2005, an alliance of AEUP, Kestedamena and the older members of the UEDP-Medhin emerged against Lidetu & Company inside the CUD.
The CUD troika–Hailu Shawel, Berhanu Nega and Lidetu Ayalew–that defeated the Meles dictatorship in the ballot box transformed into two warring factions–one led by Hailu Shawel and the other by Lidetu Ayalew. Berhanu Nega, who has his own strong following, joined the Hailu Shawel camp. He might have seen the popular Lidetu as a long-term threat to his own political ambition. The AEUP-Kestedamena leaders, who are much older, much wealthier, and had much more advanced education, did not see the young leaders of UEDP-Medhin as their equals. They looked down on them more as rabble-rousers than level-headed politicians. Most of Lidetu’s and Mushe Semu’s ideas and proposals were dead on arrival at the CUD Council meetings. It seemed that some times they rejected Lidetu’s ideas just to irk him. He in turn did not respect their approach to politics, and forcefully challenged them. His style was confrontational, and blunt, antagonizing many of the CUD leaders who are sensitive to diplomatic niceties. He was particularly disrespectful towards Ato Hailu Shawel. The two disliked each other.
During the heated internal debates inside the CUD leadership regarding how to react to the gross election fraud that the Meles regime committed, Lidetu and allies pushed for a more populist approach. They opposed going to the courts and the diplomatic community to protest the vote fraud. They wanted to confront the Meles regime through rallies, general strikes and other popular actions. They vociferously argued that going to the courts, which are controlled by the Meles regime, was useless.
The tension between these two camps continued to threaten the survival of the CUD. Some how the coalition survived through the elections, but break up was inevitable as the differences in ideology, strategy, and style of leadership were too wide apart for the two groups to remain together. With all the distrust, lack of mutual respect, and built up resentment, the only way for the CUD to survive was for one of the two camps to give in, or be destroyed by the other. The stubborn Lidetu, by then organizationally a lot weaker, was not about to give in. So, first the Hailu Shawel camp carried out a divide and conquer policy on UEDP-Medhin. They successfully brought many of the UEDP-Medhin leaders to their side. Then they gave a green light to their supporters to politically destroy Lidetu. As young politicians who are new to intraparty battles, Lidetu and allies lost out to the more experienced politicians. In politics, timing is every thing–none more so than in intra party battles. So instead of accepting defeat, and waiting for the right time to wage another battle, Lidetu and allies went on a kamikaze (suicide) mission.
2. Not responding to false rumors and fabricated stories
Knowing the rhetorical firepower of the Lidetu camp, his opponents in the CUD made sure than Lidetu is politically dead and buried. None of his opponents believed that Lidetu was a Woyanne or a traitor. In a number of discussions ER held with the top CUD leaders, their complaint about Lidetu had never been that he is a Woyanne. Their main worry was that he is a populist and a reckless leader who could have them all killed. Accusations of recklessness and hotheadedness was not enough to defeat Lidetu in the court of public opinion. So rumors started surfacing about Lidetu meeting with Sebhat Nega and other Woyanne leaders. Fabricated stories were published in newspapers, such as Lidetu received money from Al Amoudi, took up residency in Sheraton Hotel free of charge, etc. Confident that no body would believe such rumors, Lidetu failed to respond. In our culture, any thing written down is taken seriously, no matter how false the story is. But Lidetu simply brushed off the flood of rumors and negative newspaper reports about him. At the time, ER had asked Lidetu several times to interview him so that he could refute the damaging stories against him. He refused to do so saying that it is not necessary. He said that the people would not trust any of the negative stuff that was being said about him. How wrong he was! His silence gave credence to the rumors.
3. Sycophant supporters
Lidetu made a series of blunders, all of them as a result of his unwillingness to listen to the advise of others. This is a major flaw in his character. But how did he came to be like that? The answer lies in the sycophantic support he was getting from his friends and followers. Blind supporters have destroyed the careers of a number of promising leaders. Lidetu is one of their victims. They made him out to be an all-knowing, omnipotent leader. For a young politician in his 30s, such adulation and flattery no doubt had a corrupting effect on his character. Surrounded by an army of sycophants and zealots who worshipped him, Lidetu thought that he could not do any thing wrong, and he didn’t need advise from any one.
ER views sycophantic followers of political leaders with contempt. They are a scourge on Ethiopian politics.
