Seventy years ago, Ethiopians won the war against colonial aggression by their {www:archenemy} Fascist Italy. For a people {www:conscious} of its history, seventy years is not far, and for Ethiopians the sorrows, destruction and glories associated with the five-year war are still fresh in their memories. As a {www:tribute} to the patriotic resistance fighters, this write-up presents their perspective with the purpose of reminding the current generation some of what our ancestors approved or disliked in relating to foreign allies. There are two points I wish to highlight. One of them is that the fighters acknowledged British help, but they were essentially proud of their own resistance to Italian presence. To the end of their days, they insisted that they fought a war of invasion from 1935 to 1940/41; their country was not occupied despite a foreign army that they managed to dislodge eventually. The other point of emphasize here is that Ethiopians were aware of contemporary episodes that were used for asserting negative views about their political processes.
Italy crushed an Ethiopian army at {www:Maichew} in October 1935 and took the capital on 5 May, but the southern Ethiopian war front of Sidamo*, Harar, Arsi and Bale, Ras Desta, Dajazmaches Gebre Matyam and Debay, Beyene Merid and others went on fighting until February 1937. Ras Imiru, with members of young standing army cadets, sustained an army and a government in Wellega and the west until June 1936. In and around the capital, resistance picked up as {www:guerrilla warfare} in September 1937 and kept going until 1941. The same type of warfare was conducted in Gojam, Begemder, Wello and parts of Tigre, more or less throughout the same time. Far from extracting colonial wealth, the invader had to maintain a substantial fighting force at a heavy cost to Italy itself.
The United Nations has declared that five-year war as the beginning of World War II. When it ended in Ethiopia in 1940/41, it escalated elsewhere because Fascist Italy joined Germany and Japan to contest world superiority. On top of its provocation in Europe, Italian air force bombed towns along the Kenyan border and even took Galbat and Kassala on the Ethiopian Sudanese border in June and July of 1940. In a well-known historical saga, the British Middle East Command, especially General Platt in Sudan, General Cunningham in Nairobi and the French in Djibouti wanted to use the Ethiopian warriors against the Italians. Their purpose was to ‘mop up’ Italians from their African military bases and secure the Red Sea. The British authorities in Sudan reached out to the fighters along the Ethiopian Sudanese border, and gave them uniforms and supplies. So did those in Kenya and the French Djibouti.
How the British and their agents engaged Ethiopians in dialogue is a fascinating historical episode that has some relevance to contemporary attempts of approaching westerners concerning the country. At the time, only a few held the once wide-spread belief that the League of Nations would help Ethiopia against their aggressor. Indeed, those on the side of the British mission reported that they had difficulty in winning over the confidence of the fighters. Some were highly suspicious that they would only change one European aggressor for another. Others distrusted the claim that the emperor was returning with a British force. Those who finally accepted British offer of help, did so because they strongly believed that the Emperor would have the upper hand in making final decisions on Italian or any other European presence in Ethiopia. They saw the role of the British as marginal to the war effort to throw out the Italians.
Most fighters rejected the offer preferring to take their commands from the emperor. Leaders such as Amoraw Wubneh (styled ras by his followers) told the British in Gedaref “What is the difference to me. White are White, be they British or Italians or British”. Even news of the emperor’s imminent arrival in their midst did not help the British mission that was sent to coordinate the warriors’ efforts. Thus, Lij Belay Zeleke (whose bravery had obliged his followers to style him “emperor by his own might”) would not shake hands with a member of the British mission that had reached his camp in Gojam. In Kenya, General Cunningham had to restrain some Ethiopian exiles who refused to fight under the command of British colonial officers. Only the exiles in Djibouti were happy to fight the enemy as long as the French authorities cooperated with them.
The history of the British involvement in the war in Ethiopia adds another interesting aspect to foreign involvement in the affairs of the country. Once General Cunningham launched the attack against the Italians, he found that the Italians were much weakened in the south. He soon reached the center, and on April 4 had the Royal Air Force bomb the airport where it destroyed 32 planes; the following day, he entered the Addis Ababa. His use of weapons and military force from British territorial holdings in southern Africa was minimal cost to the British. The Ethiopian resistance had already carried the critical cost of dislodging the Italian forces.
Whatever the British thought they were doing in Ethiopia, the Ethiopians accompanying them were made to understand that they were only receiving assistance in their struggle against the Italians. They were easing the advance of the British columns to the capital and beyond, whether they were coming from the north and west or from the south. Later, however, the British put a facile twist of military diplomacy, with a dash of racism particularly from their military bases of their Southern African colonies, and claimed that their relationship with the fighters was one of ‘inciting a rebellion’ in the Italian ‘colony’.
This was a negation of the spirit of Ethiopian sovereignty, and with General Cunningham’s dash to enter the capital symbolically expressed it. Haile Selassie and the resistance fighters were deliberately delayed. The resistance fighters, including the famous Ras Abebe Aregai had hoped to stage a deservedly grand entry into the capital with the emperor in the lead. The same day that Cunningham arrived in Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie hoisted the Ethiopian flag in Debre Markos, Gojam. He and his warriors had to wait for until 5 May to enter the capital. British friends, who considered the emperor as a symbol of unity, also lauded that date as important for being the fifth anniversary of the emperor’s departure into exile five years before.
