By Lammii Biyyaa
I felt compelled to write this short article after listening to an eyewitness video clip posted on Ethiopian Media Forum regarding religious conflicts that reportedly took place in the Jimmaa and Ilu-Abbaa-Boora zones of Oromia. I will briefly summarize the major political patterns demonstrated by the Woyane regime in the last 15 years in order to put into context the current political developments unfolding in Ethiopia, including this unprecedented religious conflict.
For any objective observer patterns in Woyane’s political behavior in the last 15 years indicate one basic fact, i.e., their strategy for ensuring endless dominance on Ethiopian state machinery is solely based on the infamous old approach of divide and rule, historically used by colonialists and later widely adopted by minority regimes across the world. During the heydays of the Woyane regime in the 1990s, the Woyane political elites cleverly charted out every conceivable lines along which the Ethiopian society can be partitioned. The first easy pick was to capitalize on the historic inequalities and repressions perpetrated by successive Ethiopian governments, chiefly directed at the peoples of the South. They cleverly manipulated these genuine grievances to pit the two largest ethnic groups (Oromo versus Amhara) against one another. Encouraged by Woyane’s rhetoric of correcting the historical injustice, the oppressed nations and nationalities immediately moved to demand for their legitimate places in the political life of the country. As this was not the intended outcome of the Woyane tactics, the regime was forced to tone down its original rhetoric, forced to expel independent political organization from the transitional government and forced to put cap on what the Woyane-made ethnic organization (PDOs) could demand for their peoples. These measures hinted the first sign as to what the Woyane regime is all about. It sent a shockwave across the files and ranks of the PDOs leading to expulsions or otherwise voluntary departure of well-versed members of these organizations, essentially turning these organizations into collections of opportunistic individuals who go to any length to please the regime and virtually out of touch with the aspirations of their respective peoples. Failing to rally the mass, these incompetent PDOs, ruling the regions, unleashed terror on their own people further alienating the mass. Unable to effectively function, the PDOs finally resorted to producing inflated statistics about their governments’ performances, falsely claiming an unprecedented popularity of their governments. This led the Woyane elites to believe that their tactics were working and their regime is comfortably seated and is ready to take on the next challenge.
Without carefully validating the reports filed by the PDOs, the Woyane elites foolishly embarked on their next move, which was aimed at gaining more trust from their Western financiers— earning the much needed international legitimacy. It is a common knowledge that the Western nations have been unconditionally supporting the Woyane regime, solely basing their logic on the carefully worded promises made by the regime about its commitments to democratizing Ethiopia. The Woyane felt that it is time to move beyond mere promises to showing something tangible in order to secure continued support from the West and also to counter accusations from opposition groups about its undemocratic practices. To this end, the Woyane elites carefully planned which opposition political organizations it would allow to participate in the 2005 elections and how much room it will allow for these organizations to maneuver. For obvious reasons, it picked the opposition groups that draw much of their supports from the Amhara ethnic group, without knowing the depth of public detest for its policies among non-Amhara ethnic groups. It also decided to use the Addis Ababa city election as its showcase, taking a well-calculated risk of loosing significant seats to the opposition in return for well-executed showcase that would secure Western confidence. Every step of the plan was wrong, as it was based on false reports filed by PDOs about the level of support the regime enjoyed among various ethnic groups. What happened in the aftermath of the 2005 elections is a too recent an episode and doesn’t need to be elaborated it here.
Panicked by the results of the elections, the Woyane picked up its old dividing tactic all over again, but this time around, they took it further by bring in the interhamwee rhetoric. It is aimed at separating the people of Tigray from the opposition groups, on the one hand, and to scare the world about the possibility for interhamwee style genocide in Ethiopia if the Woyane regime is removed from power. In a nutshell, they wanted to tell the world that the current regime is indispensable as the only regime that could play a balancing act between peoples of varying interests. They even went on charging the opposition leaders with ridiculous crimes as serious as treason and genocide to proof their claims. These measure finally brought to light what kind of beast the Woyane regime is.
The opposition groups quickly realized what this regime has in store for the country and promptly moved to counteract its plans. They made a great deal of compromise and created a broad alliance, AFD, to seal the cracks the regime sought to exploit for its malicious agenda of pitting ethnic groups against each other.
