Below the full text of a speech given in Paris, France, by OLF’s Dr Shigut Geleta on June 17, 2006.
Thank you Mr. Chairperson for the nice introduction. As the chairperson said, my name is Shigut Geleta, and I am the Head of Foreign Relations of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Europe.
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
I feel greatly honoured and privileged to have been invited to this “8 heuers les Nouvelles d’Addis” meeting not only to participate but also to address such a distinguished audience of wide spectrum: from students, researchers, journalists, guest speakers, and of course readers and friends of “Les Nouvelles” on the topic given to me, namely: Oromia and Its Perspectives in the Present Situation.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Speaking about perspective of Oromia and the Oromo people explicitly means to speak about the central issues of the Ethiopian empire. The Oromos that live in Oromia are geopoltically and socio-economically the main issue to measure Ethiopia’s progress and/or problems. Oromia State is the largest among the Regional States, and stretches from north west Sudan border to south east to Somalia, from north Tigray border to south up to Kenya, and in the west from Sudan border to the east up to Djibouti. The Oromos account for more than 40% of Ethiopia’s projected 78 million total population; 75% of its forest resources, a lion shares of imports and foreign exchange. Most of the main stable foods of Ethiopia such as wheat, barely, corn, oats, teff, sorghum, pulses and oil seeds are produced in Oromia, and Oromia is the largest producer of cattle, poultry, horse, mule, donkey, sheep, goat, and others. Blue Nile, the longest river in the world, and other rivers that benefit the Sudan, Egypt, Somalia and Kenya get most of their tributaries from rivers that originate and flow in Oromia. As many of might be aware of, any environmental malpractice on these shared water resources such as deforestation directly affects not only Ethiopian peoples but also the life of millions of peoples of the riparian states down the streams.
Addis Ababa/Finfinne, sometimes known as the capital city of Africa that serves as the seat of Ethiopian government and many international organisations like Economic commission for Africa (ECA), African Union (AU) and others is located in the heart of Oromoland. Among the nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, the Oromos occupy an important position not only geographically but also socio-economically. The Oromo democracy, the Gada system, has many resembles with several indigenous peoples like the Sidama, Gedewo and Konso. Afaan Oromoo, the oromo language, shares many words with most of south west nations and nationalities of Ethiopia such as the Konso, Sidama, Gidolee, Gatoo, Arboora, Gedewo, Gaamota, Semayii and Geleb. The same is true with Somali, Afar and Saho languages.
These are some of the few points why the Oromo issues should be central to any topic be it economy, politics, human rights, democracy or development in general. Regrettably, for the last one hundred plus years, Oromos have been under the subjugation of different systems of Ethiopian rulers or dictators. These dictators have some common characteristic. They all had/have ascended to power by force and rule by force from Menelik to Melese Zenawi. Since each systems have ethnic vanguard and beneficiaries, Oromos have been marginalized, oppressed, and have become second class citizens in their own country for more than a century now. Oromos voices have been silenced, their culture and language suppressed and their resources exploited to sustain the oppressing systems. Oromos haven’t got an opportunity to say yes or no in any war or peace making process. It is our latest fresh memory that Oromo peasants and youths were used as cannon fodder and mine sweepers during the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000.
Sustainable economic development and growth of domestic product need peace and democracy. Oromos have none of them. The absence of justice, equality and peace in Ethiopia has made Ethiopia as the prison house of nations and nationalities and one of the poorest countries in the world. Oromia that could have been the bread basket of Africa is in need of foreign food aid. Oromos who could have enjoyed liberty and justice from their egalitarian culture are chained and put to prison for demanding God given rights that are enshrined to all human beings.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Ethiopia was described by Ennrico Cerulli (1956) as a museum of peoples and the coincidence of class and ethnic fissures has long provided the primary nexus of conflict over Ethiopian state. Both national and international factors played a key role for such deep-rooted conflict and contradiction. History teaches us, the climax of contradiction results into revolution, and the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 was nothing but the explosion of the contradictions suppressed by force for many years. As I indicated above, the problem of nations and nationalities has been the critical issue for Oromos in particular because of the emperor’s desired goal of homogenised and centralized Ethiopia by making it mono culture, language and religion. The revolutionary event of 1974 was high-jacked by the military junta, the Derg, because there was no other organized political party in the country. As the Emperor had done, Mengistu, the chairman of the Derg, continued the pattern of extreme centralisation and denial of individual or collective rights of nations and nationalities. He replaced monarchical absolutism ideology by militaristic Marxism – Leninism to build the Ethiopian nation state. Centralization and homogenisation under the culture of one ethnic group severely suppressed the Oromos culturally, economically and politically and only perpetuated the systematic domination. The grievance of oppressed nationalities resulted in ethnic based liberation movements such as Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and with the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) that finally toppled the Military junta in 1991.
