Harold G. Marcus, founding editor of H-Africa, died Wednesday, January 15, 2003, of cardiac arrest following complications from an ongoing heart condition. He is survived by his wife, Dr. Cressida Marcus, and a daughter, Emma Rose Marcus (from a previous marriage). Still a relatively young man at 66, Harold remained an inspiration for this network of scholars which he was instrumental in founding.

During the 1994 African Studies Association meeting in Toronto, Harold was touting both the possibility and the potential of an internet discussion forum for the scholarly discussions about Africa. There he recruited the first of his co-editors, and set in motion a process which led to H-Africa coming online in March 1995. He took a very active part in guiding our initial deliberations, seeking to involve a growing community of Africanists and others committed to the serious discussion of the continent. He remained convinced of the unparalleled value of H-Africa to contribute to the scholarly discourse. As recently as ten days before his death, Harold introduced a panel discussion of “Electronic Scholarship” at the American Historical Association annual meeting by speaking fondly of H-Africa’s place in that increasing universe of academe. He specifically recalled his vision of this forum as ushering in unique possibilities for “collective scholarship” about the continent. Such imagining was one of his greatest gifts, and it led him to take the lead in encouraging other, similar networks of scholars with more specific interests. It also led to his election to the governing Council of H-Net, Humanities and Social Sciences Online, the sponsoring organization of H-Africa.

At the same time, Harold was an accomplished scholar of a more traditional stripe. A graduate of Clark University, he received his PhD from Boston University in 1964 after studies with the anthropologist and historian, Daniel McCall. His dissertation research took him for the first time to Ethiopia, which became the focus of his academic interests for the rest of his life. He also studied and wrote more widely on African history, and on the development and decline of colonialism in Africa and worldwide. He was the author of many articles, editor of several books and collections of essays, and also editor of “Northeast Africa Studies.” His biographies of Ethiopian Emperors Menilek II and Haile Selassie were not only well received in scholarly circles, but are also widely read and reprinted. And his History of Ethiopia is widely regarded as perhaps the best short history of the country. Many journalists and government officials turned to him for understanding and guidance about a wide variety of matters concerning the horn of Africa.

Moreover, Harold believed that scholarship was nothing without commitment. He was active in what he believed were causes which served the people of northeastern Africa and their desire for better lives. He was an advocate for human rights, not just in that region, but in the whole of Africa and beyond. And he was, despite a sometimes gruff exterior, truly a man of compassion and caring, as many of his students and colleagues can testify. He was deeply committed to teaching, first at Addis Ababa and Howard Universities, and then for 35 years at Michigan State University where he was Distinguished Professor of History. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Khartoum and Osaka Gaidai University and lectured at scores of colleges and universities around the world. Harold believed that his scholarly efforts also demanded that he share his knowledge directly with students. Thus, he leaves a legacy of many former students around the world who owe him both intellectual and very often personal debts and who are carrying on his vision of an ever- widening circle of scholarship about Africa. The editors of H- Africa, all of whom were inspired by his plans and dreams for this network, share in those debts. We fondly hope that our efforts will stand as a fitting tribute to his commitment-to Africa and Africans, to the scholarly discussion of the continent, and to the promotion of this medium as a means of increasing the value of that scholarship.

In Memory of Harold Golden Marcus

By Mark Lawrence Kornbluh
May 5, 2003

When H-Net was launched exactly ten years ago, the relevance of the new communication media to African Studies was never considered. In 1993, most computers still had green screens and humanists were still making the transition from typewriters to word processing. Historians in this country were just beginning to gain access to email. The Internet was still mostly point-to-point bitnet and the World Wide Web had yet to be invented.

Not surprisingly then the first H-Net editors saw themselves as trail-blazers. They were proselytizers working amongst technological pioneers. H-Net was committed to building international connections, but these were envisioned almost solely in terms of the most developed parts of the world. Africa and African studies were not on the agenda.

Harold Marcus changed that overnight. Harold took one look at H-Net and immediately recognized that this was a tool that he could adopt for his purposes. Here was a way to tie together scholars around the world that were concerned with Africa. Internet access might be scarce in Africa, itself, but for Harold, this was a challenge rather than an insurmountable obstacle.

Starting H-Africa was not easy. Harold needed a collaborator, one to do the heavy lifting as he focused on the big picture, and found that in his former student and close friend Mel Page. He also needed to convince, Richard Jensen, H-Net’s strikingly conservative founding executive director. But as we all know, once moved Harold could be an unstoppable world wind. All obstacles were blown from his path, and the commitment was made to start H-Africa as MSU’s first homegrown H-Net network.

Harold was above all else very serious scholar. He did not suffer fools or foolish talk easily. Scholarly output was deeply important to him. He cajoled all who worked with him, his students, his colleagues, his friends and his competitors to devote their time and energy to scholarly research and publication. At first look, indeed at second and third thought as well, Harold seems an unlikely father to an online discussion forum. And yet at a time when most “serious” scholars were dismissing H-Net, many of them publicly, as frivolous chat, Harold devoted himself to launching H-Africa and to H-Net itself. (Indeed, by lending his gravitas to H-Net, Harold played a central role in H-Net’s development. He argued by word and action that this new media had an enormous potential for serious researchers.)

To understand this, we need to recognize Harold’s expansive vision for H-Net and new communication technologies. In the first place, Harold was a true believer in scholarly communication and collaboration. An inveterate conference attendee and organizer, he recognized that H-Africa could be an ongoing never ending conference. It was a place to meet where distance had no meaning and disciplinary boundaries vanished. Harold never tired of recounting how particular discussion threads on H-Africa advanced scholarly understanding. Whether it was a fascinating discussion on Mama Wata or on the economic development of Africa in the 14th and 15th centuries, Harold understood how scholarly work could be advanced by a broad sharing of ideas. First and foremost, new communication technology could seed new research by speeding up and greatly facilitating the exchange of ideas. Not all ideas were equally valuable. There is no doubt that on H-Africa, there was much chafe to weed through to get to the kernel wheat, just as there were scores of and scores of documents to work through in an archive to get to the nuggets that informed Harold’s scholarship. Such weeding was the work of the scholar, however, and Harold embraced it with a passion.

Harold also believed that scholarship should infuse teaching. Harold was a missionary. He wanted to improve teaching about African studies. Three months after H-Africa was launched, he wrote proudly, “Among the many beneficiaries have been high school teachers, community college instructors, and professors at remote and/or small four-year colleges. I have watched in happy wonderment as we bring back into the fellowship of Africanist those who had become anchorites and hermits in terms of their academic persuasion. One young scholar recently wrote that she no longer felt isolated as the only Africanist at Fort Lewis College, Colorado.”

Harold understood, to a greater extent than virtually any one else within H-Net did, that there was additive value in increasing scholarly communication. At a time, where the natural inclination was to stake out turf in cyberspace, Harold sought to multiply discussions and broaden forums. No sooner than he had launched H-Africa, then he began envisioning a whole family of African studies networks. He cajoled friends and colleagues into starting H-AfrArts and H-Afrlit&Cin. He scoured the country looking for scholars to start lists on African politics and sociology. Harold pushed the creation of H-AfrResearch to share information on research throughout the continent and he campaign to start H-AfrTeach to reach out to k-12 teachers. Today, H-Net has ten different networks directly within African studies. H-Africa, the granddaddy, has over 1500 subscribers worldwide and together the networks total over 5000 subscribers. (The breadth and vibrancy of this family of networks has become THE model within H-Net as scholars in other areas have come to realize that scholarly communication is far from a zero-sum game.)

While some might have thought a field with underdeveloped resources was the least likely place for new scholarly communication to take hold, Harold recognized that it was in such a field as African studies that new technology had the greatest potential benefit. African scholars within the US were often alone in their departments and even at their universities. Increased communication with their colleagues could be a lifeline. For African scholars in Africa, the situation was far worse. African universities were starved for print resources, scholars lacked the financial means to travel and meet their colleagues, African libraries lacked the hard currency resources to keep up with scholarly output, and African presses were unable to distribute scholarship effectively. The result was a very real feeling of isolation. From the start, Harold envisioned new communication technology as a way to overcome this.

Book reviewing is a good example. Book reviewing is essential to the scholarship as we know it. It is through the review process that scholarship gets known and evaluated. Harold, thus advocated for, helped to secure funding for, and helped to start, H-Net Reviews. He worked hard to ensure that works published in African got reviewed on H-Net and that H-Net Reviews were widely circulated. Just two months after H-Africa launched, Harold wrote: As I considered the world of good that H-Africa has accomplished in such a short time, and what it would achieve in the future, it occurred to me that the H-Net generally and H-Africa specifically could play an important role for African scholars. They complain about their isolation and remoteness from mainstream academia and changes in their field; and they rightly point to the inadequacy of their library resources as a hindrance to their scholarly undertakings. As a result, the scholarship often accomplished by our African colleagues is often very local and limited in terms of theory and paradigm. H-Africa could serve to keep them current of changes in the field, and our new book reviewing effort can help them keep up with the most current scholarship. They might even be able to get relevant books for review. The possibilities for our African colleagues seem enormous and relevant to their needs.

