The following are Part 1 to 6 of the Ethiopian Review and eppfOnline.org interview with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. The translation of the interview to Amharic will be posted as soon as it is ready.

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

By Messay Kebede

Whether opposition parties opt for armed struggle or peaceful methods in their attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Ethiopia, they must all come up with a vision and a political solution that can heal decades of ingrained conflicts and reconstitute national unity. Since the ethnic conflict is by far the most divisive and pernicious issue of present day Ethiopia, the endeavor both to defeat the regime and establish a post-TPLF political system presupposes an approach dealing with ethnicity. It is illusory to assume that ethnicity will simply go away if the TPLF is defeated. What follows is an attempt to show how a correct theory of ethnicity and lessons from the past history of Ethiopia can help us frame a political arrangement that favors the establishment of peace and democratic governance in our country.

Theory of Ethnicity

For one school of thought called primordialism, ethnicity is about self-determination; it is a primordial and emotional attachment to fixed social characteristics, such as blood ties, race, language, region, and custom. Such an attachment naturally longs for political sovereignty as a necessary means to protect and develop the treasured characteristics. The best way to resolve ethnic conflicts, so primordialists conclude, is to allow peoples the right to live in the state of their choice, even by seceding from existing states.

Opposed to this line of thinking is the school of instrumentalism, which argues that the solution of redrawing political borders on the basis of self-determination often advances neither democracy nor achieves the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts (India-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, the former Yugoslavia, etc). It maintains that ethnic conflict is less about attachment to primary identity and more about competition for the control of state power. Ethnicity is how elites vying for state power mobilize people in the name of ethnic identity. Since ethnic conflict is primarily about politics rather than about culture, a political arrangement allowing decentralization and power-sharing can promote a peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Instrumentalism comes up against a major objection, which is that it views ethnicity as a product of elite manipulation. Such an understanding is unable to account for the emotional mood and violent methods that are often characteristic of ethnic conflicts. It is difficult to see why the masses follow with great fervor the discourse of elites unless it awakens their own deep affective longings.

In an attempt to correct instrumentalism, the school known as constructivism underlines that, rather than reviving already existing primary attachments, the ethnic discourse invents new identities. It argues that mistreatments and the need of liberation drive marginalized elites to imagine communities embellished with thrilling characteristics, thereby successfully mobilizing the people with whom they identify. The promise of deliverance activates affective components that impart an emotional dimension to what is but an invented identity.

Sustained reflections on Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts lead me to believe that the constructivist correction of instrumentalism does not fully answer the question of knowing why the invented discourse of elites moves the masses to the point of violent confrontations. True, the element of imagination is liable to arouse emotional forces, but there is also no denying that the ethnic discourse works with past materials associated with common descent and cultural legacy to which people are naturally attached. What is achieved is thus the creation of ascriptive rights with exclusionary intent, which largely involve sentiments derived from nature rather than merely from human imaginative capacity. I also question the idea that constructivism constitutes a distinct school, all the more so as it loses much of its explanatory force if a great dose of instrumentalism does not support it.

Instead of setting apart, I propose to fuse instrumentalism with constructivism if only because such an attempt seems to recover whatever is valid in primordialism. Indeed, what is the most effective way of promoting interests if not through the mobilization of affective and cultural forces, especially when said interests are challenged or denied? Accordingly, ethnic mobilizations are better understood if cultural construction is itself an instrument whose purpose is to optimize a political claim. Such an approach retains the powerful role of culture without, however, losing sight of the material component of ethnicity. While I admit that the emotional force of ethnicity cannot be explained without appealing to primordial impulses, I argue that the impulses do not provide the inspiration; rather, they are used to maximize definite interests.

This approach insists that ethnicization is more than a mere protest against mistreatment. Indeed, had ethnicity been about the equal recognition of rights, mobilization around individual rights, as prescribed by liberal democracy, would have been the appropriate response. On the other hand, if the fight is over the control of the state, then the strategy is to mobilize group rights so as to use ascriptive characteristics (common descent, language, culture, etc.) to exclude political rivals as aliens. The use of ethnic criteria thus maps out constituencies that function as a reserved power base for vying elites.