The OLF was born to address the brutal oppression, and socio-politico-economic exploitation and subjugation of the Oromo people by the Ethiopian political system. This necessity delivered a centralised and secular OLF in 1973/1974. The sacrifice of thousands of Oromo nationalists has resulted in the recognition of Oromo and Oromia as a unified polity in the Ethiopian political system in 1991. After the fall of Derg, the ethnic based federal system was introduced to Ethiopia during the Transition Government and later enshrined in the constitution. The TPLF had conducted election in June 1992 and 1994, May 1995, 2000 and 2005. By doing so, it claimed that it has transformed the Ethiopian state from authoritarian ethnically dominated empire and command economy to democratic society and free market economy.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The current rulers of Ethiopia also never seem to learn from history. In fact, the political culture of Ethiopia remains unchanged. As all dictators do, Prime Minster Meles banned all independent political parties and liberation movements during the first year into the Transition period. A few political parties have managed to participate in the election processes mentioned above under very harsh conditions. The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has used various methods to manipulate the elections. The main methods have been closure of opposition offices, harassment, killings, arrest of candidates, refusal of endorsement of registrations of opposition organisations, last-minute shift in the election regulations regarding the number of candidates to be field, suspension of candidates by alleged cases of being “under police investigations” were a just a few of tactics the regime routinely uses.
As a result of such election mockery, the federal government of Ethiopia with bicameral parliament (legislative body), the executive body, judiciary, the army, security and police all are interwoven into one party, the TPLF led EPRDF party. The prime Minister, Foreign Minster, Security Minister, Army Chief of Staff, most military commanders and many other Federal employees are ethnic Tigres and come from the TPLF even though the total population of ethnic Tigres is about 6% of the population of Ethiopia.
Despite Ethiopia’s claim to follow free market economic policy, it is officially known that “Non-Governmental Organisations” (NGOs) such as Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Tigray Development Association (TDA) and Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray ( EFFORT) are controlled by TPLF and serve as the front organisations to channel national and international resources to the ruling party controlled business empires. Basically, the TPLF privatised (took ownership) public property nationalized during the Derg time in the name of free market economy. TPLF dictates politics, economy and security of peoples in Ethiopia. There is no doubt in fair and free competition, TPLF will never stand a chance to rob Ethiopian peoples vote and resources.
As far as free press is concerned, five Oromo magazines (Urji, Biftu, Gada, Madda Walaabuu and Odaa) were closed down when the government imprisoned their editors and publishers. Many of the Oromo journalists were exiled after their release, but Mr. Shiferaw Insermu and Mr. Dhabassaa Wakjira are currently languishing in prison. This is not unique to Oromos alone. There are also a number of Amharic and different language newspapers that are closed down by the regime.
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is true that the Ethiopian state is federally structured and the country has a constitution resembling that of western European norm. Nevertheless, this constitution remained a paper document devoid of implementation. This fake federal structure has been manipulated by TPLF to divide and rule at home, and has given the impression of prevalence of democratic structure to the international community. The regime has pitted one ethnic group against the other allotting villages to adjacent ethnic group and has caused unnecessary blood-shed. Furthermore, the incumbent minority ruling party merely formulated and expressed the competing interest and ideas of the opponent parties on paper for its own survival on power and gain international support. A constitution that has become an instrument of oppression for the vast majority of the people is not worth the ink and the paper it is written on.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Today after 15 years, we need not to enumerate the dictatorial nature of Ethiopian government. The International Observers of May 2005 National Election and the Ethiopian peoples are the witnesses what the regime is and how it has remained in power.
Ethiopia is at a cross-road and two important trends have been unfolding in the mean time. On one hand, lack of solution for pending political questions and on the other hand the underdeveloped economy have taken a collision course. Poverty, high unemployment, alarming population growth, rate of spread of HIV/AIDS, repressive measure of the government for any peaceful demonstration are hefty records of shame for the government. Since November 9, 2005 until this time there is widespread continuous people disobedience in Oromia where the government falsely portrayed itself as if it won the election in this regional zone. However it was in this region where it has used its armed wing for its flawed election. The government responded to peaceful demonstrations causing massive human rights violations such as extra judicial killings, harassment, disappearance, gang rape, detentions and etc..These brutal actions of the regime will never silence the Oromo national struggle but rather it will strengthen “Oromummaa” (Oromo identity).
This brut act is not only confined to Oromia but also makes in Ogadenia, Sidama, Anuwak, Amhara and others too. This continuous suppression of the regime and Ethiopian people’s rebellion heralds the end the road for the TPLF-led Ethiopian regime. To facilitate the end of a minority rule and to shorten the time suffering of Ethiopian people, after a long thorough discussion, liberation movements and political parties with their different pragmatic programs but representing different nations or political interest of the Ethiopian people recently (in May 2006) established Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD). As history instructs us it is the democratic vision of Pan Africanists like Kwame Nkurmah, Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral and Nelson Mandela that led and speeded up de-colonisation process. Today’s bold determination and vision of the leadership of member organisations of AFD to pool resources together and work hand in hand will be, no doubt, the light at the end of the tunnel for Horn of African peace in general and for Ethiopia in particular. It is high time that freedom and democracy reign in all corners of Africa and Ethiopia should be an example not an obstacle. AFD has a noble goal that accommodates all those who stand for justice, equality, freedom and democracy.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Before I sum up my speech I would like to say some words about the efforts the Oromo nation has been making for freedom and peace. Since 1900s, Oromos of all walks of life have been dying to restore their inalienable birthright for human dignity, freedom and equality. The OLF, as a vanguard organisation leading the Oromo people, has always showed its willingness and commitment to resolve the fundamental problems in Ethiopia peacefully and democratically. The following records are a few of the efforts made by the OLF to resolve the problem in the Ethiopian empire peacefully.After the fall of the Derg the OLF and almost all Oromo Liberation organisations participated in the 1991-1992 Transitional Government with the hope that the chronic problem of the empire and that of Oromo case would be resolved peacefully. While OLF is seriously working on Transitional Charter:
Mr. Gamahis Dhaaba (Zacharias Galata), Central Committee Member of OLF was murdered cold blooded in a TPLF office. On 25 March 1992, along the streets of Water town in Hararge region, Meles Zenaw’s army opened gunfire on peaceful Oromo demonstrators indiscriminately and killed 92 people and wounded over 300. Soon after that, Jatani Ali, a prominent Oromo politician,was murdered in Nairobi, Kenya. When the mechanism devised by the Charter was derailed by the TPLF/EPRDF, the OLF was forced to withdraw from Transitional Government of Ethiopia in the Mid-1992. Since then, the OLF has taken several initiatives to end the conflict peacefully. The OLF has sat for negotiation with the TPLF several times to resolve the Oromo issue, but all failed because the TPLF regime knows it has no public support and mandate to rule by force if equality, freedom and peace reign in the country. Just to give some chronological events:-
1.In 1993 OLF sat for negotiation with the help of eight European and North American Ambassadors. The Eritrea President with the ambassadors of Great Britain, Germany, Sweden and the US took the initiative.