Having traveled widely in Africa, Harold understood better than most, the potential that internet connectivity could mean for Africa. I remember visiting the main university library in Accra with Harold. He dragged me into the stacks, as they were, vividly pointing out the paucity of quality books and journals. African universities had lost out in a major way in the print world of the twentieth century academy. The gap was insurmountable. The promise of new technology was the potential to leapfrog over that chasm to make available to the professor in Dakar, the grad student in Bamako, the undergrad in Dar Salaam, the economist in Johannesburg, the political scientist in Mogadishu, the Historian in Addis, the very same scholarly resources that one could get at Harvard, Berkeley, or East Lansing. That potential is revolutionary. It also will not happen by itself. The cost of new information systems is not insignificant and the technological knowledge gap continues to grow day by day. In the US, it was possible to take the attitude, that if we built it, they would come. For Africa, that was unrealistic. Harold realized that it would take a concerted effort to ensure that our African colleagues would be able to share in the information revolution. He was an early, loud, and consistent advocate for projects to bring information technology to Africa, to increase bandwidth, to mirror electronic resources in African universities, and to train and capacitate our colleagues at African universities to take ownership of the tools of information technology.

For Harold, information technology was a means, not an end in itself. It was a tool to advance scholarship. It was a means to inform teaching with the latest scholarship. It was a way to spread information and effect positive change. (One of his proposals was to use H-Net to set up a crisis network for Africa to get the word out quickly worldwide when a crisis loomed, whether it was a famine or political repression.) Information technology was bringing the world closer together; Harold worked to ensure that Africa was included.

By Negussay Ayele

Background to Deir Sultan at a glance

Unknown by much of the world, monks and nuns of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, have for centuries quietly maintained the only presence by black people in one of Christianity’s holiest sites—the Church of the Holy Sepulcher of Jesus Christ in Jerusalem. Through the vagaries and vicissitudes of millennial history and landlord changes in Jerusalem and the Middle East region, Ethiopian monks have retained their monastic convent in what has come to be known as Deir Sultan or the Monastery of the Sultan for more than a thousand years. Likewise, others that have their respective presences in the area at different periods, include Armenian, Russian, Syrian, Egyptian and Greek Orthodox/Coptic Churches as well as the Holy See. As one writer put it recently, “For more than 1500 years, the Church of Ethiopia survived in Jerusalem. Its survival has not, in the last resort, been dependent on politics, but on the faith of individual monks that we should look for the vindication of the Church’s presence in Jerusalem….They are attracted in Jerusalem not by a hope for material gain or comfort, but by faith.” It is hoped that public discussion on this all-important subject will be joined by individuals and groups from all over the world, particularly the African Diaspora. At this time, I will confine myself to offering a brief profile of the Ethiopian presence in Jerusalem and its current state of turmoil. I hope that others with more detailed and/or first hand knowledge about the subject will join in the discussion.

Accounts of Ethiopian presence in Jerusalem invoke the Bible to establish the origin of Ethiopian presence in Jerusalem. Accordingly, some Ethiopians refer to the story of the encounter in Jerusalem between Queen of Sheba–believed to have been a ruler in Ethiopia and environs–and King Solomon, cited, for instance, in I Kings 10: 1-13. According to this version, Ethiopia’s presence in the region was already established about 1000 B.C. possibly through land grant to the visiting Queen, and that later transformation into Ethiopian Orthodox Christian monastery is an extension of that same property. Others refer to the New Testament account of Acts 8: 26-40 which relates the conversion to Christianity of the envoy of Ethiopia’s Queen Candace (Hendeke) to Jerusalem in the first century A.D., thereby signaling the early phase of Ethiopia’s adoption of Christianity. This event may have led to the probable establishment of a center of worship in Jerusalem for Ethiopian pilgrims, priests, monks and nuns.

Keeping these renditions as a backdrop, what can be said for certain is the following. Ethiopian monastic activities in Jerusalem were observed and reported by contemporary residents and sojourners during the early years of the Christian era. By the time of the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem and the region (634-644 A.D.) khalif Omar is said to have confirmed Ethiopian physical presence in Jerusalem’s Christian holy places, including the Church of St. Helena which encompasses the Holy Sepulcher of the Lord Jesus Christ. His firman or directive of 636 declared that “the Iberian and Abyssinian communities remain there” while also recognizing the rights of other Christian communities to make pilgrimages in the Christian holy places of Jerusalem. Because Jerusalem and the region around it, has been subjected to frequent invasions and changing landlords, stakes in the holy places were often part of the political whims of respective powers that be. Subsequently, upon their conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, the Crusaders, had kicked out Orthodox/Coptic monks from the monasteries and installed Augustine monks instead. However, when in 1187 Salaheddin wrested Jerusalem from the Crusaders, he restored the presence of the Ethiopian and other Orthodox/Coptic monks in the holy places. When political powers were not playing havoc with their claims to the holy places, the different Christian sects would often carry on their own internecine conflicts among themselves, at times with violent results.
“For more than 1500 years, the Church of Ethiopia survived in Jerusalem. Its survival has not, in the last resort, been dependent on politics, but on the faith of individual monks that we should look for the vindication of the Church’s presence in Jerusalem….They are attracted in Jerusalem not by a hope for material gain or comfort, but by faith.”

Contemporary records and reports indicate that the Ethiopian presence in the holy places in Jerusalem was rather much more substantial throughout much of the period up to the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, an Italian pilgrim, Barbore Morsini, is cited as having written in 1614 that “the Chapels of St. Mary of Golgotha and of St. Paul…the grotto of David on Mount Sion and an altar at Bethelheim…” among others were in the possession of the Ethiopians. From the 16th to the middle of the 19th centuries, virtually the whole of the Middle East was under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. When one of the Zagwe kings in Ethiopia, King Lalibela (1190-1225), had trouble maintaining unhampered contacts with the monks in Jerusalem, he decided to build a new Jerusalem in his land. In the process he left behind one of the true architectural wonders known as the Rock-hewn Churches of Lalibela. The Ottomans also controlled Egypt and much of the Red Sea littoral and thereby circumscribed Christian Ethiopia’s communication with the outside world, including Jerusalem. Besides, they had also tried but failed to subdue Ethiopia altogether. Though Ethiopia’s independent existence was continuously under duress not only from the Ottomans but also their colonial surrogate, Egypt as well as from the dervishes in the Sudan, the Ethiopian monastery somehow survived during this period. Whenever they could, Ethiopian rulers and other personages as well as church establishments sent subsidies and even bought plots of land where in time churches and residential buildings for Ethiopian pilgrims were built in and around Jerusalem. Church leaders in Jerusalem often represented the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in ecumenical councils and meetings in Florence and other fora.

During the 16th and 17th centuries the Ottoman rulers of the region including Palestine and, of course, Jerusalem, tried to stabilize the continuing clamor and bickering among the Christian sects claiming sites in the Christian holy places. To that effect, Ottoman rulers including Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) and Suleiman “the Magnificent” (1520-1566) as well as later ones in the 19th century, issued edicts or firmans regulating and detailing by name which group of monks would be housed where and the protocol governing their respective religious ceremonies. These edicts are called firmans of the Status Quo for all Christian claimants in Jerusalem’s holy places including the Church of the Holy Sepulcher which came to be called Deir Sultan or the monastery (place) of the Sultan. Ethiopians referred to it endearingly as Debre Sultan. Most observers of the scene in the latter part of the 19th Century as well as honest spokesmen for some of the sects attest to the fact that from time immemorial the Ethiopian monks had pride of place in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Deir Sultan). Despite their meager existence and pressures from fellow monks from other countries, the Ethiopian monks survived through the difficult periods their country was going through such as the period of feudal autarchy (1769-1855). Still, in every document or reference since the opening of the Christian era, Ethiopia and Ethiopian monks have been mentioned in connection with Christian holy places in Jerusalem, by all alternating landlords and powers that be in the region.

As surrogates of the weakening Ottomans, the Egyptians were temporarily in control of Jerusalem (1831-1840). It was at this time, in 1838, that a plague is said to have occurred in the holy places which in some mysterious ways of Byzantine proportions, claimed the lives of all Ethiopian monks. The Ethiopians at this time were ensconced in a chapel of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Deir Sultan) as well as in other locales nearby. Immediately thereafter, the Egyptian authorities gave the keys of the Church to the Egyptian Coptic monks. The Egyptian ruler, Ibrahim Pasha, then ordered that all thousands of very precious Ethiopian holy books and documents, including historical and ecclesiastical materials related to property deeds and rights, be burned—alleging conveniently that the plague was spawned by the Ethiopian parchments. Monasteries are traditionally important hubs of learning and, given its location and its opportunity for interaction with the wider family of Christiandom, the Ethiopian monastery in Jerusalem was even more so than others. That is how Ethiopians lost their choice possession in Deir Sultan. By the time other monks arrived in Jerusalem, the Copts claimed their squatter’s rights, the new Ethiopian arrivals were eventually pushed off onto the open rooftop of the church, thanks largely to the machinations of the Egyptian Coptic church.

