Azeb Mesfin, the wife of Ethiopia’s genocidal dictator Meles Zenawi, is now going after Al Amoudi’s Legedembi Gold Mine, according to Ethiopian Review Intelligence Unit sources in Addis Ababa.
Recently, Azeb, who is now fully in charge of the EFFORT conglomerate after pushing out Sebhat Nega, went after the coffee industry. EFFORT is currently monopolizing Ethiopia’s coffee export.
Azeb’s next move is Ethiopia’s mineral mining. Already Meles and Azeb extort huge commission from Al Amoudi’s gold export. As reported previously, Al Amoudi’s private planes transport gold directly from mining locations in southern Ethiopia to the London gold market without the knowledge of Ethiopia’s Ministry of Mining. The operation is protected by a special force under the direct command of Meles.
Earlier this year, at least three students at Awassa University were kidnapped by Meles Zenawi’s forces after complaining about Legadembi Gold Mine, which is contaminating the river in the area.
The Meles crime family‘s avaricious appetite to dominate every thing in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region is what led to the 99.6 percent victory theft at the May 2010 elections. Meles and Azeb are looting Ethiopia’s economy with the same level of audaciousness and greed they have displayed in politics.
It is not new for Azeb — as much drunkard and pervert as Al Amoudi, known to have several boyfriends — to go after Al Amoudi’s businesses. She has been pushing him out of the real estate business for a while now, causing his office buildings in Addis Ababa to remain vacant.
Currently none of Al Amoudi’s businesses in Ethiopia, including the Sheraton Hotel, are profitable. Al Amoudi is said to be frustrated with Azeb and the only reason he stays in Ethiopia is to continue having a good time with underage girls — paying hefty salaries to his underlings who bring him virgins.
Following its 4th regular session early this month, the OLF National Council issued a communiqué wherein it calls upon “all the forces opposed to the dictatorial regime of the TPLF to struggle for liberation, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, peace, and prosperity.” The communiqué states that there is “no more option left except to rise up in unison and struggle to get rid of the tyrannical minority rule.”
To this end, the Council instructs to “set our priorities in order and forge a meaningful alliance against the TPLF rule.” Then the Communiqué states that OLF is ready for “a meaningful cooperation and alliance with serious political organizations fighting and struggling for liberation democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and human dignity for all the peoples in Ethiopia.”
Is there anything new or grand about the above pronouncement? Does one see any change in form or substance that could make this communiqué a different read from what one can glean from OLF’s mission and policy statements on the OLF website? Nope. The So-called Council is still singing from the same old song book. OLF still maintains that the Oromo people are a people in Ethiopia, not a people of Ethiopia. The not so-subtle difference between the notions of “peoples in Ethiopia” and the “people of Ethiopia” actually makes all the difference between OLF and other opposition forces that are fighting to build a better Ethiopia for everyone. The fact that the Council listed liberation along with democracy, the rule of law and human rights does not camouflage the true color of OLF or its mission which remains to be the “liberation of Oromia from the Colonial empire of Abysinnia.”
So the natural question is why on earth should other opposition forces, which consider themselves Ethiopian and want to see a united, democratic and strong Ethiopia get into an alliance with an organization that doesn’t see itself or the Oromo people as Ethiopian? Why should Ethiopians who stand against TPLF’s ethnocentric policies form an alliance with an organization whose stated mission is dismembering their country? At a time when coalitions such as Medrek are declaring the advent of a new form of alliance where respect of both individual and group rights can be pursued and achieved within a united and democratic Ethiopia, why should one entangle itself with an organization such as the OLF that clearly pictures a different Ethiopia post TPLF rule?
Now one may argue that OLF doesn’t mean what it has put in black and white on its website, which is the liberation of Oromia from Abyssinia. One may say that the leadership needs to continue to use same liberation message (i.e., lying about it) to keep their rank and file intact. If this is how the OLF leadership handles openness with its rank and file regarding a major policy shift , that in itself should be highly disconcerting to anyone who contemplates to enter into any form of alliance with this organization. At any rate, sorting out OLF’s rank and file issues is OLF’s own responsibility. What other organizations should demand from OLF from the outset is to come clean and openly clear on where it stands on such a fundamental question as the unity and integrity of Ethiopia. With anything less, OLF would be a liability to any coalition it might enter into even if one were to believe that OLF has moved from its historical stance on the issue of unity.
The option for OLF has been very clear since it left or was kicked out of the coalition government back in the early 1990s: to either align its struggle with the rest of Ethiopians who are victimized under the same regime to bring about a political system that would allow nationalities or ethnic groups to exercise their legitimate rights within a united Ethiopia, or to remain an exile secessionist organization, forever giving false claims and hopes to its ever fracturing membership. For close two decades, OLF’s choice has been the latter. Three regimes have changed hands in Ethiopia since OLF came into existence. As an organization, OLF is the same age as, if not older than, TPLF. But look where TPLF is now and where OLF is. Even when one may say that TPLF no longer represents the people of Tigray, it has perhaps done more to the people of Tigray from the Minilik Palace than what OLF could dream all night for the Oromo people from the capitals of Western nations.