Once their forces from Sudan and Southern Africa overrun Ethiopia, they set to consolidating their victory over the Italian army. They dismantled its weapons, looted its administrative centers and took what they could carry to Kenya. The emperor and his government personnel had to engage in diplomatic maneuvers to finally get rid of British administrative and military personnel. Some of their administrative decisions included the attempt at forging territorial boundaries in the neighboring countries of North East Africa, notably Ethiopia and Somalia.
The resistance fighters never accepted Italian or any other claim that they had lost their sovereignty. They rejected British claims to liberate Ethiopia, and resented that Britain treated Ethiopia as an occupied territory. It has to be remembered that the British entered the war in Ethiopia as part of their strategy of denying German military holding in Rwanda-Urundi [later Rwanda] and Italian positions to Libya, Somalia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. It was neither in aid of policing the region nor philanthropic. They knew Italy’s military expenditure was overtaxing it and that even sending troops to Ethiopia in order to ease internal social and economic crisis had outrun its usefulness as a propaganda ploy. Italy was a weak enemy, and the Ethiopian warriors were already giving it a hard time. As a strategy of making the weakened enemy fragile ever further, helping the emperor to link with the guerrilla fighters was vital.
To summarize: The historical episodes –the British agents engaging Ethiopians in dialogue and British involvement in the war in Ethiopia – have influenced the turn of some events in Ethiopian history. Indeed the British sentiment of inciting rebellion in Ethiopia was at work when the British Command in Sudan sent its agents to engage the Ethiopian warriors in a dialogue for cooperation. They were talking cross-purpose of what was at stake. The engagement in dialogue underlined the difficulties in what was to be seen as the rivalry between the resistance fighters who had stayed in county and the exiles. Those who fought the guerrilla wars looked down on the returned exiles; the latter of course were said to have the support of the chief exile, the emperor. It was a rivalry that was reflected in the less than harmonious administration of post-war Ethiopia. Sadly, a more profound legacy of British involvement in the war emanated from their subsequent administrative decisions on the basis of their claim that Ethiopia was their occupied territory. Their attempt at forging territorial boundaries left hostilities among people in the neighboring countries of North East Africa, notably Ethiopia and Somalia.
Both historical incidents have been cited also as basis for characterizing Ethiopians as suspicious of one another, and as a people who lack in coordinating their own efforts. Perhaps drawing parallels between the experiences of the resistance fighters had with the British and current generation of Ethiopians with the global community is unfair. However, there are lessons to be learnt from their negative consequences. Those heroic resistance fighters also used their diplomatic skills to dislodge foreign involvement in the name of war. Follow their example in such involvement in the name of contemporary rivalry for investment is entirely up to whether we seek to learn from our history.
Meles Zenawi, the dictator-in-chief in Ethiopia, says he does not want to talk about the 2010 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights [Report] in Ethiopia. But speaking through his parrot Hailemariam Desalegn, Zenawi said the Report is a meaningless “cut and paste” exercise and will be treated with “the contempt it deserves”:
The last two years we have engaged ourselves with the authorities of the United States and discussed several meetings on the human rights situation in Ethiopia. We thought we had convinced each other on many of the issues… If this is not considered at all, then there is no need to accept this report as something that can help us. So that’s why we dismissed the report totally because it is based on unfounded allegations which are baseless… We said this is a methodology failure. So if the United States is worried about the human rights challenge, then it should be critically evaluated. So if it is ‘cut and paste,’ then it doesn’t give any meaning to anyone. So we said, if it continues like this, it has nothing to do with changing and improving the human rights situation in Ethiopia.
Desalegn said the Report would not affect the “cordial relationship” between Addis Ababa and Washington. With snooty sarcasm he emphasized, “we dismiss the report, we have not dismissed the United States.” Translation: We will gladly pickpocket American Joe and Jane Taxpayer to the tune of USD$1 billion a year, but they can take their human rights report and shove it.
Last year Zenawi blasted the 2009 human rights Report as “lies, lies and implausible lies.” He even ridiculed the U.S. State Department for not preparing a report based on true lies:
The least one could expect from this report, even if there are lies is that they would be plausible ones. But that is not the case. It is very easy to ridicule it [report], because it is so full of loopholes (sic). They could very easily have closed the loopholes and still continued to lie.”
Zenawi’s consigliere, Bereket Simon, called the 2009 Report “the same old junk” released “to punish the image (sic) of Ethiopia and try if possible to derail the peaceful and democratic election process.”
Defending against unfavorable or critical reports of international human rights and other organizations by delivering a barrage of scorn, sarcasm and derision is standard operating procedure for Zenawi’s regime. In November 2010, Zenawi blitzkrieged the European Union Election Observer Report on the May 2010 election in Ethiopia as “trash that deserves to be thrown in the garbage“.
The State Department human rights report does not “deserve” condemnation in barnyard language, but diplomatic praise for its rigorous analysis and reporting of human rights abuses. The Report is an important policy instrument submitted by the U.S. Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of the U.S. Congress annually pursuant to amended sections 116(d) and 502 B (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and 504 of the Trade Act of 1974. Using the Report, Congress aims to hold U.S. aid recipient “governments accountable to their obligations under international human rights instruments” and promote the rule of law, expressive freedoms, women’s, children’s and minority rights in recipient countries. The U.S. State Department says it uses the findings and conclusions of the Report in “shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, training, and other resource allocations” and in determining “U.S. Government’s cooperation with private groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights.” But the annual Report has broader significance in the global struggle for human rights. As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton explained, the human rights
reports are an essential tool – for activists who courageously struggle to protect rights in communities around the world; for journalists and scholars who document rights violations and who report on the work of those who champion the vulnerable; and for governments, including our own, as they work to craft strategies to encourage protection of human rights of more individuals in more places.
