SHEFFIELD, UK — An ETHIOPIAN man who had sought asylum in Sheffield drowned in the River Don after a night out in the city centre. Efrem Woldemichael, who was in the process of appealing the Home Office’s decision refusing him the right to stay, was found near Effingham Street behind The Wicker, four weeks after he disappeared.
The 33-year-old had been out in Ethiopian restaurant Ethio Cubano in Arundel Gate on December 1 last year, when he was said to be drunk but his usual self.
Restaurant owner Davit Asmelash told a Sheffield inquest Efrem was a regular customer who never caused any trouble.
He said: “He was very decent, responsible and friendly. He was drunk that night but there was no trouble – he was not that kind of person.”
Mr Asmelash said Efrem had arrived around midnight and eaten his usual meal before going downstairs to join in the dancing.
He saw Efrem “unbalanced on his feet” and suggested to one of his pals that he go home – and even took £10 out of the till to pay for his taxi fare.
Freshwa Beranu, who was also drinking and dancing in the restaurant that night, said he had gone outside for a cigarette and helped Efrem into a black cab at around 4am.
He said he saw that the driver was Asian but couldn’t identify him further, and heard Efrem, of Fox Street, Pitsmoor, say to the driver that if he took him to Burngreave he would be able to find his way home.
His body was found 27 days later on December 28 by a member of the public.
Det Con Robert Whiteman told the court Efrem had been reported missing on December 8 and checks were made on his mobile phone and bank activity.
His phone had not been used since he went missing and the wages from his cleaning job had not been withdrawn from his account.
DC Whiteman said appeals were made in The Star and on South Yorkshire Police’s website to trace the taxi driver but they had come to nothing, and CCTV footage could not reveal images in enough detail.
He added the driver’s probable route from Arundel Gate to Burngreave – when roadworks were still taking place on the inner relief road – would have been down Corporation Street and then up to the junction with Rock Street in Burngreave.
He said if Efrem had got out of the cab there he would have been very close to the River Don, and, if he had fallen in, the water would have carried him in the direction of Effingham Street.
Pathologist Dr Christopher Milroy said a post-mortem examination suggested a “long period of immersion” in water. He gave the cause of death as drowning.
Toxicology reports from Dr Stephen Morley also found Efrem had more than twice the legal amount of alcohol in his blood for driving.
Assistant deputy coroner Donald Coutts-Wood recorded a narrative verdict and added: “Putting together the lack of use of his phone, with the fact that within seven days he was paid but never withdrew the cash as he normally did, it does seem to me he was probably in the River Don shortly after his taxi journey home.”
By Sarah Dunn, Sheffield Telegraph
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Asrat Woldeyes Commemorative 80th Birthday Symposium
On behalf of the Organizing Committee We are pleased to announce the Asrat Woldeyes Altaye (AWA) 80th Birthday Commemorative Symposium to be held at:
Howard University School of Medicine
Washington D.C., USA on Saturday, 28 June 2008
From 10am -5pm
Speakers are from various medical/academic institutions, family and friends of Prof Asrat Woldeyes and include:
Dr. Ahmed Moen, Howard University, Washington D.C.
Dr. Assefa Negash, Netherland, Holland
Ato Youm Fesseha, Philadelphia, PA
Dr. Wendy Belcher, Princeton, NJ
Dr. Getachew Haile, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Prof. Nebiat Tafari, Cleveland, Ohio
Ato Wondayehu Kassa
Poetry: Ato Assefa Gebremariam
Music: Artist Teshome Metiku and friends
If you’re interested to submit relevant papers or video for the Asrat Woldeyes Symposium please contact the organizing committee by e-mail: [email protected]
For additional information please visit the website: www.asratwoldeyes.org
Organizing Committee
The Family of Professor Asrat Woldeyes
Professor Asrat Woldeyes (June 20, 1928 – May 14, 1999) was an Ethiopian surgeon, a Professor of Medicine at Addis Ababa University, and the founder and leader of the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), as well as a political figure who was jailed by the Derg and later by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Professor Asrat was the founding member of the Ethiopian Medical Association (EMA), Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh (FRCS Edinburgh) and FRCS (England), member of the British Medical Association (BMA), the East African Surgical Association (EASA) and International College of Surgeons (USA). (Source: wikipedia.org)
EDITOR’S NOTE: World Bank, the best friend of dictators and the primary source of Africa’s misery, approves more money to be given to the terrorist regime in Ethiopia led by tribal dictator Meles Zenawi. If and when a government that stands for the interest of Ethiopians comes to power, one of the first things it needs to do is to kick out the World Bank and IMF out of the country.
