1. The available accounts and reports suggest that nearly all the political parties and groups were resigned to the probability that the outcome of the 2005 elections in Ethiopia might confirm the TPLF/EPRDF’s grip on power. The ruling groups had no doubt that the elections would go the same way as previous ones–a landslide victory most of all in the countryside where local militias, the police and political cadres had displaced all the laws and institutions of the land and established total control on behalf of those groups. Far more important, the two main opposition groups (Hibret and Kinjit) had misgivings that the elections could trigger any dramatic changes in the political landscape.
2. The TPLF/EPRDF underestimated and misread the popular disenchantment with its rule expressed in the form of numerous petitions (abetuta), plain indifference or silent disapprovals sometimes paired with open support even for the most odious of their deeds–a longstanding form of political opposition in Ethiopia. (The latter attained an ‘art’ form during the Dergue years of terror where virtually no dissent surfaced even when masses of youth were slaughtered and their corpses thrown onto streets while others, including the parents of some, shouted slogans of support for the same action, labelled abyotawi ermija). The growing but scathing critique of the regime through the fledgling press, largely confined to Addis Ababa, and in other fora was interpreted by the same regime as the whining of a tiny few hankering after taking power away from the Tigrayans (hence ‘chauvinists’). The TPLF/EPRDF did not believe that any allowances to the opposition groups to gain access to the government-controlled mass media, at least in the run up to the elections, would do them any damage. After all, they had total control of the countryside, including the means to decide who was to be elected and by what margin!
3. Within the Hibret grouping, the predominant view rested on the circular (cynical) argument that the regime in power had not embraced democracy (free and fair elections, an independent judiciary and other relevant institutions) and any expectation of seizing power through the ballot box was illusory. The same view projected instead turning the election process into a means of conducting a campaign for total transformation of the state (through a new constitution and other institutional trappings) and, if there was sufficient support on the ground in terms of extensive wins in the elections, doing a second edition of the Orange Revolution in Ethiopia. Predictably, the Hibret grouping was torn between rejecting the electoral process at the outset, in keeping with this cynical theory championed by a former ideologue of the Dergue now perched at the helm of the Hibret, and pursuing the struggle for a democratic alternative through any available means (consistently championed by the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition or SEPDC, led by Beyene Petros). Not only did this dilemma cripple its leadership from evolving and executing practical policies in the wake of the fast pace of developments, it threw its potential supporters into despair and/or the arms of other groups
4. The Kinjit group was more prone to spontaneity and a reactive stance. Having emerged from an amalgam of diverse groups (some of which had just split from the Hibret) and armed with a hodgepodge of liberalism including a new doctrine of ‘change but without a revolution’, it was not possible for it to subject the onrushing course of events to any palpable scrutiny and to adopt a common viewpoint in terms of policies and tactics. Its ‘election manifesto’ was not only a concoction of all kinds of ideas and promises, befitting a ‘rainbow’ grouping, but also demonstrated the influence of varied persons and persuasions barely able to mix together into a coherent perspective to meet Kinjit’s urgent need for some kind of programme. The discernible presence of an assortment of voices, styles and views in the manifesto (as well as beyond, in the streets and through the press, for example) proved that the group was strung together partly on account of the urge for unity that the populace demanded. Indeed, although the Kinjit was fraught with the diverse, even contradictory, perceptions that had infused the constituent groups and impacted on how the Kinjit behaved in the actual course of events, its performance was always swayed by the popular desire for change and remained in that grip until the arrest of its leaders by the regime in power on false charges of treason. To be sure, it gradually overcame the internal dissonances by co-opting the leading elements in each subgroup and excluding those they deemed ‘difficult’ or ‘obstacles’ (such as, notably, the hapless Lidetu Ayalew). Yet, the formation of the Kinjit did not end the proliferation of diverse views and perceptions in its ranks. The compulsion to keep together and win the elections became a paramount rationale for its continuity as a ‘rainbow’ grouping before the elections and the transition towards a unified party, afterwards. As regards the expectation of any significant wins over the TPLF/EPRDF, that too was blurred by the lack of trust in the electoral system as well as its inability to estimate how the general populace might react on the day. That the general public could have the courage to throw the ruling groups out of power through the ballot box was too surreal for the group to contemplate. For a population that has never put its trust in political authority, particularly that of the central state, and remains in the grip of the widespread perception that those in power engage in routinely abusing it, it would not have been a normal reaction to express their will freely and without fear of consequences. The people’s fear of the current power holders and their cynical deployment of a political police throughout the length and breadth of the country meant that avoiding having to express their real feelings about state affairs to organs of the state (the election commission or whatever) would be the rule rather than the exception. Popular antipathy to, and suspicion of, anything to do with and by the state runs so deep in the psyche of the nation that no one could have accurately gauged how the public would react other than to reinstate the status quo just as during the earlier elections.
5. For all kinds of reasons, the outcome of the 2005 elections threw up nothing dramatic. The vast majority of the general public in Ethiopia had no faith in the policies and practices of the TPLF/EPRDF almost from the beginning of their reign. Sections of the population that sought to give them the benefit of the doubt in 1991 had seen their hopes dashed in subsequent years. The urban unrests and open rebellion in 2001 against the regime in power were sufficient testimony to the lack of support for, indeed also to the abject failure of, the policies and administration of the TPLF/EPRDF. Although the government had belatedly begun to realise that its policies and administration had failed in a number of areas and antagonised broader sections of the population, it focussed on undertaking mass meetings to explain them away and to reassert the validity of its ‘revolutionary democracy’–a euphemistic mumbo-jumbo frequently cited to suggest some form of populist ideological rationale behind their misrule. The TPLF/EPRDF fired, even imprisoned, a number of its leaders to reinforce the message that its policies had undergone some form of repackaging and that implementation (portrayed as the basic failure) would improve. Still, major planks of the failed policies of the regime, viewed by the vast majority as replicas of the Dergue (some had hence dubbed it Dergue II), remained intact. The premier positions in the public administration up and down the country was filled by cadres who were largely recruited from the ranks of the TPLF; the economy and the public treasury continued to be plundered by business interests linked to, or privately owned by, leaders of the TPLF (mostly) and their teletafi organisations or hangers on (a few); the TPLF/EPRDF trampled underfoot all forms of public life (the mass media, the educational system, the business community, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies). In brief, the TPLF/EPRDF had in effect become a military bureaucratic dictatorship routinely deploying brute force as a means of getting its way everywhere but masquerading as a moderniser through the incessant propaganda mounted largely by the state-controlled media. Add to this the massive deception it perpetrated on its foreign backers (painting itself as democrats engaged in a gradual and measured introduction of democracy into a country that never enjoyed any of it until they sprang to power) and the picture becomes clear of a potent force continuing with its destructive rampage in all sectors of the society. Its unending mishandling of the ‘Eritrean problem’, the neglect of growing poverty, mass unemployment and continuing exclusion of all forms of political groups from the public space gave the lie to the regime’s claim to any level of legitimacy as the ultimate authority over Ethiopian affairs. When it therefore emerged that the general public had voted in the June 2005 elections not to express acquiescence and loyalty to the TPLF/EPRDF as would have been normal, but actually to throw them out of power, it supplied fresh evidence of the public’s widespread desperation and bitterness, a determination that, come what might, they would choose death to life under the TPLF/EPRDF. It became strikingly apparent that the masses of people had voted without any fear of the consequences that might be visited on them the morning after the elections should the TPLF/EPRDF stay on. Neither were they concerned that the foreign powers so deeply involved in sustaining the regime could come to their aid and force it to recognise the popular verdict. They appeared not to be worried too much that the political leadership supplied by Hibret and Kinjit was wanting in providing clear directions and alternative options in the fast-paced course of events.
