Remapping a Democratic Path
Petros Toggia
Ethiopian Review, June 1996
The Unconstitutional Constitution
In his latest article, “A New Map for Ethiopia” (ER, Jan-Feb 1997), Professor Tilahun Yilma attempts to historically and geopolitically substantiate his previous arguments for the secession of “Ethiopia” from “Eritrea” and “Tigrai.” However, his latest reflection on Ethiopia’s current politics and past history, as well as his grand political project as a whole, is fraught with theoretical tension, self-contradictions, and historical fallacy. I understand the exigency for such outlandish counter-proposals as programs of political change, such as Tilahun’s, as reactions to EPRDF’s one-party authoritarian rule and its ethnically divisive policies. Yet, I think the political goal ought not be that which is subjectively mapped by Tilahun. I shall submit that such a contradictory proposal is inadequate to be taken as a program for political change.
First, Tilahun invokes the right to secede as stipulated in EPRDF’s constitution as a legally justifiably premise for his programmatic proposal. But on a closer reading of the clauses of the constitution, EPRDF’s authoritarian rule and constitutional interpretation do not permit de jure or de facto secession. According to the clauses of article 39, every nation/nationality has a formal right to self-determination.
Nonetheless, in sub-articles 39 (4) rights of self-determination are exercised under the following conditions: 1) when the legislature of that nation/nationality demands secession by two-thirds vote (4a); where the federal government organizes a referendum on secession for the nation/nationality within three years period (4b); where a simple majority vote through the referendum approves the demand for secession (4c); where the Federal Government transfers power to the legislature of the nation which chose to secede (4d).
What appears here as democratic and permissive about rights of self-determination, on a closer reading is actually restrictive and authoritative. The question then is what if EPRDF’s Federal Government does not organize the referendum on secession upon the request of a given nation? And most importantly, what if EPRDF’s Federal Government refuses to transfer power to the nation/nationality upon the outcome of the referendum on secession? Subsequently, the nation/nationality has absolutely no other democratic recourse for its aspiration, unless of course it resorts to force. What is this “self” about this “self-determination,” when the concerned nation/nationality cannot decide itSELF for itSELF, and the imprimatur of the central government is strictly and ultimately required? To the exception of Eritrean independence, EPRDF would not permit and recognize the separation of any of the other ethnonational regions. EPRDF’s current political and armed conflicts with national movements in Oromo and Ogaden-Somali regions exemplify this fact. EPRDF’s organizational structure, of course TPLF as its leading core, includes affiliates of different ethnic groups. Thus, it makes a monopolistic claim to rule on behalf of all of Ethiopian ethnic groups as a microcosmic political party. EPRDF controls and fashions the political discourse on ethno-nationalism and the “rights” of ethnic groups, while ethnicity is still an ineffable issue among many of the opposition groups. EPRDF has also configured ethnonational federative arrangement and accordingly devolves power to its ethnically based political affiliates under its tutelage. As a matter of fact, this is principally how EPRDF designs its source of legitimacy to impose its authoritarian rule on Ethiopian peoples. Therefore, it is elusive to take as a premise, for one’s proposal for a political change, EPRDF’s own constitutional clauses. There is an Ethiopian saying: Lam balwalebet kubet lekema (you cannot collect dung in the field where cows are not grazing).
Interestingly enough, even acknowledging the authoritarian nature of EPRDF, Tilahun, on the one hand, through “legal and simple” recourse optimistically reassures his readers that his proposal for secession “can be accomplished legally, simply by using the laws that they [EPLF/TPLF] alone have drafted and implemented into the new Ethiopian constitution.” Yet, on the other hand, a few lines further down, Tilahun contradicts himself. He writes: “they [TPLF/EPLF] do not allow these rights [self-determination] for non-Tigrigna speaking populations.” If Tilahun negatively feels this way, then, why he persistently invokes EPRDF’s constitution is incomprehensible.
Furthermore, Tilahun also makes a sweeping assumption that the secession for the “rest of Ethiopia,” will be placed on the agenda of the day consensually embracing all, including those separatist ethno-nationalists likethe OLF, al-Itihad, and so on. What is even more ambivalent is that while Tilahun demands for secession as a readily available recourse and while he still considers it as a democratic right to be respected, at the same time he rejects this same right if secession is demanded by other ethnonationalist groups.