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World Bank Press Release No:2008/342/AFR
Washington, May 29, 2008 – The Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank today approved US$ 80 million International Development Association financing (of which US$56.6 million as grant and US$23.4 million as a credit) to the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) in support of the second phase of the Pastoral Community Development Project.
The project will be implemented in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in 57 woredas of the Afar, Somali, SNNPs and Oromya Regions. About 600,000 rural households or approximately 45% of pastoral and agro-pastoral woredas in Ethiopia will benefit from the PCDPII project.
The objective of the Pastoralist Community Development Project II is to enable pastoralists to better withstand external shocks and to improve the livelihoods of targeted communities. The project will empower local communities by increasing their engagement in woreda processes and local development decision making. It will also provide them increased access to social services; and better access to support for savings and credit activities. In addition, the project seeks to improve and expand the pastoral early warning system and the responsiveness of the disaster mitigation and contingency funds.
‘PCDP II represents a great opportunity for the Government of Ethiopia to realize its commitment to decentralized development in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Ethiopia,’ said Ingo Wiederhofer, World Bank Task Team Leader for this project. According to him, the Project will support an approach to local development in which citizens are empowered to determine and implement their social and economic priorities. It will also help to expand and institutionalize systems that will enable the country to better identify and manage disaster risks in these fragile areas in a proactive manner adapted to pastoral livelihood systems.
The project has the following four components:
The Sustainable Livelihoods Enhancement component will further strengthen decentralized and participatory planning at the community/ kebele and woreda levels. Women and men in pastoral communities will identify, prioritize, design, and implement micro-projects that reflect their local development priorities. The Community Investment Fund (CIF) subcomponent will finance micro-projects related to water supply, micro-scale irrigation, health care, education, rangeland management, etc. The Rural Livelihoods Program (RLP) sub-component will finance income generating activities identified by beneficiary community groups, and will help to extend savings and credit cooperatives systems to pastoral areas.
The Pastoral Risk Management component will support the expansion of the participatory Early Warning and Response Program to all pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. The system will provide information to trigger early non-food responses to declines in the welfare of pastoralist communities using the proven Household Economy Approach. In addition, technical assistance and staff capacity building will be provided to support the development of regional Disaster Preparedness Strategy and Investment Programs in four regions.
The Knowledge Management and Participatory Learning component will support Participatory Action Learning pilots in selected woredas to develop methodologies for demand-driven approaches to participatory knowledge generation and innovation development. In addition knowledge management and information exchange will be supported at federal and regional levels.
The last component will support overall Project Management.
The World Bank will support the Pastoral Community Development Project II in partnership with the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD). Implementation of the project will be overseen by the Federal Project Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, with regional governments playing a key role.
For more information on the World Bank in sub-Saharan Africa visit: www.worldbank.org/afr
For more information on the World Bank in Ethiopia visit: www.worldbank.org/ethiopia
For more information about this project click here.
Contacts:
In Washington: Aby Toure +1 (202) 473 8302
[email protected]
In Addis Ababa : Gelila Woodeneh (251-1) 662 77 00
[email protected]
DUBAI — The Dubai Naturalisation and Residency Department (DNRD) has come to the rescue of an Ethiopian housemaid who plunged from the second-floor balcony of her sponsor’s villa while cleaning.
The housemaid suffered fractures and will need
medical treatment for at least six months
[Photo: Bassma Al Jandaly/Gulf News]
Senior DNRD officials are negotiating with her sponsor, whom it is alleged has not paid her since she started working for him, and who has threatened to deport her even though she requires medical attention.
