Ethiopia: Government continues to target peaceful Muslim protest movement
Amnesty International
2 November 2012
Ethiopia: Government continues to target peaceful Muslim protest movement
The Ethiopian authorities are committing human rights violations in response to the ongoing Muslim protest movement in the country. Large numbers of protestors have been arrested, many of whom remain in detention. There are also numerous reports of police using excessive force against peaceful demonstrators. Key figures within the movement have been charged with terrorism offences. Most of those arrested and charged appear to have been targeted solely because of their participation in a peaceful protest movement.
Tens of thousands of Muslims have participated in regular peaceful protests throughout 2012, opposing alleged government interference in Islamic affairs. Protestors accuse the government of attempting to impose the teachings of the Al Ahbash sect of Islam on the Muslim community and of interference in elections for the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs.
Ethiopia’s Constitution prohibits state involvement in religious affairs. The Constitution also contains an expansive provision on the right to peacefully protest, which is routinely flouted by the authorities.
Allegations of excessive use of force by police
An incident that occurred in Gerba town, in the South Wollo zone of the Amhara region, on Sunday 21 October -during which police officers fired on civilians, killing at least three people and injuring others – raises serious questions about the use of deadly force against protestors. In speaking about the incident to the media, the government confirmed the three deaths but claimed that protestors had attacked a police station armed with machetes and hand guns to try to secure the release of another protestor who had been arrested earlier in the day. The government also stated that a police officer was killed in the alleged attack. However, the protestors report that they had peacefully demanded and secured the release of the arrested person during the morning of 21 October and the protest had subsequently dispersed. Later in the day federal police, called in as reinforcements, arrived at the mosque in Gerba town and opened fire, targeting people coming out of the mosque as well as others in the vicinity. One man told Amnesty International that he had seen a police officer killed in the ensuing violence. Other witnesses said they could not confirm any police deaths. An unknown number of arrests are reported to have taken place during the incident on 21 October and more arrests reportedly occurred in the aftermath of the incident, including the arrests of people who spoke to the media about events.
Amnesty International has previously reported on similar, incidents of police allegedly using excessive force. In July Amnesty International called for an investigation into two incidents – at Awalia and Anwar mosques in Addis Ababa – in relation to which numerous allegations were made about excessive use of force by police, including firing live ammunition and beating protestors in the street and in detention, resulting in many injuries among protestors. However, no investigation has taken place to Amnesty International’s knowledge.
Amnesty International is also calling for an independent investigation into an incident that took place in Asasa town, Arsi district, Oromia region in April in which the police reportedly shot dead at least four people. Reports about the incident from the government and from those involved differ widely. The violence is reported to have occurred when the police attempted to arrest an Imam from the mosque. In statements to the press after the event, the government stated that supporters of the Imam attacked the police station to try to secure his release. However, local sources told the media that the police had opened fire in the town when supporters tried to prevent the man’s arrest. The government claimed the Imam had been preaching extremist ideology. However the protestors claim that the attempted arrest was because the Imam had refused to undergo ‘training’ in Al Ahbash ideology, which the government had made obligatory for Muslim preachers.
Use of Anti-Terrorism legislation against leaders of peaceful protest movement
On 29 October, 28 men and one woman were formally charged with ‘terrorist acts’ and ‘planning…, incitement and attempt of terrorist acts’ under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (2009) in relation to their involvement in the protest movement. Two Muslim organisations were also charged under the same law with ‘rendering support to terrorism.’ Those charged include nine members of the committee selected by the Muslim community to represent their grievances to the government, and one journalist, Yusuf Getachew, who works for the publication Ye’Muslimoch Guday (Muslim Affairs).
These individuals appear to have been arrested and charged solely because they exercised their human rights to freedom of expression and to participate in a peaceful protest movement. Since its introduction in 2009 the excessively broad Anti-Terrorism Proclamation has predominantly been used to prosecute dissenters and critics of the government, including journalists and members of political opposition parties.
At least 24 of those charged on 29 October were arrested in mid-July and have been held on remand under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, which allows for up to four months of investigative detention without charge. The defendants were detained illegally for the last five days before the charges were brought, after the police and prosecutors failed to turn up to a hearing on 24 October at which they were required to present charges and evidence, causing the judge to declare the case closed, according to one of the lawyers for the defendants. However, the judge did not order the release of the group, who were then brought to court on 29 October and charged.