Taking cheap shots at the Report by calling it “lies”, “junk” and “cut and paste” is to put on public display one’s abysmal ignorance of the American policy and legal process. To be sure, submitting any document to Congress containing “any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry” (i.e. “lies, lies and implausible lies”) is a serious crime subject to a five-year prison sentence under Title 18, section 1001 (a) (3) (c) (1) (2). If there are any statements in the Report that fall under the foregoing section of Title 18, it is incumbent upon anyone with evidence of such statements to lodge a complaint and request a formal investigation with the Office of the Speaker of the U.S. House, among other federal law enforcement authorities. Launching a tirade against the U.S. is no defense against the naked truth that Zenawi’s regime is a notorious violator of human rights, nor is it a substitute for substantial and credible evidence to support a claim of false statement.
Failure of Methodology?
Desalegn parrots his boss when he says there is “a methodology failure” that consigns the Report to the ash-heap of “contempt”. Over the years, Zenawi has used similar vague and unsubstantiated accusations of “methodological” flaws in a futile attempt to discredit unfavorable human rights reports on his regime. In 2008, Zenawi alleged that methodological flaws in a Human Rights Watch report on the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia amounted to manufactured lies. It is a fact that Zenawi’s regime has thwarted and frustrated every effort by human rights organizations to conduct open and independent investigations of human rights abuses in Ethiopia. By labeling the truth a lie, Zenawi seems to believe that he can indeed change the truth into a lie.
There is nothing secret or sinister about the “methodology” and data collection procedures of the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The Report is based on a compilation of information from a variety of sources. U.S. embassies collect “information throughout the year from a variety of sources across the political spectrum, including government officials, jurists, armed forces sources, journalists, human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists.” U.S. Foreign Service Officers undertake investigations of human rights abuses under difficult and not infrequently under “dangerous conditions”. They “monitor elections, and come to the aid of individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their governments.” The initial drafts of the Reports are completed at the embassies and submitted for review to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the State Department. Information collected by other sources including “US and other human rights groups, foreign government officials, representatives from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations and institutions and academic, media experts” and other sources are also evaluated and included to ensure accuracy, balance and corroboration.
The Reports reflect the work of hundreds of highly experienced and knowledgeable employees in the State Department and other branches of the U.S. Government. For the Report to be “lies, lies and implausible lies”, there must be a grand criminal conspiracy of hundreds of officials in the U.S. Government, including Secretary of State Clinton.
What’s in the “Contemptible” 2010 Human Rights Report on Ethiopia?
Here are some of the “lies, lies and implausible lies” in the 56-page Report:
There was no proof that the government and its agents committed any politically motivated killings during the year… [but] there were credible reports of involvement of security forces in the killings…in the Somali region…” (p.2.)
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, there were innumerable reports of local police, militia members, and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) seizing… opposition political activists. (p.4.)
On September 10, the federal government and Amhara and Oromia regional governments granted pardons to more than 9,000 prisoners, in keeping with a longstanding tradition for celebration of the new year on September 11. (p. 10.)
The UN Committee Against Torture noted in a November 19 report that it was ‘deeply concerned’ about ‘numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations’ concerning “the routine use of torture” by the police, prison officers and others. (p.4.)
The country has three federal and 120 regional prisons. There also are many unofficial detention centers throughout the country… Most are located at military camps… Prison and pretrial detention center conditions remained harsh and in some cases life threatening. Severe overcrowding was common… Many prisoners had serious health problems in detention but received little treatment. (p. 6.)
Authorities regularly detained persons without warrants and denied access to counsel and family members, particularly in outlying regions. (p. 8.)
The Ethiopian government and regional governments began to put in place “villagization” plans in the Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regions… The plan involves the resettlement of 45,000 households… [T]here were reports of local skepticism and resentment… because much of the land was or was to be leased to foreign companies (pp. 14-15.)
The government used a widespread system of paid informants to report on the activities of particular individuals… Security forces continued to detain family members of persons sought for questioning by the government. (p. 15.)
While the constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and of the press, the government did not respect these rights in practice. The government continued to arrest, harass, and prosecute journalists, publishers, and editors. (p. 19.)
The government restricted academic freedom during the year. Authorities did not permit teachers at any level to deviate from official lesson plans and actively prohibited partisan political activity and association of any kind on university campuses. (p. 25.)
Although the law provides for freedom of association and the right to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity, the government limited this right in practice. (p. 27.)
The constitution and law provide citizens the right to change their government peacefully. In practice the country has never had a peaceful change of government, and the ruling EPRDF and its allies dominated the government. In May [2010] elections, the EPRDF … won more than 99 percent of all legislative seats…. [T]here was ample evidence that unfair government tactics–including intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters–influenced the extent of that victory. (p.32.)
The constitution provides citizens the right to freely join political organizations of their choice; however, in practice these rights were restricted through bureaucratic obstacles and government and ruling party intimidation, harassment, and arrests, with physical threats and violence used by local officials and EPRDF operatives, local police, and shadowy local militias under the control of local EPRDF operatives. (p. 33.)