The Colonial Paradigm
Some sectors of the nationalist opposition groups glibly characterize EPRDF’s state as a colonial regime and “Eritrean/Tigrean” relation with “the rest of Ethiopia” as that of a colonial relation. This kind of view and analysis are clearly reflected in Tilahun’s writings. The use of a colonial paradigm to analyze Ethiopia’s current political problems and utilize it as a framework to propose a political alternative has dangerous political and historical implications.
First, if Eritreans and Tigreans are purported as colonial powers who dominate Ethiopia, this view implies that they have been foreign invading forces. And according to this logic, so were Emperor Yohannes IV, Alula, Axumite emperors such as Ezana, kaleb, and queen Sheba.
Second, we have to twist the logic to strongly argue, as Tilahun does, that Ethiopia is a “3,000-year-old nation.” Without the Tigreans and Eritreans, we cannot claim the history and very existence of Ethiopia then, as well as now. The noted African historian, Professor Ali Mazrui, critically observes that “one’s emotional favouritesbe they private individuals, or public heroes, or countriesare still a little too close. It is this nearness that continues to cast a spell of enchantment detrimental to historical objectivity.”
Third, the purported colonial domination by EPRDF is also based on the assessment that resources are exploited and diverted exclusively for the Tigreans. Even though there is an element of truth in this assessment, one certainly questions whether all the beneficiaries of the current free market (capitalist) economic arrangement are exclusively Tigreans or not. To put it differently, one should also observe that the newly emerging class distinctions, with the attendant economic privileges and deprivation, cut across ethnonational lines. Therefore, the concern over economic inequalities and social injustice is inadequately articulated, eschewing class relations and the negative economic impact of structural adjustment programs.
Strangely enough, the very people who now characterize EPRDF’s domination as a colonial rule, have swiftly dismissed a strikingly similar argument made by Eritrean, Oromo, Tigrean, and Ogadeni ethnonationalists about “Ethiopian colonialism” not long ago. Even today, some Oromo and Ogaden-Somali ethnonationalists advance a similar argument, such that they and the unitary nationalist forces remarkably share this “colonial domination” as a common theme. Therefore, the “colonial paradigm” is more of a rhetorical than an analytical frame of discourse.
Tilahun has further made a false analogy with the former South African apartheid state to illustrate EPRDF’s divisive ethnic policies. By any stretch of one’s imagination, the outright racist and fascist white European rule in former South Africa could not be comparable (even though EPRDF is clearly undemocratic) to the current EPRDF regime. Such glib analogy and characterization certainly damage the cause of the democratic struggle and the image of the opposition. It certainly drives a wedge among different ethnonational groups of Ethiopia to the point where the political differences and conflicts would be irreconcilable. Such analogy would undercut any potential support and sympathy from African compatriots and the international audience.
Although Tilahun is repelled by the idea of EPRDF’s “apartheid policy,” he likewise designs another form of “apartheid policy,” as illustrated in his newly drawn map, designating a peanut-like territorial space in the northern part of Ethiopia as a secluded “homeland” (Killil) to Tigreans and Eritreans. He argues that “in the new map of Ethiopia, Tigreans and Eritreans will be restricted to the highland regions of their native homeland, with a closed border to prevent the spread of ethnic hatred to the rest of Ethiopia and Africa.” Tigreans and Eritreans are “restricted within a closed border,” not only to prevent them from intermingling with Ethiopians but also from peoples of Africa in general. How he came up with such precisely drawn “historical” map for Mereb Melash without cartographical and historical evidence is another issue, which I have only to note in passing. It is also important to note here that ethnic tensions and conflicts are pervasive in Africa; it is not a unique phenomenon limited to Ethiopia alone, as Tilahun attaches a note of caution, and by way of which recommends a containment strategy for the African continent as well.
In all of his articles, Tilahun favors the metaphor “cancer” to illustrate EPRDF’s ethnically divisive rule and policy. In his latest article, he also adds “quarantine” for the secluded space that is designated for Tigreans and Eritreans in his newly proposed Ethiopian map. Metaphors are not only illustrative words. They are terms by which we live and act.