A senior representative of the government told Amnesty International that the arrested individuals instigated violence and were trying to undermine the Constitution under the guise of religion. Similar statements from other senior members of the government have also been reported in the media. Amnesty International is concerned that, in a country where the government has significant influence over the courts, these comments may undermine the right of the accused to presumption of innocence.
The government has repeatedly attempted to paint the protest movement as violent and terrorist-related in statements to the media and in parliament. However, the vast majority of the protests are reported to be peaceful, and peaceful tactics have repeatedly been used by the protestors, including silent demonstrations and holding up white material, paper and ribbons as a sign of peaceful intent. While a few isolated incidents of violence have occurred, these have taken place during episodes where excessive police force is alleged. According to the accounts of the protestors, it was the actions of the police that triggered a violent response. Independent investigations are required to establish the course of events during these incidents.
Continued arrests and detention of peaceful protestors
Since July, when large numbers of arrests took place and incidents occurred at Awalia and Anwar mosques in Addis Ababa, protests have continued to take place in several regions, including in the towns of Dessie, Jimma, Harar, Shashemene, Adama, Bati, Kemise, and Robe. In addition to the original grievances of the movement, the protestors also demonstrated against the continued detention of members of the committee chosen to represent the Muslim community’s grievances to the government. Arrests, arbitrary detention and harassment of protestors are reported to have taken place in a number of locations.� Many of these reports have included allegations of police beating protestors, and the use of tear gas against peaceful demonstrations has been alleged in at least two locations.
Many demonstrations occurred in advance of elections for the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, which took place on 7 October. Although the long delay in holding the elections was one of the central grievances of the movement, the protestors raised several serious concerns in relation to the elections, including: the fact that the elections took place while their chosen representatives remained in detention; the level of control the government had over the poll; and the rejection of the protestors’ long-standing demand that the elections should be held in mosques instead of in kebele (local administration) offices. Demonstrators also allege that the government was coercing voters in advance of the election, threatening the withdrawal of access to state resources and other repercussions for those who did not vote. In statements made to Amnesty International and to the media, members of the protest movement have reported that a significant proportion of the Muslim community boycotted the poll, although the government declared the elections a success.
It is not known how many protestors are now in detention. Hundreds of arrests have been made over recent months. Of the large numbers who were arrested around the two July incidents, as reported by Amnesty International on 25 July, many were detained for a few days and subsequently released. However, an unknown number remain in detention, in Maikelawi, Ziway and other detention centres.
Efforts to prevent reporting on the government’s response to the protests
The government has sought to prevent reporting on the protest movement. Two colleagues of Yusuf Getachew from Ye’Muslimoch Guday fled the country after Yusuf was arrested and their own houses were searched. Neither Ye’Muslimoch Guday nor two other Muslim publications – weeklies Selefiah and Sewtul Islam – have been published since the July events. A correspondent for Voice of America was temporarily detained on 5 October in Addis Ababa while reporting on protests against the Supreme Council elections, and was told to delete any interviews she had recorded with protestors.
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The response of the Ethiopian government to the protest movement has involved widespread violations of human rights. There has been almost no effort on the part of the authorities to engage with the protestors on their grievances or to put in place mechanisms for dialogue.
Amnesty International believes that the majority, if not all of those arrested, have been detained for exercising their right to peaceful protest, as protected under the Ethiopian Constitution and international law. The organization is calling on the Ethiopian authorities to release immediately and unconditionally any individuals who have been detained for their participation in protest actions. All detainees who remain in detention without charge must be brought swiftly before a judicial authority. Where credible evidence of a criminal offence exists people must be charged promptly, or should be immediately and unconditionally released. All detainees must have their rights in detention upheld, be provided with full access to legal representatives, medical care if they require it and to family members.
The reports of police use of excessive force against protestors in Gerba on 21 October, in Addis Ababa in July and in Asasa in April, must be properly investigated through processes that meet international standards in relation to impartiality and credibility. If enough admissible evidence of crimes is found, suspected perpetrators should be prosecuted in effective trial proceedings that meet international standards.
� These incidents have been reported in local and Diaspora media, on social media sites, and in information submitted directly to Amnesty International.
You are hearing it from the horse’s mouth: the group ruling Ethiopia under the moniker of EPRDF is corrupt head to toe, according to a pro-regime newspaper. The mastermind of the group is the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF has engineered the largest transfer of wealth from a much-suffering population to a small tribalist coterie. The pro government paper is bringing up the issue of corruption to facilitate the purge of undesirables, to ensure Tigrian rule and to avoid systemic collapse.
