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Month: June 2006

OLF affirms its commitment for democracy and Ethiopian unity

Below the full text of a speech given in Paris, France, by OLF’s Dr Shigut Geleta on June 17, 2006.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson for the nice introduction. As the chairperson said, my name is Shigut Geleta, and I am the Head of Foreign Relations of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Europe.

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

I feel greatly honoured and privileged to have been invited to this “8 heuers les Nouvelles d’Addis” meeting not only to participate but also to address such a distinguished audience of wide spectrum: from students, researchers, journalists, guest speakers, and of course readers and friends of “Les Nouvelles” on the topic given to me, namely: Oromia and Its Perspectives in the Present Situation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Speaking about perspective of Oromia and the Oromo people explicitly means to speak about the central issues of the Ethiopian empire. The Oromos that live in Oromia are geopoltically and socio-economically the main issue to measure Ethiopia’s progress and/or problems. Oromia State is the largest among the Regional States, and stretches from north west Sudan border to south east to Somalia, from north Tigray border to south up to Kenya, and in the west from Sudan border to the east up to Djibouti. The Oromos account for more than 40% of Ethiopia’s projected 78 million total population; 75% of its forest resources, a lion shares of imports and foreign exchange. Most of the main stable foods of Ethiopia such as wheat, barely, corn, oats, teff, sorghum, pulses and oil seeds are produced in Oromia, and Oromia is the largest producer of cattle, poultry, horse, mule, donkey, sheep, goat, and others. Blue Nile, the longest river in the world, and other rivers that benefit the Sudan, Egypt, Somalia and Kenya get most of their tributaries from rivers that originate and flow in Oromia. As many of might be aware of, any environmental malpractice on these shared water resources such as deforestation directly affects not only Ethiopian peoples but also the life of millions of peoples of the riparian states down the streams.

Addis Ababa/Finfinne, sometimes known as the capital city of Africa that serves as the seat of Ethiopian government and many international organisations like Economic commission for Africa (ECA), African Union (AU) and others is located in the heart of Oromoland. Among the nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, the Oromos occupy an important position not only geographically but also socio-economically. The Oromo democracy, the Gada system, has many resembles with several indigenous peoples like the Sidama, Gedewo and Konso. Afaan Oromoo, the oromo language, shares many words with most of south west nations and nationalities of Ethiopia such as the Konso, Sidama, Gidolee, Gatoo, Arboora, Gedewo, Gaamota, Semayii and Geleb. The same is true with Somali, Afar and Saho languages.

These are some of the few points why the Oromo issues should be central to any topic be it economy, politics, human rights, democracy or development in general. Regrettably, for the last one hundred plus years, Oromos have been under the subjugation of different systems of Ethiopian rulers or dictators. These dictators have some common characteristic. They all had/have ascended to power by force and rule by force from Menelik to Melese Zenawi. Since each systems have ethnic vanguard and beneficiaries, Oromos have been marginalized, oppressed, and have become second class citizens in their own country for more than a century now. Oromos voices have been silenced, their culture and language suppressed and their resources exploited to sustain the oppressing systems. Oromos haven’t got an opportunity to say yes or no in any war or peace making process. It is our latest fresh memory that Oromo peasants and youths were used as cannon fodder and mine sweepers during the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000.

Sustainable economic development and growth of domestic product need peace and democracy. Oromos have none of them. The absence of justice, equality and peace in Ethiopia has made Ethiopia as the prison house of nations and nationalities and one of the poorest countries in the world. Oromia that could have been the bread basket of Africa is in need of foreign food aid. Oromos who could have enjoyed liberty and justice from their egalitarian culture are chained and put to prison for demanding God given rights that are enshrined to all human beings.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Ethiopia was described by Ennrico Cerulli (1956) as a museum of peoples and the coincidence of class and ethnic fissures has long provided the primary nexus of conflict over Ethiopian state. Both national and international factors played a key role for such deep-rooted conflict and contradiction. History teaches us, the climax of contradiction results into revolution, and the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 was nothing but the explosion of the contradictions suppressed by force for many years. As I indicated above, the problem of nations and nationalities has been the critical issue for Oromos in particular because of the emperor’s desired goal of homogenised and centralized Ethiopia by making it mono culture, language and religion. The revolutionary event of 1974 was high-jacked by the military junta, the Derg, because there was no other organized political party in the country. As the Emperor had done, Mengistu, the chairman of the Derg, continued the pattern of extreme centralisation and denial of individual or collective rights of nations and nationalities. He replaced monarchical absolutism ideology by militaristic Marxism – Leninism to build the Ethiopian nation state. Centralization and homogenisation under the culture of one ethnic group severely suppressed the Oromos culturally, economically and politically and only perpetuated the systematic domination. The grievance of oppressed nationalities resulted in ethnic based liberation movements such as Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and with the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) that finally toppled the Military junta in 1991.

The OLF was born to address the brutal oppression, and socio-politico-economic exploitation and subjugation of the Oromo people by the Ethiopian political system. This necessity delivered a centralised and secular OLF in 1973/1974. The sacrifice of thousands of Oromo nationalists has resulted in the recognition of Oromo and Oromia as a unified polity in the Ethiopian political system in 1991. After the fall of Derg, the ethnic based federal system was introduced to Ethiopia during the Transition Government and later enshrined in the constitution. The TPLF had conducted election in June 1992 and 1994, May 1995, 2000 and 2005. By doing so, it claimed that it has transformed the Ethiopian state from authoritarian ethnically dominated empire and command economy to democratic society and free market economy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The current rulers of Ethiopia also never seem to learn from history. In fact, the political culture of Ethiopia remains unchanged. As all dictators do, Prime Minster Meles banned all independent political parties and liberation movements during the first year into the Transition period. A few political parties have managed to participate in the election processes mentioned above under very harsh conditions. The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has used various methods to manipulate the elections. The main methods have been closure of opposition offices, harassment, killings, arrest of candidates, refusal of endorsement of registrations of opposition organisations, last-minute shift in the election regulations regarding the number of candidates to be field, suspension of candidates by alleged cases of being “under police investigations” were a just a few of tactics the regime routinely uses.

As a result of such election mockery, the federal government of Ethiopia with bicameral parliament (legislative body), the executive body, judiciary, the army, security and police all are interwoven into one party, the TPLF led EPRDF party. The prime Minister, Foreign Minster, Security Minister, Army Chief of Staff, most military commanders and many other Federal employees are ethnic Tigres and come from the TPLF even though the total population of ethnic Tigres is about 6% of the population of Ethiopia.

Despite Ethiopia’s claim to follow free market economic policy, it is officially known that “Non-Governmental Organisations” (NGOs) such as Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Tigray Development Association (TDA) and Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray ( EFFORT) are controlled by TPLF and serve as the front organisations to channel national and international resources to the ruling party controlled business empires. Basically, the TPLF privatised (took ownership) public property nationalized during the Derg time in the name of free market economy. TPLF dictates politics, economy and security of peoples in Ethiopia. There is no doubt in fair and free competition, TPLF will never stand a chance to rob Ethiopian peoples vote and resources.

As far as free press is concerned, five Oromo magazines (Urji, Biftu, Gada, Madda Walaabuu and Odaa) were closed down when the government imprisoned their editors and publishers. Many of the Oromo journalists were exiled after their release, but Mr. Shiferaw Insermu and Mr. Dhabassaa Wakjira are currently languishing in prison. This is not unique to Oromos alone. There are also a number of Amharic and different language newspapers that are closed down by the regime.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is true that the Ethiopian state is federally structured and the country has a constitution resembling that of western European norm. Nevertheless, this constitution remained a paper document devoid of implementation. This fake federal structure has been manipulated by TPLF to divide and rule at home, and has given the impression of prevalence of democratic structure to the international community. The regime has pitted one ethnic group against the other allotting villages to adjacent ethnic group and has caused unnecessary blood-shed. Furthermore, the incumbent minority ruling party merely formulated and expressed the competing interest and ideas of the opponent parties on paper for its own survival on power and gain international support. A constitution that has become an instrument of oppression for the vast majority of the people is not worth the ink and the paper it is written on.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today after 15 years, we need not to enumerate the dictatorial nature of Ethiopian government. The International Observers of May 2005 National Election and the Ethiopian peoples are the witnesses what the regime is and how it has remained in power.

Ethiopia is at a cross-road and two important trends have been unfolding in the mean time. On one hand, lack of solution for pending political questions and on the other hand the underdeveloped economy have taken a collision course. Poverty, high unemployment, alarming population growth, rate of spread of HIV/AIDS, repressive measure of the government for any peaceful demonstration are hefty records of shame for the government. Since November 9, 2005 until this time there is widespread continuous people disobedience in Oromia where the government falsely portrayed itself as if it won the election in this regional zone. However it was in this region where it has used its armed wing for its flawed election. The government responded to peaceful demonstrations causing massive human rights violations such as extra judicial killings, harassment, disappearance, gang rape, detentions and etc..These brutal actions of the regime will never silence the Oromo national struggle but rather it will strengthen “Oromummaa” (Oromo identity).

