Elias Kifle
August 2002
The strategy of forming a “united front” to free our country from the TPLF/EPRDF tyranny needs to be reviewed and adjusted. I believe the current strategy has miserably failed. It’s about time we must admit that and change course. The new strategy should call for Ethiopians to rally around one viable organization that is operating inside the country. We need a “united front” of individual Ethiopians, not a collection of weak political groups. We need to consolidate our scarce resources and support one organization that is ideologically and organizationally equipped to bring about positive political change in our country. We have such an organization, namely, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP).
EDP is emerging as the most promising political movement in Ethiopia. It is a broad-based political movement that is inclusive of all ethnic backgrounds, languages, religions, and economic classes. EDP’s multi-ethnic character makes it attractive to most Ethiopians. EDP’s ideological “big tent” can accommodate Ethiopians of diverse political views. Those of us who wish to see ethnic apartheid eliminated from our country need to join this organization, which is trying to build a strong foundation to become a powerful force for change in our country.
What EDP accomplished so far
In the 2-1/2 years since EDP was established, it has already been able to make significant impact on Ethiopian politics. Its strategy of peaceful struggle is producing significant results. In the past six months alone, EDP has organized two mass demonstrations in which over one hundred thousand people participated; conducted a petition drive through which 135,000 people signed on a petition letter to the United Nations opposing the Hague Ruling; and held major political rallies in seven cities from the southern city of Awassa to the northern city of Mekele.
EDP’s popularity has forced All Amara People Organization (AAPO) to transform itself from an ethnic party into a national party. It was a wise decision that should be applauded by all Ethiopians who oppose ethnic politics. There may be a great deal of pressure on SEPDC and ONC to do the same, or become fringe political groups soon, leaving the political field only to EDP and AEUO (formerly AAPO). From his latest comment, one can detect that even Meles Zenawi may be considering abandoning his ethnic-based party (TPLF) and form a national party to assure his political survival. Thus EDP, by its existence alone, is contributing to the defeat of TPLF regime’s ethnic politics.
EDP top leaders are now concluding a 17-city tour in North America. As a result of a visit to North America last year by an EDP delegation led by Vice Chairman Dr Hailu Araya, 13 EDP support committees were created. These support committees in North America helped financed two mass demonstrations organized by EDP in Addis Ababa, and EDP leadership’s tour in several cities across Ethiopia, including the historic public meeting in Mekele earlier this year. As a result of this year’s visit by the EDP leaders in the United States and Europe, there will be over 22 EDP committees through out North America and Europe, putting in place a strong source of material and political support for EDP’s upcoming campaigns in Ethiopia, particularly the 2005 parliamentary elections.
The 2005 elections in Ethiopia
I’m focusing on EDP in this piece. However, I’m encouraged by the transformation of AAPO into a multi-ethnic party under a new name (AEUO), and I believe that it presents a viable alternative to EDP. Both EDP and AEUO can be organizationally strong enough to overcome the unfair and fraudulent ways elections are held in Ethiopia under the TPLF regime. In areas where these parties are well organized, the people will prevent the TPLF/EPRDF cadres from stealing votes. This has been demonstrated in some areas of Ethiopia in the 2000 elections, where people protected the ballot boxes and made sure that their votes are counted correctly. In some cases voters paid heavy sacrifices, including losing their lives, to protect their votes. It all depends on how well EDP and AEUO do in organizing their woreda committees. That depends on their financial strength. And that’s where their support committees abroad can play a major role.
Organizing locally
In order to be successful, it’s extremely important that EDP establish its local committees in all of the 556 woredas in Ethiopia. According to the EDP leadership, it takes a monthly budget of $100 to make an EDP woreda committee functional. If EDP can find 556 committed Ethiopians who can contribute $100 per month each, EDP will have the capacity to operate in every woreda of Ethiopia, enabling it to line up candidates who will compete in the upcoming elections in every woreda. This will transform EDP into a powerful political movement that can bring about a desirable political change in our country peacefully. A group of 556 Ethiopians each with $100 to spare every month can make a big difference in the political future of our country.
Cooperating with other opposition parties
Even though I urge EDP to organize in all the woredas through out Ethiopia, I suggest that in some woredas where some opposition parties such as AEUO are more likely to win, EDP withdraw its candidates and reallocate more resources to where EDP candidates are likely to win. This is the kind of cooperation that will lead to victory. Opposition candidates should not compete with each other in any woreda. They all must come together and support one strong candidate in each woreda against a TPLF/EPRDF candidate, since the overriding goal is the defeat of TPLF/EPRDF woreda by woreda, kebele by kebele.
Opposition parties that are currently not operating inside the country can make valuable contributions by creating an alliance with EDP and channel all their resources to helping EDP win the next elections. Each passing day these parties remain in exile, they will become politically more irrelevant. By aligning themselves with EDP, they are ensuring their own political survival. EDP has emerged as a de facto leader of the opposition camp, and the other opposition parties, especially those that do not operate inside the country, need to accept this reality and work with EDP.
There are already alliances in the making around the two parties that are emerging as key players. AEUO is aligning itself with SEPDC, ONC, EPRP, MEISON, and TAND. EDP is attracting EDU, MEDHIN, HibreHizb, as well as some civic groups such as TISJD.
As a supporter of EDP, I would urge MEDHIN, HibreHizb and EDU to merge with EDP or forge a close alliance as soon as possible, and get themselves ready for 2005. It would be a great victory if either of the two camps succeeds in replacing the TPLF regime. However, it would be another disaster for our country if another group financed and armed by external forces, such as TPDM, EPPF, or OLF, takes over the government.
Plan of action
The campaign for election 2005 must start today. The following are some steps that can be taken by EDP immediately.
1) Form a national election campaign committee that will coordinate the election campaigns through out Ethiopia.
2) Launch a worldwide fund raising drive to finance the 2005 election campaign.
3) Start recruiting highly motivated quality candidates that have the potential to win in their respective woredas (districts) and provide them with strong financial assistance.
4) Set up a shadow cabinet composed of the stronger candidates who will articulate EDP’s position on various issues, and if EDP wins, who can immediately take over and run the various governmental departments.
5) Redirect the focus of all the EDP support committees overseas to this campaign.
EDP’s organizing effort in all woredas and kebeles of Ethiopia need to evolve around the election campaign. The woreda committees should work to achieve one, and only one thing–win the upcoming elections.
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Elias Kifle is editor of Ethiopian Review
By Siegfried Pausewang
“We have the right to vote. We have registered, we have voting cards. But we can not make use of our right, because our candidates are not there. We demand our right to vote.”
It is voting day. But these people are not on their way to the voting station. Their speakers, talking all at once, explain:
“Our party has nominated six candidates for the zone and three for the woreda, the same number as the EPRDF. But when we came to the voting station in the morning, their names were not there.”
We had stopped the car to ask three farmers walking along the roadside for the direction. They immediately pull their voter cards from their pockets holding them demonstratively up in the air. They shout a few words, and soon other men appear from somewhere, also waving blue voter cards. We understand that they have a message for us, and climb out of the car.
Where do all these people come from? Within seconds we are surrounded by people waving voter cards. I count roughly thirty people, – a minute later it may be fifty or more.
We feel reminded of Kjetil Tronvoll’s experience in this area during the elections of 2000, when people through their refusal to go to the rigged voting manifested their protest and eventually got a re-election.
A people with political tradition
In this area of Hadiya, one and a half year ago, the Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO), an opposition party, had won a landslide election victory, in spite of discrimination, cheating, and violence. The voters had sent 24 candidates of their party to the Regional Council of Southern region, out of totally 30 seats from Hadiya, and seven to the Federal House. But it had not happened without a fight: In the elections of May 2000, HNDO candidates and voters were put under strong pressure, some were beaten, imprisoned, others threatened. In some places, ballot boxes were stuffed in the morning of election day, in others the full boxes were stolen in the evening. Two women were killed and several wounded by police shots. A Hadiya People’s Democratic Organisation (HPDO) observer threw a hand grenade into a room where his colleague from HNDO was eating lunch with his wife, killing both (see report on the election in Hadiya, in: Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000: 149-169). In several constituencies a re-election was conducted on 25 June, under strict control of the National Electoral Board, which completed the victory of HNDO (see report on the re-election in Pausewang/ Tronvoll, 2000: 212-225).