Cleaning up house critical for EPRDF
By Reporter (thereporterethiopia.com)
October 27, 2012
It is not inconceivable for the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to enjoy a popular base and support if it has the desire. Of course, this requires that it continually strengthens itself, which, in turn, calls for it to display the courage and determination to clean up its house.
Failure to pursue such a course is bound to polarize it with the public and lead to schisms and its eventual demise.
Why does the EPRDF need to engage in a courageous and determined house cleaning?
1. It is riddled with corrupt ion from top to bottom!
True, there are leaders and members within the ranks of the EPRDF who serve the public with integrity and stand for change and development. On the other end of the spectrum, however, there exist those who have are disinclined to serve the public and are intent on advancing their selfish interests through any means, including corruption. If bold actions are not latter taken to purge the latter, they will eat the Front from inside out and hasten its implosion.
2. Incapable and yet smooth-talking leaders, members abound
The fact that appointments are based not on merit but rather on one’s perceived loyalty is making it difficult for the EPRDF to further its objectives and duly fulfill the public’s demand. Consequently, these leaders and members are causing the public to lose confidence in and respect for the Front.
3. There is lack of a strong bond between member organizations and within
the EPRDF
There is no denying that the EPRDF is more united than opposition
parties. Had such unity not been in evidence the smooth power transition that took place recently would not have materialized.
But let’s not delude ourselves. In terms of the level of unity that is required in the face of local and global challenges, there still is a long way to go before the EPRDF can be deemed to be strongly united. There is a clear absence, both within individual member parties and the EPRDF in general, of the will to conduct the necessary critical self-assessment which is vital to ensure that they are solidly united.
4. Plans are not executed effectively and with the requisite alacrity
The government of Ethiopia has adopted the 5-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). Already into its third year, the plan is not being implemented according to schedule. In some places development endeavors have practically ground to a halt. The justice system is breaking down. The government is not collecting the revenue needed to accomplish objectives it has set out to. Properties and monies that the country can ill afford to waste are being squandered. The aspirations and wishes of the government and the public are not being fulfilled at expected pace. And both the federal and regional governments are not making unstinting and resolute efforts. All this makes it incumbent on them to display the courage and the fortitude to get their act together.
5. The EPRDF is not promoting itself effectively
The people of Ethiopia are very much willing to support the government as well as to demonstrate patriotism and civility. The admirable unity and good manners they showed recently both at a time of national mourning following the death of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and national joy in the wake of the qualification of the country for the 2013 African Cup bear testimony to this fact.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that they do not fault the EPRDF no matter what.
For instance, they are unhappy with the sad state of justice in Ethiopia, with the unwillingness of most government and party officials to listen to their grievances. As a result the public is not being engaged in the manner it expects and indeed deserves by the federal, regional and local governments. We can go on and on about the grievances the public has; this is just illustrative of the scores of problems confronting the public has and is sufficient to make our point.
The problems did not begin to surface after the transition of power, however; they have been around for some time now. What we are saying is that if the newly elected prime minister and chairman of the EPRDF, Hailemariam Desalegn, is to steer Ethiopia on the path to a sustainable and sustained development it is imperative that he cleans up the EPRDF for it’s only then that the government and party he heads can provide the required strong leadership.
The constituent parties of the EPRDF and the Front itself are set to hold their respective congresses in a few months’ time. Hence, they have to start preparations for an honest and constructive self-evaluation that is conducted without fear or favor.
Neither Ethiopia nor its people stand to benefit if either the ruling and opposition parties are enfeebled. In the context of the grave challenges both from within and outside, the nation’s interest could be particularly jeopardized if the ruling EPRDF does not emerge stronger until the next elections.
Therefore, given that one of the key factors essential for the building of a strong and democratic nation which enjoys rapid economic growth and brings about prosperity for its citizens is the existence of a stable and people-centered government, it is high time that the EPRDF exerts a courageous and determined effort aimed at cleaning up its house. The sooner the better!
Drone is a sanitized word for a remote-controlled assassination weapon. As the focus of the drone wars shifts from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa ( Africom steps up drone war in Africa ), it behooves Ethiopians and other Africans to pay attention to this new form of warfare about to engulf the continent.