At that time EPRDF was declaring to the world that it had captured 20,000 OLF fighters by mass arresting Oromo children, elders and women and refused to negotiate. 2.In 1993, OLF joined the Paris Peace Committee with a sincere commitment to salvage the situation. The TPLF/EPRDF beside its unwillingness to solve the conflict peacefully,
it rather aggravated the disagreement by arresting Mr. Ibsa Gutama, the OLF representative when he arrived in Addis Ababa/Finfinne from Europe to participate in the Peace and Reconciliation Conference due to take place from December 18-22,1993. The unsecured minority government intensified killing, assassinating and imprisoning Oromo civilians. 3.In 1994, OLF met at the Carter Peace Centre in Atlanta, Georgia under the chairmanship of theformer US President Jimmy Carter. Again, the Meles government was not willing to negotiate.
In March 2004, Abba Gada Boru Guyyoo, a Gada leader of Borona who was invited for a peace talk was murdered on his way back to his village by TPLF soldiers. Again, in September 2004, Mr. Darara Kafani, a successful businessman of over 65 years old was gunned down in broad day light by TPLF security forces. On 21 May 1995, Mr. Ali Yusuf, a business man who was one of the 12 member of the OLF’s seat in Transitional Government was assassinated in Addis Ababa/Finfinne by no one else but the brutal regime. 4. In 1996, in Nairobi, Kenya, through the Kenyan government another attempt was made for mediation. But the TPLF/EPDRF responded by :-
closing the Oromo Relief Association (ORA) in February 1996, and imprisoned all its workers and confiscated all the property of ORA. It also killed a well known Oromo singer Mr. Ebisa Adunyaa in August 1996 in Addis Ababa/Finfinne in his home. 5.In 1997, a former German Ambassador to Ethiopia, Dr. Horst Winkelman made his best to bring the TPLF leaders to the negotiation table but it was turned down by the Ethiopian regime.
Again, the TPLF/EPRDF arrested Oromo journalists and all members of Oromo Human Rights League in the country
6. In 1998, by the invitation of the US State department, in Washington, DC, another attempt was made for negotiation but failed since this government can not stay in power if peace, equality, freedom and democracy prevail in that country.
The TPLF government did not waste any time to instigate ethnic and tribal conflict between Guji Oromos and Gedeo in July 1998, and between Borana and Garba peoples in October 1998 that claimed the lives of many innocent civilians. 7. In 1999, again in Washington DC, under the sponsorship of Congressman Hennery Johnston, another effort was made to bring Mr. Meles to negotiation, but it did not materialize and bear no result.
8. On February 3, 2000, the OLF took extra miles to seek a peaceful settlement with the Ethiopian regime by issuing an “ Agenda for Peace to Resolve the Conflict in Ethiopia ”.
However, the TPLF regime did not miss a chance to show its true intention and goal. Just a few weeks later, it assassinated an OLF Executive Member, the Honourable Mr. Mulis Abba Gadaa. From 2000 until this very moment, many Oromo students have been killed, detained and many more have exiled in fear of immediate danger for their lives. In the same year, the regime moved the seat of Oromia Regional State from Addis Ababa/Finfinne to Adama. It detained the leaders and member of Mecha-Tulama self-help association, for no reason other than peacefully protesting the change of State government seat to Adama. Even though the government has recognized it was against the will of the people to do so and relocated the Oromia capital to Addis Ababa/Finfinne, the Mecha-Tulama leaders are still languishing in TPLF prison. 9. In September 2005, the OLF responded positively for Mr. Meles’s call for peace talk without any precondition. It was rather a public relation gimmick since at that time TPLF was cornered by International Observers and the opposition to accept defeat at the ballot. As usual, no follow up or any meaningful proposal was presented from Mr. Meles, and basically it has been OLF’s experience not to expect much from this regime.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Peace can only be attained when all stakeholders show willingness to resolve the conflict at hand and begin to negotiate in good faith. I have showed just a few examples to demonstrate that Meles regime is neither for peace, equality, freedom nor for democracy. It is an unstable, paranoid regime that relies on nothing but force and about 6% of the Ethiopian populace who belong to its ethnicity. On the other hand, the AFD, which OLF is a founding member, is calling all stakeholders including EPRDF for political dialogue to formulate a comprehensive solution for the problem the country is facing. The OLF firmly believes the problem in the country can be solved though peaceful and democratic deliberations if all agree not to use force. Unfortunately, TPLF is never late to use force and create more problem and mistrust among the Ethiopian people, the opposition and try to confuse the international community. I have no doubt that the TPLF will go to any length in fabricating anything to discredit the Alliance and its member organisations through all sorts of divide and conquer, intermediation and even by trying to make alliance to a member of AFD. AFD will not fall for old tricks.
