Third World jurists have the uncomfortable task of interpreting and applying “International Law”, which for the most part is made, shaped, twisted or even often times abused in line with the national interests of greater powers. (Presumably two of the five distinguished jurists composing the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission are nationals of Third World countries, a Nigerian and an Indian.)
“International Law” had always the academic ambiguity of being “Law” as such or some other species of power politics in disguise. Thus, the role of international law and international institutions must always be seen in the wider perspective of satisfying an existing international system or great power national interest. Today’s international system is somehow in a relative state of flux and full of uncertainties. A lot of radical changes are taking place. Some of those changes may even qualify to be historical ‘landmarks’ or ‘milestones’ in the context of the general development of international law. There were several such milestones in history. The emergence of the Westphalian international system (1648); the French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic wars (1789-1815); The Russian Revolution (1917); the end of World War II and the creation of the UN (1945); the Cold War (1950-1989); the liberation of colonies in Africa since the 1960s were the major ones. And now, at the dawn of the 21st century, we have at hand a new form of international war called “war against terrorism”.
The Westphalian treaty and the Napoleonic wars in Europe might not have any direct impact on the changes affecting the state of Ethiopia at that time, but all the rest most definitely had and continue to have. The Russian Revolution coupled with international politics in the Cold War played significant role in bringing about the liquidation of the millennial Ethiopian Monarchy. Exactly 200 years after the French Revolution, by which the infamous Bastille prison was violently destroyed, another infamous Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989, ushering in several revolutionary changes in the international system. That system had its own bearings in bringing about the devolution of the already beleaguered state of Ethiopia into several mini states.
How are the norms of international law and institutions responding to such drastic global changes in the international system or are being affected by it? Ours is an era in which extensive juridical theories are being reconsidered in the face of fast moving changes in values, the direction of which, for the most part being just obscure and difficult to tell. One aspect of the interesting part of international law affected by such changes is the question of succession of states. Old states dissolve and new ones emerge. Here is an area of research in which law and politics have, as they always had, close interplay in state practice. The interplay even seems stronger after the end of the Cold War. One of the distinguished British jurists in international law, Professor Rosalin Higgins once pointed out that “there is no avoiding the essential relationship between law and policy.” (R. Higgins, “International Law, the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes”, 230RdC 28 (1991-C).
1. Use of Force and International Law.
The overriding objective for any international tribunal or body, like the recent Boundary Commission between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in considering procedural priorities must be to arrive at conditions conducive for making immediate peace. To that end, several political avenues could be open for consideration in lieu of pure law. Juridical too, the prohibition against the use of force and the international custom-based obligation to have recourse only to peaceful means of resolving disputes/conflicts comes on top of all other considerations. In this light, the political-legal role the commission has played must have due diplomatic credit by all sides at the initial stage at least, but only just as temporary measure.
2. Ex iniuria non ius oritur (‘illegal acts do not create law’) and ex factis ius oritur (‘facts have a tendency to become law’).
There you have it! international law is inherently full of contradictions. The above two contradictory legal maxims were borrowed from the Roman Law to the international jurisprudence. Upon the general juridical premise that the use of force is basically illegal in modern international relations, almost all major events in the world could have difficulty in attaining any legal sanctity. Almost all major changes in a global scale occur through the use of force. According to the first principle (maxim), then, all the achievements of the victories in World War II would have been of no legal consequences! Because, they were achieved through the use of force. Contrarily, according to the second maxim, facts (events) if generally agreed upon by the public at large or even acquiesced to (with no tangible opposition in the international arena) have a tendency of being sanctified as legal, even though such might have been achieved through heinous use of force. The latter principle seems to work well especially in relation to state succession.
3. State Succession.
States die and are born too. When new states will have to replace old ones, there comes the legal issue of state succession. The doctrine of state succession is full of academically controversial theories and especially with respect to the ambiguities with ‘state continuity’. On this question Prof. James Crawford underlines the importance of making distinction between state succession and state continuity. He states that “[whether] some state can be said to exist, despite changes of government, territory or population, [or] one state can be said to have replaced another with respect to certain territory” must have crucial distinction. (see J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 400.)
This doctrinal analysis had a recent applicability in international law on the questions of whether Russia today is a successor of the erstwhile Soviet Union or just its continuation in the eyes of international law. The same question also arose regarding the state of Yugoslavia. How about with respect to the Ethiopian situation? Since 1974 Ethiopia has undergone five forms of governmental formations: from the monarchy to constitutional monarchy (1974-75). From constitutional monarchy to Provisional Military Administrative Council (1975-1984). From a military government to a socialist republic (1984-1991). From a socialist republic again to a ‘Transitional Government’ by EPRDF (1991-1995). From transitional government to a federal democratic republic (1995-present.) The last change has most drastic implications in international law. Because of the deep social and political implications brought about, we will have to raise this question: state continuity or state succession, which is undergoing in Ethiopia? Is the the new federal republic a continuation of the historical Ethiopian state or a successor?
In the case of Russia, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia remains bigger than all other former Soviet republics taken together. Also, Soviet Russia after 1917 was a continuing state of the Czarist Russian Empire in the eyes of international law. After the removal of the monarchy in Ethiopia, the same unitary state, under different form/s of government, continued. Added to this too, we have the subjective element, in both situations, of state continuity for the new regimes obviously intended to perpetuate the state. Hence, until 1995, through which Ethiopia continued as a unitary state, there was no doubt as to state continuity. But, the series of events after 1995, more crucially, the devolution of the unitary state of Ethiopia into several mini states, the most troublesome of which being the full independence of Eritrea, (with the silence of the more than sixty million Ethiopian people), forces us to question the legal continuity of the state of Ethiopia or her being succeeded by another state called a “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”. In the eyes of international law, emerging domestic events in a particular state are, for the most part taken note of, and then accorded the relevant juridical blessings, after passing the test of time. Extending the logic, the several mini states created in Ethiopia today might as well have that inchoate recognition of them by the international community as international persons (subjects) tomorrow, as they pass the test of time. Resolving this question might have far wider implications regarding the international legal status of the boundary delimitation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Should there be an agreement on the question that there has already occurred state succession in Ethiopia, then an a contrario argument of state restoration, should such occur eventually, will have to annul all international treaties or proceedings by the fictitious state as unlawful ab initio.