Drones: Undeclared and undiscussed
By Geoff Dyer | Financial Times
October 21, 2012
Whoever wins the White House will face pressure to be transparent about America’s use of secret military tools
If there is such as a thing as an “Obama doctrine”, it was probably first suggested by the advice of Robert Gates, defence secretary for the first two and a half years of the administration.
“Any future defence secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa,” he said shortly before leaving office, “should have his head examined.”
Given President Barack Obama’s political and economic aversion to launching new wars with lots of ground troops, it is perhaps no surprise that he has latched on so powerfully to the use of armed drones to go after suspected terrorists. US officials claim al-Qaeda’s leadership has been “decimated” over the past few years.
The surprise is that the subject has hardly come up in the course of a long election campaign – even one dominated by a sluggish economy – because it ignores one of the more remarkable and controversial aspects of the Obama administration. The president has made such extensive use of secret military tools that he would have provided himself with years of seminar material were he still a constitutional law professor.
“It is arguable that, through covert wars, this administration has violated the sovereignty of more countries, more times, than any other administration,” says David Rothkopf, chief executive of Foreign Policy magazine and a former Clinton administration official.
Mr Obama, a Nobel Peace laureate, did not invent the new approach but he has dramatically expanded it. The use of targeted killings was authorised one week after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, and in the next seven years the administration of George W. Bush ordered about 50 operations. Mr Obama has signed off on more than 350.
And while the Bush administration began the planning for what later became known as the Stuxnet computer virus, it was Mr Obama who ordered for the first time a cyber attack on the infrastructure of another nation – in this case, Iran’s nuclear programme.
These ventures in modern warfare have been conducted in almost complete secrecy, with little congressional oversight and almost no discussion with the public.
The political logic of the campaign explains much of the silence about Mr Obama’s covert wars. Mitt Romney, his Republican challenger, has used every opportunity to accuse Mr Obama of being weak: high-tech bombings of alleged al-Qaeda ringleaders do not fit very well into this attack line.
Yet the administration’s widespread use of drones is starting to come under the sort of sustained criticism that the next president will find it hard to ignore.
A flurry of legal challenges is calling into question the ethics of using unmanned combat aircraft to kill terrorist suspects. There are also growing questions about their long-term effectiveness in targeting terrorism. Whatever the outcome of the November 6 vote, the next president is likely to find himself under intense pressure to discuss the subject more openly.
Under Mr Obama, drones have killed targets in at least six countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia and Libya. Their use has become so extensive in Somalia that there have been reports of commercial air traffic being disrupted.
In the absence of official disclosure, researchers have used local news to try to put together a picture of the programme. According to the New America Foundation, a Washington think-tank, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan have killed 1,907 to 3,220 people since 2004, of whom between 1,618 and 2,765 were reported to be militants. It calculates that 15-16 per cent of those killed are “non-militants”.
When drone strikes were an occasional option, questions about their legality were easier to set aside. But the dramatic increase in their use has pushed those questions centre stage.
Legal critics, including legal campaigners, constitutional law academics and libertarians such as former presidential candidate Ron Paul, argue that the only place where the US is officially at war is Afghanistan – and that the use of drones in countries such as Yemen or Somalia is therefore illegal under US law. They also question whether the secret decisions about who to place on the “kill list” prepared by White House lawyers and officials meet the legal standard of due process.
For several years, the American Civil Liberties Union has been trying to use lawsuits to push the administration into greater disclosure. In its latest action, launched last month, the ACLU is accusing it of abandoning legal due process in the killing last October in Yemen of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, the 16-year-old son of an alleged al-Qaeda leader, and believed to be the third US citizen to have died in targeted killings.
In the face of mounting pressure, John Brennan, Mr Obama’s counter-terrorism adviser, has given two speeches this year on the policy. His April speech was the administration’s first public acknowledgment of its drone strikes. He has countered legal criticism by saying the US is in an “armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces”. The White House believes that defining the enemy in such broad terms – similar to those of the Bush-era “war on terror” – provides the legal basis for pursuing terrorists in other countries.
Mr Brennan also insists that the administration adopts “rigorous standards and process of review” when deciding who to target “outside of the ‘hot’ battlefield of Afghanistan”. The New York Times has reported that Mr Obama personally approves the names on the “kill list”.