4. Unwise words and decisions
Lidetu’s popularity and credibility with the people remained intact even after he was expelled by the CUD executive committee in late October 2005. He was expelled because he refused to surrender UEDP-Medhin’s official stamp he was keeping as secretary of the party after the four parties have merged to make CUD a unitary party. At the meeting of UEDP-Medhin executives, he was outvoted in favor of giving up the stamp that was needed to finalize the merger. But he refused, arguing that only the general meeting of the party can decide on such an issue. His legalistic stand did not have a strong foundation since at a previous general meeting the members had given the executives a mandate to make all merger-related decisions on their behalf. Politically, too, his decision was suicidal, because he was going against a strong desire by the people to make CUD a unitary party. Lidetu was portrayed as a divisive figure who was an obstacle to unity. If he wanted to take a principled–and what he believed was a legal–position, he should have resigned and gone home, instead of dragging himself and his allies through the ugly fight that was to follow. His irrationally stubborn stand caused so much unnecessary pain to so many people, particularly his supporters.
Lidetu didn’t stop there. When Meles unleashed his Federal Police and Agazi death squads on CUD leaders and members, he was not heard uttering any word of condemnation. To make matters worse, he wrote a book that condemns the jailed leaders and spoke out against them on radio and newspaper interviews while they were languishing in jail. What he was saying in the book and the interviews could be factual, but the timing was not right. It was also politically and morally incorrect to attack those who cannot defend themselves.
When the Meles regime unleashed a brutal attack on CUD leaders and supporters, Lidetu should have put aside his political differences and expressed solidarity with his former colleagues, no matter how much unfairly he felt they treated him. The least he could have done was to distance himself as far away as possible from the fascist regime that is brutalizing the people whose votes it has stolen. Instead, what Lidetu did was to show up in the parliament in the same stage with Woyanne mass murderers who had gunned down some of his own supporters just a few weeks ago. No wonder why his supporters felt betrayed. The Woyanne propaganda machine that used to demonize Lidetu for the past ten years jumped on the opportunity to exploit his appearance in the parliament a short distance away from the tyrant.
With all the complaints against Lidetu until that time, had he boycotted the parliament, his popularity as a political leader would not have significantly changed. The false rumors and fabricated newspaper reports against Lidetu had a negative impact on his popularity, but what hurt him the most and probably irreparably damaged his political career were his own unwise words (attacking the jailed leaders), and his own unwise decision (entering the fake parliament).
Can Lidetu revive his political career?
There is no doubt that Lidetu can revive his political career if he takes some steps to address the grievances against him. Ethiopians are the most forgiving people. If Lidetu wants to get back in the people’s good graces, he is well advised to do the following:
1. Organize and lead a boycott of the Woyanne parliament until all the opposition leaders and members are released
2. Demand the immediate resignation of the Meles regime for stealing the people’s votes, murdering unarmed civilians, illegally detaining tens of thousands of innocent civilians, etc.
3. As a political leader, listen what the people are saying
4. Admit mistakes and apologize
Individuals like Lidetu come one in a million. He is a gifted orator and has a brilliant mind. With experience and age, he has the potential to be a great political leader. It would be a great loss and a tragedy for our country if all the contributions Lidetu made and the sacrifices he paid for freedom and democracy in the past 10-15 years are discounted because of a few ill-advised decisions he made and unwise words he spoke. What Lidetu went through in the past ten months can only make him a better person and a better politician if he does what needs to be done. But if he thinks that he didn’t make any mistake, refuses to tune in to the heartbeat of the people, and continues to show up in the same stage with the number one terrorist in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, he would be digging his own political grave deeper and deeper.
Urgent call to Ethiopians in Seattle
KILLERS, NOT IN OUR CITY!!!
We, Ethiopians and Ethio-Americans living in and around the greater Seattle area, received the news of the visit by the unelected current Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia with great dismay and utter disturbance. The Deputy Prime Minister Addisu Legesse is directly and primarily responsible for the death, torture, and imprisonment of thousands of Ethiopians. Among the thousands of victims of Addisu Legesse and his chief Meles Zenawi, includes elected officials, journalists, children, women, elderly and people from all walks of life. While we are appalled and shocked by the audacity of Addisu Legesse to show up in Seattle, we would like to inform all those who care and concerned about human and civil rights, Ethiopians in Seattle are outraged by Addisu Legasse’s visit to our city.