This brut act is not only confined to Oromia but also makes in Ogadenia, Sidama, Anuwak, Amhara and others too. This continuous suppression of the regime and Ethiopian people’s rebellion heralds the end the road for the TPLF-led Ethiopian regime. To facilitate the end of a minority rule and to shorten the time suffering of Ethiopian people, after a long thorough discussion, liberation movements and political parties with their different pragmatic programs but representing different nations or political interest of the Ethiopian people recently (in May 2006) established Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD). As history instructs us it is the democratic vision of Pan Africanists like Kwame Nkurmah, Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral and Nelson Mandela that led and speeded up de-colonisation process. Today’s bold determination and vision of the leadership of member organisations of AFD to pool resources together and work hand in hand will be, no doubt, the light at the end of the tunnel for Horn of African peace in general and for Ethiopia in particular. It is high time that freedom and democracy reign in all corners of Africa and Ethiopia should be an example not an obstacle. AFD has a noble goal that accommodates all those who stand for justice, equality, freedom and democracy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before I sum up my speech I would like to say some words about the efforts the Oromo nation has been making for freedom and peace. Since 1900s, Oromos of all walks of life have been dying to restore their inalienable birthright for human dignity, freedom and equality. The OLF, as a vanguard organisation leading the Oromo people, has always showed its willingness and commitment to resolve the fundamental problems in Ethiopia peacefully and democratically. The following records are a few of the efforts made by the OLF to resolve the problem in the Ethiopian empire peacefully.After the fall of the Derg the OLF and almost all Oromo Liberation organisations participated in the 1991-1992 Transitional Government with the hope that the chronic problem of the empire and that of Oromo case would be resolved peacefully. While OLF is seriously working on Transitional Charter:

Mr. Gamahis Dhaaba (Zacharias Galata), Central Committee Member of OLF was murdered cold blooded in a TPLF office. On 25 March 1992, along the streets of Water town in Hararge region, Meles Zenaw’s army opened gunfire on peaceful Oromo demonstrators indiscriminately and killed 92 people and wounded over 300. Soon after that, Jatani Ali, a prominent Oromo politician,was murdered in Nairobi, Kenya. When the mechanism devised by the Charter was derailed by the TPLF/EPRDF, the OLF was forced to withdraw from Transitional Government of Ethiopia in the Mid-1992. Since then, the OLF has taken several initiatives to end the conflict peacefully. The OLF has sat for negotiation with the TPLF several times to resolve the Oromo issue, but all failed because the TPLF regime knows it has no public support and mandate to rule by force if equality, freedom and peace reign in the country. Just to give some chronological events:-

1.In 1993 OLF sat for negotiation with the help of eight European and North American Ambassadors. The Eritrea President with the ambassadors of Great Britain, Germany, Sweden and the US took the initiative.

At that time EPRDF was declaring to the world that it had captured 20,000 OLF fighters by mass arresting Oromo children, elders and women and refused to negotiate. 2.In 1993, OLF joined the Paris Peace Committee with a sincere commitment to salvage the situation. The TPLF/EPRDF beside its unwillingness to solve the conflict peacefully,

it rather aggravated the disagreement by arresting Mr. Ibsa Gutama, the OLF representative when he arrived in Addis Ababa/Finfinne from Europe to participate in the Peace and Reconciliation Conference due to take place from December 18-22,1993. The unsecured minority government intensified killing, assassinating and imprisoning Oromo civilians. 3.In 1994, OLF met at the Carter Peace Centre in Atlanta, Georgia under the chairmanship of theformer US President Jimmy Carter. Again, the Meles government was not willing to negotiate.

In March 2004, Abba Gada Boru Guyyoo, a Gada leader of Borona who was invited for a peace talk was murdered on his way back to his village by TPLF soldiers. Again, in September 2004, Mr. Darara Kafani, a successful businessman of over 65 years old was gunned down in broad day light by TPLF security forces. On 21 May 1995, Mr. Ali Yusuf, a business man who was one of the 12 member of the OLF’s seat in Transitional Government was assassinated in Addis Ababa/Finfinne by no one else but the brutal regime. 4. In 1996, in Nairobi, Kenya, through the Kenyan government another attempt was made for mediation. But the TPLF/EPDRF responded by :-

closing the Oromo Relief Association (ORA) in February 1996, and imprisoned all its workers and confiscated all the property of ORA. It also killed a well known Oromo singer Mr. Ebisa Adunyaa in August 1996 in Addis Ababa/Finfinne in his home. 5.In 1997, a former German Ambassador to Ethiopia, Dr. Horst Winkelman made his best to bring the TPLF leaders to the negotiation table but it was turned down by the Ethiopian regime.

Again, the TPLF/EPRDF arrested Oromo journalists and all members of Oromo Human Rights League in the country

6. In 1998, by the invitation of the US State department, in Washington, DC, another attempt was made for negotiation but failed since this government can not stay in power if peace, equality, freedom and democracy prevail in that country.

The TPLF government did not waste any time to instigate ethnic and tribal conflict between Guji Oromos and Gedeo in July 1998, and between Borana and Garba peoples in October 1998 that claimed the lives of many innocent civilians. 7. In 1999, again in Washington DC, under the sponsorship of Congressman Hennery Johnston, another effort was made to bring Mr. Meles to negotiation, but it did not materialize and bear no result.

8. On February 3, 2000, the OLF took extra miles to seek a peaceful settlement with the Ethiopian regime by issuing an “ Agenda for Peace to Resolve the Conflict in Ethiopia ”.

However, the TPLF regime did not miss a chance to show its true intention and goal. Just a few weeks later, it assassinated an OLF Executive Member, the Honourable Mr. Mulis Abba Gadaa. From 2000 until this very moment, many Oromo students have been killed, detained and many more have exiled in fear of immediate danger for their lives. In the same year, the regime moved the seat of Oromia Regional State from Addis Ababa/Finfinne to Adama. It detained the leaders and member of Mecha-Tulama self-help association, for no reason other than peacefully protesting the change of State government seat to Adama. Even though the government has recognized it was against the will of the people to do so and relocated the Oromia capital to Addis Ababa/Finfinne, the Mecha-Tulama leaders are still languishing in TPLF prison. 9. In September 2005, the OLF responded positively for Mr. Meles’s call for peace talk without any precondition. It was rather a public relation gimmick since at that time TPLF was cornered by International Observers and the opposition to accept defeat at the ballot. As usual, no follow up or any meaningful proposal was presented from Mr. Meles, and basically it has been OLF’s experience not to expect much from this regime.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Peace can only be attained when all stakeholders show willingness to resolve the conflict at hand and begin to negotiate in good faith. I have showed just a few examples to demonstrate that Meles regime is neither for peace, equality, freedom nor for democracy. It is an unstable, paranoid regime that relies on nothing but force and about 6% of the Ethiopian populace who belong to its ethnicity. On the other hand, the AFD, which OLF is a founding member, is calling all stakeholders including EPRDF for political dialogue to formulate a comprehensive solution for the problem the country is facing. The OLF firmly believes the problem in the country can be solved though peaceful and democratic deliberations if all agree not to use force. Unfortunately, TPLF is never late to use force and create more problem and mistrust among the Ethiopian people, the opposition and try to confuse the international community. I have no doubt that the TPLF will go to any length in fabricating anything to discredit the Alliance and its member organisations through all sorts of divide and conquer, intermediation and even by trying to make alliance to a member of AFD. AFD will not fall for old tricks.

Finally, one basic reality is that Oromos and Oromia are no more abstract to the World. They are part of the global world with name and location. No one should tamper with individual and group rights of the Oromos and other nationalities in Ethiopia except themselves. I also believe no one should forcefully separate nations that want to unite and live together, and at the same time no one should force any nations to live together if they freely express their will not to do so. Ethiopia is not the only multi-nation state in the World. Oromos have been in contact with different nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, if the root cause of contradictions and conflict that prevail in Ethiopia is sequentially and properly solved through free, fair and democratic deliberations, rather than the barrel of gun, I have no doubt that Oromo visionaries and the OLF leadership will play a key role to bring peace in the Horn of Africa by placing the hierarchy of Oromo identity in the world of multiple identities. To learn more we shouldn’t have to go very far; one of the neighbouring country adjacent to this meeting place (France), Belgium, is divided in to three ethnic based regional zones: Flandern (deutch speaking), Wallon (french speaking) and Brussels (multicultural centre) each zone is enjoying its multiple right and multiple identity in EU. We can also look at the recent vote in Montenegro where the populace expressed to try a solo journey than unity with Serbia. The future is doomed only for those who fear equality, democracy and freedom, and for those who uphold and condone injustice, inequality and dictatorship. I say freedom now, equality now, democracy now for all peoples of Ethiopia, and Freedom and Democracy for all !!!

Merci beaucoup, au revoir,
Nagaan Galatooma,
Thank you,

COMMENTS

Response to Professor Donald Levine’s article: “Tigrayawinet”

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By Fikre Tolossa

Dear Professor Levine:

It seems you are inspiring me these days. Here is another article of mine in response to your latest writing, “Tigrayawinet.” You write:

“Whence the dramatic reversal of Tigrayan sentiment, from champions of historic Ethiopia to debunkers of its reality? The story begins following the Liberation from Italian rule in 1942.”

