The Ethnicization of the Ethiopian State – Part II
Ethiopian Review, April 1996
By Ayenew Ashagre
Today, a heated debate is go-ing on among Ethiopian and foreign scholars regarding the interpretation of Ethiopia’s history. Was Ethiopia created only a hundred years ago? or has it been there for three millennia? Was the Ethiopian empire created through the colonization of non-Ethiopian peoples in the same sense that European powers colonized Africans and Asians? Essentially, both ethnic elites and foreign scholars give two answers. For the purposes of our discussion, the views of Herbert S. Lewis and Solomon Gashaw (in Crawford Young’s The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? 1993) may be taken as representing the two sides. The former argues that: “The Ethiopian empire was formed during the same period that the British and French African empires were, and with many of the same means: through a series of conquests, some of them quite brutal.” While the latter asserts: “The Ethiopian state has existed for over three thousand years. This millennial existence has forged a distinct national identity… which cannot easily be dismissed as a myth.”
The writer’s answer to these questions is very well summed up in a recent review article by Ivo Strecker (Social Anthropology: The Journal of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, 1995). In reviewing two of the many new books on Ethiopian history, and in response to what seems to him a new thesis proposed by the authors of one of these books, arguing that “Ethiopia has been from its formation an artificial unit, not a naturally-occurring one as so many believe…,” he points out that the authors “have very good point to make that the southern regions of what is called Ethiopia today were conquered and colonized by the ‘Abyssinians’ in the second half of the nineteenth century, and until today the peoples of southern Ethiopia have been suffering from the effects. But they keep spoiling this good point by the way they conduct their argument. Take, for example, the thesis with which their study begins… Ethiopia, they say, was not a naturally occurring political, cultural or economic entity. What is one to make of such a statement? Have there ever been ‘naturally occurring’ entities in the history of state formation? Are not all polities cultural rather than ‘natural’ products, and have they not all emerged (and disappeared) as an outcome of complex social conflicts and political struggles? Is it not the task of the historian to analyze and anatomize precisely these struggles and conflicts to the uninformed reader?”
This, of course, is the view of a scholar who is not involved in the active politicization of ethnicity. For ethnic elites with political agendas and goals, the criteria of scholarship and academia are sterile if not reactionary, since they aid, intentionally or not, the perpetuation of the status quo of ethnic inequality and oppression. In other words, what ethnic elites are interested in is the politicization of their respective ethnic groups through, among others, the “reinterpretation” of history so that, in the words of Rothschild, it “stresses, ideologizes, modifies, and sometimes virtually re-creates the putatively unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it (signifies)…” In so doing, they hope to create, in the members of their respective groups, the need for ethnic identification, solidarity, and political action purportedly aimed at improving the lot of their peoples. In fact, ethnic elites have too often failed to go beyond enhancing their personal fortunes. The world has yet to see an instance in which ethnic elites have established a new social order that does not duplicate the injustices and inequalities of the old they have displaced. Ethiopia’s ethnic elites, both old and new, have not been exceptions.
Beginning from the fall of the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in May of 1991, politics in Ethiopia began to be officially ethnicized. It may be useful for our discussion to review, again briefly, the sequence of events that unfolded, beginning from Colonel Mengistu’s flight to Harare and the takeover of power by the EPLF and TPLF.
Colonel Mengistu’s Marxist regime began to crack long before its actual downfall in May 1991. Racked by internal factional conflicts, undermined by the brazen corruption of its own members, sabotaged by its subjects, and harassed by the many armed opposition groups, the regime finally fell when Mengistu Haile Mariam secretly fled. A conference, sponsored primarily by the United States, was called in London. It was attended by officials of what remained of the Mengistu regime and leaders of three liberation fronts, namely, the OLF, EPLF, and EPRDF (a camouflage for TPLF).
Returning from the London conference, the TPLF leader, Meles Zenawi, announced what appeared to some as a magnanimous and democratic plan of his victorious front: the TPLF would serve as the provisional government for about a month when representatives of the various ethnic and nonethnic political organizations would be called to a national conference to discuss and approve the conditions and procedures for the establishment of a transitional government. The transitional government so established would then prepare the way for a democratically elected government. For many Ethiopians who had listened to this announcement, the occasion became an emotional one. They had seen many a moment that had seemed to hold considerable promise for the peaceful and democratic resolution of the country’s problems and unending conflicts. They had seen, too, how each of those promising moments were lost because of the selfish ambitions of their last two rulers. For many, the TPLF leader’s announcement was too good to be true and, despite lingering doubts, they were determined to provide all the critical support they could to what they thought were lofty plans.