Although efforts on behalf of Ethiopian monks in Jerusalem started in mid-19th Century with Ras Ali and Dejach Wube, it was the rise of Emperor Tewodros in 1855 in Ethiopia that put the Jerusalem monastery issue back onto international focus. When Ethiopian monks numbering a hundred or so congregated in Jerusalem at the time, the Armenians had assumed superiority in the holy places. The Anglican bishop in Jerusalem then, Bishop Samuel Gobat witnessed the unholy attitude and behavior of the Armenians and the Copts towards their fellow Christian Ethiopians who were trying to reclaim their rights to the holy places in Jerusalem. He wrote that the Ethiopian monks, nuns and pilgrims “were both intelligent and respectable, yet they were treated like slaves, or rather like beasts by the Copts and the Armenians combined…(the Ethiopians) could never enter their own chapel but when it pleased the Armenians to open it. …On one occasion, they could not get their chapel opened to perform funeral service for one of their members. The key to their convent being in the hands of their oppressors, they were locked up in their convent in the evening until it pleased their Coptic jailer to open it in the morning, so that in any severe attacks of illness, which are frequent there, they had no means of going out to call a physician.’’ It was awareness of such indignities suffered by Ethiopian monks in Jerusalem that is said to have impelled Emperor Tewodros to have visions of clearing the path between his domain and Jerusalem from Turkish/Egyptian control, and establishing something more than monastic presence there. In the event, one of the issues which contributed to the clash with British colonialists that consumed his life 1868, was the quest for adequate protection of the Ethiopian monks and their monastery in Jerusalem.

Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889), the priestly warrior king, used his relatively cordial relations with the British who were holding sway in the region then, to make representations on behalf of the Ethiopian monastery in Jerusalem. He carried on regular pen-pal communications with the monks even before he became Emperor. He sent them money, he counseled them and he always asked them to pray for him and the country, saying, “For the prayers of the righteous help and serve in all matters. By the prayers of the righteous a country is saved.” He used some war booty from his battles with Ottomans and their Egyptian surrogates, to buy land and started to build a church in Jerusalem. As he died fighting Sudanese/Dervish expansionists in 1889, his successor, Emperor Menelik completed the construction of the Church named Debre Gennet located on what was called “Ethiopian Street.” During this period more monasteries, churches and residences were also built Empresses Tayitu, Zewditu, Menen as well as by several other personages including Afe Negus Nessibu, Dejazmach Balcha, Woizeros Amarech Walelu, Beyenech Gebru, Altayeworq. As of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century the numbers of Ethiopian monks and nuns increased and so did overall Ethiopian pilgimage and presence in Jerusalem. In 1903, Emperor Menelikput $200, 000 thalers in a (Credileone?) Bank in the region and ordained that interests from that savings be used exclusively as subsidy for the sustenance of the Ethiopian monks and nuns and the upkeep of Deir Sultan. Emperor Menelik’s 6-point edict also ordained that no one be allowed to draw from the capital in whole or in part. Land was also purchased at various localities and a number of personalities including Empress Tayitu, and later Empress Menen, built churches there. British authorities supported a study on the history of the issue since at least the time of kalifa (Calif) Omar ((636) and correspondences and firmans and reaffirmations of Ethiopian rights in 1852, in an effort to resolve the chronic problems of conflicting claims to the holy sites in Jerusalm. The 1925 study concluded that ”the Abyssinian (Ethiopian ) community in Palestine ought to be considered the only possessor of the convent Deir Es Sultan at Jerusalem with the Chapels which are there and the free and exclusive use of the doors which give entrance to the convent, the free use of the keys being understood.”

Until the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930’s when Mussolini confiscated Ethiopian accounts and possessions everywhere, including in Jerusalem, the Ethiopian presence in Jerusalem had shown some semblance of stability and security, despite continuing intrigues by Copts, Armenians and their overlords in the region. This was a most difficult and trying time for the Ethiopian monks in Jerusalem who were confronted with a situation never experienced in the country’s history, namely its occupation by a foreign power. And, just like some of their compatriots including Church leaders at home, some paid allegiance to the Fascist rulers albeit for the brief (1936-1941) interregnum. Emperor Haile Sellassie was also a notable patron of the monastery cause, and the only monarch to have made several trips to Jerusalem, including en route to his self-exile to London in May, 1936. Since at least the 1950s there was an Ethiopian Association for Jerusalem in Addis Ababa which coordinated annual Easter pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Hundreds of Ethiopians and other persons from Ethiopia and the Diaspora took advantage of its good offices to go there for absolution, supplication or felicitation, and the practice continues today. Against all odds, historical, ecclesiastical and cultural bonding between Ethiopia and Jerusalem waxed over the years. The Ethiopian presence expanded beyond Deir Sultan including also numerous Ethiopian Churches, chapels, convents and properties. This condition required that the Patriarchate of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church designate Jerusalem as a major diocese to be administered under its own Archbishop.

Contemporary developments related to Deir Sultan

The foregoing pages should give the reader some idea of the deeply rooted but checkered and sinewy Ethiopian tenure in Jerusalem’s Deir Sultan. That the Ethiopian monastery has survived so far against all odds, is nothing short of a miracle. The different powers played havoc with the Ethiopian monks and nuns in Deir Sultan, taking away their key to their own chapel, changing locks on them, burning their precious religious materials, beating and mistreating them and eventually pushing them out of their central holdings in the main chapel of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher onto the rooftop of the Church. Still, they remained there making their own thatched roofs, linoleum ceiling covers, plants for shades, water well and makeshift cookeries and bathrooms. There they stayed fasting, praying, singing hymnals in the style of David of old. They also carried on their religious rituals and ceremonies in accordance with the practices and requisites of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Throughout its history the Ethiopian monastery has been a political football for Egyptian Copts and Armenian Orthodox in particular and the Turks and other overlords of the region in general. Most of the time, the Ethiopian state, was not in a position to do much on behalf of the Deir Sultan Ethiopian monks, as it was itself struggling for its survival and sovereignty in a hostile environment. Only towards the end of the 19th Century, did the Ethiopian state and the Metropolitan in Addis Ababa start making some difference in stabilizing whatever could be salvaged from centuries of Egyptian/Coptic usurpation sustained by the Ethiopian monastery.

Egyptian government/Coptic cabal against Ethiopian/black presence in Jerusalem became even more politicized and more pronounced after the 1950’s when the Ethiopian Orthodox Church opted to be autocephalous, thereby ending the centuries old tutelage of the Alexandrian Coptic Church, which had until then provided the Metropolitan or Patriarch for the Ethiopian Church. The Egyptian Copts never got over that act of self-determination by the Ethiopian Church, and they were quick to peg their petty or greedy quest for complete takeover of all Ethiopian properties and possessions in the holy places, especially the prized Church of the Holy Sepulcher. To that end, they have leaned on the Egyptian government to pressure different landlords of Jerusalem including the Jordanians until 1967 and the Israelis since then. In one form or another, therefore, the question of Deir Sultan has become intertwined with the larger issue of Arab/Palestinian an Israeli conflict in the region. Technically, the Status Quo firmans issued in earlier times, as adumbrated in foregoing pages, are supposed to govern possessions of the holy places in question and relations among the Christian claimants of same. These firmans are not only rigorous and stringent, but it is also incumbent on all landlords that be–such as Turks, British, Jordanian or Israeli—to enforce them strictly to the letter. A recent report points out, for example, that the Status Quo “prohibits simple renovations, removal of fallen debris from the decaying ceiling, even sweeping has to be done in the dark or the Ethiopians risk being reported to the authorities by their Christian neighbors.” Despite such strict provisions, it is, as we have seen heretofore, the rights and footholds of the Ethiopian monks that have been continuously usurped, to benefit mainly the Egyptian Copts and then the Armenians and to some extent other groups as well. The Ethiopian monks are even victims of internecine rivalries and jockeying for advantages among the other Christian usual suspects.

When in 1948, the State of Israel came into existence in Palestine, Jerusalem was still part of the Kingdom of Jordan. The ever irksome Copts provoked a confrontation with Ethiopian monks in Deir Sultan which required Jordanian intervention or, more properly enforcement of the age-old Status Quo provisions. Given the somewhat frigid relations then between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand and the nascent cordiality between Emperor Haile Sellassie and King Hussein on the other at that moment, the Jordanian government ordered that the Egyptian Copts hand over the keys to Deir Sultan to the Ethiopians. When the Copts failed to comply with the order, the Jordanians went ahead and changed the locks and gave the new keys to the Ethiopians. This was, however, short lived as newfound courtship between Egyptian President Nasser and Jordanian king Hussein resulted in a Jordanian volte-face which reversed their earlier ruling and the keys were once again given to the Copts. As is well known, in its sweeping military victory over its Arab antagonists in the 1967 war, Israel occupied territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. More importantly, Israel wrested Jerusalem from Jordanian control and became henceforth the new landlord of the Christian holy places as well. And so, the problem of Deir Sultan was now squarely on Israel’s shoulders. And, it did not take long for their judgment to be tested. The chronic tug-of-war between the Copts and Ethiopian Orthodox monks flared up again in 1970, when the Israeli government is said to have changed the locks and given the keys to the Ethiopians. The Copts, as expected, did not take this lying down. They decided to take the matter to the Israeli courts where they filed papers alleging that they were the sole owners of Deir Sultan and that at best the Ethiopians were only guests with no property rights to the holy places. In 1971, the Israeli High Court is said to have ruled in favour of the Coptic claim and ordered that the government turn over the keys to the Copts. It is reported that the Israeli government did not comply with the court order insisting that “its dispute with the Copts was political and not legal and that the judiciary should desist from pressuring the government to resolve the case in court.” It is to be remembered that through all this, the Egyptian Copts have already usurped the main floor and chapel of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Ethiopians are pushed to the rooftop of the Church. What the Copts want is for the Ethiopians to disappear once and for all from the scene, from the last vestige of presence they have maintained for nearly two thousand years altogether. With such Christian charity who needs enemies.