Accordingly, we respectfully request and invite that all residents of Seattle and beyond to join us in expressing our deepest and heartfelt rage by the so called Ethiopian Consulate General to host a known killer in our city. We also call upon on all Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia in and around Seattle to show our rejection, protest and disapproval of extra-judicial killings, massacre, torture, and unjust imprisonment of Ethiopians by Addisu Legesse and crew. Please gather at the address below on
Thursday, August 24, 2006, from 4:00-8:00 p.m.
The Mountaineers Building
300 Third Ave West
Seattle, WA 98119
Let’s show Addisu Legesse that Seattle is not a place for baby killers and torturers of millions. Let’s show Addisu Legesse that Ethiopians in Seattle will not support or keep silent of the grand plan by Addisu and his crew to repeat Rwanda’s horrific Genocide history in Ethiopia. And above all, let’s show Addisu Legesse and his crew that the world no longer accommodates killers, torturers, and dictators. Certainly, Seattle shall not be a place for Addisu Legesse to spread his poisonous message of ethnic hatred, and justify the killings of thousands innocent citizens. Taking this occasion we kindly request the American people and all Nations committed to promote genuine democracy to side with the Ethiopian people in getting the popularly elected opposition leadership out of jail!
Representatives of Kinijit support committees and chapters in the United States held a two-day conference in Washington DC on August 19 and 20. The conference initially was called by the Kinijit North America Support Committee (KNASC) chairman, Shaleqa Yoseph Yazew, and those who opposed the Kinijit International Political Leadership (IL). Those who supported the jailed leaders’ decision to form the IL had objected to holding the conference and expressed their opposition in a petition letter submitted to the chairman before the conference. But later on, they decided to take the opportunity to solidify support for the IL, and to also confront the KNASC officials with the serious problems facing the party. There was a great deal of worry that the conference could endanger Kinijit unless the IL takes control of the situation.
The first day and part of the second day were spent in heated debates, accusations and counter accusations. The participants, who were attending the conference representing various localities, accused the KNASC officials of being inactive and incompetent, and of mishandling the party’s resources. At times the meeting almost turned into a riot as some tried to defend the KNASC officials and bully those who were expressing their dissatisfaction. The decision earlier by KNASC officials not to allow the auditor to present a report added more fuel to the fire. Finally, the chairpersons who presided over the conference, Dr Moges Gebremariam and Ato Solomon Bekele, carefully guided the meeting towards resolutions, by first tackling the debate over whether the auditor should present a report. The conference promptly reversed the KNASC’s (6-4 vote) decision and allowed the auditor to present his report.
The auditor presented his report on the second day of the conference. The report, as anticipated, was powerful and compelling. We will not go into the details here, but the auditor practically gave the KNASC leadership a failing grade in both leadership and accountability. The shocking effect of the auditor’s report changed the mood of the conference. Even those who were recruited by the chairman and other officials to provide blind support were left speechless. After the auditor’s report was heard, the conference formed a 7-person inquiry commission to investigate the auditor’s allegations and submit a report with recommendations at the next conference of all representatives, which will be held shortly. The conference gave the Inquiry Commission full power to look at all documents, and subpoena the officials for questioning.
The conference demanded that those individuals who took control of Kinijit’s official web site to hand over the site to the appropriate Kinijit authorities immediately. One of the individuals who had the control agreed to unconditionally hand over the web site.
The conference approved a proposal that was presented by Ato Andargatchew Tsige on the relationships between the KNASC and the IL.
A proposal to eliminate dual responsibilities in the KNASC and the IL was supported by the conference. In support of this proposal, the secretary general of both KNASC and IL, Ato Berhanu Mewa, voluntarily resigned from his KNASC position. But the chairman, Shaleqa Yoseph Yazew and others decided to remain in their dual positions until a detailed plan is submitted and decided on.
The conference decided that all funds that are raised in the name of Kinijit but diverted to unknown accounts controlled by unauthorized individuals to be returned to Kinijit’s official bank account.
Most importantly, the conference decided to not only support the IL, but to also provide the necessary material and financial support to help the IL carry out its political decisions.
At end of the conference late Sunday, it was difficult to find any participant who was not happy about the outcome. The news of the conference’s success will be a source of joy and hope for Kinijit’s supporters around the world, and a reason for worry to its enemies.