On its part, the regime appeared to have realized that the newly created understanding between various political organizations has effectively killed its old tactic and thus appeared to have embarked on yet another poisonous tactic with far reaching consequences. First, it jumped onto Somalia’s internal affairs in order to secure its position in the so-called “War on Terror.” In order to justify its actions in Somalia, the regime appeared to have decided to create connections between developments in Somalia by manipulating the delicate balance that existed between various religions in Ethiopian for centuries. Eyewitness reports coming from the fields indicate that in the religious conflicts that reportedly occurred in the Oromia zones of Jimmaa and Ilu-Abbaa-Boora, some of the perpetrates of the alleged crime were in army and police uniforms (click here listen to video eyewitness report)
Given the behaviors of this regime (highlighted above) and its recent adventure in Somalia, it is highly probable that the regime is behind such crime. No one in his/her right mind would underestimate the ramifications of such mindless acts. Therefore, it is high time that all political organizations and religious groups raise their voices against such acts before things get out of hand. If not cut short, it will be the deadliest political bomb used so far in Ethiopia and the region.
The Washington DC Chapter of Coalition for Unity & Democracy Party (CUDP/Kinijit) held a highly successful town hall meeting at the Unification Church yesterday (Oct 29). Hundreds of Kinijit members and supporters (the two halls were filled to capacity) gathered to listen explanations from the Kinijit officials about the recent leadership crisis.
At the start of the meeting, the acting chairman of Kinijit International Leadership (IL), Dr Moges Gebremariam, briefly discussed the crisis, and explained that it is now under control. He also took full responsibility for allowing the problem to fester for so long. He made a heartfelt apology to all Kinijit members and supporters who depended on the leadership to lead the party according to its stated principles.
Secretary General of the Kinijit International Leadership (IL), Ato Berhane Mewa, talked about the recent leadership crisis that shook the party to the core. Ato Berhane said that the Kinijit IL made decisive decisions and took corrective measures based on Kinijit’s rules and procedures, as well as its fundamental principles.
Chairman of the Washington DC Metro Kinijit, Ato Yilma Adamu, the Kinijit NA Treasurer, Ato Berhanu Yimer, the Auditor, Ato Tesfaye, and other officials took turns to share their thoughts and answer questions from the audience.
The willingness to discuss every thing openly on the part of the acting chairman and all the officials turned a potentially quarrelsome meeting into a productive discussion on how to rebuild the party. Tough questions and comments were thrown at the leadership from the audience, but they were done in a supportive spirit. The anger and frustration were directed at the former chairman, Shaleqa Yoseph, and his friends, particularly Dr Seyoum Solomon and Dr Almaz Seyoum. Some demanded legal action against the Shaleqa, who reportedly had misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars of Kinijit’s funds.
ER has recently uncovered that, in addition to diverting $250,000 to an unknown account under his personal control, the Shaleqa had withdrawn over $25,000 using an ATM card for his personal use (such as grocery, expensive hotels and restaurants, parking, plane tickets, etc.) without the authorization of the treasurer or consent of the executive committee. He sent less than that amount to support the families of jailed Kinijit leaders and members in the past eleven months. Over $50,000 that supporters donated in checks since last November have not been deposited in the official bank account. It is not known where the checks have disappeared. Large amounts of money that were collected in cash have also not been deposited in the official bank account. Additionally, the Shaleqa, who incorporated the organization under his own name using his own residential address, had failed to file the required tax forms for the two employees Kinijit NA had hired. As a result, it is likely that he is in jeopardy of an IRS action.
Yesterday’s Kinijit meeting in Washington DC signals the revival of the party, which still has a significant reserve of political capital. The leadership was reminded not to take the goodwill of the people for granted, to be humble, and when faced with problems, to consult with members and supporters. To replace the funds misappropriated by Shaleqa Yoseph and his cohorts, the Kinijit DC Metro chapter presented a plan to raise $1 million in a short time.
In two weeks (Nov 11-12), all eyes will be on Atlanta. Kinijit NA will hold a conference of all its chapters throughout North America. Is said to be the most important conference for Kinijit since its top top leaders were thrown in jail last November.
COMMENT
By ANTHONY MITCHELL, Associated Press
NAIROBI, Kenya, Oct. 18, 2006 — (AP) Ethiopian security forces massacred 193 people _triple the official death toll _ during anti-government protests following elections last year, a senior judge appointed to investigate the violence said Wednesday.