Well, Sir, the story goes back at least 700 years earlier than that. One has to delve deep into Ethiopian history than skim on the surface to fathom this intriguing reality. Here is an other article I had published on Ethiopian Review about ten years ago which attempts to tackle this question profoundly.

You might be wondering and saying “where is he bringing an article from each time I am writing something?” The answer is that I had felt strongly about the state of my country. So, I had to research on her and write as much as I could.

You might also ask yourself, “who is this Oromo writing such articles?” If this question runs in your mind, Sir, I am an Ethiopian first and foremost, and then an Oromo. In any case, enjoy the article, once again. Here it goes. Click here

Tigrayawinet

Getz #7, Part II

By Donald N. Levine

Whence this dramatic reversal of Tigrayan sentiment, from champions of historic Ethiopia to debunkers of its reality? The story begins following the Liberation from Italian rule in 1942. The Tigrayan populace was stressed due to population pressures on increasingly infertile land. Nearly a third of Tigrayans migrated to other parts of the country. Their strained condition was severely exacerbated by impossibly heavy tax burdens, which the IEG refused to adjust. Indeed, the attitude of the central government seemed dismissive toward Tigray. It was clear that Shoa, the center of imperial rule since Minelik, and Eritrea, the returned province that Ethiopia sought to woo, were the major beneficiaries of the national budget. This grated on a people who had long played a central role in the Ethiopian political landscape.

These resentments boiled over in March 1943 when people from many parts of the province rose up in a rebellion (Tigr. woyane ) against the Imperial Ethiopian Government that lasted for five months. In response, Emperor Haile Selassie I had RAF planes drop payloads of bombs against Tigrayan villagers (as he did when he was confronted with peasant uprisings in other parts of the country, such as Gojjam). That planted the seeds of a smouldering antagonism that was fueled when the Government’s strict Amharization policy procued a ban against using the Tigrinya language in 1970.

It did not seem that things would improve under the Derg. Two days after they deposed the Emperor, a group of Tigrayans met in a café in Addis to plant the seeds of a Tigrayan opposition movement, taking the name Woyane–signifying a popular rebellion against outside oppression-as their logo. Derg policies reinforced their grievances. For example, the Derg forbade Tigrayans used to go to other parts of the country to work, a common basis for earning income that they would bring home to support their families and invest in their farms. This plunged Tigrayans ever more deeply into poverty and hopelessness, and gave the incipient TPLF movement important support from the very beginning.

“In my high school class in Agame,” one TPLF veteran of the early 1980s told me, “80% of the students supported TPLF, the rest were for EPRP.” This groundswell of sentiment led in two directions, however. One group (TLF) wanted to press the claims of a greater Tigray (Tigray-Tigrini), uniting Tigrinya-speakers from Eritrea with the province. The other group organized itself politically and ideologically through the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. It conjoined the principle of class struggle with that of self-determination of nationalities. Like other radicals of the day, they appropriated the myth that Ethiopia was the invention of Minelik in order to legitimate the independence of Eritrea, and the principle of self-determination within Ethiopia.

This ethno-Marxist sentiment drove the most ambitious elements of the TPLF movement. It led those who took political control of the TPLF to turn against Tigrayan political elements who did not support Eritrean independence. Before long that led, evidence suggests, to a policy of liquidating those elements. Tigray became, survivors of those horrific years aver, a “killing field.” According to many reports, which must be investigated further by future historians, Tigrayan civilians were slaughtered right and left–in many cases following gruesome torture, according to eye witnesses. Rumors of mass graves in the surroundings of Ghinem in Welkait Tsegede as well as in other parts of Tigray, if confirmed, would support such reports.

Like many idealistic youth of their generation, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray felt empowered by the seductive morsels of Marxian ideology–unaware of the wise pronouncements of the young Marx himself that communism like other narrow doctrines was a dangerous “dogmatic abstraction.”

Coupled with the new dogmatic abstraction about Ethiopia as an invention of Minilek, it became a heady brew that induced the committed TPLF ethno-Marxists to murder great numbers of civilians and to perpetrate slanders against Amharas and Ethiopian patriots. One veteran of those killings confesses that when he told another, early in the fighting “the number of people we have killed thus far has reached 10,000,” his comrade replied: “So what, Red China had to kill a million people in order to become victorious.” Attitudes of that sort, be it noted, were shared by other Ethiopian revolutionaries of the time.

It is possible, then, that accusations of genocide against Medsfin Wolde Mariam and other defendants may reflect something else. They may represent a wish to disavow the crimes against Tigrayans which the TPLF in its days of struggle felt it had to commit. The current leadership has changed a good deal since those impassioned days. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had strenuously disavowed the tenets of his early ideological commitments as early as 1990, arguing that what he wanted was a chance for the peoples of Ethiopia to decide their fate from the bottom up, not from the top down. The EPRDF has given up most of the doctrines of Leninism and insists that it wants to move Ethiopia in the direction of democratization. In recent months it has taken steps toward reforming parliamentary procedures, press legislation, and the Election Board. The nationalist sentiments evoked by the 1998-2000 campaign against Eritrea produced some recognition that behere etyopiya was not so fictitious after all. The old warriors may regret the misery they caused in their determined rise to power. They now insist that they want to get beyond a politics of violence.

There is much that they and the whole country can do to accomplish that. The Government commands the allegiance of cadres of Agazi troops–uncompassionate, socially isolated cadres who owe their existence to the TPLF, and who can be mobilized in an instant to inflict terrible cruelties behind the scenes. For the former TPLF leadership to embrace Ethiopian nationhood fully it will do well to insist on an impartial and transparent investigation of the actions of its security forces–at Dedessa, in Tigray, and in the streets and alleys of Addis Ababa. The current Government of Ethiopia demands that those currently indicted be held accountable for any crimes they committed by inciting illegal actions against the Ethiopian state, if such can be proven in court––even though, on the question of incitement to ethnic violence, it is doubtful that there can be credible evidence to convict the CUD leaders. Beyond that, the Government must also be vigilant in monitoring excesses of ethnic vilification. In Tigray since the election, a few people circulate the warning, “Amharotch temelsu seltan intehizu iqetleke iyu naya’aharte sheate amat qalsi behama yiteref”–if the Amhara return to power, they will kill you all and your seventeen-year struggle will have been in vain.” Surely that is something that can be discouraged.

Decades of suffering from destructive political conflicts can be ended, especially now that Ethiopia’s security is threatened on all borders. It should now be possible again to view Adwa, not as a symbol of irrendentist particularism but once again as the triumph of multiethnic Ethiopianism, when 100,000 troops from dozens of ethnic groups fought together behind every important chief from all over the country–Ras Alula, Ras Mengesha, and Ras Sibhat of Tigray; Dejazmatch Bahta of Akale Guzae; Wag Shum Guangul of Lasta; Ras Mikael of Wallo; Negus Takla-Haymanot of Gojjam; Ras Gobena and Dejazmatch Balcha of the Mecha Oromo; Ras Wele of the Yejju Oromo; Fitawrari Tekla of Wollega; Ras Makonnen of Harar; as well as Ras Gebeyehu (who died fighting at Adwa) and Ras Abate of Shoa. Minister Fisseha Ashgedom, an early TPLF loyalist, talks proudly now of the role his grandfather Dejazmatch Tessema played in the battle of Adwa. The Adwa victory became and remains the most outstanding symbol of what, a half-century later, a British colonel would describe as the “mysterious magnetism” that holds Ethiopia together. This is a magnetism that will outlast the petty particularisms and personal ambitions that became so virulent under the ethno-Marxist ideologues of the 1970s and 1980s.

_______________________________________________
TO my readers:

As noted in my introduction to Part I, “Portions of this piece might open old wounds. Please consider my point of view: that these old wounds were never properly healed and continue to spill toxins into Ethiopia’s body politic today.

Please know, also, that in this as in all previous Getzotch, I do not claim to have the absolute truth. That is never a proper claim to be made by scholars in general and in particular for anyone rash enough to make statements about Ethiopia.”

The full series can be accessed at www.eineps.org/forum.

A comparative analysis of two substitute amendments on HR 4423

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By Alemayehu Gebre-Mariam

Over the past several months, there has been much discussion and debate over House Resolution (H.R.) 4423 and the two substitute amendments1 offered by New Jersey representatives Christopher Smith (R) Chairman, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and Donald Payne (D), ranking minority member of the same committee. While the active proponents and opponents of HR 4423 have been vigorously advocating their respective positions, it appears many Ethiopians who have been following developments on the sidelines may not have fully grasped the substance of the bill or the differences between the two substitute amendments.

Reading and understanding legislative language often requires specialized knowledge and training, and for most lay people such material tends to be legal “mumbo jumbo.” Lawyers and judges spend considerable time and energy disputing and deciphering the intended meaning, scope and application of a particular piece of legislation, often without reaching agreement. Given the complexity of statutory construction (formal rules of interpreting legislation), one may not reasonably expect the average Ethiopian reader of H.R. 4423 to engage in formal legislative analysis and arrive at a comprehensive understanding of its provisions or implications. The following comparative analysis is intended to aid in a better understanding of H.R. 4423. The analysis aims to illuminate some of the major policy and legislative issues that appear in the two amendments, enhance the quality of the general public dialogue over the bill, and render intelligible the legislative language so that anyone with a cursory interest in the bill could understand its provisions.