“Cancer” and “quarantine” certainly entail patients who need treatment and a medical practitioner who provides the treatment for the better or for the worse. In Tilahun’s words, “the new map of Ethiopia will ‘quarantine’ Tigrean tribalists, preventing the devastating spread of ethnic divisiveness to other parts of Ethiopia and Africa…” Yet, his prescription is not only to surgically remove them (i.e. the cancer) from the body politic, but also to “eliminate” them. It is clear also that EPLF/TPLF (as organizations) are interchangeably and indistinguishably used with Eritreans/Tigreans in all of his writings. Tilahun’s own prescriptive words are as follows: “If we are to preserve our nation from total disintegration at the hands of EPLF/TPLF, we must act now to eliminate these disruptive elements from our society.” Fortunately, all of us who have interest in politics and tend to prescribe political solutions are spared from vowing to a code of ethics, as doctors take the “Hippocratic oath” before they begin medical practice.
Towards a Pluralist Democratic Ethiopia
The period we are passing through is indeed a tumultus one for Ethiopians. As much as the current problems are complex and the atmosphere politically explosive, the future is also uncertain. In Antonio Gramsci’s celebrated phrase, “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Ethiopians are still subjected to EPRDF’s one-party authoritarian rule; the highly ethnicized politics has greatly induced ethnic animosity, ethnonationalist paranoia, and hysterical unitary nationalism; the political opposition forces are inexorably divided; and the atmosphere is not propitious for a judicious, responsible, and accommodative political dialogue.
Tilahun aptly poses, although narrowly formulated, an appropriate question: “of what benefit is our association with Tigreans and Eritreans?” If this broadly framed: “of what benefit is our association as Ethiopian nationals in general despite our ethnonational differences?” leads to a reconstitution of a democratic Ethiopia founded upon a new social contract. It must be a democratic Ethiopia whose constitution embodies the “general will” of its peoples, in Rousseau’s sense of the term.
It must be a pluralist democratic Ethiopia in which individual and collective rights are respected and protected. It must be a pluralist democracy which includes a multinational state, whereby not only the people but also the governments are subject to the “rule of law.” It must be a democratic system where government officials are accountable and whose powers are checked by constitutional laws. It must also be a democratic system which blends a representative and participatory forms of democracy.
The question however is: how do we (re)map the political path which leads towards such a democratic society?
Procedurally, only when we far-sightedly aspire and show goodwill for the establishment of a democratic system vis-a-vis the conventional effort to wield a state power dominated by one political group. We have to be able make this important distinction between a democratic system and a particular form of state power. In a democratic system, various political groups would peacefully compete and succeed one another in democratic elections. On the other hand, a particular form of state power is often an ephemeral government absolutely dominated and dictated by a particular political group, as is the case today and was in the recent past.
We need to aspire for the former, if we are truly committed to democracy, peace, national reconciliation, and economic development. I believe this is the path which takes us to a democratic society and which also guarantees a democratic union.
To seek otherwise, is to pursue a sectarian interest of one’s organization or ideological orientation as an ultimate goal vis-a-vis the general interest of the Ethiopian peoples. Such parochial political pursuits (YAuÞî UÞ politics) have already proved to be self-destructive in our contemporary political history. In Aristotle’s classical phrase, “one swallow does not sustain a person for the entire summer.”
A political transformation to a democratic system also presupposes a change in political culture. Our political culture is repleted with features such as organizational vainglory, vengeance, intolerance, mistrust, and belligerence.
As some of my friends indicated to me this vision may sound too idealist, particularly at time of extreme political polarization. In defense of political ideals, I think it was Plato who noted that without such ideals we would not able to notice how far we deviate and steer off course. Moreover, as a cynical aphorism cautions: If you do not know your possible destination, any route will take you “there”! As a matter of fact, every political program and proposal of an organization or an individual reflects an ideal vision, so to speak. Should we have to seek farther than to witness the democratic change in post-apartheid democratic South Africa. It has primarily been the struggle and democratic vision of Mandela, ANC, and even ironically the goodwill of the former ruling Afrikaaner leaders that underlie the democratic change in South Africa. By and large, what more democratic model for struggle and change do we need to adopt than South Africa’s.
Every daughter and son of Ethiopia, who are truly committed to democracy, peace, national reconciliation, and economic development, can translate such an idealistic proposal into a realistic and permanent one. And I will join them in this democratic endeavor.
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Petros Toggia is associate editor of ER.
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