This year, too, people are more than willing to report their grievances to a foreigner: their candidates have been arrested, and only released recently after intervention of the National Electoral Board (NEB). Voters have been told they would not be entitled to communal services, access to relief food distribution or fertiliser if not voting for the EPRDF-affiliated party. Then, after the release of most imprisoned supporters, HNDO fielded six candidates each in every constituency except one in Hadiya. However, when people arrived at the voting stations in the morning, they found out that all of their candidates had been cancelled at the last moment. The kebele had checked the signatures endorsing their candidacy, and found them insufficient. Kebele officials claimed that some signatories had withdrawn their endorsement, others were found to be under age, signatures had been forged, or people cheated to sign. But these peasants told us with anger that such accusations were altogether groundless, but difficult to disproof. “Why should they have forged signatures? There were sufficient people who were willing to sign for HNDO candidates”, they said. So people protested, saying they knew their rights and would not go to the polls if their candidates had been cancelled. Instead they went to the street, waving their voter cards in a peaceful demonstration for their right to vote.
Similar accusations were told in many places the same day and the days before. In the neighbouring constituency, Soro 2, two of the six HNDO candidates were still in the election. Early in the morning, there was none in Soro 2 either. But after some debate and after the HNDO threatened to file a complaint with the NEB, the election officials accepted two candidates and re-introduced their names belatedly on the lists in the voting stations.
“You see, the kebele officials call people who signed to their office, one by one. Me, I was told: So you want to get rid of us, after all we have done for you – you know that might have consequences next time you want to get fertiliser, or when you need a service from the kebele.”
“Me, they told me: Don’t come to us next time you need food assistance. We get food supplies from international charitable donors if there is an emergency. Why should we give you from our food if you betray us by not voting for us… I said I know my rights, and I would complain, so they left me alone. But I know of others who withdrew their signature. They signed a prepared statement saying they had been forced to endorse this candidate.”
People protest in the streets
We told the people that we had no influence on the election and could not intervene nor investigate, but that we would take note of their complaints and report them. Not far along the road we reached a voting station. The officials were sitting on the shade of a kebele office, no activity was seen, there were no voters. When the officials saw us they came to meet us. “You have a lunch break?” I asked. “No,” they said, “voting continues, but there are no voters.” One of them said: “I don’t know why, I am from Addis Ababa, “I don’t know people here. Maybe they will come after lunch, or after church. But everything is OK here.” I was told there had been a conflict in the morning, but it had been cooled down by the electoral board and some policemen. Now everything was going smoothly. At this point a young man came forward and said:
“You see, this is no fair election. Since it is not correct, they don’t want to come. There is only one candidate of HNDO for the woreda and two for the zone. But the government (sic) has three and six candidates respectively. This is all nonsense… The opposition candidates have been in prison and only four weeks ago they were released. They were allowed to collect signatures for their candidacy but this morning we learned that the signatures had been cancelled. Then, later in the morning, those two were re-introduced. People are threatened to vote for EPRDF or face consequences. So people decided not to go to the vote, but go to the street instead and protest. You can see there…”
Indeed, while we talked people had gathered around. They had seen our car and came running from all corners, waving their light blue voter cards high in the air. “- Oh, these are just school students, they are under age, but they want to disturb the election”, explained one of the officials.
We went back to the car and were soon surrounded by a quickly growing crowd of protesting, chanting, cheering peasants waving their voter cards. Most of them were men at all ages, but there were also quite a few women among them. One after another they told us their stories of how they had been warned to vote for HPDO and threatened with consequences if they voted HNDO. Some told us about being beaten, others said they had been in prison.
“In the voting station, people are forced to vote for EPRDF. When people come out of the booth, someone is there to check what they voted for. If it is HNDO, they tear the ballot to pieces and give them a new form: Now you fill it for EPRDF.”
“How is that possible?”
“You can go and see it for yourself. They are there…”
“My son was slapped in his face: Why do you mark your ballot like that? Fill out another one correctly – you know how…”
“We will not go to the election though we have registered, because we can not cast our votes for the party we want and for our candidates.”
A well-dressed man pushed his way through to our car and explained in English to me: “Don’t listen to them. They are just trying to disturb the election. There is nothing true in what they tell you… These are just troublemakers – we know them. Don’t listen…”
By that time, a huge crowd had collected around our car. I tried to count people on one side to make an estimate of their number – there might have been between 300 and 400 or more waving their voter cards above their heads:
A short distance down the road we met another group of agitated people, they too waving voter cards. They asked for a lift, and we continued with a full car, people telling us on the way further details about how they had been threatened to vote for the EPRDF or face repression.
Giving people a lift was indeed a good way to be able to talk undisturbed. We made use of it where we could. Early in the morning, a young man told us that there had been big problems last year:
“It was a conflict between EPRDF and HNDO. It became a conflict between the people and the police. That made people very angry. So this year everything is covered. Everything is in our heart. We don’t talk, don’t want to say whom we elect. People have learned. Now they don’t talk….”
An elder from Soro also came with us for a few kilometres, and explained further:
“The election should be free, so everybody can elect whomever they like. But here, there are no candidates of the opposition party. They have all been cancelled yesterday. In Soro 1 and Soro 2, there are no candidates of HNDO, only of EPRDF. This is a problem not of the people, but of the administration. They try to manipulate – people ask for a correction – but they don’t find a remedy. Well, we are going to solve that problem. We will do it in a cool manner, rather than by violence.”
It turned out that in Soro 2, two of the six opposition candidates were re-admitted. In the morning, when voting stations opened, there were only EPRDF candidates. Later in the morning two names were added again on the lists posted in voting stations. The other four seats remained uncontested, with only EPRDF having a candidate running.
Voting with only one alternative
In Gimbicho, we met at the entrance the chairman of the voting station. He saw our letter of introduction and welcomed us. Another man who spoke some English approached us and wanted to see the letter. He was introduced as a kebele official. We saw from the outside the voting taking place in open air. Voters went into one of the rooms prepared as “secret booth”, came out again and put their ballots into the box. The process appeared to be working according to the rules. But was there any competition? We asked the kebele official which candidates were competing, and he explained that there were six candidates for the zone and three for the woreda from EPRDF and the same number from the HNDO. A short time after, two NEB officials who had been sent from Addis Ababa to this voting station explained that there were no candidates from the opposition – only from the EPRDF. The kebele official was embarrassed and tried to explain: There had been candidates of HNDO, but they did not have sufficient signatures and could not meet the necessary conditions.
Back on the road, a young lady who got a lift told us in a tone of incitement and indignation:
“The election? It was terrible. I came to the voting station this morning. I gave them my registration card and got my ballot paper. They asked me to fill it in while they were watching. I wanted to elect HNDO. But they said: No, make your mark here, not there – pointing at the EPRDF candidates. I said no, I know where to mark. But they insisted, and said otherwise I would have to face consequences, I could not live in the community. What can I do? If my children get sick I need a paper from the kebele to take them to hospital… They appeared quite threatening. I was afraid, so I marked the EPRDF candidates and voted for them. What can I do? They will punish me if I insist. But this is not an election..”
And then we get in our car three men who defend the EPRDF. They tell us a lot of complaints against the HNDO:
“The opposition group tell things they don’t believe themselves to win voters. For example they say: When we come to power we will give you work opportunities, we will eradicate corruption, we will privatise land so you will be allowed to sell your land. – The opposition people want government workers to share their salaries with their party candidates. They hate those who follow the government. They want to exclude the government followers from membership in the edir (a community self-help organisation). Last year they told people: Beyene Petros will distribute fertiliser by helicopter… But it is not he who said that. Still, people don’t know Beyene. They do many things in his name, which he did not say. People expect immediate change. And sometimes, when a robber or a murderer is put in prison, they call Beyene and say: our candidates are arrested…”
Then we arrive at another voting station where the chairman comes to meet us. This station belongs to Gibe, another constituency with no opposition candidates. “They could not come to compete,” says the voting station chairman, “People here don’t accept them. They can not explain their programme and their ideas.” Gibe is a new woreda, and according to people in the HNDO office in Hosaina, it was created recently as an independent woreda, people were told: Now you got your own woreda, now you have to vote for us. Voting goes on, but there are very few people coming, no queues, but no problems.