Objectivity and impartiality are critical to a fair rendition of the various elements of the two substitute amendments, and this author shall attempt to provide such an analysis. In the interest of full disclosure, however, the reader should know this author supports Chairman Smith’s substitute amendment, and briefly explains his reasons at the end in a postscript.

The comparative analysis focuses on legislative objectives, legislative findings, proposed action plan to assist Ethiopia and sanctions for noncompliance.

I. Legislative Objectives 2

Smith and Payne appear to subscribe to similar legislative objectives, although the practical implications and outcomes of their respective objectives are quite different. Smith broadly aims to support human rights, democracy, and economic freedom in Ethiopia. Payne seeks to promote human rights, good governance, free and fair elections and economic development, as well an independent judiciary and free press institutions. (See Smith, Sec. 2; Payne, Payne, sec. 2.) Analysis While there is apparent overlap in the declared objectives of the two amendments, the conceptual and practical differences become readily apparent upon closer examination. Both amendments aspire to achieve similar outcomes, but overused words and phrases such as democracy, good governance, human rights, economic development, etc., are often understood differently not only by lay persons but also legislators, political scientists, economists and others.

One illustrative example of different outcomes in legislative policy objectives concerns the issue of promoting “economic development” in Ethiopia. Smith approaches economic development along the lines of “economic freedom” (broadly defined in terms of private entrepreneurship, private ownership of land to allow the peasant farmer borrowing opportunities, and compensation for persons whose properties were confiscated by the Derg), and specific mechanisms aimed at advancing such freedom, e.g. providing technical assistance to develop the Awash and Nile hydro resources, promoting joint Ethiopian-American joint commercial ventures, improvements in the system of taxation, etc. (See Smith, sec. 5.) Payne’s notion of economic development is limited to support for rural education and effective water resources management. (See Payne, sec. 6.)

II. Legislative Findings

Both Smith’s and Payne’s substitute amendments are based on several sets of factual predicates (evidence) related to violations of human rights, deficiencies in the Ethiopian legal system and political process, obstacles to economic development and functioning of free press institutions, and post-election events.

Human Rights

Smith’s amendment begins its findings of human rights violations in Ethiopia by focusing on recent evidence of killings, torture and persecution of Anuaks in the Gambella region. Smith finds widespread human rights abuses in Ethiopia, including occurrences of unlawful killings of opponents, abuse and mistreatment of detainees, excessive use of force by security forces, detention of thousands of people without charge, government restrictions on the freedom of speech and assembly, and limitations on citizens’ rights to peacefully change their government.

Smith makes specific findings that after the May 15, 2005 elections, the human rights situation in Ethiopia deteriorated significantly marked by the killing of scores of demonstrators by government security personnel, and detention of tens of thousands of government opponents, including opposition political leaders, human rights activists, community leaders, and journalists.

Payne’s amendment begins its findings by framing the issue of human rights violations in Ethiopia as a Derg legacy, and implicitly commends the EPDRF for ushering a new era of human rights by ending “Mengistu’s brutal dictatorship.” The EPDRF-led government is credited for setting up a coalition government which has integrated various groups including liberation fronts (such as the OLF and ONLF), resulting in significantly improved human rights conditions and political stability in Ethiopia. Payne acknowledges that human rights conditions deteriorated significantly in Ethiopia after the May 15, 2005 elections, but points out that serious abuses occurred only after opposition parties refused to accept the announced election results and called for civil disobedience protests. Payne’s findings confirm that the government has detained notable political leaders, human rights activists, and journalists; and in Oromia and Amhara regions, Payne finds that federal police have threatened, beaten and detained opposition supporters often in nighttime raids.

Analysis

On April 6, 2006, Smith provided a mark-up statement3 to the Subcommittee explaining his reasons for introducing HR 4423. Smith became concerned after the May, 2005 elections when he learned of delayed release of election results and massive arrests of demonstrators. He was afraid the situation could “spiral out of control” and began working with international human rights organizations. He was able to craft legislation that would help improve “human rights abuses and encourage Ethiopia to pursue a more certain path to democratic elections, good governance and economic development.” Smith also sought to hold accountable those who were involved in the shootings of demonstrators.

Smith subsequently visited Ethiopia and observed first hand that opposition leaders were being followed and harassed. He met with Zenawi who bragged to him that he had “proof” opposition leaders had committed treason, and that he could arrest them at any time. Unbeknownst to Smith, Zenawi was telling him his actual plans, and within weeks, Zenawi had ordered the roundup and detention of hundreds of opposition leaders for treason and genocide. (See Smith Mark-Up Statement.) In the absence of an official mark-up statement or other public declarations by Payne, one has to rely on the plain language of his substitute amendment and record of hearings, which in this writer’s view are insufficient to provide a substantial basis to ascertain Payne’s real interest in presenting his amendment or in deciphering the reasons for his opposition to Smith’s bill.

The differences in legislative findings on human rights in the two versions are significant and wide-ranging. Smith’s findings place the entire burden of human rights violations squarely on the shoulders of the government. He holds the regime exclusively responsible for the denial of due process to opposition detainees and the deteriorating economic situation in the country. He is critical of the government’s human rights record, and makes no effort to explain away the human rights abuses that have occurred in the country. (See Smith, sec. 3-5.)

On a more subtle level, Smith frames the issue of human rights violations in Ethiopia as part of a comprehensive interplay of policy and institutional failures, including repressive government actions and policies, inept judicial officers and ineffective judicial institutions, general official indifference to the rule of law and unbridled use of security forces to violently suppress all opposition. The Ethiopian judiciary is criticized for its failure to protect the rights of the accused sua sponte (i.e. the court on its own power), and for its complicity with the government in denying due process to defendants by conducting closed proceedings, limiting or denying attorney-client consultations and disregarding the presumption of innocence accorded to those accused of political crimes.

Payne’s amendment takes a radically different view of the current and historical human rights situation in Ethiopia, and seeks to excuse the current regime’s record by condemning the Derg-era human rights violations. (See Payne, sec. 3 (1)) Payne portrays the defeat of the “brutal dictatorship of Mengistu’s regime” by the EPDRF as the dawning of a new age of human rights and participatory democracy in Ethiopia. (See Payne, sec. (2). Payne’s findings broadly acknowledge and commend the EPDRF and the current regime for creating a “spirit of a new start” in “the building of a democratic Ethiopia.”

Payne’s findings imply that any human rights violations that have occurred since the takeover of the EPDRF government in 1991 were episodic and not systematic or significant. (See Payne, sec. 3 (9)). Although Payne acknowledges a “significant deterioration of human rights conditions” after the May 15, 2005 elections, and disapproves of the killing of nearly 80 demonstrators by government security forces and detention of opposition leaders and thousands of others, he curiously seems to hold demonstrators and opposition leaders responsible for their misfortunes. In other words, following Payne’s findings, had the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) abstained from civil disobedience protests and not challenged the election results, there would have been few human rights violations by the government in the post-election period! (See Payne, sec. 4 (1). This conclusion is somewhat analogous to a provocation defense sometimes raised in domestic abuse prosecutions where the husband pleads to the court that his wife is responsible for the injuries he inflicted upon her because she has a bad habit of talking back to him and challenging his commands.

Payne’s amendment makes no finding on the current status of detainees or the ongoing arrests and detentions of persons suspected of opposition to the government, the nature and gravity of the charges leveled against opposition leaders, the general atmosphere of fear, loathing and intimidation throughout the country, and the need to guarantee due process to the prisoners of conscience or international oversight of their trial.

Payne makes specific findings with respect to the “marginalization” of “the Oromos” and Ethiopian Somalis, implying that with the exception of these groups, others do not feel marginalized. (See Payne, sec. 3 (4) (5). Acknowledgement is made of the fact that members of the original EPDRF coalition “were forced to leave,” but the impression is left that only the OLF has been the object of military action by the government. The manifest implication of this finding is that other groups who were forced to leave, or who remained “outside the political process” have not suffered military action or persecution by the government. (See Payne, sec. 3 (4)).

It is puzzling that Payne makes no findings that “marginalization” is a direct outcome of the government’s policy of “ethnic federalism” — a gentler and kinder version of bantustanization or tribal homelands – which has been used to force Ethiopians to declare their ethnic identities and establish narrow ethnic allegiances. One could conclude from Payne’s findings that Ethiopia’s “ethnic federalism” is the most significant recent innovation in the general political theory of federalism. It is remarkable that a distinguished member of the American federal government could find any merit in the fictitious notion of “ethnic federalism.”

Payne’s overall findings suggest that he has a threshold of human rights abuses to trigger his outrage. Unfortunately, the killing of scores of demonstrators and incarceration of hundreds of opposition leaders and thousands of opponents is insufficient to provoke his moral outrage and demand immediate remedial action.

Deficiencies in Legal/Political Processes

Smith’s amendment finds significant flaws and deficiencies in the political and judicial processes in the country. As alluded above, some of Smith’s legislative findings accuse the Ethiopian courts for acting inconsistently with Ethiopian law and constitutional protections. The election board is criticized for what amounts to a dereliction of duty by failing or refusing to perform an impartial investigation of allegations of election irregularities, and for undermining opposition efforts to pursue their election complaints. The government is blamed for failing to release election results in a timely fashion, and expelling internationally respected nongovernmental organizations for political reasons.