4. The Principle of Uti possedetis (“have what you have had”).
The principle of uti possedetis in international law, which in effect means accept what is given by the colonial rulers, emerged following the new international system after the decolonization of Latin America and Africa. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its decision on the frontier between Burkina Faso and Mali (22 December 1986) reiterated that principle by declaring that uti possedetis constituted as a general principle of law to be applied after independence. (Burkina Faso vs. Republic of Mali, 1986 ICJ Reports 565) The recent imposition of the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 by the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission also seems to affirm that principle. Speaking of the colonial treaties, there were so many intricated legal arguments, which should have been raised in relation to Ethiopia’s rights, not least of which her right to territorial seas. They simply and silently have been trampled upon by virtue of the words of the Algiers agreement between the respective governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, explicitly excluding the interpretation of legal principles Ex Aequo et Bono. In other words, the wills of the two leaders simply substituted the historical Ethiopian interests.
5. Ex Aequo et Bono.
Under its Procedural Introduction Chapter I article 1(2) the Boundary Commission skillfully excluded all other very complicated juridical considerations, which could arise with respect to the Ethio-Eritrean relations, by solely relying on the Algiers Accord. Under article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, prior agreements made by parties, like treaties, technically override all other possible sources of international law, like the customary practices of the historic state of Ethiopia. Here again, a major juridical flout has been made, in preference to political expediencies, which could be a major source of tension in the future of the region.
6. Conclusion.
Inasmuch as peace is the overriding objective, the international commission’s decision must be seen as an important diplomatic clout. Whether or not this intrepid political/legal clout will work for peace is, of course, to be seen on the ground. (Already both sides are claiming ‘victory’ as an outcome of the decision, proving once again the absurdity of the war, if the border was the real cause of it, in the first place, in which thousands of precious lives have perished.) Nonetheless, in view of the carefully ignored historical rights of Ethiopia complacence shall be avoided by any far sighted scholar, and at best the Commission’s decision must be seen as an interim measure to prevent bloodshed.
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Yohannes Chane Metiku, Adj. Professor of International Relations/Law. [email protected]
Radical politics and civil strife have transformed the face of the Ethiopian nation over the past quarter of a century. Besides drastic changes at home, refugees to more than a dozen countries have formed a diaspora which numbers somewhere between one and 1.5 million people. As Ethiopia’s refugees established themselves in local communities and organized themselves more widely through national gatherings and media, they created the basis for reconfiguring Ethiopia as one nation located in three domains: ye-bet agar, ye-wutch agar, and ye-cyber agar. The devotion to homeland that was distinctive of Ethiopians at home continues to burn brightly in the diaspora. It has motivated expatriates to create a number of projects designed to help the home country as well as to improve life in their new homes. In so doing, they participate in a process that is reconfiguring the world community in a global era–the growth of civil associations across national boundaries. Having engaged in some of these projects, I thought it might be useful to give them greater publicity. The first three projects I describe concern programs of social action and institution-building in Ethiopia; the next two concern projects to help Ethiopians in the diaspora; and the last two concern cultural projects to promote pan-Ethiopian communication.
1. AIDS EDUCATION
BACKGROUND: Cumulative fatalities due to the AIDS epidemic in Ethiopia are estimated at well over a million. By the end of 1999, it was estimated that some 700,000 children had been orphaned (loss of mothers or both parents) as a result of HIV/AIDS. According to the Center for Disease control, with 1% of the world’s population, Ethiopia contains 9% of the world’s HIV/AIDS cases. “Tackling AIDS is the most serious. problem that Ethiopia now faces,” Ministry of Health spokesperson Amsale Yelma recently told a United nations information source.
PROJECT A: Gathering and distributing information.
The Johns Hopkins University Center for Communication Programs (JHU/CCP) has announced establishment of an Ethiopia AIDS Resource Center which will provide health care workers, government officials and HIV/AIDS organizations, and journalists with the latest information on HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis. Jointly sponsored with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Ethiopian Center is scheduled to open in Addis Ababa in December 2002. The Center will include print and web-based resources and will support a local AIDS telephone hotline that provides HIV/AIDS information and counseling services.
In addition, the Johns Hopkins Center, with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, has provided technical assistance to the National Office of Population in Ethiopia to develop a radio serial drama, “Journey Through Life,” designed to encourage young adults to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies. The series, which began airing on Sunday, Nov. 25, appeals to young married couples and unmarried adolescents in urban and semi-urban areas of the country. Of this series, Araya Demissie, country representative in Ethiopia for the JHU/CCP, said: “We are hoping Journey Through Life will help Ethiopians understand just how easy it is to become infected with the AIDS virus. But we also hope the program will convey just how easy it is to protect yourself.”
PROJECT B: AIDS entertainment-education in the countryside.
An initiative known as the Awassa Children’s Project has developed into a force for rural AIDS education. The project started around 1997 when Woyzero Sunnayit Bekele of Awassa began to provide food and school materials for a number of destitute local children. Aided by her sister Aster Bekele-Dabels, a resident of Germany, the project now aims to create a self-sufficient children’s home in Awassa, to prepare students for community service, and to train them as electricians, carpenters, textile workers, and computer technicians.
Subsequently, the director of Chicago’s Free Street Theater, David Schein, went to help these young people–now numbering around forty–create an outdoors theater project, which they call an AIDS Education Circus. Working with youngsters who had taught themselves gymnastics, juggling, tight rope, and other circus skills, Schein helped create a show that was performed in the Awassa marketplace before many thousands of people. During the circus performance, the children distribute educational materials about HIV and condoms. Currently they are seeking support from UNICEF and American AID to finance a tour of 12 markets in southern Ethiopia, while German, Ethiopian, and American friends are raising money to complete the construction of a Vocational Training and Arts Center in Awassa on land donated by the town.
CONTACTS: A. For more on JHU/CCP AIDS programs in Ethiopia, see .
B. For information on the Awassa Children’s Project AIDS Education Circus., contact Aster Bekele-Dabels, at or David Schein, Free Street Theater, Chicago, at “free street” .
2. ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
BACKGROUND: The intellectual and professional life of Ethiopia requires the nourishment of first-rate universities. The abrupt dismissal of some forty Ethiopian faculty members in April 1993 struck a serious. blow at the quality and morale of the Addis Ababa University program, as did the arbitrary imprisonment of Prof. Emeritus. Mesfin Wolde Mariam and Prof. Berhanu Nega in May 2001. As my letter reprinted at ) indicates , curtailment of academic freedom has reached unprecedented heights under the EPRDF. Beyond these and other constraints on academic freedom, the University suffers on every front from impoverished resources.
PROJECT A: In June, 2001, Professors Ivo Strecker of the University of Mainz, Donald Crummey of the University of Illinois, and I organized the International Ethiopian University Support Committee (IEUSC), a group of Ethiopianists from seven countries who wrote letters protesting the imprisonment of Drs. Mesfin and Berhanu. These letters went to a number of embassies as well as heads of the Ethiopian government, and may have helped to secure their release. Beyond that, Strecker established a continuing web site, which provides information about the university and statements from a wide group of scholars supporting academic freedom in Ethiopia. (The site also reprints my 1993 article, “Is Ethiopia Cutting Off Its Head Again?”) As of December, Dr. Makonnen Bishaw has been serving as coordinator of the site. The committee is working to maintain a continuing presence of foreign scholars to monitor the situation in Ethiopia and provide future support for the University.
PROJECT B: An exciting initiative has recently gelled in Addis Ababa. Professor Baye Yiman, current director of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, has launched a new Institute of Ethiopian Studies Library Project, estimated at five million U.S. dollars. The project proposes to erect a new structure to house the library’s thousands of books and periodicals. The current library in Ras Makonnen Hall is not able to hold the weight of the vast growing collection of books, manuscripts, and periodicals. The collection is so crowded that proper cataloguing has become problematic. The proposed structure will be situated to the east of the former Palace building, in the area of the former stables. The new library will house the literary collection properly and provide computer and audiovisual facilities.
CONTACT: A. For information on the IEUSC, visit the web site .or Dr. Makonnen Bishaw at .
B. To assist the Institute of Ethiopian Studies project, send donations to the Institute and Society of Friends of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, P.O. Box 1176, Addis Ababa. For more information on the IES project, email the Addis Tribune at [email protected]. Donors in the United States can give tax-exempt financial support by sending their checks to: American Friends of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, P.O. Box 15438, Washington DC, 20003-998, U.S.A.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS
BACKGROUND: Each of the three last regimes in Ethiopia committed serious infringements of human rights. Under the Derg the attacks on human rights escalated horrifically. Under the EPRDF and EPLF regimes in the past decade, human rights conditions in certain respects improved; in other respects they worsened considerably. Each year brings numerous cases of unjust imprisonment, torture, and killing under these regimes.
One other thing that has been different during the past decade has been a more active presence of the United States Government and other donor countries. In particular the U.S. State Department has supported a full-time officer devoted to monitoring human rights conditions (in June 1992, for example, I accompanied the then Human Rights officer to prison to interview OLF candidates who had been imprisoned apparently illegally, and who then filed a report raising questions about those cases). Concerning the 1995 elections, the U.S. and other donor countries produced a confidential report listing numerous. instances where legally registered parties faced intimidation, arrests, and closure of offices.
PROJECT A. Political action in the U.S. Congress.
Action by Ethiopians in the U.S. and American friends of Ethiopia was successful in getting the U.S. Congress to pass unanimously an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill in 1995 tying future aid for the Ethiopian government to demonstrated improvement in its human rights record. More recently, action by Ethiopians in Illinois was crucial in getting Senator Dick Durbin, who with six other senators to sent a letter to Secretary of State Powell protesting EPRDF human rights violations, which elicited Powell’s prompt statement of support.
PROJECT B. Human Rights Information.
1. Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO). In Ethiopia itself, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, a non-governmental human rights organization established in 1991, has been monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the country. To date, it has issued some 17 regular and 47 special reports, including comprehensive reports on the most recent general and local elections. A number of persons in Europe and North America, identified on the EHRCO web site, provide support for the association.
2. Amnesty International. Amnesty International has a long record of monitoring human rights conditions in Ethiopia. This goes back as far as early 1961, when they sent observers to the trial of Gen. Mengistu Neway following the attempted coup of December 1960. Most recently, they made the case of Dr. Taye Wolde-Semayat a project for their Freedom Writers in October. This means that something like 5,000 letters were written on his behalf by the Freedom Writers Network, which is committed to writing for whatever case is identified during that month.
AI will continue to monitor Dr. Taye’s trial, and will report on it in their Urgent Action bulletins. The most recent of these bulletins reported on the imprisonment of nine Eritrean journalists who were “detained incommunicado at a police station in the capital, Asmara, for over a month. They are not known to have been charged with any offense, or brought to court within 48 hours, as required by law. Conditions in police cells in Eritrea are harsh, and they are at risk of ill-treatment. They were arrested after 19 September, when the government ordered all independent newspapers to cease publication.” Dr. Taye also headed the list of five prisoners of conscience selected by Amnesty International for their annual
3. Human Rights Watch, and its subsidiary, Africa Watch, report regularly on human rights conditions in Ethiopia. Most recently, they posted a letter of protest against the suspension from operation of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), a leading local nongovernmental women’s rights organization.
4. The U. S. State Department. Reports on human rights have been produced every year since 1993 by the Department of State. These reports have been valuable in securing asylum for Ethiopians who have been endangered because of dissident political activism and independent journalism.
CONTACTS:
For EHRCO’s reports and links, see its web site: http://www.ehrco.net/
For a write-up of the case of Dr. Taye, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/action/special/wolde_semayat.html
For the Freedom Writers Network, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/freedomwriters/
For the Urgent Action bulletins, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/urgent
For Human Rights Watch coverage of Ethiopia, see http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/ethiopia-1017-ltr.htm
For the U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports on Ethiopia, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/hrp_reports_mainhp.html
4. DIASPORA COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND: As Ethiopians fled to various. countries during the Derg years, they came to form self-help organizations to minister to the adjustment needs of their compatriots. I shall describe a few of them.