In the next voting station, there is no secret booth. The official that controls the registration card and hands the ballot paper to the voters shows them where to mark their ballots. They do it under his supervision. The chairman of the voting station, also sent from Addis Ababa, does not react to this open breach of the rules; he even invites us to see the process. But there is no opposition anyway in this constituency, so it makes no difference. There are very few voters, one explains: People will come after church.
In another voting station, in a big tent, there is a secret booth but it is clearly visible from afar that there is somebody standing in the booth advising voters and controlling what they vote. The station chairman however finds that everything is smooth and peaceful and no problems occur. There are no observers from HNDO, though three candidates of their party are competing in this constituency, two for the zone and one for the woreda. They could not come, they could not meet the conditions, explains the station chairman.
A man comes towards the voting station, but is chased away with harsh words: You are not supposed to be here – it turns out he is a candidate of the opposition who wants to talk to us. The rules say he is supposed to stay away, so we have to see him later. On the other hand, the kebele chairman finds no problems in being present – though the rules ban him as well from entering the voting station.
We find the candidate later in the village. Together with some friends we talk to him in a small hotel. The candidate tells us he has been in prison for seven months, together with other candidates, for no crime except being a candidate for HNDO. In prison, he says, we were asked: if you join our party you will be free. But he had refused. He was only released shortly before the new election. But this year, he says, they decided to reject our candidates. The Election Board and the kebele worked together. That is why people found a new way of expressing their protest – by waving their voter cards saying: This is no election… His friend added:
“Yesterday evening we were rejected, they argued that some of the signatures were not qualified, were from under-aged or not resident voters. But this is only their justification for refusing us. Why would we cheat? Even if time was short, there were many people willing to sign for us, it was not a problem at all to get signatures. My friend here complained and told them he would accuse them with the National Electoral Board, so they got afraid and two candidates were re-admitted and added to the lists this morning. But a good number of people had already voted by then.”
Complaints of the opposition
Everywhere people told us similar stories of candidates imprisoned and of cadres threatening people and forcing them to vote for their party. The list of complaints against the governing party was long, and repetitive. The most important complaints expressed to me were:
Candidates and supporters were arrested, both before the elections to prevent them from running, and after the previous elections as a punishment. So they expected revenge also after this one. The most popular candidates are targeted; we were told.
People known to belong to the opposition are beaten, threatened, harassed.
There is discrimination in distribution of fertilisers. Supporters of the opposition have been refused food aid and community services. People who oppose the government loose their jobs- many teachers are dismissed or transferred to remote places, families separated etc.
The police are engaged for frightening and harassing supporters of the opposition.
Before the election, military was brought into the regions, soldiers are harassing people, especially in remote areas, creating fear and penalising HNDO supporters.
Administrative leaders use government resources for personal gain, give jobs to their friends and family and embezzle money.
When HNDO exposed corruption in the administration, the administration took revenge, jailed leaders under false accusations, dismissed them from jobs etc.
Peasants were forced to pay their fertiliser debts twice, the first payment not being accounted for; or they were forced to pay for fertiliser they had not received.
In the election, candidates of the opposition were refused under pretext of having forged signatures, having forced people to sign, having signatures of under-age youths.
The lists of signatures identify supporters of the opposition, who are then targeted, called in, asked: “So you do not support us? You know this will have consequences?”
People who signed for a candidate of the opposition were threatened and given a paper to sign that they had been cheated or forced and wanted to withdraw their signatures. Thereafter the candidates were dismissed for not having the required number of signatures.
Candidates of HNDO were called in and threatened and given a prepared letter to sign that they withdrew their candidacy, because they felt HNDO had been cheating them.
In the voting stations, people had to show their ballots, and were advised to vote for EPRDF. In some places there were no secret booths (as I had also seen myself).
In some voting stations there were officials in the secret booth giving advise (In one voting station I saw this myself).
From some voting stations, it was reported that officials controlled ballot papers, tore apart those filled for HNDO and demanded voters to fill another one for EPRDF.
It was alleged that the local election boards worked together with EPRDF, that election officials silently accepted such manipulations or even supported them.
People who went to the streets to protest against an election, in which all or most of their candidates had been cancelled, claimed that they were beaten by police.
Complaints of the ruling party
But there were equally many complaints from officials and their supporters against the opposition:
The opposition has no programme except being against the present government.
The opposition is lacking in maturity. The top leaders may be responsible but their followers misuse their name and reputation, do illegal things.
They create unrest, support bandits, and create destruction of public property.
They recruit former soldiers of the Derg, who escaped with their weapons, and are dangerous, difficult to control, jeopardise peace.
If a criminal is arrested, they say: our member is imprisoned.
If a criminal is arrested, they say: We will get you out if you become our member.
They are all criminals, and they recruit criminals.
They promise former soldiers to be policemen if the opposition wins.
They promise the unemployed jobs after they win the election.
They make unrealistic promises to get people’s support.
They force people to sign for them, and they forge signatures go register candidates.
They tell people not to pay taxes, to refuse paying their fertiliser loans.
Because of the opposition, the farmers did not get fertilisers. This will lead to a famine in spite of good weather.
HNDO ostracises people who support EPRDF, try to have them excluded from the edir, from community life.
People are beginning to get fed up with HNDO. Beyene Petros is getting unpopular. He is never coming here, but is steering the party from Addis Ababa.
People hope to escape from their debts and from tax payment, therefore they listen to the opposition’s empty promises. This is why they have followers.
The opposition is only running for elections if they think they can win. If they loose they withdraw and say: it was unfair, we were cheated.
Mutual accusations are almost always accompanying election campaigns. And seldom will it be possible to sort out what is true and what is not correct. Luckily we do not need to judge these controversies here. All we need to conclude is an assessment of whether the elections were sufficiently unbiased to promote democratisation in Ethiopia. The question is thus: Was there sufficient room for all competing parties to discuss and promote their views and aims, and to compete in the election for representation in the relevant councils? Which factors reduced equal chances, and how severely did they affect equality? And has the situation improved or deteriorated, compared to the last elections? We will attempt to answer these questions on the base of the experience in the December 2001 election.
Control and coercion
Hadiya conducted a largely peaceful election. There was little direct violence on voting day in December 2001. We saw no military seen patrolling on the streets, neither in town nor on the rural roads. There were complaints about military being dispatched to remote areas in the weeks before election, but if so, we have not heard complaints about the soldiers interfering in the elections. We have not heard of any violent incidents as they were reported from the 2000 elections. This is certainly an important improvement from 2000.
However, there has been considerable repression especially in the rural areas in the months before the election, and indeed ever since the 2000 election was won by HNDO in Hadiya. The kebele and woreda authorities used the police to penalise HNDO candidates and supporters. There can hardly be any doubt that the lists of signatures for the HNDO candidates served as information to penalise opposition supporters. We were told that many of them were imprisoned and kept in jail for some weeks or months without being heard by a court. Others were punished by administrative disfavours – such as getting no access to fertiliser, being asked to pay their debts on the spot, or other unnecessary administrative obstacles. It may be true that the opposition has a tendency to overstate such incidents. But the pattern is too well known everywhere in the rural areas to be dismissed. And in Hadiya especially, there are so many indicators to the same effect that we see no reason for doubts. For the average peasant, repression was felt first of all through warnings – and if necessary more direct threats – that lack of support for the ruling party would have severe consequences. Where such hints were not sufficient, peasants were told in no uncertain terms that they would not receive fertilisers, they would not get access to land, and they would be excluded from communal services. If this did not bring the desired result, family members were put under pressure or the person himself was threatened something could happen to his family. The whole spectre of coercive measures designed to make the peasants dependent on the administration, and hence docile, as it is known from other areas, was applied in full measure in Hadiya. This is the conclusion we can draw after listening to many complaints of peasants and other informants who live in the area and know the rural life conditions well.