The World Bank’s 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators made it clear that corruption remained a serious problem… [S]ome government officials appeared to manipulate the privatization process, and state- and party-owned businesses received preferential access to land leases and credit. (p. 37.)
The law provides for public access to government information, but access was largely restricted in practice. (p. 38.)
The government harassed individuals who worked for domestic human rights organizations. (p. 40)
The government denied NGOs access to federal prisons, police stations, and political prisoners. There were credible reports that security officials continued to intimidate or detain local individuals to prevent them from meeting with NGOs and foreign government officials investigating allegations of abuse. (p. 41.)
There were no further developments in the July 2009 case of the 444 staff members, including high-ranking officials, fired by the Addis Ababa Police Commission for involvement in serious crimes, including armed robbery, rape, and theft. (p.8.)
Women and girls experienced gender-based violence daily, but it was underreported due to cultural acceptance, shame, fear, or a victim’s ignorance of legal protections… Domestic violence, including spousal abuse, was a pervasive social problem. The 2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) found that 81 percent of women believed a husband had a right to beat his wife. (p. 42.)
Sexual harassment was widespread. The penal code prescribes 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment; however, harassment-related laws were not enforced. (p. 43.)
Child abuse was widespread. Unlike in previous years there was no training of police officers on procedures for handling cases of child abuse. (p. 45.)
There were an estimated 5.4 million orphans in the country, according to the report of Central Statistics Authority. Government-run orphanages were overcrowded, and conditions were often unsanitary. Due to severe resource constraints, hospitals and orphanages often overlooked or neglected abandoned infants. (p. 47.)
There were approximately seven million persons with disabilities, according to the Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities. There was one mental hospital and an estimated 10 psychiatrists in the country [of 80 million people.] (p. 48.)
If the foregoing facts are “lies, lies and implausible lies”, the U.S. State Department must be held accountable for issuing false, misleading and deceptive reports and those involved in its preparation should be prosecuted. But if it is the truth that keeps the human rights abusers in Ethiopia closemouthed, then as Scriptures counsel, “Let the lying lips be put to silence.”
Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of development aid, receiving over US$3.3bn (R22.6bn) annually. Ethiopia is perceived by Western leaders as a largely Christian country bordering two unstable Islamic states, Sudan and Somalia, and viewed as a crucial ally in the “war on terror”.
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister dictator Meles Zenawi has charmed Western leaders so successfully that he has seen foreign aid more than double in the past six years, while his regime has become increasingly {www:repressive}.
Zenawi presided over what were regarded as {www:fraudulent} elections in both 2005 and 2010, and in an attempt to maintain his regime’s grip on power, detained tens of thousands of opposition supporters, imprisoned opposition leaders and executed demonstrators. The US State Department acknowledged in its human rights reports the “numerous credible reports of unlawful detention of opposition candidates in Ethiopia, and the politically motivated killings committed by the security forces”. Despite this, Ethiopia remains a top US client state in the East African region and has not been subjected to official public criticism for the ruthlessness with which it deals with its detractors.
Ethiopia’s geo-strategic {www:importance} to the US has become the overriding issue, eclipsing the government’s growing political repression. With escalating calls from within Ethiopian society for a people’s uprising, the US finds itself again propping up a dictatorial regime, at US$1bn (R6.8bn) a year, in addition to the provision of military training and weaponry.
The collaborative relationship between the US and Ethiopia has been developing for years, with the common purpose being the rooting out of Islamic radicalism, particularly inside Somalia. The Pentagon has trained Ethiopian troops for counterterrorism operations in camps near the Somali border, and the US believes these efforts have disrupted terrorist networks in Somalia.
The US backed the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, and has shared its intelligence on the positions of Islamic militants with the Ethiopian military. The US has gone as far as using a base in Ethiopia to capture al-Qaeda leaders, and to use an airstrip in eastern Ethiopia to launch air strikes against Islamic militants in Somalia. Ethiopia’s geo-strategic importance is not only its proximity to Somalia, a known breeding ground for al-Qaeda, but as a backdoor to the Middle East.
This close relationship with Ethiopia is coming under the spotlight as the wave of people power in North Africa and the Middle East has inspired Ethiopian opposition movements to follow suit. In March, the Ethiopian Americans Council wrote to US President Barak Obama about the political situation in Ethiopia and the growing political suppression by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). They claim the punitive legislation such as the Civil Society Law, Anti-Terror Law and Press Law hamper the ability to organise public meetings and rallies, and to raise funds. They have warned that Ethiopians are organising strikes and demonstrations for the coming months, and claim that an uprising has already begun in the southern region. It is alleged that security forces used deadly force against peaceful protestors on March 7 and 9 in the Gamgofa zone. The Council is seeking US support for the opposition’s campaign.
The Ethiopian regime is concerned about the power and influence of its massive diaspora, and their ability to stage demonstrations in cities around the world. This concern is well placed given that the diaspora is becoming more mobilised and determined to expose the {www:draconian} nature of the regime.
The regime is so concerned about the inevitability of a mass uprising at home that any gathering of more than three people in all urban centres has been banned, and there is a heavy military presence in the capital Addis Ababa. Prime Minister Zenawi has articulated his concern about the political turmoil in Yemen, just 150km from Ethiopia’s northern border, and has claimed that some domestic opposition groups are trying to incite a similar uprising.