Smith encourages Ethiopian opposition parties to follow through on court challenges of the May 15, 2005 elections, and urges reorganization of the National Election Board to be more representative of the spectrum of political parties and perspectives in the country, and to become more independent in its investigative functions and decision-making.

Payne’s findings on the performance of the EPDRF and the government it has led since 1991 are largely favorable. The EPDRF is credited with bringing “stability” and much improved human rights conditions in Ethiopia. (See Payne, sec. 3 (9)). It is given credit “for significantly changing the political structure” and “shifting political dominance among groups,” creating “ethnic federalism,” and a “multiparty system,” and is approvingly described as “the best organized political party in the country” with wide support in the countryside. It is also commended for conducting a “transparent, competitive and relatively fair and fair election” in May, 2005, and for establishing a commission to investigate the post-election killings of demonstrators. Casting a shadow on this illustrious achievement, according to Payne’s findings, was the threat of dissension within EPDRF and challenges to Zenawi’s power (which was resolved through “restructuring and ouster” of dissenting leaders). (See Payne, sec. 5 (a) (1), (4), (5), (6) (16))

Payne’s findings on opposition groups are far less favorable. They are characterized as “suffering from internal divisions” and “lacking clear policy objectives.” They are said to suffer from government and exile group interference. They are generally portrayed as a negative political force responsible for election boycotts, civil disobedience protests and causing election turmoil. (See Payne, sec. (a) (2) (5) (10) (12)). It is noteworthy that Payne is dismissive of Ethiopians in the Disapora, and by inference particularly those “exiles” in the United States. He finds little role for “exile” groups of Ethiopians in the political or economic life of their homeland.

Repression of Free Press Institutions

Smith’s findings are critical of the Ethiopian government’s treatment of press institutions and journalists. The findings lament the fact that the government’s “repressive media law,” which threatens capital punishment for its violation, has had a chilling effect on the free press and spawned rampant self-censorship. The government’s monopoly of the electronic media (radio and television and internet) and lack of progress towards licensing of private radio are singled out for special criticism. Smith’s amendment encourages the Ethiopian government to support freedom of the press by allowing print and broadcast media to operate without censorship, facilitate and expedite the licensing of independent radio and television, and provide unimpeded access to the Internet. Smith specifically urges the government to revise Press Proclamation No. 34 of 1992 with the aim of repealing criminal defamation provisions and other speech-related crimes. Payne’s findings on the operation of a free press merely pays lip service to the severity of government control and censorship. He finds that while “foreign journalists continue to operate freely,” independent Ethiopian journalists continue to face harassment, prosecution, detention and exile. This parallel universe of a free foreign press operating alongside a decimated independent Ethiopian press does not seem to present any contradictions for Payne requiring immediate remedial. (See Payne, sec. 4 (6) (7)).

Economic Issues

Smith’s amendment finds economic conditions in Ethiopia have worsened “measurably” over recent years due to the government’s inability to formulate and implement effective policies and regulations and control corruption. The Ethiopian economy is deemed to be mostly “unfree”, largely due to a cumbersome bureaucracy that deters investment, a judicial system that does not offer sufficient protection for property rights, and a system of higher tariffs on imported products. The government’s refusal to change its policy of state ownership of all land and insistence on land leases is said to prevent financing opportunities for farmers, and contribute to the suboptimal performance of the agricultural sector. Lack of water is considered a major reason for the recurrent famine in the country, but Smith finds that food insecurity in Ethiopia is exacerbated by misguided government policies, including prohibitions on the private ownership of land, excessive taxation of farmers, and the high cost of fertilizer sold by companies affiliated with the government.

Payne’s findings on the economic situation in Ethiopia merely acknowledge that the country remains poor country despite strong performance of the agricultural sector. His findings simply lack the depth and breadth of understanding of the complex economic issues facing the country.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN TO ASSIST ETHIOPIA ACHIEVE DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND OVERCOME ITS HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

To promote and preserve human rights in Ethiopia, Smith proposes various types of support and mechanisms: financial and technical assistance to independent human rights monitoring organizations working in Ethiopia, training to government officials and other leaders/activists on international human rights standards, readmission of the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDA) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to continue their work in developing democratic institutions and practices, and use of the office of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture to conduct an investigation of the conditions of prisoners of conscience in government custody.

Smith also provides for training assistance to strengthen local, regional, and national parliaments and governments, political parties and civil society groups in Ethiopia. Such assistance is expected to facilitate ongoing communication between political parties and the government and improve voter/party/candidate registration to ensure the credibility of the next election in Ethiopia. Assistance is also available to enhance the independence and competence of the Ethiopian judicial system, particularly to support institutionalization of procedural due process.

Smith’s amendment further provides additional technical assistance to the government in such areas as budgeting, taxation, debt management and banking. Assistance will be available to develop the Nile and Awash River resources and hydroelectric power and irrigations systems to prevent future famines. There is additional assistance in Smith’s bill to promote use of financing programs for joint United States and Ethiopian commercial ventures. The bill also aims to remove obstructions that have prevented Ethiopia from participating in such programs as the United States Millennium Challenge Account.

Payne seeks to promote human rights in Ethiopia by creating a Victims Support Network for Ethiopia, which will provide assistance to families of individuals killed in demonstrations and others injured by security personnel, as well as financial support for the legal defense of prisoners of conscience, human rights groups and others actively monitoring the status of detainees. Payne proposes a Judicial Watch Network to monitor court proceedings throughout Ethiopia, and insulate and strengthen the judiciary from undue government usurpations.

Payne aims to promote democracy and good governance by providing assistance to strengthen local, regional and national parliaments and government agencies in Ethiopia in the form of training provided by such organizations as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). These organizations are expected to undertake various tasks, including training of local groups in election monitoring and voter registration, and establish programs focused on reconciliation efforts between the government and groups outside the political process. Payne’s amendment provides economic development assistance by increasing funds to support the education sector, especially in rural areas of Ethiopia, and by providing technical and financial support for irrigation and improved management of the Nile River and other water resources.

Sanctions

Smith’s amendment requires suspension of all joint military activities between the Ethiopian and U.S. governments other than anti-terrorism and peace-keeping activities. Travel restrictions will be imposed on any Ethiopian official or member of the security forces involved in the shooting of demonstrators. Non-compliance with the legislation could also result in the denial of non-essential United States assistance (all aid except humanitarian assistance, emergency food programs, assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, fistula treatment, health service planning, child/motherhood programs, etc.).

Payne’s amendment provides for denial of visa to any government official or member of the security forces involved in the shooting of demonstrators, unless waived by the U.S. President.

Commentary

The Ethiopian Government is Unlikely to Agree to Smith’s Demand for the Immediate and Unconditional Release of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience and Free Operation of Human Rights Groups, or Accept Economic Development Measures Prescribed in the Bill.

In his Mark-up Statement, Smith asserted that “H.R. 4423 is not merely a punitive measure,” but seeks to use “technical assistance and other support” to change the human rights situation and contribute to Ethiopia’s economic and political development. The first order of business for Smith is the “immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and prisoner’s of conscience.” This is to be followed by reactivation of international and local human rights organizations to operate in the country, and deployment of the U.S. Special Rapporteur on Torture to undertake an investigation of the conditions of the prisoners of conscience. It is highly unlikely that the Ethiopian government will accept either of these proposals.

First, the government has painted itself into a corner by detaining opposition leaders on charges of genocide, treason, incitement and so on. These are patently bogus charges. Amnesty International has characterized the genocide charges “absurd.” If the government were to release the political prisoners now, it would be an admission that they were held arbitrarily and improperly in the first place. Unlawful detentions are a violation of international human rights standards, and the government is unlikely to admit such culpability.

Second, release of opposition leaders in the foreseeable future would be tantamount to handing the opposition a political and moral victory. The prisoners will emerge from detention triumphantly as heroes who valiantly faced persecution and sacrificed their liberties for the cause of democracy and human rights. They will gain considerable popularity and moral authority among the people, and inspire others to become even more defiant of the government. The government can not take such a risk.

Third, releasing the prisoners now would create the impression that the government is giving in or buckling to U.S. pressure. The government does not want to be seen as weak and irresolute. It wants to maintain the appearance of standing up to U.S. pressure, and even pretend that it does not want or need U.S. aid. The government can not appear to be an American lackey.

Fourth, the government will not agree to the free operation of domestic and international human rights groups with monitoring and civil society training missions. Such organizations will in effect function as watchdogs limiting the government’s scope of action in controlling opposition groups and parties, and in ensuring observance of Ethiopian law and constitutional mandates and compliance with international human rights conventions. The government can not withstand such scrutiny or accountability.

As to Smith’s proposals for economic freedom, particularly private ownership of land, they are unlikely to be accepted by the government. Presumably, the government’s objection to private ownership of land is based on fears of protracted litigation by pre-Derg land owners who may seek to reclaim their land or seek compensation, and/or because the government believes the peasants who currently have possessory use of the land will sell it and move to the city if they had full ownership rights, creating large numbers of displaced and landless peasants in the urban areas. Regardless of the economic merits of these contentions, the government is unlikely to allow private ownership of land because control of the land is its principal means of controlling the economic lifeline of the rural population, and its most effective strategy in disempowering this population and perpetuating its dependency on government handouts.