After close to four decades of existence, OLF is not closer to, indeed is further away from achieving its stated goal. Each day it is not getting stronger but weaker and less relevant. So, at this point, it has neither the moral nor the material leverage to entice anyone to enter into an alliance with it as long as it sticks with the same old political agenda. The future is more unlikely to reward OLF with better results if it stays on the same track.
One wonders why OLF is not doing the one right thing once for its life, namely, come up with true and realistic goals and aspirations for the Oromo people and for Ethiopia in general, close ranks with other opposition organizations in a truly new and lasting alliance, and fight to get the country rid of the TPLF repressive and regressive regime to build a free, democratic and prosperous Ethiopia where all people of Ethiopia will live in harmony and economic prosperity?
One plausible explanation could be OLF’s utterly exaggerated, if not entirely false, sense of exclusive tenure to the cause of the Oromo people and consequently its misplaced pride in the purity of its stance, namely the “liberation of Oromia from the Colonial Empire of Abysinnia.” Otherwise, why should OLF still maintain the colonial theory and liberation objective when other Oromo political organizations are fighting for the cause of the Oromo people within a united Ethiopia?
When the current regime took power in 1991, it declared that Ethiopia would no longer be a prison of nations and nationalities. Forget that this was a preposterous notion, but even if one were to believe this notion in 1991, 19 years is too long a period of time not to re-evaluate this notion against the reality now on the ground. The unquestionable reality is that it is actually now or over the last 19 years that Ethiopia has been made a prison of Oromo activists, students, and elders. Previous regimes have not arrested a fraction of the number of Oromos that have now congested the Kaliti Prison. However, it would be a gross misperception, once again, to think that only Oromos are languishing in TPLF’s prisons. Equal, if not more, numbers of non-Oromos are sharing those same prisons. Their common enemy is the authoritarian regime that wields power not by the will of the people but by its military and security might.
Looking forward, what the Oromo people want is to become makers of the Ethiopian destiny, not just their own destiny as an ethnic group. One is not complete without the other. What the Wollega Oromo wants in life is not fundamentally different from what an Amhara in Gojjam wants. Both want equality and a fair opportunity to take part and derive benefits from the economies of their regions and their country at large. Both wants to promote and exercise their culture, to preserve and share the good of their identity, which together with the culture of other people of Ethiopia makes Ethiopia a mosaic of cultures. Each wants, democracy, unfettered participation in the political life of their respective regions and their country. Each wants peace and prosperity to raise children and leave them a better legacy and opportunity. This is the kind of vision on which a meaningful alliance should be built up on among Ethiopian opposition forces.
Many Ethiopians would like to see OLF playing a constructive part in the political struggle to build a better Ethiopia for all. Many Ethiopian opposition organizations have in the past responded generously to OLF’s slightest gestures of moving away from its longstanding stance. The recent, now defunct, Alliance for Freedom and Democracy is one example. But OLF has proved to be incapable of extricating itself from the past and formulate a realistic and functional political program for the future. Until it does so, its call for any form of alliance will not and should not get a sympathetic ear. The ball is still in OLF’s court.
Several attempts by Ethiopian opposition groups to forge a viable alliance during the past two decades have failed with disastrous result for Ethiopia. The alliances start to unravel soon after they are formed. The main cause of such failure has been lack of advance preparation, according to Ato Sioum Gebeyehou, a senior nuclear power generation engineer and management consultant. The opposition parties also fail to involve all stake holders, such as civic groups.
Ato Sioum comes up with a 4-step process that calls for fractious opposition groups to be united behind common issues and shared interests if there is to be any chance of bringing about regime change in Ethiopia. The 4-steps include: 1) Prepare to dialogue, 2) Dialogue to dialogue, 3) Dialogue for a common goal, and 4) Achieve the goal.
Tagay Gebremedhin (aka Aba Diabilos), who claims to be the patriarch in Ethiopia, has erected a bronze statue for himself in Addis Ababa at the cost of 3 million birr. It is reported that the Gun-totting, self-proclaimed patriarch is planning to erect more statues of himself inside Ethiopian church compounds in Kenya, South Africa and Israel. Deutsche Welle Radio has been gathering public opinion on Gebremedhin’s statue. Listen below:
In an effort to sell goodwill and to gain the hearts and minds of Eritreans, soon after Eritrea won independence, Meles stood on a podium in Asmara stadium and promised, “We will not scratch your wounds.” After decades of barbaric rulers; years of suffering, bloodshed, looting, rapes, destruction, displacements and cruelty; after decades of wars, Eritrea was ready to let go and move on. Eritrea was ready for peace and for good news. Meles understood Eritrea’s hunger and need to hear soothing words of peace when he made those statements. Of course, he never meant it. After gathering himself, he ignited unnecessary war, expelled more than 75, 000 Eritreans out of Ethiopia, stole their hard-earned wealth and temporarily destroyed the goodwill to heal wounds between the good people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Meles-ovich has been selling everything to bolster his stature as a strong man and key figure in Africa and the world consistently. He wanted to be the figurehead and was encouraged to act the part by his US and Western financiers; and he performed that part splendidly. The job required someone with no ethical standards, willing to lie and wreak havoc without regard to the future of the region or his people. The job required a lot of selling mainly to the international community. He obliged.