Finally, one basic reality is that Oromos and Oromia are no more abstract to the World. They are part of the global world with name and location. No one should tamper with individual and group rights of the Oromos and other nationalities in Ethiopia except themselves. I also believe no one should forcefully separate nations that want to unite and live together, and at the same time no one should force any nations to live together if they freely express their will not to do so. Ethiopia is not the only multi-nation state in the World. Oromos have been in contact with different nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, if the root cause of contradictions and conflict that prevail in Ethiopia is sequentially and properly solved through free, fair and democratic deliberations, rather than the barrel of gun, I have no doubt that Oromo visionaries and the OLF leadership will play a key role to bring peace in the Horn of Africa by placing the hierarchy of Oromo identity in the world of multiple identities. To learn more we shouldn’t have to go very far; one of the neighbouring country adjacent to this meeting place (France), Belgium, is divided in to three ethnic based regional zones: Flandern (deutch speaking), Wallon (french speaking) and Brussels (multicultural centre) each zone is enjoying its multiple right and multiple identity in EU. We can also look at the recent vote in Montenegro where the populace expressed to try a solo journey than unity with Serbia. The future is doomed only for those who fear equality, democracy and freedom, and for those who uphold and condone injustice, inequality and dictatorship. I say freedom now, equality now, democracy now for all peoples of Ethiopia, and Freedom and Democracy for all !!!
Merci beaucoup, au revoir,
Nagaan Galatooma,
Thank you,
Whence this dramatic reversal of Tigrayan sentiment, from champions of historic Ethiopia to debunkers of its reality? The story begins following the Liberation from Italian rule in 1942. The Tigrayan populace was stressed due to population pressures on increasingly infertile land. Nearly a third of Tigrayans migrated to other parts of the country. Their strained condition was severely exacerbated by impossibly heavy tax burdens, which the IEG refused to adjust. Indeed, the attitude of the central government seemed dismissive toward Tigray. It was clear that Shoa, the center of imperial rule since Minelik, and Eritrea, the returned province that Ethiopia sought to woo, were the major beneficiaries of the national budget. This grated on a people who had long played a central role in the Ethiopian political landscape.
These resentments boiled over in March 1943 when people from many parts of the province rose up in a rebellion (Tigr. woyane ) against the Imperial Ethiopian Government that lasted for five months. In response, Emperor Haile Selassie I had RAF planes drop payloads of bombs against Tigrayan villagers (as he did when he was confronted with peasant uprisings in other parts of the country, such as Gojjam). That planted the seeds of a smouldering antagonism that was fueled when the Government’s strict Amharization policy procued a ban against using the Tigrinya language in 1970.
“In my high school class in Agame,” one TPLF veteran of the early 1980s told me, “80% of the students supported TPLF, the rest were for EPRP.” This groundswell of sentiment led in two directions, however. One group (TLF) wanted to press the claims of a greater Tigray (Tigray-Tigrini), uniting Tigrinya-speakers from Eritrea with the province. The other group organized itself politically and ideologically through the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. It conjoined the principle of class struggle with that of self-determination of nationalities. Like other radicals of the day, they appropriated the myth that Ethiopia was the invention of Minelik in order to legitimate the independence of Eritrea, and the principle of self-determination within Ethiopia.
This ethno-Marxist sentiment drove the most ambitious elements of the TPLF movement. It led those who took political control of the TPLF to turn against Tigrayan political elements who did not support Eritrean independence. Before long that led, evidence suggests, to a policy of liquidating those elements. Tigray became, survivors of those horrific years aver, a “killing field.” According to many reports, which must be investigated further by future historians, Tigrayan civilians were slaughtered right and left–in many cases following gruesome torture, according to eye witnesses. Rumors of mass graves in the surroundings of Ghinem in Welkait Tsegede as well as in other parts of Tigray, if confirmed, would support such reports.
Like many idealistic youth of their generation, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray felt empowered by the seductive morsels of Marxian ideology–unaware of the wise pronouncements of the young Marx himself that communism like other narrow doctrines was a dangerous “dogmatic abstraction.”
Coupled with the new dogmatic abstraction about Ethiopia as an invention of Minilek, it became a heady brew that induced the committed TPLF ethno-Marxists to murder great numbers of civilians and to perpetrate slanders against Amharas and Ethiopian patriots. One veteran of those killings confesses that when he told another, early in the fighting “the number of people we have killed thus far has reached 10,000,” his comrade replied: “So what, Red China had to kill a million people in order to become victorious.” Attitudes of that sort, be it noted, were shared by other Ethiopian revolutionaries of the time.
