Eritrea-Yemen Dispute Over the Hanish Islands
Ted Dagne
Ethiopian Review, April 1996
Background to the Conflict
In mid-December 1995, Yemeni and Eritrean forces clashed for two days over the Hanish Islands, a small archipelago at the southern entrance of the strategic Red Sea. The crisis erupted into an air and sea battle in which 12 Eritrean and 15 Yemeni soldiers were killed. Eritrean forces captured an estimated 185 Yemeni soldiers, but released them after two weeks. Eritrean President Issayas Afeworki said Yemeni forces provoked Eritrean troops by attacking Eritrean forces on the islands. Yemen, on the other hand, denounced what it called “treacherous aggression and piracy” by Eritrean troops.
What triggered the confrontation between Yemen and recently independent Eritrea remains ambiguous. According to Yemeni authorities, the crisis started in late October when Eritrean soldiers demanded that Yemeni troops on the Greater Hanish Island leave. Early in 1995, a Yemen-German company was granted a license to operate a scuba diving school, and Yemeni troops were sent to guard company equipment. Eritrea protested Yemen’s move, and in response Yemeni officials proposed the formation of a committee comprising the interior and foreign ministers of both countries. The committee was formed and the first meeting took place in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. At dawn on December 16, a clash between the forces erupted and within two days Yemeni forces were defeated. Yemen officials reluctantly cite the swift capture of the island by Eritrean forces as proof of a premeditated aggression by Eritrean forces.
Eritrea’s account of the crisis differs sharply from that of Yemen. Eritrean authorities argue that Yemen began to deploy troops in mid 1995 even though Yemen had no presence on the island before. Eritrean authorities dismiss Yemeni assertion that the troops on the island were deployed to protect company equipment. Officials in Asmara contend that the deployed included senior military officers and were not merely guards. In early December, as tensions increased, a second round of talks were held in Asmara, but the Yemen delegation only wanted to discuss the Greater Hanish Island, according to Eritrean officials. Both sides reportedly agreed to meet in February 1996 to discuss all outstanding issues. Meanwhile, according to Eritrean authorities, a unit of Yemeni forces advanced on Lesser Hanish Island to provoke Eritrean forces, which led to a preemptive strike by Eritrean troops.
Source of Conflict: Sovereignty Over the Islands
The sources of the conflict are multi-faceted. Both Eritrea and Yemen claim ownership of the two arid islands, although neither side has presented clear evidence thus far. Yemeni officials argue that they have had a presence there since 1981, and a Yemeni shipping company had financed the lighthouses on the islands. Yemeni authorities also cite their support for the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) during the struggle for independence as proof that Yemen had a presence on the islands. Eritrea for its part cites historical ownership of the islands, and rejects the argument that Yemen had a presence on the islands, which Eritrea says were uninhibited. During the Mengistu era North Yemen repeatedly raised this issue with government officials when Sanaa provided its good offices for talks between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Mengistu regime, according to sources familiar with these talks. Observers suggest that both Eritrea and Yemen could present historical documents in support of their respective positions, which could lead to a prolonged legal battle.
Source of Conflict: Economic/Security Factors
Some observers have suggested that the conflict over the arid islands was sparked in part by economic considerations on both sides. Yemen had entered into a business deal with a German company early in 1995, while Eritrea negotiated a deal with an American company for oil exploration. The economic value of the islands appears limited, unless oil is discovered, except for tourism and fishing. But both countries are poor and neither can easily cede a potential asset, however limited, to the other. From Eritrea’s perspective, Yemen’s project could have emerged as a major source of competition to the Eritrean-planned scheme for a tourist attraction on the Dahlak islands, near the main Eritrean port of Massawa. Yemen had its own hopes for tourism and may have feared losing a possible oil resource once it learned Eritrea’s exploration plans.
Tied to economic considerations is the strategic location of the islands, situated on major oil shipping lanes. An estimated 100 ships and 125,000 barrels of oil pass through these lanes every day. Yemen and some Arab states are concerned that Israel is behind the Eritrean move to establish presence on the Red Sea, although Eritrean authorities deny Yemen’s allegation of an Israeli connection. On the other hand, Eritrean authorities are concerned about potentially being surrounded by extremist regimes allied with the radical National Islamic Front (NIF) government already entrenched in Sudan. In December 1995, shortly after the clash with Yemen, President Issayas of Eritrea suggested that the conflict over the islands may have been instigated by radical elements within the Yemeni military. Meanwhile, some Arab governments are concerned that a prolonged conflict over the islands could threaten the flow of oil.