He sold the Badme war while labeling Eritrea the aggressor for a temporary gain and thus destroying all good will with Eritrea’s leaders. He misled the Ethiopian people into a war with Eritrea without a clear and achievable objective by tapping into the hopes of those who want to retake Eritrea by force using border issue as excuse with no intention to resolve what he foolishly started. He sold the Ethiopian people and the world a lie that he won the Badme decision at The Hague and soon thereafter, he rejected it by calling the EEBC decision as illegal and virtual demarcation as a “Legal nonsense.” Then he accepted it in principle and tried to sell the tired and disingenuous “dialogue” idea.
Meles-ovich is an incessant salesperson who thinks that the world is buying whatever he sells. He actually deserves a great deal of credit for trying to follow through on all his pitches albeit to a colossal failures. He followed through in Somalia after selling fabricated threats in an effort to invade a sovereign nation. He tried to sell one Somalia Transitional Government (TFG) after another in the hopes of screwing a leadership core that favors his repertoire. He overplayed the terror card that the Bush Administration may have felt out-staged. He sold Eritrea as a nation that sponsored terrorism and failed.
Moreover, whenever Meles sells Ethiopians, he addresses them with total disrespect and unashamed arrogance. He does not look or smile, never interacts and, he lashes with his sharp tongue whenever he utters a word. He simply talks down to Ethiopians. He says and does anything. He reverses himself at will; contradicted himself countless times whenever convenient. He never needed to stay true and principled. He never cared to tell the truth, he talked around things and never directly addressed issues. He is rude. He actually never addresses the Ethiopian people. Moreover, if-and-when he addresses Ethiopia, his favorite audience is his rubber stamp parliament that looks dazed. They ask predetermined questions and express fake frustration on queue. It is simply a surreal environment, a fantasy-drama world made up for the satisfaction of the donor communities.
Leaders around the world do many things to remain in power but what Meles-ovich does is simply unprecedented. The intriguing fact is that this despot actually enjoys selling his agendas and believes that people will actually buy his lies after lying to them for years. The question is what is his product or what is he selling? To understand his logic and antiques one must decipher, a) his target audiences, b) the various constituencies he is trying to address, c) understand what his challenges are and, how he intends to overcome it, d) most importantly, what he considers his opportunities are and how he goes after them.
His product is any thing that is the opposite of peace. He has no interest in peace. Therefore, he sells wars as in Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and most importantly in Ethiopia. He sells fear and terrorism as excuse to stifle his people. Meles-ovich has been selling the stability of Ethiopia as if he is the savior of it by telling his US and Western financiers if you stop helping me, Ethiopia will break apart along ethnic and religious lines after he himself divided the nation deliberately.
Meles’s target audience is usually the international community. That is, even when he gives phony interviews to selected “journalists” mainly from Tigray. However, that changed for a brief period days before the sham election in May of 2010. Meles-ovich conducted an interview with Ethiopian TV and answered pre-selected questions sent to him, supposedly from the public. For the first time in over 13 years, he showed eagerness to express, explain and most importantly tried to sell his ideas to Ethiopians. It was by far the most fascinating balancing-act I have ever witnessed albeit based on fabrication, convenient placement-of-issues, in accordance with his needs and desired outcomes. It was odd because normally, he sends his henchmen to do the job, namely Sebhat, Ghebru, Siye or the heavy hitter Bereket Simon when needed. He addressed four areas, namely Asseb, the Independence of Eritrea, the election and Ethiopian stability. His target audience: a) some of the anti-Eritrea “Eritrean” lost souls who are working with him aimlessly in the hopes of becoming the TFG of Eritrea, b) the general Eritrean public, c) Ethiopians in the Diaspora, particularly the Amhara, d) and, his supporters.
What is intriguing is how Meles-ovich cleverly tried to sell these issues to all segments mentioned above collectively and at once. He told Eritreans that he is not interested in Asseb, that he respects Eritrean territories and international laws. This man sent thousands of Ethiopians to their premature death in 2000 in an effort to capture Asseb. He is the man that is arming Afar and other ethnic groups from his side and parading them as Eritreans seeking self-determination. A man that wants to sell to Ethiopians that, Eritreans opted for independence due to repressive Ethiopian regimes while, at the same time selling the fragmentation of Eritrea along ethnic and religious lines by using religious extremist, pedophiles and other criminals discards.