The regime has taken immediate measures to counter any potential uprising by arresting more than 200 members of the opposition during March to prevent the organisation of demonstrations. The regime has also resumed its jamming of the US-financed Voice of America (VOA) language service broadcasts to Ethiopia. The VOA is the only international radio service broadcasting in the three main Ethiopian languages – Amharic, Afan Oromo and Tigrayan. Any political broadcasts by the VOA are now disrupted, as they provide the opposition with a voice.
An immediate mass uprising may not materialise given the collective memory of the harsh crackdown following public demonstrations in 2005, where 200 peaceful demonstrators were killed by security forces, 765 were wounded, and 30000 detained. At the time the opposition had protested against what they termed fraudulent elections, where the manipulation of election results gave the opposition far fewer seats than they believe they won. Thousands were arrested, the independent media silenced and 131 opposition politicians and journalists were put on trial for treason, outrages against the constitution and genocide. While the Ethiopian Parliamentary Commission report said the security forces did not use excessive force, the commission leaders claim their findings were altered by the government prior to the report’s release.
The 2010 elections were arguably worse, with higher levels of intimidation and coercion used. In the 2005 elections the opposition had won all the national and regional council seats of Addis Ababa, but in 2010 the government claimed to have won them all back. The regime claims to have won an overall 99.6% in the poll.
Prior to the 2010 elections, the government also denied food aid to opposition supporters, using it to reward its political allies – a tactic employed in successive elections. In a country where 3 million people experience hunger every year, this was a gross politicisation of humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch has painstakingly documented the regime’s multilayered oppressive strategies in its 105-page report Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian public know any uprising would be dealt a swift and brutal response by the regime. Unless there is reason to believe that segments of the Ethiopian military and Western powers would support their calls for regime change, it may be too much of a calculated risk.
Compared to Egypt and Tunisia, Ethiopia has a much smaller, less educated middle class, with less access to the internet. Internet connection in Ethiopia is 0.5% compared to 21.2% in Egypt. Somalia, which has not had a stable government for more than 20 years, has a higher internet connection rate than Ethiopia.
For any uprising to succeed in Ethiopia a critical mass of support is needed , particularly among the youth, with clear objectives, a well-defined strategy, determination and at least some support from the armed forces. Nationally no political organisation has the influence or credibility to lead a popular revolt, but as in Egypt, a cohesive political leadership is not necessary for an uprising to succeed.
What would be pivotal is the support of the US to opposition forces in the face of a brutal government crackdown.
It is this solidarity with democratic forces that cannot be relied upon given the close relations with the Zenawi government nurtured over time to ensure a virtual US proxy in the region.
(Shannon Field is a independent political analyst)
Following the Battle of Zela in 47 B.C. (present day Zile, Turkey), Julius Caesar claimed victory by declaring: “I came; I saw; I conquered.” In 2011, Caesar Meles Zenawi, the dictator-in-chief in Ethiopia, scattered his top henchmen throughout the U.S. and Europe to declare victory in the propaganda war on Diaspora Ethiopians. But there was no victory to be had, only {www:ignominious} defeat at the hands of Zenawi’s {www:tenacious}, resolute and dogged opponents. No victory dances; only a speedy shuffle back to the capo di tutti capi (boss of all bosses) to deliver the message: “We went; We saw; We got chased the hell out of Dodge!”
The purpose of the recent official travelling circus was to introduce and generate support among Diaspora Ethiopians for Zenawi’s five-year economic program pretentiously labeled “Growth and Transformation Plan”. In city after city in North America and Europe, Zenawi’s crew received defiant and pugnacious reception. Ethiopians made the various meeting venues and sites virtual mini-Tahrir Squares (Egypt). Ethiopian men and women, Christians and Muslims, young and old, professionals and service workers, students and teachers and members of various political groups and parties showed up in a united front to confront and challenge Zenawi’s henchmen. One need only view any one of the numerous videotapes online to appreciate the intensity, depth and strength of Diaspora Ethiopian opposition to Zenawi’s regime.
In Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Atlanta, Dallas, Seattle, New York, Toronto, London and various other cities, Ethiopians came out in full force and tried to gain admission into the meetings. Many were singled out and turned back. In a widely-disseminated and cogently argued “open letter”,Fekade Shewakena, a former professor at Addis Ababa University, wrote Girma Birru, Zenawi’s official representative in the U.S., complaining about his discriminatory treatment in being refused admission at the meeting held on the campus of Howard University:
I was formally invited by an [Ethiopian] embassy staffer… I faced the wrath of the protestors as I was crossing their picket lines [to attend the meeting]. Then I met the people who were deployed by the [Ethiopian] embassy to man the gate, and do the sad job of screening participants and deciding what type of Ethiopian should be let in and what type should be kept out. I was told I was ineligible to enter and saw many people being returned from entering. One screener told me… “ante Tigre titela yelem ende min litisera metah” [Tr. Do you not hate Tigreans? What business do you have here?…]
The ethnic stripe test was the last straw for many of the protesters who denounced Zenawi and his crew as “murderers”, “thieves” (leba) and “opportunists” (hodams). Inside the meeting halls, those who asked tough questions were singled out and ejected by the organizers, often violently. Some were physically assaulted requiring emergency medical assistance. Nearly all of the meetings were disrupted, cancelled, stopped or delayed. To sum it up, those who made peaceful dialogue impossible, made angry verbal exchanges inevitable.
