Skip to content

A sloppy attempt at self-exoneration – Messay Kebede

By Messay Kebede

My purpose begins by stating that my reading of Asgede Gebre Selassie’s book Gahdi 1 significantly departs from the review of the book by Tecola Hagos, an esteemed friend and an established public intellectual for the democratization of Ethiopia. Even though Tecola was critical of some aspects of the book, notably, of the “jubilation” that Assegid displays in his narratives of the TPLF’s victories against the Ethiopian army––since he seems to forget that the so-called victories were victories against his own country––in the main, his review is laudatory. The main reason for the praise is neither the literary quality of the book nor its conceptual insights but its truthful account of important political and military events by a person who had been both a direct participant and observer.

Nonetheless, every time Tecola reviews a book, something insightful is bound to happen, mostly because he has a way of putting the finger on issues that the author either failed to articulate properly or does not want to confront. His review of Gahdi is no exception to the rule, and the discernment comes out in the following statement: “what is most puzzling to me is the fact that why TPLF that was well organized, had superior manpower and weapon by the 1980s remained in some kind of subservient relations with EPLF’s Leadership.” The puzzle is real and reveals the failure of the book in that Assegid never succeeds in dissipating it. On the contrary, the book aggravates the riddle to the point of casting serious doubts on the veracity of its reports and explanations of events.

Though I reserve a more complete and detailed review of the book for a later date, I could not postpone the crucial importance of Tecola’s puzzlement, as it throws into relief the great question of Ethiopians about the nature of the TPLF. My claim is that Assegid’s book goes a long way in delivering the essence of the TPLF, provided that one reads it, not as an accurate account of events, but as a sloppy attempt at self-exoneration. I say “sloppy” because the book rests on a flagrant contradiction between Assegid’s visceral commitment to the TPLF and his own political demise, which he identifies with the loss of Assab and the wretched condition of Ethiopia under the TPLF.

The commitment is expressed by Assegid’s unreserved admiration of the TPLF’s fighting spirit and superior military strategy, an admiration so unbounded that he does not hesitate to say that the TPLF was the major, if not the only, defeater of the Derg. His account of the military force of the EPLF is deliberately demeaning, not to mention his utter contempt for the Ethiopian army. It is no exaggeration to say that, according to him, the TPLF would have defeated the Derg even without the EPLF when the plain fact is that the TPLF prevailed only after the Ethiopian army had been considerably diminished in its unsuccessful confrontations in Eritrea. The fate of the Derg was decided, not in Tigray, but in the Sahel mountains.

Unfortunately for Assegid, the more he assigns the exclusive victory over the Derg to the TPLF, the more he enhances the military and organizational power of the TPLF, and the less comprehensible becomes its subordination to the EPLF, all the more so as at times Assegid speaks as though the EPLF were the instrument of the TPLF rather than the other way round. Consequently, to explain why the TPLF failed in its commitments to liberate the Ethiopian peoples and create a prosperous and united Ethiopia with Assab as its main port, Assegid concocts the thesis that its leadership fell into the hands of Eritrean agents, the principal actors being Meles Zenawi, Abayi Tsehai, Sebhat Nega, Seyoum Mesfin, etc. Hence the puzzling issue: if the TPLF was so strong and the EPLF so weak, how on earth was the weak able to dominate the strong?

Assegid alludes to repression and deception silencing pro-Ethiopian elements in the TPLF. But his explanation falls flat when he himself admits that the anti-Eritrean forces within the TPLF failed to show a strong opposition to those working for the EPLF (see p. 31). Moreover, throughout the book, Assegid shows that the EPLF systematically engaged in activities detrimental to the TPLF and that the two organizations were sworn enemies from the get-go. He even states that the EPLF conspired with the Derg to undermine the TPLF, for instance by providing sensitive information to the Derg (pp. 138-139).Given this deep and protracted animosity, it is not clear how the leaders and fighters of the TPLF could be tricked, let alone forced, into giving the leadership to groups that were openly siding with the cause of Eritrea.

To the extent that the explanation of the derailment of the TPLF from its original goal is hardly convincing, the reason why Assegid clings to an irrational explanation is obviously rooted in his refusal to take a hard and critical look at the ideological and political goals of the TPLF. Since he refuses to question the original intent, he had to come up with an explanation involving derailment, essentially through the suggestion that Eritrean agents infiltrated the organization and brought about the betrayal. What speaks here is not reason or the resolution to understand and admit mistakes, but passion and the need to exonerate oneself by attributing the negative outcomes to a conspiracy, however unbelievable it may be.