Ethiopian Review would like to indulge in a little self-congratulatory for shining a light on the problems inside Kinijit, informing and pushing its members to find solutions. In the eyes of many intelligent readers, particularly those who believe in promoting a democratic culture inside Kinijit, ER’s way has been vindicated.
Ethiopian Review has been informed that Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam was rushed to a hospital yesterday. “Although it is not clear what exactly the health problem is yet, we do know that he is in the Intensive Care Unit,” a message from the family stated.
“We would like to assure all that at the present time, he is doing well under observation,” the family said.
“We remain concerned about the adverse health consequences of the living conditions in Kaliti prison, particularly among the elder prisoners, those with prior health conditions etc, and the quality and availability of appropriate care to these prisoners, even by local standards,” the Professor’s family added.
For all the talk about ethnic self-determination in Ethiopia, almost no attention has been paid to the one and only ethnic group that actually seceded from Ethiopia–the Beta Israel, formerly called Falasha, whose entire population left the country. The story of their secession is full of drama, intrigue, suffering, and jubilation–and, like so much else about Ethiopia, fraught with misunderstandings.
One account of their exodus, which I once believed, was that their departure was instigated from outside pressures, most notably from the American Jewish community. Stephen Spector’s meticulously researched Operation Solomon (2005) clarifies the matter decisively, locating the real impetus in the religious motives of the Beta Israel themselves. Spector and other sources demonstrate that during the mid-1970s, once Israel’s two chief rabbis of Israel declared the Beta Israel authentic Jews, they experienced a heightened yearning to emigrate to the Land of Israel. How they strove to realize that yearning offers yet another testimony to the religiosity, hardiness, determination–and love of pilgrimage–that characterize Ethiopians of many regions.
Ethiopians of the North long regarded the Holy Land as an alluring beacon. Ethiopian Christians refer to themselves as deqiqa israel, children of Israel; Ethiopians were among the earliest immigrant groups to settle in Jerusalem. Legend is that the Lalibela churches were constructed to enable Ethiopian Christians to have an awesome destination once the route to Jerusalem was hampered by the Arab conquests. Years ago, I spoke with a group of resident monks in Jerusalem and asked if they did not miss their homeland: “Sela-agaratchew nafqot albezabatchihum?” “Inday!” they replied, “izih new agaratchn!” (What do you mean? Our homeland is right here!)
Visiting Jerusalem this year, however, I learned of two points Ethiopian Christians were in trouble. One concerns the decision of authorities not to grant asylum to some seventy illegal Christian immigrants. They were detained in prison for two years until a court accepted the UNHCR judgment that their appeal for asylum based on fear of personal persecution in Ethiopia was not well founded. Under pressure from local Ethiopians, the Government of Israel stayed their deportation until the Canadian Embassy issued invitation letters for them to be interviewed.
More serious is current litigation over Ethiopia’s age-old proprietary claims to a small enclave on the roof of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Deir es-Sultan (Eth. Debra Sultan). Thanks to their long presence in Jerusalem, from not long after their Christianization in the 4th century CE, Ethiopians acquired rights to some of Christianity’s most sacred sites. These rights were attested repeatedly by European visitors through the Middle Ages, one reporting in the late 14th century that Ethiopians possessed four different chapels in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Even so, after Salahadin conquered Jerusalem in 1187 and assigned Ethiopia’s rights to Egyptian Copts, those claims were contested repeatedly. Subsequent competition with diverse Christian nationals–Armenians, Greeks, and Copts–made it difficult for Ethiopians to hold on to those rights. Skirmishes with Egyptians during the two centuries after 1770 took away nearly all Ethiopian property. After the Six-Day War in June 1967, Ethiopians had to evacuate an old monastery near the Jordan, and rejoined their old compatriots at Deir es-Sultan just after it was evacuated by panicking Egyptian Coptic monks–all except their determined archbishop, who stayed only to be manhandled by the tough Ethiopians. That was a retribution of sorts for the episode when Copts threw stones at the Ethiopian Easter celebration on the roof; Israeli authorities changed locks of the two chapels and handed Ethiopians the keys. Still, vicissitudes of relations among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Israel continue to jeopardize Ethiopian rights to the site; at the moment, the case is still before the Israeli High Court.
