The correspondent for Washington Post and Time Magazine in Ethiopia, Kassahun Addis, has fled to Kenya last week.

Kassahun had told his colleagues that the U.S.-financed tribal dictatorship in Ethiopia was harassing him and that he faced danger.

Alemayehu G. Mariam

Trying Times

“These are the times that try men’s souls,” said Thomas Paine, one of the Founders of the American Republic, at the onset of the American Revolution. It could be said equally that these are times that try a nation’s soul. Ethiopia today is stranded in a sea of political, economic and social troubles; and it continues to be strafed by the slings and arrows of wicked villains, thugs and scoundrels, to paraphrase Shakespeare. But before Ethiopia became the playground of outlaws, she was the land of patriot-soldiers who protected her boundaries from foreign invaders, defended her honor and dignity against the insolent and cowardly hordes, and guaranteed her independence and freedom from enemies who sought to slice and dice her. Those patriots were the members of her armed forces of yesteryears who marched the arid lowland deserts in the blistering heat, endured the biting cold of the craggy highland mountains and defended against the aggressor in the bushes, the swamps, the valleys and the once-dense forests. They were underpaid and overworked, under-funded and overburdened. They were under-appreciated. They faced unimaginable hardship in their decades of selfless service. Many suffered hunger, thirst, disease and isolation in their remote outposts. But they marched on, sailed the sea and flew over the glorious skies to make sure Ethiopia kept her independence for another 3,000 years.

A couple of weeks ago, an event was held in Washington, D.C. to honor former members of Ethiopia’s armed forces. The event, dubbed “Evening of Ethiopian Heroes” (Ye Jegnotch Mishet), was organized by the Committee to Honor Ethiopian Heroes. The purpose of the event was to pay homage to the brave patriot-soldiers, to show them the high respect and appreciation they have earned for their sacrifices, and to express to them profound gratitude for their long service. The sample list of named soldiers [1]  was drawn to represent all ranks of the hundreds of thousands of veterans, fallen soldiers and those missing in action. For the occasion two legendary retired generals, Tesfaye Habte Mariam and Kassaye Chemeda, were honored for their exemplary and extraordinary service to their country. Ali Berke, a militia fighter known for his heroism in various theatres of conflict, was honored in absentia. Last year General Legesse Tefera and others were honored by the Committee. Truth be told, these generals and many of their officer colleagues proved to be extraordinary military leaders because the troops they commanded made them so; and the honor goes to their loyal troops as well.

True Courage and True Colors

Ethiopian history offers accounts of mercenaries who took up arms against their country and people dreaming of riches and political power. There were those who betrayed the honor and dignity of their uniforms to advance their political ambitions and to grab power, along the way abusing and misusing professional military institutions as tools of repression of the civilian population. But there were also the true soldiers, the soldiers’ soldiers, like the ones honored in Washington who performed their duties with skill, professionalism, integrity and honor. These were a special breed of soldiers who had mastered not only the art of war and the ways of peace, but also lived the values of country, duty and honor everyday of their lives.

Military skills can be taught and learned, but courage, integrity and humility are the specialty of the patriot-soldier. These honored soldier took up their profession for one purpose only: to defend their people and their homeland. In peace time or at war, in good times or bad, these patriot-soldiers never wore their ethnic stripes, and never displayed their tribal marks. Under fire, they showed only two things: true courage they inherited from their forefathers and their true colors — the Green, Yellow and Red. They put their flag and country above all things, including their own safety and their families’ well being; and they did it all with unquestioning devotion and unconditional love.

Never Was So much Owed By So Many To So Few

History will tell of the great sacrifices and courage of these patriot-soldiers when freedom rings in Ethiopia. But we know a lot from reading the autobiographies and battlefield accounts of the generals honored at this event. We are moved to tears by the horrible toll war exacts on the mind, the soul and body of the soldier, and the unfortunate civilians caught in the tragedy of conflict. We know these patriot-soldiers carry with them the emotional and spiritual burdens and scars of their battlefield experiences; and we can only imagine their great sacrifices from the injuries and disabilities they suffered defending their country.