This form of indirect control and coercion was also applied during election day, and may at least partly explain why there was indeed no need for military intervention. People were afraid, and had reason to be. In particular, candidates and party organisers of HNDO were visibly afraid, and were treated almost like outcasts. We saw in Soro a candidate of HNDO being chased away from a voting station – formally correct, as the rules forbid a candidate to be present in the station except for casting his own vote. But an official of the kebele was present in the same voting station, as kebele chairmen were in others, in spite of the rules banning also them from the station. Also ordinary voters were conscious of being under control and kept in fear. Most visible, people who told us they had been requested – in some cases outrightly ordered – to vote for EPRDF, abided through fear. And those who dared to challenge the administration, expressed fear that they would face retaliation, imprisonment and worse. Again, individual incidents and reports might be overstated or invented to impress us. But we have by now sufficient experience from all over the country to know that this form of repression has increased in general and we are able to sense its ascent.
To the picture of repression is added the fact that none of the people from the administrative and government side who were responsible for crimes under the 2000 election – see the report by Kjetil Tronvoll (Pausewang/Tronvoll 2000: 149-169) were held responsible up to now. I asked the Secretary of Hadiya zone, Ato Tamrat, whether any one of those responsible for crimes at that time has been brought to court. He answered evasively: They are powerless now, the previous chairman and secretary of the zone have both been replaced by new faces. The secretary was transferred to another region. The former chairman, his name was also Tamrat, is now at the Civil Service College in Addis Ababa. (A significant step in a future career, I thought, which he must have appreciated.) The one who threw the deadly hand grenade apparently is not arrested – though Ato Tamrat only admitted, “some robbers and gangsters are not to be controlled… though those who do serious crimes are controlled.” The opposition in Hadiya has a point when asking: How come they could not arrest and persecute even one of those responsible for these serious crimes – while they could imprison hundreds of our supporters? And this is not an overstatement: the Electoral Board got over 100 people in Hadiya area released before HNDO agreed to participate in the election.
A structure of administrative control
As we have shown in the report on the time between the elections (see NIHR Report 2001:14), repression is embedded in the administrative structure. It is caused by the fact that the ruling party cadres have control over all the resources of government institutions. And they know that they will loose access to these resources if they loose an election. So they defend not only their seats and their party in an election campaign, but their social status, their jobs, the livelihood of their families. So they fight for their seats with all means, often even illegal ones. They have the power to do so, for they know that also the judges and the police are dependent on them and would not dare challenging them.
In December 2001, apparently, the local cadres of HPDO attempted – successfully – to assure their election victory by making sure that HNDO could not compete with sufficient numbers of candidates to gain a victory. Instead of frightening voters into voting for them, – a strategy which in 2000 led to serious violence – they used their administrative control over information and over the institutions controlling the process on local level. Kebele officials had to check the lists of signatures of each candidate. So the kebele cadres made sure that so many signatures were either rejected or withdrawn that the candidates of HNDO could be disqualified. There were several ways to achieve this: some signatures were cancelled because the persons were considered under-age, or not residents. Others were persuaded to withdraw their signatures. In some kebele people reported being called in and told they would have to face consequences if they supported the opposition. People have experience that the kebele officials have the power to put force behind their threats. So it did not take too much convincing to make people sign a prepared letter saying they had been mistaken, or they were cheated by HNDO, and withdrew their signatures. In some cases also candidates themselves were threatened and forced to withdraw from candidacy in the last moment.
In Hosaina constituency, all candidates of HNDO were running. But in more remote areas they were withdrawn or disked. In the two constituencies of Soro 1 and 2, all HNDO candidates for the Zonal council were cancelled – but during voting day, two of them were re-admitted in Soro 2 (plus one for the woreda council) – two to three hours after the election had started. We talked to several candidates and HNDO supporters, who told us about the candidate who protested and was re-admitted. Another one was told he could not compete because there was a court case against him, we were told. But when he protested and the police found no charge against him, he was re-admitted. Still, in Soro 1 and 2, there were only two opposition candidates standing against twelve EPRDF candidates for the zonal council, and one against six for the woreda. A majority for the opposition was excluded beforehand. And in fact, people felt disenfranchised: “Our candidates are not there – how can we go to vote?”
The morning after the election I met the chairman of NEB, Assefa Birru, in Hosaina. He was confident that these elections had been much better than the last ones. As far as security was concerned, I could only agree. I mentioned the demonstrations in Soro. He admitted there was a problem, and said he might himself be partly responsible for it, because he accepted the cancellation of candidates. HNDO could have filed a complaint, he said, and have got a re-election. But people had spoilt the situation by refusing to go to the polls. As they had not voted, they could hardly complain either.
I think his decision was correct. The kebele was the competent authority to verify the signatures. He could not without lengthy and serious investigations reject the result of their scrutiny. As the highest Election Board official present, he had to accept the judgement of the kebele certifying that a substantial number of signatories were cancelled because they were under-age, non-residents or otherwise legally not entitled to sign, others had withdrawn their signatures. Even if he, warned by experience, might have reacted to the fact that all the twelve HNDO candidates (or at least ten of them) had cheated, while all candidates of the EPRDF were admitted, he had no legally relevant grounds to overrule their conclusion. However much he might have doubted, he could only give an opening for an ex-post investigation, and a possible re-election. The problem is that a re-election is almost impossible to attain, unless blatant violations are obvious. Local authorities know very well that they can get away with almost any kind of rigging. If the opposition goes to court for a re-election, the burden of proof is theirs; and local courts depend on the local government and would not easily accept evidence against them. In this case, even Assefa Birru indicated he saw little chance now, as the people had boycotted the polls. They will no doubt be told: Since you voluntarily decided to make use of your right not to vote, you can not complain when the other side wins. But what else could they have done? Had they voted blank, they would have been told that by doing so they had accepted the election.
Candidates and representation
Totally in Hadiya zone, HNDO could compete with 35 candidates for 60 seats in the Zonal council. 25 candidates were dismissed- while EPRDF could field all their 60 candidates. One might still argue that an opposition party that systematically cheats does not deserve better. However, the experience in earlier elections reveals a different pattern. In case of serious competition a situation is created which effectively stops the opposition in a way that is legally hard to challenge. Formally, the opposition is given an option to go to court and prove that they were discriminated to a degree that makes a re-election necessary. It puts the burden of proof with the opposition. In practice, with slow and inefficient local courts, which on top of that are not independent from the administrative and political leadership, the opposition never expects appeals in court to give results. In most cases they are not even accepted.
The President of Southern Region (SNNPRS), with whom we had a long meeting before the election, made a point of the establishment of Joint Committees on kebele, woreda and zonal level, which were to mediate in case of disputes on the election. These committees consisted of one representative each of the competing parties and an official from the electoral board. He expected them to become a neutral institution, which could contribute to create an atmosphere of trust and equal opportunity. However, in practice, at least in Hadiya, they were totally sidelined or not established at all. They may have been efficient in negotiating minor individual quarrels and complaints. In the question of dismissing signatures and lists, they were neither involved before nor after a candidate was rejected. In such a decisive issue for the election on zonal and woreda level, they had no influence whatsoever.
The National Electoral Board had sent election officers to most woreda in Hadiya, to pre-empt accusations of election officials being local officials and EPRDF members. They were posted in the kebele in time before the election, and seemingly became integrated into the local power structures. Otherwise it would not be explainable why they accepted the serious shortcomings and formal faults in the electoral process: There were voting stations with no secret booths, an electoral official from Addis Ababa being there and accepting that people were told where to mark the ballot for EPRDF. There were voting stations with somebody in the booth checking what people voted, again without protest from the NEB representative. There were also voting stations where the observers of HNDO were not allowed access. NEB officials in the voting station joined uncritically the local officials’ attempts at explaining away the low turnout of voters and the demonstrating people on the street with their voter cards. The overall impression is that they have let themselves be absorbed by the local culture of the administration.