The bare truth, however, is that the secession of Eritrea was the major condition allowing the TPLF to become the single hegemonic force controlling Ethiopia. Unquestionably, so long as the EPLF was a contending force within Ethiopia, the domineering goal of the TPLF could not come to pass so that pushing Eritrea out of Ethiopia was the appropriate strategic choice. (For further information on this point, see my article “The Underside of the Eritrean Issue.”) This same hegemonic goal explains why the TPLF decided to battle with the EPRP and the EDU, even as an alliance with these opponents of the Derg would have been more logical for an organization committed to democratize Ethiopia.

The point is that the TPLF has never been an organization committed to democracy; instead, it had a hegemonic agenda from the start, a point that has been recently underscored by another but more remorseful founding member. I have in mind Aregawi Berhe, who wrote: “the TPLF leadership put forward ethno-nationalism with ‘self-determination including and up to secession’ as its principal goal mainly because it offered the best chance of building an effective fighting force that leads to power, which understandably is the elite’s own goal” (A Political History Of The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991), p. 307.)

What this reveals is that the so-called agents of Eritrea actually designed the right strategy to achieve domination. They understood very early that the best way to weaken the Derg and become the sole owner of Ethiopia was to fully support the Eritrean independence. The port of Assab was the necessary sacrifice to realize such a goal, given that any desire to retain the port would lead to war, thereby placing the TPLF in the same situation as the Derg. Indeed, to secure Assab, the TPLF would be forced to occupy Eritrea and engage in the same destabilizing conflicts as the Derg, with the added difference that it would have been in a much more disadvantageous position to pursue its hegemonic interests.

The great lesson here is that dissident members of the TPLF cannot join the struggle for democracy by denouncing the derailment of the organization for the simple reason that the theory is contradictory and utterly untenable. They must have a hard and critical look at the initial ideology and political agenda of their organization and admit that the predominance of Meles and his clique is neither an accident nor the product of a conspiracy, but a logical development of both the initial stand against Ethiopia and the subsequent hegemonic aspiration. They must do so for their own sake and regeneration into a democratic force, for admission of guilt chiefly conditions their emancipation from the demons of resentment, radicalism, and vindictiveness.

(Dr Messay Kebede can be reached at [email protected])

15 thoughts on “A sloppy attempt at self-exoneration – Messay Kebede

  1. I do not understand why the defeat of the Derge led army is seen as something attributable to mainly EPLF or TPLF. I honestly believe that Derge lost the war long before that when it totally lost its base: the heart of the Ethiopian peoples, when the army leadership started to be dominated by party elites rather than professionals, when Mengistu continued to lead under arrogance and terror that denied him to get realistic information and good vision. Because of lack of trust to information from Durge media most people knew the pro-secessionist stand of TPLF too late. The stand taken by AAU students is a good example. I think EPLF and TPLF crashed just a sleep waking army.

  2. It doen’t surprise me that the TPLF are now claiming they had the upper hand. It is an Ethiopian thing to rewrite history. I still have a clip from Radio-TPLF acknowledging that they were saved by the mighty Shaebia at the battle of Shire amongst others. Even Mengistu Hailemariam didn’t recognise them as a fighting force – remember his Gorf Yametachew rant? iF tplf was the bigger threat to the Derg, how come they stationed their biggest army in Eritrea and a handful of posts in Tigray? They can rewrite history but it would be wise to do it after this generation is passed. Too many eye witnesses!

  3. Mesay Kebede is “yemeskel wofe”. He does have neither firm stand nor persistant will to fight for justice and democracy.

    Traditionally, philosophers’ and Monks suffer and die for the well being of the society. Remember Socrates and others.

    In Ethiopia, we see philosophers (like Endirias Eshete) and Monks (look aba Gebre medin -aka Paulos) live sucking the blood of people. Unfortunate!

  4. I think Messay’s (an ex Marxist during the Derg Regime) analysis of Ghadi is very short sighted and shallow.

    It would be childish to assume all TPLF members are similar ( like ONE SIZE FITS ALL) do things the same.

    Ghadi has exposed TPLF much better than Tesfay Gebreab or Mr Messay.

  5. (1) As Sebhat alluded on VOA, TPLF made sure Eritrea chose independence. Isayas on the other hand, would have “sold Eritrean independence”, meaning he was neutral in the independence issue.