Bizuwork Girma, the 33-year-old housemaid is currently being treated in Rashid Hospital and has severe injuries. Major General Mohammad Ahmad Al Merri, Director-General of Dubai DNRD told Gulf News it was the responsibility of sponsors to provide medical treatment at their own expense if domestic helpers are injured at work.
“The UAE domestic helpers’ work contract makes it obligatory for sponsors to give all necessary medical treatment for their employees. If it is proved that the sponsor is ignoring the law he will face punishment,” he said.
Full support will be given to Bizuwork, Major General Al Merri added.
Bizuwork, a mother of a four-year-old boy back in her home country, came to work in Dubai in November last year as a housemaid for a British man, his Lebanese wife and their three children.
According to a social worker from the Ethiopian Consulate Bizuwork’s sponsor told them he had sent the money to her sister but her sister said she has not received any money.
“We asked the sponsor to check with the exchange company why the money did not reach the family but the sponsor said he was too busy for such things,” the social worker told Gulf News.
Bizuwork told Gulf News that on the day of the accident she was cleaning her sponsor’s house when she fell off the villa’s second-floor balcony while she was putting a blanket out to air.
Doctors at the hospital said that Bizuwork was suffering from fractures to her back and would need medical treatment for a while.
They said she will be discharged from the hospital in a week’s time. But she has to come back for follow-up treatment for at least six months.
If she does not receive proper treatment she could be permanently paralysed, the doctor said.
According to the consulate’s social worker Bizuwork’s sponsor will not allow her to stay in the UAE for her follow-up treatment and will try to send her back to her home country as soon as she is discharged from the hospital.
Bizuwork tearfully said that she was from a very poor family who live in a small city in Ethiopia. Her father died a long time ago. She left her young son with her mother and came to the UAE in order to be able to work and support them.
Bizuwork said her life would not be easy if she went back to her country while she was in such a poor physical condition. “I will die. I cannot afford to go to hospital,” said Bizuwork.
By Bassma Al Jandaly, Gulf News
By Michael A. Weinstein, Purdue University
During the second half of May, the balance of power in Somalia shifted decisively, as the armed insurgency against the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and the Ethiopian Woyanne occupation has begun to seize and control territory in every region of the country. As the T.F.G.’s parliamentary speaker, Sheikh Adan Madobe, put it bluntly, “The situation in the country is very dangerous; the anti-government groups are capturing a new district every day.”
The gains of the insurgency, which is composed of the radical jihadist Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.), more nationalist Islamist forces operating through the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.) and anti-T.F.G. clan militias, have revealed the military weakness of the T.F.G., which cannot even pay its forces, and the over-extension of Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s forces, which have been unable to stem the opposition’s rising tide. For the first time since the Ethiopian invasion in December, 2006, which ousted the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) from control over most of Somalia south of the autonomous sub-state of Puntland, central and southern Somalia has become contested territory. The Courts and their allies on the ground are no longer the “remnants” of a defeated movement; they have the military power and popular support to deprive the T.F.G. of even nominal sovereignty.
As the insurgency achieved a new level of success, a strategic split opened up in the A.R.S., which is dominated by the Courts movement, but also includes dissident parliamentarians, ex-warlords and leaders of the Somali diaspora. The split was occasioned by the decision of some A.R.S. leaders, notably its chief executive, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former chair of the I.C.C.’s executive council; and Sheikh Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, the chair of its central committee and former T.F.G parliamentary speaker, to participate in peace talks with the T.F.G. in Djibouti that were mediated by the United Nations and supported, at least rhetorically, by Western powers.
The decision to take the A.R.S. into a “reconciliation” process with the T.F.G. before a timetable for Ethiopian Woyanne withdrawal from Somalia had been set provoked determined opposition from A.R.S. hardliners, notably Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former head of the ICC’s consultative council; and former warlord and ICC defense secretary, Yusuf Indha’ade, who — bolstered by the successes of the insurgency on the ground — held out against the Djibouti talks and pressed for a military approach until the Ethiopians Woyannes withdrew from or were forced out of Somalia.