Zenawi in September, His Troops in April?
It will be recalled that in September 2010 when Zenawi came to the U.S. to speak at the World Leader’s Conference at Columbia University, he set off a firestorm of opposition among Ethiopians in the U.S. Busloads of Ethiopian activists descended on New York City to confront Zenawi, but they were kept away from the campus. A massive campaign (reminiscent of the anti-war protest days at Columbia in the late 1960s) was undertaken to mobilize Columbia students, faculty and staff to put pressure on the university administration to disinvite Zenawi.
Zenawi’s invitation also provoked strong reaction among non-Ethiopians. Prof. Ted Vestal, the distinguished and respected scholar on Ethiopia, outraged by Zenawi’s invitation wrote Columbia President Lee Bollinger: “The only way you can redeem the damaged reputation of the World Leaders Forum is by publicly making known the shortcomings of Prime Minister Meles and his government in your introductory remarks–a refutation similar to what you did in introducing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran in 2007.”
World-renowned Columbia economist Prof. Jagdish Bagwati wrote in disgust: “It seems probable that the President’s [Bollinger] office was merely reproducing uncritically the rubbish that was supplied by one of these Columbia entrepreneurs [Columbia Professors Joseph Stiglitz (Zenawi’s sponsor) and Jeffrey Sachs] whose objective is to ingratiate himself with influential African leaders regardless of their democratic and human-rights record, to get PR and ‘goodies’ for themselves at African summits, at the UN where these leaders have a vote, etc.”
I vigorously defended Zenawi’s right to speak at Columbia because I believed the opportunity could offer him a teachable moment in the ways of free people:
I realize that this may not be a popular view to hold, but I am reminded of the painful truth in Prof. Noam Chomsky’s admonition: ‘If we don’t believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don’t believe in it at all.’ On a personal level, it would be hypocritical of me to argue for free speech and press freedoms in Ethiopia and justify censorship or muzzling of Zenawi stateside. If censorship is bad for the good citizens of Ethiopia, it is also bad for the dictators of Ethiopia.
Following the Columbia episode, one has to wonder why Zenawi would send hordes of his top officials to the U.S. and elsewhere to evangelize on behalf of his regime. It is logical to assume that Zenawi conducted a “vulnerability analysis” of Diaspora Ethiopians before sending out his crew. It is likely that he studied Diaspora attitudes and perceptions toward his regime and the current situation in the country, the ethnic and political divisions and tensions in the Diaspora, the strength of Diaspora elite cooperation and intensity of conflict among them, etc. and decided to make his move. He likely concluded that any potential opposition to the meetings could be handled by utilizing an “ethnic filter” at the door of the meeting halls.
But what are Zenawi’s real reasons for sending his top cadre of officials to North America and Europe? There could be several answers to this deceptively simple question.
Zenawi’s Arsenal of Weapons of Mass Distraction
Careful evaluation of Zenawi’s propaganda strategy shows that the dispatch of officials to the to the U.S. and Europe is part of a broader integrated campaign to undermine opposition in the Diaspora, energize supporters and reinforce favorable perception and action by foreign donors and banks. Manifestly, the mission of the crew sent to “dialogue” with the Ethiopian Diaspora was to divert attention from the extreme domestic economic, political and social problems in the country and to exude public confidence in the fact that the upheavals in North Africa are of no consequence in Ethiopia. The other elements in this propaganda campaign of mass distraction include belligerent talk of regime change in Eritrea, {www:inflammatory} water war-talk with Egypt, wild allegations of terrorist attacks, wholesale jailing and intimidation of opponents, proposals for the construction of an imaginary dam, attacks on international human rights organizations that have published critical reports on the regime (just a day ago, Zenawi’s deputy said he “dismisses” the 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report as “baseless”) and so on. The hope is that the more Diasporans talk about the manufactured issues, the less they will talk about the real issues of stratospheric inflation, food shortages, skyrocketing fuel costs, massive repression, information and media suppression, etc. in Ethiopia.
By alternating propaganda topics from day today, Zenawi hopes to keep his opponents and critics talking reflexively about his issues and off-balance. The more outrageous his claims, the more reaction he is likely to elicit from his opponents and critics, and be able to better control the debate and the minds of those engaged in it. To be sure, by sending his travelling circus to the U.S., Zenawi has succeeded in angering, inflaming and riling up his Diaspora opponents. He knows just how to “get their goat”. He manipulates that outpouring of anger, rage and frustration to keep his opponents’ eyes off the prize.
The Propaganda Value of “In-Yo’-Diaspora-Face” Confrontation
By sending a large delegation into the Ethiopian Diaspora, Zenawi is also sending an unmistakable message: “In yo’ face, Ethiopian Diaspora! I can do what I am doing in Ethiopia just as easily in your neck of the woods.” It is a confrontational propaganda strategy tinged with a tad of arrogance. Zenawi seems to believe that the Ethiopian Diaspora is so divided against itself and inherently dysfunctional that it is incapable of mounting an effective opposition to his regime or even his crew’s visit. By unleashing swarms of regime officials in the Diaspora, Zenawi likely intended to further degrade the Diaspora’s ability to conduct or sustain opposition activities, {www:demoralize} and disconcert them and confuse their leadership. On the other hand, if he can muster a successful foray with his crew, he could establish his invincibility and spread pessimism and despair in the Diaspora. But the whole affair proved to be a total failure as have all previous efforts to stage “in yo’ face” confrontation with Diaspora Ethiopians. The Diaspora may be divided but not when it comes to Zenawi’s regime.