Chicago, Illinois. The Ethiopian Community Association of Chicago (ECAC) has long provided numerous. services for Ethiopians in the Greater Chicago area. Geared initially to refugee settlement, employment, and adjustment problems, its emphases have evolved as the immigrant community matured. ECAC now provides Amharic instruction to Ethiopian children born in the U.S. as well as English-language training to adults, translation and interpretation services, and assistance for new entrepreneurs. Recently it opened a Computer Training Center; equipped with state-of-the-art facilities, the program includes career counseling and job placement services. The ECAC helps other groups as well, through such cooperative activities as health outreach services and youth development projects. It regularly organizes community events such as Enquetatash celebrations and publishes a handsome bilingual quarterly magazine, Mahiber.
Seattle, Washington. The Ethiopian Community Mutual Association has been active for close to 20 years. Its services include case management and advocacy for Ethiopian expatriates, job placement, language training (Amharic and English), translation and interpretation, and citizenship classes. The association also organizes sports activities, after-school tutoring, and parenting classes. During the past year it has opened a Computer Resources and Training Center that offers classes five days a week at beginning, intermediate, and advanced levels.
Hadera, Israel. Founded in 1996, the Ethiopian Immigrants Volunteer Organization grew rapidly in response to the requirements of a large immigrant community. Its activities cover the entire gamut of adjustment needs, from infancy through senior citizens, with programs for parents and pre-school children, school children, adult education, community service, and culture. The organization features a holistic conception, whereby every member of the community is enabled both to give and to receive services according to their abilities, with continuous. follow-up to ensure meeting the stated objectives. Some distinctive elements include a program to help parents guide their children through kindergarten; a two-year leadership program that trains members of the community to develop good relationships with local government and regional and national institutions; a program to assist community elders (shemagles) help families and individuals solve issues in accordance with community customs; and a program to preserve traditional Ethiopian music and teach it to the next generation. New projects under way include the construction of a community cultural center and the creation of a course for mothers who can complete high school programs while learning to work as assistant teachers in kindergartens.
PROJECT: Ethiopian Community Association Networking
Representatives of these organizations with whom I have spoken indicate that it would be helpful to have some sort of clearinghouse whereby they could be in contact with one another. They have comparable problems and stand to benefit from ways of sharing information about how they have solved or are working on those problems.
CONTACT: For the Chicago association, contact Dr. Erku Ymer, Director, at
< [email protected]>
For the Seattle association, contact Belay Demssie, Director, or Emanuel Habte, Secretary of the Board, at [email protected] , or see their web site at
For information on the Hadera association, contact Tesfaye Aderajew at 972-4-630-3211; Fax: 972-4-624-8353, or
For qualified and interested volunteers to assist in the networking effort, please contact me at
5. REPATRIATION
BACKGROUND: Many Ethiopians who left under duress during the Derg period would be interested in returning to their homeland, but they may require special assistance. Repatriation is not a simply matter of getting on a plane and disembarking. It involves a whole complex of adjustments, requiring the establishment of a supportive milieu often quite different from what was left behind. This may be particularly true of Jewish Ethiopians, known as Bete Israel (FKA Falasha), who emigrated to Israel en masse in 1986 and 1991 Many of them are having difficulty finding employment because they have not learned to speak Hebrew. Having left a condition of extreme poverty and often discrimination, they may find it especially difficult to repatriate. On the other hand, some who have acquired modern training may wish to return to help rebuild their homeland.
PROJECT A: Several people are working to set up a structure to coordinate efforts among a number of interested parties. These include Ethiopian Jews in Israel who may wish to return to Ethiopia; Ethiopian Jews in Israel who wish to stay there but can help others to return; Bete Israel who have already returned, to Gondar and their traditional agerbet as well as to Addis Ababa; and members of Gondar Development Associations in Addis Ababa, Gondar, San Francisco, and elsewhere who wish to help their countrymen resettle. They are talking about a plan to make Weleka, the traditional Bete Israel homeland, the first site of resettlement. A target for the first phase would be about one hundred settlers. The idea would be to build houses at Weleka and also construct small plants for producing bricks, hollow blocks, and pottery. Weleka could become a center for training rural people in handicraft and trade skills.
PROJECT B: Another initiative would be to establish a clearinghouse of information for other Ethiopians anywhere who wish to repatriate as part of a movement to build a unified and democratic national society. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees may be a place to start working on that.
CONTACT: Mulugeta Wudu of San Jose and Dr. Mengistu Legesse, President of the Gondar Development and Cooperation Organization in North America are working to develop the project and make connections among the relevant parties. I am currently working to identify persons in Israel to make contact with Bete Israel immigrants who may wish to return to Ethiopia.
6. PAN-ETHIOPIAN RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
BACKGROUND: Ethiopia is perhaps the only country where the three great Semitic religions have not only lived side by side for centuries, but where their adherents have converted back and forth a fair amount and even celebrate festivals together. The annual pilgrimage to Qulubi Gabrael in December is a case in point. Encouraging communication among representative figures of each of the three faiths would not only advance the cause of Ethiopian unity but also be an important exemplar for other countries at this troubled time. What is more, many traditional Ethiopian religions have elements that show a family resemblance to the sacred symbols and practices of the Semitic religions. Might it be possible to contemplate resemblances as well as differences among the conceptions of Oromo Wak and other non-Semitic Ethiopian deities, Christian Egzhiabher, Jewish Yahweh, and Muslim Allah, and thereby open a process of communication of benefit not only Ethiopians but more than half of the world?
PROJECT: One way to pursue such conversations would be to hold them in a supportive, neutral place–perhaps even outside of Ethiopia. One possible site for this would be the center of Etz Hayyim, a restored ancient synagogue in the town of Hania, Crete. A historic temple whose congregants were all annihilated by the Nazis and whose building was later destroyed by an earthquake, it was placed non the list of endangered monuments of international cultural concern. Dr. Nicholas Stavroulakis spearheaded the campaign to restore the synagogue and maintains it now as a museum and conference center to promote dialogue among the Semitic religions. Dr. Stavroulakis has recently offered the site as a place for Ethiopians to meet and pursue a pan-Ethiopian ecumenical dialogue.