We are familiar with the efforts that have been made to slander, defame and shame these patriot-soldiers. We know these soldiers were put in jail by criminals who sought to cover up their own crimes. The criminals tried every treacherous means to demoralize, discredit and dishonor them. But the patriot-soldiers marched on; they harbor no grudges and ill will to those who have mistreated and abused them. They stand tall above all as patriot-soldiers, and we can say to them from the depths of our hearts: “Never have so many owed so much to so few.”

What Goes on in the Minds of Old Patriot-Soldiers?

Old patriot-soldiers are good at hiding their pain, heartache and suffering. It is a professional virtue they have developed from experiencing years of hardships few of us can imagine, let alone endure. Those of us who have not walked a mile in their boots — never tasted life in the windswept deserts, never held sentry in desolate mountain outposts, never set eyes on the horrors of war, never heard the “crash of guns, the rattle of musketry and the strange and mournful mutter of the battlefield” — often wonder: “What goes on in the minds of old patriot-soldiers?” What do they think of their legacy of decades of dedicated service and sacrifice to their country? What do they say to each other when they see the land they defended with their blood, sweat and tears cut up like a slab of meat and handed away to the enemy? What do they think when thy see their people forced into ethnic corrals like cattle; and their lifelong sacrifices for the unity, harmony and territorial integrity of their country turn into a faint memory. What do they see in their dreams about the country they loved so much and the people they served so selflessly?

How do old patriot-soldiers survive in these trying times?

Those of us who never answered the call to service, we have learned some very hard lessons. These old patriot-soldiers have taught us that the unity, security and integrity of Ethiopia can never be taken for granted. Our burden is to deliver the lesson we have learned to the new generation: “There is a price to be paid to have a country united under the rule of law. That price is eternal vigilance against enemies foreign and domestic.”

Old Soldiers Never Die, They Live in Our Hearts Forever

It has been said that “men love their country, not because it is great, but because it is their own.” These patriot-soldiers love Ethiopia even though she is very poor and down on her luck; and her skin is covered with ticks that suck her lifeblood away. They love her because she is all they have got.

Most of us spend our lives asking whether we could have done this thing or that for our motherland; we question ourselves in the deep of the night if we could have made this contribution or that sacrifice. These patriot-soldiers do not have to ask themselves any questions. Unlike us, they have answered the call.

It has been said that “old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” Not our patriot-soldiers. They never die, and they never fade away. They just live in our hearts forever. I have no doubts that when these old patriot-soldiers rest their heads for the last time, just before they close their eyes for eternity, in their last breaths will be the words: “God bless Ethiopia, my home, sweet home!”

We owe them an eternal debt of gratitude (Ye Mairesa Wulleta). May God bless them all!!!

[1] http://www.addisvoice.com/article/ethiopian_war_heroes.htm

By Messay Kebede

I would like to thank Jawar Siraj Mohammed for the civility with which he engaged my article, “The OLF: Ideological or Leadership Bankruptcy?” Some Oromos responded to the article with emotional outcries and personal attacks, thereby displaying not only their alarming deficiency in sound arguments, but also their refusal to even discuss the issue. Some even went to the extent of saying that the Oromo issue is none of my business, as though Oromia had already become a foreign country. The happy contrast is that Jawar argues and wants to show that what failed the Oromo is not the ideology but the leadership. Since his sober and argued reply denotes an opening to dialogue, I reciprocate with an even higher longing for a rapprochement.

Jawar’s arguments are as follows: (1) there is no ideological bankruptcy since the large majority of the Oromo people supports the nationalist agenda of the OLF. (2) It is not true to say that the OLF operates in geographical conditions that are inimical to armed insurgency. (3) The success of the TPLF and EPLF highlights the importance of leadership. (4) The failure of the EPRP was due less to ideology than to strategic mistakes of its leadership.

What we get from these factual arguments is that “ideology does not play much role in determining the failure and success of an insurgency.” Jawar adds that, so long as an insurgency is not strong enough, it cannot consider reformist options, for it is suicidal for an organization to give up its mobilizing ideology. In other words, the Oromo nationalist or secessionist agenda should be preserved until the movement is strong enough to reform itself. Let me examine one by one these arguments.