Changes required in the bill in other areas of government economic policy such as budgeting, taxation, debt management, bank supervision and corruption control are likely to be rejected as well because these issues require implementation of complex regulatory systems and structures. For instance, Smith’s amendment aims to provide policy assistance to address key economic obstacles arising from deficiencies in the system of taxation. This may involve overhaul of the Ethiopian tax system — which by some accounts is antiquated, irrational and afflicted by massive corruption — to achieve substantial efficiency and spur economic growth. It is unlikely that the government will be open to abolition of certain taxes and tariffs that are considered disincentives to foreign investments, or introduce substantial changes in the system of taxation, tariff and custom duties to bring about significant gains for the country’s economy.

Smith’s proposals for technical and economic assistance to enable Ethiopia to participate in the U. S. Millennium Challenge Account, develop the Nile and Awash River resources and undertake other hydroelectric power and irrigation projects to prevent future famines and joint commercial ventures all seem to make eminent good sense. It is unlikely that such massive national projects could be undertaken in the context of an “unfree” economy.

Why the Ethiopian Government Will Tacitly Endorse Payne’s Substitute Amendment

It appears Payne’s amendment has received the tacit approval, if not the active support, of the Ethiopian government. Some of the reasons for the government’s acceptance of Payne’s version seem obvious. Manifestly, Payne’s version “waters down” Smith’s robust provisions, which require significant policy changes and accountability on the part of the Ethiopian government. Under Payne’s version, the government is required to perform window dressing without undertaking any real changes in its policies or practices.

Payne’s amendment may be acceptable to the government because Payne does not really find any significant problems with Zenawi or the current regime, and in fact suggests that Zenawi and the EPDRF are the only viable option for the country today. Payne portrays the current regime as the only hope of political salvation and stability for the country. In the background of Payne’s findings on human rights violations and political repression in Ethiopia stands a shadowy specter of chaos and anarchy, which will consume Ethiopia should Zenawi and the current regime be removed from power. The government may find Payne’s apologia a valuable political and ideological tool.

Payne may not be alone in his messianic appraisal of Zenawi and his regime. British Prime Minister Blair handpicked Zenawi for his Commission for Africa because he believed Zenawi was one of the new breed of progressive leaders who will take Africa to new heights. It may be that Payne subscribes to the same view that in the meager field of real leaders and parties on the African continent, Zenawi’s government may be the only hope for Ethiopia. He is wrong.

Dislike and distrust of Ethiopian opposition groups may provide common ground for Payne and the Ethiopian government to oppose Smith’s bill. The fact that Payne’s amendment castigates and discredits opposition groups should be a welcome development for the government. Payne seems to have had unpleasant personal experiences with some Ethiopian groups in the United States over this bill. Judging from his comments at the last full subcommittee hearing, he seemed quite bitter and critical of the tactics used by these groups in advocating their support for Smith’s bill.

On the other hand, there is speculation that Payne’s own opposition to Smith’s bill may be based on ideological grounds. It is well known that the Congressional Black Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives has played and continues to play a critical role in the formulation of U.S. policy in Africa. Payne, as a former chair of the Caucus, may find it difficult to accept the idea of republicans championing the cause of freedom and human rights in a black African country. One hopes such speculation is groundless, for the cause of human rights and justice knows of no racial or ideological boundaries.

There is also other speculation that Payne has grown sympathetic and fond of the current regime because of his long term involvement with them, and wants to protect the regime from critical external scrutiny. Payne’s almost romantic fascination with the EPDRF and its efforts in dislodging the Derg regime, and his depiction of the regime as Ethiopia’s salvation should bring considerable delight to Zenawi and company.

Payne has not been vocal in explaining his version of H.R. 4423, nor has he articulated in detail his reasons for opposing Smith’s bill. For those who have had an opportunity to observe him at the hearings or other forums, he appears uncomfortable with the subject matter and overly defensive about his role.

In contrast, Smith has been forthright, passionate and candid in his views and comments on the situation in Ethiopia. His questions at the hearings were incisive, skillful and unrelenting, his observations keen and to the point, and his knowledge of the current situation in Ethiopia prodigious.

Postscript

There are many supporters of Smith’s version of H.R. 4423, particularly in the United States. I support Smith’s version because his bill upholds the principles of human rights and civil liberties, and private property ownership rights in Ethiopia. It is my professional creed that every person is entitled to due process of law regardless of the nature of the accusations or the gravity of the alleged crime. This means the accused is presumed to be absolutely innocent until proven guilty, that s/he has the right to counsel paid for by the government if s/he can not afford one, that s/he is entitled to a speedy and public trial and that no person shall be convicted unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. International human rights groups report that the prisoners of conscience in Zenawi’s jails are denied these and many other rights. I call upon Zenawi and his government to release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia immediately and unconditionally!!!

In the same vein, I believe that private property ownership is a natural right, and that no person shall be deprived of it without due process of law and just compensation. I reject wholly the socialistic principle that only the state can own land. The government must make changes to allow exclusive ownership of land in private hands.

I have defended these principles of civil liberties, human rights and property rights not only in American courtrooms but also in the court of public opinion. Smith’s bill deserves the support of all who believe in the preservation of civil liberties and human rights, and value the growth of democratic institutions, practices and culture in Ethiopia.

POST-POSTSCRIPT

This author remains perplexed by the singular fact that Representative Payne has not demanded and insisted upon the immediate and unconditional release of opposition leaders and other prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia. Payne knows that there is not a single government or international human rights organization that has recognized the legitimacy of the detention of opposition leaders in the aftermath of the May 15 elections.

Similarly, the stony silence of our brothers and sisters in the Congressional Black Caucus in the dialogue over H.R. 4423 and the detention of opposition leaders has, in the words of Martin Luther King, cast a “shadow of deep disappointment” upon a large segment of the Ethiopian community in the U.S. But we should be careful not to harbor resentment; rather we should reach out to the Caucus members and convert them to the cause of human rights and justice in Ethiopia with Dr. King’s message:

“Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The yearning for freedom eventually manifests itself, and that is what has happened to the American Negro. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom, and something without has reminded him that it can be gained. The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations, and he must release them. So let him march; let him make prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; let him go on freedom rides and try to understand why he must do so. If his repressed emotions are not released in nonviolent ways, they will seek expression through violence; this is not a threat but a fact of history.”

The yearning for freedom that African Americans experienced four decades ago is the same yearning that Ethiopians are experiencing today. Let’s share Dr. King’s message with our brothers and sisters on the Congressional Black Caucus in the spirit of solidarity for justice.

Whether H.R. 4423 will be enacted into law remains to be seen. It is abundantly clear, however, that regardless of the outcome of the bill, Ethiopians in the United States have gained a new consciousness and unflinching resolve to defend and sustain human rights and democracy in their homeland, and participate in its economic development. Those who continue to flagrantly abuse and trample upon the human rights of their citizens should heed the regretful observations of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto after the ill-fated attack on Pearl Harbor: “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”

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Al Mariam, Ph.D., J.D. (Esq.) is professor of political science and a defense attorney in California. Readers are invited to visit and share their comments at: https://almariamforthedefense.wordpress.com/
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[1]. Refers to the two versions of H.R. 4423 presented before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations [hereinafter “Subcommittee”]: “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to HR 4423 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey,” April 6, 2006; and “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to HR 4423 Offered by Mr. Payne of New Jersey,” April 6, 2006. Specific references to the two versions in the discussion will be captioned “Smith, sec.__”, and “Payne, sec__.”

[2]. “Legislative findings” in a bill often provide insight on the facts and circumstances supporting the proposed legislation and component provisions. Such findings also provide insight into the thought processes of lawmakers (technically referred to as ‘legislative intent’) and are used in judicial interpretation (technically referred to as “statutory construction”) of a bill once it is enacted into law.

[3]. See Mark-Up Statement for H.R. 4423, Rep. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, April 6, 2006. “Mark-Up” refers to the preparation of a bill in final form in a congressional committee before it is reported out for a vote by the legislative body. Smith’s “Mark-Up Statement” was provided before H.R. 4423 was reported out of his Subcommittee to the House Committee on International Relations.

The win-win nature of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy

By Messay Kebede

I would like to add my voice to the ongoing debate and exchange over the creation by some opposition parties of a coalition titled “Alliance for Freedom and Democracy.” The initiative has generated a chain of diverse, contradictory, and sometimes heated reactions, ranging from surprise to outright support and rejection. Unsurprisingly, TPLF supporters reject or downplay the alliance, arguing that it is unnatural. For them, the alliance cannot last because it can never overcome the incompatibility between the CUDP’s and OLF’s political agendas. Among the supporters, there are those who show some anxiety: they demand for more clarification as to the political program of the alliance; in particular, they would like to know whether the OLF has abandoned its secessionist goal. Those who fully support the agreement do so because they consider it as a significant advancement on the democratic road. It shows the choice of resolving conflicts, however serious they may be, through the democratic process rather than through imposition. Moreover, they see such an alliance as the best way to shorten Meles’s regime by effectively countering his divide and rule policy.