The strategic split between diplomatic and military approaches had always been incipient within the A.R.S., which from its inception in 2007 adopted the familiar dual-track strategy of resistance movements (for example, the Irish Republican Army and Palestine Liberation Organization) of pursuing diplomacy and armed insurgency simultaneously. The dual-track strategy, which is essential for a resistance movement to secure a foothold, tends inexorably to create a division in the movement between a political wing and a military wing, each one wedded to its half of the double strategy.
In the case of the A.R.S., the incipient tension broke into a split, because the non-Islamist elements of the A.R.S., which favor diplomacy, joined with the more nationalist components of the Courts to move toward negotiation at the precise moment that the armed insurgency was achieving its first significant successes.
The strategic split within the A.R.S. should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign that the alliance is weakening. The successes of a resistance movement’s military wing provide its political wing with bargaining chips, and prolonged negotiations conducted by its political wing give the military wing some lee- way for its operations. Obviously, disunity has its dangers, but as long as the two wings understand their own limits and the other’s function, they can create a synergy.
On the Ground
It is an understatement to say that the insurgency’s successes on the ground have been under-reported in the international media, although they have been reported extensively in the Somali media. Under-reporting means under-valuing, impeding accurate analysis; that is, the interests served by the international media – the major world-power concentrations – would rather not publicly acknowledge Islamist gains, but would prefer to pretend that their plans for “reconciliation” and possible international peacekeeping forces still are viable.
Just as an example of a day’s monitoring of Somalia in the recent past, look at May 26 through the Somali media.
In the Juba regions, the Islamic Courts commander, Abdirahman Abdullahi Waheliye said that he was conducting discussions with elders and intellectuals aimed at setting up Shari’a administrations in Kamsuma, Jilib and Jimaame districts, which the Courts forces had recently captured. Waheliye expressed optimism that the districts would defect from formal support of the T.F.G. and join the Courts movement.
Context: The insurgency has been gaining territorial control in the Juba regions throughout 2008, to the point that there were fears that the Courts forces would attempt to take the strategic port city of Kismayo, now controlled by an administration of the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan family that is not recognized by the T.F.G. On May 23, there was a report that the Marehan had made an agreement with the Courts, in which the Marehan would give thirty percent of port revenues to the A.R.S. forces and thirty percent to the Y.M.M. in return for the promise that the Courts would leave the present administration in control. Whether or not this report is accurate, it would not
have appeared even two months ago; nobody could have taken it seriously.
In the Middle Shabelle region, Courts leader Sheikh Dahir Adow announced a ban on carrying small arms in the region’s capital Jowhar in response to an increase in arms bearing stemming from inter-clan conflict. The significance of this news bit is the implication that, for the moment, the Courts are taking over security in Jowhar, which has changed hands several times recently.
Context: The insurgency has been taking over districts in Middle Shabelle through the spring and negotiating with local leaders to set up “independent” administrations outside the framework of the T.F.G. Middle Shabelle borders the Banadir region (Mogadishu and its environs); what does it mean that the Courts have been able to establish themselves there?
In the Hiraan region, Ethiopian Woyanne forces were conducting vehicle searches for weapons and ammunition in the region’s capital Beledweyne, after they had been attacked the previous day and had seized a bag of explosives from a car. It was reported that Courts forces were moving towards Beledweyne, which they had briefly captured earlier in the spring.
Context: With their third largest concentration of forces in Somalia in Hiraan (after Mogadishu and Baidoa), the Ethiopians Woyannes have not been able to reverse the insurgency’s momentum. On May 20, thousands or hundreds of people (depending on the source) were addressed by A.R.S. officials who had come from Asmara to the town of Bulo Burde. Col. Umar Hashi, secretary general of the A.R.S., told the crowd to “beware of the deceptions of the enemy” and told the media that the delegation had come “to encourage the people to resist.” This was the first time that high-ranking members of the A.R.S. had appeared openly in Somalia. Hiraan is of key strategic importance to Ethiopia as a the gateway to central Somalia and as a source of instability in the Ogaden region if it fell into hostile hands. The region was one of the first places into which Ethiopia Woyanne made incursions when the Courts were rising in 2006, yet neither it nor the T.F.G. is able to control Hiraan.