6. The reactions of the different parties to the outcome of the elections were nevertheless dramatic. The moment the news of their wipe out in Addis Ababa and possibly in outlying regions came flooding in, the leadership of the TPLF/EPRDF was consumed by fear and unease. If any of the news reports are to be believed, some of them had started packing to run away before they were ordered to stay put at their posts until further notice. The inner circle of top military officers, intelligence and security chiefs and selected political bosses were reportedly hastily gathered for a debriefing and to map out a plan of action in case the expected Orange Revolution materialised. Drastic steps were soon announced to stem the tide of public opinion and expectations of a quick handover of power to the presumed winners. The election machinery appeared to have been co-opted into delaying announcements of vote counts and overseeing massive rigging of the outcomes. Stories abound of independent observers refusing to budge (some killed, but many intimidated and forced to abandon their posts) from the voting stations before the counting process was completed and the winners duly declared on the very night of the fateful elections. The fact that the regime brought into the capital an infamous army corps (known by the name of ‘Agazi) instantly reviled for its atrocities (beatings, killings and imprisonment of thousands) to stamp out any expression of popular disenchantment with the election process and suspended even the semblance of democratic liberties it used to flaunt for the benefit of foreign embassies and international agencies in Addis Ababa exposed the hysterical level of fear that engulfed it. Indeed, its media started churning out steadfastly scare stories of plots by the opposition parties to target Tigrayans in the capital that it had insinuated at infrequent gaps before the elections. The real aims appeared to be to bring back into the fold of the TPLF sections of the Tigrayans in the administration, the army and within the business community as well as abroad (in foreign countries) who had deserted the TPLF or opposed its policies and practices, particularly after the split of the leadership and the demise of the Gebru Asrat-Siye group. Once the immediate fear of a mass uprising against the TPLF/EPRDF receded (partly because of the confusion in the ranks of the opposition as to what to do and partly also because of the expectation among the same groups that the foreign embassies who had kept tab on all the developments might advise the regime to come clean on the results), the government targeted groups of people for its systematic suppression: taxi drivers, university students, youth in general and finally supporters and members of the opposition movements. Each time one or more groups rose spontaneously (it had to be such because the opposition groups disavowed any form of mass action and disowned even those who died on the streets exercising their rights to hold peaceful demonstrations under the TPLF-designed constitution), the regime would forcibly disband, arrest and incarcerate ever wider sections and take them to all corners of the country. It seemed that history was repeating itself but this time the regime in power raining bullets on the demonstrators and establishing huge concentration camps (some with the identical names dating from the 1970s) was headed by a few of the protestors of some thirty years ago. It is incredible, but true, that a number of today’s jailers and executioners were the very persons who feared for their lives under the imperial regime and sought to bring to an end mass repression and dictatorship.
7. The reactions of the Hibret and Kinijit to the election outcomes were extraordinary. This had to do in part with the manner in which the disparate opposition political groupings in the two years preceding the 2005 elections in Ethiopia came together. The decade long public disappointment and despair with the TPLF/EPRDF had generated increased pressures on the opposition political groupings to create a broader consensus and unified action to remove the incumbents from power. In spite of the differences that might have existed among those groups, it had become increasingly ridiculous for miniscule groups to opt to gain power at the expense of all other forces, including the TPLF/EPRDF. Once the 2005 elections were around the corner, it seemed necessary for all to forge alliances or fronts, at least, to make a dent on the grip of the TPLF/EPRDF on the Ethiopian state. As referred to above, the Hibret and Kinijit operated on the premise that some gains may be made in the elections but that a decisive victory would be unthinkable knowing fully well the ruling parties’ undiminished control over the electoral system, access to the media and the army (often viewed as the praetorian guards of the TPLF). When the results for Addis Ababa became known and those for the provinces began to filter through, however, the opposition sensed blood on the carpet. Instead of the earlier expectation of some level of success (reinforced by the foreign media and the local ambassador’s insistence that such was sufficient for the time being, until the next elections that is), the opposition declared that they would have won had it not been for the massive fraud and intimidation in the outlying regions. They therefore started to mount fresh campaigns to verify the outcome of the elections, partly through the election board itself (despite their repeated castigation of that body for its bias and role as a tool of the dictatorship) and by appealing to foreign embassies as well as the very government they sought to displace. The two main groups appeared to believe that a recount or verification of the contested votes would give them the majority they thought they had won. The next few weeks after the elections were therefore spent by these groups in trying to find the listening ear for their pleas: the regime itself; the foreign embassies of the big powers in Addis Ababa and the foreign media. If at all the general public was considered in the calculus of regaining the lost votes, it was as a force of last resort. The public was told repeatedly not to engage in any action that might be construed as ‘violent’ or endangering the peaceful process underway in brief, “change but no revolution!â€Â
8. The contrasting political chess game between the TPLF/EPRDF which deployed brutal forces and engaged in unadulterated repression mainly against the urban population and the Kinjit and Hibret who unwittingly acquiesced in the liquidation of the popular craving for a total change of government did not represent any forward movement in the political conditions of the country. The slide of the TPLF/EPRDF towards a blatant dictatorship ostensibly to thwart a re-enactment of the Orange Revolution or the massacre in Rwanda was not met by popular mass action if only to assert the veracity of the overwhelming votes cast against it and to resist its onslaught. If the people had indeed voted in the opposition groups and cast the TPLF/EPRDF out of power, the obvious conclusion must have been to go back to the people and urge them to support their votes by taking to the streets and demanding either a recount, re-elections or whatever other suitable moves. Nothing of the kind transpired except the feeble threats of ‘civil disobedience’  a self-imposed staying away of the people from the streets and work. Even that was given up when the foreign ambassadors intervened to wrest a verbal promise from the government that they would agree to negotiate a way out, only to be unceremoniously ditched by them a few days later. In the despair over the lack of any actual leadership and directions for the developing situation in the ensuing days and weeks after the elections, the indomitable spirit of student activism at the universities rose to explode the myth of the TPLF/EPRDF repression as the pivotal factor for not mounting any resistance. Again, this was a literal application of the newly concocted ‘change but no revolution’ adage; the new belief (if at all one could call it that) sought to avoid any confrontation, any blood from spilling and giving the TPLF/EPRDF any excuses for launching its brutal attacks on the people everywhere. Student activism, the spontaneous resistance of the youth and taxi drivers nevertheless showed the impotence of the opposition leaders as well as their mantras of a negotiated settlement of the dispute about the results of the elections. It also showed for the nth time in history that the people never desire to die, spill any blood or seek to launch a revolution if their demands are met by those in authority. Although the TPLF/EPRDF regime managed to disperse, kill, imprison and abuse the youth and students as well as the general population, it did not stamp out the resistance, nor could it; it merely lost any vestiges of credibility or ‘revolutionary democracy’ in the process. As a matter of fact, since the first bloody suppression of demonstrations and the mass incarcerations, even primary school pupils have joined the ranks of the political opposition and shut down schools! The entirety of circumstances has underlined that its days as a government would last only as long as it continued to muster the military forces that could do its bidding: shooting down demonstrators (mostly youngsters and students), arresting anyone in the streets and re-creating the concentration camps that had long been forgotten with the imperial regime. Secondly, by virtue of its arrogance, malicious propaganda and thuggery, the TPLF/EPRDF has opened the doors even wider for any form of armed opposition. On top of this, significant sections of the population (not just the intellectuals) have rediscovered their voices to express openly their disdain for the TPLF/EPRDF and the fact that they would sacrifice everything to see the back of it. Ultimately, the TPLF/EPRDF has prepared the ground for a major counter-resistance on a scale never known before in Ethiopia. A veritable revolution is knocking at its doors and brewing with every passing day. (The thrust of this new wave has already led to the formation of an alliance of otherwise implacable enemies sworn to get rid of it. But more of this later.) In the meantime, the fate of the leadership of the TPLF/EPRDF is in the hands of a small circle of military and intelligence officers who might decide to act sooner rather than allow any form of popular uprising that might put an end to the entire edifice of brutal power, corruption and plunder of the nation’s resources. It is not inconceivable that the foreign powers that have sustained the leadership of the TPLF might seek to replace it at their whim, just like they did to the murderous regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam.