Even if these arguments prevail in court, they have left a lot of observers deeply uncomfortable with the way the “war on terror” can be used to blur the terms of where and when the US is at war. As Georgetown University legal scholar Rosa Brooks put it recently: “That amounts, in practice, to a claim that the executive branch has the unreviewable power to kill anyone, anywhere, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret information discussed in a secret process by largely anonymous individuals.”
. . .
While Mr Brennan has attempted to address the strikes against alleged terrorists, he has largely avoided the issue of “signature strikes”, where the targets are individuals whose identities may be unknown in an area where terrorist activity is believed to be taking place. According to critics, the large number of recent strikes means not all the targets can have represented an imminent threat to the US.
The White House has not spoken about allegations that the US, in the belief that any rescuers are likely to be connected to the alleged terrorist has, conducted follow-up strikes after bombings. Christof Heyns, UN special rapporteur on extra-judicial killings, said this year that if it was true that “there have been secondary drone strikes on rescuers who are helping [the injured] after an initial drone attack, those further attacks are a war crime”.
The legal waves are being felt in the UK, where a High Court case brought on behalf of the relatives of a Pakistani man killed in a drone strike alleges that British security services provided intelligence information used in US drone strikes, which could be deemed illegal under UK law.
Amid the legal questioning, there is also growing unease in Washington foreign policy circles about the long-term effectiveness of drone strikes. Even some observers who have worked in the counter-terrorism field who support their deployment against terrorist groups believe they are being overused.
“In lots of ways, drones have taken the place of US strategic decision-making,” says Joshua Foust, a former intelligence official now at the American Security Project think-tank. “People think if there is a problem and it is difficult to get to, then let’s use drones to solve the problem.”
Mr Romney has said little about how he might use drones but in a speech two weeks ago he echoed some of this criticism, saying they were “no substitute for a national security strategy for the Middle East”.
In recent months international opposition has become harder to ignore. In April the Pakistani parliament unanimously called for an end to drone strikes within its borders. In Yemen, a series of witness accounts suggests that the increased pace of US drone attacks has contributed to a rise in anti-Americanism and could be encouraging recruitment to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the local affiliate of the terrorist network. “Drone policy at its current tempo does put the US at the very top of the bad-guys list,” says Will McCants, a former counter-terrorism official at the state department.
However, in an August speech about Yemen, Mr Brennan dismissed such suggestions. “Contrary to conventional wisdom, we see little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits for AQAP,” he said.
. . .
There are growing calls, particularly among Democrat-leaning foreign policy experts, for the next administration to establish clearer rules about exactly how drones can be used. Anne-Marie Slaughter, who was head of policy planning at the state department in the first two years of the Obama administration, compares the situation to the early years of nuclear weapons, when the US was first to develop the system but other countries soon caught up. “We do not want a world where we are saying that we can decide who a drone can take out,” she says. “We will suffer enormously for setting this precedent. I do not want to be in a world where China can decide who to target.”
Supporters of drones say that whatever the moral and legal problems of targeted strikes, the alternative policies are much worse. When Pakistani authorities launched an offensive in 2009 against insurgents in the Swat valley, the UN estimated that as many as 1.4m people were displaced in the violence and instability that ensued.
In an era of tighter defence budgets, drones are also cheaper than fighter jets. A new-generation F35 fighter jet is expected to cost about $130m, for example, whereas a new Reaper armed drone costs about $53m. Given the large number of highly trained people needed to operate them, however, the cost advantage is less than the price tags suggest.
Those who back drones also say the administration could address many of the criticisms about the identity of targets and the number of casualties if officials provided much more information about their activities. Only more disclosure, they say, will fend off mounting criticism of targeted strikes.
“Even drone-supporters like me will benefit from [ACLU] lawsuits, because evidence is what we are all looking for,” says Christine Fair, a Pakistan expert at Georgetown University. “Without doing this, the drone programme will simply not be sustainable.”
Looking at a wide portion of Somali or Afar regions, one might be tempted to call it as an unproductive or non-loam soil because of the hottest temperature and the acacia trees as well as thorny prosopis juliflora (derogatorily otherwise known as Woyane tree).
Meanwhile, in the eye of anyone from Israel, this is a funny view. For them, Somali or Afar areas are like a virgin and fertile land.
For Ethiopian pastoralists, whose livelihood depends on animal husbandry, agriculture had almost ‘zero position’. For them livestock are everything. Most of them have a belief that there is no life without livestock.