In Mogadishu, where the insurgency began and continues, Ethiopian soldiers were reported to have shot dead three civilians after beating them with clubs. The Y.M.M. attacked forces of the small African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) near the strategic Km4 junction. Eleven civilians were killed in the cross-fire.
Context: The insurgency continues to flourish in Mogadishu, with several incidents every day, some of them involving face-to-face combat spreading over several districts. Increasingly, the insurgents have been able to seize checkpoints and government facilities. On May 14, the “peacemaker” in the Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council, Ahmed Behi Ali, said that Somalia had “no government” and that the Somali people had to form their “own administrations.” Hawiye sub-clans that are marginalized and threatened by the T.F.G. and the Ethiopian Woyanne occupation have been unwilling to participate in “reconciliation” and still control much of what remains of Mogadishu after a year and a half of warfare. Their leadership functions independently of the A.R.S., but the situation on the ground is more complex.
May 26 is a representative day in the life of the insurgency. On other days, similar news would have come from the Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Galgadud and Mudug regions. Is it likely that protracted “reconciliation” talks in Djibouti can change the flow of events on the ground? It does not appear that Ethiopia Woyanne has either the will or the ability to reverse the momentum militarily. The “international community” (Western powers) will not back an international peacekeeping force beyond AMISOM (half-heartedly) until there is progress toward “reconciliation.”
The failure of the external actors to secure Somalia has opened the way for the Courts’ comeback. Nobody, including the A.R.S. leadership, knows what to do about what is happening on the ground. The development does not appear to be centrally coordinated and responds to highly localized circumstances, even though it is unified by a resistance struggle against occupation and the general strategy of detaching districts from allegiance to the T.F.G.
In the Halls
In light of the insurgency’s successes on the ground, the brutality of Ethiopian Woyanne responses to insurgent initiatives and U.S. missile strikes against alleged “terrorists,” it is not surprising that the first round of “reconciliation” talks between the T.F.G. and A.R.S., which began on May 12 and ended on May 16, did not result in direct negotiations, but only in a commitment to a second round on May 31 and an agreement to facilitate humanitarian access.
The talks, mediated by the U.N. and pushed by the Western powers as their latest last resort to stabilize Somalia, foundered due to the pressures on the pro-“reconciliation” wing of the A.R.S. to take an uncompromising line. From the outset, on May 13, the A.R.S. stated that it would restrict itself to discussing with U.N. special representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abadallah, an Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. On the same day, A.R.S. defense secretary Indha’ade opened the split between the political and military wings, declaring that the Djibouti conference was an attempt to “destroy” the A.R.S., that the pro-“reconciliation” faction did “not represent the opposition” and that there should be no talks with the T.F.G.
The hardline counter attack gained momentum on May15,when Shekh Aweys took
the lead, saying in an interview with Reuters that the ARS delegation in Djibouti should walk out of the talks, which were “hastily” arranged and had not been based on a consensus within the A.R.S. on “thorny issues.” Aweys added that the solution was simple: the Ethiopian Woyanne “enemy” needed to be “removed.”
On the same day, the pro-Courts website Qaadisya carried a statement attributed to the A.R.S. that the A.R.S. representatives to the Djibouti talks had violated the alliance’s constitution by failing to seek and gain approval from the A.R.S. central committee. Charging that the pro-“reconciliation” faction had made a “secret deal” with Western powers in Nairobi in March, the statement went on to assert that there would be no talks with the T.F.G. prior to an Ethiopian Woyanne withdrawal, that no foreign troops should be introduced into Somalia “without the people’s consent,” that “killers of civilians” must be brought to justice and that the “international community” should provide “urgent” humanitarian aid.