9. To the extent that the TPLF/EPRDF succeeded in dispersing the gathering post-election storm in Addis Ababa and some of the regional capitals and got the foreign ambassadors engaged in hoodwinking the opposition that their intention of a negotiated outcome was honest and the like, one would have thought that the upper hand they got might prompt them, in their own self-interest, to reflect on their brutal responses to the people in the recent past and start making amends. If they had any sense of abiding by any democratic principles or belonged to any sane belief system, for that matter, they would of course have renounced their hold on power once the majority of senior ministers in the government were defeated at the polls. The decapitation of the government at the polls was in no measure a reflection of the personal weaknesses of those who fell but of the policies and practices of the entire administration. Yet, true to form, the TPLF/EPRDF behaved as if its policies and track record had won in the elections and discounted any significance that the fall of the senior ministers definitely had. Worse, it threatened to retain the fallen ministers in their jobs. In the end, it assigned the same persons to various high posts in the state again indicating that the voice of the mass of voters who gave them a thrashing in the elections counted for nothing. In effect, the TPLF/EPRDF did not mind being perceived by all, not just the section who always contested its democratic claims, as a government that has no respect for the expressed wishes of its population. A second area of possible concessions by the TPLF/EPRDF was to keep its brutal praetorian guards away from popular spaces and venues (urban centres in general, universities and schools, public festivities) to avoid any further aggravation of the dire situation. As a follow up, it could have let the opposition leaders and their organisations go about their business. Having lost the plot in the first week after the elections and never being able to regain their senses in the second, the Hibret and Kinjit leaders were already at loggerheads with their membership and the general public, playing into the hands of the government by quietly working for a negotiated settlement (which was never going to happen) and without any form of dialogue with the general public at all. While the TPLF/EPRDF had an army rampaging in the streets, a media sowing all kinds of confusion among the people, at the same time as blocking any means of mass communications (including mobile phones, fax machines, the Internet and the fledgling press), they denied themselves of the support of the only force that helped them gain a sense of purpose and hope for change at all. It was therefore odd, even lunatic, for the TPLF/EPRDF to launch more attacks and imprisonment of masses of people as well as the leadership of the Kinjit and to a lesser extent (by design, it seems) of the Hibret.
10. It is not easy to understand why the TPLF/EPRDF has continued its onslaught on the popular masses in spite of the fact that it has gained the upper hand in the post-election confrontations (however expressed) and that the mass movement has yet to evolve a stable leadership with distinct policies and strategies. Yet, it seems that the changed circumstances have not allayed its fear of what could have happened. The TPLF/EPRDF still remains in a state of shock and unforgiving of those forces who nearly brought it down. Thus instead of engaging in a brutal assessment of its failed policies and practices and working towards remedying/revamping them, it continues to be fixated on the past and on meting out punishments against those who dealt it a severe blow in the 2005 elections. Its supporters abroad, including Tony Blair and Bob Geldof, were at a loss to understand how a regime they generously dubbed ‘an example to the rest of Africa’ might all of a sudden unleash such a devastating attack and murderous campaigns against its own people. The true picture seems to be a morbid fear of the huge gulf that separates the dictatorial state from the populace and an inability to see how they can claw back the support that has deserted them. The nightmare of losing power to persons they suspect to be the very forces they have for long castigated as ‘chauvinists’, ‘neftegna’ and what not seems to be behind the frantic, desperate and diabolical waves of atrocities, incarcerations of political activists and their supporters of any age, gender and national group. Just as the imperial regime and the Dergue before it, the TPLF/EPRDF’s indiscriminate acts of repression of the entire population is propelling mass opposition to the level unheard of in our history. Having shut off the space required for political dialogue and debate and incarcerating the leadership of the principal opposition movement in Ethiopia today, the TPLF/EPRDF is throwing the gauntlet to all those who aspire for change to find other ways of throwing it out of power.
11. Paradoxical though it might seem, the slide of the TPLF/EPRDF towards dictatorship and brutality has fostered two principal outcomes that might otherwise have taken an extended period of gestation. On the one hand, it has accelerated the integration of the motley of groups that joined together to establish the Kinjit as a front to become a single party. By blocking the non-violent path of struggle, the onslaught has stemmed the creation of ever newer but disparate political groups, thus eliminating the persistent problem of attempting to unify them under a single programme and organisation. Moreover, the fact that the Kinjit has been singled out by the TPLF/EPRDF to bear the brunt of the repression has gifted that organisation a virtual monopoly of the moral and political authority over entire sections of the population in the confrontation with itself. In brief, the victims of the mass terror and unbridled oppression carry the mantle of justice and victory even while behind bars, in hospital morgues and muzzled not to speak/write a word. On the other hand, the differences that persisted within the constituent groups of the Kinjit were narrowed further and prevented the occurrence of any likely splits. Not that the process was accompanied by clearer views and positions on issues of the day and the social-economic transformation of the country. Initially, the focus of all the groups in the Kinijit was on getting to grips with the widely reported rigging of the election results and any other issues (including the rationale and foundations of the planned party) were relegated to second place. As soon as the TPLF/EPRDF opened its reign of terror and committed mass killings and incarceration, the Kinjit began to be preoccupied with demanding a halt to the atrocities and the restoration of the democratic rights including the release of prisoners. No sooner had the TPLF/EPRDF shifted towards capturing the entire leadership and members (suspected or actual) of the Kinijit and a few others on charges of fomenting public disorder and the ‘illegal overthrow of the constitutional authorities’ than the opposition to the regime assumed a global reach. Ethiopians living abroad assumed the responsibility of voicing opposition to, and propagating to the outside world of, the spectrum of misdeeds, systematic emasculation of the democratic movement inside Ethiopia. Although the lack of foresight on the part of the Kinjit leadership to prepare alternative centres of authority within the ranks of its membership but to leave the movement in a state of disorganisation and leader-less started to throw up a measure of confusion and other problems, the overall tenor of the determined opposition to the regime has deepened and grown.
12. While the respective leaderships of the opposition movements inside Ethiopia put their trust more in the ongoing negotiations mediated by the foreign embassies of the big powers than in the indomitable will and strength of the general public, the US and Britain in particular had remained unconvinced that the TPLF/EPRDF had to go. In spite of the atrocities, widespread killings and suppression of students, the youth and the general public that the TPLF/EPRDF committed, these powers merely sought to distance themselves from its ‘excesses’, ‘overreaction’ or whatever. The European Union took the more direct step of withdrawing the budgetary support that it had been providing to the regime for years on end and threatened to act on any form of aid to the regime unless it mended its ways. Yet, US reluctance to do the same against the Ethiopian regime and the general Western indifference to whatever happened in Africa added to the familiar position of letting the state sort out its internal problems the way it saw fit. Moreover, the US does not see any risk of losing its influence over the TPLF and the role the latter has played over the last 20 years or so as US henchmen in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia. Any US fears that the European Union or, belatedly China, might loosen their grip over the Ethiopian state seem to be too far in the distance to matter at all. Whatever might come out of efforts in the US Congress, essentially, to clip the wings of the TPLF/EPRDF, the general consensus among the Western governments with influence over Ethiopia seems to be to intervene through their embassies in Addis Ababa towards making the political opposition succumb to the status quo: play as a loyal opposition in a parliament dominated, once again, by the TPLF/EPRDF and bid their time hoping to win in the coming elections. The pressure of foreign embassies on the leaders of the opposition forces stretched beyond promises of more ‘development aid’ targeted at improving the electoral system, to lenient sentencing on the trumped up charges pending in the courts, to some sort of sharing of the political space with the regime.
13. The role of foreign elements and forces (governments, voluntary organisations, donor agencies, consultant of all shapes) and their embassies in Ethiopian affairs has reached its peak during the rise to power of the TPLF/EPRDF and afterwards. The efforts made by the TPLF/EPRDF to polish its image and presentation in front of these forces has paid dividends in terms of gaining it unreserved support regardless of its odious practices (amongst others, the massacres in the early years in Arsi and Harar, during the last two elections in Hadiya and Wolaita and most recently in Gambella). Foreign experts and journalists unashamedly peddle the farsightedness of its leaders and the supposed huge improvements in the life and conditions of the people as well as deride popular opposition to them as manifestations of the Amharas yearning to regain the power they lost in 1991. By contrast, they portray the TPLF/EPRDF as trusted allies in the fight against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa and perhaps beyond (remember the warm response given by these people and their friends on the other side of the Mereb to Bush’s call for sending troops to Iraq). The tragedy for the Ethiopian people has not been the fact that its rulers became out and out agents of foreign powers and cared less that their mainstay was not the people as ‘revolutionary democracy’ decreed, but that opponents of the regime too sought to find succour from the same foreign forces. The contest of who must gain power in Ethiopia was therefore viewed by the opposition parties to be determined by the level of support they won among the foreign powers. Every time the various leaders of the opposition movements visited foreign capitals, they routinely solicited an appointment to talk to officials in government departments who often turned out to be low ranking and desirous only of sucking up any information of interest to their governments. It is thus not difficult to see that the contests in the elections were predestined to be shaped by the extent to which foreign forces put their pressure on the TPLF/EPRDF to conduct free and fair elections and to abide by the results. Where these were lacking, it was inevitable that the claim to rectify any resulting fraud or rigging would only be brought to the attention of those foreign forces. The support of millions of people up and down the country would always be regarded as second best.
