How Meles helped Issayas build his Air Force
By Dula Abdu
January 1999
Before the Badme conflict, Meles Zenawi systematically dismantled the Ethiopian Air Force (EAF), while assisting in the building of the Eritrean Air Force. Meles put at the disposal of Eritrea, Ethiopian assets, planes, equipment, missile defense systems, personnel and information. This enabled Issayas Afeworki’s regime in Eritrea to construct a formidable air force, almost reaching parity with Ethiopia. Before 1991, Ethiopia was taunted as having one of the most advanced air power in Africa.
Meles sent Ethiopian pilots and instructors to Eritrea to help build the fledgling Eritrean Air Force. Among those sent include Lt. Col. Tadesse Muluneh and others. It’s alleged that the pilots who bombed Adigrat and Mekele were Ethiopian trained pilots, since Mengistu HaileMariam phased out Eritreans from the EAF training program since the early 80s.
Meles made sure that recent recruits were mainly of Eritrean and Tigrean origin. Some of the Eritreans are now manning and maintaining the Eritrean air force that is now attacking Ethiopia. According to reliable sources, over 75% of the new recruits were Eritreans and Tigreans. This was true also among those sent to the U.S. for training in places like the Kelly Air Force base in San Antonio, Texas. Now, a large number of these recruits are in Asmera.
During the Yemen-Eritrean conflict, Meles sent a squadron and various anti-aircraft missile and radar system to Eritrea to defend Asmera from Yemeni fighter planes. Those assets were never returned to Ethiopia.
Meles Zenawi’s desire to build the Eritrean air force was based on the premise that Issayas was a more reliable ally to TPLF than the majority of Ethiopians. Meles saw Issayas as his protector and ally in case of an uprising or a revolt by any group in Ethiopia. Consequently, Meles saw it fit to accommodate and support the building of the Eritrean air force while systematically dismantling the EAF.
Ethiopian planes, missile defense systems, information on personnel, equipment, codes and other critical components in the making of one of the most advanced air force in Africa prior to 1991 were transferred to Eritrea without question.
The destroying of an air force
Before 1991, Ethiopia had one of the strongest air force in Africa. Why did the TPLF want to destroy it? The decimation of the Ethiopian Air Force by Meles was systematic and deliberate. As usual, Meles saw the air force as part of a viable Ethiopian institution, vital to its existence, pride and integrity. That created a threat to Meles who saw no glory in having a formidable Ethiopian air force and saw no protection from it.
Meles did not just want to destroy the air force, but also wanted to punish those who stood for Ethiopia’s national integrity such as the air force pilots and technicians. In 1992, TPLF gave Issayas full access to the Ethiopian Air Forces files. After all the files were checked and opened, it was decided that those alive regardless of their age or whereabouts were to be hunted down and thrown into jail, unless they were part of the EPLF spy machinery or supporters or sympathizers of TPLF/EPLF.
Until recently, Meles gave free access to Issayas and his generals not only to physical plants, but also to every file, details and history of every Ethiopian in the Ethiopian armed serves.
Even Meles, who was to become the head of government in Ethiopia in 1991, did not see the need to preserve the air force. This was primarily due to his attachment to narrow Tigrean nationalism and the air force symbolized Ethiopian nationalism, unity, pride. Besides Meles’s hate for Ethiopia and its institutions, he had deep sympathy for Eritrean cause and its preservation and EAF was a threat to that.
Meles was uncomfortable to assume the new mantle as the head of Ethiopian government. He was full of anger at Ethiopia and what it stood for. For Meles, Ethiopia represented the tentacle of an empire that needed major surgery in the form acceptable to him and to Issayas and to end Ethiopian hegemony on Tigray and Eritrea.
In a typical civil war the victors usually show magnanimity and rehabilitate their old foes in order to reconcile and bring the nation together. To the contrary, Meles’s intention seemed to destroy and to punish his so-called enemies, the Ethiopian people. The victors of the Nigerian civil war, the victors of the American civil war and other conflicts had shown great magnanimity instead of showing revenge or destroying vital parts of previous institutions or further alienating the defeated sector.
Recently, I had a chance to talk to former EAF officers residing in the U.S. The following information is based on that communication.
Meles imprisoned the following officers under the instruction of Issayas for duty they performed some of them under HaileSelassie’s regime and even before the rise of EPLF in Eritrea. The list of imprisoned for performing their duty on behalf of Ethiopia in Eritrea include generals, colonels and a captain. They are: Brig. Gen. Mesfin Haile, Asmera Air Force Commander; Brig. Gen. Ashenafi G. Tsadick, Commander of Operations; Brig. Gen. Techane Mesfin, Ministry of Defense, Operation Chief (released); Brig. Gen. HaileMichael Biru, Deputy Air Force Commander; Maj. Gen. Alemayehu Agonafir, Air Force Commander; Col. Ambatchew Wube, former fighter, later Antonov captain; Lt. Col. Desalegn Mebrate, MiG 23 bomber pilot; Lt. Col. Lema Tekalegn; Lt. Abayneh Hailu, Junior MiG-21 pilot, POW in Eritrea and was released in 1991; Capt. Kifle Wube, MiG 21 fighter pilot;
The following are some of the former Ethiopian Air Force officers who were working for Issayas.
Capt. Tsegaye Debela, MI-8 captain; Lt. Col. Tadesse Muluneh, MiG-23 instructor, fighter, and regiment commissar; Lt. Marcos, MI-35 fighter helicopter pilot and squadron commander.
