Much has recently been made of my ethnic identity although this is a matter of no relevance whatsoever to a reasoned discourse on the existence of the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange. However, when the unnecessary gets in the way of the important, however unpleasant it may be, it must be faced.
I am Ethiopian, as truly and wonderfully as that is, and no one has the right to define, reduce, or otherwise dismiss my identity. I do not apologize for or defend who I am, as each one of us, whoever we are, has a God-given set of circumstances that uniquely defines us.
My reality is that, born in Addis Ababa, I first left Ethiopia with my family at the age of four to live in New York city, accompanying my father, Zaude Gabre-Madhin, who was a senior United Nations official, prior to which he served in the Imperial government. Upon returning a few years later, my family then left Ethiopia again, escaping the chaos of the new Derg regime, this time to Rwanda and later Togo, Malawi, and Kenya. I thus grew up in six different countries, going to school in French as well as English, and learning Swahili along the way. Throughout this time, my parents, to whom I owe everything, instilled in me and my sisters the deepest love and pride for our country Ethiopia. As I grew up in different cultures, grappling to understand my adolescent identity, I drew on the stories my parents told me of my heritage and of those who came before me. My mother, Bizuwork Bekele, who never missed a chance to boast about her beloved Harar, shared stories of my incredible great-grandmother, Imahoy Saba Yifat, from Menz and Gondar by origin, who lived in rural Hararghe as a widow after the Italian invasion and was one of the few women fighters of her time standing up to the invaders to defend the land and her six children. I heard about her son, my grandfather, Ato Bekele Haile, a respected magistrate serving as a judge in Harar town, himself of Gurage and Amhara ancestry, and of my mother’s birth in the historical site today known as the House of Rimbaud. As a young child, I loved to sit for hours with my maternal grandmother, Imahoy Beletshachew Habte-Giorgis, a witty, intelligent, and extremely strong-willed woman who would often exclaim in Afan Oromo which she and her children, including my mother, spoke fluently, as she laughed recalling how she managed her coffee farms in the areas around Jijiga, Fedis, and Deder, where many of my relatives still live today.
My father, for his part, mostly to amuse his daughters, named the water tank in our UN provided house in Kigali, Rwanda, “Bulga Springs” to recall his father’s birthplace in northern Shewa. He would proudly speak of my grandfather, Fitawrari Gebremedhin, a noble and highly disciplined official in Emperor Menelik’s time, who later settled in Wolaita Soddo in the late nineteenth century, marrying my grandmother, Woizero Ayalech Alaye, niece of the great Wolaita King Tona. At the age of seven, I remember visiting Soddo where my father was born and where many of my relatives still live, to spend time in his last years with my grandfather who was then nearly a century old. A tall, dignified, and handsome man, deeply religious, my grandfather showed me and my sister his coffee farm and I remember him speaking of my much loved late grandmother, and of his childhood and the family still in Bulga, and his laughing politely, not understanding, as I chattered to him in English with children’s jokes I had learned in New York.
Thus I grew, within and outside Ethiopia, celebrating all the different identities and cultures that are woven beautifully into the tapestry of my identity as an Ethiopian. To my parents, always, we were Ethiopian and that was something to be deeply proud of, recognizing and cherishing all of our different ethnic strands. I never knew until much later, nor did it matter, which particular ethnic group I should claim. In my extended family, my aunt married a man from Wollega and my uncle married a woman from Asmara, my great aunt married into the Abba Jifar clan in Jimma, and the list goes on. So the Ethiopia I knew growing up with my cousins was a kaleidoscope of identities bound together in one Ethiopia.
This is my Ethiopian story, and it is unique to me, as each Ethiopian would similarly have. It is the story of my Ethiopia, the Ethiopia for which I have enduring love and to which I have returned after thirty years to contribute in the best way I know how. This is my Ethiopia to which I bring all the global experiences which have shaped me, as I have lived my adult years in Mali, Switzerland, and the United States, trained and worked in some of the best institutions, and traveled and explored dozens of countries around the world. This is my Ethiopia that represents all of my heritage, the strong and courageous women and men in my family through the ages whose blood flows in me. This is my Ethiopia for which I am willing to work, fight, and believe all things are possible. This is my Ethiopia to which I have brought my US-born sons, to instill in them the pride and love of all that we are as Ethiopians. I would like to teach them that in our increasingly inter-connected world, they are Ethiopians but also global citizens.