Identity politics is all the more mobilizing when ruling elites are made responsible for economic plights of ordinary people. What is common in ethnic discourses is the framing of culprits with the consequence that it unleashes anger. The revival of traditional identities, in addition to portraying elites as saviors of their community, thereby upgrading their authority, frames social relations in terms of culprits and victims. Just as the Marxist concept of class exploitation politicized poverty, so too the ethnic discourse politicizes identities by portraying the possession of some characteristics (language, descent, religious beliefs) as reasons for mistreatment. In so doing, it stirs up anger that it directs against those who hold power.

On top of deriving the emotional component from the construction of imagined communities, my approach thus adds the important factor of the vilification of ruling elites, which often results in the them/us dichotomy with high normative overtones. The use of moral qualifications turns the confrontation between ethnic groups into a struggle between the good and the bad, the virtuous and the vicious. This moral classification is then used to justify the resort to violent means.

To understand the wide impact of ethnic discourse, one must go beyond the negative role of inciting anger by adding its restorative function. Discriminatory treatment as a result of the hegemony of one ethnic group has a deep impact on the self-representation of dominated or marginalized groups, since it activates feelings associated with humiliation. This explains why ethnicity is so violent when compared to class conflict, which is mostly about justice and fair distribution, and not about human pride. Not only does the ethnic construction highlight humiliation, but it also proposes a curative solution in the form of self-determination or self-rule. While the solution supports the political ambition of elite groups, it is also largely accepted as a necessary step toward the removal of humiliation. According to the logic of ethnicization, pride is restored only when governments by non-kindred people, however democratic they may claim to be, are replaced by governments of kindred-people.

The significance of my hypothesis transpires as soon as one asks what specific ideas it contributes to the paramount issue of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The importance of having the correct approach is that it enables us to find relevant solutions: if we know what causes ethnic conflicts, then we can devise institutional mechanisms that remove the causes and, therefore, ease ethnic tensions.

The primordialist approach has no other option than the secessionist solution, since it reduces ethnic conflicts to cultural incompatibilities. The instrumentalist approach has the merit of deriving ethnic conflicts from elite rivalries for the ownership of the state. In agreement with instrumentalism, my approach suggests that the main solution to ethnic conflicts is to open up the power game by devising institutions that decentralize power, as in the case of federal arrangement with large autonomy. Nevertheless, my analysis of the cultural dimension as a maximizing factor argues that autonomy should go to the extent of allowing the implementation of group rights and self-rule. I thus take into consideration the powerful emotional forces unleashed by the ethnic discourse. Unless these forces are appeased, a mere decentralization will not be enough.

In addition, my view, which can be termed “maximism,” suggests the possibility of displacement (in the Freudian sense of the word). One way of reducing tensions would thus be to shift the emotional forces to trans-ethnic or multiethnic institutions and symbols. My assumption is that multiethnic institutions can supersede ethnic exclusiveness if access to higher levels of national government represents, not the surrender of ethnic identity, but its graduation from local to national statures. Such institutions together with the celebration of diversity will help cultural conversion to multiethnicism as an imagined community.

Ethnicization of Ethiopia

My thesis, namely, ethnicity as a maximizing factor in elites’ struggle for the control of power, finds a perfect confirmation in both the origin of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and Ethiopia’s experiment with ethnic federalism. A strong argument for this would be the fact that the Ethiopian system, besides being imposed, is deliberately established to encourage ethnicization. Whereas other countries, such as Nigeria, India, etc., used federalism as a devise to dilute ethnicity so as to safeguard national unity, all the practices and constitutional provisions in Ethiopia tend to strengthen ethnic identity to the detriment of national integration.

The explanation springs to mind: both to mobilize the Tigrean people so as to overthrow the dominance of the Amhara elite and to establish a federal system that favors it, the TPLF had to fracture Ethiopia along ethnic lines, thereby speaking of the country as an ensemble of nations and nationalities. So fractured, the political struggle becomes focused on self-rule and the control of regional states, leaving the federal government to the TPLF. Such a system develops local elite groups that have common interests with the ruling power without, however, making them competitors.