When the talks broke down on May 16, the A.R.S. demanded a timetable for Ethiopian Woyanne withdrawal. A.R.S. representative Abdishakur Abdirahman Warsame told the press that there had been an agreement to meet again and “nothing else worth mentioning.” Ould Abdallah commented: “It is a good day for Somalia. We should not minimize what has been achieved.”
On May 17, the U.N. and T.F.G. departed from Djibouti, but the A.R.S. delegation remained there for the arrival of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad and Sheikh Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. From Asmara, Aweys said that the pro- “reconciliation” faction had not been there for forty days, underscoring the failure to consult.
On May 21, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad was reported to have held talks with the U.S. ambassador to Djibouti. A.R.S. representative Abdirahman Abdishakur announced that the A.R.S. was preparing an agenda for the next round of talks, including prosecution of “war criminals,” the return of internally displaced persons to Mogadishu and improved security. Aweys raised the rhetorical pressure in an interview with Britain’s Guardian newspaper, saying that the T.F.G. is run by “traitors” who would be exiled or put on trial in the event the Courts prevailed. He remarked that Ethiopia Woyanne would not have invaded Somalia without U.S. backing and that the U.N. was not impartial, concluding that the Somali people would remove the Ethiopians Woyannes by force. Aweys said that the opposition would form a “unity government” based on Islam: “We have no idea of secularism. The people will place their trust in religion.”
Aweys continued his rhetorical offensive on May 25 in an interview with al- Sharq al-Awsat, in which he said that Ould Abdallah’s conduct of the negotiations was “very bad,” emphasizing that he did not oppose talks on principle, but adding that the opposition should not sit down with the “agents” of the occupation.
Aweys’ drumfire attacks finally provoked a response form Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad who complained that Eritrea was trying to break up the A.R.S. (presumably to prevent reconciliation and keep Ethiopian forces tied down in Somalia). He apologized for Aweys’ remarks and assured that “the alliance is a peaceful movement set up to represent the Somali people in the international arena,” quickly adding that if — as Ethiopian prime minister dictator Meles Zenawi said to the country’s parliament in May — Ethiopian Woyanne intended to remain in Somalia until the jihadists were defeated, “they will leave by force.”
On May 26, A.R.S. social affairs secretary, Muhamad Sudan Garyare, said that the A.R.S. would hold a meeting to resolve its internal disputes when a quorum arrived in Asmara.
The West and Ethiopia Woyanne would welcome a split in the A.R.S. that would “isolate” its military wing, and Eritrea would welcome a split in the A.R.S. that would strengthen its military wing. At present, Asmara seems to be more perceptive than Addis Ababa Woyanne and Washington. Indeed, it appears that the pro- “reconciliation” wing of the A.R.S. is feeling the pull of its military wing more strongly than the push of the “international community.”
Fundamentally, the facts on the ground are likely to drive the A.R.S. negotiating position should talks resume. The Courts will not surrender their gains on the ground and those gains give negotiators bargaining chips; protracted negotiations, which even Ould Abdallah anticipates, will allow the armed opposition to continue to succeed and consolidate. From that perspective, the split in the A.R.S. would not be internally destructive, but synergistic. Although uncertainty clouds the future of the A.R.S., it is most likely that the alliance will not dissolve.
Conclusion
The key to the current situation in Somalia is that the balance of power has shifted in favor the insurgency/opposition, throwing Western hopes for “reconciliation” into severe doubt, and presenting Ethiopia Woyanne with bleak prospects.
Had Addis Ababa Woyanne been able to reverse or stall the insurgency, the pro- “reconciliation” faction in the A.R.S. might have been tempted to sue for peace and make the concession of talking while Ethiopian Woyanne forces remained in Somalia. That the opposite scenario is unfolding makes any concessions by the A.R.S. less likely, indicating that the Djibouti initiative will not bear fruit, at least in the short term. With no decisive military action to curb the Courts on the horizon, look for them to continue their momentum, threatening the interests of the external actors, except for Eritrea.
The December, 2006 invasion cannot be repeated and the Courts are back.
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Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University, can be reached at [email protected]