Who Wants Secession?

Is it true to say that the Oromo people supports the secessionist agenda of the OLF? For that matter, let us extend the issue and ask whether the Eritrean people has supported the secessionist goal of the EPLF and whether the Tigrean people has agreed to the secession of Eritrea and the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines. If both movements led to dictatorial regimes, is it not because the so-called popular support was actually imposed on the people they claim to represent? True, both Eritreans and Tigreans wanted self-rule, but it is one thing to fight against centralization and quite another to advocate secession. The latter is none other than a resurgence of the elitism of the 60s when Western-educated Ethiopians usurped the right to speak in the name of the people.

The only way by which Jawar can convince himself and other Ethiopians about the popular support for secession is through the implementation of a free and fair democratic process that begins by making serious reforms. If, after a time of power-sharing and democratic relationships, the Oromo people still expresses the desire to secede, only then can we speak of popular support. But all theoreticians, including ethnonationalists, know that in a truly democratic setup secession is unlikely. Put otherwise, what Jawar presents as a fact is not yet a fact; it is an elitist manipulation that uses past mistreatments to justify partition.
I add that if the Oromo had really wanted to separate from the rest of the country, no force on earth could have stopped them. Then, what is Jawar’s hurry? Let democracy sets in and you will have what you want if the grievances are still real. Incidentally, Jawar accepts that the OLF does not own the monopoly of representing the Oromo people, since he accuses me of “categorizing all Oromos under one ideology and under one organization.” Another mishap is when he calls my position “centrist,” even though all the books and articles I have written on Ethiopia unravel centralization as the main reason for Ethiopia’s failure to modernize.

Comparing Apples with Oranges

I leave out Jawar’s assumption that the OLF operates in conditions conducive for insurgency because it cannot be decided by people who write from America. However, there remains the issue of finding a neighboring country that provides political and military assistances, especially, that can serve as a shelter. In his reply, Jawar completely overlooked a detrimental outcome that he had vigorously and correctly denounced in his first article, to wit, the growing subordination of the OLF to the Eritrean regime. Yet the ideology of secession which, of course, leads to the choice of armed struggle, is responsible for the subordination.

Once it is said that the OLF has appropriate geographical conditions, the question is why it is still failing. Jawar’s answer is unequivocal: the severe shortcomings of the leadership. He uses a comparative approach to prove his point, namely, the military success of the TPLF and EPLF against the Derg. Unfortunately, the comparison is defective from various angels. One cannot compare the secession of Eritrea with that of Oromia. Not only different historical and geographical reasons intervene, but also minority groups, as was the case with Eritrea, have often no other option that the threat of secession.

When it comes to Oromia, we are presented with the unheard case of a group that wants to secede, even though it claims to be the largest ethnic group of the country. It is the unfeasibility of the case that derives me to speak of ideological bankruptcy. In the records of history, majority groups have defended the nation so that secession has always been the ideology of overpowered peoples. That is why I spoke of “self-mutilation” in that a group is degraded into thinking and acting like a desperate minority group. The Oromo need an ideology that is commensurate with their potential. Only then can they emerge victorious.
Who is the Winner?

As to the TPLF, its success should be taken with a grain of salt in light of the fact that Tigray is historically and culturally one of the cornerstones of Ethiopia. As such, any ideology that supports the breakup of Ethiopia is contrary to the historical role and identity of Tigrean people. That is why every time I hear about the victory of the TPLF’s insurgency, I cannot contain my perplexity. If the success of the TPLF depended on the secession of Eritrea, then I do not see where the victory is. Mengistu Haile Mariam could have also stayed in power by letting Eritrea go. Such an outcome would have been considered, not as a victory, but as a defeat. Moreover, how is the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines an expression of victory? When Ethiopia is diminished and put in a condition close to disintegration––which is the only way by which an anti-Ethiopian Tigrean clique can dominate the country––I do not shout victory for the Tigrean people.