Ethiopia is ours, to claim, to build and to restore. Rather than engage in destructive ethnic bigotry, far better to embrace all of what we are and to build together a better future for our children. My personal identity is irrelevant to my choice or ability to lead an initiative to bring a better marketing system for all Ethiopians, regardless of their ethnic roots or which corner of the country they claim. A market is above all a connection between humans, an exchange of goods and money that links two sides. The market is neutral as to who is on either side, it is the connection that counts. I have always found traders to be the most pragmatic people in the world. Let us too live by this market principle: we are far richer and far stronger if we build on our connectivity to each other in meaningful ways, and that much weaker if we seek isolation and succumb to narrow divisiveness. Let us be like the market. I believe it is our only hope.
(Eleni Zaude Gabre-Madhin, Ph.D., is chief operating officer of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange.)
How this Happened is a “creative non-fiction” book written with the intention of making it palatable to a wide audience including the many millions who avidly followed the 2008 US presidential election as well as professionals, and scholars who may be interested in looking at how Barack Obama run a successful campaign by looking at it from the perspective of three theoretical frameworks. The author is engaged in the study of the Emotional Intelligence, Transformational Leadership and Project Management frameworks. He has used his research findings together with his personal experience as a first-generation immigrant and his observations while volunteering for the Obama campaign to produce this compelling yet very pleasurable book… [read more]
Part 1 documentary of the rarely mentioned rebel activity in southern Ethiopia. For the first time ever, rag-tag fighters of the shadowy Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) under the maverick leadership of Generals Kemal Gelchu and Haile Gonfa have been filmed in their bases in southern Ethiopia following an epic journey into the rebel territory by NTV reporter Yassin Juma and cameraman Eric Okoth. The OLF has been fighting a low key guerrilla war whose effects have occasionally been felt in the remote villages along the common border. The NTV exclusive inside rebel territory began with the drive up north for our crew.
PART 1
WASHINGTON DC — The Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF) held its first official meeting in Washington DC on Sunday, August 9, 2009. The meeting was organizing by the Washington EPPF Chapter. (Photos and video will be posted shortly)
Head of EPPF’s press office, Ato Demis Belete, opened the meeting with a one-minute silent prayer for martyrs of the struggle and welcoming remarks. Representatives of the Washington Chapter also welcomed the guests and participants.
Ato Melke Mengiste, secretary general of the EPPF International Committee, then took the stage. He spoke about the founding mission of EPPF, how it was created 10 years ago, and made a call to the participants to volunteer their time and resources for the struggle to liberate Ethiopia from the Woyanne tribal junta.
Following Ato Melke’s speech, Wzr. Sophia Tesfamariam and Dr Berhe Habtegiorgis from the Eritrean community made brief remarks in a show of solidarity with Ethiopians who are fighting against the anti-Ethiopia Woyanne junta. Dr Berhe’s speech, which was based on his first-hand experience as a one-time resident of Addis Ababa and a member of the Ethiopian armed forces under HaileSeliassie’s government, had captivated the audience.
The next speaker was Ethiopian Review’s editor-in-chief Elias Kifle who briefly talked about Ethiopia-Eritrea relationships and Eritrean government’s role in preventing the Woyanne tribal junta from dismembering Ethiopia and implementing its Greater Tigray Republic manifesto.
Several prominent Ethiopians such as Cmd. Tassew Desta, former head of Ethiopian Navy, Dr Daniel Kindie, Professor of History at Herderson State University in Arkansas, Ato Fekade Shewakena, an Ethiopian political analyst, Lij Seifu Zawdie of Medhin Party, Ato Abebe Belew of Addis Dimts Radio, Abakia, a writer and videographer, Ato Billilign Woldesenbet, human rights advocate, and Wzr. Meseret Agonafer, chairperson of Ethiopian Review’s Board of Trustees, graced the meeting with their presence.
Dr Daniel Kindie briefly talked about the need for some kind of federation between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibiouti.
The keynote speaker of the meeting was Ato Sileshi Tilahun, EPPF’s head of organizational affairs for the International Committee. He spoke about how EPPF was created, its mission, organizational structure and current activities.
Ato Sileshi is playing a key role in reorganizing the EPPF structure around the world. He is responsible for the creation of EPPF chapters, the recent launching of its radio program that is being broadcast to Ethiopia, a new web site, eppfonline.org, and the opening of a large headquarters in Asmara that is currently housing EPPF Radio’s studio. Sileshi’s remarkable achievement in a span of short time in transforming EPPF’s political and external operations has caused him to be a primary target of various groups.