CONTACT: I am looking for a few Ethiopians who would be willing to help organize a project of this sort. If qualified and interested, please contact me at . To learn about the Etz Hayyim synagogue, see http://www.etz-hayyim-hania.org/
7. PAN-ETHIOPIAN SCHOLARLY DIALOGUE
BACKGROUND: For many years, the world of Ethiopian Studies comprised a vibrant international community whose participants knew and respected one another and where it really didn’t matter much if one were linguist or historian, geographer or musicologist, Northerner or Southerner, habesha or ferinj. Apart from the usual academic communications in what has been term an invisible college, the community manifested itself every few years in international conferences of Ethiopian Studies.
As Ethiopia became internally divided, however, the community of Ethiopianist scholars registered similar divisions, above and beyond the worldwide processes of professional specialization. Two splinter groups formed, the Eritrean Studies Association and the Oromo Studies Association, and for some years their respective members have had little or nothing to do with one another.
PROJECT: A small number of scholars who have been active in these associations are beginning to open a dialogue about finding ways to restore and enhance collegial communications. They include Drs. Asmarom Legesse, who originated this idea; Mohammed Hassen; Alessandro Triulzi; Donald Donham.; and myself. The idea is to organize a conference on a theme that would invite participation on a pan-Ethiopian basis and that might be relevant to the construction of a more democratic national society in Ethiopia. The idea of the first projected conference is to examine traditions of local democratic practices in the various. societies of historic Ethiopia.
CONTACT: Further details will be announced during the coming year.
Concluding comment.
The networks of communication among Ethiopians in the diaspora and with those at home make it possible to envision new dimensions of strength in the effort to help Ethiopia recover from the traumas of the past generation. Supposing all Ethiopians in the diaspora committed themselves to participating at some point in one or another project of the sort described here or elsewhere? Might it be possible to view them now, not just as “expatriates” but as “external patriots”?
A year ago this month, I was in Ethiopia enjoying the company of friends and loved ones. And now a year later, I am reliving the experience and wishing that I could still be there. On the flight from Rome to Addis Ababa, I was sitting next to a European married to an Ethiopian citizen. He lives and works in Addis Ababa as a businessman running his own business. During that long flight, this gentleman and I introduced ourselves to each other and began a long conversation about Ethiopia in general and Ethiopian politics and the prevailing economic system in particular. I was returning to Ethiopia after twenty nine years of absence and he has lived in Ethiopia longer than that as a businessman. He willingly assumed the role of an authority on current Ethiopian affairs and I became his interested student eager to learn what I was about to experience upon arrival in Ethiopia. The man was well informed and well connected with both the political establishment and the business community. I was grateful for his valuable information and for answering my questions.
One issue stands out more than any other the gentleman and I talked about. He predicted that government policies in Ethiopia were on the verge of a major shift. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was over and the Ethiopian government appeared to be reaching out to the people for better understanding and cooperation. The Ethiopian people had stood with the government in its hour of need during the war and it was reasonable to assume that the government would now be more responsive to the will and desire of the people. He singled out two specific government policy matters as being candidates for major reform. One was the rigid ethnic interpretation of federalism and the other was land ownership.
I was surprised to find exactly the same sentiment among a wide range of Ethiopians I was privileged to associate with for six weeks. There was both a sense of satisfaction that Ethiopia had successfully defended her sovereignty against Eritrea’s aggression and there was also an air of expectation that it was pay back time for the EPRDF regime. After all, the Ethiopian people had put their differences with the government aside and willingly sent their youth to die for the national cause. It was hoped that the EPRDF would finally see the value of national unity and the folly of ethnic politics.
Unfortunately, neither has happened so far. The EPRDF still ignores the will of the people and conducts business as usual. So far, there is no apparent reform on the government’s agenda to do something with the thorny issues of ethnic politics and land tenure. It is interesting to note that modern Ethiopian politics often surprises everyone with the unexpected. For example, no one expected the rise and fall of Mengistu HaileMariam and his regime in the manner that it did and no one expected the rise of the EPRDF to national power. And in more recent times, it caught experts and ordinary people alike by surprise when the honeymoon between the regimes in Addis Ababa and Asmera ended abruptly followed by a senesless and deadly conflict. It is interesting to note that even Haile Selassie’s rise to power had the element of surprise.
Speaking of the unexpected, it is even more astounding that the TPLF would break apart in the manner that it has. And what is next? Who knows! What has been known for sure so far is the fact that the EPRDF government has gone from bad to worse in terms of its power base. For ten years, the TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics with tight control of its power base in Tigray. It has also been able to control the rest of the country through ethnic organizations created after its own image. It is obvious at this point that, like Mengistu Hailemariam before him, Meles Zenawi has managed to neutralize his opponents within the TPLF in very dramatic fashion. For now, Meles Zenawi has outmaneuvered, outsmarted, outvoted, and marginalized his enemies. But his power base is shifting like quick sand and his future and the future of Ethiopia hang in the balance. And once again, the country is holding its breath for the next surprise in its troubled history.
Currently, the warning signs of a troubled regime are there for all to see. For ten years, the Tigrean population at large both in and out of the country blindly supported the TPLF and its regional and national vision with no apparent crack in its ranks. But that is now history. Tegreans in Ethiopia and in the diaspora are busy trying to figure out what to do next and they have joined the rest of the country with their new found confusion and dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, Meles Zenawi’s regime is losing trusted cadres and diplomats through defections and desertions. These are serious signs that all is not well with the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia. Consequently, the country’s future is also uncertain.
Sadly, the opposition is in no more predictable form either. The heavy handed approach of the EPRDF regime toward the opposition parties coupled with the inability of the opposition itself to forge a viable alliance has further complicated the future political landscape. Once again, Ethiopia is between a rock and a hard place. The EPRDF is floundering and so is the opposition. Without national reconciliation followed by a broad based government, Ethiopians are condemned to endure more of the same. And the burning question of the day is this: when will Ethiopian politicians learn the simple lesson that rule by repression has limited political capital and that a just and stable system guaranteeing a peaceful transfer of power from one group to another is in everyone’s best interest?