Unarmed protesters were shot, beaten and strangled to death, said Wolde-Michael Meshesha, who was vice chairman of a government-backed inquiry but said he has fled the country after receiving threats. He said he believed the Ethiopian government was trying to cover up the findings.
Ethiopian officials refused to comment on the claims.
“This was a massacre,” Wolde-Michael said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press. “These demonstrators were unarmed yet the majority died from shots to the head.”
“There is no doubt that excessive force was used,” said Wolde-Michael, who left the country last month after receiving anonymous death threats, leaving his wife and five daughters behind. He is now claiming asylum in Europe and would not disclose his exact whereabouts out of fear for his safety.
Last year’s elections were followed by a government crackdown on its opposition and increasing questions about its commitment to democracy.
A draft of the inquiry team’s report, which was to have been presented to the Ethiopian parliament in early July and has since been obtained by the AP, says among those killed were 40 teenagers, including a boy and a girl, both 14. The two were fatally shot.
Six policemen were also killed in the June and November 2005 riots, bringing the overall death toll to 199. Some 763 people were injured, the report adds. Wolde-Michael says the figures could be higher because many people were too afraid to speak out.
The government claimed at the time that 35 civilians and seven police were killed in November and that in June, 26 people were killed.
Ana Gomes, who was the European Union’s chief observer during the May 2005 elections, told the AP the report “exposes the lie” that the Ethiopian government is moving toward democracy.
“It is time the EU and U.S. realize that the current regime in Ethiopia is repressing the people because it lacks democratic legitimacy and is actually weak,” she said by e-mail after reading the report. “It is driving Ethiopia to more poverty, conflict and war.”
Wolde-Michael and the other commissioners spent six months interviewing more than 600 people, including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, police officers, witnesses, and other government officials.
According to Wolde-Michael, Meles said he did not authorize police to use live bullets.
The inquiry’s mandate was to determine whether excessive force was used. In early July, shortly before completing its report, the team held a vote and ruled eight to two that excessive force was used.
The vote and comments of the commission members were recorded on video, a copy of which has also been obtained by the AP.
“Many people were killed arbitrarily,” said inquiry chairman and supreme court judge Frehiwot Samuel, who is also believed to have fled Ethiopia, was heard saying on the video. “Old men were killed while in their homes and children were also victims of the attack while playing in the garden.”
An Ethiopian Orthodox priest, Estatiose Gebrekristos, was recorded as saying, “Based on my eyes, ears and knowledge the actions taken were 100 percent wrong.”
But two of the commission members said the government responded appropriately.
“I consider the motives of the protesters was to overthrow the government,” Elias Redman, vice president of the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Council, said on the video. “I therefore fully support the action taken by the police.”
The prime minister said at the time that demonstrators were trying to overthrow his government in an Ukraine-style revolution. Prior to the unrest he had banned all demonstrations and announced on state television he had put security forces under his direct control.
Wolde-Michael, who was appointed a judge by the current government in 1994, said the inquiry team came under intense pressure once the ruling party learned of its findings.
Electricity to their offices was cut and at one point their office was surrounded by security forces, he said. The team was also summoned by the prime minister, two days before the report was to be released, and told to reverse its findings, Wolde-Michael added.
Wolde-Michael said police records he saw showed 20,000 people were rounded up during the anti-government protests.
Of them more than 100 opposition leaders, journalists and aid workers are on trial for treason and attempted genocide.
Meles was once thought to be one of Africa’s more progressive leaders. However his reputation suffered in the aftermath of the elections. The EU and U.S. Carter Center expressed serious concerns over the vote.
In January of this year, Britain withheld $87 million in aid because of concerns about the government’s handling of the unrest.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, and more than half of its 77 million people live on less than $1 a day.
Further notes on the Trial
By Donald Levine
Almost duped once
In 1992 I joined dozens of Ethiopia’s friends to monitor the “first democratic election” in the history of Ethiopia. Never mind that democratic elections for Parliament had been held in 1957; in 1963; and in 1967. (In 1967, incidentally, one Ato Zenawi of Adwa and others were disputing the ballot counts in their local election.)