Before the TPLF took over, Ethiopia had approximately 100 MiG 21s, 25-30 MiG 23s, 8 MiG-23 Interceptors, 20 MI-24 fighter helicopters, 9 MI-35 fighter Helicopters.
Type of equipments in the stockpiles of the Ethiopian Air Force prior to the TPLF takeover included anti-air craft guns and air defense missiles. Approximately ten divisions was in Eritrea (close to 150,000 Ethiopian soldiers). Plus Asmera was a stockpiling center. Most of the equipment was left at the disposal of EPLF.
The following civilian employees were arrested from the Ethiopian Airlines for their service at the EAF. Most of them retired before the TPLF came into existence. The majority of these Ethiopian airline employees are imprisoned by the order of Issayas Afeworki:
Col. Berhane Meskel, MI-24 fighter helicopter instructor, later C-130 pilot; Col. Teka Mekonnen, Antonov pilot, later C-130 pilot; Col. Tigneh Woldegiorgis, F-5 pilot, most experienced senior pilot and over 10 years of at EAL; Col. Birhane Wubneh, F-5 pilot, MiG-21 instructor and C-130 pilot at EAL; Col. Birhane Kebede, F-5 pilot, Antonov-12 instructor, C-130 pilot , EAL captain; Col. Gizaw Deriba, former Asmera AFB commander, MiG-23 pilot, C-130 pilot; Col. Asmare Getahun, MiG 23, Antonov 12, and C-130 pilot, equipment commander; Col. Kassaye Kifle, MI-24 pilot, Antonov 12 pilot and instructor; Col. Tilahun Nebro, MiG 21 instructor; Maj. Bekele Zegee, MI-24 fighter pilot, Twin Otter captain (released);
Habte Tsion Hadgu, the Eritrean Air Force Commander defected from EAF before 1991 and he returned to work for Issayas. After he became head of the Eritrean air force, he had complete access to the EAF files.
Recently, Issayas alleged that he knows as much about the Ethiopian military capability as Meles. As evidence, he said that Ethiopia does not have pilots to fly its existing planes and it’s shopping for pilots in the eastern block countries. It’s amazing that a foreign power has as much knowledge about the inventory of its enemy.
How did Issayas acquired all this information about the capability of the EAF. Let me start with a bit of history and share the plight of EAF personnel under the TPLF. Prior the TPLF takeover of Ethiopia, HabteTsion Hadgu, Air Force Commander of Eritrea, was allowed to take any asset at his pleasure and information. For example, he personally took and flew a MiG-21 to Asmera to celebrate Eritrean “independence” and during the referendum to encourage people to vote for independence.
It’s common knowledge that Issayas and Habte know as much about the quality and quantity of the Ethiopian Air Force, if not more than anybody in Ethiopia. Habte or Issayas were allowed to take any EAF assets at their pleasure and pick and chose which Ethiopian pilot went to jail for fighting EPLF in its guerilla days. Based on that, most of the former Ethiopian pilots active and retired were arrested by gathering files from different bases.
During the TPLF takeover of Ethiopia, 60-66 pilots and technicians defected to Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Yemen using two Antonov and an L-3. The planes were returned to Ethiopia. Tilahun Bezabuh of Bahir Dar is responsible for assisting and for turning some files and getting most of the Ethiopians arrested. He was befriended by Habte and thus became a tool for EPLF in order to implicate and harass current and former Ethiopian pilots by Issayas. For his collaboration, Tilahun was given a job at the Ethiopian Airlines.
After the war broke between Eritrea and Ethiopia Tilahun refused to fight against Issayas and for Meles. He gave an interesting argument for his refusal. He said he is afraid that he might end up in jail if he attacks Eritrea like the other Ethiopians. Tilahun still is regarded a turncoat and a betrayer of his oath and loyalty to his country. His character might have been shaped during his captivity. He was captured during combat by EPLF in late 80s and he was released in 1991. After his release, he joined the TPLF Air Force and subsequently he was rewarded with a posh job with the Ethiopian Airlines, while many Ethiopian Air Force personnel were still languishing in refugee camps in Kenya, Djibouti and some in Uganda. Recently some have returned due to coercion and some voluntarily. Former Ethiopian military personnel were made persona non-grata by the U.S. government thus did not qualify for resettlement programs in other countries including in the U.S.
Victories groups within a nation usually try to heal the wounds and reach out to the opposition for the sake of uniting the country.
No victorious army punished their opponents with brimstone and fire like the TPLF did to the Ethiopian Air Force and the Ethiopian people. This is one of the distinguishing characters of the TPLF. They act like a foreign occupier rather than part of the Ethiopian family. Their scheme was based on destruction not on building bridges or healing the wounds.
The TPLF action might have been motivated by their hate for Ethiopia rather than fear of loosing power to any adversary. Or it might have been shaped by their alleged desire to move to Tigray at the end of their escapade making Ethiopia a disparate nations of tribes or chieftains without common language, economic system or national identity.
Now, Issayas might have foiled their scheme of building up just Tigray at the expense of the rest of Ethiopia. The question is, would they still behave as Ethiopians and start releasing these prisoners arrested under the instruction of Issayas?
Before the TPLF, Ethiopia had one of the strongest Air Force in Africa. Ethiopian Air Force including the Ethiopian Airlines were the envy of Africa. Now, it can not even defend itself against the tiny and emerging Eritrean Air Force, because Meles found it fit for destruction.
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Dula Abdu resides in Houston, Texas.