Scholars who study the Ethiopian case marvel about the radical nature of ethnic federalism, but they also observe shortcomings. They thus underline a disparity between theory and practice, especially when it comes to the autonomy of ethnic regions. This disparity proves that the wrong understanding of ethnicity actually inspires those who speak of shortcomings. A consistent and comprehensive view of the discrepancy is achieved only when it is admitted that ethnicity is less about democracy than it is about the control of state by elite groups.

The primordialist position is completely unable to explain the disparity between practice and theory. If primordial sentiments exclusively motivate ethnicity, then the victory of the TPLF should have led to the secession of Tigray or the implementation of a real system of decentralization and self-rule. What is more, the TPLF wholeheartedly supported the Eritrean independence on the basis of primordialist criteria, but refuses to recognize the claim of secessionist movements in the regions of Oromia and Somalia. These apparent contradictions vanish if it is shown that calculations of interests condition the TPLF’s decisions.

The involvement of interests becomes manifest when we remark that, though the Ethiopian system encourages ethnicization, it remains very centralized. The centralization is realized through a party system, the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), which is a coalition of ethnic parties in which the TPLF is the dominant partner. Thanks to the democratic centralism governing the coalition, the TPLF thus controls the whole federal system and intervenes extensively in the administration of regional and sub-regional governments. What comes to mind is the Soviet model of federalism based on the tight control of the communist party.

What this means is that regional autonomy is not how a region is allowed to decide and control its affairs; rather, the system creates client parties that allow the center to maintain its controls through dependent local elites. That is why, as I wrote in a previously published article titled “The Underside of the Eritrean Issue,” it is perfectly sound to state that the TPLF politely but firmly expelled Eritrea from Ethiopia because it understood that the EPLF will never agree to become a dependent partner. The system and the way it works make sense only if we assume that it is purposely designed to maintain the hegemony of an elite group claiming to defend the interests of a minority ethnic group.

The presence of interests in ethnic claims is also attested by the fact that there is no shortage of elite-groups seeking to become clients. To the imposition of ethnicity as a primary criterion of federal arrangement, local elites responded by creating political movements that endorsed the criterion. So that, ethnic identities that used to be weak are restructured as primary for the simple reason that the TPLF-dominated federal government rewards ethnicization.

Be it noted that instrumentalism cannot explain the ethnicization of Tigray without interpreting ethnicity as an imaginative reinvention of identity. Though Tigray has been part of Ethiopia (Abyssinia) for at least 3000 years and Tigreans and Amhara–– the dominant ethnic group during Haile Selassie’s long reign–– share the same culture and political system, the TPLF constructed Tigray as a nation by emphasizing language difference. While this reinvention supports constructivism, a complete view is achieved only if it is inserted into my interpretation of identity politics as a maximizing factor.

The use of ethnic criteria to reinforce a political goal is what explains the deep contradiction of ethnic movements in Ethiopia. Whether we take the Eritrean, Oromo, Tigrean, or other ethnic movements, all trace their emergence back to the imperial regime, which they defined as the imposition of Amhara culture and interests in a tightly centralized political system. The democratic solution would have been decentralization together with the recognition of Ethiopia as a multiethnic country. Ethnic movements did not opt for such a solution; instead, they brandished self-rule and group rights. The definition of ethnic groups as nations and nationalities means that they revert back to the nation-state model that they had previously rejected in the name of multiethnicism. Only the goal of capturing state power by amplifying cultural incompatibilities can explain the reversal.
The factor of maximization becomes fully manifest when we notice the rise of dissident ethnic parties accusing the TPLF of not being consistent. Such movements are often secessionist and they become so by stretching cultural disparity, that is, by adopting an even more primordialist language. Dissident ethnic parties cannot hope to compete successfully against client elites working with the TPLF unless they change identity into a primordial commitment overriding everything. In particular, the works of intellectuals of Oromo origin clearly show how they combine vilification and utopia to create the “Oromo” nation. The vilification inherent in the thesis of Abyssinia’s colonization of Oromia and the myth of democratic Oromia before the colonization both testify to the invention of Oromia as an imagined community.