To these critics, what occurred later seemed to confirm what was only a suspicion: that the TPLF-led government was intent not in the genuine democratization and decentralization of the state, but in the consolidation of its own control of state-power. Through manipulation and even blatant show of force, the new government of Meles Zenawi managed to get a series of decrees and legislation passed through what soon became a rubber-stump Council of Representatives. While acknowledging the relief that the Ethiopian people felt at the cessation of the decades of civil war, critics soon started warning that the relative peace attained was not going to last, especially because of the persistence of contradictions that the TPLF leadership was constantly manipulating. The following examples, among many others, were cited often:
First, among the most significant provisions of the charter approved by the July 1991 National Conference were those concerning the individual and collective rights of citizens. The charter provided for the recognition and respect of the human and democratic rights of individual citizens while also affirming “the right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to preserve their identities and cultures, administer their own affairs, and exercise the right to independence when they are convinced that these rights are denied, abridged, or abrogated.” Unfortunately, instead of being the bases for the democratic empowerment of previously oppressed and exploited groups, these provisions became mere pretexts for pitting one group against another. They were used to fan narrow nationalist sentiments and to split the opposition, real or imagined, by manipulating ethnic elites and their organizations to fall in line with the pre-charted political and ideological lines of those in power. Citizens were told and encouraged to organize politically along ethnic lines only to be harassed, imprisoned, and even summarily executed later for forming or joining the “wrong” groups. This was particularly clear in the case of the Amhara. In the words of one Ethiopian observer, what became clear was TPLF’s: “obsession with the politics of nationalism, and a determination to alter the structure of the state in such a way that nothing remains of what it perceives as the domination of the Amhara over the rest. Every policy, or lack of policy, is measured in terms of its impact on the perceived level or form of Amhara representation in state bodies, institutions of learning and cultural fora.” (Dawit Abate in Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy, a collection of essays edited by Abebe Zegeye & Siegfried Pausewang).
Second, the TPLF guerrilla army was made the official, national defense force, replacing the demobilized, huge army of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Not only did this action render these ex-soldiers and their families destitute almost overnight, but it also made the armies of other liberation fronts illegal. The result of this was the further heightening of tension and potential conflict. Actual conflicts did occur between this new government army and the armies of the OLF, IFLO, SLF, ALF, and a number of other groups. Except perhaps in Tigray, the TPLF army began to be seen not as a national army but as an occupation force.
Third, the administrative map of the country was redrawn using the single criterion of language. Fourteen ‘ethnic homelands’ were created, though this number was reduced to ten later. The overlap that exists among the various linguistic, religious, and territorial groups mentioned earlier soon became the source of a thorny problem for the TPLF-led transitional government. Disputes and sometimes serious conflicts that threatened to spill over into adjacent regions emerged regarding ethnic boundaries. While government supporters applauded the TPLF-controlled regime for addressing this undoubtedly important issue, the opposition rightly argued against it, because (a) the matter was too important a national one to be decided upon by a government that was only transitional and without the peoples’ mandate, (b) the use of the linguistic criterion, to the virtual exclusion of others such as the economic and administrative viability of the regions, was wrong as it would perpetuate and even aggravate regional and ethnic inequality, and (c) the manner in which the TPLF-led government was going about it suggested not so much a genuine desire to address the wishes of the various ethnic groups, but to sow and fan discord among them. The exercise of drawing and redrawing of these boundaries has continued, reflecting TPLF’s perceived threat to its hegemony by emerging coalitions among different opposition groups.
Fourth, under the pretext of furthering the democratic rights of citizens to engage, individually or collectively, in peaceful political activities, the TPLF-led government embarked upon the systematic creation of political organizations “that resembled and duplicated those already existing.” This soon had the effect of “splitting the difference” as well as heightening the militancy of many of the newly created ethnic organizations. With the exception of the Tigray and Amhara, almost every other ethnic group was soon made to have at least two and sometimes up to five organizations each of which claimed to be its ‘true’ representative. TPLF cadres spoke of this as a concrete proof of their organization’s determination to respect and protect the democratic rights of citizens to organize themselves in any and as many ways as they wished, arguing that the people of each ethnic group would be the ultimate judges as to which of the organizations represented their true interests. Two of its actions showed TPLF’s duplicity in this regard. First, while professing commitment to the respect and defense of the democratic rights of members of other ethnic groups to organize themselves, it prevented, by all means available to it, Tigreans and Amharas from forming political organizations other than the ones set up by its own cadres. It became clear that TPLF believed that such alternative organizations would undermine its monopolistic control over Tigreans and mobilize Amharas under a strong and independent opposition group. Second, it openly encouraged discord among groups claiming to represent the same ethnic group. Very much aware that their continued existence depended wholly on TPLF, the elites of the newer ethnic organizations began to engage not only in open quarrels among themselves, but also seemed desperate to gain some legitimacy and acceptance by instigating what Dawit Abate has described as “revanchist activities in the hope of claiming the blood price that Menelik and his associates had levied on their ancestors.” Because of this “entire communities, long settled and indistinguishable from the local nationality apart from their different origins many generations ago, were wiped out.”