Though the Ethiopian government, as a national development strategy, had attempted to introduce the agriculture system to pastoralist areas, most of them seem hardly manageable to accept agriculture as an alternative means to their livelihood. Their life is always mobile.
Within these prevailing facts and challenges an Israel company, Agropeace, came to Ethiopia two years ago to engage in the country’s large-scale agriculture mainly focusing in the mass production of biofuel plants and floricultures as well as crops, unlike most local as well as oversees investors who do not dare to engage in such ventures in the region. This is obviously seem that many of the investors, if not all, prefer putting their money near fertile lands of the country around Addis Ababa and in the nearest and relatively modest towns.
Meanwhile, Agropeace looks determined to grow more in one of the country’s hottest and remote areas of Somali region such as Shinile and Gad districts.
In fact, for a longtime, ploughing lands or having agriculture practice has been an unusual, or unpreferable business in Shinile and Gad localities which are not very far from the town of Dire Dawa.
Having secured nearly 2000 hectares from the Somali region four years ago, Agropeace launched its first pilot project by producing maize and caster seeds. Since such kind of agri-business has not been common in the pastoralist’s areas, for Agropeace it was a challenging mission to gain the support of the local residents.
According to the existing tradition of most pastoralists, every plot of land belongs to their communal property where they feed their cattle no matter the title deed given to them as is common in other parts of Ethiopia. As a result, the Israel company had not received positive welcome from the resident pastoralist communities from Shinile as well as Gad.
So, the company had to work hard to get the goodwill of the pastoralists. Eventually since water shortage is the serious problem of the, Agropeace first built around six wells and delivered water to the community for their livelihood and to their livestock. Next, in its first year the company produced tomato, green pepper and maize and distributed it to the community. This was also coupled by teaching them a new trend of agricultural production on how to produce it and create employment opportunities.
Recently, the company organized a two-days field trip where its major shareholders from the US and the UK, along with the Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia, as well as local officials visited the project sites in Shinile and Gad.
Briefing on the progress of the project, the founder of the company, Zir Brosh, told visitors that “the project is very promising. So far, from this pilot project, we have learnt that the area is very fertile and suitable for castor, any crops and vegetables so that we are able to grow year round. “
Yohash Zohar, the general manager of Agropeace Ethiopia, said that despite some challenges the company faces as an initial development cost the company is profitable in a short period of time.
“This project, I believe, will be a benchmark for Ethiopia and will attract many other foreign investors,” he told The Reporter.
“We truly believe that the drier regions of Ethiopia such as Somali and Afar regions can actually be the bread-basket of Ethiopia,” he said, adding that with the right development and usage of underground water they (Afar and Somali regions) can produce more cash crops probably for all other parts of Ethiopia together.
He also explained that the advantage of investing in the Somali region is also advantageous, logistically citing its proximity to the Port of Djibouti.
“It makes a lot of sense to invest in such areas,” Zohar said.
According to the general manager, the company is investing a total amount of 20 million dollars for its 2000 hectare project, out of which 70 percent of the investment loan is acquired from Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) while the rest is partly financed from Agropeace, development partners as well as from the income generated from the project itself.
He told The Reporter that the company aims to start exporting in 2013 for the first time, starting with some 2000 tons of castor seed that is estimated to be roughly worth about 2.5 million dollars.
So far, over 350 hectares of land has been cleared for castor production.
“In Israel we have a lot of experiences in developing deserts and turn it into productive agricultural farm. Once you have enough water and use it with kid gloves, it will be advantageous because being very dry is an advantage. When you have water for irrigation, you can absolutely control how much water you can use for your farm.”
For the company, infrastructure development is a bottleneck challenge that has already forced it to incur core investment costs.
Anteneh Gelaye, chief operation manager of the project, explained that such a kind of investment is the first project in the area.
Anteneh told The Reporter that at that demonstration site, Agropeace has carried out pilot project and has seen satisfactory results particularly in castor seed, soya bean, groundnut as well as maize.
“Though this areas is semi-desert, for example, last year using Israeli technology we grew an American maize seed. And we have harvested about 80 quintals from a hectare while is 30 quintals in normal case.”
The Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia, Belaynesh Zevadia, hailed the company’s project saying, “I’m happy about this promising achievement. They did a great job.”
She also told the company, “I hope in a couple of years, you would reap good production.