A week before I left Ethiopia last year, I took a trip to the south to visit my high school in Kuyera, Shashemane, and I was pleasantly surprised by the condition of the highway from Addis Ababa to Shashemane. The highway was freshly paved and it was simply impressive. When I reached my destination, I was able to locate some of my Arsi friends from high school days and we soon began talking about politics. I made the comment that the Ethiopian government has done them a huge favor by building such a beautiful highway. Their response was totally unexpected. They categorically stated that they were sure that the government did not build that road for their benefit. However, they were not exactly sure what the government stands to gain by building it. In other words, my Aris friends were not even willing to entertain the possibility that the government built the road for their benefit despite the fact that the people in that area will be well served by that highway. This tragically illustrates the point that governments that lose the good will of their people lose everything eventually. It is high time to recognize what has not and will not work and give the Ethiopian people what is rightfully theirs.
Adugnaw Worku is Associate Editor of Ethiopian Review. He resides in northern Califnornia.
In an attempt to divert attention from the serious problems facing his administration, Mr. Meles Zenawi wrote a hollow piece of paper sometime ago called “a renewal something” and ordered his employees and party cadres to discuss it for months. Although I have serious doubts about the effectiveness of both the paper and discussions, Ethiopians finally got a temporary relief from the nauseating media coverage of the drama, until now. The new drama these days is entitled “Poverty Reduction Strategy”, which this time is written, choreographed, and directed by the world bank and played by the same actors headed by Mr.. Zenawi.
The world bank’s motive for being behind the latest drama is to increase its lending program to Ethiopia. That institution is fast running out of new “initiatives” to justify more lending since loans made to-date have not shown any improvement in the performance of the economy and/or in improving the livelihood of ordinary Ethiopians. For the unsuspecting, recycling of past loans under a new cover of poverty reduction strategy sounds a new initiative to support increased lending. Mr. Zenawi also considers this as a good diversion from the catastrophe awaiting the forthcoming decision on border demarcation with Eritrea, and also as an endorsement of his “renewal” propaganda. The beneficiaries from this process will be the world bank and Mr. Zenawi, and the losers will be the people of Ethiopia.
Those of us who are deeply disturbed about the unfolding events in Ethiopian politics should also be concerned about the disastrous direction of the government’s economic policies, including the heavy dependence on external borrowing. Loans contracted by Zenawi’s administration over the last ten years exceed all non-military loans contracted by the previous two regimes combined. As a result, Ethiopia’s external debt is equivalent to an entire year’s Gross Domestic Product, or about US$100 per Ethiopian young and old, or equivalent to nearly 20 years of all exports. Future generations are doomed to languish in perpetual poverty as they will use the little export earnings to service such hugh loans rather than to invest for economic development and poverty reduction.
Contrary to common perception, the primary interest of external financial institutions (such as the world bank) is to lend more for their own survival and to promote exports from the industrialized countries rather than to help promote the economic development in third world countries. As demonstrated amply by numerous studies, over fifty years of lending by the world bank throughout the world had been ineffective in promoting sustainable development and in alleviating poverty. In fact the reverse was true, where more lending had driven the poor countries into deeper poverty due to the escalating debt service. An excellent recent example in Africa is Ghana, where over 20 years of heavy lending had done very little to alleviate poverty or to promote sustainable development.
Instead, that country’s future cocoa and mineral exports will be used for servicing loans that did not generate much net economic benefits. While the world bank used Ghana as an “excellent” example to sell its structural adjustment programs to the rest of Africa 15 years ago, it does not mention that country as an example of success story these days because the numerous structural adjustment and project loans over the past twenty years did not have much impact either in alleviating poverty or in promoting sustainable development. This was the main point of President G. Bush’s speech during the United Nations sponsored economic development summit in Mexico two weeks ago, when he emphatically stated that the hugh loans made in the past to the world’s poor had failed miserably in promoting economic development.
You can draw your own conclusions about the effectiveness(or lack of) of world bank lending to Ethiopia by reading on the world wide web the institution’s lending over the past ten years and its proposed lending in the near future. First log on www.world bank.org, and click countries & regions on the left side. Then choose Africa-Sub-Sahara, and select Ethiopia from the list of countries. On the left side of the page, you will see Lending Projects and Lending Pipeline. You can then read summaries of the listed projects (you need acrobat reader to read the summaries, and for that you just download the acrobat reader for free). Pay special attention to the report on a proposed “Food Security Program
Project”, which is one aspect of the poverty reduction strategy. The paper explains how past loans for similar projects elsewhere in Africa have failed, but yet proceeded to recommend similar program for Ethiopia, which I am certain would lead to the same disastrous results.
The hodgepodge components included in that project, in addition to being incoherent, would not make the targeted beneficiaries any more food secure than they are now. More seriously, the project would lead to misallocation of resources, lead the country to adopt unsound economic policy, and promote corruption all the way to the smallest administration units. This is another vivid confirmation of how foreign lending institutions are perpetuating poverty rather than promoting sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation. President Bush was absolutely correct in his remarks at the Mexico summit.
In summary, the big talk that is now going on in Ethiopia about poverty reduction strategy has everything to do with lending more by the world bank (and other external lenders) and very little to do about reducing poverty in Ethiopia. It also has everything to do with Mr.Zenawi’s attempt to get external credibility for his miserably failing administration, and with his scheme to divert domestic attention from the soon to be exposed end results of his conspiracy with Shabia to destroy Ethiopia.
NEW YORK – A top United Nations expert on the impact of armed conflict on children said today that during a recent visit to Eritrea and Ethiopia he had seen no systematic use of child soldiers and found no evidence of child abuse in refugee camps.
Briefing the press at UN Headquarters in New York on his mission to the two countries, Olara Otunnu, Secretary-General’s Kofi Annan’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, said that the absence of the “child soldiering” phenomenon was particularly impressive since no other conflict zone he had visited recently had been free of the problem.
In addition, since his field trip had coincided with the “horrific allegations” coming to light in western Africa about the systematic sexual exploitation of children in refugee camps, Mr. Otunnu said he looked for any inkling of such activity and found no reports or evidence of such abuse among women and children housed as either refugees or displaced persons. There appeared to be good coordination between the local authorities and community, and with the international personnel of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).