Furthermore, he is trying to sell Ethiopians that Eritrea wants to destabilize Ethiopia by working, even with those who do not believe on Eritrea’s independence and those who claim Asseb. He is also claiming Eritrea is working with former Derg officials. However, Meles-ovich conveniently forgot, after the eruption of the border war, he released all the former Derg officers from prison in order to help him fight Eritrea. Moreover, he knows well, that Eritreans do not compromise on Eritrean independence and an inch of their territory. Badme should serve as example. Eritreans will not work with those who have territorial ambitions on Eritrea. During the recent Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa conference, Dr. Berhe Habtegiorgis told those who claimed Asseb is Ethiopian, their claim amounted to a declaration of war.
Meles’s pitch changes from day to day, as he tries to maximize on his opportunities any way he can. He sells exaggerated economic growth while millions are starving. He sold democracy until he realized that democracy threatened his power and disbanded it. His current sales pitch is that Ethiopia does not need democracy. He is selling Ethiopians not to focus on political issues but economic developments. He is touting the tiger economy of China as his savior. He is selling new military partnership with China and is trying to sell China, in effect blackmailing the US.
The Key
The above-mentioned facts are not new; many have pointed this out ad nauseam. Some have broken it down and spoke the truth to how Meles-ovich and his gang damaged the lives of women, children, and the youth. They listed the genocides, crimes against humanity, political imprisonments, harassment and looting of national treasures. They listed litany of criminal charges that should have sent the whole regime into prison. Therefore, it is an established fact that Meles-ovich does not represent the best interest of the people of Ethiopia and the region. He and his gang are criminals working under the umbrella of a legitimized government. It is a forgone conclusion amongst 95% of Ethiopians that the country is in the worst shape that it has ever been. The recipe for disaster is already set in motion. Absent of urgent remedies, it is just a matter of time until the doomsday scenario becomes a reality. The consensus is that it is impossible to work with Meles-ovich. Hence, it is imperative to remove him and his henchmen from power for the country and the region to get peace.
Moreover, it is clear to those who hoped for the international community, particularly the US or the EU, to stand on behalf of the Ethiopian people in the name of justice, democracy and the rule of law to wake up. It is like praying to devil outside the gates of hell for deliverance. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the interest and focus of Western countries has shifted into protecting energy and other resources. The war against terrorism and stability of the region are the main excuses used as reasons to prop up the brutal despots like Meles-ovich and Museveni. The US is his number one financier. Without US and Western support, Meles-ovich would close shop in days because he cannot afford to pay his war machinery. He is fully funded, armed and provided-with unparalleled political, diplomatic and PR-cover from the international community. And until now, he has done well in pursuing the agenda of destruction and genocidal missions throughout the region leaving trails of untold human suffering.
Clearly, Meles-ovich is the most reviled figure in the history of Ethiopia. Even those who use to support him have reversed course because they realize that he is the path to the destabilization of Ethiopia. Why then is he finding success in the Diaspora in the face of all these disdain? While there are many reasons, one of the main reasons is that many Ethiopian opinion makers and agenda setters have, and are working for his agenda knowingly or unknowingly.
As stated earlier, let us be clear here that Meles-ovich does not have any interest in peace. His interest lies on conflicts, fear and wars! After he heard about the Qatar mediation efforts and the agreement it produced between Djibouti and Eritrea, he cried foul and decried the UN for welcoming the development. Any sign of peace and reconciliation amongst the people in the region brings nightmares to the TPLF gang because they know that will bring their end. The recent change-of-tone and approach of the US regarding the situation in Somalia is sending shockwaves into the psyche of Warlord Meles-ovich and his partner Museveni of Uganda to the point of unilaterally deciding to send thousands of more troops into Somalia to the dissatisfaction of the US. They are threatening to internationalize the threat of Al Shabab to the dismay of the US in an effort to regain the funding they lost after they were forced to retreat in a humiliating defeat. This is the reaction of the US envoy to Somalia:
“If I could think of any tactfully discreet and diplomatically clear way to describe the outcome of the 15th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Somalia without compromising the essence of my message, I would have simply chosen that approach. Therefore, going crude is the appropriate way: As a patched up political charade destined to embolden the very extremist elements that it is intended to subdue and push Somalia deep into anarchy and destruction, the resolution passed in that session is haphazardly imprudent and wildly dangerous”.