The last segment of the August 9 public meeting was a Question and Answer session in which a lively discussion took place.
The meeting was concluded in a strong note by Ato Melkie Mengiste who repeated his call to all the participants to join him in going to the field and support EPPF.
The EPPF August 9 meeting in Washington DC has for the first time in decades brought together Ethiopians and Eritreans under one roof as allies. It is a fast growing alliance that is capable of building a foundation for peace and prosperity in the Horn of Africa region.
Similar events are being held around the world that involve interactions between Ethiopians and Eritreans. On Sunday, a delegation of Ethiopians led by Ato Melkie Mengiste and Ato Sileshi Tilahun attended the Eritrea Festival at the Washington Convention Center. Next week, Ethiopian Review editor will take part in a panel discussion that is organized by Community of Eritreans in the Bay Area (Click here for more info).
Ethiopia’s [ruling tribal junta] sent a stiff protest to Kenya on Thursday, seeking to stop the Nation Media Group from airing a television programme on a rebel movement fighting the Addis Ababa Government Meles Zenawi’s tribal junta in Ethiopia.
Kenya’s ambassador was summoned to the Ethiopian Woyanne Foreign ministry as the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s tribal junta launched a diplomatic offensive to block NTV’s four-part investigative report on the Oromo Liberation Front, which went on air last night.
It was the climax of a dramatic week in which Ethiopia’s Woyanne ambassador to Kenya, Mr Disasa Dirribsa, first sent a protest letter to the Nation Media Group after NTV began promoting its exclusive series on the secretive guerrilla group based in southern Ethiopia.
Ethiopia Woyanne accused NTV of lending support to an unlawful organisation and warned that airing the programme could undermine relations with Kenya.
Appeals to cancel the series were backed by Kenya’s Foreign ministry, which argued that Kenya’s national interests were at stake in the diplomatic row.
The Ethiopian Woyanne embassy wrote to the Nation Media Group dismissing the OLF as “a terrorist group whose activities have been known to be anti-democratic and anti-peace”.
Mr Dirribsa wrote: “It is a minority group whose agenda runs parallel to the aspirations of the Oromo people. Indeed, OLF has been totally rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Oromo population, who are exercising and enjoying their democratic rights.”
He said airing the programme confirmed suspicion of a larger conspiracy to “speak for these terrorist elements in our sub-region, leading us to question NTV’s covert or overt political agenda”.
In the programme, NTV ventures into the OLF infested territory in south western Ethiopia to demystify a guerrilla outfit that has fought successive Ethiopian governments for over three decades.
The NTV crew spent five days travelling through the rough and dusty terrain cutting through Isiolo and Marsabit to Moyale at the Kenya-Ethiopia border, where an OLF linkman smuggled them into the rebels’ bases on the Ethiopian side.
So shadowy is the OLF leadership that it took the NTV crew three years to make contact with the rebels.
For three days, journalists witnessed first-hand the punishing training the OLF recruits undergo in the rough terrain.
U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa center on preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other transnational jihadist groups. In pursuing its counterterror strategy, the United States has found common cause with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has long feared the renewal of Somali irredentist claims on its eastern border, or that a powerful Islamist movement may stoke unrest among its own large Muslim population, and feels beset both by a powerful indigenous separatist movement in its Ogaden region and an unresolved border dispute with its northern neighbor, Eritrea.
But the [ruling] Ethiopian government’s tribal junta’s behavior in recent years, both domestically and in bordering states, poses mounting difficulties for the United States and its long-term goals in the region. Washington must be prepared to press its partner to alter its strong-handed approach to political dissent and counterterrorism or consider ending the relationship.
Ethiopia has struggled with internal reforms since the collapse of the communist Derg regime in 1991. The country’s economy has grown, but attempts to institutionalize a system of multiparty democracy have stumbled.
In 2005, Ethiopia held largely free and fair democratic elections. Prior to the polls, there was an unprecedented opening of political space. Opposition political parties were able to hold rallies, the press was able to publish critical political analysis, and international and local civil society organizations assisted in election monitoring. But the government’s tentative efforts to increase political space were not rewarded: After a series of irregularities in the vote closing and tallying processes were discovered, a variety of political parties contested the election results. The Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency and responded brutally to a series of apparently peaceful protests. The country was plunged into a period of violent civil disturbance, during which the Ethiopian government detained thousands of protesters and arrested hundreds of opposition figures, including arguably nonpolitical actors from civil society and the press. Many of these emergency measures have been institutionalized, resulting in legislation that has criminalized social advocacy by “foreigners” (including Ethiopian civil society organizations that receive foreign charitable funds), and imposed harsh criminal penalties on broadly defined “terrorist” acts, including disruptive public protests.
