By Peter Heinlein, VOA
Listen the report: [podcast]http://www.voanews.com/english/figleaf/mp3filegenerate.cfm?filepath=http://www.voanews.com/mediaassets/english/2008_10/Audio/Mp3/LCR%20Heinlein%20ETHIOPIA%20NGO%20LAW%202350155%20%20329P%20gg.Mp3[/podcast]
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA – Ethiopia’s government The Woyanne dictatorial regime in Ethiopia is coming in for fierce criticism over a draft law before parliament that would prohibit or criminalize many activities of foreign charities and NGOs. VOA’s Peter Heinlein in Addis Ababa reports the bill is almost certain to pass easily in a legislature overwhelmingly controlled by Ethiopia’s ruling party.
Ethiopian Woyanne officials have told western diplomats that parliament will approve a proposed Charities and Societies Proclamation within weeks. The bill would give the government supervisory powers over non-governmental organizations that receive at least 10 percent foreign funding, including money from Ethiopians living abroad.
The text before lawmakers prohibits such NGOs from promoting democratic or human rights, the rights of children and the disabled, and equality of gender or religion. Violators could face up to 15 years in prison and fines up to $10,000.
Foreign NGOs have reacted with alarm to the bill, saying it could make it impossible for them to operate in Ethiopia. A group of ambassadors in Addis Ababa recently warned Ethiopian Prime Minister Woyanne dictator Meles Zenawi that passage of the Charities and Societies Proclamation could mean the loss of untold millions of dollars in desperately needed aid.
The organization Human Rights Watch issued a statement urging Ethiopia’s lawmakers to reject the bill, calling it ‘repressive’. But the leader of an opposition parliament faction, Bulcha Demeksa, said he and like-minded lawmakers are powerless to stop it in the face of an overwhelming ruling-party majority. “The government is going to silence the NGOs and their leadership when they speak about human rights, when they spoke about democratic rights, when they spoke about giving democratic education to the citizens.”
He continued, “The government does not like it, that is why the government wants to silence them, and I am very sorry about it, I am very hurt about it. I wish I could do something about it, because practically all the NGOs are doing something good for this country.”
A senior adviser to the prime minister dictator, Bereket Simon, says NGOs will still be welcome to help fight poverty. But he says the bill is designed to prevent foreign interference in the country’s political affairs. “We need foreign NGOs to participate in poverty alleviation programs and to participate in development works, but we definitely believe the political realm must be left for Ethiopians. That is the prerogative of Ethiopians.”
Tom Porteous, the U.K. country director of Human Rights Watch says laws governing the behavior of foreign NGOs can be positive. But he says the draft before Ethiopia’s parliament is contrary to the country’s constitution. “NGOs should not be immune from accountability, and we would support efforts by the Ethiopian Woyanne government to increase the accountability of civil society organizations.”
Porteous added, At the same time, many other countries in Africa have managed to achieve this without criminalizing human rights activities for example, and in fact this law contravenes not only international and regional African treaties on freedom of association and so forth, but it actually violates Ethiopia’s obligations under its own constitution.”
Ethiopian Woyanne officials, however, say they see nothing repressive or unusual about the draft law. Bereket Simon says NGOs who stay out of Ethiopia’s internal affairs should have nothing to fear. “It is not repressive, because this is a matter that is between Ethiopia and foreigners, so foreigners have their domain, we have our domain. As a sovereign state which runs Ethiopia, we are designing our own law, and any foreigner who is ready to work in Ethiopia should come and see the law, and if it feels comfortable with the law, it can continue to work. If he does not feel comfortable, then we are not going to force them to work here.”
Bereket says the law is aimed partly at what he described as ‘NGOs collaborating with terrorist organizations’. He declined to elaborate.
There are an estimated 3,000 NGOs in Ethiopia. Their combined budgets are believed to be more than $1 billion a year.