No matter. Full of good will, we Americans and Europeans had come to celebrate a new era of political democracy following the Derg dictatorship. We were excited that the new regime wanted to demonstrate commitment to an open political process and a pluralistic democracy, and honored to be part of it. My fellow monitors included a Congressman Donald Payne of new Jersey and Professor Edmond Keller of UCLA. My monitoring companion was first political officer at the Russian Embassy-a pairing unthinkable only a few year before
On arrival I told the taxi driver that I had come to support Ethiopia’s new experiment in democracy. All he said was: “Wushet Demokrasee.” His phrase became a logo for what my companions and I experienced during our brief tour. We found opposition candidates and parties hamstrung by restrictions. Opposition candidates in Amhara districts were reportedly harassed. I was there when the Government kept journalists from covering a new conference of an independent candidate. Together with the American Human Rights officer at the time, I visited a prison where several would-be OLF candidates had been locked up for no apparent good reason. I was there when Profesor Keller was ordered to leave the country within 24 hours simply because as an election observer he had visited an OLF rally. I went to Aliu Amba where the TPLF had installed a cadre from Tigray who insisted on running as an Argobba Liberation Front candidate instead of an authentic Argobba local. “You don’t know how to be liberated,” the cadre said, “we have come to teach you.” My Russian companion said to me, “I know that man. He is a Russian commissar from 1920.”
It was upsetting to be brought for an open democratic process when little of the sort was being shown. We felt we had been manipulated, as some habeshas do who think they can fool outsiders at will; after all, ferinjotch wustun aygebatchewm, aydelem? Our report embarrassed the Government. From then I became a critic of the Leninist character of the EPRDF regime.
Meles Zenawi’s Reformist Credentials
By 2004, Ethiopia’s political scene appeared to be changing. To be sure, throughout that year, large numbers of Oromos were booted to the Dedessa prison simply for expressing the innocent disagreements about government policy. To be sure, judges continued to work under the thumbs of a centrally-controlled judicial system. But something new was in the air.
I caught a glimpse of that when I, known as a critic of the regime, was invited to receive an honorary doctorate Addis Ababa University in July 2004. And during my visit to Ethiopia earlier this year and since, I learned that EPRDF officials went to some lengths to open up the media to competing political parties. I learned that in 2004, Reporters Without Borders had removed the name of PM Meles Zenawi from their list of enemies of a free press for the first time. And recently I learned, from a reliable report on the campaign in rural Shoa, that as the election campaign wore on and opposition candidates appeared to be growing in strength, the Government initially insisted on keeping the process open and not interfering with the local electoral process in any way. That was an amazing change, which I attribute to the sense of confidence and security experienced by the EPRDF elite following the purges of General Siye Abraha and his allies in 2001; heightened appreciation of Ethiopian nationhood following the war with Eritrea; successes in growth of infrastructure; improved handling of famines; and growing respect form the international community.
I have cited these liberalizing developments when talking with opposition activists who could not believe that EPRDF ever had any interest in a pluralistic democracy and so should be overthrown by any means possible. One of my critics, confronted by my reference to Meles’s liberalization, finally acknowledged that. He wrote:
I think everybody was banking on the reformist credentials of Meles. It is difficult to argue that there was no change after the split. There is no doubt that the years between the split and 2005 were the best years of the EPRDF. In fact I am of the opinion that had the reforms started earlier, the EPRDF would have done much better at the polls. As it turned out the reforms were too little too late.
Despite these visible reforms, the hatred against EPRDF generated by the policies and actions of their first decade created such intense antagonism that some of the opposition simply could not trust the new openings that EPRDF created. Sensing that CUD elements might be ambivalent about participating whole-heartedly in the constitutionally mandated political process, and fearing that growing popular support for CUD might actually turn them out of office and overturn the major EPRDF reforms in which they believed so strongly, EPRDF leaders engineered an abrupt turn-around in the middle of April.
Ambivalent Regression to an Older Script
A month before the election, party cadres started receiving different signals. Across the country they were told to direct Government resources to pressure the populace to vote for EPRDF. For example, systematic house visits were paid by armed cadres who told peasants that they had better vote for EPRDF or suffer serious consequences. The Government was gearing up for a different sort of denouement than planned, thinking they had to do whatever it took to secure their hold on power (an attitude not unknown to Americans from the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004). Not wanting outsiders to see what was going on, the Government abruptly expelled three American NGOs that had come to monitor the elections.
Much of what transpired subsequently-imposing martial law on election night; premature announcement of EPRDF victory; shootings of demonstrators in June, harassment and property confiscation of CUD party members; arrest of thousands of young males and transporting them to distant hardship prisons-is well known. (Much is still not known, including how and why security forces entered college dormitories in Addis Ababa and Bahr Dar provocatively during the night of June 5, and the extent to which opposition property was confiscated and government critics were silenced.) Following the June 6 massacre, the world recoiled in horror, much as in November 1974 when Mengistu’s agents carried out their bloody massacre.