It is possible, then, that accusations of genocide against Medsfin Wolde Mariam and other defendants may reflect something else. They may represent a wish to disavow the crimes against Tigrayans which the TPLF in its days of struggle felt it had to commit. The current leadership has changed a good deal since those impassioned days. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had strenuously disavowed the tenets of his early ideological commitments as early as 1990, arguing that what he wanted was a chance for the peoples of Ethiopia to decide their fate from the bottom up, not from the top down. The EPRDF has given up most of the doctrines of Leninism and insists that it wants to move Ethiopia in the direction of democratization. In recent months it has taken steps toward reforming parliamentary procedures, press legislation, and the Election Board. The nationalist sentiments evoked by the 1998-2000 campaign against Eritrea produced some recognition that behere etyopiya was not so fictitious after all. The old warriors may regret the misery they caused in their determined rise to power. They now insist that they want to get beyond a politics of violence.
There is much that they and the whole country can do to accomplish that. The Government commands the allegiance of cadres of Agazi troops–uncompassionate, socially isolated cadres who owe their existence to the TPLF, and who can be mobilized in an instant to inflict terrible cruelties behind the scenes. For the former TPLF leadership to embrace Ethiopian nationhood fully it will do well to insist on an impartial and transparent investigation of the actions of its security forces–at Dedessa, in Tigray, and in the streets and alleys of Addis Ababa. The current Government of Ethiopia demands that those currently indicted be held accountable for any crimes they committed by inciting illegal actions against the Ethiopian state, if such can be proven in court––even though, on the question of incitement to ethnic violence, it is doubtful that there can be credible evidence to convict the CUD leaders. Beyond that, the Government must also be vigilant in monitoring excesses of ethnic vilification. In Tigray since the election, a few people circulate the warning, “Amharotch temelsu seltan intehizu iqetleke iyu naya’aharte sheate amat qalsi behama yiteref”–if the Amhara return to power, they will kill you all and your seventeen-year struggle will have been in vain.” Surely that is something that can be discouraged.
Decades of suffering from destructive political conflicts can be ended, especially now that Ethiopia’s security is threatened on all borders. It should now be possible again to view Adwa, not as a symbol of irrendentist particularism but once again as the triumph of multiethnic Ethiopianism, when 100,000 troops from dozens of ethnic groups fought together behind every important chief from all over the country–Ras Alula, Ras Mengesha, and Ras Sibhat of Tigray; Dejazmatch Bahta of Akale Guzae; Wag Shum Guangul of Lasta; Ras Mikael of Wallo; Negus Takla-Haymanot of Gojjam; Ras Gobena and Dejazmatch Balcha of the Mecha Oromo; Ras Wele of the Yejju Oromo; Fitawrari Tekla of Wollega; Ras Makonnen of Harar; as well as Ras Gebeyehu (who died fighting at Adwa) and Ras Abate of Shoa. Minister Fisseha Ashgedom, an early TPLF loyalist, talks proudly now of the role his grandfather Dejazmatch Tessema played in the battle of Adwa. The Adwa victory became and remains the most outstanding symbol of what, a half-century later, a British colonel would describe as the “mysterious magnetism†that holds Ethiopia together. This is a magnetism that will outlast the petty particularisms and personal ambitions that became so virulent under the ethno-Marxist ideologues of the 1970s and 1980s.
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TO my readers:
As noted in my introduction to Part I, “Portions of this piece might open old wounds. Please consider my point of view: that these old wounds were never properly healed and continue to spill toxins into Ethiopia’s body politic today.
Please know, also, that in this as in all previous Getzotch, I do not claim to have the absolute truth. That is never a proper claim to be made by scholars in general and in particular for anyone rash enough to make statements about Ethiopia.”
The full series can be accessed at www.eineps.org/forum.
I would like to add my voice to the ongoing debate and exchange over the creation by some opposition parties of a coalition titled “Alliance for Freedom and Democracy.†The initiative has generated a chain of diverse, contradictory, and sometimes heated reactions, ranging from surprise to outright support and rejection. Unsurprisingly, TPLF supporters reject or downplay the alliance, arguing that it is unnatural. For them, the alliance cannot last because it can never overcome the incompatibility between the CUDP’s and OLF’s political agendas. Among the supporters, there are those who show some anxiety: they demand for more clarification as to the political program of the alliance; in particular, they would like to know whether the OLF has abandoned its secessionist goal. Those who fully support the agreement do so because they consider it as a significant advancement on the democratic road. It shows the choice of resolving conflicts, however serious they may be, through the democratic process rather than through imposition. Moreover, they see such an alliance as the best way to shorten Meles’s regime by effectively countering his divide and rule policy.
These are all valid reasons for supporting AFD, but they fall short of indicating the social dynamics that pressured the CUDP and the OLF into reaching such an agreement. When agreements occur between political parties that exhibit great disparity both in terms of ideology and political programs, we must suspect that they are involved in a strategic planning projecting some substantial gains, if not final victory. I maintain that the May election, its results, and the shortsighted crackdown of the Meles regime combined to bring about the new strategic thinking.