Source of Conflict: Domestic Factors
Domestic political considerations were evidently not a factor in the current conflict over the islands. Eritrea enjoys relative stability since its independence in 1991 from Ethiopia after three decades of war. President Issayas and his ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), formerly known as the EPLF, launched a transition program to install a democratically elected government by 1997. The President and his party appear well entrenched and do not face serious internal or external challenge, although remnants of the ELF remain active in exile, but they pose no immediate or long-term threat to the ruling party’s grip on power. In recent months, however, the mainstream ELF faction led by Abdalla Idriss has been welcomed by the NIF regime in Khartoum, after years of strained relations.
The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ), also backed by the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Khartoum, has emerged in recent years as a potential destabilizing force in Eritrea. In 1994, EIJ forces were repulsed by Eritrean troops shortly after crossing the Eritrea-Sudan border. Captured EIJ members, including several Arab nationals, are reportedly still in Eritrean custody. While EIJ does not have the military capability to unseat the Issayas government at this juncture, EIJ’s potential is serious and the EIJ is still conducting ambushes on government vehicles inside Eritrea. EIJ, with the support of the Khartoum military government, is heavily recruiting from the disaffected 500,000 Eritrean refugees inside Sudan. But growing tensions between the political and military factions within the EIJ could split the organization in the near future.
Eritreans and international observers have accepted the transition program of President Issayas as a constructive mechanism to insure smooth transition to democratic rule in a region marred by religious and ethnic conflicts. Critics accuse the Eritrean leader, however, of being reckless at times and too ambitious. They point to measures taken by the Eritrean leader against Sudan, its more powerful neighbor, in recent months, including the handing over of the Sudan Embassy in Asmara to Sudanese opposition groups. But proponents of President Issayas argue that, though undiplomatic, the Eritrean leader is committed to peaceful resolution of conflicts and economic prosperity for the troubled Horn of Africa region. President Issayas’ punitive measures against the Khartoum regime and Sanaa, are indicative of his determination not to tolerate aggressive and potentially destabilizing behavior by governments.
Mediation Efforts
Despite a cease-fire agreement in place since late December, the situation remains tense. Both sides are reportedly beefing up their military presence: Eritrea on Greater Hanish Island and Yemen on nearby islands. Efforts by Ethiopia, Egypt, France, and the United Nations Secretary General have yet to produce tangible results. Ethiopia, which took the lead first, has proposed to both sides to pull out their troops and engage in talks. Both sides accept the Ethiopian proposal in principle, but serious differences remain over who should withdraw first. Yemen argues that Eritrea should withdraw its troops first before negotiations take place. Meanwhile, French mediation effort seems to be stalled, despite strong support by both countries.
In recent weeks, the Ethiopian proposal has taken a back seat to French mediation, while the Egyptian proposal for a Yemen-Eritrea summit has been shelved because of Sanaa’s opposition. The French proposal has not been made public, but sources involved in the effort say that, among other things, it calls for a cessation of hostilities and seeks arbitration before a panel of judges from the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The French proposal also includes an important demand by Eritrea that arbitration should include other islands in the region as well as demarcation of the maritime borders between the two countries. Yemen has reportedly dropped its earlier condition that Eritrean forces withdraw first before negotiations take place. Under the current proposal, forces do not have to be removed but would be monitored by observers. Eritrea has not responded formally to the French proposal but has submitted a position paper summarizing its concerns. The failure to respond formally on the French proposal has raised concerns in the region that Eritrea may not be keen to French mediation. Some observers suggest that Eritrea would like to see the groundwork prepared before entering negotiations with Yemen. Yemen, on the other hand, has expressed its strong support for the French initiative, but has not offered a proposal of its own.
Role of Regional Actors
Ethiopia: Yemen is skeptical of Ethiopia’s neutrality, despite Sanaa’s public support for the Ethiopian effort, in part because of political, cultural, and historical ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Nonetheless, Sanaa would like Ethiopia to remain in the mediation process to keep the Meles government neutral in the current conflict. Ethiopia for its part would like this conflict to be resolved peacefully since increased tensions between Yemen and Eritrea could jeopardize its access to the sea. Shortly after the ouster of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a military agreement, and in an event of a wider conflict between Sanaa and Asmera, Ethiopia is likely to come to the aid of Eritrea.