Despite the fact that the government of Emperor Haile Sellassie broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973, in solidarity with Egypt (an OAU member) which lost its Sinai territory, the Israeli government did not at this time retaliate by siding with the Egyptian Copts. To be sure, the Israelis were, and some say they still are, annoyed by Ethiopia’s decision which they regard as ‘betrayal’ and which also spawned an avalanche of diplomatic break off of ties with Israel by several other African countries, they did not retaliate on Deir Sultan for several reasons. One reason was that in the larger Arab-Israeli scheme of things, Deir Sultan does not figure big either for Egypt, the Arabs or for Israel. Sinai, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, Red Sea littoral and most importantly, sovereignty over Jerusalem as a whole and, when all is said and done, Palestinian/Arab and Israeli peaceful coexistence in the region are the most important issues. At best, the Deir Sultan issue is a nuisance to them as it has been for all landlords of Jerusalem historically.

Another reason for the Israeli reluctance to tackle the Deir Sultan dispute between mainly the Copts and the Ethiopian monks has to do with yet a different factor in the mix embedded in millennial history of the region. For a very long time, it was recognized by Zionist elements that several thousands of Ethiopians referred to in Ethiopia as falashas and now named bete Israelis as being more or less Jews and in the early 1970’s the rabbinical authorities had authenticated as Jews in exile from one of the lost tribes and therefore eligible for the right of return or aliyah to Israel. Thus, for several years Jewish groups in North America, Europe and Israel had been working painstakingly to safely facilitate the return of the Ethiopian Jews to Israel, and the Israeli government was well advised not to jeopardize this process by antagonizing the Ethiopian government(s) on the Deir Sultan issue. In the event, between the mid-1980’s and 1991 more than 60, 000 Ethiopian Jews have arrived in Israel.

It appears that the Egyptian government and the Copts have left no stone unturned to divest the Ethiopian Church of its rightful heritage in Jerusalem which is as much, if not more, legitimate as that of the Copts and other Christian sects. It is to be recalled that in 1978, then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat were negotiating land for peace through the good offices of U.S. president Jimmy Carter at Camp David. It is believed that in the course of those negotiations, Sadat privately raised the Deir Sultan issue on behalf of the Copts under his suzerainty, and it is intimated that Begin made some kind of personal promise to him. Inasmuch as what transpired or what exactly was promised was all personal, private and unregistered or not declared publicly at the time, one wonders if any responsible state or government would deem to be duty bound to act upon such informal exchanges. The Egyptians are said to have also raised the matter of Deir Sultan at the Israeli-Egyptian Normalization talks in 1986. What is of interest to us here in all of the above litany of Egyptian/Coptic pleas and goadings, is how relentless and dogged the Egyptians/Copts have been in their hostility to Ethiopian/black Christian presence in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher of Jerusalem.

This brings us to the latest physical clashes perpetrated by the Egyptian Coptic clerics in the Deir Sultan holy site in Jerusalem, which has been the subject of several reports by British, American, Israeli and Arab papers.

Unholy violence occurred in Christianity’s holiest place in Jerusalem at the end of July 2002, when an Egyptian Coptic priest, Father Abdel Malek, decided to bring a chair, go up to the rooftop of the Church, which is the last remaining preserve of the Ethiopian monks, and proceeded to sit there under the shade of a tree in clear violation of the Status Quo. It is to be remembered that, the cleric and his colleagues would not allow Ethiopians to visit, sit or worship in the Coptic chapels. The details are sketchy in terms who did what and when. However, it appears that when Ethiopians naturally tried to resist this wanton violation of their rights to their space by the impudent Copt, violent clashes erupted involving also Israeli policemen. In the melee, nearly a dozen monks, mostly Ethiopians suffered injuries and lascerations. After all that, it is reported that, escorted by Israeli police daily, Coptic cleric Abdel Malek continued to perch at the Ethiopian property, presumably until the Ministry of Religious Affairs issues a ruling on the matter. A question that comes on loudly to an interested observer is, “Why did the Copts choose this particular time to force a confrontation on Deir Sultan?” It seems that, given the volatile and bloody situation in Palestinian and Israeli relations, the Egyptians/Copts may have assumed that the Israelis may at the moment be ready to cave in and Deir Sultan’s rooftop may just be the kind of bone they can throw to them to elicit a possible or putative mediating role vis-à-vis the Palestinians. And the Egyptians/Copts continue to put pressure on Israel by inflaming Arab opinion. Egyptian President Mubarak is said to have boycotted an important regional meeting recently protesting the Deir Sultan affair. An Arab paper reported that earlier on, Pope Shenuda III of Alexandria lambasted Israeli Prime Minister Israel Sharon, calling on the Arab world to unite and put more effective pressure on Israel, inserting his pet agenda and saying, “the Israelis are occupying since 1970, the Deir Al Sultan church in east Jerusalem by force, and did not implement a ruling issued by the Jewish Supreme Court in favor of the (his Coptic) church.”

Since these shameful events, several deputations and representations to the Israeli authorities have been made by a newly formed “Ethiopian Association for Jerusalem” in the United States. These deputations took the form of written communications to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., and also in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Other concerned groups including the longstanding Association in Ethiopia and individuals of Ethiopian origin are, no doubt making efforts to let the authorities in Israel know their concern on the issue. It is also hoped that the black Jews from Ethiopia and elsewhere will also weigh in on the matter. Though the current regime in Addis Ababa is better known for its systematic destruction of Ethiopian history, culture, and integrity, it sent a delegation to Israel for perfunctory reasons and with no avail on behalf of the Ethiopian monks or the monastery. Given the split of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Addis Ababa and in the Diaspora, the Church’s effectiveness in successfully challenging the Egyptian Coptic pressures to eliminate Ethiopian, hence black presence in Jerusalem is a matter of serious concern.
Ethiopia and Black Heritage In Jerusalem

For hundreds of years, the name or concept of Ethiopia has been a beacon for black/African identity liberty and dignity throughout the Diaspora. The Biblical (Psalm 68:31) verse , “…Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God” has been universally taken to mean African people, black people at large, stretch out their hands to God (and only to God) in supplication, in felicitation or in absolution. As Daniel Thwaite put it, for the Black man Ethiopia was always “…an incarnation of African independence.” And today, Ethiopian monastic presence in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher or Deir Sultan in Jerusalem, is the only Black presence in the holiest place on earth for Christians. For much of its history, Ethiopian Christianity was largely hemmed in by alternating powers in the region. Likewise, Ethiopia used its own indigenous Ethiopic languages for liturgical and other purposes within its own territorial confines, instead of colonial or other lingua franca used in extended geographical spaces of the globe. For these and other reasons, Ethiopia was not able to communicate effectively with the wider Black world in the past. Given the fact that until recently, most of the Black world within Africa and in the Diaspora was also under colonial tutelage or under slavery, it was not easy to appreciate the significance of Ethiopian presence in Jerusalem. Consequently, even though Ethiopian/Black presence in Jerusalem has been maintained through untold sacrifices for centuries, the rest of the Black world outside of Ethiopia has not taken part in its blessings through pilgrimages to the holy sites and thereby develop concomitant bonding with the Ethiopian monastery in Jerusalem. Apropos to this theme, there is an initiative afoot by a few individuals to launch a “Forum for African Heritage in Jerusalem” website that can serve as a forum for education, dialogue and/or action by any and all concerned on Deir Sultan and the sustenance of Black presence there.

For nearly two millennia now, the Ethiopian Church and its adherent monks and priests have miraculously maintained custodianship of Deir Sultan, suffering through and surviving all the struggles we have glanced at in these pages. In fact, the survival of Ethiopian/Black presence in Christianity’s holy places in Jerusalem is matched only by the “Survival Ethiopian Independence” itself. Indeed, Ethiopian presence in Deir Sultan represents not just Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity but all African/black Christians of all denominations who value the sacred legacy that the holy places of Jerusalem represent for Christians everywhere. It represents also the affirmation of the fact that Jerusalem is the birthplace of Christianity, just as adherents of Judaism and Islam claim it also. The Ethiopian foothold at the rooftop of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher is the only form of Black presence in Christianity’s holy places of Jerusalem. It ought to be secure, hallowed and sanctified ground by and for all Black folks everywhere who value it. The saga of Deir Sultan also represents part of Ethiopian history and culture. And that too is part of African/black history and culture regardless of religious orientation.

When a few years ago, an Ethiopian monk was asked by a writer why he had come to Jerusalem to face all the daily vicissitudes and indignities, he answered, “because it is Jerusalem.” And the writer makes the perceptive observation that “The Ethiopian church in Jerusalem itself resembles a plant which in Jerusalem has found poor soil, but has continued to grow in defiance of the laws of probability and to survive the hardest winters and the hottest summers.” The number of Ethiopian monks and nuns domiciled in Deir Sultan today has shrank drastically from several hundreds at the turn of the century to a few dozens today. And they are of the view that “if they are forced to leave Deir as-Sultan Monastery, blacks will never again be represented in the sacred place.” It is hoped that henceforth not only Ethiopians but all other Black folks from every land in the African continent and in the Diaspora will embark on annual pilgrimages to the Ethiopian convent of Deir Sultan and assert their rights of representation in this holiest of holy Christian shrines in Jerusalem.

Elias Kifle
August 2002

The strategy of forming a “united front” to free our country from the TPLF/EPRDF tyranny needs to be reviewed and adjusted. I believe the current strategy has miserably failed. It’s about time we must admit that and change course. The new strategy should call for Ethiopians to rally around one viable organization that is operating inside the country. We need a “united front” of individual Ethiopians, not a collection of weak political groups. We need to consolidate our scarce resources and support one organization that is ideologically and organizationally equipped to bring about positive political change in our country. We have such an organization, namely, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP).