In the eyes of the CUDP, if there is one thing that the election results confirmed beyond any doubt is that the party is not only the most powerful force of opposition, but also a national force. The ethnic ideology and political structure of the Meles regime was shaken, not by other ethnic parties, but by a party transcending ethnic organizations and ethnic political agenda. This was nothing short of a renewal of Ethiopian nationalism, the very one that organizations, such as the EPRP, the MEISON, and even the Derg, had represented, it is true inconsistently, after the collapse of the imperial regime. The essential result of the May election is, therefore, the official consecration of a strong national party.
The emergence of a strong national party explains the alliance. So long as the CUDP enjoys the support of a large number of Ethiopians, ethnic parties, including the OLF, which claims to represent the largest ethnic group, need not be excluded. Instead, they should be co-opted into the democratic process, which is unlikely to result in any secessionist outcome, given the unbroken and unbreakable presence of Ethiopian nationalism, henceforth incarnated by a tangible organization. What the alliance expresses is the self-confidence of the CUDP, self-confidence that emerged from the May election.
The overwhelming victory of the CUDP in the Addis Ababa election denotes its national stature, obvious as it is that the composition of the capital city is a sample of Ethiopia’s class and ethnic diversities. Had the CUDP operated in conditions free of the restrictions of the TPLF in the rest of the country, an appreciable number of people would have given their support. The strength of the CUDP came from its economic agenda, which set off nothing less than an alliance between various classes, all equally frustrated by the ethnic oligarchy controlling power and wealth in Ethiopia.
For its part, the OLF agreed to form the alliance because of the understanding that a national force has indeed emerged. To ignore the CUDP would be tantamount to saying that nothing new has happened in Ethiopia. Something great did happen: for the first time, a government was defeated through an electoral process, an event that invited political parties to serious revisions under pain of becoming irrelevant. Not to take account of the outcomes offered no other alternative than the endorsement of the disruption of the democratic process. One such outcome is the CUDP. And the more the TPLF attacked and imprisoned CUDP leaders, the more the party appeared as the true opposition to an increasing number of Ethiopians, including the Oromo. The crackdown only succeeds in expanding the identification of Ethiopians with the CUDP.
Let us go further. The OLF knows that by itself it will never threaten the TPLF regime. The need for alliance is flagrant; so is the fact that the CUDP is the only force that can seriously challenge the TPLF. Herein lies the puzzle. Given the CUDP’s political agenda, people rightly wonder whether the alliance means that the OLF has given up its main goal. If yes, the sacrifice does not seem worthwhile, since the OLF could have obtained a similar arrangement with the TPLP. That is why many Ethiopians suspect that the OLF is not sincere, that the agreement is simply a tactic to get rid of the TPLF so as to realize its secessionist goal.
Again, these interrogations fail to take into account the watershed created by the May election. Because the CUDP represents a large and inclusive movement, it alone is able to play the democratic game, thanks to which the OLF thinks of emerging as a major force. To the extent that the TPLF represents the sectarian interests of a few ethnicized cliques, it cannot play by democratic rules, all the more so now that the May election definitively took away from its leaders the illusion that most peasants and suppressed ethnic groups support their system. In other words, for the first time, the OLF saw the possibility of a genuine democratic process in Ethiopia. With the claim to represent the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the OLF could no longer push aside this unique opportunity. The opportunity does not necessarily mean secession; what it does mean is a concrete possibility for the Oromo to finally gain the real place they deserve in Ethiopia.
For both of them, then, alliance appeared as a win-win solution. If my analysis is correct, that is, if both the CUDP and the OLF agreed because of their respective confidence in the democratic process, then misgivings about the alliance should wither away in favor of support. As I have already indicated in various articles, behind the ethnicization of politics in Ethiopia there is nothing but elite conflicts. A perfect illustration of this is the paradox of the ethnicization of Tigrean educated elite. I say “paradox†because Tigray, the birth place of the Kibre Negast, is the source of Ethiopian nationalism.
For the purpose of dismantling the Showan hegemony and mobilizing popular support, a sector of the Tigrean educated elite baptized Tigray a nation even though no records exist that even remotely allude to a time when Tigray existed outside Ethiopia. Once the defeat of the Derg achieved, we saw the TPLF leadership easing itself into the position of new ruling elite. To give a lasting guarantee to their rule, the new rulers designed and applied the system of ethnic federalism. The system had one defect, but a colossal one: it could assure the persistence of the TPLF rule only by going against democracy, especially by holding down the two largest ethnic groups, namely, the Oromo and the Amhara.
This exclusion was reason enough for both ethnic groups to come together earlier, but mutual suspicion and, especially, the lack of democratic institutions did not create a situation where they could say that an alliance is worth trying. It is imperative to understand that this alliance cannot hurt in any way the Tigrean people without losing its democratic essence. On the other hand, as a minority group, the best way for the Tigrean people to protect their legitimate rights is to fully participate in the democratic process, and they cannot do so unless they champion, once more, Ethiopian nationalism. Otherwise, the attempt to have a special status leads nowhere but to supporting directly Meles’s rhetoric of accusing the CUDP of anti-Tigrean feelings, nay, of genocide.
Once this demonizing stand is adopted, I see no other way out than ethnic confrontations, which will benefit no one, certainly not the Tigrean elite. The fact that Meles’s repressive method seems to prevail should not blind us to the fact that the regime can survive only by developing a system of government akin to the defunct apartheid regime in South Africa. Participation in this malefic design will kill Tigray as we know and admire it. By the way, I don’t exclude the possibility of nationalist and farsighted Tigreans finally coming together and doing what is necessary to resume the interrupted democratic process.