One ploy to deprive HNDO of an earlier victory seems to have been planned, or at least accepted, on higher level. According to the explanation of the President of SNNPRS given three days before the election, the zones are administrations, not governments. Therefore the zonal councils are composed of 50 % directly elected members. The other half represents the Regional Council. They were elected in 2000 to represent the zone in the Regional Council. For Hadiya, this meant that HNDO had already 24 seats in the Zonal council, and would win a majority if getting another seven or more candidates elected into the 60-seat zonal council. According to the Secretary of Hadiya zone, the zonal council had been increased to 85 members. The zone elected in total 60 representatives, six each in the 10 constituencies. HNDO had already won 21 out of 85 seats in the zonal council, and needed another 22 to win a majority – a substantial difference, but not impossible to win under conditions of equal chances. But when the NEB announced the results of the elections, all 54 seats in Hadiya zone were won by EPRDF’s member party HPDO, and there were, according to NEB, only 54 seats in the zonal council. The newly added 30 members elected in 2001 had not extended the council but replaced the 21 or 24 seats already won by HNDO.
There may be good reasons for changing from indirect representation to directly elected zonal councils, especially in Southern region, where the zone is often the highest level of self-determination for one ethnic group. But changing the rules on the way, after an opposition has achieved a partial electoral victory, can not be called a fair play or an equal chance. And explaining to foreign researchers the old system while a new one is already being voted for does not strengthen the credibility of an electoral process in the hands of local, zonal and regional authorities.
Nothing new in Gedeo?
For comparison and to check on the general pattern of discriminating against an opposition and pushing on them the onus to take the administration to court and prove alleged faults, I decided to take a short detour and re-visited Gedeo, where I followed the elections in May 2000. Here, at least two constituencies should have had a re-election in 2000, had equality and fair play been honoured. Probably four, if not all seven constituencies should have repeated the voting. As reported earlier, the Gedeo People’s Democratic Organisation (GPDO) believed to have a large majority of voters behind their candidates. In the days before the election we had seen a very tense situation. The GPDO claimed that pressure and violence was directed against their members. And indeed we got serious indications supporting that view. There was a palatable atmosphere of fear, and it was clearly targeting the GPDO. In Bule, woreda authorities chased some GPDO members from the community for disclosing internal complaints to outside researchers. They had been telling us their complaints.
The woreda election board in Cochorre tried to hide from us the fact that they had given training to communal and party election observers, but had – at the orders of the woreda chairman – excluded the observers from GPDO. In itself a small issue, this was but another indisputable indication that authorities consciously used their power to limit the chances of GPDO in the election. We were witnesses to arrests, talked to several GPDO observers who were imprisoned on election day, and saw military patrolling the highway with a machine gun mounted on a car with local government plates.
The one ploy that alone would have necessitated a re-election was the “Women-first”-trick: when during the voting day the queues before voting stations became too long, officials started to urge people to let women vote first. Soon they admitted only women to enter the voting stations, while the men – at least the younger men – had to wait. By three o’clock there were huge crowds of men waiting outside the voting stations. By four o’clock they started to get excited, saying:
“You see, they don’t refuse all the men. Their supporters are allowed in. The women they can put under pressure inside. They don’t know the rules, they are weak. What you see standing outside here, is the politically conscious part of the population. And you will see, by six o’clock they will close the voting station and we will be sent home without voting.”
Indeed, in most voting stations, people were sent home at six o’clock sharp. The young men outside were denied their right to vote after they were made to wait for hours. From Michille, the neighbouring constituency, other observers reported the same pattern. Large crowds of disenfranchised people had even come to the zonal capital of Dilla to protest, but were sent back home without remedy.
I have indisputable proof that the zonal administration knew of the “women-first”-ploy and most probably had initiated it. Gedeo should have had a re-election in 2000 had there been serious concern for equal chances and a fair election campaign. I reported the “women-first-ploy” and the other issues to the National Electoral Board, and other observers did. But the Board did not consider such reports as evidence that could be used in court.
We can of course not know whether GPDO would have won a majority in a fair contest, or in a re-election. It was never tested. But indirectly, the ruling party admitted that they were afraid of loosing. Had they been as confident of their victory as they pretended, they would never have taken the risk to invent a ploy and exclude a large group of GPDO supporters from casting their votes.
Conclusion: Election without competition
Coming back to Dilla and Gedeo one and a half-year later, I was immediately reminded of the discouraging experience of the 2000 elections. I met again the zonal chairman, Yohannes Gebeyehu on his last day in office: He is moving to Awasa, to become the President of the Regional Council. The official who introduced the “Women-first” campaign got a scholarship for a PHD at a foreign university. Yohannes told me that everything was peaceful and there were no tensions now. But from several people, from independent citizens and supporters of GPDO, I heard a different story. A short visit of one day and a half can hardly produce definite evidence. But impressions give a clear picture. The ruling Gedeo People’s Revolutionary Democratic Movement (GPRDM) penalised GPDO as an organisation as well as their supporters. After the election in 2000 was over and observers had left, the offices of GPDO were immediately closed and many of their candidates and supporters were arrested. Others escaped to Addis Ababa and returned only after the worst revenge was over. I was told about supporters of GPDO who were dismissed from jobs, their families were threatened. The pattern was the same as we had seen it in Hadiya, in Muger in Oromia, in Seraro, and even in Addis Ababa in February 2001.
The elections of 2001 were uncontested in Gedeo. Only some few independent candidates were competing against GPRDM. Some of them had been nominated by GPRDM and even their lists of signatures were provided by the authorities. Representatives of GPDO told me that they had come to the conclusion that the EPRDF can not be challenged in elections. They did not put up candidates, and did not participate in the election of 2001. While that meant to limit their political activities, the leaders in Addis Ababa indicated they could not take the responsibility to ask people to register as candidates, knowing which consequences they would have to face.
HNDO in Hadiya has drawn the same conclusion after the December 2001 election. One of the party leaders told me: “At least, we have proven that it is, under present conditions, impossible to challenge the EPRDF in elections.”
By Yohannes Chane Metiku
April 2002
Third World jurists have the uncomfortable task of interpreting and applying “International Law”, which for the most part is made, shaped, twisted or even often times abused in line with the national interests of greater powers. (Presumably two of the five distinguished jurists composing the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission are nationals of Third World countries, a Nigerian and an Indian.)
“International Law” had always the academic ambiguity of being “Law” as such or some other species of power politics in disguise. Thus, the role of international law and international institutions must always be seen in the wider perspective of satisfying an existing international system or great power national interest. Today’s international system is somehow in a relative state of flux and full of uncertainties. A lot of radical changes are taking place. Some of those changes may even qualify to be historical ‘landmarks’ or ‘milestones’ in the context of the general development of international law. There were several such milestones in history. The emergence of the Westphalian international system (1648); the French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic wars (1789-1815); The Russian Revolution (1917); the end of World War II and the creation of the UN (1945); the Cold War (1950-1989); the liberation of colonies in Africa since the 1960s were the major ones. And now, at the dawn of the 21st century, we have at hand a new form of international war called “war against terrorism”.
The Westphalian treaty and the Napoleonic wars in Europe might not have any direct impact on the changes affecting the state of Ethiopia at that time, but all the rest most definitely had and continue to have. The Russian Revolution coupled with international politics in the Cold War played significant role in bringing about the liquidation of the millennial Ethiopian Monarchy. Exactly 200 years after the French Revolution, by which the infamous Bastille prison was violently destroyed, another infamous Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989, ushering in several revolutionary changes in the international system. That system had its own bearings in bringing about the devolution of the already beleaguered state of Ethiopia into several mini states.
How are the norms of international law and institutions responding to such drastic global changes in the international system or are being affected by it? Ours is an era in which extensive juridical theories are being reconsidered in the face of fast moving changes in values, the direction of which, for the most part being just obscure and difficult to tell. One aspect of the interesting part of international law affected by such changes is the question of succession of states. Old states dissolve and new ones emerge. Here is an area of research in which law and politics have, as they always had, close interplay in state practice. The interplay even seems stronger after the end of the Cold War. One of the distinguished British jurists in international law, Professor Rosalin Higgins once pointed out that “there is no avoiding the essential relationship between law and policy.” (R. Higgins, “International Law, the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes”, 230RdC 28 (1991-C).