“There is a jewish saying that goes “If you save one life, you will save the world”, Belaynesh said after she saw the water wells the company provided for the local residents “I was born in Gondar and grew up in Addis Ababa before leaving for Israel when I was 17. I didn’t know we have such kind of place. Now I’m proud of being Jewish. I’m proud of Ethiopia. Please keep saving more lives.”
Similarly, the vice president of development DBE, Tadesse Oge’e, praised the company for its project.
“Your commitment to invest in such kind of area is very fantastic while most investors prefer to invest in Addis Ababa and surrounding areas. We are ready to support this project and continue to support it.
Issayas Kebede, from Ministry of Agriculture, on his part said, “This is the kind of development that Ethiopia seeks. When you lose, we lose, when your gain we gain.
For a long time the area was known as one of the country’s smuggling corridor and black market zones.
U.S. Expands Secretive Drone Base for African Shadow War
By David Axe | Wired.com
October 26, 2012
A US Air Force Predator drone
The Pentagon’s secretive drone and commando base in the Horn of Africa is getting a lot bigger and a lot busier as the U.S. doubles down on its shadowy campaign of air strikes, robot surveillance and Special Operation Forces raids in the terror havens of Yemen and Somalia.
Camp Lemonnier, originally a French colonial outpost in Djibouti, a tiny, impoverished nation just north of Somalia, has been the epicenter of America’s Indian Ocean shadow war since just after 9/11. What was once little more than a run-down compound adjacent to Djibouti city’s single-runway international airport is now a sprawling complex of hangars and air-conditioned buildings housing eight Predator drones and eight F-15E fighter-bombers plus other warplanes, as well as around 300 Special Operations Forces and more than 2,000 other U.S. troops and civilians.
According to an investigation by The Washington Post, the Pentagon is spending $1.4 billion to expand the base’s airplane parking and living facilities. The extra housing could accommodate another 800 commandos, the Post reports. The military is also adding new lighting to a emergency landing strip a few miles from Camp Lemonnier — an urgent precaution as more and more planes and drones pack onto the main base’s sole runway.
The Djibouti base is just one of a constellation of hush-hush U.S. drone, commando or intelligence facilities in East Africa. Others are located in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the island nation of the Seychelles. But “those operations pale in comparison to what is unfolding in Djibouti,” the Post’s Craig Whitlock notes.
As previously reported by Danger Room, the scale and intensity of covert U.S. operations in Djibouti has increased steadily since 2001. Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force commandos and other Special Operations Forces stage from Djibouti on surveillance infiltrations, counter-terrorism raids, hostage rescues and pirate take-downs. And those are just the operations we know about.
The CIA’s armed Predator drones operated from Camp Lemonnier as early as 2002. In November of that year, an Agency Predator crew, following tips from the NSA, tracked al-Qaida operative Qaed Salim Sinan Al Harethi, one of the men who had organized the October 2000 attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole, to a car in Yemen. The drone launched a single Hellfire missile, killing Al Harethi and several other men.
Drones came and went at Camp Lemonnier on a temporary basis between 2002 and 2010, joining a little-mentioned force of F-15 fighter-bombers deployed to the desert base for high-speed bombing runs over Yemen. In 2007 a Predator apparently flying from Djibouti struck a convoy near the southern Somali town of Ras Kamboni, killing Aden Hashi Farah, one of Somalia’s top al-Qaida operatives.
In 2010, the Pentagon made the drone presence at Lemonnier full-time, with eight Predators permanently assigned. In September last year, a Djibouti-based Predator took out Anwar Al Awlaki, an American-born cleric and top al-Qaida member.
As the pace of drone and other warplane flights increased, so too did the number of flying accidents. A Special Operations Command U-28 spy plane crashed in February, killing four airmen. The Post details five Predator crashes at or near Lemonnier since January 2011. Besides providing evidence of a ramp-up in the U.S. shadow war, the crashes represent a window into the little-discussed methods of America’s commando forces. One Air Force drone accident report from last year mentions a commando officer, identified only as “Frog,” whose job it was to alert the Air Force crews to launch their drones on covert missions.
“Who is Frog?” one investigator asked, according to a transcript obtained by the Post. “He’s a Pred guy,” an airman responded. “I actually don’t know his last name.”
That level of secrecy is typical of Pentagon activities in Djibouti. Thanks to the Post’s excellent reporting, we now know just a tiny bit more about America’s expanding shadow war in East Africa.