The way out is clear enough: understand ethnicity for what it is, namely, not so much incompatibility between peoples as expression of elite conflicts, and you will see that democracy is its most elegant and final solution. The struggle for and the establishment of a genuine system of power-sharing should announce the decline of ethnicization. Such a decline means the emergence of a win-win situation for everybody, for the Oromo, the Amhara, the Tigreans, the Somali, etc. Only under the protection of unity or Ethiopian nationalism does diversity lend itself to democratic treatment.
There is an unwritten rule in an autocratic society that the news and other information disseminated must be sanitized to paint the government in a positive light. Furthermore other sources of information have to either be reduced to being a non-factor or being banned all together.
Since the 17th of May websites that have been critical of the Ethiopian Government have not been accessible to their readers in Ethiopia. This includes the sites that are hosted on blogspot.com. Despite the fact that there has been no official word from the authorities in Addis Ababa it is widely accepted that this is an effort at censorship and not a technical glitch.
There have been some major internal problems in Ethiopia in Recent months. A highly controversial election has had two major results. First there were violent street protests that left dozens of people killed and the other and potentially the most damning is the treason trial of members of the Opposition that sit in Parliament that refused to take their duly elected seats after the results of the election.
The Group Reporters Without Borders recently sent a letter to the Ethiopian Minister of Information seeking clarification into this Matter. It stated in the letter that “Preventing debate and controlling news and information circulating online will only aggravate an already very tense political climate.â€Â
The letter also made the statement that blocking access to the server has the effect of censoring all of the publications hosted on the site. Most of these sites do not deal with either Politics or Ethiopia in that matter. But the Government feels that it needs to take this action to control the flow of information.
This is not the only country in Africa where there are concerted efforts to limit the flow of information. There are serious efforts to limit the flow of information on the web notably this occurs in Zimbabwe and the DRC. But the efforts in Zimbabwe may be the proper comparison into the effort to limit the free flow of Information. Once again Freedom has taken a shot. But will its defenders rise to the task of defending it?
_______________________________ The Author comments on US Policy and Human Rights in Africa. He can be contacted at [email protected]
Should Jean-Bedel Bokassa (the former butcher of Central African Republic) sit in judgment of Idi Amin Dada? The drama of one dictator convicting another of genocide is currently underway in Ethiopia.
On Tuesday, May 23 Meles Zenawi has promised to deliver the final verdict for his predecessor, the butcher Mengistu Haile Mariam. And Meles wants the world to think better of him for doing so.
“Mengistu Haile Mariam, accused of a 17-year reign of terror in Ethiopia, faces a long-awaited genocide verdict on Tuesday in a sign of Africa’s new resolve to bring ex-leaders to account for past abuses,†writes Tsegaye Taddesse in a May 21, 2006 Reuters dispatch from Addis Ababa.
Is what the Ethiopian government doing a “sign of Africa’s new resolve to bring ex-leaders to account for past abuses†or is it a cruel manipulation of public opinion to divert attention from Ethiopia’s current crisis?
Why did it take the government of Prime Minister Zenawi 15 years to try and convict Mengistu and company? Ethiopians who suffered under the murderous Mengistu regime wanted justice a long time ago. Why the delay and why now?
The answer may have a lot to do with Ethiopia’s troubled present than redressing past grievances.
Ethiopia’s ruling Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has been acting like a wounded animal in the wake of the disputed 2005 elections. Feeling the wrath of an angry population that has rejected its rule, the minority government is willing to go to any length to stay in power. It has killed upwards of 100
civilians and arrested thousands since June 2005 alone.
Those in jail include the top leaders of the main opposition party, journalists and civil society leaders. To intimidate his opponents and stamp out all opposition, Prime Minister Zenawi has hurled ridiculous accusations of genocide against his
political opponents.
The timing and the manner of reporting of the Mengistu genocide verdict are curious.
The Ethiopian government expelled competent foreign
correspondents such as Anthony Mitchell of the Associated Press and threw dozens of domestic journalists in jail, shutting the avenue for any sort of critical reporting. It has turned instead to carefully cultivated, compliant locals such as Tsegaye Taddesse who lend wire service legitimacy to an
otherwise clear-cut disinformation campaign.
Ethiopia’s government is deeply reliant on international begging to support a kleptocratic tribal patronage system, a bloated bureaucracy and an extensive security apparatus.
Zenawi’s turn towards tyranny has not sat well with donors. Many donors have withdrawn direct budget support and tightened the strings.
While putting up a brave face, the Zenawi government is already feeling the pinch. Foreign exchange reserves have dwindled; gasoline prices have almost doubled; the price of basic commodities have gone up and the government is reportedly having difficulty paying salaries in regions outside Addis Ababa.
The TPLF government’s response to these challenges is to go on propaganda offensive to confuse the issue. In the face of famine and increasingly crushing poverty, they claim fantastic “growth†rates that put China to shame.
The so-called verdict of Mengistu coming at this time also appears to be part of the propaganda offensive. Zenawi and associates are clinging to power partly out of fear of being held responsible for looting and terrorizing a nation of 77 million people for the last 15 years.