From Theory to Practice

Since democratic rules guaranteeing the proper application of federalism are not followed in Ethiopia, ethnic federalism, as it is now implemented, only succeeds in radicalizing and multiplying dissident ethnic groups. As a result, there is a growing danger of disintegration that will lead to violent confrontations, not only inside Ethiopia, but also in the entire Horn of Africa, unless a reverse process toward reintegration is put in place. In other words, what puts the country in danger is less ethnicity than the lack of democratic governance, itself originating from an eccentric group’s shortsighted and vain goal of preserving indefinitely the control of power.

The theory of maximization and its attendant, namely, the possibility of displacement, suggest a way out through the creation of national symbols and institutions encouraging ethnic cooperation. In other words, the crystallization of ethnic identity could be diluted if national offices are made dependent on moderation. The lure of higher political rewards through moderation could thus produce a displacement mitigating the exclusionary practice of identity politics.

This means, of course, that the main solution to ethnic conflicts is the democratization of the state through decentralization and large local autonomy. However, I emphasize that the autonomy must go to the extent of allowing the implementation of group rights and self-rule, the only way by which the affective element can be dealt with. Since in denouncing alien rule, the ethnic discourse has awakened the feeling of humiliation, only the provision of a local or regional administration controlled by culturally kindred elites can satisfy both the masses and the competing elites.

My thesis also predicts that, as soon as grudge is removed through the granting of self-rule, ethnic groups will lose their original compactness and give way to diversity and the appearance of sub-group elites vying for the control of local power. In due course, this will reintroduce issues of individual rights that will be useful both to democratize the local community and to rebuild the national unity.

My solution is then to open up the power game in conjunction with the creation of institutional mechanisms that work toward unity. The tendency to unity should grow from the political dispersion, that is, from the implementation of group rights, itself leading to intra-ethnic rivalries. From this diffused power game must rise national ambition forcing elite groups to moderate their views if they want to extend their power and influence beyond their ethnic groups. Moderation as a prerequisite to national leadership can also be used to prevail over local rivals.

Appropriate institutional mechanisms can further fortify the appeal of moderation. So that, the peaceful and lasting solution to ethnic conflicts seems to be the device of a political system in which centripetal forces (national institutions and symbols) counter centrifugal forces (ethnicity). While federalism with large autonomy and self-rule should satisfy ethnicity, political institutions making national positions dependent on moderation should encourage unity. As much as I support the political recognition of ethnicity, unlike primordialism, I think that the reconstruction of unity is also necessary for a lasting peace.

One way of balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces is the creation of a presidential figure with large political and symbolic meanings. If the election of the president depends on majority vote of the people, in addition to encouraging the expression of individual rights in conjunction with group rights, candidates for the presidential office will have to become attractive to voters outside their ethnic groups. This arrangement encourages moderation, but also creates national figures.

History Lessons

My theory of ethnic management finds a validating argument in the proposal that it is but a modernized version of the political system of traditional Ethiopia. Seeing the long duration of the political system, which even resisted repeated colonial assaults, it is sound to contend that the provision of an open power game based on the interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces was the secret of the long survival of Ethiopia (for detailed explanation of the traditional system, see my book, Survival and Modernization).

Indeed, while the nobility with often ethnic definitions controlled regional power, the imperial throne and the Orthodox Church represented centripetal forces. Another crucial centripetal force was the active role of the national intelligentsia (debtera), which was the product of a common system of education whose pillars were use of the Geez language, the centering of Ethiopia, and the propagation of its divine mission (the Kibre Negast).The system defined the emperor as king of kings: the recognition of regional leaders as kings meant nothing less than the acceptance of large autonomy and self-rule. That Tigray preserved its language and ruling elites for centuries even though the Amhara were numerically superior and often in control of the imperial throne proves how extensive was the autonomy that regions enjoyed.

What is more, regional lords could freely compete for the imperial throne, since the system did not institute any exclusive definition of the heir to the throne, except for the vague and inclusive concept of Solomonic descent. Decentralization and competition for the imperial throne encouraged intra-ethnic competitions resulting in the emergence of rival sub-regions in Amhara and Tigray. These conditions never allowed the crystallization of ethnic identity; instead, they enabled the emperor to emerge as a divine-elected protector of Orthodox Christianity and unifier of a multiethnic community. In other words, political dispersion or regional autonomy was coined as a source of rivalry setting the stage for the intervention of God’s express choice of the emperor. Often based on military prowess, God’s choice became formal the moment the Church anointed the elect.