It is with this outlook in mind that one can say that many Ethiopian opinion makers and agenda setters are, and have been working for Meles-ovich’s agenda as it pertains to regional issues for the following reasons:
1) They failed to talk about humanity and bread and butter issues for the people in the region in ways that could have united Ethiopians with the various population segments of the region, i.e., Somalia, Gambella, and others. 2) They failed to own up to the issues of Somalia, Gambella, Ogaden, Oromo, etc… 3) They failed to recognize their weaknesses and acted and talked as if they rule Ethiopia when they were in no position. 4) They give Ethiopians exaggerated expectation of what Western powers, particularly the US, can do to bring change in Ethiopia. 5) Most importantly, they keep standing on the wrong side of history as in regards to Eritrea. During the wars that erupted in 1998, they sided with Meles. In fact, they were pleased because they felt it would weaken both antagonists and strengthen their positions. Many failed to speak about the horrendous uprooting of Eritreans and Ethiopians from Ethiopia. Moreover, and unfortunately, they are still steering Ethiopians into a conversation of Eritrea and Eritrean territories as if they have any ability to change the facts on the ground. Thus, placing the focus and attention away from Meles-ovich and provide fuel for his fire. They keep doing a disservice to Ethiopia time after time. It is somewhat baffling to see them duped easily by sales gimmicks Meles-ovich and his gangs throw at them. Weeks before the last sham election, at a time when Ethiopians were planning and conducting a significant conference in North America, Meles-ovich sent a select group from his henchmen and paraded them as opposition. Many Ethiopians actually fell for it and engaged Medrek-stars on tour. What is ironic is that they forgot that Siye and Meles actually have fought together for the same cause, Tigray. How can they think someone who sacrificed to come to power hand-over power on their demand? In addition, how could they believe; opposition that is on tour for weeks in the US during a crucial phase of the election is a legitimate? This shows a serious weakness and ill judgment.
Concluding Remarks
Meles-Ovich has sold everything to the point that he has nothing left to sell. He sold sham elections until he realized what happened in Kenya could happen to him; power sharing. He preempted his opponents by intimidating, jailing and harassment. However, the sad part is, even after Meles-ovich declared his complete victory, humiliating the Ethiopian people, some dinosaurs or elites actually found it opportune time to talk about other issues, namely Eritrean ports and asking for political space from Meles-ovich. The question is when will they learn? When will they realize the truth and the reality as it is? When will they know their limitations and work within the scope of what they can realistically achieve? When will they learn to stop asking Meles-ovich to give them “some-political space,” when in reality, Meles-ovich has denied them their country and identity? Plain and simple! How is it possible for any one with an ounce of brain to think that Meles-ovich, who actually sacrificed to get to where he is possible to invite individuals to share power simply because they can eloquently describe democracy? Furthermore, why are these elites and educated personalities always assuming that the West and the US will actually work against their own interest and press Meles-ovich (funded by them) to bring change against his will?
Meles-ovich has drawn the line on the sand. He has unambiguously told the world, I rule my way and there is not a damn thing you can do about it! However, the elites are still pointing-out how bad, Meles-ovich is and, they are trying to plan on what to do next. Moreover, why are they not recognizing the efforts of those who are giving their foreheads to save Ethiopia? Do they still believe that their words and letters alone will be enough to dethrone Meles-ovich and his gang? Furthermore, do these elites actually believe that those who are paying sacrifices with their lives now (EPPF, OLF, ONLF etc…) will give them political space once they achieve victory? When will they stop playing on neutral grounds and take hard stands? When will they declare their positions regarding the OLF, Ogaden, Somalia, and whether to work with Eritrea and other related matters?
It is a matter of record and history that there has been no major achievement in the fight against Meles-ovich. Based on this sad history, it is obvious there is a need for some fresh thinking and a shot of new blood to re-energize this hopeless situation. The one thing that Ethiopians need to realize is that Meles-ovich and his gangs are not only Ethiopia’s problem. They are regional vermin. In order to cleanse the situation and plan for peaceful beginning towards successful coexistence, all options need exploring.
In these endeavors, the only country that is standing for the people of the region is Eritrea. The only country that is standing for justice in the region is Eritrea. The people of Eritrea want to see Ethiopia, Somalia and a region that is successful. Moreover, as President Isaias Afwerki stated, “Eritrea is not threatened by a strong and successful Ethiopia.” Therefore, it is high time for all to declare their solidarity and focus on the bull’s eye, but do so fully respecting Eritrean territories and sovereignty.
‘I really feel totally betrayed by the system,’ confessed Beyene Petros, one of the most respected leaders of the Ethiopian opposition, a few days after its crushing defeat in the general elections on 23 May 2010. ‘I thought that, if we competed in the elections, there would be a door ajar that could be made use of by competing parties. This assumption of mine was totally misplaced.’
But how could he have been so mistaken? Like most of the opposition, how could he have expected that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party since 1991, would faithfully play the electoral game and run the risk of repeating the surprise scenario of the 2005 elections, where the opposition made such spectacular progress? How could he even imply, a few days later, that the voters voted for the opposition in the election and that cheating only defeated it? And what a defeat! 99.6% of the vote, just one opposition representative out of 547 elected members of the federal Parliament and just one out of the 1900 regional assembly representatives. In a nutshell: how and why did the Ethiopian opposition make such a mistake about its electoral chances, as if it had not fully realized that the EPRDF had systematically and implacably started immediately after its 2005 electoral blow to make sure it would win in 2010, at any price?
‘Whatever policy differences there might be among the opposition, I think we agree on the minimum issues of democracy and rule of law.’ This appeal from opposition leader, Seye Abraha, calls on the opposition to unite in order to recover from its defeat. Most commentators credit it with its disarray, which they see as aggravated by internal conflict and the lack of coherence in its policies but these explanations do not stand up to scrutiny.