These are all valid reasons for supporting AFD, but they fall short of indicating the social dynamics that pressured the CUDP and the OLF into reaching such an agreement. When agreements occur between political parties that exhibit great disparity both in terms of ideology and political programs, we must suspect that they are involved in a strategic planning projecting some substantial gains, if not final victory. I maintain that the May election, its results, and the shortsighted crackdown of the Meles regime combined to bring about the new strategic thinking.

In the eyes of the CUDP, if there is one thing that the election results confirmed beyond any doubt is that the party is not only the most powerful force of opposition, but also a national force. The ethnic ideology and political structure of the Meles regime was shaken, not by other ethnic parties, but by a party transcending ethnic organizations and ethnic political agenda. This was nothing short of a renewal of Ethiopian nationalism, the very one that organizations, such as the EPRP, the MEISON, and even the Derg, had represented, it is true inconsistently, after the collapse of the imperial regime. The essential result of the May election is, therefore, the official consecration of a strong national party.

The emergence of a strong national party explains the alliance. So long as the CUDP enjoys the support of a large number of Ethiopians, ethnic parties, including the OLF, which claims to represent the largest ethnic group, need not be excluded. Instead, they should be co-opted into the democratic process, which is unlikely to result in any secessionist outcome, given the unbroken and unbreakable presence of Ethiopian nationalism, henceforth incarnated by a tangible organization. What the alliance expresses is the self-confidence of the CUDP, self-confidence that emerged from the May election.

The overwhelming victory of the CUDP in the Addis Ababa election denotes its national stature, obvious as it is that the composition of the capital city is a sample of Ethiopia’s class and ethnic diversities. Had the CUDP operated in conditions free of the restrictions of the TPLF in the rest of the country, an appreciable number of people would have given their support. The strength of the CUDP came from its economic agenda, which set off nothing less than an alliance between various classes, all equally frustrated by the ethnic oligarchy controlling power and wealth in Ethiopia.

For its part, the OLF agreed to form the alliance because of the understanding that a national force has indeed emerged. To ignore the CUDP would be tantamount to saying that nothing new has happened in Ethiopia. Something great did happen: for the first time, a government was defeated through an electoral process, an event that invited political parties to serious revisions under pain of becoming irrelevant. Not to take account of the outcomes offered no other alternative than the endorsement of the disruption of the democratic process. One such outcome is the CUDP. And the more the TPLF attacked and imprisoned CUDP leaders, the more the party appeared as the true opposition to an increasing number of Ethiopians, including the Oromo. The crackdown only succeeds in expanding the identification of Ethiopians with the CUDP.

Let us go further. The OLF knows that by itself it will never threaten the TPLF regime. The need for alliance is flagrant; so is the fact that the CUDP is the only force that can seriously challenge the TPLF. Herein lies the puzzle. Given the CUDP’s political agenda, people rightly wonder whether the alliance means that the OLF has given up its main goal. If yes, the sacrifice does not seem worthwhile, since the OLF could have obtained a similar arrangement with the TPLP. That is why many Ethiopians suspect that the OLF is not sincere, that the agreement is simply a tactic to get rid of the TPLF so as to realize its secessionist goal.

Again, these interrogations fail to take into account the watershed created by the May election. Because the CUDP represents a large and inclusive movement, it alone is able to play the democratic game, thanks to which the OLF thinks of emerging as a major force. To the extent that the TPLF represents the sectarian interests of a few ethnicized cliques, it cannot play by democratic rules, all the more so now that the May election definitively took away from its leaders the illusion that most peasants and suppressed ethnic groups support their system. In other words, for the first time, the OLF saw the possibility of a genuine democratic process in Ethiopia. With the claim to represent the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the OLF could no longer push aside this unique opportunity. The opportunity does not necessarily mean secession; what it does mean is a concrete possibility for the Oromo to finally gain the real place they deserve in Ethiopia.

For both of them, then, alliance appeared as a win-win solution. If my analysis is correct, that is, if both the CUDP and the OLF agreed because of their respective confidence in the democratic process, then misgivings about the alliance should wither away in favor of support. As I have already indicated in various articles, behind the ethnicization of politics in Ethiopia there is nothing but elite conflicts. A perfect illustration of this is the paradox of the ethnicization of Tigrean educated elite. I say “paradox” because Tigray, the birth place of the Kibre Negast, is the source of Ethiopian nationalism.

For the purpose of dismantling the Showan hegemony and mobilizing popular support, a sector of the Tigrean educated elite baptized Tigray a nation even though no records exist that even remotely allude to a time when Tigray existed outside Ethiopia. Once the defeat of the Derg achieved, we saw the TPLF leadership easing itself into the position of new ruling elite. To give a lasting guarantee to their rule, the new rulers designed and applied the system of ethnic federalism. The system had one defect, but a colossal one: it could assure the persistence of the TPLF rule only by going against democracy, especially by holding down the two largest ethnic groups, namely, the Oromo and the Amhara.

This exclusion was reason enough for both ethnic groups to come together earlier, but mutual suspicion and, especially, the lack of democratic institutions did not create a situation where they could say that an alliance is worth trying. It is imperative to understand that this alliance cannot hurt in any way the Tigrean people without losing its democratic essence. On the other hand, as a minority group, the best way for the Tigrean people to protect their legitimate rights is to fully participate in the democratic process, and they cannot do so unless they champion, once more, Ethiopian nationalism. Otherwise, the attempt to have a special status leads nowhere but to supporting directly Meles’s rhetoric of accusing the CUDP of anti-Tigrean feelings, nay, of genocide.

Once this demonizing stand is adopted, I see no other way out than ethnic confrontations, which will benefit no one, certainly not the Tigrean elite. The fact that Meles’s repressive method seems to prevail should not blind us to the fact that the regime can survive only by developing a system of government akin to the defunct apartheid regime in South Africa. Participation in this malefic design will kill Tigray as we know and admire it. By the way, I don’t exclude the possibility of nationalist and farsighted Tigreans finally coming together and doing what is necessary to resume the interrupted democratic process.

The way out is clear enough: understand ethnicity for what it is, namely, not so much incompatibility between peoples as expression of elite conflicts, and you will see that democracy is its most elegant and final solution. The struggle for and the establishment of a genuine system of power-sharing should announce the decline of ethnicization. Such a decline means the emergence of a win-win situation for everybody, for the Oromo, the Amhara, the Tigreans, the Somali, etc. Only under the protection of unity or Ethiopian nationalism does diversity lend itself to democratic treatment.

The essense of AFD

By Olaana Abboma

AFD (Alliance for Freedom and Democracy) arrived with a bang and took almost everyone by surprise. Its birth had already generated strong reaction among all the stakeholders. Several articles and commentaries were written in this short period of time; mostly pro, a few against. Its arrival is welcomed by the majority as a beacon of hope, but a few others dismissed it as an unworkable venture; for some this was capitulation for the OLF, for others it was surrender for the CUDP. Some thought it will bring overnight the demise of EPRDF, and others feared it as an alliance against the Tigrai. This was an interesting week not short of opinions.

This Alliance is misunderstood by some quarters from its very outset. In a country accustomed to politics of zero-sum game this is not surprising. The essence of AFD and the revolutionary concept underlying it need to be captured and expounded, and the zero-sum fallacy underlying some of the criticisms should be exposed. It’s only if we understand the rationale for its creation that we can appreciate its implication and criticize its shortcomings. From what I have seen AFD is both praised and denigrated for the wrong reasons.

At the beginning I will in particular address Oromo groups, both those who support and oppose the formation of AFD. The Oromo people’s struggle has come a long way. Today, even if controlled by the TPLF, we have Oromia as a politico-administrative reality. Today, the brutal repression aside, Oromia’s children learn in their own language and more or less exercise their culture. Today, we have OLF, an organization that has, not only acquired a great deal of experience, but also earned a great respect among our people as well as beyond. Compared to the past, our people’s struggle has reached such a stage that even the ruling group could rule us only by using our own people. Given where we were about 30 years ago, this is one stage forward, but now we have to move beyond this. The TPLF, with all its state machinery, the army, the security and the bureaucracy, cannot rule Oromia without OPDO, and cannot undo Oromia without inviting a great danger to itself. Our new rulers have become in some curious ways the prisoners of our potential might; they are not free to act the way they want to. In short, it could be safely said that, if not impossible, it is very difficult for any force to dismantle Oromia. Oromia is today a reality that exists, and it is here to stay.

Two interdependent deductions could be made from this; the first from the Oromo side and the second from the angle of non Oromo political forces. Even, as some predict, if AFD resulted in exclusively bringing CUDP to power (mind you this is a big if and the chance of that happening is very minimal), would this be an end of Oromia? To this lingering question in the mind of many Oromos in Diaspora, my answer is, “absolutely not!” Even assuming for a moment that CUDP will try to do this, there is no way that this will be an easy ride for CUDP. To conclude that CUDP could easily dismantle Oromia, we have to assume that our people will not fiercely resist this. For me this assumption is preposterous. In fact, rather than fighting to achieve something new, people fight more fiercely when you try to take away from them what they already have. The Oromo are “given” some rights on paper and they want nothing short of making the promise for self-government real. Thus, the fear that the AFD will empower the CUDP, which will in turn lead to dismantlement of Oromia, is unfounded or highly exaggerated.