But then, the regime hurried to pick up the pieces and move on. They convinced themselves if not others that had they not reacted with such violence, mob action would have led to destructive civil actions. They proceeded with initiatives to reform the rules of parliament, re-examine the National Election Board, and draft new legislation regarding the press. They urged the opposition candidates who had won to take over the administration of Addis Ababa and to take their seats in Parliament and to continue their struggle for democratization and economic progress within the constitutionally mandated system. They carried out negotiations day by day with CUD leaders in an effort to avoid further violence and move the country forward. PM Meles said he was looking forward to working with Mayor-elect Berhanu Nega.
And then, due to circumstances about which everyone disagrees, the CUD leaders made a controversial decision not to accept their huge electoral victory and build on it. That decision, many CUD supporters believe, was not in anyone’s best interest. When they broke off talks and refused to enter Parliament, the regime regressed once more to reimpose a veil of terror. Security forces reportedly drove around the city and randomly assassinated innocent civilians in cold blood. They seized and incarcerated rejectionist CUD victors, civil society leaders, and independent journalists. An independent commission has now reported that 193 civilians were murdered, often in horridly brutal ways. All those detained, plus several Ethiopians living abroad, were charged with crimes punishable by death, including the illogical, unfounded, insulting, and self-defeating charge of genocide. With that, Ethiopia plunged from being a country full of democratic promise and then a polity tragically riven with destructive conflict to being the laughing stock of the international community.
Almost Duped Twice or What?
Officials and informal leaders from all the donor countries tried repeatedly to encourage the Prime Minister to reconsider those charges. He adamantly refused to budge, and sought to transform his offensive tactics into defense of an autonomous judicial system. He assured all concerned that the defendants would receive a fair and speedy trial, and that this would enhance respect for Ethiopia’s legal system.
Given the PM’s uncompromising attachment to this line of argument, it appeared futile to continue pushing for a politically negotiated release of the prisoners. I sought to direct attention instead to other, consensually supported openings for progressive development. One of these was to see if the trial proceeded in a way that demonstrated his announced commitment to a judicial system bound by high standards of legal procedure. My hope for that process lay behind the exchanges subsequently carried out in Addis Fortune and on the eineps web site. To quote my conclusion:
We must respect the forms of a systematic, independent, speedy completion of their trial “as a step toward advancing the role of an independent judiciary.” I chose those words deliberately in order to encourage the Government to move forward toward a system in which a judiciary functions autonomously… If legitimate procedures are not respected by the Government, I expect that domestic and international observers will get the word out quickly, and I shall be among the first to voice disapproval… But if the trial is reasonably fair, then its success could be joined with other steps being taken toward reform of the judicial system, the last in the series of four efforts at democratic institution-building.
When the trial adjourned after dragging on for many months, I made an interim assessment based on careful analysis of daily records, and concluded that the trial could be considered neither speedy nor fair:
No ordinary court case, the trial against selected opponents of the EPRDF regime has divided the Ethiopian body politic as has no other issue since the time of Emperor Susneyos. One would expect the Ethiopian judicial system to go to great lengths to demonstrate its integrity both to Ethiopian citizens and to international observers. Its failure to do so reflects, at the very least, a lack of capacity to mount a fair and speedy trial…
Of all flaws in this trial, I consider the most dysfunctional to be . . . the prosecution’s repeated failure to link evidence with specific defendants or charges. Lack of adequate differentiation has [marked] these proceedings from the outset. While the Government appears, at best, to possess hard evidence incriminating one or two individuals of one or two categories of action that are possibly illegal, it has included several dozens of individuals under a broad range of criminal accusations. It is this feature of the proceedings that opened up to ridicule what could and should have been a serious juridical process.
During this period of recess, it would behoove the Ministry of Justice to re-assess those charges more carefully and demonstrate to the world the high level of legal competence that Ethiopians manifest at their best. That would lend greater speed and fairness to the final sessions of this trial and thereby enable Ethiopians to get back to working together to make their beloved land a better place. If such action were to be matched by a willingness of defendants to avail themselves of counsel, that desired outcome would be facilitated even more.
