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Author: EthiopianReview.com

Revisiting the aftermath of 2005 Ethiopia Election

By Maru Gubena

Five year ago, though there were feelings of uncertainty and fearfulness about the future direction of Ethiopia itself, as well as its politics – including the possible transfer of power from the regime of Meles Zenawi to the then opposition parties – a good number of Ethiopians both at home and in the Diaspora were not just active but were energized and determined to fight against the factors and actors that divide us, to cultivate and expand a sense of togetherness and unity, and to do everything in our capacity to be sincere and respectful to each other, helping our country with collective hands and fresh thoughts. Yes, even though some of us felt a growing anxiety, especially due to the absence of well structured, professionally functioning and legally framed organizations in the Diaspora, a disproportionately high number of Ethiopians indeed anticipated that a harmonious society and a relatively peaceful, free and economically prosperous Ethiopia were being shaped and set on the right path for the first time in the entire history of our country. Consequently, the period was marked by plentiful, memorable sights and sounds of Ethiopian get-togethers, the publication of enormous number of articles, radio transmissions and demonstrations held throughout the international community protesting against the brutal killings of Ethiopians, including women and children, in support of what was then Kinijit and its leadership, from which Ethiopians were enthusiastically and with excitement awaiting relative freedom and democracy, expecting to face and test both its fruits and challenges.

Unfortunately, however – even though many of my compatriot politicians and political activists might not want to recognize this, to avoid creating impediments to their short term political agendas – whether we live in Ethiopia or in the Diaspora, and whether we belong to the ruling regime or opposition groups, one tends to feel that our blood, cultural behaviours and attitudes seem immune or perhaps inappropriate to the concepts of democracy, equality, individual freedom and human rights. Indeed, as the past two or more decades of political upheavals and experiences have shown, family affiliations, comradeship, group interests and regionalism are more urgent, more imperative to us than the complex collective issues and problems of the people of Ethiopia as a whole.

Yes, in Ethiopian culture equality, individual freedom and democracy are unknown quantities; they are strange to us, even though most Ethiopians expressed repeated wishes and uninterrupted prayers that the fears and anxieties voiced by a few concerned Ethiopians were wholly unfounded, and that instead the winds of change and democracy blowing above the mountains of Ethiopia would become more rapid and powerful. Meanwhile, the actual fashioning of implementable democratic strategies and the possibilities for working hand in glove with all stakeholders, while maintaining a sense of integrity and accountability, quickly became a tricky business, difficult to integrate with the mindsets and cultures of Ethiopians. Everything related to the opposition movements was emotionally loaded; once group oriented, they soon became to be dominated by personal and group interests and rivalries. Consequently, internal conflicts, infighting and rifts within the various movements and groups were rife, both in our homeland and in the Diaspora. This contributed to the untimely and complete dissolution of Kinijit and its disappearance from the political landscape of Ethiopia, which in turn left us today in complete darkness and confusion, with no a single reliable political party or socio-political movement to engage with and support.

Chronicling the Forgotten and Unrecorded Recent Events and Wars

As if writing up crucial historical and political events is forbidden by God or culturally restricted, we Ethiopians in general remain apathetic, appearing unconcerned about recording our own socio-economic and political processes and events, including the origins and dissolution of political parties and movements. This is notwithstanding that these political parties or movements are part and parcel of the political landscape and history of our country. They were established with the objective of adding helping hands and voices to support the process of democratization of the country, even though the opposition leaders and their supporters have been unable to communicate effectively and tirelessly and to avoid repeated confrontations and infighting. The recent unexpected dissolution of Kinijit and the unhappy split among its top leaders is a case in point. In fact, no one among those involved in Kinijit politics and activities knew in advance about the measures undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel during that chilly winter season, except a very few insiders or others very close to him.