EDP is emerging as the most promising political movement in Ethiopia. It is a broad-based political movement that is inclusive of all ethnic backgrounds, languages, religions, and economic classes. EDP’s multi-ethnic character makes it attractive to most Ethiopians. EDP’s ideological “big tent” can accommodate Ethiopians of diverse political views. Those of us who wish to see ethnic apartheid eliminated from our country need to join this organization, which is trying to build a strong foundation to become a powerful force for change in our country.

What EDP accomplished so far

In the 2-1/2 years since EDP was established, it has already been able to make significant impact on Ethiopian politics. Its strategy of peaceful struggle is producing significant results. In the past six months alone, EDP has organized two mass demonstrations in which over one hundred thousand people participated; conducted a petition drive through which 135,000 people signed on a petition letter to the United Nations opposing the Hague Ruling; and held major political rallies in seven cities from the southern city of Awassa to the northern city of Mekele.

EDP’s popularity has forced All Amara People Organization (AAPO) to transform itself from an ethnic party into a national party. It was a wise decision that should be applauded by all Ethiopians who oppose ethnic politics. There may be a great deal of pressure on SEPDC and ONC to do the same, or become fringe political groups soon, leaving the political field only to EDP and AEUO (formerly AAPO). From his latest comment, one can detect that even Meles Zenawi may be considering abandoning his ethnic-based party (TPLF) and form a national party to assure his political survival. Thus EDP, by its existence alone, is contributing to the defeat of TPLF regime’s ethnic politics.

EDP top leaders are now concluding a 17-city tour in North America. As a result of a visit to North America last year by an EDP delegation led by Vice Chairman Dr Hailu Araya, 13 EDP support committees were created. These support committees in North America helped financed two mass demonstrations organized by EDP in Addis Ababa, and EDP leadership’s tour in several cities across Ethiopia, including the historic public meeting in Mekele earlier this year. As a result of this year’s visit by the EDP leaders in the United States and Europe, there will be over 22 EDP committees through out North America and Europe, putting in place a strong source of material and political support for EDP’s upcoming campaigns in Ethiopia, particularly the 2005 parliamentary elections.

The 2005 elections in Ethiopia

I’m focusing on EDP in this piece. However, I’m encouraged by the transformation of AAPO into a multi-ethnic party under a new name (AEUO), and I believe that it presents a viable alternative to EDP. Both EDP and AEUO can be organizationally strong enough to overcome the unfair and fraudulent ways elections are held in Ethiopia under the TPLF regime. In areas where these parties are well organized, the people will prevent the TPLF/EPRDF cadres from stealing votes. This has been demonstrated in some areas of Ethiopia in the 2000 elections, where people protected the ballot boxes and made sure that their votes are counted correctly. In some cases voters paid heavy sacrifices, including losing their lives, to protect their votes. It all depends on how well EDP and AEUO do in organizing their woreda committees. That depends on their financial strength. And that’s where their support committees abroad can play a major role.

Organizing locally

In order to be successful, it’s extremely important that EDP establish its local committees in all of the 556 woredas in Ethiopia. According to the EDP leadership, it takes a monthly budget of $100 to make an EDP woreda committee functional. If EDP can find 556 committed Ethiopians who can contribute $100 per month each, EDP will have the capacity to operate in every woreda of Ethiopia, enabling it to line up candidates who will compete in the upcoming elections in every woreda. This will transform EDP into a powerful political movement that can bring about a desirable political change in our country peacefully. A group of 556 Ethiopians each with $100 to spare every month can make a big difference in the political future of our country.

Cooperating with other opposition parties

Even though I urge EDP to organize in all the woredas through out Ethiopia, I suggest that in some woredas where some opposition parties such as AEUO are more likely to win, EDP withdraw its candidates and reallocate more resources to where EDP candidates are likely to win. This is the kind of cooperation that will lead to victory. Opposition candidates should not compete with each other in any woreda. They all must come together and support one strong candidate in each woreda against a TPLF/EPRDF candidate, since the overriding goal is the defeat of TPLF/EPRDF woreda by woreda, kebele by kebele.

Opposition parties that are currently not operating inside the country can make valuable contributions by creating an alliance with EDP and channel all their resources to helping EDP win the next elections. Each passing day these parties remain in exile, they will become politically more irrelevant. By aligning themselves with EDP, they are ensuring their own political survival. EDP has emerged as a de facto leader of the opposition camp, and the other opposition parties, especially those that do not operate inside the country, need to accept this reality and work with EDP.

There are already alliances in the making around the two parties that are emerging as key players. AEUO is aligning itself with SEPDC, ONC, EPRP, MEISON, and TAND. EDP is attracting EDU, MEDHIN, HibreHizb, as well as some civic groups such as TISJD.

As a supporter of EDP, I would urge MEDHIN, HibreHizb and EDU to merge with EDP or forge a close alliance as soon as possible, and get themselves ready for 2005. It would be a great victory if either of the two camps succeeds in replacing the TPLF regime. However, it would be another disaster for our country if another group financed and armed by external forces, such as TPDM, EPPF, or OLF, takes over the government.

Plan of action

The campaign for election 2005 must start today. The following are some steps that can be taken by EDP immediately.

1) Form a national election campaign committee that will coordinate the election campaigns through out Ethiopia.

2) Launch a worldwide fund raising drive to finance the 2005 election campaign.

3) Start recruiting highly motivated quality candidates that have the potential to win in their respective woredas (districts) and provide them with strong financial assistance.

4) Set up a shadow cabinet composed of the stronger candidates who will articulate EDP’s position on various issues, and if EDP wins, who can immediately take over and run the various governmental departments.

5) Redirect the focus of all the EDP support committees overseas to this campaign.

EDP’s organizing effort in all woredas and kebeles of Ethiopia need to evolve around the election campaign. The woreda committees should work to achieve one, and only one thing–win the upcoming elections.
__________________________________________________________________________
Elias Kifle is editor of Ethiopian Review

By Siegfried Pausewang

“We have the right to vote. We have registered, we have voting cards. But we can not make use of our right, because our candidates are not there. We demand our right to vote.”

It is voting day. But these people are not on their way to the voting station. Their speakers, talking all at once, explain:

“Our party has nominated six candidates for the zone and three for the woreda, the same number as the EPRDF. But when we came to the voting station in the morning, their names were not there.”

We had stopped the car to ask three farmers walking along the roadside for the direction. They immediately pull their voter cards from their pockets holding them demonstratively up in the air. They shout a few words, and soon other men appear from somewhere, also waving blue voter cards. We understand that they have a message for us, and climb out of the car.

Where do all these people come from? Within seconds we are surrounded by people waving voter cards. I count roughly thirty people, – a minute later it may be fifty or more.

We feel reminded of Kjetil Tronvoll’s experience in this area during the elections of 2000, when people through their refusal to go to the rigged voting manifested their protest and eventually got a re-election.

A people with political tradition

In this area of Hadiya, one and a half year ago, the Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO), an opposition party, had won a landslide election victory, in spite of discrimination, cheating, and violence. The voters had sent 24 candidates of their party to the Regional Council of Southern region, out of totally 30 seats from Hadiya, and seven to the Federal House. But it had not happened without a fight: In the elections of May 2000, HNDO candidates and voters were put under strong pressure, some were beaten, imprisoned, others threatened. In some places, ballot boxes were stuffed in the morning of election day, in others the full boxes were stolen in the evening. Two women were killed and several wounded by police shots. A Hadiya People’s Democratic Organisation (HPDO) observer threw a hand grenade into a room where his colleague from HNDO was eating lunch with his wife, killing both (see report on the election in Hadiya, in: Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000: 149-169). In several constituencies a re-election was conducted on 25 June, under strict control of the National Electoral Board, which completed the victory of HNDO (see report on the re-election in Pausewang/ Tronvoll, 2000: 212-225).

This year, too, people are more than willing to report their grievances to a foreigner: their candidates have been arrested, and only released recently after intervention of the National Electoral Board (NEB). Voters have been told they would not be entitled to communal services, access to relief food distribution or fertiliser if not voting for the EPRDF-affiliated party. Then, after the release of most imprisoned supporters, HNDO fielded six candidates each in every constituency except one in Hadiya. However, when people arrived at the voting stations in the morning, they found out that all of their candidates had been cancelled at the last moment. The kebele had checked the signatures endorsing their candidacy, and found them insufficient. Kebele officials claimed that some signatories had withdrawn their endorsement, others were found to be under age, signatures had been forged, or people cheated to sign. But these peasants told us with anger that such accusations were altogether groundless, but difficult to disproof. “Why should they have forged signatures? There were sufficient people who were willing to sign for HNDO candidates”, they said. So people protested, saying they knew their rights and would not go to the polls if their candidates had been cancelled. Instead they went to the street, waving their voter cards in a peaceful demonstration for their right to vote.

Similar accusations were told in many places the same day and the days before. In the neighbouring constituency, Soro 2, two of the six HNDO candidates were still in the election. Early in the morning, there was none in Soro 2 either. But after some debate and after the HNDO threatened to file a complaint with the NEB, the election officials accepted two candidates and re-introduced their names belatedly on the lists in the voting stations.

“You see, the kebele officials call people who signed to their office, one by one. Me, I was told: So you want to get rid of us, after all we have done for you – you know that might have consequences next time you want to get fertiliser, or when you need a service from the kebele.”