Impact on U.S. Policy Objectives
For the United States, cooperation with an authoritarian Ethiopia presents looming challenges to U.S. policy objectives. First, the Ethiopian government’s attempts to minimize political competition in the run-up to the 2010 elections are likely to fan ethnic tensions in the country. The government’s ruling party, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is perceived by many Ethiopians to be dominated by a single minority ethnic faction, the Tigre, and its consolidation of political power may be read as an assault on the majority ethnic Amharic and Oromo populations. Public dissatisfaction with the government is high in the wake of the 2005 elections and a violent explosion is not out of the question.
Second, Ethiopia’s the Woyanne tribal junta’s conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia, and with the powerful separatist movement in the Ogaden, have a jihadist impact. While the U.S.-Ethiopia Woyanne alliance has had short-term tactical advantages, it may be undermining broader US counterterror goals.
Arguably, U.S. reliance on Ethiopian Woyanne military might and intelligence has served to exacerbate instability in Somalia. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia, and the extended presence of Ethiopian Woyanne troops in Mogadishu, instead of quelling conflict, has triggered a local backlash that has served as a rallying point for local extremists. It was the development of a complex insurgency against the Ethiopian Woyanne occupation that effectively catapulted a fringe jihadist youth militia, the Shabaab, to power. International jihadists have now capitalized on the local insurgency, and on U.S. support of the Ethiopian Woyanne invasion, as an opportunity to globalize Somalia’s conflict. The presence of foreign expertise, fighters, and funding has helped to tip the balance of power in favor of Somalia’s extremist groups. Additionally, there is growing concern that the conflict in the Ogaden may give birth to indigenous jihadist movements.
Anti-American sentiment in Somalia is pervasive, and stems in large part from U.S. complicity with the Ethiopian Woyanne invasion and reported Ethiopian Woyanne human rights abuses in Somalia. Ethiopia Woyanne has also reportedly engaged in human rights abuses within the Ogaden region, which borders Somalia, where the government Woyanne tribal junta is engaged in a counterinsurgency effort against an ethnic Somali separatist movement. Though Ethiopia Woyanne has denied these charges, human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented atrocities committed by both sides in that conflict. The U.S. decision to withdraw its military personnel from the Ogaden in April 2006, and the subsequent failure of the international community to seek accountability for these atrocities, has cemented a widespread public perception in Ethiopia and Somalia that the United States is willing to turn a blind eye on human rights abuses in exchange for cooperation in the counterterror effort.
Further complicating U.S. efforts to bolster Somalia’s central government is the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia Woyanne and Eritrea. Eritrea complains that Ethiopia Woyanne has refused to honor the ruling of an independent border commission on the demarcation of the common boundary and has demanded intervention from the international community. Ethiopia Woyanne charges that Eritrea has retaliated by funneling weapons and funding to radical groups in Somalia, some of which oppose Ethiopian Woyanne forces there. Eritrea has denied these charges, and some specific accusations leveled by the United Nations and the African Union against Eritrea have been disproven. The demand for sanctions on Eritrea is nevertheless growing, and comments by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on a visit to Kenya on Aug. 6, in which she linked Eritrea to Somali militants suggests efforts by the Obama administration to engage in a constructive political dialogue with Asmara may be dimming.
These factors suggest that U.S. ability to influence events in Somalia will depend in some measure on diplomatic efforts to resolve the border dispute and to address Ethiopian Woyanne human rights abuses. But perhaps even more important than either is what the United States decides to do in response to the shrinking democratic space in Ethiopia.
Obstacles to U.S. Action
The United States has been unwilling to overtly pressure Ethiopia Meles Zenawi and his Woyanne tribal junta to adopt major democratic reforms for a number of reasons. Many experts and policymakers already fear that the regime is vulnerable to collapse. Some diplomats fear that aggressive–or even public–pressure on Ethiopia Woyanne may inadvertently undermine or destabilize the regime. The United States cannot afford to unsettle a country that has served as a rock of stability its puppet in an otherwise troubled region.
Another major hurdle for the United States is the lack of an international consensus on one fundamental question: Is Ethiopia still a democratic country, or is the regime of President warlord Meles Zenawi regime headed towards dictatorship? The perception that Ethiopia is a fundamentally democratic country remains strong, particularly among European nations. The lack of any consensus would require the United States to take a lead and potentially isolated role in pressuring [the tribal junta in] Ethiopia for reform.