Effective Propaganda Tool Against the “Extreme Diaspora”
The other less apparent side of “in yo’ face” confrontation is to make a record of the “extreme Diaspora”. Zenawi will no doubt use this episode to show American and European policy makers that he is reasonable and statesman-like while the opposition, particularly in the Diaspora, consist of an assortment of wild-eyed, hysterical, fanatical, intolerant, irrational, hateful and mean-spirited extremists. He will argue to American policy makers that he sent his top leaders to engage Diasporan Ethiopians in civil dialogue only to be attacked, insulted and berated. He will hand them copies of well-edited videotapes of agitated protesters titled: “Behold the Ethiopian Diaspora!” In short, Zenawi will use the protest videos as Exhibit A to demonize, discredit, dehumanize, marginalize, categorize and sermonize about the Evil Extreme Ethiopian Diaspora. At the end, he will offer American policy makers a simple choice: “I am your man! It’s me or these raving lunatics.” Based on historical experience and empirical observations, some American policy makers may actually buy his argument.
Pandering to the U.S., IMF, E.U.
A third objective of the dog and pony show about the “Growth and Transformational Plan” is to please (hoodwink) the U.S., the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and others. It is an elaborately staged drama for this audience to show that Zenawi has a real economic plan for Ethiopia that exceeds the “Millennium Goals” (e.g. eradicate extreme poverty, reduce child mortality, fight AIDS, form global partnership, etc. by 2015). By making gestures of engagement with the Ethiopian Diaspora, Zenawi is trying to build credibility for his “economic plan” and that it has broad support within and outside the country. He deserves billions more in in loans and economic aid. Zenawi knows exactly what buttons to push to get the attention and approval of donors and loaners.
The “economic plan” itself floats on a sea of catchphrases, clichés, slogans, buzzwords, platitudes, truisms and bombast. Zenawi says his plan will produce “food sufficiency in five years.” But he cautions it is a “high-case scenario which is clearly very, very ambitious.” He says the “base-case” scenario of “11 percent average economic growth over the next five years is doable” and the “high-case” scenario of 14.9 percent is “not unimaginable”. The hype of super economic growth rate is manifestly detached from reality. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative Multidimensional Poverty Index 2010 (formerly annual U.N.D.P. Human Poverty Index) ranks Ethiopia as second poorest (ahead of famine-ravaged Mali) country on the planet. Six million Ethiopians needed emergency food aid last year and many millions will need food aid this year. An annual growth rate of 15 percent for the second poorest country on the planet for the next five years goes beyond the realm of imagination to pure fantasy. The IMF predicts a growth rate of 7 percent for 2011, but talking about economic statistics on Ethiopia is like talking about the art of voodoo.
Dialogue, Like Charity, Begins at Home
Like charity, dialogue begins at home. Zenawi should allow free and unfettered discussion of his economic plan as well as human rights record within Ethiopia first before sending his troupe into the Diaspora. Conversation is a two-way street. If Zenawi wants to talk about his economic plan to Diaspora Ethiopians, he must be prepared to listen to their human rights concerns.
There is not a single Ethiopian who will oppose food sufficiency in that hungry country by 2015 or decline to contribute to the prosperity and development of Ethiopia. Reasonable people could disagree on Zenawi’s “growth and transformation plan”. History shows that similar schemes based on foreign agricultural investments in Latin America have produced Banana Republics. Whether Zenawi’s economic plan will produce a Barley or Rice Republic in Ethiopia is an arguable question. But there can be no development without freedom. There can be no development in a climate of fear, loathing and intimidation, and one-party, one-man domination. Most certainly, there can be no development without respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Though it is very possible to pull the wool over the eyes of people who have very little access to information, it is impossible to fool a politically conscious, active and energized Ethiopian Diaspora community by putting on a dog and pony show.
The miserable life of Ethiopians is replete with facts such as:
Ethiopian girl looks for food at a city dump in Addis Ababa
Ethiopia is ranked at 210th out of a total of 210 countries.
That Ethiopia by any measure is the 2nd poorest nation in the world.
That it is at the bottom of the list of the three weighed indicators of well-being.
That 64.9% of school children are not enrolled.
In health, child mortality, it stands at 38%.
85.7% lack electricity.
54% do not get any clean water.
89.5% do not have any cooking oil.
It has one of the smallest economies in Africa inspite of its population, accounting only for the continent’s 1% National domestic product.
90% of the nation’s 77 million people live below the poverty line (Getachew Begashaw, “Acute Poverty amidst “Double Digit Economic Growth”: Contradiction in Terms, Addis Voice, 2010)
Yet the regime is daring us, when it has selected Boston and Los Angeles as cities in which to display its vacuous new five-year plan.
The gruesome facts above should have been attended to twenty years ago, and by now nine of the points above could have been reduced to at least one half and yet twenty years later Ethiopians are still saddled with this primitive existence unfit for animals. The Prime Minister is more concerned to clean his legacy in four more years and fool the Ethiopian people, again and shamelessly with false promises.