In 2005, apart from its common hostility to those in power since 1991 and a shared desire for democratic change, the opposition was divided into two main camps: the Coalition for Unity and Democracy and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces. They also differed on some essential points, left-overs of a persistent divide, inherited from the conquests of the Abyssinian Empire in the second half of the 19th century. Schematically, the electoral base of the Coalition was urban, led by Addis-Ababa, and northern, with the Amhara (26% of the population), the epicentre of the old imperial power. The UEDF found its support in the former conquered territories, among the Oromos (37% of the population) and the peoples of the South. The CUD and the UEDF both criticised the EPRDF’s policies on the two main problems confronting Ethiopia for decades – the ‘national question’ or how the 80 ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia could agree on a modus vivendi and poverty issues – but they disagreed on the solutions. The ruling Party has set up a federal system, with equal rights for all ‘ethnic groups’ as the basis for the “revolutionary democracy” it advocates, with individual rights taking a back seat. But this federalism is a smokescreen behind which Tigreans (6% of the population) held the reins of power, even in all the ‘non traditional’ sectors of the economy. The Coalition advocated a form of recentralisation borne by an ‘Ethiopianism’ that was supposed transcend ethnic differences while the UEDF advocated a genuine ethnic federalism to be implemented. The economic strategy of the EPRDF focused on the land which is the economic base of Ethiopia and public property, in which peasants – 83% of the population – have only temporary usage rights and more precisely, on the masses of subsistence farmers. The CUD quite simply wanted to privatise the land, to ‘liberate’ the peasantry from Party-State’s grip; the UEDF, however, was radically opposed, fearing that it would open the door to northern investors to corner the market of southern land once again.
In 2010, the main opposition force, the Medrek (Forum), had a support base extending over almost all the country, with the notable exception of the Amhara region. On paper at least, its eight components had reached a common position on the ‘national question’ and on the issue of land. Thus, the gulf that separated 2005 when the opposition had drawn with the governing party in the elections with the extent that the governing party was forced to cheat to ensure a comfortable official victory, the 2010 defeat cannot be explained by an intrinsic weakening of the opposition.
The second reason most often put forward to explain the ‘landslide victory’ of the EPRDF is the undeniable intensification of its authoritarianism. This led to ‘the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties,’ according to the European Union Observation Mission. But several opposition leaders and commentators have only taken this into account within certain limits, i.e. when and where they themselves or their own milieu were directly affected by it. In social terms this means urban dwellers and more precisely the thin slice of them that makes up ‘civil society’. In temporal terms, it means during the two years in the run-up to the elections and during the electoral campaign, when the government stepped up its control even further. Once again, the opposition succumbed to that almost systematic tropism of the Ethiopian elite – navel-gazing, which led it to distance itself from the ‘real country,’ for which it has a kind of ‘blind spot’, starting with the rural areas, where 83% of the population and therefore 83% of voters live.
So, it was on the three recent ‘villainous’ laws on information, NGOs and the fight against terrorism that they concentrated their denunciation of the regime’s shift towards increased authoritarianism. The media have almost no direct influence in the rural areas as there are no circulating newspapers. Very few people have a radio that works and those who do shamelessly confess that ‘political debates are not for us, we don’t understand what they are talking about.’ The only local NGOs are traditional community organisations run on age-old lines. So the anti-terrorist law has no effect here. Since time immemorial an official can punish any of those under his authority, even throwing him in jail, unless he has some form of special protection.
Similarly, while opposition campaigners were undeniably harassed during the elections, this had little real effect in rural areas, for the simple reason that, even if they had tried to campaign there, no-one would have listened to them, to the point of trying to avoid them altogether.
For at least two thirds of the peasant population, an election simply has no meaning. They have a vision of the world where absolutely everything is determined by divine will, including who is in power. They feel they have no right to choose. As they often say: ‘God only decides who rules,’ so an election is futile. Above all, it presents one major danger: voting for the loser. The winner will find out even though the ballot is secret, the election winner has mysterious ways of knowing how each person voted. It could then take revenge on the ‘culprits’ which means putting no less than their survival at risk. This is because all public services, from education to fertiliser, from health care to loans, depend on the good will of local officials of the Party-State, up to and including access to the peasant farmer’s only means of production – land. The only electoral challenge, then, is to try to figure out who is going to win and to slide the ‘right’ ballot into the box. To find this out, one can only turn to the ‘opinion leaders’ of the peasant community, in other words, its elite and then all vote the same way. That way, even if they get it wrong, there is safety in numbers – ‘it’s easier to punish one individual than a whole community.’
The elite have generally developed a more secular vision and therefore have started to claim for citizen’s rights. Thus it feels entitled in choosing the country’s leaders. In 2005, where these elite’s members opposed the ruling regime for many and several reasons – in most rural areas at least – they were easily able to persuade people to vote against it, especially given that they could put forward tangible arguments for forecasting its defeat.