Indeed, while most of us living in the western world were enjoying the approaching Christmas and New Year holiday shopping so quietly and happily, some holding firmly the hands of lovely little children or someone we love dearly, the unexpectedly speedy winds of the long smoldering rift among Kinijit leadership reached its ultimate climax. And, much to the astonishment and shock of politically conscious Ethiopians, the chilly December Winter season of 2007 marked the end of the main opposition party, Kinijit, when the Chairman of the party, Engineer Hailu Shawel abruptly announced the suspension of five top leadership figures, including Judge Birtukan Mideksa, then Vice Chair of the party; Mayor-Elect of Addis Ababa city, Dr. Berhanu Nega; Kinijit Spokesperson, Dr Hailu Araya; Engineer Gizachew Shiferaw and Brook Kebede. The announcement of the suspension was posted and/or transmitted through the Ethiopian Diaspora media outlets.

As can be imagined and as is always the case in Ethiopian political culture, the suspended individuals felt deeply offended, that the actions undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel were unfounded, and that the words and tone of the announcement were antagonistic, disparaging and autocratic, they responded instantaneously and heavy handedly – much to the displeasure of Engineer Hailu Shawel and his supporters – by establishing their own political party and movement, at home and in the Diaspora. The end of 2007 and the subsequent years were not marked just by the suspension of five key Kinijit figures and the establishment of a new political party and movement; more damagingly, there was also a declaration of a highly intense cyberwar among the supporters of each political group – each firing its tanks and guns from its own warzones and hidden fortresses, unknown and remote from its targeted enemies. As understood by most of us, the announcement of the suspensions and the subsequently established movement and political party marked the final dissolution of Kinijit, thereby dashing the immeasurable and intense, though short-lived, hopes and expectations Ethiopians had for both Kinijit and its leaders.

A related event took place some six weeks prior to the suspensions carried out by Engineer Hailu Shawel. Strangely, almost unbelievably, even the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) activists – with almost four decades of experience in politics and conflict resolution, and who had managed to regroup, primarily during the campaign and the aftermath of the May 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary election – were not spared by the spreading cruel, unforgiving disease of divisiveness. One would certainly not imagine that the hostile winds of division would dare to shake and tear the rocky houses built by those who were the direct victims of both the Dergue and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and suffered so tremendously at their hands – those who had held secret and dangerous meetings in various Ethiopia cities, waged urban wars, and who spent time together so closely and intimately as brothers, sisters and comrades under the chilly winters and summers of the Assimba mountains. Unfortunately, however, we who envisaged that the houses of EPRP were built upon heavy, immovable rocks and that decades of life and political experience and wisdom would not be so easily and so simply cracked were wholly in error. Yes, we were utterly wrong because, notwithstanding the incalculable sacrifice made by the generation that withstood the early years of Ethiopia’s socio-economic and political upheavals, accompanied by a climate of irreversible and irreparable destruction and of trust and confidence in each other, and the wisdom and life experience built up by the EPRP over decades, including their unhurriedly, carefully constructed rocky and immovable houses, appeared full of holes – weak and unable to hold back the strong, speedy winds carrying both long existing animosities and newly conceived hostilities and resentments among Ethiopian political activists.

Many politically conscious Ethiopians, especially those who belong to the generation had hoped that the long-held ideology of EPRP, the lost comrades, brothers and sisters in the cities of Ethiopia and in the vicinity of the mountain of Assimba, and the deep-seated and painful memories of the struggle would serve the entire EPRP, activists and other sympathizers, as sources of motivation, as fuel providing energy, and as a vital linkage, keeping them together and united for as long as the resistance requires them, and even beyond. Unfortunately and sadly, however, the hopes most us associated with both the blood and the ideology of the generation did not materialize. After some months of rumors in some Diaspora media outlets about increasing disagreements and wrangling, the actual split of EPRP into two camps became a reality at an Extraordinary Congress held on 29 October 2007 in Washington DC, which was marked by a fierce debates and the exchanges of unpalatable words, statements and accusations among long-time friends and war comrades who together had survived repeated attempts on their lives in the cities, the bush and the deserts of both their country of origin and their countries of exile within the region of the Horn of Africa. As can be imagined, the news was received by member activists, sympathizers and by others who belong to the generation with astonishment and sadness.