Last year, Ethiopia’s Woyanne government expelled the International Committee of the Red Cross, charging its workers with providing assistance to rebels fighting for independence in the country’s Somali region known as the Ogaden. The ICRC dismissed the allegations.
Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous nation, and one of the world’s largest recipients of international aid. The United States is the largest single donor to Ethiopia Woyanne, with aid donations this year expected to top $800 million.
By Alemayehu G. Mariam
A Thankless Job, But Somebody’s Got to Do It!
It is gratifying to know that Ethiopian Americans are carrying their fair share of the load in helping the economy of their homeland. It was an eye-opening revelation to learn that Ethiopian Americans contributed a cool $1.2 billion to the Ethiopian economy this past year. That is “only second to the amount generated by Ethiopia’s exports.” Last week Elias Loha, Manager of Reserve Management and Foreign Exchange Market of Ethiopian National Bank, fretting over “a cut in vital remittances from Ethiopians in the United States” told Reuters: “We are concerned and worried that as a result of the financial crisis… some of the Ethiopians may loose their jobs and as a result they may stop sending money to help their families back home.” Could that be a backhanded way of giving us teeny-weeny credit for the much vaunted stratospheric “10 percent a year economic growth” Zenawi gasbags about? Regardless, there seems to be manifest alarm in Zenawi’s officialdom that the Ethiopian-American goose may not be laying as many golden eggs as it has been previously because of the sub-prime mortgage debacle.
The $1.2 billion figure came as a pleasant and unexpected surprise for many Ethiopians who regularly send money to their families or make remittances for other purposes. The official figure most likely underestimates the actual figure since the National Bank does not have the data collection mechanisms to accurately gauge the remittance flow in the informal channels or in the underground economy. For instance, a 2006 World Bank study suggested that if remittances sent through informal channels are included, total remittances in recipient countries could be as much as 50 per cent higher than the official record. What surprised most Ethiopian Americans aware of the staggering contribution was the fact that remittances substantially exceed the total amount of U.S. aid given to Ethiopia. Evidently, such massive infusion of money could have significant and decisive implications for Ethiopian society, but there are few systematic studies on the impact of remittances on the Ethiopian economy. We do not know if the $1.2 billion dollars we sent alleviated poverty or deepened the inequality in Ethiopia between remittance recipients and the vast majority of people who do not receive them. Did our remittances help reduce the poverty rate in Ethiopia or place an added burden on the poor by grossly distorting the local economy? Is the $1.2 billion we sent last year or the hundreds of millions in prior years in some part responsible for the current high inflation, high food and fuel costs and stratospheric housing prices? Is there evidence to show that the billion plus dollars we sent contributed to economic development in Ethiopia? Would a significant decline in remittances by Ethiopians in the U.S. have positive effects on the economy by alleviating inflationary and other pressures? What is the relationship between increased levels of remittances and the “brain drain” of highly skilled workers from Ethiopia? Do our remittances provide economic buoyancy to help keep afloat the doomed ship of a ruthless dictatorship? We just don’t have the empirical data to answer these questions.
The Evidence on Remittances, Growth and Poverty
Although there are few studies on the impact of remittances on the Ethiopian economy, there is an emerging body of empirical literature on the subject in the Asian and Latin America contexts. The top recipient countries of recorded remittances include India ($21.7 billion), China ($21.2 billion) and Mexico ($18 billion). Africa receives only 4 percent of total remittances made to developing countries. The International Monetary Fund Yearbook (2006) reports that 5 African countries enjoy the highest remittance flows relative to their size (based on both ratio of remittances to GDP and export earnings); these include Lesotho, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Togo.