Mr. Otunnu attributed the fact that there was no military recruitment of children and no evidence of abuse in camps to the control exercised by the local authorities and communities. The locals both organized and monitored life in the camps and distributed provisions, he said, while the international community and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided support for their activities.
Furthermore, there was a high level of organization between the local authorities and the local population, particularly in seeing to the needs of vulnerable people, as well as a high level of cooperation based on rapport between UNMEE and the locals.
In moving forward, Mr. Otunnu stressed, there were two imperatives for Ethiopia and Eritrea. The first was to ensure a successful acceptance of the forthcoming decision on 13 April by the Boundary Commission on the disputed border. Acceptance could inaugurate a much-needed, definitive period of peace; both women and children said they wanted it and hoped their leaders would agree.
Secondly, the currently displaced people would need wide support for the resettlement activities that would return them to their homes with the tools to start development projects, Mr. Otunnu said.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
SOSSINA GIRMA,
Petitioner,
VERSUS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
February 20, 2002
Before JONES, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sossina Girma, appeals a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter “BIA”) denying her application for asylum and withholding of deportation.(1) Finding a proper application of the mixed motive standard and substantial evidence to support the BIA’s factual conclusions, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Girma, a native Ethiopian citizen of Amharic ethnicity, entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor in November 1991, with authorization to remain in the United States until November 11, 1992. After failing to depart as required, Girma filed an application for asylum and withholding of deportation in the fall of 1995. In December 1995, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause.
At her evidentiary hearing in the spring of 1996, Girma testified to the following: On June 30, 1991, Girma was abducted from her home/restaurant in Ethiopia by five masked men wearing army fatigue type clothing. Girma was then blindfolded, placed in a vehicle and driven to a warehouse full of wooden furniture where she was held for two hours and then questioned concerning her involvement with the All Amhara People’s Organization (hereinafter “AAPO”). After she admitted her affiliation with the AAPO, the abductors demanded that Girma pay a ransom for her release. Insisting that she had no money, Girma refused to pay the ransom. Angered by Girma’s refusal, the abductors assaulted and raped her. The abductors then drove Girma approximately 30 miles from the warehouse and set her free. Girma informed the local police of the incident; however, they did not believe her story and informed her that she would be “persecuted” if she continued “telling lies.” Girma was then admitted to a hospital where she remained for approximately one month. Between the time of her release from the hospital in late July and her departure to the United States in November 1991, Girma suffered no further encounters with her abductors.
In support of her testimony and application for asylum, Girma submitted a letter on AAPO letterhead dated July 17, 1991, identifying her as an AAPO member. Although Girma was in Ethiopia on July 17, 1991, the letter strongly advised Girma not to return to Ethiopia and failed to mention that Girma had been raped or beaten on June 30, 1991. Girma also submitted various articles discussing the political conditions in Ethiopia, including an Amnesty International study from 1995 indicating that the AAPO was not formed until 1992.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Immigration Judge (hereinafter “IJ”) denied Girma’s application. In March 2000, the BIA conducted a complete review of the record under a mixed motive analysis and affirmed the IJ’s ruling upon a finding that Girma did not present adequate evidence from which one would reasonably conclude that the harm she suffered was motivated, at least in part, on account of her membership in a particular social group, her actual or imputed political opinions, or any other protected ground. In reaching its decision, the BIA found that Girma failed to adequately establish who attacked her and that they were motivated on account of a protected ground rather than an unprotected one. Girma now challenges the BIA’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We have authority to review only an order of the BIA, not the IJ, unless the IJ’s decision has some impact on the BIA’s decision.” Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994)). Here, the BIA did not adopt the decision of the IJ, but conducted a complete review of the record. Thus, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision. The BIA’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while factual conclusions are reviewed for substantial evidence. See Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “Under the substantial evidence standard applicable to review of denials of asylum, we must defer to the BIA’s factual findings unless the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find otherwise.” Mikhael, 115 F.3d at 304. “The BIA’s determination that [Girma] was not eligible for asylum must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Girma argues that the BIA erred in denying her asylum application and that she is entitled to relief because of her past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion and association with the AAPO. Specifically, Girma contends that the BIA incorrectly required her to prove that her persecutors were motivated by a protected ground to the exclusion of other motivations, and therefore, failed to properly apply the mixed motive standard. Furthermore, Girma maintains that she satisfied the evidentiary burden set forth in Elias-Zacarias, by providing some evidence that the persecution she suffered was motivated, at least in part, by a protected ground.
The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who is a refugee. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 1999). The term alien is defined as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(3) (West 1999). An alien is a refugee when he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(42) (West 1999).
“The level of proof required to satisfy the requirements for withholding of deportation is more stringent than for asylum purposes.” Mikhael, 115 F.3d at 306 (citations omitted). To avoid deportation, “an alien must establish a clear probability of persecution.” INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2492, 81 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1984). Thus, where an alien fails to satisfy the requirements for asylum, he or she will also have failed to satisfy the requirements for withholding of deportation.
A. Mixed Motive Analysis
Oftentimes, persecutors will convey to their victims the motivation behind the persecution. Other times they may not. Persecution may also result from a mixture of motivations. Although our research reveals no Fifth Circuit case, and neither Girma nor the government have brought one to our attention, which involves a mixed motive analysis in the context of asylum law,(2) the BIA and at least two other circuit courts have applied a mixed motive analysis. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (BIA 1996); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999)(en banc); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1994).
Under a mixed motive analysis, an applicant need not show past persecution or fear of future persecution “solely on account of” a protected ground. Borja, 175 F.3d at 735 (quoting Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1028. Stated another way, “the presence of possible mixed motives need not [necessarily] defeat an asylum claim.” Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (discussing the holding in Borja, 175 F.3d 732). An applicant must only show that one of the persecutor’s motives falls within a statutorily protected ground. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, an applicant is not required to provide direct proof of her persecutor’s motives but rather some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S. Ct. at 816-17. The evidence presented, however, must compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the harm suffered by an applicant was motivated, at least in part by, a protected ground. Borja, 175 F.3d at 736.