Fifth, despite the protests of opposition groups on the grounds that the conditions created by TPLF hegemony did not permit free political activity and competition, local and regional elections were held, resulting in “overwhelming victories” for TPLF-sponsored candidates. The OLF withdrew from the TGE, while other groups were kicked out for expressing dissent. These and other political organizations declared themselves out of the competitions and TPLF’s “democratic elections” were unanimously criticized as undemocratic by the team of international observers sent by different European and North American governments.
Sixth, as individuals and groups began to criticize and oppose these and other government policies and actions, the TPLF-led transitional government became even more defensive and repressive. It continued expelling political groups from the TGE, arresting individuals and keeping them in jail without trial, closing the offices of opposition groups and arresting their leaders, sometimes summarily executing them, harassing and imprisoning members of the free press, and dismissing critical academics and other civil servants from their jobs. All these, according to the opposition groups, simply showed that the TPLF was determined not to pioneer the democratization of the society, but to use every means it can to keep state power.
The Opposition and Its Dilemma
As pointed out earlier, beginning from Haile Selassie’s time, there have been a number of political organizations, some of which were organized along ethnic lines. Irrespective of whether or not they were ethnic-based, all were banned and their members persecuted. This ban and persecution continued with much greater intensity during Mengistu’s time. Despite that, many of them survived the repressions of the two regimes either by going underground and keeping nominal existence or, in the case of a few, by mounting armed struggles. Soon after the TPLF takeover of power in May 1991, the ban on political organizations, whatever their nature, was declared lifted. By the time of the July National Conference, quite a large number of new ones, mainly ethnic-based, declared themselves into being. Since the large majority of these had never made their existence known, in whatever form, even to members of the ethnic groups they claimed to represent, it is quite certain that they were formed soon after TPLF’s takeover of power. The manner in which these newer ethnic organizations were created and the fact that the Conference did not become as inclusive a forum as had been promised led many in the opposition to suspect TPLF and its leadership of harboring a hidden agenda.
Many more ethnic and nonethnic political organizations continued to be formed after the Conference and the formation of the TGE. Many had drawn up programs and strategies that seemed to duplicate those of TPLF, each ethnic-based organization declaring as its main objective the liberation of its respective group from oppression and exploitation by neftenga Amhara. Even those that claimed to be nonethnic or multiethnic and whose leaders were openly against TPLF’s ethnicization of the state found themselves playing the ethnic game in one way or another. A few of these identified with, and even named themselves, after one or another ethnic group while declaring their intentions and even membership to be multiethnic. Most, if not all, incorporated in their programs provisions for the recognition and respect of the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination while protesting the inclusion of a similar provision either in the charter of the TGE or, later, in the constitution. Most, including those claiming to represent ethnic groups somewhere in rural Ethiopia, were based in Addis Abeba and had very little to show regarding their grassroots following. While it is true that they were barred from political activities especially outside Addis Abeba, many of them did not even make serious attempts to make their existence known outside the capital. The leaders of many of these organizations seemed content staying in Addis Abeba and covering up their weaknesses with mere posturing and eloquent speeches at periodic, popular rallies at Mesqel Adebabay. Other examples of the dilemma in which the opposition groups within the country found themselves can be cited, but these should suffice for now.
Sadder still was the situation of the opposition groups in exile most of which were, and still are, based in the United States. Some new ones claiming to be nonethnic were formed in Europe, North America, and Kenya, but the most important and vocal were the older ones, especially EPRP and Meison. These two had been bitter enemies during the Mengistu era and, although each blamed the other for all the bad things that happened during that period, in the opinion of many Ethiopians, both were perhaps no less responsible than Mengistu’s government. For these two older organizations, transcending their smeared pasts became extremely difficult to say the least. Even some of the newer ones formed outside Ethiopia, particularly in the U.S. and Kenya, appeared to be in some way implicated, or still connected, with Mengistu Haile Mariam. The opposition’s dilemma did not end here. Soon after Mengistu’s regime disintegrated, many of these political groups declared their intentions to work together for a peaceful and democratic transition in the country. However, this was short-lived, since a number of them, especially the older ones, seemed unable or unwilling to give up the arrogance and chauvinism that had characterized their past. Disputes over issues, ranging from petty, personal ones to seemingly lofty, ideological principles, began to surface among them. These soon became so pervasive that while the coalition they had formed started disintegrating, the limited resources of each of the disputing groups began to be expended on accusations and counter-accusations of each other.