    (2) Gebreab said Meles and Seye have identical stand on Eritrea. In other words, their differences today is bogus.

    Professor Messay likewise is conveying what Sebhat and Gebreab alluded before that TPLF pushed Eritrea out of Ethiopia to accomplished the goal they set out to do with Meles at the helm.

  6. Dear Mr. Mesay,
    The fact that you keep writing the Gahdi’s author name as “Assegid” is a self testament that you are still stuck in the old days of anything Amhara mentality.

  7. Thank you Professor Messay. Well said. I can’t agree more.

    Yes, TPLF is neither democratic nor has Ethiopianism agenda. Yes, this is not by accident, but by desire.

  8. A lesson for OLF. :-) If you do the converse of what TPLF did you would definitely take power in Ethiopia.

    TPLF/Meles has an upward battle (probably achievable) switching horses in the middle of a race to exonerate itself from the short cut “hegemonic aspiration” that brought it to power.

    On the other hand, for OLF to switch back to their “secessionist agenda” after they win power would be a piece of cake and less taxing. It’s doubtful they would do that but it is an option to present to the Oromo “chauvinists” who oppose a united Ethiopia.

    after they win power would be a piece of cake and less taxing.

    Cheers!!

  9. Hmmmmmm!!!!
    I can’t wait to find the book & read it.
    Exonerate?!….. It sounds like there are lots more are attempting here to exonerate themselves, if you ask my opinions even from the outset .

  10. @ least prof. Messay is rite in one account that shaebia had an upper hand to control the menelik palace which i prefer to call it by its real name; the alula betremesafnti since thier main base they trust is in mekele while adis is just for begging and milking. Ops! excuza for carrying away and allow me to go back to my main topic. SHAEBIA IS A GOVENMENT OF FAIRNESS, JUSTICE & PRINCIPLES UNLIKE WOYANE THAT FOLLOWS W/WHATEVER THE WIND FLOWS, USUALLY TO THE DIRECTION OF THE TASTY KUTFO SMELLS! that’s all i can say.
    unity & peace everywhere!

  11. I like your analysis this time and it is very interesting to see it the way you look at it.

    How shall we come out of this historical quagmire, Professor? What are the true solutions? When shall we stop killing each other? When shall the westerners stop providing us with their killing machines and ideas?

    I remember reading about Samuel Baker visititing the King of Buganda. He gave him a gift of a gun and the king wanted to test it if it kills a person and tried on one of his servants. When we are provided with guns we keep killing each other to make one of us a king.

    Let me hear more about this enigmatic problem of Africa and also Ethiopian Empire- realistic critical solutions. I am sure we all got it by now that wars are not solutions

    Sabbata

  12. The very office “Menelik Palace” that the prime minster Meles Zenawi is temporarily staying was secured by the mighty EPLF forces after the collapse of the Dergue.

    TPLF was never a threat to the Dergue’s Military. TPLF could not even liberated a small town of Shire which was controlled by by the Dergue soldiers. TPLF fought for almost 10 days to dislodge these soldiers and miserably failed. The EPLF force came and liberated the town in 4 hours, and one my Eritrean fighter friend was martyred in the war.

    The defeat of the Dergue was at the mountains of Sahel Eritrea, “nadew ez”, the capture of massawa that stunned not only the Ethiopian forced but the whole world by the speed and coordinations of the mighty EPLF.

    The mistake the EPLF did is trusting the TPLF and ascending the TPLF tothe power by undermining other groups such as OLF and other movements. This is the biggest strategical mistake the EPLF made and now the Eritrean people are paying for it.

    History can not be re-written.

  13. Assegid is such a lier, a confused personality, who has simply written something of his own hallucination and self-agrandizment. It is sad that we ethiopians have to kill eachother to solve our problems. The fact remains that Derg’s policy was ill conceived and was brutal in those periods.

    Dergs 90% of its foreces were stationed in Eritrea. Weyane was simply spending its time with minor skirmishes here and there. Derg lost its spinal chord in the Afabet war. That was it!!! It was after Afabet that Weyane started to wage wars in Shire ( with the help of EPLF).

    Fact is fact, you can’t re-write history. But, some Tigriyan intelectuals and former TPLFites, who have ill-feeling towards EPLF are trying to destort the truth, and they contradict themselves on the way.

Leave a Reply