Which transformational strategy is going to make Ethiopia free of famine in five years, when the regime had twenty long years of attending to them slowly, carefully and intelligently? Instead, the reality on the ground can be changed only by a total regime change, consisting of new faces, new thoughts, and new transformational strategies.
The new plan may aim at embarrassing the Diaspora opposition but the regime forgets that it will only embarrass itself when its plans are logically attacked by those who know and by those who see through the aim of the caravan of another five year plan and will subject it to a vigorous scrutiny and demand that the regime gives a regime change a real chance for the love and respect of the Ethiopian people.
The new plan does not address the existential and political rights of the people, the violation of their dignities and economic opportunities. Only a civilized uprising can change the reality on the ground, with a new vision of the Ethiopian person, a new political party and most importantly replacing ethnocracy with Ethiopianity.
For the past 13 years, the Woyanes have become so {www:predictable} when they are in a political quagmire. The recent political uprising in the Middle East and in the Northern part of Africa has Zenawi’s regime so concerned creating political diversion that is further from the reality was crucial in an attempt to {www:engross} mainly the people of Ethiopia and, if anyone is listening, the rest of the world.
Of course, Zenawi’s regime has no respect for what his own citizens think. The latest political stint is pretty much staged for the donors he can’t afford to upset since his survival is depending on what these donors think of him. One must keep in mind that the regime is so terrified of the potential up rise and measures to squash it must be justified ahead of time. One must also keep in mind that the regime is pretty good at taking survival measures since it has no principle of fundamental politics to lean on. It is that lack of core of principle the regime is suffering from that will ultimately facilitate its demise. The lack of principle of fundamental politics is a recipe for disaster as it has been witnessed in the past. The regime in Ethiopia is no different than the others with same deficiencies; however, what makes this regime unique is the fact that it receives unwavering support from the West for its unique ability of providing what the West needs. Perhaps, the West deserves share of the blame. In addition, the West needs to evaluate its policy towards the regime in Ethiopia and be on the right side of history, which ultimately benefits the West.
As mentioned above, the latest political stints by the regime were targeting two main elements: national security and economic growth. These two elements were brought to the surface with the assumption that they would create the type of political distraction the regime was hoping for. Unfortunately for the regime, any political stint comes with its own price.
National security:
In the name of national security, the regime was forced to bring Eritrea in this equation with the assumption that any mention of “a threat from Eritrea” will galvanize the nation. This may be true in 1998 -2000. Today, Ethiopians are more educated of what had transpired since the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out. Moreover, Ethiopians are aware of the fact that legally, Eritrea had won the border issue fair and square. The 2002 decision by Hague took the air out of those who were beating the war drum to recover access to the sea. Though the regime in Ethiopia is not officially advocating the return of Assab, the thought process is that by creating the possibility of waging war with Eritrea, potential political capital could be gained, and will ultimately conciliate the anticipated potential threat from civil disobedience that is similar to what had transpired in the Middle East and North Africa. To the regime’s disappointment, the reaction from the vast majority of Ethiopians, including those in Diaspora was extremely negative of the war monger attitude of the regime.
Every time the regime in Ethiopia chooses to show its arrogance about its military superiority it admits its weakness ignorantly. Back in 2000 after the war was over and crowning itself as a winner, the regime couldn’t manage to hide how terrified it was of the strength of Eritrea’s military capacity. It was for that valid reason the regime asked guarantee from the West and the institutions that were involved in bringing peace between these two countries. The latest military bravado, from the regime’s Prime Minister, to invade Eritrea was also a message to the opposition groups who are currently waging internal war with the regime. This message was spawned out of fear.
The Grand Millennium Dam:
The regime’s infatuation to building a dam has been a discussion for quite a while. However, the magnitude of this project is so {www:humongous} some doubt the project would be feasible anytime soon due to financial reasons. The regime is banking on the west to assume the bulk of the financial responsibility. In addition, the regime is also taking advantage of this thrill-seeking project as way of communicating with the Diaspora and enticing them with potential investment opportunity hoping to gain political capital. Again, this also failed miserably as it became evident all over the United States where the regime tried to hold these meetings with the Diaspora this past weekend.
Given the regime’s past record, major projects such as the grand millennium dam were used to divert the political attention of the people of Ethiopia from war, economic and political crisis. In 1999, the regime boasted that “merkato” was supposedly to be bought by a Malaysian company for Six billion dollars. During that period of time, the regime also bragged about a 1.7 billion dollars investment on gas pipeline project connecting Ethiopia and Sudan. Of course, no one forgets the empty promises the regime was making about exporting power to Africa while the city of Addis Ababa was suffering from power shortage just about every other day.
Last,
As mentioned above, the political reverberation the regime in Ethiopia has created in the name of “national security” and “Economic growth” has produced no political dividend. Oddly, the regime bankrupted politically on both elements. The war drum against Eritrea was rejected by Ethiopians, which exposed the regime’s vulnerability should these two countries confront each other militarily. Furthermore, the regime credibility in front of the International community (those who matter) will further be damaged. The “economic growth” fiasco that was supposedly to be used as a conduit to establish a relationship with Diaspora with the hope to capitalize politically proved to be a disaster. If anything, this political miscalculation by the regime gives the Diaspora the energy it was looking for. One doesn’t anticipate the regime to try to coddling again with the Diaspora any time soon; however, one will not rule out this regime’s possible war adventure against Eritrea as desperate times call for desperate measures. The Weyanes are indeed desperate.