But just a few months after the elections, they were already disenchanted. The most visible opposition members were arrested while other opposition representatives were either totally powerless or even simply physically absent. ‘We voted for the opposition in 2005 and we got nothing from it,’ said these opinion leaders. ‘On the contrary, we suffered the wrath of the authorities.’ For them, ‘the 2005 elections taught us, above all, that however we vote, in the end the ruling power always wins.’ On the evidence that they had nothing to gain from joining the opposition except from being targets of harassment, these elite confided that ‘we remain strong opponents, but only in the remotest corner of our backyard.’ And the measures that the ruling party were to take in the following years, particularly 2006 to 2008, such as forced enrolment of this elite into the Party (see below), would only confirm this position. They repeatedly said it years before the electoral campaigns started – ‘we will not be campaigning for the opposition and will not even vote for them.’ Even supposing that the opposition had more ways and the elbow room to make itself heard, the ‘lesson’ of the 2005 elections as well as an omnipresent fear, would, in any event, have deprived it of the rural activists it needed to capture a decent share of the vote in the countryside.
Given the weight of the peasant vote, defeat was inevitable from as early as Autumn 2005. But the debacle only started to emerge in the last two years before the elections especially during the electoral campaign, when the urban voters, traditionally the bastion of the opposition, progressively adopted the same reasoning as those living in the countryside – that is, that they would have nothing to gain by voting for the opposition but a great deal to lose. The repression of criticism, muffling of civil society and finally, the incredible pressure that the EPRDF put on voters, all had an effect. But the opposition seems also to have underestimated a decisive factor that led to the loss of its urban support: the political shift in the ruling Party, intensified after 2005 and the concomitant multiplication by seven in its membership (from 700,000 in 2005 to 5 million today or around one in seven of the adult population).
Very schematically and in line with its original Marxist-Leninist leanings, it saw itself as the small elite – the self-proclaimed avant-garde – with the right and duty to direct the ‘development’ of the ‘broad masses’, which meant the mass of peasant farmers to lead them out of their incredible misery. In the same ‘socialist’ vein, it reined in private businesses. But some years ago, this ‘pro-poor policy’ gradually disappeared in the face of a form of development where the ‘developmentalist state’ continues to play a central role but essentially to benefit the ‘constructive investors’ to order to promote their entry into a ‘market economy’. It is these people that the Party has enrolled en masse, be it urban small entrepreneurs, intellectuals or especially, those very same, more dynamic farmers, all those who had provided the vast battalions for the opposition by rejecting the authoritarianism of the ruling party and its obstruction to their economic and social advancement. This membership is either purely utilitarian – ‘I am joining the Party because it will reward me in return’ or more often obligatory, where the Party forces the leading social and economic players to join. In a few words, the hard core of the EPRDF which once focused on the “toiling masses,” is now formulating its new political basis on an emerging middle class by promoting its advancement and by enrolling its members at the Party’s periphery. As a result, these former opponents have either actually been rallied round or at least politically neutralised. The opposition, therefore, lost most of its fighting forces and its ‘opinion leaders’, who brought with them the bulk of the electorate.
While it was, then, inevitable that the opposition would be heavily defeated, no-one expected it to be wiped out. This provoked just as much surprise as its massive push in 2005. When the Prime-Minister, Meles Zenawi declared that he expected to get ‘50% to 75% of the vote” and that “we neither projected nor expected to get 99%,’ they confirmed their vision of the electoral challenge facing them. This translated as a clear win over the opposition as well as making up for their humiliation in 2005, but via a sufficiently ‘clean’ election, at least on the surface, to avoid violent reaction by the people, as in 2005, to get the opposition to ratify the results and finally and above all to provide donors with the argument they had been lacking up until then, to justify their full backing of the regime: it would finally have gained a democratic legitimacy through the ballot box.
If, for the time being there is nothing to indicate that troubles like those of 2005 might break out – people have not forgotten the 200 demonstrators who lost their lives and the 30,000 members of the opposition who were arrested – the electoral plan of Meles Zenawi is in 2010 a failure just as it was in 2005. The reason is, once again, the disconnect between the party leaders and its apparatus, despite its rigid, ‘Leninist’ form of hierarchical management. In 2005, the local ‘cadres’ had tried in vain to alert the top leadership of the growing opposition in order to contain its push and to this end to throw the EPRDF in the electoral battle. But these appeals never reached the ears of the leadership, not least because of its blind confidence in victory. They only realised the danger a month before Election Day and the Party-State’s counter-offensive, from top to bottom, and from one day to the next, came too late not to have to resort to vote-rigging in order to win. In 2010, the party’s apparatus went much beyond the original intentions of its leadership. They set out on a frenetic local campaign of one-upmanship, probably motivated by their humiliating defeat in 2005 and with the particular aim of showing their superiors that they were even more zealous than their colleagues next door. They therefore over-reacted by over-pressuring the voters, which European Union observers did not fail to note and even with flagrant vote rigging, which could be noticed in the EU final report. Hence the 99.6% return which is so improbable that it makes the regime look ridiculous, even, it seems, discrediting the Party in the eyes of some of its own core members and once and for all negates any ambition it may have had of being seen as ‘democratising.’ As a result, the EPRDF did not have a ‘landslide victory’ so much as a serious defeat.