Finally, U.S. efforts to promote democratic reform in Ethiopia are impeded by a lack of willing partners on the ground. Democratic civil society groups generally fear for their safety and are not willing to mobilize in a public advocacy effort. This means that U.S. efforts to counteract repressive measures by the government will not be supported–or legitimized–by a corresponding local effort. International organizations that might have engaged with opposition political voices have already been expelled from the country.
Policy Recommendations
Change is needed to ensure the sustainability of the U.S.-Ethiopia partnership and U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region at a time when Somalia continues to flounder as a failed state. The United States should consider adopting a more assertive approach that makes use of two primary points of leverage:
First, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should refuse direct funding to the many known “GONGOS” (governmental nongovernmental organizations) that pose as legitimate civil society development organizations, but are in practice political and social agents of the ruling party. The recognition of GONGOs as legitimate civil society organizations abets the Ethiopian Woyanne strategy of marginalizing nongovernmental actors, and allows the government to continue a “business as usual” approach to the delivery of international support.
Second, the United States should publicly express its concern over the shrinking democratic space, the crisis in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s refusal to uphold the findings of the independent border commission. Ethiopian Woyanne officials are extremely sensitive to public opinion and likely to respond to threats to their country’s international standing and participation in international fora such as the African Union and the United Nations.
Relations with Ethiopia are likely to become strained, and the United States can expect, at least initially, to receive very limited support from its European partner nations. These countries, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, lack the political leverage necessary to lead a collective shift in donor policy and have been hesitant to alienate the Ethiopian government. This reluctance may require a diplomatic version of the “good cop/bad cop” approach, in which the United States agrees to take an isolated, leadership role in demanding change, while European donor nations persist in a strategy of quiet diplomacy. This has the advantage of ensuring that some constructive dialogue will continue.
In a worst-case scenario, the United States may have to threaten to suspend foreign and military aid to Ethiopia Woyanne. U.S. humanitarian and development assistance to Ethiopia the Woyanne regime was upwards of $650 million in 2008, and the U.S. has contributed significant, though less transparent, financial and tactical support to Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s attempts to modernize its armed forces. Such an action has rightly been perceived as unthinkable in the past, as the cessation of aid would certainly risk destabilizing the Ethiopian government Woyanne tribal junta and may precipitate widespread public disorder. At the same time, Ethiopian Woyanne’s certainty that U.S. aid is inviolate has allowed the Ethiopian government tribal junta to effectively tune out demands for reform. Ethiopian Woyanne dependence on U.S. assistance is a card that policymakers must learn to play to provoke meaningful change. This is another reason to consider developing a good cop/bad cop arrangement with the European donors–if the United States is forced to suspend aid, other donors may mitigate the shortfall while quietly reinforcing demands for democratic reform.
The prospect of strained relations with [the Woyanne regime in] Ethiopia at a time of regional crisis is not desirable. If the United States ultimately wishes to sustain its partnership with Ethiopia, however, inaction is the more dangerous option. Democratic space in Ethiopia will continue to erode, while human rights abuses in the Ogaden and ongoing Ethiopian Woyanne military incursions in Somalia will continue to stroke anti-American sentiment in the Horn. U.S. efforts to mitigate the conflict in Somalia, and to support Somalia’s struggling Transitional Federal Government (TFG), will be fatally undermined by this dynamic. The visible reentry of Ethiopian Woyanne troops into Somalia already threatens to extinguish the last embers of popular support for the TFG, and may rekindle the insurgency dynamic that brought the Shabaab to power throughout southern Somalia. At the same time, Ethiopian Woyanne and Eritrean intransigence over the border dispute will ensure a continued flow of arms into the hands of various Somali factions.
The United States has recently taken positive steps to disaggregate its Somalia policy from that of Ethiopia. These steps include diplomatic outreach to Eritrea and public attempts to restrain Ethiopian Woyanne military action in response to the escalating violence in Mogadishu. These constructive efforts need to be coupled with more assertive diplomacy in Addis Ababa. Until Ethiopia becomes a credible democracy, the U.S.-Ethiopia partnership will do more harm to U.S. regional standing than good.
(Bronwyn E. Bruton is International Affairs Fellow in Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC)
Much has recently been made of my ethnic identity although this is a matter of no relevance whatsoever to a reasoned discourse on the existence of the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange. However, when the unnecessary gets in the way of the important, however unpleasant it may be, it must be faced.