The available data on the impact of international migration and remittances on economic growth and poverty is not definitive, but there seems to be general consensus that remittances have a positive impact on the reduction of the employment and poverty rates in recipient countries. For instance, a study of 74 low and middle income developing countries done by the United Nations Population Fund in 2006 concluded that there is statistically significant correlation between remittances and decline in poverty. The study suggested that a 1.2 percent reduction in the poverty rate could be achieved by a 10 percent increase in the share of remittance in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Other studies in the Asian context suggest that remittance inflows could accelerate entrepreneurial activity in households by obviating credit restrictions. According to the World Bank, the more remittances a country receives, the higher its creditworthiness and the easier access it has to international capital markets. Remittance inflows are also said to have multiplier effects (money used to create more money) making a significant contribution to savings and investments in recipient countries. One study of Tunisian workers, for instance, showed that workers who had limited access to bank credit or the financial market used remittances for investment purposes. Other reported benefits of remittances include improved financing in health care and education and reduction in child labor in recipient countries.
There is also a body of literature that casts doubt on the relationship between remittances and economic growth in recipient societies. There is some evidence to suggest that remittances in Latin America have had only short term positive impact on poverty by increasing the income of recipients, but no appreciable effect on economic growth. A number of other studies have suggested that the primary use of remittances in recipient countries is to raise the recipients’ level of consumption with the balance going into home building, debt repayment and the financing of future migration by other members of recipients’ households. Some scholars have argued that remittances indirectly but negatively affect labor supply in recipient countries by encouraging some recipient households to work less, creating a “moral hazard” in which remittances spawn an informal “welfare” system. Concern has also been expressed by some economists that large and sustained remittance inflows could result in the so-called “Dutch Disease” problem, whereby remittances cause an increase in the real exchange rate (how much one currency is worth relative to another) and make the production of tradable goods sector (e.g. exports) less profitable. For instance, a study of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries showed that remittance inflows into these countries caused an increase in the exchange rate which reduced the value of exports and the competitiveness of the recipient countries’ export sectors.
Do our Dollars Help or Hurt Our People?
There are few studies that have examined the relationship between remittances and economic consequences in Ethiopia. One of the few systematic and enlightening studies on the subject was done by Dejene Aredo of Addis Ababa University in 20051. Aredo’s study lends some interesting insights on the role of remittances and their impact on the economy, particularly in the urban areas. Aredo examined the effect of remittances (both domestic and foreign) on urban households who are “more vulnerable than rural households to different sorts of urban shocks” (e.g. effect of structural adjustment programs [i.e. to get World Bank or IMF loans, a country must do what it is told] on urban workers, higher rates of HIV/AIDS, withdrawal of government subsidies for targeted programs, higher rate of poverty among female-headed urban households, higher incidence of homelessness and unemployment, disproportionate impact of global financial crises, etc.). Aredo found that a “considerable proportion of sampled households (16.63%) received remittance from abroad.” International remittances (77 percent) exceeded domestic ones (23 percent) “both in terms of volume and per capita flows.” Urban households received remittances at a higher frequency during the month suggesting that remittances were used “largely to cover day to day consumption expenditures.” Only 1.1 percent of remittances in the sample were used for investment purposes, 1.7 for savings and 2.8 percent for asset purchases. Aredo also found that women got more remittances than men from both international and domestic sources, suggesting that “remittances are a means by which poverty among the most vulnerable groups of society, i.e. female-headed households, is partially addressed.” Based on his findings, Aredo suggests that “with increased remittances, it is possible to cover a substantial portion of the resource gap and reduce poverty by half by the year 2015.” He also suggests implementation of a more comprehensive policy to tap into available Diaspora funds beyond the regime’s policies (e.g. removal of import tariffs on certain goods, land grants for home building, bank deposit in foreign exchange, etc.).
The jury is still out on the impact of remittances on the Ethiopian economy. The available data is insufficient to determine whether remittances from Ethiopians in the United States alleviate poverty, accentuate existing inequalities or contribute significantly to economic development, job creation and investments. The preliminary evidence suggests that remittances can cushion the “ever-deepening poverty and vulnerability to recurrent shocks” of urban households, particularly female-headed ones. Aredo’s study appears to suggest that “in the absence of credit and insurance market (even in urban areas), vulnerable households attempt to smooth their consumption by partially relying on both sources of remittances (i.e. domestics and international), while households with stable and high incomes rely heavily on international remittance transfers for investment or other purposes (other than for consumption smoothing purposes).”
