The Conflict in Northern Ethiopia
By Imiru Zeleke
January 1999
It is now nine months since the TPLF-EPLF border conflict has begun. The TPLF side has accepted all the suggested solutions—including the presence of military observers—made by the OAU mediation team and endorsed by the U.S., the EU and the OAU general council.
In the meantime, the Ethiopian people—duped by TPLF propaganda and a confused patriotic euphoria—have contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to a war that is unlikely to benefit anyone.
a) It is evident that the EPLF, with the contrived consent of some members of the TPLF or by sheere blackmail, is trying to obtain internationally recognized new borders to legitimize further its independence, and gain special economic and political rights over Ethiopia. In doing so, the Eritreans will have earned the everlasting suspicion and enmity of the Ethiopian people. The absurdity of the EPLF claim is that, having achieved independence, they want back all the political and economic rights Eritreans had when their country was an integral part of Ethiopia.
b) For the TPLF this will mean a terrible destruction of their power base in Tigray and the complete erosion of their power hold on Ethiopia; since they cannot win the war by themselves, without the support of the rest of the Ethiopian population, a fact that the TPLF have not missed in espousing their new-born Ethiopian nationalism. While shamelessely ignoring the crimes they themselves are committing against the Ethiopian people, of whom the thirteen thousand prisoners of conscience are a living example. Whatever the outcome of the conflict, they will be losers.
c) For Ethiopia, quite apart for the tragic and criminal waste of human lives that will occur, it will be another regressive blow to its frail state of development.
In terms of the aspirations, interests and needs of the people of Ethiopia and and the whole region, the real reason for the conflict still escapes some reasonable rationale. Obviously, the root causes of the conflict are the greedy and senseless ambitions of the two minority political groups on how to exploit the rest of Ethiopia. Eventually, both will lose tremendously from any armed conflict. Neither side has the resources or the political stability to help recover from the devastation that will be caused by such war.
The 11-point proposals made by the OAU, endorsed by the U.S. and EU, and accepted by the TPLF regime, includes a new “demarcation of the borders.” Does that mean that the existing borders are not legitimate anymore? Or that once the EPLF has withdrawn from those areas it occupies in Tigray (Badma, Shiraro, Zalambessa) the TPLF is willing to cede other areas to the EPLF—for instance, in Setit Umera and Afar territories? Furthermore, the proposals prescribe the “creation of conditions conducive to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict.” Which means what?
In Ouagadougou, Issayas told the conciliation committee that the areas he has occupied within Tigray were “worthless, not even fit to sustain animals life,” that the committee should concentrate instead on the “overall Ethio/Eritrean relations.” What does he want? And what are the intentions of the TPLF when it agrees a priori to negotiate on these broad and very vague terms?
Basically, Eritrea has never been of vital interest for the rest of Ethiopia. The primary reasons for Ethiopia’s revendication of Eritrea were matters of historical legitimacy and geopolitical considerations, rather than economic factors. Historical legitimacy, because the whole area was an integral part of Ethiopia since antiquity and parcel of its birthplace as a nation. Geo-political, because: a) it was the historical access of Ethiopia to the outside world; and b) a matter of security, for all attempts of foreign invasion came through that part of the country. However, the most determining factor of all was the manifest desire of the majority of the people of Eritrea to rejoin their motherland, after sixty years of ruthless colonial rule. Otherwise, Eritrea was not an absolutely essential element for the survival of the rest of Ethiopia, whose overall human and material resources are infinitely greater than those of Eritrea. It is clear that today Eritrea has little intrinsic value for Ethiopia. Its economic input has always been marginal and politically it has been more of a troublesome burden than a factor of peace and stability for the rest of Ethiopia. The development and continued survival of the port of Assab depends entirely on Ethiopian commercial traffic. In addition, the political, social, cultural and economic ties of the Afar region is with central Ethiopia. Although the area was integrated forcibly with the rest of Eritrea by the colonial power, due to its geographic position it has never been a functional part of Eritrea. The so-called infrastructural developments that occurred in Eritrea during the colonial era were strictly of military and strategic nature. They were undertaken in the early 1930s, as part of Italy’s military preparations for the war against Ethiopia. A war in which Eritrea in the North and Somalia in the South served in 1935 as springboards for the invasion. Prior to that period, Eritrea was a small colonial outpost which Italy kept as a matter of prestige rather than as an exploitable source of wealth or a migration area. After the successful invasion of Ethiopia, the Italians did not make an independent unit of Eritrea. It was simply integrated with Ethiopia as an administrative entity— a governatorato—within the Italian colonial empire.
Moreover, during the colonial era, and particularly in the past six decades, almost one third of the Eritrean population migrated to Ethiopia for its livelihood. The mass migration of Eritreans towards the south began with the Italian invasion when two to three thousand Eritreans came to Ethiopia as colonial troops, helpers and family members. Since then, the migration has continued because of the many opportunities Ethiopia offered and thereafter because of the deliberate efforts made by the Imperial Government to cement further the union, by extending to Eritreans special advantages in employment, education and so forth. Eritreans were not asked to establish their identity. It was considered their birthright to move, make a living and prosper freely within Ethiopia. If, according to the new mythology, Eritrea had been developed and flourishing under Italian colonialism, the migration would have been the reverse—from Ethiopia to Eritrea. The recent post-independence period has proven again that Eritrean independence depends heavily on Ethiopia’s economic and market resources. Such being the realities, what does the comprehensive settlements imply, other than giving more concessions and special rights to Eritreans? Over those of Ethiopian citizens?