The clear beneficiary, though certainly not a passive one, from this disarray of the opposition has been the TPLF. It may be argued that the opposition’s confusion has been as much the result of TPLF’s divisive tactics as it has been due to the weakness of its own leadership. Granted that the TPLF has been ruthlessly divisive, but it has also been skillful. Letting TPLF’s divisive tactics win should be a further proof of the incompetence of the opposition’s leadership. A number of times during the transition period, the TPLF could blatantly declare its overwhelming victory in local and regional elections. Ethiopians and the international community declared then that there could be no victory where there was no one but the TPLF in the running. Today, too, the TPLF is triumphantly telling Ethiopians and the world about its victory in the recent national “elections.” But this time, Ethiopians may not have the open support of the international community in proclaiming this victory as another that TPLF won by running against no one but its own shadow. In openly criticizing the earlier elections, the international observers may have been concerned about the possible, perhaps violent, reaction of the opposition; in keeping quiet now, they may be stating the obvious fact that the opposition is nothing but a mere paper tiger.
Both those currently in power and those in the opposition will undoubtedly protest against the views expressed above, and for seemingly different reasons. Given the present political realities, both will almost certainly try to infer the writer’s ethnic background. The mutual mistrust between the opposition and those in power has been so infectious that the society has been dangerously polarized. That this has happened is shown by the unwillingness of either side to listen to one another or to anyone else for that matter. Whatever motive(s) the two sides may wish to read into the views expressed here would not matter if only both sides would try to examine soberly these and many other views expressed by others during the past four years and see if they can find even a grain of truth especially regarding those that seem critical of their respective political goals and activities. One can only hope that there is still some possibility for individuals and groups, irrespective of their ethnic identities, to engage in constructive dialogue.
What makes the official ethnicization of society tragic is the futility of the current leaders’ attempt to make neat distinctions among the bearers of the various criteria of ethnicity. The consequences of the policy of “Bantustanization” that the TPLF-controlled government have been devastating. It led to disputes, sometimes violent, among various groups over territorial boundaries, often showing the insufficiency of using a single criterion such as language to define these boundaries and, sometimes, indicating the hegemonic ambitions of the ethnic leaders of some of the groups.
At the individual level, the drawing and redrawing of ethnic boundaries and the associated fanning of intra-ethnic hatred has created the sad situation under which many citizens had to suffer for no other reason than their descent from ancestors that allegedly originated, generations ago, from another region and linguistic group. Individual citizens who claimed Amharic as the only language they spoke suddenly became suspect, real threats to democracy and justice. Many others who claimed mixed ethnic parentage found themselves in the impossible position of having to disown, to survive TPLF’s ethnic cleansing, one half of their heritage and identity. Ridiculous as it may seem, the members of an ethnic group, that of the Tigray, as a whole became the vanguard of democracy, equity, and justice, while those of others were rendered either passive beneficiaries of the magnanimity of Tigreans or, in the case of the Amhara, real or potential enemies of their lofty cause. By condoning, indeed actively advocating, this kind of ethnic politics, the TPLF leadership has undoubtedly earned the suspicion with which its proclaimed intentions of democratizing the society are being regarded by citizens. Sooner or later, it should not be surprising if that suspicion grew into conviction and a basis for violent civil discord.
Again one can only hope that all is not lost yet. Whether or not lasting peace, democracy, and socioeconomic reconstruction will begin to occur will depend on a whole set of factors, the most important of which will be the willing disposition and ability of the contending groups to respect and tolerate each other, to compromise, and, above all, to respect the rule of law.
Perhaps much more will depend on the willingness and ability of those currently in power to learn from the country’s and their own movements’ recent history. They must realize, among other things, that it was the dictatorial ambitions of Haile Selassie and Mengistu that finally undid their regimes and that also provided the popular support for the victories the TPLF leadership so much brags of having achieved. By doing away with the arrogance, duplicity, and underhanded tactics that have characterized their political activities so far, by submitting to the rule of law and the unconditional recognition and respect of citizens’ individual and collective rights, the present leaders will have contributed their share toward ensuring lasting peace and democracy in the country.
A great deal will be expected of the opposition as well. The fact that most opposition groups lacked the preparation and experience when events surprised them, the personal ambitions of their leadership, the rigid political stands of some of them, and the divisive tactics of those in power are all responsible for the opposition’s present disarray and confusion. Nor have the narrowly-conceived and rigid political programs of some opposition groups made cooperation and coalition formation among them possible. The result has been continuous bickering and factionalism both within and between different groups. Until they can evolve clearer and longer-term visions and become flexible and compromising enough to build strong and viable coalitions, the opposition groups may remain unable to influence developments in the country let alone become effective alternative forces for the democratic transformation of the society.
Finally, both those in power and the opposition must realize the dangers of ethnic politics which now seems to lead to the “over-ethnicizing” of everything in everyday life and the stereotyping of competing ethnic groups into “starkly polarized images of virtue and menace.”
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Ayenew Ashagre is a Guest Professor at Institut für Ethnologie und Afrika-Studien, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität,Mainz, Germany.