What Can We Do As Ethiopian American “Remittance Donors”?
Remittances are essentially private transfers of wealth with potentially significant economic and political consequences in recipient countries. In Ethiopia, $1.2 billion in remittances in one year appear to represent the largest source of foreign exchange earnings, rivaling and/or exceeding export revenues, foreign aid, foreign direct investment or other private capital flows. If we as Ethiopian Americans collectively remit (“donate”) well over a billion dollars a year, that effectively makes us a major stakeholder in the economic well being of our country. Obviously, the regime’s “concern” with declining remittances has to do with the potential evaporation of foreign exchange reserves caused by job losses of Ethiopians in the U.S. World Bank data does not support their concern. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that there tend to be more remittances in an economic downturn, political crisis, natural disaster, famine or war than in normal circumstances. But as “remittance stakeholders” our issues transcend the regime’s insatiable appetite for foreign exchange reserves. Our issues are different: Do we have an obligation to carefully analyze the economic impact of our financial transfers on economic growth and poverty in Ethiopia? Do we have any political or moral responsibility in the way our remittances are used in the country? Could we be spreading the “Dutch Disease” to Ethiopia by massive remittance infusions? Do our remittances provide a mechanism to those in power to substitute remittances as anti-poverty programs and avoid long-term development efforts? If our remittances tend to increase income inequality between recipients and others, do we have an obligation to rectify that imbalance through remittances to charitable organizations? How can we help build institutional capacity without building and fortifying the current repressive dictatorship? Do our remittances indirectly support, prolong and entrench the one-party, one-man dictatorship in Ethiopia? These are questions properly put to Ethiopian economists.
In terms of prescriptive remittance policies, various scholars have proposed initiatives in three categories: 1) policies that maximize remittance savings in national financial institutions in recipient countries, 2) policies that promote investment among recipient households while minimizing consumption, and 3) policies that are aimed at promoting infrastructure development funded totally or partially by “collective” remittances. One area of exploration for Ethiopian Americans should be “community development” totally or partially funded by “collective” remittances. For instance, some Mexican migrants in the U.S. have formed hometown associations that raise funds for their communities of origin and spend those funds on community development projects such as improving water supply and quality, health and educational services, etc. In some cases, their contributions have been matched by the Mexican federal and state governments. The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, a non-profit organization with headquarters in Islamabad provides investment advisory and facilitative services to returning Pakistanis who seek to establish businesses. At the institutional level, India and Pakistan have offered specialized incentives for their “Diasporic” citizens to set up or expand businesses, particularly in economically backward or depressed areas. Commercial banks in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala have remittance policies that offer higher interest rates on term deposits and foreign currency denominated banking accounts. Undoubtedly, Ethiopian economists could develop a whole list of creative uses of remittances for maximum local benefits. Beyond the need for substantive policies, better data collection and analysis on the multifaceted aspects of remittances is needed. Without such data, much of the analysis and policy prescriptions are likely to be speculative and not particularly useful in maximizing the positive impact of remittances on the Ethiopian political economy. Needless to say, it is awfully nice to know that there are some in Ethiopia who are concerned about the economic health of the Ethiopian American goose that lays the golden eggs. But does the golden goose have to be a cash cow too?
—
1 http://www.gdnet.org/pdf2/gdn_library/global_research_projects/macro_low_income/Aredo.pdf
By Martin Plaut BBC News
Aid agencies are warning that Ethiopian authorities are under-estimating the scale of the country’s drought.
Official estimates of the number of people facing hunger and hardship stand at 4.6m but agencies warn the real figure could be more than 8m.