The working principle required not only the respect of large local autonomy with self-rule, but also that the various regions of Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, Shoa, and Tigray had comparable powers. Witness: when the central system collapsed during the Era of the Princes, no one was really able to prevail until the rise of Tewodros, who also failed partially. Menelik was able to triumph because the southern expansion of Showa created an imbalance that favored the Shown nobility. The loss of balance changed the political game: the political dispersion necessary to set God’s choice in motion was replaced by entitlement derived from the Shoan hegemony.

The unrivalled power of Show cleared the way for the establishment of Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule and his hereditary monarchy. In the name of modern nation-building, Haile Selassie put an end to the decentered power game through a tight political centralization and Amharization that naturally favored the Amhara nobility. Its outcome was the slow but steady exasperation of ethnic conflicts through the instigation of elites from marginalized ethnic groups.

The traditional system teaches us that wisdom lies in creating regional units that are balanced, but also open to intra-group competitions. The latter together with centripetal institutions and symbols prevent the crystallization of ethnic identity to the benefit of multiethnicism. The shift results from the open power game that defines national positions as graduations of ethnic identities to trans-ethnic representations.

The present policy of the TPLF prevents the emergence of national ambitions and intra-ethnic group competitions by the method of democratic centralism, which protects client parties from competition. Moreover, the principle of balanced power does not command the establishment of federal units. In particular, the two big regions of Amhara and Oromia create a serious imbalance endangering national unity. Wisdom advises the fracturing of these two regions into smaller units as a necessary condition of promoting ethnic cooperation.

What we learn from the traditional system is thus the recapture of the culture tolerating diversity, which culture was sidelined by the uprooting imitation of Europe’s model of the nation-state. The expression “Amhara or Tigrean hegemony” would be incomprehensible to the people of traditional Ethiopia who understood ethnicity in terms of rivalry, and not as a system of hegemonic government. The other important lesson is the need to couple ethnicity with centripetal institutions and visions, whose outcome is the promotion of multiethnicism. A strong presidential figure who would be elected on the basis of majority vote among all ethnic groups would be to the modern system what the emperor was to the traditional polity.

(Dr Messay Kebede can be reached at [email protected])

By Alemayehu G. Mariam

Our (Home) land on Fire sale

A while back, the capo di tutti capi (the “boss of bosses”) of the dictatorship in Ethiopia rebuked Congressman Donald Payne for pushing H.R. 2003 (“Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act”). He quipped with his signature sarcasm, “Ethiopia, this government and this country, are incapable, unwilling and unable to be run like some kind of banana republic from Capitol Hill or anywhere else.” That is not exactly true today. The evidence shows that “Ethiopia and this government” are “capable, willing and able to be run like some barley republic from Jeddah or any of the other Gulf states.” It has been widely reported that Saudi and other Gulf “investors” have spent over two hundred million U.S. dollars to buy (“lease”) fertile Ethiopian farmland free of local taxes and other requirements to supply themselves with a cornucopia of agricultural commodities which, oddly enough, they could purchase on the world market at competitive prices. It seems the desert sand has trumped the fertile land in the barley republic.

There are many bewildering things about this sordid multimillion dollar land deal. First, as the dictators are orchestrating a fire sale of chunks of the country to foreign governments fronting as “investors” and lining their pockets, nearly a quarter of the Ethiopian population is teetering on the brink of famine. The rest of the population is menaced daily by malnutrition and hunger. Second, the dictators are bending over backwards to insure food security in the “investor” countries while Ethiopia’s food insecurity is causing frantic alarm in the rest of the world. For the past year, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization has been calling for immediate steps to be taken to protect the poor in Ethiopia from skyrocketing food prices. Just last week the U.N World Food Program issued an advisory estimating that the national relief program for Ethiopia will fall nearly 178,000 metric tons short of assessed needs for the second quarter of the year. Third, to add insult to injury, the same dictatorship, after engorging itself with the proceeds of the ill-gotten loot from the so-called “investors”, will shamelessly stand at the gates of the World Food Programme, the U.S. Government, the European Union and other donor countries panhandling for food aid. Such is the brazen audacity of dictatorship!