“Me, they told me: Don’t come to us next time you need food assistance. We get food supplies from international charitable donors if there is an emergency. Why should we give you from our food if you betray us by not voting for us… I said I know my rights, and I would complain, so they left me alone. But I know of others who withdrew their signature. They signed a prepared statement saying they had been forced to endorse this candidate.”

People protest in the streets

We told the people that we had no influence on the election and could not intervene nor investigate, but that we would take note of their complaints and report them. Not far along the road we reached a voting station. The officials were sitting on the shade of a kebele office, no activity was seen, there were no voters. When the officials saw us they came to meet us. “You have a lunch break?” I asked. “No,” they said, “voting continues, but there are no voters.” One of them said: “I don’t know why, I am from Addis Ababa, “I don’t know people here. Maybe they will come after lunch, or after church. But everything is OK here.” I was told there had been a conflict in the morning, but it had been cooled down by the electoral board and some policemen. Now everything was going smoothly. At this point a young man came forward and said:

“You see, this is no fair election. Since it is not correct, they don’t want to come. There is only one candidate of HNDO for the woreda and two for the zone. But the government (sic) has three and six candidates respectively. This is all nonsense… The opposition candidates have been in prison and only four weeks ago they were released. They were allowed to collect signatures for their candidacy but this morning we learned that the signatures had been cancelled. Then, later in the morning, those two were re-introduced. People are threatened to vote for EPRDF or face consequences. So people decided not to go to the vote, but go to the street instead and protest. You can see there…”

Indeed, while we talked people had gathered around. They had seen our car and came running from all corners, waving their light blue voter cards high in the air. “- Oh, these are just school students, they are under age, but they want to disturb the election”, explained one of the officials.

We went back to the car and were soon surrounded by a quickly growing crowd of protesting, chanting, cheering peasants waving their voter cards. Most of them were men at all ages, but there were also quite a few women among them. One after another they told us their stories of how they had been warned to vote for HPDO and threatened with consequences if they voted HNDO. Some told us about being beaten, others said they had been in prison.

“In the voting station, people are forced to vote for EPRDF. When people come out of the booth, someone is there to check what they voted for. If it is HNDO, they tear the ballot to pieces and give them a new form: Now you fill it for EPRDF.”

“How is that possible?”

“You can go and see it for yourself. They are there…”

“My son was slapped in his face: Why do you mark your ballot like that? Fill out another one correctly – you know how…”

“We will not go to the election though we have registered, because we can not cast our votes for the party we want and for our candidates.”

A well-dressed man pushed his way through to our car and explained in English to me: “Don’t listen to them. They are just trying to disturb the election. There is nothing true in what they tell you… These are just troublemakers – we know them. Don’t listen…”

By that time, a huge crowd had collected around our car. I tried to count people on one side to make an estimate of their number – there might have been between 300 and 400 or more waving their voter cards above their heads:

A short distance down the road we met another group of agitated people, they too waving voter cards. They asked for a lift, and we continued with a full car, people telling us on the way further details about how they had been threatened to vote for the EPRDF or face repression.

Giving people a lift was indeed a good way to be able to talk undisturbed. We made use of it where we could. Early in the morning, a young man told us that there had been big problems last year:

“It was a conflict between EPRDF and HNDO. It became a conflict between the people and the police. That made people very angry. So this year everything is covered. Everything is in our heart. We don’t talk, don’t want to say whom we elect. People have learned. Now they don’t talk….”

An elder from Soro also came with us for a few kilometres, and explained further:

“The election should be free, so everybody can elect whomever they like. But here, there are no candidates of the opposition party. They have all been cancelled yesterday. In Soro 1 and Soro 2, there are no candidates of HNDO, only of EPRDF. This is a problem not of the people, but of the administration. They try to manipulate – people ask for a correction – but they don’t find a remedy. Well, we are going to solve that problem. We will do it in a cool manner, rather than by violence.”

It turned out that in Soro 2, two of the six opposition candidates were re-admitted. In the morning, when voting stations opened, there were only EPRDF candidates. Later in the morning two names were added again on the lists posted in voting stations. The other four seats remained uncontested, with only EPRDF having a candidate running.

Voting with only one alternative

In Gimbicho, we met at the entrance the chairman of the voting station. He saw our letter of introduction and welcomed us. Another man who spoke some English approached us and wanted to see the letter. He was introduced as a kebele official. We saw from the outside the voting taking place in open air. Voters went into one of the rooms prepared as “secret booth”, came out again and put their ballots into the box. The process appeared to be working according to the rules. But was there any competition? We asked the kebele official which candidates were competing, and he explained that there were six candidates for the zone and three for the woreda from EPRDF and the same number from the HNDO. A short time after, two NEB officials who had been sent from Addis Ababa to this voting station explained that there were no candidates from the opposition – only from the EPRDF. The kebele official was embarrassed and tried to explain: There had been candidates of HNDO, but they did not have sufficient signatures and could not meet the necessary conditions.

Back on the road, a young lady who got a lift told us in a tone of incitement and indignation:

“The election? It was terrible. I came to the voting station this morning. I gave them my registration card and got my ballot paper. They asked me to fill it in while they were watching. I wanted to elect HNDO. But they said: No, make your mark here, not there – pointing at the EPRDF candidates. I said no, I know where to mark. But they insisted, and said otherwise I would have to face consequences, I could not live in the community. What can I do? If my children get sick I need a paper from the kebele to take them to hospital… They appeared quite threatening. I was afraid, so I marked the EPRDF candidates and voted for them. What can I do? They will punish me if I insist. But this is not an election..”

And then we get in our car three men who defend the EPRDF. They tell us a lot of complaints against the HNDO:

“The opposition group tell things they don’t believe themselves to win voters. For example they say: When we come to power we will give you work opportunities, we will eradicate corruption, we will privatise land so you will be allowed to sell your land. – The opposition people want government workers to share their salaries with their party candidates. They hate those who follow the government. They want to exclude the government followers from membership in the edir (a community self-help organisation). Last year they told people: Beyene Petros will distribute fertiliser by helicopter… But it is not he who said that. Still, people don’t know Beyene. They do many things in his name, which he did not say. People expect immediate change. And sometimes, when a robber or a murderer is put in prison, they call Beyene and say: our candidates are arrested…”

Then we arrive at another voting station where the chairman comes to meet us. This station belongs to Gibe, another constituency with no opposition candidates. “They could not come to compete,” says the voting station chairman, “People here don’t accept them. They can not explain their programme and their ideas.” Gibe is a new woreda, and according to people in the HNDO office in Hosaina, it was created recently as an independent woreda, people were told: Now you got your own woreda, now you have to vote for us. Voting goes on, but there are very few people coming, no queues, but no problems.

In the next voting station, there is no secret booth. The official that controls the registration card and hands the ballot paper to the voters shows them where to mark their ballots. They do it under his supervision. The chairman of the voting station, also sent from Addis Ababa, does not react to this open breach of the rules; he even invites us to see the process. But there is no opposition anyway in this constituency, so it makes no difference. There are very few voters, one explains: People will come after church.

In another voting station, in a big tent, there is a secret booth but it is clearly visible from afar that there is somebody standing in the booth advising voters and controlling what they vote. The station chairman however finds that everything is smooth and peaceful and no problems occur. There are no observers from HNDO, though three candidates of their party are competing in this constituency, two for the zone and one for the woreda. They could not come, they could not meet the conditions, explains the station chairman.

A man comes towards the voting station, but is chased away with harsh words: You are not supposed to be here – it turns out he is a candidate of the opposition who wants to talk to us. The rules say he is supposed to stay away, so we have to see him later. On the other hand, the kebele chairman finds no problems in being present – though the rules ban him as well from entering the voting station.

We find the candidate later in the village. Together with some friends we talk to him in a small hotel. The candidate tells us he has been in prison for seven months, together with other candidates, for no crime except being a candidate for HNDO. In prison, he says, we were asked: if you join our party you will be free. But he had refused. He was only released shortly before the new election. But this year, he says, they decided to reject our candidates. The Election Board and the kebele worked together. That is why people found a new way of expressing their protest – by waving their voter cards saying: This is no election… His friend added:

“Yesterday evening we were rejected, they argued that some of the signatures were not qualified, were from under-aged or not resident voters. But this is only their justification for refusing us. Why would we cheat? Even if time was short, there were many people willing to sign for us, it was not a problem at all to get signatures. My friend here complained and told them he would accuse them with the National Electoral Board, so they got afraid and two candidates were re-admitted and added to the lists this morning. But a good number of people had already voted by then.”

Complaints of the opposition

Everywhere people told us similar stories of candidates imprisoned and of cadres threatening people and forcing them to vote for their party. The list of complaints against the governing party was long, and repetitive. The most important complaints expressed to me were:

Candidates and supporters were arrested, both before the elections to prevent them from running, and after the previous elections as a punishment. So they expected revenge also after this one. The most popular candidates are targeted; we were told.

People known to belong to the opposition are beaten, threatened, harassed.

There is discrimination in distribution of fertilisers. Supporters of the opposition have been refused food aid and community services. People who oppose the government loose their jobs- many teachers are dismissed or transferred to remote places, families separated etc.

The police are engaged for frightening and harassing supporters of the opposition.

Before the election, military was brought into the regions, soldiers are harassing people, especially in remote areas, creating fear and penalising HNDO supporters.

Administrative leaders use government resources for personal gain, give jobs to their friends and family and embezzle money.