In place of victory, I see defeat, as no amount of military prowess will remove the bare fact of Ethiopia as a landlocked country. What was the main source of Ethiopia’s weakness and isolation in the past, that is, since the control of the Red Sea by Muslim forces, is back again thanks to the TPLF. Some years ago I posted an article in which I asked Ethiopians to let Assab go because it would only mean continuous war against Eritrea. I argued that the best option is to work toward the return of Eritrea through some form of federal arrangement. The TPLF government is now fully experiencing the huge impediment of being landlocked. The ethnic paradigm and victory at all costs, even by sacrificing Eritrea, combined to bring disaster and despair on Ethiopia. In light of these monstrous costs, is “victory” really a proper term?

Ideology and the Choice of Means

I am confused by Jawar’s statement that “ideology does not determine the failure and success of an insurgency.” How can it be so when we know that strategic choices are dependent on ideological inspirations? The OLF and EPLF opted for guerrilla warfare because of their secessionist ideology. Consequently, they allied with forces opposed to Ethiopia and refused to work with Ethiopia’s progressive forces. Likewise, to associate with the EPLF, the TPLF had to invent the ideology of Tigray as a nation and adopt ethnic references as the highest norms of political struggle. This ideological orientation explains why it could not ally with the EPRP and other progressive forces. Instead, it went in the direction of helping Eritrea to become independent in exchange for military and political support. You cannot explain the TPLF’s “victory” without its alliance with, nay, its subordination to the EPLF. In short, vision commands strategy as well as the degree of commitment.

To explain the defeat of the EPRP by the failure of its leadership is correct, provided it is added that the leadership failed because of ideological extremism. The choice of urban guerrilla struggle, which is believed to be the main blunder of the organization, is not separable from the slogans demanding a people’s government and socialism. If the EPRP had focused on democratic struggles for freedom of association and expression and for the establishment of a national government of reconciliation, etc., it would not have embarked on the wrong path of urban guerrilla. Contrary to Jawar’s statement, at that time, people, including the bureaucratic elites, the peasantry, the workers, and the Amhara population, expressed democratic demands as opposed to the socialist ideology of students and intellectuals. The EPRP and other leftist movements fought for the control of the state in order to impose their vision on the society. The Derg foiled the project and adopted socialism, not because it was forced to do so by the civilian left, as some authors claim, but because socialism exactly fitted its dictatorial interests.

The debate over the primacy of the national question over class interest in the Ethiopian student movement is the typical ideological battle that led to the formation of the TPLF and the OLF. According to the Stalinist vision, the liberation of the ethnic group has precedence over the consideration of unity with other groups. The detrimental consequence of this reasoning fully transpires in today’s Ethiopia, since the vibrant student movement in Ethiopia is now practically dead, undermined as it is by the dividing impact of ethnic ideology. This death is a palpable proof of how deeply ideology can be paralyzing. My message to Jawar is thus clear: what keeps you in chains is the diatribe against Amhara, Abyssinians and the correlated discourse on the Ethiopian colonization of the Oromo, which discourse undermines the gestation of common goals and actions.

Here and there Jawar’s reply seems to suggest that self-determination and secession are used for their mobilizing power rather than their intrinsic merit. He writes: “just because an ideology makes it simple to mobilize support, it does not mean it should be adapted without careful and rational evaluation of its short term and long term impact after liberation.” A merely tactical purpose diminishes the mobilizing power: not only does the secessionist ideology divide people, but also a tactical usage means that the leaders do not really believe in the ideology they are preaching. If that is the case, weigh the for and against, and it becomes clear that the best option is to simply drop the ideology.

But neither Jawar nor the leaders of the OLF are willing to drop the ideology. Why? Because it would allow extremist groups to rise and marginalize the present leadership. This is the inevitable price for cultivating and spreading for such a long time a divisive ideology. At one point a situation is created where it becomes impossible to reverse course. All the more reason for allying now with Ethiopia’s moderate and progressive forces, for only the engagement of the country in the path of resolute democratization can block the rise of extremist groups.

(The writer can be reached at [email protected])