As if the shock and astonishment experienced by Ethiopians at the split of the EPRP and the measures undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel had not been enough, the unforgiving, cruel winds of divisiveness continued, spreading into the bodies of other political activist groups like a contagious disease. Even though society regards women, in comparison to their male counterparts, as more tolerant, sensible and capable of resolving disagreements and conflicts through softly, wisely and diplomatically crafted talk and other means of communications, due to an apparent absence of training in effective communication and conflict resolution within organizations, and also due to the affiliation of most of the leading members of the International Ethiopian Women’s Organization (IEWO) to one or the other of the political groups, there was no way to prevent the powerful and spreading disease of separation from entering the body of this group as well. Consequently, within just a few months after the split within EPRP, the IEWO group, to which I was once invited to speak, giving an overview about the future role and direction of Ethiopian opposition parties, made its irreconcilable decision to follow the footsteps of Kinijt and EPRP. It became two IEWO groups in early 2008, and exactly as other Ethiopian social and political groupings, they too decided to create two separate groups, each with its own website, but with significantly fewer activities, including face-to-face gatherings, and with fewer activist members, especially in comparison to the initial months of the IEWO.

The three tragic events described here, which took place in just under six months, illustrates how we Ethiopians evidently find it extremely difficult to work together on issues related to our country, unless we are forced to it either by extreme economic hardships or political and other pressures. These three most unfortunate examples show also how far removed our political culture is from becoming mature. What is more confusing, even embarrassing, is that – while we are not even in a position to maintain a friendly and peaceful climate while engaging each other in mature political discussions, and to manifest integrity and democratic minds while working together in groups – individual Ethiopians, even those who have already split up and established their own talking shops and groups are still talking so boldly and so loudly about their irrevocable determination to free Ethiopia from the entangled chains of the repressive regime of Meles Zenawi. They also repeatedly raise billion dollar questions, such as what exactly would be the best strategy and the shortest road to travel to destroy Meles Zenawi and those around him? Instead of first asking themselves why on earth we Ethiopians are so culturally stubborn, so unable to work together on the issues of our country and to sort of what exactly went wrong with us, including how we can be cured of our culturally inculcated diseases of family and group orientation and regionalism in relation to Ethiopian politics? Why, actually, do we still talk about destroying the power structure of the tyrannical regime when over ninety percent of us cannot even look at and talk to those who belong to other opposition political groupings in civil terms, genuinely, and with clean and clear minds?

In summary, though difficult to measure in objective terms, I would nonetheless dare to say that the price to be paid for the direct and indirect repercussions of these tragic events and related infighting would be, as has already been witnessed, the gradual disappearance of political movements and politically active community members, the breakup of already weakened social relationships and work within the Ethiopian Diaspora community, and unquestionably – and more essentially – the extension of the lifespan of Meles Zenawi by an additional two or more decades, unless some kind of coup d’état within his own circle, possibly by the armed forces, were to occur.

(The author, Dr Maru Gubena, can be reached at [email protected])

U.S. official in charge of Africa policy caught in a lie (Wikileaks)

In September 2007, nine months after Ethiopian despot Meles Zenawi invaded Somalia, the top U.S. officials for Africa policy, Ms. Jendayi Frazer, told TIME magazine: “We urged the Ethiopian military not to go into Somalia.” [read here]

The just-released U.S. diplomatic cable that is leaked to Wikileaks.org [read here] contradicts Jendayi’s statement. It is now confirmed by the U.S. Government’s own diplomats that the Woyanne invasion of Somalia that resulted in the killing of 20,000 Somali civilians and the displacement of 2 million others was masterminded by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and carried out by the beggar tyrant in Ethiopia.