15. The morning after the polling stations of the 2005 elections closed, a war of claims and counter-claims erupted. In its habitual mode of shooting itself in the feet first and trying to cover up malicious falsehoods and blatant deceptions, the TPLF/EPRDF declared a landslide in its favour. As if to distract attention from the shock of its defeat in Addis Ababa and the virtual beheading of the government (most of its senior ministers having lost their seats in parliament), it vociferously declared it had got the election in the bag even before any official figures were released by the pertinent body (of its own making). Evidently, the fear of losing the elections was so widespread among its membership (mainly its army) that it sensed fabricating news of its victory was better than allowing the rumour of its impending defeat to spread across the country. This provoked the broad supporters of the opposition groups into a frenzy to find out the truth and to respond with their own versions of total victory. Still, the ruling groups were in the opportune position of not just finding out what the results were from the Election Board that they had set up by themselves, they could also order what those results must be. Surely, a dictatorship which has lasted over a decade and a half doing the kind of unsavoury things in all directions (establishing an army with loyalty to the TPLF alone, building up a band of huge corporations from the state’s coffers and other resources to be run and owned by the TPLF, establishing a media empire by stripping and dwarfing that nominally run by the state), could not possibly resist the temptation to fiddle with the figures and results of constituencies mostly in the regions and far away from the gaze of the foreign media and elections monitors. The constant intimidation and brutal force poised to be deployed in whichever locality the regime might find resistance assured that whatever shock it expected to protect itself against did not materialise. The disorganisation and lack of foresight among its political opponents also helped it keep the election returns to be delayed as long as possible and to orchestrate massive vote rigging. The demonstration of the university students that erupted in Addis Ababa in the days following the government’s unilateral declaration of winning the elections was no doubt in opposition to the deliberate delays and the suspicion that it might be falsifying the results. All told, the opposition groups could not hasten the declaration of the results and the only way open to them was to reject the results as a whole or to contest some of them. There was a temptation in the first few weeks to reject the declared outcomes of the government’s Election Board (obviously in league with the government itself) but it seems that pragmatism and persuasion from the foreign ambassadors dissuaded them from such a path. Should they reject the results as a whole, the question would turn into why did they participate at all? Once they desisted from total rejection, the door was open to attempting to right the wrongs largely by appealing to the regime itself, the foreign ambassadors who continued to mediate between the opposing sides more formally, and then the legal avenue. The regime was in no way prepared to accept any malpractices in the counting of the votes and directed the complainants to take up their ‘gripe’ with the Electoral Board knowing full well that the latter was a mere government department serving the purposes of the TPLF/EPRDF as directed. The foreign ambassadors concurred with the government in directing the opposition parties to seek solace in the same organ of state. The quest to get the TPLF/EPRDF to recognise any misdeeds in the electoral process was hence doomed from the outset. This the foreign ambassadors seemed to have understood when they began to prod the political opposition to compromise (read: accept what has happened as final and unchangeable) and play their ‘responsible role’ by entering parliament and continuing their struggle to get into power through subsequent round of elections.
16. The inability of the political opposition to impose their will on the TPLF/EPRDF, nullify the effects of its interference in determining the results of the election became clearer with each passing day. Still, they did not devise any means of channelling the popular anger at the deception perpetrated by the TPLF/EPRDF and their determination to pay any price to get ready of it into any meaningful support for their tactics. The exclusion of the general public from the legal confrontations they set about (partly on the advice of the foreign ambassadors), diminished any prospects they might have had in winning any concessions from the TPLF/EPRDF. It was perfectly possible for example for the electoral body to be declared totally incompetent to decide on the contentions as it was a department of the government. This could at least have served the purpose of getting rid of this ulcer in the electoral process for good. Instead, they allowed that body to be used by the TPLF/EPRDF to make a mockery of their contentions and complaints. The resort to the courts proved to be such a drawn out affair with an outcome only too well foreseeable that the opposition parties had misgivings about pursuing that path from the start.
17. While the results of the elections were still contested, the TPLF/EPRDF rushed to open parliament and push through new rules that made it virtually impossible for anyone but their members to table any motions in the house. Such a step is symptomatic of what the TPLF/EPRDF is all about: riding roughshod over everyone and everything, including the laws it has pushed through. Thus it has legislated against corruption but the leaders of the TPLF/EPRDF routinely plunder state resources to establish their own corporations. While the TPLF/EPRDF was fiddling with the parliamentary rules, the Kinjit and Hibret had for some time indicated that unless the accuracy of the election results was confirmed, they would not enter parliament. They kept repeating to all and sundry that ‘entering parliament without rectifying the rigged results would be tantamount to treason’. The public was also led to believe that the accurate results would be established somehow and that their participation would never happen until such was done. In reality, the possibilities for such an outcome was dimmer and dimmer as (indicated above) their links with the general public remained tenuous, their tactics were about pleading with the authorities established by their antagonists and the foreign ambassadors. Even when the urban youth started breaking into demonstrations and street fights with the Agazis, the political opposition took the side of the government in condemning such steps and disowned them. Then in a twist that would make fiction writers gasp for air, the TPLF/EPRDF concocted the idea of stripping the ‘elected representatives’ from Hibret and Kinjit of their legal immunity before they even set foot in parliament. This was, with hindsight, in preparation for more odious measures to be launched against the Hibret and Kinjit. The powers that be stepped in to put an end to any further wrangles by arresting hundreds of the supporters and leaders of the oppositional parties. They also set in motion proceedings in the courts to charge more than a hundred people of crimes against humanity and such other acts. By locking away such a high number of people and virtually the entire leadership of the Kinjit, they were probably aiming at incapacitating that organisation and reducing its presence in parliament.
18. The arrest of the Kinijit leadership and the trumped up charges of genocide and treason initiated against it further inflamed broader sections of the population that had declared their support for change in government. Quite to the dismay of even their foreign backers, the TPLF/EPRDF stepped up their repression in the countryside, conducted a rerun of a few elections they had managed their agents, the Electoral Board, to pronounce as tainted by irregularity. In reality, this was a ploy to regain seats that some of its senior ministers had lost. The Hibret and Kinjit were in no state to contest these reruns as they were busy countering government propaganda of the success of the elections overall and concentrated on pushing for a re-examination of the rigging of the entire process (through the expected help of the foreign ambassadors and the courts). In the meantime, the TPLF/EPRDF started harassing the elected representatives who did not want to take part in the opening of parliament or to join it afterwards so long as the results were not certified as legitimate. The test of strength obviously favoured the regime who used all manners of pressures and threats to force each of the elected representatives to turn up for the opening of parliament and to sit at its sessions subsequently. Those who succumbed to the pressure and/or sought to retreat from the standpoints of their groups (to continue to oppose the officially declared outcome of the elections) inevitably encouraged the TPLF/EPRDF to harden its strong-arm tactics. It seemed to the TPLF/EPRDF as well as to the opposition that the options of engaging in negotiations or having the courts determine the legitimacy of the outcomes no longer remained attractive to either side. The regime in particular gloated over its successes and appointed defeated electoral candidates (some of whom were senior ministers) to prominent state positions. It constantly bragged that it had the firepower to silence any opposition and proved it without reservation. Arraigning the leaders of Hibret before the courts and simultaneously playing out its malicious propaganda against the opposition in general whilst denying them any means of voicing their opinions ushered in a sordid chapter in its dictatorial rule. The lessons it offered to the opposition day in and day out has been to take up arms and force it out of power or to remain in submission for the remainder of the five years it has declared itself elected.