1. Use of Force and International Law.
The overriding objective for any international tribunal or body, like the recent Boundary Commission between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in considering procedural priorities must be to arrive at conditions conducive for making immediate peace. To that end, several political avenues could be open for consideration in lieu of pure law. Juridical too, the prohibition against the use of force and the international custom-based obligation to have recourse only to peaceful means of resolving disputes/conflicts comes on top of all other considerations. In this light, the political-legal role the commission has played must have due diplomatic credit by all sides at the initial stage at least, but only just as temporary measure.
2. Ex iniuria non ius oritur (‘illegal acts do not create law’) and ex factis ius oritur (‘facts have a tendency to become law’).
There you have it! international law is inherently full of contradictions. The above two contradictory legal maxims were borrowed from the Roman Law to the international jurisprudence. Upon the general juridical premise that the use of force is basically illegal in modern international relations, almost all major events in the world could have difficulty in attaining any legal sanctity. Almost all major changes in a global scale occur through the use of force. According to the first principle (maxim), then, all the achievements of the victories in World War II would have been of no legal consequences! Because, they were achieved through the use of force. Contrarily, according to the second maxim, facts (events) if generally agreed upon by the public at large or even acquiesced to (with no tangible opposition in the international arena) have a tendency of being sanctified as legal, even though such might have been achieved through heinous use of force. The latter principle seems to work well especially in relation to state succession.
3. State Succession.
States die and are born too. When new states will have to replace old ones, there comes the legal issue of state succession. The doctrine of state succession is full of academically controversial theories and especially with respect to the ambiguities with ‘state continuity’. On this question Prof. James Crawford underlines the importance of making distinction between state succession and state continuity. He states that “[whether] some state can be said to exist, despite changes of government, territory or population, [or] one state can be said to have replaced another with respect to certain territory” must have crucial distinction. (see J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 400.)
This doctrinal analysis had a recent applicability in international law on the questions of whether Russia today is a successor of the erstwhile Soviet Union or just its continuation in the eyes of international law. The same question also arose regarding the state of Yugoslavia. How about with respect to the Ethiopian situation? Since 1974 Ethiopia has undergone five forms of governmental formations: from the monarchy to constitutional monarchy (1974-75). From constitutional monarchy to Provisional Military Administrative Council (1975-1984). From a military government to a socialist republic (1984-1991). From a socialist republic again to a ‘Transitional Government’ by EPRDF (1991-1995). From transitional government to a federal democratic republic (1995-present.) The last change has most drastic implications in international law. Because of the deep social and political implications brought about, we will have to raise this question: state continuity or state succession, which is undergoing in Ethiopia? Is the the new federal republic a continuation of the historical Ethiopian state or a successor?
In the case of Russia, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia remains bigger than all other former Soviet republics taken together. Also, Soviet Russia after 1917 was a continuing state of the Czarist Russian Empire in the eyes of international law. After the removal of the monarchy in Ethiopia, the same unitary state, under different form/s of government, continued. Added to this too, we have the subjective element, in both situations, of state continuity for the new regimes obviously intended to perpetuate the state. Hence, until 1995, through which Ethiopia continued as a unitary state, there was no doubt as to state continuity. But, the series of events after 1995, more crucially, the devolution of the unitary state of Ethiopia into several mini states, the most troublesome of which being the full independence of Eritrea, (with the silence of the more than sixty million Ethiopian people), forces us to question the legal continuity of the state of Ethiopia or her being succeeded by another state called a “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”. In the eyes of international law, emerging domestic events in a particular state are, for the most part taken note of, and then accorded the relevant juridical blessings, after passing the test of time. Extending the logic, the several mini states created in Ethiopia today might as well have that inchoate recognition of them by the international community as international persons (subjects) tomorrow, as they pass the test of time. Resolving this question might have far wider implications regarding the international legal status of the boundary delimitation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Should there be an agreement on the question that there has already occurred state succession in Ethiopia, then an a contrario argument of state restoration, should such occur eventually, will have to annul all international treaties or proceedings by the fictitious state as unlawful ab initio.
4. The Principle of Uti possedetis (“have what you have had”).
The principle of uti possedetis in international law, which in effect means accept what is given by the colonial rulers, emerged following the new international system after the decolonization of Latin America and Africa. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its decision on the frontier between Burkina Faso and Mali (22 December 1986) reiterated that principle by declaring that uti possedetis constituted as a general principle of law to be applied after independence. (Burkina Faso vs. Republic of Mali, 1986 ICJ Reports 565) The recent imposition of the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 by the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission also seems to affirm that principle. Speaking of the colonial treaties, there were so many intricated legal arguments, which should have been raised in relation to Ethiopia’s rights, not least of which her right to territorial seas. They simply and silently have been trampled upon by virtue of the words of the Algiers agreement between the respective governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, explicitly excluding the interpretation of legal principles Ex Aequo et Bono. In other words, the wills of the two leaders simply substituted the historical Ethiopian interests.
5. Ex Aequo et Bono.
Under its Procedural Introduction Chapter I article 1(2) the Boundary Commission skillfully excluded all other very complicated juridical considerations, which could arise with respect to the Ethio-Eritrean relations, by solely relying on the Algiers Accord. Under article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, prior agreements made by parties, like treaties, technically override all other possible sources of international law, like the customary practices of the historic state of Ethiopia. Here again, a major juridical flout has been made, in preference to political expediencies, which could be a major source of tension in the future of the region.
6. Conclusion.
Inasmuch as peace is the overriding objective, the international commission’s decision must be seen as an important diplomatic clout. Whether or not this intrepid political/legal clout will work for peace is, of course, to be seen on the ground. (Already both sides are claiming ‘victory’ as an outcome of the decision, proving once again the absurdity of the war, if the border was the real cause of it, in the first place, in which thousands of precious lives have perished.) Nonetheless, in view of the carefully ignored historical rights of Ethiopia complacence shall be avoided by any far sighted scholar, and at best the Commission’s decision must be seen as an interim measure to prevent bloodshed.
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Yohannes Chane Metiku, Adj. Professor of International Relations/Law. [email protected]
By Donald N. Levine
April 2002
Radical politics and civil strife have transformed the face of the Ethiopian nation over the past quarter of a century. Besides drastic changes at home, refugees to more than a dozen countries have formed a diaspora which numbers somewhere between one and 1.5 million people. As Ethiopia’s refugees established themselves in local communities and organized themselves more widely through national gatherings and media, they created the basis for reconfiguring Ethiopia as one nation located in three domains: ye-bet agar, ye-wutch agar, and ye-cyber agar. The devotion to homeland that was distinctive of Ethiopians at home continues to burn brightly in the diaspora. It has motivated expatriates to create a number of projects designed to help the home country as well as to improve life in their new homes. In so doing, they participate in a process that is reconfiguring the world community in a global era–the growth of civil associations across national boundaries. Having engaged in some of these projects, I thought it might be useful to give them greater publicity. The first three projects I describe concern programs of social action and institution-building in Ethiopia; the next two concern projects to help Ethiopians in the diaspora; and the last two concern cultural projects to promote pan-Ethiopian communication.
1. AIDS EDUCATION
BACKGROUND: Cumulative fatalities due to the AIDS epidemic in Ethiopia are estimated at well over a million. By the end of 1999, it was estimated that some 700,000 children had been orphaned (loss of mothers or both parents) as a result of HIV/AIDS. According to the Center for Disease control, with 1% of the world’s population, Ethiopia contains 9% of the world’s HIV/AIDS cases. “Tackling AIDS is the most serious. problem that Ethiopia now faces,” Ministry of Health spokesperson Amsale Yelma recently told a United nations information source.
PROJECT A: Gathering and distributing information.
The Johns Hopkins University Center for Communication Programs (JHU/CCP) has announced establishment of an Ethiopia AIDS Resource Center which will provide health care workers, government officials and HIV/AIDS organizations, and journalists with the latest information on HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis. Jointly sponsored with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Ethiopian Center is scheduled to open in Addis Ababa in December 2002. The Center will include print and web-based resources and will support a local AIDS telephone hotline that provides HIV/AIDS information and counseling services.