On Thursday, October 5, the trial resumed. One might have thought that the Ministry of Justice would have done something to redress the shortcomings of the first phase. Yet the first day of the resumed trial was abysmal. Lead judge Adil Ahmed Abdullahi and lead prosecutor Shemelis Kemal were simply not present. The trial began an hour and 15 minutes late. Absent a quorum to rule on the admissibility of evidence, the proceedings were quickly adjourned and postponed for eight days. The senior judge and the main prosecutor were not even present. Nothing was accomplished; the trial was delayed yet another week.
And so, are we back to square one? Was the notion of putting the prisoners on trial to parade an evolving legal process simply another sort of make-believe to dupe the ferenjis? Or can that ill-conceived theater still be repaired? If not, let us hope that this time the donors will waste no time in confronting the regime with their marked displeasure. And let us hope that another war with Somalia will not becloud the issue of justice and good governance in Ethiopia. It is especially in time of war that a nation needs to be unified. Besides, andnet kala, agarun yakeberal.
By Workie Briye
Over the last several weeks, the news on many Ethiopian Web sites has been dominated by the defection of Ethiopian diplomats and other professionals, including army generals. A significant number of diplomats, including several Ambassadors and high-level diplomats, left their jobs protesting against the appalling human rights abuse taking place in the country. While the news of this occurrence has received a wide coverage, analysis providing deeper insight into the political dimension of this trend has not been adequate in view of the huge importance of this development. Considering the imminent fact that defection of diplomats and army officials is a phenomenon bound to continue in earnest, the democratic movement must be able to provide further impetus for such patriotic action to be taken by all professionals who work with in the security, military, and diplomatic apparatus of the regime.
First of all we must pay tribute to those diplomats and other professionals, who left their positions by sending an unambiguous message to the regime that the loyalty of the professionals lies to their country and they could not be a party to the crime committed against their people. Considering the dire political situation most of the diplomats were in, and their contribution while under the regime, the recent measure they have taken is commendable. Although the recent defection constitutes just a latest episode in a long-running saga of defection, there has never been a departure of such huge number of qualified and experienced diplomats with in a short time span. The regime’s Foreign Service is currently left with very few professional diplomats. The regime has replaced all career diplomats with substitutes drawn from the ranks of the ruling party.
Professional and Political Life Under the Regime-the Diplomas’ Perspective
While some compatriots consider massive defection as having huge political significance, others tend to emphasize on what they consider the “loyal service†the diplomats and military officials have been rendering to the regime. Although, a mix of reactions to this development is expected, the context under which diplomats served the regime need to be placed in its proper perspective. Indeed, many of these diplomats served between five and fifteen years as career diplomats; not a short period of time in the professional or personal life of any individual. For the majority of these diplomats, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is their first as well as their last institution to serve as civil servants. For these professionals, what they left behind is not a mere place of work or employer but an important chapter in their life where the best part of their companionships and social networks have been established. Such a social network takes a long time to knit, and cannot be easily cloned in a foreign country. The departing diplomats also represent the most experienced, hard-working and capable members in the country’s Foreign Service.
For many Ethiopians who do not possess proximate knowledge about the Foreign Service structure of the regime, the current exodus of diplomats might appear as a result of a recent change of heart from the diplomats, merely related to the post-election saga. Although the chain of events that followed the election and the crimes being committed by the government have been more than what they could endure as diplomats, this protest nonetheless is not a sudden shift in the political position of diplomats.
In the first place, many diplomats, like millions of civil servants in the country, have been serving in that particular institution not because they were happy with the policies and day to day operations of the regime, but in spite of it. Even though diplomats formally “represent†and receive directions from the government in power, many Ethiopian diplomats have tried to carry out their formal duties without loosing sight of the fact that their proper responsibility lies to the millions of Ethiopians who suffer from poverty, backwardness, bad-governance, and human rights abuse. Although maintaining a perfect equilibrium between formal duty and personal conviction is not an easy task, many diplomats have tried to make their daily activities to be of some significance to their country and its people.
Needless to say, a diplomat’s formal duty may well have to be obeyed and executed under all circumstances, arguably including under those circumstances where it appears clear that the long term interest of the country is trampled by the ruling group in exchange for some myopic political and personal advantages of those in power. Diplomats are, therefore, expected to compartmentalize their formal functions to their personal views on the agenda and policies of the government in power, where it is not uncommon for personal convictions coming into conflict with formal duties. The resulting struggle with in the individual diplomat in his/her best attempt to maintain balance between formal duty and personal faith is not evident to third party observers, who tend to think that all diplomats lend a blind support to the regime. The reality on the ground, however, is different from that and displays a much more complex picture. This holds true with most of non-TPLF diplomats who are still with in the Foreign Service.