Everyone in the world is perplexed by this new mercenary land hustle taking place in Ethiopia. The Economist magazine, that unwavering bastion of conservatism and defender of free trade and globalization, wondered in total bafflement: “… Are these ‘land grabs’, ‘neocolonialist’ rip-offs, different from 19th-century colonialism only because they involve different land-grabbers and enrich different local elites?” Even the left-leaning Independent newspaper expressed righteous indignation: “Over the past few months, Saudi Arabian investors have paid $100m for an Ethiopian farm where they hope to grow wheat and barley, adding to the millions of acres they already own in the war-ravaged country… Neo-colonialists are buying up agricultural land in Africa and local farmers could be crushed unless there are international rules to protect them…” Agricultural experts worldwide have also chimed in to condemn such one-sided secret deals arguing that the deals ultimately serve to water the deep roots of the culture of corruption among Africa’s kleptocratic dictatorships than materially contributing to its development.

Anatomy of the Sale of Ethiopia

Time was when foreign private companies bought land from private owners in the developing countries and created large scale plantations. In the “banana republics” of Central America, multinational corporations exploited a large, impoverished peasant class by creating a dependent and subservient local oligarchy. American fruit companies eventually became powerful enough to dominate the entire export sector of these countries and own and operate key infrastructures such as railways, mining and ports.

What we are witnessing in countries like Ethiopia today is an extreme form of the banana republic syndrome. In the barley republic, the aim is to create a foreign enclave economy (completely and totally isolated and insulated from the local economy) in the host country with the singular purpose of extracting agricultural commodities for export back to the “investor” countries. The farms to be established on the acquired lands are expected to be high technology driven using high yield seeds, modern pesticides and other production systems. The “agricultural clusters” that are expected to be developed will have little connection to the host country’s broader economy. They will contribute very little to the development of a skilled work force at the local level, and local workers will be relegated to menial jobs that require minimal training. There will be few environmental standards for these “investors” to uphold, and there is no way to monitor the damage they are likely to cause to the local ecosystem. In short, in the enclave economy of the barley republic, there will be little “spillover” or “ripple” effect on the local or national economy; and there will be miniscule net gains to the host countries from the “investments” (except the millions of dollars that will line the pockets of the corrupt dictators). For Ethiopia’s wretched poor and hungry, it will all be a surreal experience: They will be standing by the dusty roadsides watching helplessly as the endless caravan of diesel trucks shuttle back and forth delivering the harvest of barley, wheat and rice to port for shipment.

The dictators in Ethiopia naturally want to conceal the corrupt and mercenary nature of the land deals. They say they are just attracting foreign direct investment which will result in a stable source of capital, boost national income and local employment while reducing the country’s debt load. Is that even theoretically possible in an enclave economy?

According to a study prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), it is obvious that the whole land deal is an elaborate swindle, a scam, a shell game [1]:

In Ethiopia, for example, enquiries at the state-level Oromia investment promotion agency found evidence of some 22 proposed or actual land deals, of which 9 were over 1,000 ha, in addition to the 148 recorded at the national investment promotion agency. It is possible to speculate that state-level agencies in other Ethiopian states may also have records of additional projects, and that some land acquisitions may not have been recorded at all….For example, in Ethiopia information about the land size of many deals proposed or concluded in 2008 was missing….

In another instance, “an investment by German company Flora EcoPower in Ethiopia was reported to involve 13,000 ha (hectare), while it is recorded at the Ethiopian investment promotion agency for 3,800 ha only.”
To avoid public scrutiny and ward off local opposition, the dictatorship intentionally and fraudulently misclassifies all land sold to foreign governments as vacant “wastelands” implying that the land is unused, unoccupied by anyone or just wilderness. In fact, the so-called “wasteland” often supports herders who graze animals on it and people who have farmed it for generations. The dictators ignore the customary rights of the local people to satisfy their voracious appetite for foreign-investment deals to line their pockets. There is also evidence to suggest that smallholders have had their arms twisted to sign away their rights for insignificant compensation. According to the above-referenced study:

In Ethiopia, for example, all land allocations recorded at the national investment promotion agency are classified as involving “wastelands” with no pre-existing users. But this formal classification is open to question, in a country with a population of about 75 million, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas. Evidence collected by in-country research suggests that at least some of the lands allocated to investors in the Benishangul Gumuz and Afar regions were previously being used for shifting cultivation and dry-season grazing, respectively.