Those who believe in an eventual armed conflict rest their assumption on the uncompromising demand of the people of Tigray for the return of the border areas occupied by the EPLF. A premise of little value since Issayas does not attach much value to these areas, and would be willing to give them up if he can get what he is really after. However, at this point in time, events seem to have acquired a life of their own. The dispute has overtaken bitter rhetoric and reached levels that will render difficult present negotiations and future relations.
Ignominies and illegal measures taken by both regimes against each other’s citizens are not conducive to good neighborly relations for people who are, historically and geographically, destined to condemned to interact and live next to each other. Expelling indiscriminately each other’s citizens and expropriating their property is a reprehensible act of vandalism, which no law abiding and self-respecting government would commit. Some self-serving aspects of these measures are particularly repulsive. However, considering all the negative turns that have developed since the beginning of the crisis, I think that the solution to this tragic charade might occur by default rather than what was intended.
With regard the TPLF, we must remember that the regime in Ethiopia has gained absolute political power. TPLF cadres occupy all key positions from the centeral government to the lowest sub-district level. Furthermore, it has re-nationalized all rural and urban land, over which it has full control. Directly and indirectly through proxy companies, it also controls or owns the major sectors of the economy. In a country where 86% percent of the population is engaged in farming for its livelihood, the TPLF exercises tremendous political clout, especially when it comes to forcing the population to vote in its favor and rigging the elections. Therefore, the underlying truth about the crisis is that the TPLF wants to keep the lion’s share of the loot. However, as the broad majority of the Ethiopian population is hostile to its rule, it would not be farfetched to think that the TPLF is willing to make any kind of deal with the EPLF, as long as it can maintain its political and economic grip on Ethiopia. Hence, we shouldn’t be surprised if a deal is worked out despite the loud war cries.
For instance, they maybe thinking of a renewed alliance or even a confederation with Eritrea. An internationally recognized and US/EU supported alliance with the EPLF would not be such a bad deal for the TPLF. The EPLF will maintain its sovereignty and independence, with the right to exploit Ethiopia to its heart’s content. The credulous Ethiopian public will be manipulated with the usual propaganda and the TPLF might even get some credit for reuniting the renegade province with its motherland. If the arrangement doesn’t work, the formula of confederation might even be extended to the other Kilils, thus insuring the disintegration of Ethiopia for good. Anyway, if it were not for the wealth that they siphon from the country, the proclaimed goal of both TPLF and EPLF has always been the breakup of Ethiopia. However exaggerated the above scenario may appear, it is not improbable.
Ultimately, the question is: Is Ethiopia to become a TPLF/EPLF condominium? A protectorate? Or simply a fiefdom of the two totalitarian masters? The question we must ask ourselves is: What are we to do to save the country and its people from being exploited by gun toting minority political gangs? Or from being dismantled into unstable and unviable mini states?
I still believe that the present crisis is an Ethiopian ‘internal’ matter, and one of the many problems to be solved to insure our existence as a nation. Eritrean independence was an act accomplished by force of arms, with the official and active support of the TPLF regime. It was “validated” by a referendum in which the Ethiopian people had no voice. The claimed 99% of Eritrean votes for session also remains doubtful, since it was made under conditions where no other views were allowed. For instance, according to official figures, out of the 530 thousands Eritreans living within Ethiopia, only 130 thousand registered for the referendum. Although the EPLF and TPLF each are doing their best to cement the permanent division of the two Ethiopian entities, the fact is that we are bound to live together as brothers and good neighbors. We have to coexist not only with Eritreans but also with Somalis, Sudanese, Kenyans and other people of our continent. The lack of vision and petty village mentality of our so-called leaders is not what the Ethiopian ethos is, or has been, all about.
I would like to suggest to the Eritreans to stop listening to their myth-makers about their glorious colonial past, because there wasn’t any. Admittedly, hideous crimes were committed by the Derg in Eritrea. But they were also committed in Ethiopia. Many Eritreans were also members of the Derg, many others prospered in other fields of endeavor during that era. Some had high ranking positions within the Derg and the ruling party Vice-Premier, generals, chief of staff, ambassadors and so on. To some degree, the guilt must be shared by all. If the EPLF wants independence for Eritrea, so be it. But they cannot maintain it by bullying and blackmailing others.
Some fervent patriots are highly alarmed by the present conflict. They believe that Ethiopia is in danger of disappearing and that we have to defend it at all costs. Fortunately, that is not the case. To manifest such an overwhelming fear of the EPLF is a measure of one’s lack of self confidence, and to underestimate the strength and the resilience of the Ethiopian people. We have overcome graver crises and bigger enemies in the past. The enduring fact is that unless we get rid of those “political gangs” that are exploiting us for their own selfish aims, we will never come out of the quagmire of poverty and backwardness in which we exist. We should erase from our minds and our sub-conscious of the atavistic notions we have about our past governance. As free men and women, individually and collectively, we have to be deliberate in our commitments and about what we want best for our country.
This crisis has actually created an excellent opportunity for all of us to get our act together. So far all attempts for national reconciliation have failed. Evidently, the TPLF is not willing to concede anything to an opposition which it considers weak and not a threat to its rule. We must set up a strong and broadly based national political front and a program that has the consensus of the nation. We must assume the responsibility and make the necessary sacrifices to save our country. If we pull our human and material resources together, and we can and shall make miracles.
In conclusion, I would like to say to all my fellow Ethiopians “it is our house, let us put it in order.” Our people are poor and desperately handicapped by ignorance, disease and bad governance. It is only if we stand and work together that we can achieve the freedom and peace under which we can survive and prosper.
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Imru Zelleke is a former Ethiopian ambassador to Germany and France. He is now a spokesperson of Ethiopian Democratic Action League and resides in Washington DC.