From the massacre of over 400 Anuaks in Gambella in 2003 to the June and November 2005 killing of innocent civilians, there is a substantial body of evidence implicating Zenawi and associates in crimes against humanity.
The current charade makes one wonder who the TPLF has for advisors. Their desperate drama can only remind the world the need for holding the current leaders accountable for their crimes.
After all, the day Zenawi will be judged by his successors may not be far away. Mengistu fled the country leaving all his comrades behind to rot in jail. There may be a lesson here for TPLF operatives.
When the chips are down, their capo too may flee to a foreign safe haven on an American helicopter. They will be the ones left holding the bag and facing justice. One hopes it does not take 15 years for justice to be meted out when their turn comes.
The writer, an Ethiopian analyst residing in the US, can be reached at [email protected]
May 15, 2005 was marked by an extraordinarily large voter turnout for an unprecedentedly open multi-party election. As we know, the sweetness of that event turned sour; a year later, we suffer from its traumatic aftermath. From the perspective of a caring observer, I propose to take stock of the situation, to ask all to acknowledge possible mistakes, to express appreciation for what has been done, and to begin a year of constructive efforts toward national development and further development.
Let me start with my own deeds and mistakes.
During visits to Ethiopia in January and February of this year, I was able to mediate some communication between the Kaliti prisoners and the Prime Minister; to help secure medical help for some of the prisoners; to discuss with the Prime Minister ideas for furthering democratization and economic development; and to help establish in Awassa a peace center for youth which MP/Professor Beyene Petros described as offering a “novel approach to peace making in this troubled land.â€Â
At the same time, I made a number of mistakes. I said things at various points that upset a number of Ethiopians whom I count as my friends. This led them to accuse me of being a stooge of the EPRDF, an enemy of Tigrayans, an ill-informed partisan of the opposition, and in one case even “the number one enemy of the Ethiopian people.” If I had expressed myself more carefully, some if not all of those hurt reactions could have been avoided.
Let me now mention some achievements and mistakes made by the EPRDF regime, the opposition parties, and the EU observers.
In contrast to previous elections, the EPRDF regime made efforts to offer opposition parties access to the public media. They also took the initiative to invite a number of international observers to monitor the elections. Despite their perception that certain CUD leaders had conspired to change the government by unconstitutional means, the EPRDF leadership encouraged them to take their seats in Parliament and thereby secure immunity against charges. And when CUD electees failed to do what was necessary to take over the administration of Addis Ababa, they extended the deadline for such accession more than once.
On the other hand, the government sent away some of the legitimate election observers. They made a rash decision to impose martial law the very evening of Election Day. The provocative event at Addis Ababa University that led to the first violence in early June was not investigated. Their security forces reacted too extremely to post-Election protests, when government security forces killed or wounded a great number of innocent civilians. They escalated antagonism with dangerous statements likening the opposition to genocidal forces elsewhere in Africa.
In contrast to previous elections virtually all the opposition parties participated in the 2005 election. They thereby set a wonderful precedent for future engagement in the national political process. They also showed statesmanship in their decision not to make resolving the disputes over contested seats a precondition for their participation in the Parliament.
On the other hand, to the detriment of that process, some winning opposition candidates cut their participation short. They refused to take the seats in Parliament to which they had been duly elected, despite the unanimous judgment of two public meetings in July with the most educated and mature elements in their constituency that they should do so. They refused to assume their official responsibilities for governing the city of Addis Ababa. They called for protest actions in November that led to the deaths of several civilians and policemen.
Some of those who refused to take their seats in Parliament are now in prison. Insofar as anything they did was actually in violation of the law, I believe it important to respect the forms of a systematic, independent–and, we hope, speedy–judicial review of their deeds as a step toward advancing the role of an independent judiciary in this country. On the other hand, following the trial and its outcomes they should publicly and officially be encouraged to rejoin the national political process.
It is important, finally, to acknowledge the contributions of all those Ethiopians and foreign observers who undertook the arduous task of serving as observers in that historic election. To be sure, some members of the European Observers Election group erred by rushing to judgment prematurely and otherwise acting in an unprofessional way, committing violations of their code of conduct which officers of the EU subsequently acknowledged. Those actions had significant adverse consequences for the aftermath of the election, for which I believe Ethiopian citizens have had to pay an enormous price.
It is understandable that each of the parties holds on to the injuries suffered in this complicated historic episode. My recommendation would be to follow the example of forgiveness that Ethiopian leaders have traditionally shown to those who harmed them. All must forgive, because the nation must move on.
Ethiopians must work together to face their daunting challenges: poverty and unemployment; food insecurity and famines (see Getz #6); poor and insufficient education; distressingly inadequate medical care; inter-ethnic conflicts; environmental degradation; and cultural renewal. Ethiopia must strengthen her position as a voice for peace and stability in one of the most tragically conflicted regions of the globe. These great challenges require the collaboration of Ethiopians of every ethnic and religious background and every political persuasion, including numerous fellow citizens in the Diaspora.
Despite the upsurge of ethnic politics in the past generation, it is abundantly clear that the bonds of Etyopiyawinet are alive and well. Indeed, they may in many quarters be stronger than ever. I salute the people of Ethiopia for maintaining those bonds and for carrying on with their traditional attachment to justice, their cheerfulness in adversity, and their determination to carry on. I say with all my heart: Idme le-hulatchu, idme le-Etyopiya!!