There is also confusion over the amount of money needed to meet the crisis, with the Oxfam agency estimating it at about $500m.
However, the United Nations reports that $772m has already been pledged.
Proud people
Ethiopia is in the grip of severe food shortages after rains failed across a large swathe of the east and south of the country.
But attempts to deal with the crisis have been hindered by disputes over the number of people affected.
In April the first government appeal spoke of more than 2m in need of food aid. By June that figure had risen to well over 4m.
Aid agencies now say the official estimate has reached 6.4m – but has not yet been released.
But, say the agencies, even this underestimates the scale of the problem.
Ethiopians are a proud people, who hate the image of their country forever extending a begging bowl. And they are suspicious of the motives of the aid community.
In an interview with Time magazine in August, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said there were pockets of severe malnutrition but that the situation was manageable.
He questioned the way some agencies operated, saying they tended to use “hyperbole” to get the aid they needed.
“That can convey the message that the situation is hopeless when in fact it is not,” said the prime minister.
Yet if the 8m figure is correct, and if this is added to the approximately 7m who are chronically short of food, then as many as 20% of all Ethiopians could need food aid this year.
Oxfam has just released a fresh appeal. It says the aid required is $260m short of its target.
But figures produced by the United Nations office for the co-ordination of humanitarian affairs show that $772m has already been pledged, the vast majority from the US, which has nearly trebled its aid to Ethiopia this year.
The current crisis in Ethiopia is being lost in a swirling mist of competing figures.
EDITOR’S NOTE: As if terrorizing and starving millions of Ethiopians is not enough, the regime of Tigrean People Liberation Front (Woyanne) – supported by the U.S. State Department and the World Bank – has invaded Somalia and turned it into a hell on earth, as the following story by a French magazine LaDepeche shows.
Somalia: The worst state in the world
Throughout the last week, the news has once again centred on Somalia, as a series of attacks on ships sailing through coastal waters has revealed just how much trouble Somalia is in. Pirating is a profitable business in the failed Eastern African state, as ransoms can lead to a way out of the country,and for some a new life. Last week, pirates hijacked a Ukrainian ship, some 300 miles off the coast, containing 20 Russian tanks bound for South Africa. The ransom was set at €15 million, and for once governments and private corporations are struggling to find ways to pay for it. This is the 20th attack this year, so supplying ransoms for hijacked ships encourages pirates more, rather than deters them. But how, most importantly, has Somalia become and remains the world’s most failed state?
Somalia, throughout history, is known for its rich soil, bountiful fish stocks and poetry. Some of the best poets on the continent, historically speaking, hail from Somalia. But since 1991, the country has been driven into chaos, as a lack of centralized government and a series of poorly planned interventions from the outside world has sunk the country deeper into hell every year. Famines and warring clan factions haven’t helped either. Now, since 1991, the once beautiful Mogadishu, the coastal capital of the country, has lost nearly ¾ of its population, and millions more around the country have fled, mostly to neighbouring Kenya or Ethiopia.
Two years ago, an Islamist government swept into power through violence and intimidation and finally brought order and stability to the country. It came at a cost though. Sharia law became the preferred penal code and women were stripped of rights, let alone dignity. But order came. Crime fell sharply, the airport briefly opened up and trade slowly trickled in, as the Islamists, despite all their flaws, tried to rebuild the country to shape their desires – conservative, religious, patriarchal, harsh and hopefully, stable.
But the Americans, with the help of the Ethiopian Woyanne military, refused to allow Islamists to run a country famous for harbouring terrorists, so they invaded and defeated them. Since, a poorly organized transitional government has done nothing, making it easier for pirates to operate on the coastal waters. Unemployment nears 90%, infrastructure is dismal and the country is too dangerous for international aid organizations, so piracy, crime and drug smuggling provide jobs and money, something the government and international community can’t. So as of now, Somalia remains failed, impoverished and drowning in a sea of problems; it’s good this piracy has become salient in the news. Too bad the state of country hasn’t. Everyone is praying for the hostages aboard the hijacked Ukrainian ship. But no one seems to pray for Somalia anymore.