In addition, the Johns Hopkins Center, with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, has provided technical assistance to the National Office of Population in Ethiopia to develop a radio serial drama, “Journey Through Life,” designed to encourage young adults to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies. The series, which began airing on Sunday, Nov. 25, appeals to young married couples and unmarried adolescents in urban and semi-urban areas of the country. Of this series, Araya Demissie, country representative in Ethiopia for the JHU/CCP, said: “We are hoping Journey Through Life will help Ethiopians understand just how easy it is to become infected with the AIDS virus. But we also hope the program will convey just how easy it is to protect yourself.”
PROJECT B: AIDS entertainment-education in the countryside.
An initiative known as the Awassa Children’s Project has developed into a force for rural AIDS education. The project started around 1997 when Woyzero Sunnayit Bekele of Awassa began to provide food and school materials for a number of destitute local children. Aided by her sister Aster Bekele-Dabels, a resident of Germany, the project now aims to create a self-sufficient children’s home in Awassa, to prepare students for community service, and to train them as electricians, carpenters, textile workers, and computer technicians.
Subsequently, the director of Chicago’s Free Street Theater, David Schein, went to help these young people–now numbering around forty–create an outdoors theater project, which they call an AIDS Education Circus. Working with youngsters who had taught themselves gymnastics, juggling, tight rope, and other circus skills, Schein helped create a show that was performed in the Awassa marketplace before many thousands of people. During the circus performance, the children distribute educational materials about HIV and condoms. Currently they are seeking support from UNICEF and American AID to finance a tour of 12 markets in southern Ethiopia, while German, Ethiopian, and American friends are raising money to complete the construction of a Vocational Training and Arts Center in Awassa on land donated by the town.
CONTACTS: A. For more on JHU/CCP AIDS programs in Ethiopia, see .
B. For information on the Awassa Children’s Project AIDS Education Circus., contact Aster Bekele-Dabels, at or David Schein, Free Street Theater, Chicago, at “free street” .
2. ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
BACKGROUND: The intellectual and professional life of Ethiopia requires the nourishment of first-rate universities. The abrupt dismissal of some forty Ethiopian faculty members in April 1993 struck a serious. blow at the quality and morale of the Addis Ababa University program, as did the arbitrary imprisonment of Prof. Emeritus. Mesfin Wolde Mariam and Prof. Berhanu Nega in May 2001. As my letter reprinted at ) indicates , curtailment of academic freedom has reached unprecedented heights under the EPRDF. Beyond these and other constraints on academic freedom, the University suffers on every front from impoverished resources.
PROJECT A: In June, 2001, Professors Ivo Strecker of the University of Mainz, Donald Crummey of the University of Illinois, and I organized the International Ethiopian University Support Committee (IEUSC), a group of Ethiopianists from seven countries who wrote letters protesting the imprisonment of Drs. Mesfin and Berhanu. These letters went to a number of embassies as well as heads of the Ethiopian government, and may have helped to secure their release. Beyond that, Strecker established a continuing web site, which provides information about the university and statements from a wide group of scholars supporting academic freedom in Ethiopia. (The site also reprints my 1993 article, “Is Ethiopia Cutting Off Its Head Again?”) As of December, Dr. Makonnen Bishaw has been serving as coordinator of the site. The committee is working to maintain a continuing presence of foreign scholars to monitor the situation in Ethiopia and provide future support for the University.
PROJECT B: An exciting initiative has recently gelled in Addis Ababa. Professor Baye Yiman, current director of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, has launched a new Institute of Ethiopian Studies Library Project, estimated at five million U.S. dollars. The project proposes to erect a new structure to house the library’s thousands of books and periodicals. The current library in Ras Makonnen Hall is not able to hold the weight of the vast growing collection of books, manuscripts, and periodicals. The collection is so crowded that proper cataloguing has become problematic. The proposed structure will be situated to the east of the former Palace building, in the area of the former stables. The new library will house the literary collection properly and provide computer and audiovisual facilities.
CONTACT: A. For information on the IEUSC, visit the web site .or Dr. Makonnen Bishaw at .
B. To assist the Institute of Ethiopian Studies project, send donations to the Institute and Society of Friends of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, P.O. Box 1176, Addis Ababa. For more information on the IES project, email the Addis Tribune at [email protected]. Donors in the United States can give tax-exempt financial support by sending their checks to: American Friends of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, P.O. Box 15438, Washington DC, 20003-998, U.S.A.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS
BACKGROUND: Each of the three last regimes in Ethiopia committed serious infringements of human rights. Under the Derg the attacks on human rights escalated horrifically. Under the EPRDF and EPLF regimes in the past decade, human rights conditions in certain respects improved; in other respects they worsened considerably. Each year brings numerous cases of unjust imprisonment, torture, and killing under these regimes.
One other thing that has been different during the past decade has been a more active presence of the United States Government and other donor countries. In particular the U.S. State Department has supported a full-time officer devoted to monitoring human rights conditions (in June 1992, for example, I accompanied the then Human Rights officer to prison to interview OLF candidates who had been imprisoned apparently illegally, and who then filed a report raising questions about those cases). Concerning the 1995 elections, the U.S. and other donor countries produced a confidential report listing numerous. instances where legally registered parties faced intimidation, arrests, and closure of offices.
PROJECT A. Political action in the U.S. Congress.
Action by Ethiopians in the U.S. and American friends of Ethiopia was successful in getting the U.S. Congress to pass unanimously an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill in 1995 tying future aid for the Ethiopian government to demonstrated improvement in its human rights record. More recently, action by Ethiopians in Illinois was crucial in getting Senator Dick Durbin, who with six other senators to sent a letter to Secretary of State Powell protesting EPRDF human rights violations, which elicited Powell’s prompt statement of support.
PROJECT B. Human Rights Information.
1. Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO). In Ethiopia itself, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, a non-governmental human rights organization established in 1991, has been monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the country. To date, it has issued some 17 regular and 47 special reports, including comprehensive reports on the most recent general and local elections. A number of persons in Europe and North America, identified on the EHRCO web site, provide support for the association.
2. Amnesty International. Amnesty International has a long record of monitoring human rights conditions in Ethiopia. This goes back as far as early 1961, when they sent observers to the trial of Gen. Mengistu Neway following the attempted coup of December 1960. Most recently, they made the case of Dr. Taye Wolde-Semayat a project for their Freedom Writers in October. This means that something like 5,000 letters were written on his behalf by the Freedom Writers Network, which is committed to writing for whatever case is identified during that month.
AI will continue to monitor Dr. Taye’s trial, and will report on it in their Urgent Action bulletins. The most recent of these bulletins reported on the imprisonment of nine Eritrean journalists who were “detained incommunicado at a police station in the capital, Asmara, for over a month. They are not known to have been charged with any offense, or brought to court within 48 hours, as required by law. Conditions in police cells in Eritrea are harsh, and they are at risk of ill-treatment. They were arrested after 19 September, when the government ordered all independent newspapers to cease publication.” Dr. Taye also headed the list of five prisoners of conscience selected by Amnesty International for their annual
3. Human Rights Watch, and its subsidiary, Africa Watch, report regularly on human rights conditions in Ethiopia. Most recently, they posted a letter of protest against the suspension from operation of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), a leading local nongovernmental women’s rights organization.
4. The U. S. State Department. Reports on human rights have been produced every year since 1993 by the Department of State. These reports have been valuable in securing asylum for Ethiopians who have been endangered because of dissident political activism and independent journalism.
CONTACTS:
For EHRCO’s reports and links, see its web site: http://www.ehrco.net/
For a write-up of the case of Dr. Taye, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/action/special/wolde_semayat.html
For the Freedom Writers Network, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/freedomwriters/
For the Urgent Action bulletins, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/urgent
For Human Rights Watch coverage of Ethiopia, see http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/ethiopia-1017-ltr.htm
For the U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports on Ethiopia, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/hrp_reports_mainhp.html
4. DIASPORA COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND: As Ethiopians fled to various. countries during the Derg years, they came to form self-help organizations to minister to the adjustment needs of their compatriots. I shall describe a few of them.