The existence of Oromia as a politico-administrative unit the last 14 years, and the support it has generated among the Oromo population has also implication on the other non Oromo political protagonists in Ethiopia. If democratic rule follows the fall of TPLF, it means that such major undertaking as dismantling the existing structure should be done democratically. Given the commitment that the Oromo people have for Oromia, I fail to see how this could be achieved democratically without the blessing of Oromos. If the Oromos agree to this in a democratic way, so be it. But the basic point is this: Any force or organization that has any ambition of becoming a national organization will not attempt to do this for the simple reason that it would not want to alienate Oromos. Democratic power basically means vote, and the Oromos have a lot of it that any organization would like to court; and that is the beauty of democracy. Of course, the question that follows is, “what if these forces want to achieve this undemocratically, i.e., by way of force or trickery?” This would be inviting a civil war in Ethiopia. After the fall of TPLF not many would want to go there. I believe that the commitment of our people and the strength of our political organization would be a great disincentive from indulging in this. And even if there are some foolhardy who would attempt to achieve this, given where we are today, they will not be successful. Thus, notwithstanding the declaration of this intention by some at this stage, no one who would come to power would attempt to implement this unless they are insane.

The above is based on the worst case scenario, and does not at all imply that CUDP will try to dismantle Oromia unilaterally. I can understand that not to alienate some of their supporters the leadership might not want to come out and clearly state that they are not against the existing structure. But the reasonable amongst them do recognize, even if they may not like it, that this is something here to stay. They have come into terms with it as an existing reality. This is one reason why the CUD platform left this to the decision of the people instead of taking a stand on it. To summarize, the two deductions are: The Oromo people would strongly resist any effort to dismantle Oromia as a politico-administrative entity, and the knowledge that the Oromo people would strongly resist dismemberment will restrain other forces from attempting this (cost factor).

Because of the above, there is no need to dwell on the fear of Oromia’s demise with the very remote possibility of CUDP’s coming to power alone. The danger to the existence of Oromia is not as serious as some want us to believe. The TPLF tries to paralyze the initiative by exaggerating the danger coming from Amharas, and we should not fall prey to it. This brings me to the second point of criticism of the AFD from Oromo angle. I have heard comments along the following line: “TPLF’s program is closer to OLF, therefore, OLF should have formed alliance with TPLF rather than with CUDP,” or something to that effect. I totally reject this line of thinking because unwittingly it is predicated on the assumption that we are destined to choose between TPLF and CUDP. The Oromo is no longer a force forced to choose between the two but a real force on its own merit. Besides, it is only when you vote that the question of whose program is close to you is of paramount importance, you look at the program of a party and choose the one that is close to your belief. When you are the contender for power it is not in all situations the cardinal point. The question for us today should not be whether it is TPLF or CUDP that is better to rule us. The question should rather be, “what situation will bring us closer to be masters of our own affairs?”, or “what situation will bring us closer to establishing a just, representative and democratic society?” I say, as long as the TPLF is in power, the possibility of resolving our issue, as well as the question of forming a democratic polity is out of question. TPLF is maintained in power by dividing the people in Ethiopia. The essence of its existence is rooted in divide and rule. This is so, not merely because Meles Zenawi is a bad person, but simply because the constituency of Tigrai cannot be the basis for democracy–majority rule. If the Oromos and Amahras are not in each other’s throat, then Meles will not be in power, as simple as that. Besides, there is nothing more that the Oromo people need from TPLF, short of the TPLF stepping down, which the TPLF would never accept; therefore, there is no rationale for contemplating an alliance with Meles. TPLF’s control of power is the major stumbling block to the resolution of our question through dialogue and negotiation with others. In the journey to seek a solution, TPLF is not a member of the search team, but a spoiler that is there only to sabotage the search. Thus, the first objective, at this juncture, should be to force the TPLF out of office. And the formation of AFD is essential to achieve this. However, the creation of alliance with CUDP should not be supported simply because it is essential to force the TPLF from power, but also because it presents us with an opportunity to seek solutions to our problems together for the first time in our tortuous history. Given its constituency, its leadership and the common repression we suffered in the hands of TPLF, CUDP is a better partner to negotiate with.

This brings me to my third and last point. Only the belief and practice in democratic principles could bring together organizations as divergent as the OLF and CUDP together. It is essential for these organizations to be democratic for them to stand together. To be democratic essentially means accepting the supremacy of the people. It means not imposing your will on others by force. It means agreeing to disagree. It means resolving contradictions through dialogue and peaceful ways. It means respecting each other and each others views, it means disagreeing without being disagreeable. This means, as long as they are ready to bring their program to the vote of the people for decision, OLF and CUDP do not have to have the same program in order to form an alliance. Semantics aside, this is only an alliance; there is no objective to have the same political program. The only substantive agreement going beyond the ousting of TPLF is about the formation of a transition government that will lead to a democratic society. OLF does not have to change, and did not change its program and vision and CUDP does not have to do the same in order to achieve that. Agreeing to create AFD means, “let us create a democratic society where we can compete freely,” and does not mean let us merge our organizations. At the core of the formation of AFD is the dawn of democratic society—as their statement says “a just, representative and democratic order”. One has to be totally democratic to accept this and even to understand it, and hence the confusion and hullabaloo in some sectors.

There are those who claim that OLF is using others as a vehicle to come to power. This is a concern raised by those who claim that they are for “unity” and sadly from quarters that traditionally supported “people’s rights”. One thing that needs to be clear is that it is inevitable for the Oromo to assume a central role in a free and democratic Ethiopia. On the other hand, an Ethiopia that has fully embraced the aspirations of the Oromo and addressed their grievances would be a powerful Ethiopia, a peaceful Ethiopia. The fact that OLF played a central role in the formation of AFD should be commended and encouraged and not feared and discouraged. This for the first time brings the Oromo people to the central stage in Ethiopian politics and that is what makes AFD historical. In the long-term, we will not be talking about which group is the majority and which one is not. The majority will be based on ideas. That is the beauty of a free and democratic society.

The idea that empowering the OLF and the Oromo is tantamount to risking the dismemberment of Ethiopia is totally preposterous. This comes from those who still think in the old paradigm of win-lose and domination. The future the AFD promises is not one of domination. On the other hand, as Fekade Shewakena aptly suggested, “What is wrong with representatives of the Oromo people manipulating the rest of us at least once in history,” given “how many times in our history the Oromo people have been manipulated.” The fear of the Oromo is a presupposition that is based on the belief that the contradiction between Oromos interest and the Amharas is irreconcilable. If Ethiopia is free and democratic, the Oromo and others have no incentive to even consider breaking away as an option. The gain for the Oromos does not necessarily mean loss for the Amahras and vice versa, there is no reason why we cannot create a win-win situation for all. If this venture becomes successful it will change politics as we know it in this part of the world. Ethiopia cannot be saved by excluding Oromos and their organizations, but by making the Oromo movement to play a central role. The more democratic Ethiopia become by including the aspiration of the Oromo, the more difficult it will become to separate Oromia from Ethiopia. With negotiation, dialogue and compromise there is no contradictions that we cannot resolve or mitigate. There are even worse contradictions in history that were peacefully resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. This is what underlies the formation of AFD, and what make it revolutionary in our context. This is a new paradigm, a paradigm based on the simple thesis that conflict is not a natural and inevitable law of nature, that conflicts could be overcome, people could rise above their differences, however protracted and deep-rooted. It is based on the belief that the problems in Ethiopia are complicated and even if we agree amongst ourselves on many of the fundamental issues, the problems we will be facing are still enormous. It is based on the premise that there is hope in freedom and democracy. The promise of freedom and democracy is what AFD offers—the hope that we can someday leave our terrible past behind us and concentrate on leading our lives freed from the violence, fear and repression that we are accustomed to. It is a result of the conclusion that domination, subjugation and exploitation of each other have condemned us all into misery, poverty, tyranny and underdevelopment. For those who think that this is a pact against the Tigrai people, AFD has extended its offer to the TPLF to change its ways and join the common effort. Even if the TPLF declines this offer and remains outside, it should be clear that this Alliance is not targeted against the Tigrai people. AFD is an all inclusive undertaking. Lasting solution in Ethiopia cannot be found by excluding the Tigrai people who have always played important role in the past.

AFD is an idea whose time has come. It is still a beginning but a beginning towards a journey into a new future, a future that is radically different from our past, a future where we can all win together, a future where the specter of the zero-sum game is once and for all retired from Ethiopian politics, a future where politics would not be our single most pressing preoccupation, a future where we can also dedicate part of our lives to more important things like love, literature, art, travel, culture and what not. AFD is a dream, a positive dream, a glimpse of the great things we could do together if we have the courage to redefine what is meant by “us” and “them”. Past systems might have unjustly benefited elites from only certain sectors of the society while the majority suffered. In a large sense, we have all been suffering, mostly together, for generations; for heavens sake, can we not think of a future where we can all thrive and prosper together, a future where the menace of unending animosity and conflict would give way to just peace and harmony? I am fully cognizant of the challenge, but fully believe we can! Ni danda’ama. Yichaalaal!