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US policy objectives, options on the Horn (Theresa Whelan)

We continue to pursue a strategic bilateral relationship with Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), a partner in regional counter-terrorism activities. We believe that promotion of a professional ENDF,
committed to human rights and rule of law, is best achieved through engagement, rather than isolation, and we have invested in training and supporting the professionalization of the Ethiopian forces. Our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia and the ENDF emphasizes our expectation that any military partner of the United States is to behave in a professional manner with full respect for the rule of law and citizens’ rights. Our training engagement is particularly important with the ENDF, a 200,000-person military that is professionalizing and restructuring into a more conventional force. This transformation has been challenged and made all the more necessary by the border conflict, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia’s military activities in Somalia.

Our relationship with the ENDF includes military education, counter-terrorism capability development, and funding for equipment purchases and maintenance to support the ENDF’s modernization. Our security assistance office in Addis works closely with the Embassy to ensure our assistance complies with Leahy Law requirements. Until last year, the U.S. conducted military to military training in basic soldiering and commando skills at small outposts in central Ethiopia. All of this training emphasized the rule of law. While this training ceased in 2007 at the request of the Ethiopian government, we continue our activities at the Ethiopian Command and Staff College, where we have two uniformed instructors who have trained over 120 mid- and senior-level Ethiopian military officers. We believe that continued robust security cooperation, including military to military training, is critical to the development of the ENDF and to U.S. foreign and national security policy in the region.

Eritrea

Although we currently do not have a bilateral relationship with the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), we believe there are areas of strategic security interest to the United States, including maritime security in the crucial shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the transformation of the EDF from a guerilla force to a smaller, professional military. Since the closure of our Security Assistance Office in Asmara in early 2006, based on indications from the Government of Eritrea that it no longer wished to maintain a bilateral military relationship, we have had little to no contact with the Eritrean forces.

The Government of Eritrea continues to undermine security in the Horn of Africa by supporting destabilizing elements in the region. We are concerned about Eritrea’s actions, including the decision in November 2007 to deny the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) the right to purchase or import fuel, de facto forcing UNMEE’s current relocation of forces out of the TSZ and into Asmara. We continue to monitor the situation with UNMEE, and particularly whether UNMEE, now that it has started to withdraw from Eritrea, will be allowed to take with it all its equipment. If UNMEE were not allowed to take its equipment out of the country, Eritrea in essence would receive a windfall of military equipment left by departing UN troops.

Somalia

Another area of concern for us is the situation in Somalia. Although we have no bilateral military cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), we are watching the security situation in Somalia and the implications of its continued instability for the region as a whole.

Although recent efforts of the new TFG Prime Minister to reach out to elements of the opposition appear promising, there are serious and on-going concerns about the security situation throughout Somalia. There is sporadic violence between Somaliland and Puntland forces. The lack of a representative security force impedes the TFG’s efforts to extend its authority and control over all of Somalia, including portions of Mogadishu and the southern border area. Terrorist and extremist elements, including the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militia, continue to exploit TFG weaknesses and are attempting to undermine any efforts towards a peaceful dialogue process and seek a safe haven in Somalia.

The ability of al Qaeda operatives and their affiliates to continue to use Somalia as a base for operations is a real and severe threat not only to Somalia, but to the entire region and to the United States. We continue to work with our partners, particularly Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, to develop a regional counter-terrorism capability to respond to terrorists and extremist elements in Somalia that threaten U.S. interests and the security of the region. Security assistance, including through traditional funding streams like foreign military financing (FMF) and international military education training (IMET), and the DoD 1206 authority, have allowed us to support partners as they develop the capability to respond to the terrorist threat emanating from Somalia. Kenya’s progress in developing a counter-terrorism capability, with U.S. assistance, has been critical to regional security. Continued and increased assistance to these front-line states is crucial to ensuring that the instability in Somalia does not impact its neighbors. There also may be opportunities to make progress in Somalia by working with those parts of Somalia, including Somaliland, that are relatively stable. In addition to our partner relationships, the U.S. also has on-going operations in the region that respond to the presence of identified al Qaeda terrorists in Somalia.

Summary

We remain committed to promoting security and stability in the Horn of Africa, and believe this is in the best interests of the people and governments of the region, and of the United States. The Department of Defense’s relations and policies in the region are subordinate to our foreign and national security policies, and consequently we continue to support and work closely with the Embassies and USAID missions in the region to ensure our activities are consistent with and support U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Horn.

One thought on “US policy objectives, options on the Horn (Theresa Whelan)

  1. The United States military assistance to the Horn of Africa is not going to help the Horn region, but instead it will break its horn into pieces and make the Continent hornless, without a horn, which means powerless or without honor since the word horn according to Scripture means power or honor.