Pour écouter cet article lu en anglais, téléchargez le fichier MP3 en cliqu
[podcast]http://www.mycow.eu/pics/radio/2490.mp3[/podcast]ant ici
In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousandfold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers… we are ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.” – Aleksander Solzehnitsyn
Ethiopian Review continues to work on a dossier of crimes that documents the crimes of Meles Zenawi’s regime against the people of Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea. We need help from every one in making this dossier comprehensive and factual that can be admitted to future judicial proceedings against the Meles criminal gang. Please participate in this important documentation by posting here any information of crime you may have been informed about that have been committed by the brutal dictatorship of the Tigrean People Liberation Front (Woyanne) and its opportunist allies.
Click here to see the information documented so far.
The following are the main perpetrators of terror against the people of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. The list is a work in progress.
Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Tigray People Liberation Front, Chairman of the Marxist Lenonsit League of Tigray, Chairman of the Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front
Azeb Mesfin, wife of Meles Zenawi, member of the fake parliament, and the mother of corruption in Ethiopia.
Sebhat Nega, Tigray People Liberaton Front’s moneyman and godfather.
Bereket Simon, chief of propaganda, responsible for the disappearance of Destaw Kassie who defeated him in the Bugna Woreda (district) of Wollo at the 2005 elections.
Samora Yenus, General, army Chief of Staff, of Woyanne
Gabre Heard, Commander of all Woyanne military forces in Somalia. General Gabre is responsible for displacement of over 2 million Somalis who have become homeless as a result of his indiscriminate bombing of civilians. He is also responsible for mass killing of civilians, gang-raping of women, and slashing the throats of Muslim religious leaders.
Seye Abraha, former defense minister who had carried out the ethnic cleansing against Eritreans in Ethiopia
Addisu Legese, chairman of the Amhara National Democratic Movement and vice-chairman of the EPRDF, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Agriculture
Tefera Walwa, Minister of Capacity Building
Kassu Ilala, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of Economic Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office, Minister of Work and Urban Development
Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the TPLF Politbureau
Girma Woldegiorgis, fake president whose only job, when he takes a break from eating, is to try to tell the world that the Woyanne regime is not totally dominated by one ethnic group.
Mahteme Solomon, Minister of inJustice who prosucuted tens of thousands prolitical prisonser who were rounded up after the 2005 elections.
Indrias Eshete, Addis Ababa University president who helped carried out the mass arrest, beating, torture and killing of students who protested the stealing of votes at the 2005 elections
DebreTsion GebreMikael, member of the TPLF central committee and chairman of the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation who has carried out Meles Zenawi’s order to shutdown SMS (Internet text messaging service) and block web sites.
Zeriou Melese, Vice-Prosecutor General
Arkebe Ekubay, member of the TPLF central committee, mayor of Addis Ababa during the 2005 masaccre of civilians, currently State Minister of Work and Urban Development
Abay Tsehaye, member of the TPLF central committee
Tsegay Berhe, Tigray province president and TPLF politburo member who stores tens of thousands of tonnes of food in Tigray region, some of which to be distributed to Woyanne members while over 10 million people in southern Ethiopia face starvation. Tsegay Berhe is buying the food at below market prices, or in some cases steal, from poor farmers in southern Ethiopia who are currently unable to feed their own families
Workneh Gebeyehu, Head of the Federal Police who had carried out Meles Zenawi order to shoot down unarmed pro-democracy protestors in June and November 2005
Solomon Enqui, TPLF Central Committee member
Aba Dulah Gamada, Defense Minister
Omot Obang Olom, Woyanne security chief for the Gambella region who had carried out Meles Zenawi’s genocide against the Anuak ethnic group in western Ethiopia
Tadese HaileSelassie, Woyanne Police Commander in Gambella
Nagu Beyene, commander of the Ethiopian army in Gambella
Gebrab Barnabas, The architect of the Anuak genocide
Kidusan Nega – Mekele Mayor and TPLF central commite member (Sebhat Nega’s sister)
Aberash Nega – member of TPLF (Sebhat Negas’s sister)
Berhane GebreKirstos, TPLF central committee member and former Ambasador to the USA and current Ambassador to Brussels Belgium
Abay Woldu – TPLF politburo member
Turufat KidaneMariam, Abay Woldu’s wife, Meles Zenawi’s justice and security chief, and TPLF central committee member.