19. The overall consequences of the systematic emasculation of non-violent political opposition by the TPLF/EPRDF have been twofold. Firstly, a fresh wave of anti-TPLF politics has engulfed practically all sectors of the society. The unanimous view appears to be that its time is up. The use of brute force by the TPLF/EPRDF against children, the youth and students, peaceful demonstrators and supporters of the Kinjit and Hibret has fostered a belief in the general population that the only way to get rid of its rule is to embrace armed struggle. Such a stance has gained acceptance across age groups and political persuasions. A number of armed ‘fronts’ have either declared their emergence or unwavering commitments in parts of the country. Still, a new round of civil war waged against the background of ethnically defined regions making up the country and ethnically-based political organisations teeming everywhere has perilous repercussions that cannot be underestimated. Not only the predictable but objectionable outcomes of armed movements not willing to give up power to elected representatives but also the probability of ethnically divided regions pitting themselves against each other make that alternative fraught with dangers. Secondly, the assault on the Kinjit and Hibret and their immobilisation through the denial of non-violent political fora has prompted the establishment of bigger and more far reaching alliances than was attempted before the elections. The most recent that has begun to take shape in the latest attempt to find suitable formula for removing the TPLF/EPRDF from power is the ‘Alliance for Freedom and Democracy’ (AFD). The AFD constitutes an umbrella for groups and movements more diverse than one could possibly have imagined possible a year ago. It purports to link up Kinjit and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), diametrically opposed to each other at least in one regard (the moronically conceived ‘cessation’ of Oromia from Ethiopia), to similar movements waging war (actual or planned) against the regime. The AFD defines itself as committed to a broad framework that allows each party or member to maintain its independent existence as well as politics.
20. The creation of the AFD represents the first step in the realisation that no single political force alone can undo the damage done by the TPLF/EPRDF to the process of democratisation of the Ethiopian state that started with the overthrow of the imperial regime in 1974 but met with all kinds of obstacles and deficiencies along the way. Moreover, it seems to recognise that the weaknesses of each political opposition in failing to remove the TPLF/EPRDF from power could only be overcome through the combination of all sections/elements of the society on a broad front of pluralist political activism. Although it is an article of faith in any politics bent on seizing power to seek to unite all forces that stand in opposition against the established political order, this has rarely happened in Ethiopia because of the backwardness and/or short-sightedness of the leading political elements. More inclined towards feudal parochialism and obscurantism as they often have been, even the more radical elements in the society sought to wage their respective struggles in exclusion of all other forces that championed the very aims they proclaimed to stand for. The splintering of the Ethiopian Patriots before the returning Emperor Haile Selassie I, the innumerable attempts to unseat the Emperor by diverse groups and persons, the parallel existence/struggle of radical groups against the Dergue, the different factions that sprang up in opposition to the TPLF/EPRDF though they spoke the same political language and desired almost identical ends, all these and more kept the popular struggle at bay while the respective rulers maintained their grip. The AFD’s focus therefore on removing the TPLF/EPRDF from power, or, at any rate, seeking to erect a universal platform whereby the process of democratisation could be propelled forward by bringing all political forces in Ethiopia (obviously opening the door wide open for the TPLF/EPRDF to join in if it so wished) therefore constitutes a break with the long standing decadent tradition. The message that all the political forces have a stake in coming together to tackle the continuing domination of a remorseless kleptocracy in Addis Ababa and work towards establishing democracy and the rule of law introduces a breathe of fresh air in Ethiopian politics.
21. Unfortunately, the AFD’s emergence has not been met with universal acceptance. The Hibret group which has already splintered between the largely domestic forces and those based in North America became the first victim of allegiance to decadent parochialism and sentimentalism. It simply lost the essential significance of the AFD, confused it with a process of unification of all the political forces and threw up all kinds of objections before declaring itself against it. By not recognising the merit of pulling all forces that militate against the latest military bureaucratic dictatorship, irrespective of the distinct and often conflicting stances of the diverse groups that would be joining in the new wave, it has elected to play into the hands of the TPLF/EPRDF. Merely by playing up the deficiencies or idiosyncratic bents of the diverse groups, it has sought to stress self-evident truisms and, ultimately, to score cheap points against the AFD. Whilst the forces it denigrates and vilifies have expressed their willingness, and started activities, to work together towards the principal objective of democratising the Ethiopian state, it engages in disseminating all kinds of nonsense dressed in theoretical and political gimmicks. Many have already given up hopes that the Hibret, as it exists in North America and in keeping with the conspiratorial/divisive tradition of the two constituent groups inside it (Meisson and EPRP), will ever recover from its gross lack of common sense and avoid its impending political suicide. Surely, the hovering of the EPLF as a shadow behind some of the constituent members of the AFD, the formal structure of the AFD or other secondary issues cannot justify sabotaging this historic opportunity of erecting a new, broad framework to bring down the beleaguered dictatorial regime of the TPLF.
22. Remarkably, whilst a section of the Hibret is engaged in self-destruction, the TPLF is frantically looking for, and deploying, diversionary activities. Having lost the credit facilities and aid extended to it by all foreign governments and agencies (except the US), the TPLF was keenly eyeing China and North Korea as potential sources of support, in the footsteps of Mugabe & Co. It has also sought to maintain a state of ‘no war no peace’ with Eritrea by way of igniting a conflict at any time to divert the poplar opposition towards its rule. Moreover, the TPLF/EPRDF continues to meddle in the conflict within Somalia, to shore up groups that do its bidding and ultimately carry out the strategic objectives of the US in that part of the Horn. The designs of the TPLF/EPRDF to conduct a ‘war against terrorism’ in Somalia is being projected as part of its attempt to regain full US and European support. In light of these tactics, it makes one wonder why the Hibret lost its senses and seeks to destroy a potent weapon with which to counter the machinations of the TPLF/EPRDF. Besides, the foreign powers are not exactly averse to the coming together of all political forces in Ethiopia to get to grips with the democratisation of the state and the transformation of the economy and society. Indeed, if ever there was any opportunity of dislodging the TPLF/EPRDF from its long-term alliance with the Western powers on the false premise that there are no other competent political forces to govern the country democratically and build a prosperous economy, then this was precisely the time and condition to act prudently. The fact that the foreign powers have started to release the funds they had blocked (following their finding of abuse of human rights and the rigging of the popular vote by the TPLF/EPRDF) was an indicator that they had reassessed (and retreated from?) the viability of expecting an alternative government emerging from among the opposition movements.
23. From the disproportionate space devoted to current Ethiopian politics, one might be excused for thinking that politics is the be all and end all of the debate about our future. Indeed, the essential problems of current Ethiopian politics pale in comparison with the little understood (discussed) questions of economic and social regeneration of the country. We have yet to hear from any of the political groups a systematic programme of action to check the economic and social decline of the nation and to transform it. In a sense, the incoherence and wishy-washiness in the realm of politics manifested through the multiplicity of (contradictory) views just about any issue and the glaring lack of consensus hold back any serious examination of how the economy and society need to be managed AFTER WINNING POWER. The obsession with the narrowly conceived notion of getting into government without a clear programme of social and economic transformation virtually postpones the need to put pressure on the ruling clique to mend its misguided and destructive policies and practices in the meantime. The fact that the removal of a regime from power should be predicated on its actual failure to deliver on day to day tasks as well as long-term policy goals makes it incumbent on its opponents to examine its spectrum of activities continuously and challenge them whenever necessary and not just confine themselves to high-flown ideals without concrete links to the here and now. It cannot be emphasised enough that political democracy is a tool for social and economic transformation and not an end itself. Those sworn to bringing about a fundamental transformation for the Ethiopian people need to recognise that accomplishing that heavy task may be easier with the introduction of a democratic regime but that the task will not be resolved overnight or in a short span. For a nation that has been constantly in decline for many decades and in a world with rapidly changing economic and technological parameters, it will not be enough to have a transfer of power from one group to another. The millions of people afflicted with poverty, illness and the gruesome struggle for survival need and deserve the creation of the broadest coalition of all possible forces to be able to start the journey towards a more decent and respectable livelihood. The era of single issues and small groups fighting for a portion of the pie should come to an end.