When HNDO exposed corruption in the administration, the administration took revenge, jailed leaders under false accusations, dismissed them from jobs etc.

Peasants were forced to pay their fertiliser debts twice, the first payment not being accounted for; or they were forced to pay for fertiliser they had not received.

In the election, candidates of the opposition were refused under pretext of having forged signatures, having forced people to sign, having signatures of under-age youths.

The lists of signatures identify supporters of the opposition, who are then targeted, called in, asked: “So you do not support us? You know this will have consequences?”

People who signed for a candidate of the opposition were threatened and given a paper to sign that they had been cheated or forced and wanted to withdraw their signatures. Thereafter the candidates were dismissed for not having the required number of signatures.

Candidates of HNDO were called in and threatened and given a prepared letter to sign that they withdrew their candidacy, because they felt HNDO had been cheating them.

In the voting stations, people had to show their ballots, and were advised to vote for EPRDF. In some places there were no secret booths (as I had also seen myself).

In some voting stations there were officials in the secret booth giving advise (In one voting station I saw this myself).

From some voting stations, it was reported that officials controlled ballot papers, tore apart those filled for HNDO and demanded voters to fill another one for EPRDF.

It was alleged that the local election boards worked together with EPRDF, that election officials silently accepted such manipulations or even supported them.

People who went to the streets to protest against an election, in which all or most of their candidates had been cancelled, claimed that they were beaten by police.

Complaints of the ruling party

But there were equally many complaints from officials and their supporters against the opposition:

The opposition has no programme except being against the present government.

The opposition is lacking in maturity. The top leaders may be responsible but their followers misuse their name and reputation, do illegal things.

They create unrest, support bandits, and create destruction of public property.

They recruit former soldiers of the Derg, who escaped with their weapons, and are dangerous, difficult to control, jeopardise peace.

If a criminal is arrested, they say: our member is imprisoned.

If a criminal is arrested, they say: We will get you out if you become our member.

They are all criminals, and they recruit criminals.

They promise former soldiers to be policemen if the opposition wins.

They promise the unemployed jobs after they win the election.

They make unrealistic promises to get people’s support.

They force people to sign for them, and they forge signatures go register candidates.

They tell people not to pay taxes, to refuse paying their fertiliser loans.

Because of the opposition, the farmers did not get fertilisers. This will lead to a famine in spite of good weather.

HNDO ostracises people who support EPRDF, try to have them excluded from the edir, from community life.

People are beginning to get fed up with HNDO. Beyene Petros is getting unpopular. He is never coming here, but is steering the party from Addis Ababa.

People hope to escape from their debts and from tax payment, therefore they listen to the opposition’s empty promises. This is why they have followers.

The opposition is only running for elections if they think they can win. If they loose they withdraw and say: it was unfair, we were cheated.

Mutual accusations are almost always accompanying election campaigns. And seldom will it be possible to sort out what is true and what is not correct. Luckily we do not need to judge these controversies here. All we need to conclude is an assessment of whether the elections were sufficiently unbiased to promote democratisation in Ethiopia. The question is thus: Was there sufficient room for all competing parties to discuss and promote their views and aims, and to compete in the election for representation in the relevant councils? Which factors reduced equal chances, and how severely did they affect equality? And has the situation improved or deteriorated, compared to the last elections? We will attempt to answer these questions on the base of the experience in the December 2001 election.

Control and coercion

Hadiya conducted a largely peaceful election. There was little direct violence on voting day in December 2001. We saw no military seen patrolling on the streets, neither in town nor on the rural roads. There were complaints about military being dispatched to remote areas in the weeks before election, but if so, we have not heard complaints about the soldiers interfering in the elections. We have not heard of any violent incidents as they were reported from the 2000 elections. This is certainly an important improvement from 2000.

However, there has been considerable repression especially in the rural areas in the months before the election, and indeed ever since the 2000 election was won by HNDO in Hadiya. The kebele and woreda authorities used the police to penalise HNDO candidates and supporters. There can hardly be any doubt that the lists of signatures for the HNDO candidates served as information to penalise opposition supporters. We were told that many of them were imprisoned and kept in jail for some weeks or months without being heard by a court. Others were punished by administrative disfavours – such as getting no access to fertiliser, being asked to pay their debts on the spot, or other unnecessary administrative obstacles. It may be true that the opposition has a tendency to overstate such incidents. But the pattern is too well known everywhere in the rural areas to be dismissed. And in Hadiya especially, there are so many indicators to the same effect that we see no reason for doubts. For the average peasant, repression was felt first of all through warnings – and if necessary more direct threats – that lack of support for the ruling party would have severe consequences. Where such hints were not sufficient, peasants were told in no uncertain terms that they would not receive fertilisers, they would not get access to land, and they would be excluded from communal services. If this did not bring the desired result, family members were put under pressure or the person himself was threatened something could happen to his family. The whole spectre of coercive measures designed to make the peasants dependent on the administration, and hence docile, as it is known from other areas, was applied in full measure in Hadiya. This is the conclusion we can draw after listening to many complaints of peasants and other informants who live in the area and know the rural life conditions well.

This form of indirect control and coercion was also applied during election day, and may at least partly explain why there was indeed no need for military intervention. People were afraid, and had reason to be. In particular, candidates and party organisers of HNDO were visibly afraid, and were treated almost like outcasts. We saw in Soro a candidate of HNDO being chased away from a voting station – formally correct, as the rules forbid a candidate to be present in the station except for casting his own vote. But an official of the kebele was present in the same voting station, as kebele chairmen were in others, in spite of the rules banning also them from the station. Also ordinary voters were conscious of being under control and kept in fear. Most visible, people who told us they had been requested – in some cases outrightly ordered – to vote for EPRDF, abided through fear. And those who dared to challenge the administration, expressed fear that they would face retaliation, imprisonment and worse. Again, individual incidents and reports might be overstated or invented to impress us. But we have by now sufficient experience from all over the country to know that this form of repression has increased in general and we are able to sense its ascent.

To the picture of repression is added the fact that none of the people from the administrative and government side who were responsible for crimes under the 2000 election – see the report by Kjetil Tronvoll (Pausewang/Tronvoll 2000: 149-169) were held responsible up to now. I asked the Secretary of Hadiya zone, Ato Tamrat, whether any one of those responsible for crimes at that time has been brought to court. He answered evasively: They are powerless now, the previous chairman and secretary of the zone have both been replaced by new faces. The secretary was transferred to another region. The former chairman, his name was also Tamrat, is now at the Civil Service College in Addis Ababa. (A significant step in a future career, I thought, which he must have appreciated.) The one who threw the deadly hand grenade apparently is not arrested – though Ato Tamrat only admitted, “some robbers and gangsters are not to be controlled… though those who do serious crimes are controlled.” The opposition in Hadiya has a point when asking: How come they could not arrest and persecute even one of those responsible for these serious crimes – while they could imprison hundreds of our supporters? And this is not an overstatement: the Electoral Board got over 100 people in Hadiya area released before HNDO agreed to participate in the election.

A structure of administrative control

As we have shown in the report on the time between the elections (see NIHR Report 2001:14), repression is embedded in the administrative structure. It is caused by the fact that the ruling party cadres have control over all the resources of government institutions. And they know that they will loose access to these resources if they loose an election. So they defend not only their seats and their party in an election campaign, but their social status, their jobs, the livelihood of their families. So they fight for their seats with all means, often even illegal ones. They have the power to do so, for they know that also the judges and the police are dependent on them and would not dare challenging them.

In December 2001, apparently, the local cadres of HPDO attempted – successfully – to assure their election victory by making sure that HNDO could not compete with sufficient numbers of candidates to gain a victory. Instead of frightening voters into voting for them, – a strategy which in 2000 led to serious violence – they used their administrative control over information and over the institutions controlling the process on local level. Kebele officials had to check the lists of signatures of each candidate. So the kebele cadres made sure that so many signatures were either rejected or withdrawn that the candidates of HNDO could be disqualified. There were several ways to achieve this: some signatures were cancelled because the persons were considered under-age, or not residents. Others were persuaded to withdraw their signatures. In some kebele people reported being called in and told they would have to face consequences if they supported the opposition. People have experience that the kebele officials have the power to put force behind their threats. So it did not take too much convincing to make people sign a prepared letter saying they had been mistaken, or they were cheated by HNDO, and withdrew their signatures. In some cases also candidates themselves were threatened and forced to withdraw from candidacy in the last moment.

In Hosaina constituency, all candidates of HNDO were running. But in more remote areas they were withdrawn or disked. In the two constituencies of Soro 1 and 2, all HNDO candidates for the Zonal council were cancelled – but during voting day, two of them were re-admitted in Soro 2 (plus one for the woreda council) – two to three hours after the election had started. We talked to several candidates and HNDO supporters, who told us about the candidate who protested and was re-admitted. Another one was told he could not compete because there was a court case against him, we were told. But when he protested and the police found no charge against him, he was re-admitted. Still, in Soro 1 and 2, there were only two opposition candidates standing against twelve EPRDF candidates for the zonal council, and one against six for the woreda. A majority for the opposition was excluded beforehand. And in fact, people felt disenfranchised: “Our candidates are not there – how can we go to vote?”

The morning after the election I met the chairman of NEB, Assefa Birru, in Hosaina. He was confident that these elections had been much better than the last ones. As far as security was concerned, I could only agree. I mentioned the demonstrations in Soro. He admitted there was a problem, and said he might himself be partly responsible for it, because he accepted the cancellation of candidates. HNDO could have filed a complaint, he said, and have got a re-election. But people had spoilt the situation by refusing to go to the polls. As they had not voted, they could hardly complain either.