Mulugeta Alemseged, Meles Zenawi’s nearest family member, Meles Zenawi’s security chief and personal body guard, National Security Affairs Adviser with the rank of minister
Birhane Negash – Meles Zenawi’s Palace security chief and the god-father of Meles Zenawi’s daughter.
Sintayehu WoldeMichael – Minister of Education, responsible for Addis Ababa University masaccre.
Grima Biru – Minister of Trade and Industry
Junedi Sado – Minister of Transport and Communication, responsible for the disappearance of 26-year old Minisha Girma who defeated him in Arsi at the 2005 elections
Sufian Ahmed, Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Melaku Fenta, Minister of Revenue
Siraj Fegisa, Minister of Federal Affairs
Assefa Kessito, Minister of Justice
Kuma Demeksa, Mayor of Addis Ababa
Berhan Hailu, Minister of Information
Asfaw Digamo, Minister of Water Resource
Aster Mamo, Minister of Youth and Sport
Hirut Delebo, Minister of Women Affairs
Mohammed Dirir, Minister of Culture and Tourism
Alemayehu Tegenu, Minister of Mines and Energy
Hassen Abdella, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Tewodros Adhanom, Minister of Health.
Fikru Desalegn, State Minister of Capacity Building
Belete Legeso, State Minister of Capacity Building
Adhana Haile, State Minister of Education
Wondwosen Kiflu, State Minister of Education
Fuad Ibrahim, State Minister of Education
Tadesse Haile, State Minister of Trade and Industry
Ahmed Tusa, State Minister of Trade and Industry
Abera Deresa, State Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development
Ahmed Nasir, State Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development
Yacob Tola, State Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development.
Getachew Mengiste, State Minister of Transport and Communication
Mekonnen Manyazewal, State Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Birhanu Kebede, State Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Mamo Gito, State Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Tezera Wodajo, State Minister of Revenue
Maeregu HailelMariam, State Minister of Federal Affairs
Kebede Worku, State Minister of Health.
Hashim Tewfiq, State Minister of Justice
Semegn Wube, State Minister of Justice
Haile Tilahun, Major General, State Minister of Defense
Sultan Mohamed, State Minister of Defense
Kashaun Dendir, State Minister of Defense
Tekeda Alemu, Dr., State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nega Tsegaye, State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tesemma Fote, State Minister of Information
Adugna Jebesa, State Minister of Water Resources
Abdisa Yadeta, State Minister of Youth and Sport
Ubah Mohammed Hussien, State Minister of Women’s Affairs
Tadelech Delecha, State Minister of Culture and Tourism
Mohamuda Gaas, State Minister of Culture and Tourism
Sinknesh Ejigu, State Minister of Mines and Energy
Zenebu Tadese, State Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Mohammed Mealin Ali, State Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
NewayeKristos GebreAb, Economic Advisor of the Prime Minister with the Rank of Minister
Abay Tsehaye, Federal Affair Minister, member of the TPLF Central Committee
Birhanu Adelo, Minister of Cabinet Affairs
Fasil Nahom, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister with the Rank of Minister
Mesfin Abebe, Advisor of the Deputy Prime Minister with the Rank of Minister
… more to come