Most Ethiopians fail to grasp the significance of this monastery for their nation–so argues Daniel Alemu, a young Ethiopian scholar in Jerusalem. Yet if Badme is significant for Ethiopia, he says, Deir es-Sultan is far more integral to Ethiopian history and national identity. It also symbolizes the deep religiosity often attributed to Ethiopians of all faiths; only the unbounded devotion that Ethiopians have for this
ancient holy site enables them to manifest the strength and tolerance needed to live for centuries under inhuman conditions in a collapsing monastery.
The attachment of Christian Ethiopians to the Holy Land pales next to that of their Beta Israel kinsmen. So deep was the Falashas’ historic identification with their Hebraic roots that they created an annual holiday, Sigd, when they climb a mountain and recite the Ten Commandments in honor of Moses on Mt. Sinai. All the Ethiopian olim (immigrants) whom Spector interviewed mentioned this as their primary motive. He quotes an elderly qes (Jewish priest): “Our ancestors all hoped and prayed that they themselves would make it to Jerusalem. They did not make it. We are on the brink of reaching Zion.” This evidence contradicts stories circulated in the West to arouse sympathy and donations, stories disconfirmed by those on the ground. Ethiopian officials, U.S. Government officials, and American relief agencies alike affirm that Falasha did not leave because of famine, warfare, disease, or persecution by Christians. Many Christians pleaded with them not to go, while others felt sympathy for their outpouring of collective devotion, including Berhanu Yiradu, who chaired a committee in Gondar working to expedite the movement to Addis; Dr. Girma Tolossa, who represented the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Addis; and an Ethiopian Christian priest who rented his large compound there to camp the Falasha migrants.
The dream of Zion drove Beta Israel to a via dolorosa into Sudan in the years after 1977 when the Derg halted emigration to Israel. Huge numbers made a long, dangerous trek across the desert, usually at night, in which thousands died dreadful deaths along the way. Once there, many more died in pestilential refugee compounds. Their tragic situation aroused the concern of people in Canada, the U.S. and Israel, after which the ministrations of outside supporters from North America and Israel were indispensable. Israeli Defense Forces began heroic efforts to locate and transport the survivors to Israel–efforts that culminated in Operation Moses of late 1984 when they brought some 6500 Falashas to Israel. When that was exposed in the Sudanese Press, it had to be discontinued. President Nimeiri was deposed, and the new regime imprisoned or executed Sudanese thought to have assisted those rescues. Even after that, Israelis rescued a couple thousand more from Sudan. All told, some twenty thousand Beta Israel left Ethiopia by way of Sudan, of whom about four thousand perished before reaching their destination.
By 1989, nearly half the recognized Falasha community had reached Israel. This fired a constant demand for family reunification, which led eventually to Israel’s agreeing to let some 27,800 more Ethiopian come between 1990 and 1992. The climactic highlight was the remarkable Operation Solomon in which 14,300 Beta Israel were evacuated during a daring 36-hour airlift in late May 1991. A recent Jerusalem Post
article includes Operation Solomon among the most memorable noble achievements in Israel’s modern history, alongside the Six-Day War and the rescue at Entebbe.
By now, numbering at 100,000 to two per cent of the Jewish population of Israel, Ethiopians comprise a larger percentage of the population there than of any other state outside of Ethiopia. Their adjustment problems have been amplified by having to leap from a largely rural subsistence lifestyle into the lifestyle of modern cities, to learn a difficult new language, and to be absorbed in such large numbers in a short time. Much has been made of stories about their maladjustment: reported high rates of divorce, school dropouts, and suicide. For some, the cultural rift proved catastrophic. “On the day I set foot in Israel,” one Ethiopian man said, “my life came to an end.” A great deal of the Ethiopian Jewish community lives below the poverty line in depressed neighborhoods. A disproportionate number are unemployed, since they lack skills appropriate to work in a modern economy. Some claim to have been excluded from schools or jobs on racial grounds.
On the other hand, the Beta Israel of Ethiopia were treated with better accommodations and services than any other immigrant group in Israel’s history. A recent survey showed that although their poverty level was higher than any other immigrant group, so was their level of satisfaction with life in the Promised Land. A decent number have made positive adjustments, becoming army officers, small businessmen, and successful candidates for city councils. Above all, from the viewpoint
of the olim, coming to the Promised Land was the fulfillment of a culture’s dream.