Sudan: Eritrea’s arch enemy to the north-west, Sudan, has taken a very active role in the Yemen-Eritrea conflict by condemning Eritrea and offering material support to Yemen. Sudan sees this current dispute between Eritrea and Yemen as a vindication of its criticism of “Eritrean aggression.” The military junta is also manipulating the conflict to ease its international and regional isolation. Meanwhile, Khartoum is likely to step-up support for Eritrean opposition elements inside Sudan and provide diplomatic and moral support to Yemen. The military regime in Khartoum is not in a position, however, to offer substantive military assistance to Yemen because of the war in the south and deteriorating economic conditions.
Israel: Israel has been targeted for criticism by some Arab governments for allegedly being behind the “Eritrean aggression.” Both Israel and Eritrea have denied these allegations. However, a recent visit to Israel by President Issayas has once again increased suspicions in some Arab capitals. President Salih of Yemen has not directly accused Israel of being behind the current conflict, but senior officials in his administration have accused Israel of backing Eritrea. The growing ties between Israel and Eritrea in recent years, however, have emerged as a major source of concern to some governments in the region.
OAU: The Organization of African Unity (OAU) reacted swiftly to the Eritrea-Yemen dispute by dispatching the Secretary General of the organization to the region and by offering its good offices for peaceful end to the conflict. The OAU also chided the Arab League for siding with Yemen after the League’s Secretary General, Esmat Abdel-Majid, said “Yemen had the right to defend its territory.” OAU’s Secretary General Salim Salim responded by saying “the statement is regrettable and could be misconstrued as an attempt to create a wedge between Yemen, an Arab country, and Eritrea, an African state.”
Prospects for Peace
The feud over the Hanish Islands is likely to drag on, and prospects for renewed military clash are high. An escalation of the conflict is unlikely at this juncture, but Ethiopia’s involvement on the side of Eritrea or other regional actors on the side of Yemen could widen the conflict. Meanwhile, if the current status of the islands remains unchanged for a prolonged period, the political future and survival of the longtime President of Yemen could be in question. Salih is reportedly under intense pressure from the Islamists in his government coalition and his own military to avenge what some Yemenis consider a humiliating defeat in December 1995. Salih is trying to resolve this dispute peacefully, and show tangible results quickly, but progress has been painfully slow for Salih. One option is to use military force to recapture Hanish, and there are signs that this option is being given serious consideration by Salih and his military advisors. However, should Yemen fail in its effort to recapture Hanish, Salih could be ousted by the Islamists or his own military. Some commentators believe Salih’s call for a U.N. Security Council meeting to address the dispute may have been designed to reduce internal pressure on him to seek a military solution to the problem. Yemen’s other option is to provide support to Eritrean opposition groups and harass Eritrean forces on the island and mainland Eritrea. Ironically, this conflict has helped unite some of Yemen’s antagonistic political forces, and has led to the return of some opposition figures to Yemen from exile.
Eritrea may also prefer to see the conflict resolved peacefully because a prolonged conflict with Yemen could scare off potential investors and weaken its economy. Eritreans are also concerned that should the Islamists takeover power in Sanaa, tensions between the two countries could escalate and prospects for a wider conflict would be high. This factor is a major consideration in Eritrea’s strategy in resolving the conflict with Yemen. Another factor is the daunting challenge of confronting foes on two fronts simultaneously, as is the case now. If the tensions with Yemen and Sudan drag on, Eritrea may need to recall its demobilized soldiers to duty and actively seek Ethiopia’s support. Issayas’ position in Eritrea is well secured, and he faces no immediate challenge within the ruling party. But a disastrous outcome could weaken his grip within the ruling party and the military in the long-term. Issayas may also find his influence checked by his own colleagues in the military and the ruling party.