Although the dictatorship claims that the so-called land leases are determined by the regional governments, the evidence proves conclusively otherwise:

Most documented land leases are granted by the government. This includes 100% of documented
cases in Ethiopia.

The dictatorship’s claim that the land deals bring prosperity and jobs to the local economy is simply false. The evidence actually shows that the “investors” are ripping off the country blind in broad daylight:

In-country research confirms the general impression that land fees are low in monetary terms and an unimportant component of negotiations. In Ethiopia,rent was required in four deals out of the six projects examined in greater detail, with prices ranging from US$ 3 to 10 per hectare per year. These fees are low in the international context, though land rentals are going up (in the Ethiopian state of Oromia, for instance). Several deals – including the contract from the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State, examined by this study – involve five-year exemptions from land fees (article 4(a) of the Benishangul Gumuz contract)…. In Ethiopia, for example, profit tax (estimated at US$ 20 per hectare per year) is usually exempted for a period of 5 years; for a total of 602,760 ha allocated to documented projects, it is estimated that the exemption of this tax for each project over 5 years amounts to US$ 60,276,000.42.

This is the deal that made it possible for the king of Saudi Arabia a few months ago to celebrate the delivery of the first fresh harvest from his lush farms in Ethiopia.

The Scramble for Africa Redux?

It is a historical irony that Ethiopia should escape and successfully defend its sovereignty and independence during the European scramble for Africa in the late 19th Century and again in the last century against Italian colonial aggression only to become the first casualty of a newfangled neocolonial agricultural scramble. The historical parallels are obvious: In its early stages, European imperialism planted its economic tentacles in Africa by sending out its explorers, adventurers and merchantmen. The gunboats and armies showed up later. In the kinder and gentler world of petrodollar neocolonialism, there is no need for gunboats. The weapon of choice is a slush fund of petrodollars and so-called sovereign-wealth funds directed at corrupt and thieving African dictators and politicians who are able, willing and ready to sell out chunks of their countries for pennies. In this brave new world of petrodollar neocolonialism, neither the corrupt dictators nor their bankrollers care about the consequences of their deals on the local population, the displacement of local farmers and herders or adverse environmental impacts.

Last May, Tekleab Kebede, “Ethiopian Consul General” in Saudi Arabia, sought to bless the Saudi land deal by saying: “After all, the relations between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia are longstanding. There is geographical proximity and the religious values and linguistic affinities that we share have brought the two countries close and strengthened the bonds. So, Saudis should have no hesitation in turning toward Ethiopia for investment.” That may be polite diplomatic palaver, but historically it is untrue. It is a fact that Saudi Arabia provided substantial material and moral support to secessionist elements in Ethiopia in the not too distant past. It also supported Somalia diplomatically and materially in its invasion of Ethiopian territory in 1977. Ethiopia’s supposed “special relationship” with Israel and other matters of religion have been a cause of ongoing irritation for the Saudis in their relations with Ethiopia.

The simple point is that this runaway land deal with the Saudis and the Gulf states needs to be scrutinized carefully for its broader implications. Is this ever expanding land deal a Trojan Horse used by the Saudis and the Gulf Shiekdoms for a broader thrust into Ethiopia? Are these “investments” the first elements of a grand strategic calculus to penetrate and dominate the Ethiopian economy and society? Or is it merely a benign search for land to raise crops, which by all accounts can be purchased on the world market at very competitive prices? Here the experience of the banana republics is instructive. The multilateral companies that invested in Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, Ecuador and other places initially produced and exported bananas, pine apples, coffee and other commodities. Over a period of time, through their control of the large plantations, they managed to place a chokehold on the local oligarchies who depended almost entirely on the cash flow provided by the multinational agri-businesses. As history shows, it did not take long for the foreign “investors” to own and operate the rail, trucking, ports and banking systems in those countries. History also shows that the social upheavals in the banana republics which occurred in reaction to the oppressive alliance of the oligarchies and multinationals resulted in atrocities that lasted for decades in those countries.