Wikileaks dispatch exposes Meles Zenawi as a mercenary

U.S. diplomatic dispatched that are leaked and now posted on Wikileaks.org confirms Ethiopian Review’s report that Ethiopia’s despot Meles Zenawi was hired by U.S. Government to invade Somalia in 2006. The proxy war was spearheaded by U.S. head for African affairs Jendayi Frazer who conducted the disastrous invasion over the objection of her own colleagues in the State Department and the Pentagon. The 2006 invasion of Somalia succeeded in eliminating the benign Islamist group UIC, but it also led to the birth the al Queda-affiliated al Shabab. In short, al Shabab is the creation of Jendayi Frazer and Meles Zenawi. Al Shabab is now being financed by Saudi sheiks and it is purchasing its weapons from Woyanne and Uganda officers, as reported here by French journalist Alain Lallemand for LeMonde newspaper. Over 20,000 Somalis were slaughtered and over 2 million were made homeless as a result of Jendayi Frazer’s adventure and Meles Zenawi’s prostitution. — Elias Kifle

The following is from Wired.com:

WikiLeaked Cable Confirms U.S.’ Secret Somalia Op

2 December 2010

It was an off-hand compliment during a January 2007 dinner meeting between Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, plus staff, and then-U.S. Central Commander boss General John Abizaid. But Al Nayhan’s jocular praise, as reported in WikiLeaks’ trove of leaked diplomatic cables, is a rare admission that the United States played a central role in the disastrous December 2006 Ethiopian Woyanne [the ruling party in Ethiopia] invasion of Somalia, a move that ultimately emboldened the very Islamic extremists the U.S. and Ethiopia Woyanne had hoped to squash.

“The Somalia job was fantastic,” Al Nahyan interjected between discussions of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the prince’s desire to buy Reaper drones for his air force. At the time of Al Nahyan’s comment, the dust was just settling from Ethiopia’s Blitzkrieg-style assault toward Mogadishu. Some 50,000 Ethiopian Woyanne troops, supported by T-55 tanks, Hind helicopters and Su-27 jet fighters, had cut a bloody swath through the lightly-armed forces of the Islamic Courts Union, an alliance of mostly nationalist Islamic fighters that prior to the invasion had controlled much of Somalia.

The Somali attack had surprised outside observers. Ethiopia Woyanne and Somalia had been rivals a long time, but no one had expected such brutal fighting, and so suddenly. It was fairly obvious that Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion. For one, Ethiopian Woyanne air force did not appear capable of coordinated air strikes in support of on-the-move ground troops; it seemed likely that the Su-27s were piloted by Russian or Ukrainian mercenaries — a time-honored tradition in Africa. What’s more, Ethiopian Woyanne’s army didn’t possess the intelligence or logistical skill for long-range operations. Those, not coincidentally, are particular American strengths.

Washington certainly had a motive to get involved in Somalia. There was growing concern in the White House and the Pentagon that Somalia’s Islamists might ally themselves with Al Qaeda and turn to international terrorism. Already with two escalating wars on its own plate, the U.S. was in no position to openly lead its own large-scale attack on Somalia. It’d have been far simpler to simply sponsor somebody else to do the dirty work. Enter Ethiopia Woyanne. [Ethiopia has nothing to do with the invasion of Somalia.]

In early January following the invasion, USA Today’s Barbara Slavin reported on Washington’s extensive behind-the-scenes support for Ethiopian Woyanne troops. “The ties include intelligence sharing, arms aid and training,” Slavin noted. A couple days later, The Washington Post’s Pauline Jelinek, citing anonymous sources, described U.S. Special Forces accompanying Ethiopian Woyanne troops. CBS news revealed that U.S. Air Force gunships were active over southern Somalia during the Ethiopian blitz. Through all the reporting, U.S. officials remained vague or silent on the subject of Washington’s involvement. All the same, evidence was mounting that the U.S. had played a leading role in the Ethiopian Woyanne invasion. Journalists only strongly suspected it, but Abu Dhabi prince Al Nayhan apparently knew it for certain, if his praise of “the Somalia job” was any indication.

