By Siegfried Pausewang and Lovise Aalen
Meeting the President of Southern Region, or the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS), Ato Haile Mariam Dessalegn, the Secretary and Deputy Chairman of Hadiya Zone, Ato Tamrat, the Chairman of KAT Zone, Abote Anito and the Chairman of Gedeo Zone, Yohannes Gebeyehu, we got the encouraging impression that authorities acknowledge past shortcomings and promise improvements.
Compared to 2000, the elections in Hadiya in particular showed indeed one important improvement: the 2001 election was peaceful and there were no major confrontations and no major incidents of violence. We saw no presence of the regular army on election day, in spite of rumours about the military spreading fear in some remote areas. There were, however, several armed guards at the gate and even inside many of the polling stations on election day. According to the election regulations published by NEB, the electoral offices are only allowed to assign the police for security, and persons carrying weapons should stay five hundred metres away from the polling stations (Election Officers Manual, April 2000, Addis Ababa, p. 180).
On local level, in the woreda and kebele, the promise of equal chances for all parties was not fulfilled. It was the same pattern as in 2000: wherever the opposition put up alternative candidates who could challenge the ruling party, repression was applied, both before the election and during voting day. The opposition was invited and got some concessions to participate. But in the last moment, a considerable number of their candidates were removed from the lists for formalities or withdrew after intense pressure and intimidation. In several woreda of Hadiya and Kambata, no one or only one or two opposition candidates could compete for seats in the Zonal and woreda councils.
In the preparation to the elections, people who signed for a candidate of the opposition were threatened to withdraw their signatures or face consequences. We have evidence that in some cases even candidates themselves were forced to withdraw. In most places, EPRDF representatives explained the opposition’s withdrawal with the opposition realising that they did not have sufficient support to stand as candidates. Ex-members or ex-candidates of the Southern Coalition, however, told us that they had abandoned their party membership or candidacy because they feared for their family’s security, and not because they rejected the ideas or the programme of the party.
In the rural constituency Soro 1 in Hadiya, no candidate of HNDO, and in Soro 2, only two candidates of HNDO for the zonal and one for the kebele election were allowed to run. People protested by going to the street with their blue voter cards, saying: “We have the right to vote – we have registered – but we can not exercise our right because our candidates have been refused. We demand our right to vote.” It was an impressive and peaceful demonstration. Local officials tried to explain this demonstration: “These are school students under 18 years. They try to disturb the election.”
Complaints about imprisonment of candidates and supporters of the opposition were reported everywhere and there was a widespread belief that all the opposition candidates would be imprisoned after the elections were finished. Even if these complaints were repetitive, there can hardly be any doubt that a huge number of people have been in prison for a shorter or longer period because of political preferences. We were informed that the National Electoral Board had succeeded in releasing over one hundred members of the opposition. Still, we were informed about candidates and supporters being arrested or kept in prison over election day. In Kambata, we observed ourselves how the police attempted to arrest an opposition activist after he had approached us to report on violations of the electoral law. We had no mandate to visit and interview the detained in prison, but the number of complaints, and indeed the efforts of officials to explain away political detentions, leave little doubt about the fact.
The Secretary of Hadiya Zone and the Chairman of KAT Zone explained that the two Southern Coalition regional MPs imprisoned in Durame were accused of murder and could not be released on bail. The actual court charges which we have seen, concern only accusations of having agitated people to resist payment of taxes and fertiliser debts and to use force if payment was demanded – a charge often set forth and hard to disprove. Moreover, the charge is extended to include banditry and an attempt at destabilising the administration and jeopardising peace and security, after the people allegedly upon such agitation forcefully seized a gun from a kebele security guard. We have also heard rumours that the candidates are being made responsible for a murder committed with this illegally seized gun. This incident supports the opposition’s argument that people are detained on fabricated allegations, which have no basis in real court charges.
While hundreds of opposition members were imprisoned for shorter or longer periods, none of those responsible for election fraud, stealing of ballot boxes, violence and even murder during the election in 2000 has been arrested or brought to court so far. The authorities try to explain away this fact by pointing out that some officials had been replaced or transferred, or by the fact that authorities had for some time little control over some rural areas. However, they had sufficient control to arrest their opponents.
During the elections, voters in several voting stations were asked to mark their ballot papers openly in presence of election attendants, or to show them to the officials. From different voting stations we heard people telling us that they had been forced to vote for EPRDF. In some cases, eyewitnesses reported that officials or cadres tore ballot papers marked for HNDO into pieces and demanded a new one filled in for EPRDF.
The President of SNNPRS, Ato Haile Mariam Dessalegn, explained to us that the Hadiya zonal council consisted of 60 members, of which 30 were elected last year in the regional election, the other half to be elected now. HNDO had already won 24 seats – as representatives in the regional council are also entitled to a seat in the zone – and needed only seven more seats to gain a majority. Was it just a slip that he did not tell us what we learned in Hosaina: In the meantime, the number of zonal council members had been increased to 85, reducing the lead of HNDO from 40 to 28 per cent. The announcement of the election results of NEB contains yet another twist in this matter: it says that in Hadiya, the HPDO, and EPRDF-affiliate, “won 54 seats for the zonal council elections. The zonal council has 54 seats.” It seems thus that there will no more be a representation of the regional council members in the zonal council: the 24 mandates, which Ato Haile Mariam told us about, have disappeared. Moreover, there were 10 constituencies in Hadiya when we observed the zonal elections, each of them electing six representatives. At least in one of them in Soro, a majority of people did not go to vote. We would expect that their six seats have not been dropped, but will be decided in a re-election.