The situation is more ambiguous for several thousands of other Ethiopians who attempt to follow the trail of their Jewish countrymen. These people claim to be relatives of those already in Israel or to be converts to Christianity; the Hebrew name for them, Falasmura, signifies “Falashas who converted.” Their case has been championed by the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry (NACOEJ), an organization that sprang up in the 1980s to assist the Falasha immigrants, but was scarcely known in Israel before the completion of Operation Solomon in 1991. At that point the head of the Jewish Agency announced that except for a few hundred souls, the aliyah of Ethiopia’s Jews had reached a successful completion. The chief charitable organization for the Falasha, the American Association for Ethiopian Jews, closed down its American operation and all of its work in Ethiopia. NACOEJ seized the opportunity to establish itself in Addis as advocate for those refused entry to the airplanes of Operation Solomon because they were known to be converts to Christianity–hence, according to the clear guidelines of the Law of Return, not eligible to come on aliyah.
After 1991 NACOEJ assumed jurisdiction over the 3000 or so Falasmura in Addis and sent agents to villages south of Gondar to recruit groups of Ethiopian Orthodox Christians who in one way or another recalled that their ancestors had been Falashas. The new migrants needed little encouragement; they streamed into Addis Ababa en masse, before long swelling the total arrivals to 50,000. NACOEJ lobbies in Israel and in the States became influential; they readily enlist the support of the Black Caucus as well as the United Jewish Communities if Israel makes any move that seems detrimental to the “Jews” languishing in Ethiopia. Although the group has now been thrown out of Ethiopia, it still works behind the scenes to support those thousands of expectant Ethiopians who anticipate eventually being brought to Israel. Processing all those hopefuls and new immigrants has become what some call a racket. The large reservoir of potential immigrants get encouragement both from their relatives who are already in Israel and from the tireless efforts of a NACOEJ-affiliated Ethiopian, Avraham Beyene, whose organization, which seeks to bring all the Falasmura to Israel, is based in Jerusalem. Paradoxically, Ato Avraham’s own Falasha ancestors were among those who early on converted to Christianity, and he, prior to his aliyah, had worked in Gondar under the auspices of the London Missionary Society for the Conversion of the Jews.
The Falasmura story threatens to override what was a narrative of triumph with a troubling denouement. Ethiopians who arrived since the early 1990s, despite their announced conversions to Judaism, keep distant from the Jewish life of the genuine Falasha community. They have become an increasing burden on the limited resources of the Israeli Government. They incite political opportunists to accuse the Government of racism by not admitting more Ethiopians, just as earlier ideologues accused Israel of racism by importing settlers from Africa.
The genuine Falasha exodus continues to have repercussions. Their departure had costs. It robbed Ethiopia of an important part of her history, a part to which recent scholarship has brought fresh attention. It deprived Israel of the only indigenous Jewish community left in the African Continent. It deprived Gondares of close friends and neighbors. (Indeed, some Gondares have come to feel guilty about how they mistreated the Falashas before their departure and wish to make amends by providing favorable conditions for their return.) And it stripped Falasha culture of its traditional moorings and accessories–ritual objects, prayerbooks, idiosyncratic monastic traditions.
On the other hand, Operations Moses and Solomon saved a distinctive branch of Judaism for the world. Ethiopianist Chaim Rosen notes that “there are perhaps one hundred Falasha priests still functioning in Israel, with many followers, and determinedly passing their tradition down to their sons. So the unique Beta Israel religion remains alive in Israel, and has been preserved there perhaps even more than in it might have been in Ethiopia, where it could have faded away like the Qemant religion.”
What is more, as I wrote in my IJES article, “Reconfiguring the Ethiopian Nation in a Global Era,” there is a sense in which Ethiopians in the Diaspora can and do continue to be an integral part of the Ethiopian nation. They can and do engage from afar, through visits, through the internet, and sometimes by repatriation. Some envisage channels through which Israeli Ethiopians can begin to connect back with the motherland, just like other Diaspora Ethiopians who return for limited times or for good. Falashas are learning skills that can be put to good use in Ethiopia’s development. They and fellow Israelis can harness the experience of Israelis in turning deserts into gardens, and fructify areas like the Ogaden and the their homelands in the northwest. The Ethiopian Government has broached the idea of offering fellowships at Ethiopian universities for Ethiopians in Israel. The prospect of offering Ethiopian Israelis a chance to renew ties to their other motherland offers opportunities for all concerned after the trials and tribulations of the past few decades.