In the instant case, the BIA concluded that Girma “did not establish by sufficient evidence that those who harmed her were motivated at least in part by a protected ground.” Particularly important in this conclusion, was the BIA’s determination that Girma failed to adequately establish who attacked her. The BIA reached this conclusion because Girma admitted in her evidentiary hearing that her persecutors “could have been government officials or common criminals.” The BIA also found that Girma did not sufficiently establish that her persecutors were motivated by her membership in the AAPO or political opinion, rather than her financial status as a business woman. The BIA reached this conclusion upon a finding that the record indicated that Girma’s persecutors were interested in her money and only began to harm her when she indicated that she could not pay the ransom sum they demanded from her. Furthermore, the BIA noted that Girma “acknowledged that she fears future harm from the government because the government believes that the respondent has money.”
Girma contends that in reaching its decision, the BIA erred in its mixed motive analysis by requiring her to demonstrate, to the exclusion of all other motivating factors, that her persecutors were motivated by a protected ground. Girma bases her argument concerning exclusivity of motivation upon a single sentence in the BIA decision which reads: “In addition, she did not sufficiently establish that her attackers were motivated by the respondent’s membership in the All Amhara People’s Organization (“AAPO”) or political opinion, rather than her financial status as a business woman.”
Although this sentence, read alone, may appear at first to support Girma’s argument, when read in the context of the entire BIA decision, Girma’s argument fails. In its decision, the BIA acknowledged that it was employing a mixed motive analysis, and that under this inquiry, the predominant motive for the abuse is not determinative. The BIA further acknowledged that an applicant for asylum must present evidence sufficient for one to reasonably believe that the harm suffered was motivated in meaningful part by a protected ground. A mixed motive analysis, by its very nature, requires that there be more than one possible factor motivating the persecutor. Here, the BIA examined motivations based upon economics, political opinion and membership in a social group. The BIA also acknowledged that Girma testified that she was kidnaped, questioned, beaten and raped on account of her AAPO membership, but found that “the record indicate[d] that the respondent’s attackers were interested in the respondent’s money and only began to harm her when she indicated that she could not pay the ransom sum.” Although an applicant is not required to present evidence showing, to the exclusion of all other factors, that the persecutor was motivated by a protected ground, the evidence must still be of such weight that it compels the fact-finder to conclude that the applicant suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. Borja, 175 F.3d at 735.
After a complete review of the record, the BIA determined that Girma “did not establish by sufficient evidence that those who harmed her were motivated at least in part by a protected ground.” The BIA’s use of the phrase “rather than,” was not an expression of a mutual exclusivity standard between protected and unprotected grounds but an explanation of its findings concerning the sufficiency of the evidence relative to multiple possible motivating grounds, two of which are protected and one which is not. The analysis performed by the BIA was consistent with a mixed motive inquiry’s requirements under Borja.
B. Substantial Evidence
Girma maintains that she has satisfied her evidentiary burden under Elias-Zacarias by providing some evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that her persecutors were motivated in part by a protected ground. Elias-Zacarias involved a Guatemalan native who fled his country to avoid conscription by Guatemalan guerillas. The issue before the Court was whether forced conscription by a guerilla organization necessarily constituted persecution. At his asylum and withholding of deportation hearing before the IJ, Elias-Zacarias admitted that he did not want to join the guerillas for fear of retaliation from the government. The IJ ultimately denied his application and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision and held that a guerilla organization’s coercive acts of conscription constitute persecution on account of political opinion because resisting conscription is, in effect, expressing a political opinion contrary to that of the persecutor, whose political motive underlies the coercive acts.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that conscription by coercive acts does not necessarily constitute persecution on account of political opinion, as even a person who supports a guerilla organization might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons unrelated to any political opinion. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482, 112 S. Ct. at 815-16. The Court did not decide whether Elias-Zacarias’s failure to take sides with any political faction constituted the affirmative expression of a political opinion. The Court did hold, however, that even assuming Elias-Zacarias’s failure to politically align himself with one side or the other constituted a political opinion, he must still “establish that the record also compels the conclusion that he has a ‘well-founded fear’ that the guerillas will persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S. Ct. at 816. (emphasis in original). In answer to Elias-Zacarias’s objection that he could not provide direct proof of his persecutor’s motives, the Court held that direct proof was not required, but rather some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial, and in order to warrant reversal of the BIA’s determination, the evidence presented must be “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S. Ct. at 816-17.
Reversal of a BIA determination under a substantial evidence standard does not hinge upon the quantity of evidence presented, but rather the quality. To reverse the BIA’s determination, the evidence presented must compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Girma suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution because of a protected ground. Id. Although Girma unquestionably presented some evidence that her persecutors were motivated by a protected ground, the record also contains evidence which questions its credibility. It remains for the BIA, however, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a grant of asylum. Rivas-Martinez, 997 F.2d at 1148. Here, after conducting a complete review of the record, the BIA properly applied the mixed motive analysis and found the evidence presented to be insufficient to reasonably conclude that the harm suffered by Girma was motivated, at least in part, on account of her membership in a particular social group, her actual or imputed political opinions, or any other protected ground. Any disagreement we might have with the BIA’s evaluation of the facts is not a sufficient ground for reversal. A reasonable fact-finder could have found the evidence presented by Girma sufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. We do not find, however, that the evidence presented would compel a fact-finder to do so. Accordingly, we find that the BIA decision reflects a proper application of the mixed motive standard and is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the BIA is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
1. Although this opinion refers only to Sossina Girma, the case involves a joint deportation proceeding where Sossina Girma’s request for asylum and withholding of deportation was joined with that of her minor daughter, Elshaday Abdo, who is seeking derivative asylum on the basis of Girma’s application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).
2. Girma suggests that our decision in Rivas-Martinez v. INS, 997 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993), involved a mixed motive case. However, that case recognized that when an asylum applicant has voiced a non-political excuse to avoid conscription, he is not thereafter precluded from demonstrating that the conscriptors either knew or would learn of the applicant’s political opposition by extraneous evidence. Rivas-Martinez, 997 F.2d at 1148.