Now that the Meles regime has ignored the AFD’s call for a national reconciliation conference, the next step is for the AFD to go ahead and set up a transitional government in exile. A plan could be already in the works behind the scene. If it is, we believe that public discussions and input is helpful.
The government in exile is necessary for the following reasons:
1) highlights the illegitimacy of the dictatorship in power.
2) its presence helps exert increasing international and domestic pressure on the dying regime, expediting its inevitable fall down.
3) serves as a rallying point for the people of Ethiopia.
4) the international community will see that there is a better alternative that will be able to bring democracy, peace and stability in the Horn of Africa region.
5) there will be a planned, smooth transition of power, avoiding potential chaos.
6) defeats the Meles regime’s “divide and conquer” strategy.
Planning the government in exile starting now will give time for thorough discussions among the political parties, scholars, and the public at large. There is nothing to be gained by waiting.
Structure of the proposed Transitional Government
A proposal by Ethiopian Review
The Transitional Government will be headed by a five-member Presidency Council–a president and four vice-presidents.
President – from OLF
Vice President – from Kinijit
Vice President – from EPPF
Vice President – from ONLF
Vice President – from SLF
The Presidency Council (PC) will have a three-year term. At the end of the three-year term, there will be a national election under a new constitution.
The presidency rotates every 12-month.
Decisions in the PC will be made by consensus.
The PC’s decisions will be carried out by a Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers (CM) will be composed of a prime minister (PM) and two deputy prime ministers (DPMs).
The PM and DPMs will be appointed by the PC.
Prime Minister –
Deputy Prime Minister –
Deputy Prime Minister –
Minister of Defense –
Minister of Foreign Affairs –
Minister of Justice –
Minister of Interior –
Minister of Finance –
Minister of Agriculture –
Minister of Industry –
The rest of the CM members will be appointed by the PM with the consent of the PC and the DPMs.
The CM will serve during the three-year transition period.
The PC’s primary task will be to prepare the country for elections within three years. In preparation for the elections, the PC will:
1. create an election committee composed of one representative from each party.
2. convene a Constitutional Convention (CC) composed of 500 members, each member representing one woreda (district) of the country, as well as representatives of civic, religious, labor, and other groups.
Kinijit and OLF will have equal numbers–about 150 each–in the Constitutional Convention. The rest will be distributed among the other parties and groups.
Addis Ababa will be administered by Kinijit during the transition period since there is already a legitimately elected mayor (currently unjustly imprisoned) and city council.
Activities while in exile
1. The Transitional Government in exile, upon its formation, will contact all governments around the world and seek recognition as the legitimate government of Ethiopia.
2. Merge the EPPF, OLF, ONLF, and SLF fighters under one unified command to be named Ethiopian Armed Forces.
3. Contact each military officer in the army under the Meles regime and persuade them to join the legitimate Ethiopian Armed Forces.
4. All the ministers in the Transitional Government in exile will start to carry out their responsibilities. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affair will mobilize international support for the government in exile; the Minister of Justice will investigate officials of the Meles regime for crimes against humanity and corruption; the Ministers of Finance, Industry and Agriculture will create an economic team that will prepare a plan on how to grow the country’s economy during the transition period; etc
The danger of not setting up a government in exile
1. When the Meles regime collapses, chaos could reign in the country for several days, or weeks. A well executed plan by the transitional government in exile will prevent that.
2. The Meles regime will continue to incite ethnic conflict.
3. An unknown armed force could come to power and install another dictatorship.
4. The unity of Ethiopia will be in grave danger as ethnic-based parties become militarily and politically more powerful and decide to stick to their independence agenda when they see for them no political space under the Ethiopian tent. The Transitional Government will give political space for these ethnic-based parties to address the concerns and grievances of their constituencies under a united Ethiopia using democratic means such as elections, courts, dialogue, etc.
The wisdom of creating AFD
The Kinijit and OLF leaders, in deciding to create an alliance, were cognizant of the fact that Ethiopia is a changed country after a 15-year rule by the TPLF ethnic apartheid regime. The Meles regime has been leading the country towards a civil war by spreading hate, suspicion and hostility among the many ethnic groups, particularly the Amhara and Oromo. AFD is the best instrument to heal the wounds, and neutralize what Meles and his criminal gang have in store for us–Interahamwe-like civil war. Meles and his close family members may flee when the end for them arrives. But the hard core TPLF gangs such as General Samora Yenus have already declared their stand–to destroy and be destroyed (atfito metfat). Those who cannot see this are too far removed from the realities in Ethiopia.
For Melissa Fay Greene, the enormity of the AIDS orphan crisis in Africa became impossible to ignore one Sunday morning in August 2000. After reading an article in the New York Times estimating that more than 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa had lost parents to AIDS — and that by 2010 those figures were expected to rise to between 25 million and 50 million — Greene wondered who was going to raise 12 million children. Admitting that she and her attorney husband in Atlanta were being driven cheerfully “insane” by their five kids, Greene asked, “Who will offer grief counseling to 12, 15, 18, 36 million children? Who will help them avoid lives of servitude or prostitution? Who will pass on to them the traditions of culture and religion, of history and government, of craft and profession? Who will help them grow up, choose the right person to marry, find work, and learn to parent their own children?”
These questions sent Greene, now 53, on a journey as both an adoptive parent and a journalist. Since that Sunday morning, she and her husband have adopted two Ethiopian orphans, with two more on the way.
This month, Bloomsbury has published Greene’s fourth book of nonfiction, “There Is No Me Without You: One Woman’s Odyssey to Rescue Africa’s Children.” Greene, who has twice seen her work nominated for the National Book Award, is not the titular woman. Instead, it is Haregewoin Teferra who gives a human face to the havoc AIDS has wreaked on an entire continent. A middle-class, middle-aged Ethiopian, Teferra is as surprised as anyone to find herself running an orphanage out of her home in Addis Ababa. In 1990, Teferra’s husband unexpectedly died of a heart attack at the age of 54; eight years later, her adult daughter, the mother of an infant, died of AIDS. Overcome with grief, Teferra prepared to move into a hut on the grounds of a cemetery and live in seclusion. Instead, the director of a Catholic charity asked if she’d consider staying where she was and taking in a 15-year-old AIDS orphan. One orphan became two, and then four, and then — despite disapproving friends and little to no government assistance — 80. Some of these orphans were HIV-positive, some not. With the expansion of the orphanage came problems for Teferra, which Greene does not shy away from describing: Teferra was accused of child trafficking and also of negligence in ignoring claims from orphans that an orphanage employee molested them. These charges led to Teferra’s arrest, though she eventually was exonerated.
In addition to chronicling Teferra’s story, Greene provides a scientific and cultural history of AIDS — one in which she makes withering assessments of government leaders and pharmaceutical companies — and also a history of Ethiopia. But Greene is too shrewd a storyteller to think that it’s statistics that will motivate people to act, or even make them cry. Without a doubt, this is a three-hankie read, but it’s because of the stories about individuals: of those who, like Teferra, have upended their stable lives in order to help those less lucky; of the orphans themselves, among whom it is not uncommon for a 7-year-old to single-handedly raise a 5-year-old; of the adoptive families in America who, in cross-cultural run-ins worthy of a sitcom, must politely decline their new son’s offer to butcher a cow for dinner, or explain to their new daughter that there is no need, in Snellville, Ga., to watch out for hyenas when using the bathroom at night.
Both in print and in conversation, Greene comes off as very much a mom. She is perceptive, compassionate and clearly tickled by a good fart joke: Although the Ethiopians are famously well-mannered, she can’t resist bringing whoopee cushions as gifts for children at one orphanage. Indeed, it is the combination of Greene’s maternal tendencies and narrative gifts that make her the ideal person to tell this timely story.
What do you think motivated Haregewoin Teferra to give her entire life to taking care of these children?