The National Electoral Board (NEB), and its executive secretary, did a tremendous job to resolve some of the complaints of the opposition and to facilitate their participation. But the executive secretary cannot be everywhere, and the people he sent from other areas as “neutral” election officials were in many places absorbed into the local climate of total dominance of the electoral process by the EPRDF. We have seen several voting stations where the electoral officers from Addis Ababa watched without objections while voters were filling in their ballots under the eyes of officials, or where a cadre was present in the secret booth to “advise” voters. They chased away opposition candidates, but had no objections against the kebele chairmen or EPRDF candidates being present in the voting stations. Nor did they react when observers of the opposition were excluded from being present in the voting station. Some NEB officials at local level accepted the disqualification of candidates on the basis of the kebele officials scrutinising their endorsing signatures and refusing some of them, without questioning how and why they were disqualified.
In some woreda, “Joint Committees” were established, consisting of one representative each from the contesting parties and one from NEB. The idea of joint committees is an encouraging step towards giving the elections more credibility and transparency. These committees were meant to solve conflicts that arose in the pre-election period and on election day. But in most places, the strong power and presence of the kebele and woreda executives in the electoral process made the joint committees inactive or non-existent and generally they played no significant role in solving differences or mediating in conflicts during the election.
One of the researchers had a chance to stop for a short re-visit in Gedeo, where he had been under the 2000 election. At that time, the opposition party had indeed mobilised a substantial support. The ruling EPRDF party used their control over the administration, police, and judiciary to prevent their electoral victory. Nevertheless, the experience was not taken sufficiently serious to warrant a re-election. NEB argued they needed evidence that could be used in court.
In Gedeo we talked to several people we had met during the election in 2000. We got a vivid picture of GPRDM revenging against their adversaries after the election: offices of the opposition were closed, many of their leaders arrested, property confiscated, civil servants transferred or dismissed, families put under pressure and personal careers ruined. As a result, GPDO did not even field candidates for the 2001 elections. “We have learned from the experience that it is just not possible to challenge the EPRDF in elections”, said the Chairman of GPDO, now living in Addis Ababa. After 2001, leaders of HNDO drew exactly the same conclusion in Hadiya.
Officials in Southern region claim that the popularity of Beyene Petros is waning as he is never seen in the region and is steering the Southern Coalition centrally from Addis Ababa. We found his support in Hadiya to be strong. But in some other areas, we sensed some discontent, i.e. with his decision to withdraw from the kebele election. One member organisation, the Sidama Liberation Movement, intended to continue for the kebele election, and partly did so. Budding discontent may be an indication that the organisation needs some strengthening of its internal communication and building internal unity founded on participation in transparent decision making. Discontent may also be a reaction to repression and to the many frustrations of being disqualified in spite of strong voter support.
In conclusion, seeing this recent election as the last one in a succession since 1992, we cannot see that local repression in the preparation and conduct of the election has decreased. So far, the promises from higher officials have not been met by improvements on local level. We have followed the process since 1991 and found that there are structural reasons for rural repression – in the elections as well as in other contexts – in the way the party and the administration are linked in the kebele and the woreda. Repression is structurally caused. Already the NIHR report on the 1995 elections observed that rural repression was increasing: the peasant association structure of the Derg had been revived, only EPRDF cadres had replaced the former Ethiopian Workers Party (EsePa) cadres. They control the administration of the kebele and the peasants. Since then, the control over peasants – where necessary by repression – has increased. In the elections of 2000, when opposition for the first time challenged the EPRDF, it became openly visible. In 2001 it reached Addis Ababa in full force. And the present election, in spite of encouraging promises, gave no indications of improvement.
The immediate reason is that the local party officials depend on the party for their livelihood, just as much as the party depends on them. Therefore they fight for their positions with all means – also illegal ones. But the ruling party also depends on the local officials for keeping their positions: Without offering them government positions, the party (or the EPRDF-affiliated parties) could not maintain their party organisation. This structure creates the problem: it incites local officials to fight with all means, including repression. It allowed them to deprive the supporters of HNDO from public resources and community services. And it gives them virtually total impunity.
Moreover, the local structure, with a strong executive and a weak judiciary, strengthens this trend. Judges are not in a position to challenge the administrator. Cadres order the police, and frequently can command the police to do even clearly illegal arrests and punishments. Rural people believe that there are two legal forms of imprisonment: by court decision or by administrative decision.
There are some encouraging signals indicating that the government is attempting to initiate a clear separation of legislative, executive and judiciary, and of party and government structures. There have been constitutional amendments in most regions to provide the legal base for this separation. We strongly support these reforms. But there is a long way to go from an amendment of a constitution to its practical implementation in the everyday life of peasants. As long as peasants can not be convinced that their rights are respected, as a matter of everyday experience, the reforms will not reach their goal. As long as peasants can not feel that they have an institution to complain to if their rights are violated, they will not trust democracy, they will continue to say (as they did to us:) “Election is shaking just one hand…” or “Democracy is just another word for fraud”. Peasants feel defenceless, under pressure, and not free, if they can not hold the cadres and administrators accountable.
This said, however, we see a potential in a serious implementation of the promised reforms. We want to emphasise that a separation of institutions and powers, from central level and down to local administration, is a most essential step. It will go a long way towards establishing inclusive structures that offer the individual the security and consciousness of having civic rights –and having access to remedies if these rights are infringed. We hope that the announced efforts will succeed in putting local accountability into practice all the way down to the kebele level. Unfortunately, we have experienced unrestricted local repression in spite of sincere promises from officials. One should continue to measure promises by their results in local practice.
The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights / Nordem
University of Oslo
February 2002