I think his decision was correct. The kebele was the competent authority to verify the signatures. He could not without lengthy and serious investigations reject the result of their scrutiny. As the highest Election Board official present, he had to accept the judgement of the kebele certifying that a substantial number of signatories were cancelled because they were under-age, non-residents or otherwise legally not entitled to sign, others had withdrawn their signatures. Even if he, warned by experience, might have reacted to the fact that all the twelve HNDO candidates (or at least ten of them) had cheated, while all candidates of the EPRDF were admitted, he had no legally relevant grounds to overrule their conclusion. However much he might have doubted, he could only give an opening for an ex-post investigation, and a possible re-election. The problem is that a re-election is almost impossible to attain, unless blatant violations are obvious. Local authorities know very well that they can get away with almost any kind of rigging. If the opposition goes to court for a re-election, the burden of proof is theirs; and local courts depend on the local government and would not easily accept evidence against them. In this case, even Assefa Birru indicated he saw little chance now, as the people had boycotted the polls. They will no doubt be told: Since you voluntarily decided to make use of your right not to vote, you can not complain when the other side wins. But what else could they have done? Had they voted blank, they would have been told that by doing so they had accepted the election.

Candidates and representation

Totally in Hadiya zone, HNDO could compete with 35 candidates for 60 seats in the Zonal council. 25 candidates were dismissed- while EPRDF could field all their 60 candidates. One might still argue that an opposition party that systematically cheats does not deserve better. However, the experience in earlier elections reveals a different pattern. In case of serious competition a situation is created which effectively stops the opposition in a way that is legally hard to challenge. Formally, the opposition is given an option to go to court and prove that they were discriminated to a degree that makes a re-election necessary. It puts the burden of proof with the opposition. In practice, with slow and inefficient local courts, which on top of that are not independent from the administrative and political leadership, the opposition never expects appeals in court to give results. In most cases they are not even accepted.

The President of Southern Region (SNNPRS), with whom we had a long meeting before the election, made a point of the establishment of Joint Committees on kebele, woreda and zonal level, which were to mediate in case of disputes on the election. These committees consisted of one representative each of the competing parties and an official from the electoral board. He expected them to become a neutral institution, which could contribute to create an atmosphere of trust and equal opportunity. However, in practice, at least in Hadiya, they were totally sidelined or not established at all. They may have been efficient in negotiating minor individual quarrels and complaints. In the question of dismissing signatures and lists, they were neither involved before nor after a candidate was rejected. In such a decisive issue for the election on zonal and woreda level, they had no influence whatsoever.

The National Electoral Board had sent election officers to most woreda in Hadiya, to pre-empt accusations of election officials being local officials and EPRDF members. They were posted in the kebele in time before the election, and seemingly became integrated into the local power structures. Otherwise it would not be explainable why they accepted the serious shortcomings and formal faults in the electoral process: There were voting stations with no secret booths, an electoral official from Addis Ababa being there and accepting that people were told where to mark the ballot for EPRDF. There were voting stations with somebody in the booth checking what people voted, again without protest from the NEB representative. There were also voting stations where the observers of HNDO were not allowed access. NEB officials in the voting station joined uncritically the local officials’ attempts at explaining away the low turnout of voters and the demonstrating people on the street with their voter cards. The overall impression is that they have let themselves be absorbed by the local culture of the administration.

One ploy to deprive HNDO of an earlier victory seems to have been planned, or at least accepted, on higher level. According to the explanation of the President of SNNPRS given three days before the election, the zones are administrations, not governments. Therefore the zonal councils are composed of 50 % directly elected members. The other half represents the Regional Council. They were elected in 2000 to represent the zone in the Regional Council. For Hadiya, this meant that HNDO had already 24 seats in the Zonal council, and would win a majority if getting another seven or more candidates elected into the 60-seat zonal council. According to the Secretary of Hadiya zone, the zonal council had been increased to 85 members. The zone elected in total 60 representatives, six each in the 10 constituencies. HNDO had already won 21 out of 85 seats in the zonal council, and needed another 22 to win a majority – a substantial difference, but not impossible to win under conditions of equal chances. But when the NEB announced the results of the elections, all 54 seats in Hadiya zone were won by EPRDF’s member party HPDO, and there were, according to NEB, only 54 seats in the zonal council. The newly added 30 members elected in 2001 had not extended the council but replaced the 21 or 24 seats already won by HNDO.

There may be good reasons for changing from indirect representation to directly elected zonal councils, especially in Southern region, where the zone is often the highest level of self-determination for one ethnic group. But changing the rules on the way, after an opposition has achieved a partial electoral victory, can not be called a fair play or an equal chance. And explaining to foreign researchers the old system while a new one is already being voted for does not strengthen the credibility of an electoral process in the hands of local, zonal and regional authorities.

Nothing new in Gedeo?

For comparison and to check on the general pattern of discriminating against an opposition and pushing on them the onus to take the administration to court and prove alleged faults, I decided to take a short detour and re-visited Gedeo, where I followed the elections in May 2000. Here, at least two constituencies should have had a re-election in 2000, had equality and fair play been honoured. Probably four, if not all seven constituencies should have repeated the voting. As reported earlier, the Gedeo People’s Democratic Organisation (GPDO) believed to have a large majority of voters behind their candidates. In the days before the election we had seen a very tense situation. The GPDO claimed that pressure and violence was directed against their members. And indeed we got serious indications supporting that view. There was a palatable atmosphere of fear, and it was clearly targeting the GPDO. In Bule, woreda authorities chased some GPDO members from the community for disclosing internal complaints to outside researchers. They had been telling us their complaints.

The woreda election board in Cochorre tried to hide from us the fact that they had given training to communal and party election observers, but had – at the orders of the woreda chairman – excluded the observers from GPDO. In itself a small issue, this was but another indisputable indication that authorities consciously used their power to limit the chances of GPDO in the election. We were witnesses to arrests, talked to several GPDO observers who were imprisoned on election day, and saw military patrolling the highway with a machine gun mounted on a car with local government plates.

The one ploy that alone would have necessitated a re-election was the “Women-first”-trick: when during the voting day the queues before voting stations became too long, officials started to urge people to let women vote first. Soon they admitted only women to enter the voting stations, while the men – at least the younger men – had to wait. By three o’clock there were huge crowds of men waiting outside the voting stations. By four o’clock they started to get excited, saying:

“You see, they don’t refuse all the men. Their supporters are allowed in. The women they can put under pressure inside. They don’t know the rules, they are weak. What you see standing outside here, is the politically conscious part of the population. And you will see, by six o’clock they will close the voting station and we will be sent home without voting.”

Indeed, in most voting stations, people were sent home at six o’clock sharp. The young men outside were denied their right to vote after they were made to wait for hours. From Michille, the neighbouring constituency, other observers reported the same pattern. Large crowds of disenfranchised people had even come to the zonal capital of Dilla to protest, but were sent back home without remedy.

I have indisputable proof that the zonal administration knew of the “women-first”-ploy and most probably had initiated it. Gedeo should have had a re-election in 2000 had there been serious concern for equal chances and a fair election campaign. I reported the “women-first-ploy” and the other issues to the National Electoral Board, and other observers did. But the Board did not consider such reports as evidence that could be used in court.

We can of course not know whether GPDO would have won a majority in a fair contest, or in a re-election. It was never tested. But indirectly, the ruling party admitted that they were afraid of loosing. Had they been as confident of their victory as they pretended, they would never have taken the risk to invent a ploy and exclude a large group of GPDO supporters from casting their votes.

Conclusion: Election without competition

Coming back to Dilla and Gedeo one and a half-year later, I was immediately reminded of the discouraging experience of the 2000 elections. I met again the zonal chairman, Yohannes Gebeyehu on his last day in office: He is moving to Awasa, to become the President of the Regional Council. The official who introduced the “Women-first” campaign got a scholarship for a PHD at a foreign university. Yohannes told me that everything was peaceful and there were no tensions now. But from several people, from independent citizens and supporters of GPDO, I heard a different story. A short visit of one day and a half can hardly produce definite evidence. But impressions give a clear picture. The ruling Gedeo People’s Revolutionary Democratic Movement (GPRDM) penalised GPDO as an organisation as well as their supporters. After the election in 2000 was over and observers had left, the offices of GPDO were immediately closed and many of their candidates and supporters were arrested. Others escaped to Addis Ababa and returned only after the worst revenge was over. I was told about supporters of GPDO who were dismissed from jobs, their families were threatened. The pattern was the same as we had seen it in Hadiya, in Muger in Oromia, in Seraro, and even in Addis Ababa in February 2001.

The elections of 2001 were uncontested in Gedeo. Only some few independent candidates were competing against GPRDM. Some of them had been nominated by GPRDM and even their lists of signatures were provided by the authorities. Representatives of GPDO told me that they had come to the conclusion that the EPRDF can not be challenged in elections. They did not put up candidates, and did not participate in the election of 2001. While that meant to limit their political activities, the leaders in Addis Ababa indicated they could not take the responsibility to ask people to register as candidates, knowing which consequences they would have to face.

HNDO in Hadiya has drawn the same conclusion after the December 2001 election. One of the party leaders told me: “At least, we have proven that it is, under present conditions, impossible to challenge the EPRDF in elections.”