I think in Haregewoin’s case, she was absolutely up against the wall. Grief had completely ruined her life, and she was going to need to leave the world as a result. She could no longer live without her husband and her daughter. That component of the story is so powerful and universal. I think a lot of people have found that the only way to survive is to start reaching out to others and trying to love other people. The children saved Haregewoin as much as she saved them.
How did you cross paths with Haregewoin?
I had heard she had these containers, like a trailer off the back of a truck, and she would cut a door in the container. People were calling her “the Container Lady” and thought she was living in the container with the children. But she wasn’t — she was using that as a dining hall and classroom.
I asked Good Housekeeping if I could do a story for them about her. Good Housekeeping had never done an international story, ever, but they said OK, they would try it.
The response [to the story] was tremendous. Good Housekeeping readers from all over the country sent contributions, $10 and $25 at a time, saying, “We had no idea this was happening.” Haregewoin was so encouraged by that. It emboldened her to keep talking to me.
And yet, while you were in the process of writing a book in which Haregewoin plays a huge role as a heroine, things temporarily unraveled at her orphanage. What was that like?
Last September, I first heard that there were accusations that child molestation had taken place in her compound, it was overcrowded, there were too many kids in each bunk, there were too many kids everywhere.
I did not mention it to my editors at that time because I wanted to be able to confirm it myself and figure out what was happening. I went over to Ethiopia, got what I thought was the story, came back, and then in December, she was arrested. The book was due Dec. 15. And Dec. 14, Haregewoin called me from prison. So then there was a frantic scramble on my part to get on top of events and to deal with my own disappointment and fury.
When I connected with Haregewoin again, I understood what had happened and I felt that I didn’t have her wrong. This stuff was not her fault. She wasn’t getting any help from the government or anywhere. She was taking in all these kids.
I had to forgive Haregewoin, see her as human, understand that she’s more interesting not being a saint, and realize that I sort of messed up because I did think I was writing about a saint. So I had to rewrite the book, starting from the beginning.
By the time you began reporting this book, you already had adopted a son from Bulgaria and a daughter from Ethiopia, in addition to your four biological children. How did you initially become interested in international adoption?
At 42, I thought, if my husband and I are going to have another child, this is the time. I have to do it. Should I do it? And we didn’t. I thought, we’ve got our four, they’re great, it’s enough already. By [the time I was] 46, our daughter Molly was starting to apply to colleges and we suddenly realized this was all going to end. It’d all been so incredibly fun and crazy and nice and she was going to leave. And we got kind of this panicky feeling of empty nest that we were going to be down to just three. At some point, my husband said, “Listen, if we want more children, we can adopt.” I’m sure he just tossed it out to comfort me.
One day I sat at the computer and I typed in “adoption” and suddenly I realized that the entire Internet had been invented for international adoption. I learned about the Internet at the same time that I learned about international adoption. At that point, Bulgaria displayed photos of children in orphanages who needed families, and I came across the picture of this little boy who became our son. He was just a sweet little guy, 4 years old, and needed a family and so we followed all the steps. At the moment that we brought him home [less than a year later], I had this science fiction feeling like I had pushed something on the computer and he’d come out of the screen.
Then a couple of years later, [our son] Seth was ready to go off to college and we thought, Oh God, no! Another one? You’ve taken Molly, leave us someone! So we started thinking about adoption again at the moment that, for me, the headlines hit the kitchen table: Africa is a continent of orphans. So I just thought, if we’re really going to adopt again, could we bring in one of these children?
Was your interest in AIDS orphans originally as an adoptive parent rather than as a journalist?
I sort of used journalism as a cover. I would say, outside a really close circle of friendship, people thought I was sent on these interesting assignments by the New Yorker and the New York Times and Good Housekeeping, and while I was over there, I would meet some nice little kid I didn’t feel like I could leave behind. But that was a total deception. I didn’t want people to think I was completely insane. But in each case, we already were doing the adoption and the article was a way for me to go over and do more research in something that passionately interested me.
I wrote about AIDS orphans for the New York Times Magazine feeling really humble that I was not an epidemiologist, a doctor or a social scientist. I had none of the criteria. But I was a firsthand witness. I could look at something and say what it was I was looking at. I thought, I can tell stories. Even here, I can tell stories. And that’s useful.
What’s it like preparing to adopt your eighth and ninth children?
It’s ridiculous. I almost hate to mention it. It sounds like more than it feels like. We had neighbors years ago in Rome, Ga., who had eight children, and I never thought we would pass that family, ever, ever, in a million billion years. They had eight children and we had a newborn, and the newborn was just about to undo me. I found the change from zero to one to be so gigantic and so difficult and impossible and wonderful, but exhausting, and I was hallucinating from the sleep deprivation. That change from zero to one — nothing else has compared to that. So going from four to five or five to six — once you survive zero to one, I found it manageable. Plus we’re not bringing in little babies, and not everyone lives at home.
My husband and I went pretty quickly from thinking, How could we possibly do this? to How could we not do this? Because we know we can do it. By our Atlanta Midtown standards, it’s a lot of kids and it’ll be a little crowded and crazy, but by the standards of where the kids are, it’s going to be Disney World here. For them, we live in the Disney World castle.
You tackle the science and politics behind the AIDS crisis in Africa, and your portrayal of pharmaceutical companies is incredibly damning. You speak particularly critically of companies like Glaxo Wellcome and Bristol-Myers Squibb who for years protected their patents through legal maneuvering, made drugs expensive, argued that they had to keep prices high because of the cost of research even though most research was government-funded — and made outrageous profits.
World-record-shattering profits were made on these drugs while people died. People in the know, looking at that, have said, “These were crimes against humanity.” There have been all these arguments by the pharmaceutical companies about why it doesn’t boil down to giving the drugs to people. But when you’re on the ground over there, the only thing that matters is getting the drugs to people. Everything else can follow from that.
It was life-changing what I saw when I went over [to Ethiopia] the first time, especially the orphanages of the HIV-positive children where they were all going to die — these were just orphanages that were hospices. We talked to the director of one of those orphanages and asked him what would he do if he had money. And he said he would immediately bring in more children. And we said, “What if it was a choice between buying medicine and bringing in more children?” And he said, “I’d bring in more children.” And we were incredibly shocked. But what he saw was children dying on the streets, so he thought the most good he could do was let the children at least die in a loving circumstance.
Are things still as bad as they were five or 10 years ago?
Progress has been made. The “3 by 5 Initiative” [an initiative by UNAIDS and the World Health Organization to get 3 million people in developing countries on anti-AIDS drugs by 2005], even though it failed to meet its target, still got hundreds of thousands of people on drug treatment. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the William J. Clinton Foundation are reaching tens of thousands of people with the actual drugs that you would get if you lived in Chicago or Las Vegas.
What’s going to happen down the road a few years is that people will start to build up immunities to those drugs and need the second-line drugs, and those second-line drugs still have the high price tags on them. But we’re not at that crisis yet.
You point out that one misperception Americans have is that we’re a leader, in financial terms, in fighting AIDS and HIV. But though the United States does in fact give the most foreign aid money of any country in dollars (over $75 million between 2002 and 2005) — it gives one of the lowest GNP percentages (0.1575 percent).
We’re pathetic in that respect. And we don’t know it about ourselves. We think that we’re so generous and that we’re holding up the world, but we’re not.
You present a few theories about how HIV first spread, and you seem to favor the theory that, with the introduction of antibiotics to Africa in the 1950s, HIV spread through hundreds of thousands of unsterilized needle injections.
I found trusted experts who believe that is definitely the direction of the inquiry. But the force of the research now is behind finding a cure or a vaccine. There are not many people interested in how this happened. But it’s also possible that the answer is so terrible, if it’s truly the result of well-intentioned but misguided health campaigns. That’s a tragic answer. And it’s still going on.
There are regions where safe sex is increasing, condom use is increasing, sexually transmitted diseases are falling — and HIV is off the charts. That’s not explained by sexual behavior. One of the things people think is that AIDS is spreading out of control because of some African hypersexual behaviors. But researchers into sexual behaviors find African men have fewer lifetime partners than American men.
Was your goal in writing this book to move Americans to adopt an orphan themselves? To donate money? Or merely to be more aware of the situation?