    The United States has been training the Meles’ army for a long, long time for four reasons: to curve the spread of terrorism, to eliminate the Islamist extremists from the Horn of Africa, to monitor the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and to safeguard the access to the sea. The United States believes that it is training the Meles’ army so that Meles could have a modernized and a well disciplined army – an army that respects human rights – the rights of the individuals. In theory, the United States may have taught the Meles’ army discipline, respect to the right of an individual, and the rule of law; however, in practice, we saw the Meles Army indiscriminately slaughtering the peaceful demonstrators of innocent Ethiopians on the streets of Addis Ababa in 2005; we see it now killing the Somali people and burying alive some of the people of Ogaden. What happened to the human rights? What happened to the rule of law? Does indeed the Theresa Whelan’s report include the atrocities of the United States-trained Meles’ army against the Ethiopian civilians and the civilians of the Somalia? The Whelan’s report is silent about these undeniable facts about the atrocities of the Meles’ army in Somalia, in Ethiopia, and even in Kenya or Sudan.

    The Whelan’s report simply states, hiding the facts, that the involvement of America in the Horn region is to minimize lawlessness because of the weak governance in that region. Didn’t the Meles’ army learn discipline, the rule of law and human rights from the United States army trainer? Does the Theresa Whelan’s report reveal the weakness and lawlessness of the Meles’ army whose trainer has been the United States army staff? Instead of reporting the many shortcomings of the Meles’ army, Whelan talks about the lawlessness, the territorial disputes, and the weak governance in the Horn of Africa.

    To the individual Ethiopians, especially to the people of Ogaden and the people of Somalia, who live under constant fear, intimidation, persecution, and many times killings, the Whelan’s report has no substance. Because it tells them nothing about their human rights violations by the Meles’ army the United States has been training for a long time – an army that brought instability in Somalia, total destruction in Ogaden, deep hatred between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for America supports Ethiopia but not Eritrea.

    The presence of American military staff in the Horn of Africa has been a severe headache not only to the terrorists but also to the normal citizens of Ethiopian, Somalia, and particularly to the Ogaden people, for American assistance goes mostly to the building of a strong, ruthless, and lawless army such as the army of Meles Seitanawi, so the common people of Ethiopian and Somalia benefits nothing by the presence of the American army in the Horn of Africa. In order to be there, Americans have been preaching to the people of the Horn that they should cooperate with the United States in destroying terrorism so that America could build them new roads, new hospital, new schools, and send them engineers, doctors, well-trained teachers, and nurses, but America is sending them army generals who could train the Meles’ army, army helicopters, guns, and commandos instead of teachers, doctors, nurses, and engineers.

    Whelan’s report says nothing that America has a plan to feed the hungry Ethiopians, to treat the Ethiopian AIDS victims, to bring peace and stability between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Somalia and Ethiopia, and between Ogaden and its mother country, Ethiopia. Yes, Whelan talks about lawlessness, territorial disputes, and weak governance in the region. Whelan’ report has failed indeed to mention that it was Washington who created lawlessness, territorial disputes, weak governance, and terrorism in the Horn of Africa by training the Meles’ army to terrorize its neighbors, create lawlessness, bring terrorism, and establish territorial disputes. Had not Washington gone to war with Iraq with a pretext that Iraq had developed a mass destruction weapon, the world, including the Horn of Africa, would be the safest place to live now freely, and the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea would have been solved long time ago without the help of any foreign government. Right now, Eritrea is adamant to seek help from Washington, and Ethiopia is handcuffed to do any thing without the help of America. Therefore, for all these territorial disputes, lawlessness, weak governance, and terrorism, America is to blame, no one else.

    In reality, America’s foreign policy, especially its policy about the Horn of Africa, is a mess; one of its ugliest policies is sending its military staff to Ethiopia to train a terrorist army – Meles’ army- to fight against terrorism that Washington has created by invading Iraq and Afghanistan instead of invading Saudi Arabia where most of the terrorists that hit new York City originated. Knowing that America is losing the battle to eradicate terrorism from the face of the earth, it is now forcing the Horn regions through its economic incentives to guard the American interest by waging war against its enemies – Islamist terrorists – not the enemies of either Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, or Eritrea.

    Therefore, the true nature of Theresa Whelan’s report is to modernize Meles’ army – a terrorist army – to fight terrorism to protect Washington’s interest in the Horn of Africa and Meles’ interest in Somalia, Ogaden, and America; without these two fundamental interests, Washington will never help Meles, and Meles will never fight Washington’s terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the two interests are interwoven; none of them will function without the other.

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