Chicago, Illinois. The Ethiopian Community Association of Chicago (ECAC) has long provided numerous. services for Ethiopians in the Greater Chicago area. Geared initially to refugee settlement, employment, and adjustment problems, its emphases have evolved as the immigrant community matured. ECAC now provides Amharic instruction to Ethiopian children born in the U.S. as well as English-language training to adults, translation and interpretation services, and assistance for new entrepreneurs. Recently it opened a Computer Training Center; equipped with state-of-the-art facilities, the program includes career counseling and job placement services. The ECAC helps other groups as well, through such cooperative activities as health outreach services and youth development projects. It regularly organizes community events such as Enquetatash celebrations and publishes a handsome bilingual quarterly magazine, Mahiber.
Seattle, Washington. The Ethiopian Community Mutual Association has been active for close to 20 years. Its services include case management and advocacy for Ethiopian expatriates, job placement, language training (Amharic and English), translation and interpretation, and citizenship classes. The association also organizes sports activities, after-school tutoring, and parenting classes. During the past year it has opened a Computer Resources and Training Center that offers classes five days a week at beginning, intermediate, and advanced levels.
Hadera, Israel. Founded in 1996, the Ethiopian Immigrants Volunteer Organization grew rapidly in response to the requirements of a large immigrant community. Its activities cover the entire gamut of adjustment needs, from infancy through senior citizens, with programs for parents and pre-school children, school children, adult education, community service, and culture. The organization features a holistic conception, whereby every member of the community is enabled both to give and to receive services according to their abilities, with continuous. follow-up to ensure meeting the stated objectives. Some distinctive elements include a program to help parents guide their children through kindergarten; a two-year leadership program that trains members of the community to develop good relationships with local government and regional and national institutions; a program to assist community elders (shemagles) help families and individuals solve issues in accordance with community customs; and a program to preserve traditional Ethiopian music and teach it to the next generation. New projects under way include the construction of a community cultural center and the creation of a course for mothers who can complete high school programs while learning to work as assistant teachers in kindergartens.
PROJECT: Ethiopian Community Association Networking
Representatives of these organizations with whom I have spoken indicate that it would be helpful to have some sort of clearinghouse whereby they could be in contact with one another. They have comparable problems and stand to benefit from ways of sharing information about how they have solved or are working on those problems.
CONTACT: For the Chicago association, contact Dr. Erku Ymer, Director, at
< [email protected]>
For the Seattle association, contact Belay Demssie, Director, or Emanuel Habte, Secretary of the Board, at [email protected] , or see their web site at
For information on the Hadera association, contact Tesfaye Aderajew at 972-4-630-3211; Fax: 972-4-624-8353, or
For qualified and interested volunteers to assist in the networking effort, please contact me at
5. REPATRIATION
BACKGROUND: Many Ethiopians who left under duress during the Derg period would be interested in returning to their homeland, but they may require special assistance. Repatriation is not a simply matter of getting on a plane and disembarking. It involves a whole complex of adjustments, requiring the establishment of a supportive milieu often quite different from what was left behind. This may be particularly true of Jewish Ethiopians, known as Bete Israel (FKA Falasha), who emigrated to Israel en masse in 1986 and 1991 Many of them are having difficulty finding employment because they have not learned to speak Hebrew. Having left a condition of extreme poverty and often discrimination, they may find it especially difficult to repatriate. On the other hand, some who have acquired modern training may wish to return to help rebuild their homeland.
PROJECT A: Several people are working to set up a structure to coordinate efforts among a number of interested parties. These include Ethiopian Jews in Israel who may wish to return to Ethiopia; Ethiopian Jews in Israel who wish to stay there but can help others to return; Bete Israel who have already returned, to Gondar and their traditional agerbet as well as to Addis Ababa; and members of Gondar Development Associations in Addis Ababa, Gondar, San Francisco, and elsewhere who wish to help their countrymen resettle. They are talking about a plan to make Weleka, the traditional Bete Israel homeland, the first site of resettlement. A target for the first phase would be about one hundred settlers. The idea would be to build houses at Weleka and also construct small plants for producing bricks, hollow blocks, and pottery. Weleka could become a center for training rural people in handicraft and trade skills.
PROJECT B: Another initiative would be to establish a clearinghouse of information for other Ethiopians anywhere who wish to repatriate as part of a movement to build a unified and democratic national society. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees may be a place to start working on that.
CONTACT: Mulugeta Wudu of San Jose and Dr. Mengistu Legesse, President of the Gondar Development and Cooperation Organization in North America are working to develop the project and make connections among the relevant parties. I am currently working to identify persons in Israel to make contact with Bete Israel immigrants who may wish to return to Ethiopia.
6. PAN-ETHIOPIAN RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
BACKGROUND: Ethiopia is perhaps the only country where the three great Semitic religions have not only lived side by side for centuries, but where their adherents have converted back and forth a fair amount and even celebrate festivals together. The annual pilgrimage to Qulubi Gabrael in December is a case in point. Encouraging communication among representative figures of each of the three faiths would not only advance the cause of Ethiopian unity but also be an important exemplar for other countries at this troubled time. What is more, many traditional Ethiopian religions have elements that show a family resemblance to the sacred symbols and practices of the Semitic religions. Might it be possible to contemplate resemblances as well as differences among the conceptions of Oromo Wak and other non-Semitic Ethiopian deities, Christian Egzhiabher, Jewish Yahweh, and Muslim Allah, and thereby open a process of communication of benefit not only Ethiopians but more than half of the world?
PROJECT: One way to pursue such conversations would be to hold them in a supportive, neutral place–perhaps even outside of Ethiopia. One possible site for this would be the center of Etz Hayyim, a restored ancient synagogue in the town of Hania, Crete. A historic temple whose congregants were all annihilated by the Nazis and whose building was later destroyed by an earthquake, it was placed non the list of endangered monuments of international cultural concern. Dr. Nicholas Stavroulakis spearheaded the campaign to restore the synagogue and maintains it now as a museum and conference center to promote dialogue among the Semitic religions. Dr. Stavroulakis has recently offered the site as a place for Ethiopians to meet and pursue a pan-Ethiopian ecumenical dialogue.
CONTACT: I am looking for a few Ethiopians who would be willing to help organize a project of this sort. If qualified and interested, please contact me at . To learn about the Etz Hayyim synagogue, see http://www.etz-hayyim-hania.org/
7. PAN-ETHIOPIAN SCHOLARLY DIALOGUE
BACKGROUND: For many years, the world of Ethiopian Studies comprised a vibrant international community whose participants knew and respected one another and where it really didn’t matter much if one were linguist or historian, geographer or musicologist, Northerner or Southerner, habesha or ferinj. Apart from the usual academic communications in what has been term an invisible college, the community manifested itself every few years in international conferences of Ethiopian Studies.
As Ethiopia became internally divided, however, the community of Ethiopianist scholars registered similar divisions, above and beyond the worldwide processes of professional specialization. Two splinter groups formed, the Eritrean Studies Association and the Oromo Studies Association, and for some years their respective members have had little or nothing to do with one another.
PROJECT: A small number of scholars who have been active in these associations are beginning to open a dialogue about finding ways to restore and enhance collegial communications. They include Drs. Asmarom Legesse, who originated this idea; Mohammed Hassen; Alessandro Triulzi; Donald Donham.; and myself. The idea is to organize a conference on a theme that would invite participation on a pan-Ethiopian basis and that might be relevant to the construction of a more democratic national society in Ethiopia. The idea of the first projected conference is to examine traditions of local democratic practices in the various. societies of historic Ethiopia.
CONTACT: Further details will be announced during the coming year.
Concluding comment.
The networks of communication among Ethiopians in the diaspora and with those at home make it possible to envision new dimensions of strength in the effort to help Ethiopia recover from the traumas of the past generation. Supposing all Ethiopians in the diaspora committed themselves to participating at some point in one or another project of the sort described here or elsewhere? Might it be possible to view them now, not just as “expatriates” but as “external patriots”?