Is this the bright future that awaits the brave Barley Republic of Ethiopia?

Resistance to Land Swindles

Not everyone is taking it lying down. Recently, the government in Madagascar was overthrown in large part because of public anger over a secret deal by the deposed ruler to hand over to a South Korean company one million hectares of Madagascar to grow maize. Marc Ravalomanana, the deposed president, initially denied the existence of a secret land deal. He and his cronies were expecting to pocket millions of dollars from the deal until the coup disrupted their plans. The interim president Andry Rajoelina rejected the deal declaring that, “In the Constitution, it is stipulated that Madagascar’s land is neither for sale nor for rent, so the agreement with Daewoo is cancelled.” Interestingly, the South Korean company had “promised to spend $6-billion in the next 20 to 25 years to help build infrastructure such as roads, railways, a port and schools in exchange for developing huge swathes of arable land in Madagascar.” The Maize Republic of Madagascar was not to be! (It is worth noting that Madagascar is ranked 143/176 on the U.N. Development Program Human Development Index (which measures life expectancy, literacy, education, GDP per capita in 176 countries in the world). Ethiopia ranks 169/176. Local opposition is brewing in Zambia against a proposed Chinese plan to acquire 2million hectares for a biofuels project. Kenyan farmers are demanding to produce the commodities themselves and export it to Quatar instead of working as menial farmhands.

The Real Questions

There are many basic questions that need to be answered: Should a country teetering on the verge of famine and starvation engage in large-scale shady land leads in secrecy and without public discussion? Has Ethiopia become a Crookdom where a small oligarchy of crooks is free to do whatever it wants? Do these land agreements have any validity under international law? What safeguards are in place for the environment and the rights of the indigenous people?

There are some economists who suggest that a country like Ethiopia that is perpetually afflicted by food shortages will eventually explode as in the case of Madagascar. Others plead for implementation of interim measures to protect the local people and ecosystem by some international standards or code of conduct. Still others argue that technologically sophisticated large farms could never work in Africa. They say history shows that such efforts “have often ended with abandoned machinery rusting in the returning bush.” In the long run, it is said, peasant farming will trump advanced commercial farming. What is clear in Ethiopia’s case is that none of these land deals will bring about development of infrastructure or have any significant “spillover effect.” There will be few, if any, schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, rail lines or other lasting structures built as a result of these deals. The only legacy will be more misery and exploitation for the local people and environmental damage. As Ruth Meinzen-Dick, a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute warned: “The majority of agricultural land in Africa is not titled. If these rights are not respected in these transactions, the livelihoods of millions of people will be put at risk.” In the end, in the petrodollar land swindle, Ethiopians will be stuck holding the bag. An empty bag!

[1] http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/KHII-7SE4R4-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf Read See pp. 40, 41, 62, 78, 79, 80

The writer, Alemayehu G. Mariam, is a professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino, and an attorney based in Los Angeles. For comments, he can be reached at [email protected]

(The Reporter) — The Ethiopian Football Federation (EFF) disclosed that is probing some Premier League clubs that staged below-par performance during the matches that took place last weekend.

EFF said that it is now investigating the games between Adama City and Trans-Ethiopia, St. George and Sebeta City as well as Insurance and Electric Power, to allow it to take the necessary measures against those that had violated the rules of the sport.

The match between St. George and Sebeta City was considered to be outrageous by many sport fans and some clubs. St. George which had already won the season’s title, was blamed for its defeat by Sebeta 1-0, and also accused of playing below strength.

Sebeta, Metehar and Trans-Ethiopia are in the relegation zone ahead of the end of the season’s tournament this weekend. If the federation fails to take action against below strength performance from the clubs that are already far from the relegation zone, some clubs would be punished.

In a bid to avoid problems related to below-par performances, the federation said it had established a body to oversee any under performance during this week’s matches between Metehara Sugar and Mugher Cement, Ethiopia Coffee and Sebeta City, and Defense and Trans-Ethiopia.

The federation warned that all clubs should conduct their competitions seriously. It added if that any of the clubs under-perform it will take severe measures against them.

EFF also called upon competition discipline and arbiter committees to give due attentions to the competitions to be held this weekend.