Balance of Power
The forces of Yemen and Eritrea are not unknown to each other, but they may be overconfident and unrealistic in their assessment of their respective strength. During the Eritrean struggle, both South and North Yemen provided support to Eritrean liberation fronts. Socialist South Yemen was a staunch supporter of the EPLF until South Yemen changed sides in 1977 and began to support the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. South Yemeni forces were deployed to Eritrea in support of Ethiopian troops against the EPLF in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and assisted the Mengistu regime in the battle of Massawa. After Eritrean independence and the reunification of Yemen, relations between the two countries improved significantly. During the Yemeni civil war in 1994, for example, Eritrea reportedly backed the unionists in the North and permitted the northern dominated Yemeni government to land its civilian and military planes at Asmera airport for safe-keeping.
Eritrean forces are highly motivated and battle-tested. The command structure of the Eritrean military is unified and cohesive, according to many observers. On the other hand, Yemeni forces, though recently engaged in battle, tend to be disorganized and have suffered from the defection of some southern units during the 1994 civil war. In the current conflict, both Eritrea and Yemen have appointed their best commanders in charge of their forces on the islands. Yemeni forces on Zuqar Island are reportedly commanded by the highly respected commander who liberated Aden from the secessionists, while Eritrean forces on Greater Hanish are under the direct command of the chief of staff of the Eritrean forces. Both Eritrea and Yemen have beefed-up their military presence on the islands and are reportedly shopping for arms. Eritrea is counting on Ethiopia to provide covert and logistical support to move troops around. Yemen is reportedly buying weapons on the black market.
Open support by Ethiopia to Eritrea could compel some Arab countries to come to the aid of Yemen, although they appear reluctant at this juncture. Yemen has an edge over Eritrea in quality and quantity of weapons, especially in the air. Yemen’s two dozen Mig-21s and F-5E fighter planes could inflict serious damage on Eritrean forces, while its SS-21s and Scud B missiles could be used to target Eritrean logistic bases. Yemen’s Soviet-made patrol and missile craft are also a major challenge to Eritrea’s small navy. Data on Eritrean naval capability are scarce, although it is largely assumed that Eritrea had acquired some of Ethiopia’s navy after the defeat of Mengistu in 1991. However, Ethiopia’s boats in Djibouti still remain under Ethiopia’s control. In March, officials in Addis Abeba announced plans to auction the ships currently grounded in Djibouti.
The Role of the U.S.
The United States has played only a limited role in the Yemen-Eritrea conflict, in part due to active French involvement and the proliferation of mediators in the region. However, in December, the U.S. ambassadors to Yemen and Eritrea helped facilitate a cease-fire agreement between Sanaa and Asmera. In early March 1996, a senior U.S. State Department official, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Arthur Hughes, visited the region to discuss the Yemen-Eritrea dispute over the islands. Both Yemen and Eritrea have expressed interest in Washington’s active engagement in the peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The United States strongly supports the French initiative and would like to see other mediators, including Egypt, play a supportive role, according to U.S. officials. Washington is reportedly concerned about Yemen’s military buildup on the islands and about Eritrea’s lukewarm response to the French proposal. The United States is not anxious, however, to take the lead on this issue, but would participate as a monitor if an agreement is reached between Yemen and Eritrea and if it does not involve U.S. troop commitments.
The crisis in the Red Sea is not taken lightly by Washington, officials say. Freedom of navigation, security, political, and economic interests are at stake in the Red Sea region, according to U.S. officials. In Eritrea, the United States would like the transition program to succeed and to establish strong economic ties with Asmera. American companies are investing in Eritrea and trade between the two countries is likely to grow as the newly independent country continues to explore untapped natural resources. Eritrea is also a major partner in the fight against terrorism in the region and in efforts to establish a stable and prosperous Horn of Africa region.
Over the past several years, Eritrea has emerged as an important U.S. ally in the Horn of Africa. U.S. military officials see Eritrea as strategically important, and American ships make regular port visits. In 1994, Washington was negotiating with officials in Asmera to install a powerful radar system to monitor the region. Investments by American companies are also growing. In recognition of Eritrea’s importance, Washington provides significant amount of foreign assistance to the government of Issayas Afeworki. In fiscal year 1994, Washington provided Asmera $33.2 million in development and food assistance and $20.5 million in fiscal year 1995. In early 1995, President Issayas came to the United States on official visit and met President Clinton as well as senior officials at the Pentagon and the State Department.
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Ted Dagne is Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs & National Defense Division, U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS).
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