Despite the pressure and event threats from the government, the main opposition force continues to contest the election results. It also wonders whether their single representative should join Parliament or not, so as to refuse to legitimise the de facto reign of a single party. The USA, stalwart ally of Ethiopia, went further than ever by declaring that the elections did not meet ‘international standards’. The foreign press is of one voice in its judgement that the regime is authoritarian, if not totalitarian and even goes as far as comparing it to that of Mengistu Haile Mariam, leader of the communist-military junta overthrown by Meles – in both cases, ‘the state and the ruling party are one and the same’ (Wall Street Journal). The setback is so obvious that the demonstration held in Addis-Ababa by the EPRDF to celebrate its ‘victory’ aimed in fact to demonstrate that Ethiopians ‘have rejected election meddling by western powers under the guise of human rights.’
But all the signs are that this cooling in relations with the donors will not have a long-term impact. While they are openly critical of the elections, they have never put into question the pursuit of their aid. Following the 2005 elections they had suspended part of it, only to reinstate it and even increase it a few months later, with just a change to its distribution network. Ethiopia is the perfect illustration that those receiving aid are not necessarily obliged to those giving it but rather the reverse. They would find it hard to justify to their public opinion a suppression of aid on political grounds, while Meles, on the contrary, can reject any imposed conditions in the name of the ‘sovereignty’ of the country. Finally, and above all, he knows that the West see him as the sole guarantee of stability in Ethiopia, which is at the core of a Horn of Africa in the throes of innumerable conflicts, as well as being their inescapable ally in the ‘fight against terrorism,’ which is their strategic priority for the entire region.
Nevertheless, this forced electoral takeover will weigh heavily on the country’s internal development. The extra-parliamentary opposition sees in the 2010 election one more proof that any form of democratic contest would be meaningless, the only remaining option being the armed struggle. But the chances of such an uprising being successful are still as slight as ever, either because of the persistent weakness of its leadership (Oromo Liberation Front), or because a core leadership still has not found the leverage to mobilise a peasant army (Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front), the juncture between the former and the latter being the sine qua non of an armed struggle in Ethiopia. The legal opposition, which saw not a single one of its leaders re-elected, is out for the count with very few chances of getting back on its feet not least because the ruling party will not allow them an inch of room to rebuild.
The hypothesis of a brutal breakdown cannot be totally excluded, with an unexpected event such as some insignificant incident that flares up into urban riots, stirred up by ethnic tensions and/or a sudden rage against the regime that the police and the army would be unable to contain. But, any internal changes could most probably only come through developments within the ruling party itself, given the impotence of the opposition and aid donors’ support of the regime. The political shift by the EPRDF and the multiplication of its membership has already started a process of change. Added to this is a generation change in the leadership, which is inevitable given the advanced age of the present incumbents. The profile of the newcomers is quite different to that of their elders in two fundamental ways: they did not rise out of the Ethiopian student movement of the 1970s, which was the strongest and most radically Marxist in all of black Africa; they came to the party out of self-interest, or were forced to do so.
So, what will be the position adopted by the new leadership? Will they stick together, or will the old guard keep control from the sidelines? How, within the Party, will the old hardcore deal with this mixed mass of newcomers and if they do manage to have a say within this heavily hierarchic Party, what will be their political stance? The future depends very much on the answers to these questions.
Given that the deepest sense of hierarchy runs through Ethiopian society as a whole, and given that the emerging middle class largely overlaps with the traditional elites, who have always been the opinion leaders, the neo-patrimonial system under construction could become sustainable, in other words, could offer the Party a wide enough and attractive base to be legitimised through (at least superficially) ‘clean’ elections. But on one condition: that everyone can benefit from this system on equal terms, i.e. that an end is put to the privileges accorded to the Tigreans. But will the present beneficiaries accept it?
Maintaining Tigrean domination, which has prevented any real democratic opening, was and still is the main factor of instability in Ethiopia. And it will continue if ethnic inequalities are perpetuated under this new, neo-patrimonial Party. The ‘national question’ remains the key of Ethiopia’s future.
(The above article is originally posted on openDemocracy.net. René Lefort has been writing about sub-saharan Africa since the 1970s and has reported on the region for Le Monde, Le Monde diplomatique, Libération, Le Nouvel Observateur.)
Azeb Mesfin, the wife of Ethiopia’s genocidal dictator Meles Zenawi, is now going after Al Amoudi’s Legedembi Gold Mine, according to Ethiopian Review Intelligence Unit sources in Addis Ababa.