A question may then follow, as to why these diplomats had to spend this whole time serving the regime prior to the measure they are taking in recent times? Although such a question cannot lend itself to one simple answer, the situation prevailing within the institution can be explained without difficulty. Many diplomats stayed with in the diplomatic structure of the regime mainly hoping against hopes that the leadership might one day come to a temperate level; that the anger and hatred that drive the TPLF upper echelon would some how subside through time; that the group could gradually build up confidence and adopt inclusive kind of political process as they institutionalize whatever ideology they believe the country must be guided by, etc., etc.
Yet, inspite of forbearance and moderation by diplomats and millions of Ethiopian professionals for a long time, the course of behavior followed by the leadership through time has been quiet the contrary. While several high profile cases of human rights violation, including the mass killing in Gambella, has been committed by the regime at various times, what took place in our country following the 2005 election turned out to represent the worst crime yet committed by the regime against the civilian population. In the aftermath of the rigged election and the violent suppression of democracy, the regime opened a huge diplomatic campaign of lie aimed at confusing the international community and some Ethiopians in the Diaspora. The regime, quiet naturally, has made every effort to employ diplomats as tools for this campaign. Many diplomats, however, displayed courage and patriotism by rejecting the regime’s campaign and reaffirming their dedication to their people. Many diplomats openly refused to be part of the regime’s effort to implement several heinous plans outlined by TPLF.
Nevertheless, while the opposing political views of many diplomats towards the regime is by no means new, the pain and trauma resulted from the post election terror reigned over the country has indeed had its own impact in triggering the mass exodus of diplomats we are currently witnessing. On the other hand, throughout their tenure as diplomats under the regime, for most of the diplomats, although they had to execute formal duties that had the effect of advancing narrow interests of the ruling group, their country and its people have always remained the ones nearest to their heart. Moreover, in addition to the human rights abuse against their people, almost all non-TPLF and some diplomats who were members of the TPLF, had endured evils against themselves long and patiently before they ever thought of migrating to a foreign country.
Significance of the Defections to the Democratic Movement
Many Ethiopians who follow the news of this massive defection of diplomats are expressing hopes that the trend could bolster the democratic struggle. In deed diplomats possess a set of skills and power stemming from their education and extensive international experience. They had also been exposed to a situation where they could have observed the day to day operation of the regime and conduct of its officials at a close range. Moreover, many diplomats are not new to the democratic struggle. They have been fighting their own battles by opposing the regime not only inwardly but also openly confronting the cadres and other party officials. Due to the nature of the work environment in the Foreign Service, diplomats had repeatedly been led to oppose corruption, nepotism, the kinship style of management, and other forms of unrestrained behavior on the part of TPLF officials. After the May 2005 election, as indicated earlier, this struggle from within did not remain concealed. Diplomats openly opposed and refused to take part in the execution of directives, action plans and orders handed down by the regime. Accordingly, diplomats are currently rejecting the regime not merely as a matter of salving their conscious, as presented by some individuals, in the crimes being committed by the regime. Diplomats took this patriotic measure as part of their long-running fight and political difference with the government. All diplomats went to exile at the time when their safety, and even their life was at stake as a result of the massive Government crack down within the foreign service structure, targeting all those considered members and supporters of opposition parties. Consequently, it is only natural to expect these diplomats to add valuable input to the democratic struggle.
On an other note, diplomats have gained some measure of personal freedom by distancing themselves from the regime. Except at times of some abrupt and usually risky confrontations with the cadres in the Foreign Service, total asphyxiation prevails in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of freedom to express individual opinion without reprisal from the officials. Those ornamental types of rights the regime had tried to display in some other areas are totally unknown with in the Foreign Service. Accordingly, although a life of exile has its own combats, the relative freedom from a ruthless regime and abusive and despotic bosses, however, afford diplomats with the most sublime moments of relationship with their ideals that have been suppressed during their time in the grip of the regime. Given the wide experience and diverse educational resource, contribution from diplomats can take various forms. Former diplomats have the potential to contribute to the whole spectrum of the democratic struggle ranging from the utilization of their diplomatic skill to providing additional insight into the underworld operation taking place with in the regime in general and the foreign service structure, in particular.