Three years later, it’s clear the Ethiopian Woyanne invasion was a bad idea. The attack rallied Somalis of all stripes and politics against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for fringe Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the Ethiopians Woyannes and their suspected American puppet-masters. Violence mounted as the Ethiopians Woyannes settled in for a bloody, two-year occupation.

When the Ethiopians Woyannes withdrew in 2009, the Islamists rushed to fill the vacuum. A year later, the Al Shabab Islamic group, successor to the Islamic Courts, conducted its first international terror attack. Last month, a Somali-born American teen plotted to explode a bomb in Portland. Today, U.S. Special Forces continue to target terrorists in Somalia. There are arguably more of them than ever, thanks in part to the botched Ethiopian Woyanne invasion. “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea,” U.S. diplomat Donald Yamamoto said in March.

Al Amoudi servant makes legal threat

One of Al Amoudi’s servants in the Diaspora, Ato Eyaya Arega, is imitating his boss by hiring a lawyer to harass Ethiopian Review. The lawyer, Steven Sarfatti of Washington DC, wrote a letter (read here) demanding that we remove the articles about Eyaya and his gang of thugs who have turned the Ethiopian Sports Federation in North America (ESFNA) into a tool for the Woyanne genocidal regime in Ethiopia.

The answer to Mr Sarfatti is that Ethiopian Review stands by the articles. In fact, there is more to come.

Wikileaks: Reports by U.S. diplomats on various world leaders

Wikileaks.org has released 250,000 classified U.S. diplomatic dispatches on Sunday, which is said to be the biggest intelligence leak in U.S. history. The following are some excerpts from the dispatches that were sent to the State Department by U.S. embassies around the world regarding various leaders.

Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe: A minister in the South African government calls Mugabe “a crazy old man.” U.S. Ambassador Christopher W. Dell writes: “Mugabe is “more clever and more ruthless than any other politician in Zimbabwe… To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant tactician and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly change the rules of the game, radicalize the political dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda.” Mugabe also seem to believe that his 18 doctorate degrees give him the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including supply and demand. Ambassador Dell goes on to explain: “The regime has become so used to calling the shots and dictating the pace that the merest stumble panics them. Many local observers have noted that Mugabe is panicked and desperate about hyperinflation at the moment, and hence he’s making mistakes. Possibly fatal mistakes. We need to keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do him in.” He added: “Mugabe and his henchman are like bullies everywhere: if they can intimidate, you they will. But they’re not used to someone standing up to them and fighting back.”

[Most of the above description about Mugabe can be also be said about Ethiopia’s tyrant Meles Zenawi. There are 1,623 dispatches from Ethiopia to be released by Wikileaks. We will post them when they become available. Read more about Mugabe here.]

North Korea’s Kim Jong-il: Flabby old chap who suffers from ‘physical and psychological trauma.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel: Risk aversive and rarely creative.

Russia President Dmitry Medvedev: A pale, hesitant figure who plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.

Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi: Cannot travel without what one diplomat described as his “voluptuous blonde” Ukrainian nurse. The report, from the US embassy in Tripoli, disclosed that Colonel Gaddafi appeared to be afraid of staying on upper floors and disliked flying over water. He enjoyed horse racing and flamenco dancing and was upset when he was refused permission to pitch his Bedouin tent in New York City.

French President Nicholas Sarkozy: Emperor with no clothes; thin-skinned, authoritarian with a tendency to rebuke his senior team repeatedly for their alleged shortcomings.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel: Avoids risks and is rarely creative.

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh: Saleh was viewed by U.S. diplomats as “dismissive, bored and impatient” during a meeting he held with John Brennan, a senior adviser to the US President on national security. In a meeting with former American commander in the Middle East General David Petraeus, Saleh reportedly said: “We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours.”