Challenges Facing Diplomats In their Participation in the Democratic Movement
There are, however, challenges coming into the ways of former diplomats as they try to make meaningful contribution to their country. The challenges may come from two sources. On the one hand, the regime is trying to use its long hand tactic in the form of intimidation. Over the last several months, we have seen the ruling group actively and expensively engaged in operations aiming at silencing opposition and containing emergence of further insight into the truth within the government. Primarily, the authorities in the Foreign Ministry are often seen trying to impose their own self-serving version of ethical and behavioral standards regarding if and how to criticize government officials, especially of former bosses. According to their “ethical rulesâ€Â, criticizing the management of a public institution and its officials is spiteful, treacherous and/or an unconstitutional conduct that constitute a crime of grave consequences. This assertion is mixed with a smear campaign and fabricated accusations backed by various forms treats. The highlight of their campaign is use of official government Web site to publish shocking lies, a conduct absolutely unbecoming of personalities one would call “Vice Minister†or a Minister, against individuals who criticize the regime. The intended goal of this smear and threat is that of scaring others, that criticizing former bosses has serious consequences.
Accordingly, diplomats may be targets of false accusations as they try to contribute to the democratic movement. Inspite of such threats, many diplomats and other professionals believe that this is not too much a sacrifice to be made considering those young children and mothers brutally murdered by the regime, the elected leaders who languish in prisons and concentration camps enduring torture and other inhuman treatment.
Many professionals, mainly diplomats, had served the regime under situations where, in any discussion on any subject, the worth of the employee was as a mere object of audience while, TPLF cadres do all the chatting and the preaching. The authorities in the Foreign Service especially are not only talking machines but also merciless gods who possess all the life and death matters concerning diplomats. Through a lawless and purely personal style of management, the bosses possess the power to grant what one doesn’t deserve and deny what legitimately deserves to an employee. Under such leadership, rules, regulations, and the rights that ought to be derived as such had no meaning at all, resulting in the prevalence of absolute fear, submission and dependence on the omnipotent bosses. Accordingly, a new freedom to express one’s views with out fear may prove to be not an easy exercise to come to terms with.
On an other dimention, the regime’s cadres and officials are exceptionally good at preaching what they don’t practice. Such personal qualities or virtues as “commitmentâ€Â, â€Âintegrityâ€Â, â€Âcredibilityâ€Â, â€Âhonestyâ€Â, etc are familiar jargons in their discourse. Although many diplomats comprehend the purpose of such a ploy, some employees might, through time, have been led to believe that TPLF officials are the paragon of these virtues and measure of such values as†integrityâ€Â, commitmentâ€Â, loyalty, etc. With some degree of success, these officials tried to brainwash the entire diplomatic staff that the highest one in the hierarchy of values is the value of remaining loyal even in exile.(Some cadres even have a term for this, i.e. ‘Tamagn Kedategna’ (Loyal Traitors). This is of course in keeping with a TPLF tradition of blackmail and assassination against dissidents who break the precondition to “go away and shut up†in return to having been spared from execution). However, if the authentic benchmark to possessing such virtues was considered to be tangible measures such as actual delivery, everyday behavior, or the management of public resources, many of the party officials who rant about integrity or commitment are the most commonplace and contemptible ones, taken as employees or managers, or even as ordinary citizens. The Devil reciting from the Scriptures is still a Devil.
In general, threat of false charges or publication of gross lies must not make us shy away from any input we could provide to the struggle for democracy. Not only for asserting our personal liberty, but also for achieving our aspirations for our people, the first enemy, (to use a well-trodden cliché), we must “conquer is our own fearâ€Â. As highlighted by Dr. Berhanu Nega in his recent book, Yenetsanet Goh Sike’d, the political system called “democracy†presupposes not merely a merciful government and fine laws, but mainly citizens who are courageous enough to have the audacity to aggressively assert what they deserve under the system. According to Dr. Berhanu Nega, the corollary of this truth is that Zombie-like subjects remain susceptible to the bully and terror unleashed every time by dictatorial regimes.
Finally, if the nature of TPLF and its style of governance is something to go by, what is currently happening to the departing diplomats will undoubtedly happen to the remaining “diplomats†and “Ambassadorsâ€Â, including those recently recruited through their ideological and business ties with the ruling clique, as long as the group remain in full control.