I don’t want to promote adoption as the major answer to AIDS in Africa because there’s no way enough families around the world will open their homes to these children. That’s doomed to failure.
I hope to be working against paradigm. The paradigm of Ethiopia is, People are starving and/or People are very fast runners. A lot of the major newspaper coverage begins with images like that. In Haregewoin Teferra, there’s the story of a middle-class educated women whose husband was the high school principal and she too is suffering.
And on the most elementary level, I would love people to read this and think, “Oh my God, they’re just like us! What’s going on is as if my partner and I died and left our children orphans.” The first step is to feel it as an emergency happening to people like yourself.
In the book you describe a white father from Vermont who wonders, when traveling with his wife to Ethiopia to pick up their new daughter, whether there’s an imperialist angle to these adoptions. What’s the answer to his question?
Of course one has mixed feelings looking at international adoption. You weigh what the child is losing: connection to culture and history and language and religion and art and literature. A child is losing the world into which the child was born. And that is almost always a loss. It’s hard to offset that. A child is losing the right to grow up in a family that looks like the child, the child is losing the possibility of going out for dinner on a Tuesday night with his or her parents and not having people look over at the odd configuration of that family. It’s not all good news, and the fact is that people can have incredibly happy and wonderful childhoods outside the U.S. In fact, on every trip I’ve taken into rural Ethiopia, I’ve had the same thought looking around, which is, if you could have enough food, schools and medicine, this would rival any childhood on earth — the freedom of being out on this beautiful landscape and riding a donkey and chasing the geese and climbing a tree and running across the fields with your friends and swimming in a lake. It’s a Huckleberry Finn childhood — if there were food, medicine and schools. And parents.
But all of that is swept off the board when a child is orphaned in a poor country. Then you ask what can you do to make up for what the child has now lost? And what you can offer the child is a new family. And a new family trumps just about everything else. I can’t imagine a child on earth who would rather be speaking their native language in the impoverished orphanage in Romania or Bulgaria or China or Cambodia or Vietnam or Ethiopia rather than learn English with a suburban family in, you know, Dallas. The tradeoff wins out.
It’s a truism in the adoption world that people walking around with their adopted babies or children have observers come up and say, “She’s so lucky, he’s so lucky,” and the adoptive mom or dad says, “No, I’m the lucky one.” But what I’ve learned is that the true answer is, “You’re right. This child has won the lottery. This is a lucky child.”
In my June 18 response to the engaging letter of Tibebu Bekele, published in Addis Fortune two weeks earlier, I commented on problems of Ethiopia’s judiciary. Regarding the trial of the Kaliti detainees I said, “If legitimate procedures are not respected by the Government… I shall be among the first to voice disapproval.”
Now that the court has recessed until October, it may be appropriate to comment on what has transpired to date. As noted in my Public Radio interview of August 8, 2006, my assessment rests on an independent analysis of notes of the trial proceedings. The notes were obtained from a variety of sources. A non-Ethiopian graduate student who has worked in a major Chicago law firm carried out the analysis. A summary of the main findings of his analysis follows.
Based on that analysis I conclude that to this date those procedures appear to have been neither speedy nor consistently fair. The major source of unfairness has been the conduct of the prosecution. Although the court has at times been at fault, in a number of respects the court has shown fairness and responsiveness to the rights of the accused.
A. Obstructionist delays by the Prosecution
1. The prosecution has repeatedly delayed court proceedings by being late.
2. The prosecution has repeatedly delayed court proceedings by being unprepared, which delays rulings on other matters before the Court.
3. The prosecution frequently introduces new evidence, which was not previously produced to the defendants’ attorneys.
B. Unfair procedures on the part of the Prosecution
1. The prosecution repeatedly refuses to produce copies of evidence for the defense.
2. The prosecution frequently presents evidence not included as part of the initial charges.
3. Evidence against the defendants is presented in suspect ways. Video, audio, and documentary forms of evidence have been taken out of context, edited, and distorted in an extremely prejudicial manner. That the chief prosecutor was accused of tampering with or fabricating documentary evidence–and effectively tried to hide this by presenting the evidence at the last minute and without producing copies to the defense–is in keeping with the prosecution’s conduct throughout this trial.
4. The prosecution’s arguments often rely upon hearsay, speculation and, frequently, outright deception. The Action Aid defendants are referenced elliptically, implicated in evidence unrelated to them, and almost never receive copies of the evidence being used against them. The arguments against CUD members presented in Court are so far afield from the actual evidence, often in direct contradiction with the evidence presented, that those proceedings verge on the comical. One glaring example: at one point during the trial of July 13, Ato Shimelis stopped to summarize several CUD press releases by saying “in nearly every speech they say they support peaceful struggle, but essentially they are promoting violence.”
5. The prosecution frequently fails to link evidence with specific defendants or charges.
C. Unnecessary delays due to Court rulings
1. The prosecution has not been held accountable for its habitual delay of proceedings, including late arrival, lack of preparedness, and introduction of new evidence without producing copies for the defense.
2. The Court has delayed ruling on motions from the defense for copies of evidence.
D. Fair and responsive conduct on the part of the Court
1. The court proceedings have been open to the public.
2. Domestic and international observers have been permitted to take notes.
3. The defendants have been permitted to speak.
4. The Court has become responsive to requests from the defense to have copies of the video evidence shown to defense counsel. On August 4, albeit belatedly, a court order set a time limit of two weeks for the prosecution to produce copies of video evidence to the defense.
5. Although the Court has often provided the prosecution great latitude in the presentation and admission of evidence, the Court did rule the prosecution’s third, heavily edited videotape inadmissible despite vehement protest from counsel.
6. When asked to provide relief to the defendants from ill treatment or prejudicial acts by third parties while defendants are in State custody, the Court has generally obliged by calling third parties before the bench for an explanation. At times this resulted in improved treatment of the detainees. The court may also have been responsible for the decision to hospitalize Professor Mesfin Woldemariam for pneumonia treatment last month, but this effort seems in vain now that he is returned to Kaliti Prison where coldness, dampness, poor sanitation and hygiene, and various species of vermin exacerbate his condition. After Dr. Berhanu Nega was returned from hospital to Kaliti Prison against doctor’s advice in June, the High Court ruled on 19 July that he be relocated in a less crowded and better ventilated cell in Kaliti Prison. When no improvement resulted, it was presumably due to the independent authority of third parties. Confining Dr. Berhanu Nega to extremely punitive conditions or journalist Iskinder to solitary confinement are actions over which the court may have little jurisdiction, but the judicial system certainly does.
E. Unfair conduct on the part of the Court and demonstrable irregularities with the proceedings
1. The Court does not consistently demand that the prosecution produce copies of new evidence in advance of trial presentation.
2. The Court often allows the prosecution to introduce new evidence not included in initial charges without furnishing a copy for the defense.
3. If the Court should provide the defense comparable latitude in the presentation of evidence it would indicate a higher degree of fairness to these proceedings. Failure to do so would suggest that the Court conducts this trial in a manner favorable to the prosecution.
F. Controversial conduct on the part of the defendants
It should be noted that some of the flaws in the proceedings noted above might have been reduced if the defendants, other than those involved in the civil society group Action Aid, had availed themselves of legal defense. Excellent lawyers had volunteered to provide counsel for them pro bono, and it is hard to imagine that some of the irregularities noted above would not have been corrected had all the accused taken advantage of those resources.
COMMMENT
No ordinary court case, the trial against selected opponents of the EPRDF regime has divided the Ethiopian body politic as has no other issue since the time of Emperor Susneyos. One would expect the Ethiopian judicial system to go to great lengths to demonstrate its integrity both to Ethiopian citizens and to international observers. Its failure to do so reflects, at the very least, a lack of capacity to mount a fair and speedy trial. The urgent need to upgrade that capacity would seem to call for the concerted contributions from Ethiopian legal processionals in the Diaspora as well as those at home. Ethiopians traditionally are distinguished by a high regard for judicial fairness and the rule of law; distortions introduced by the Derg and largely maintained under the EPRDF regime are arguably most un-Ethiopian.
Of all flaws in this trial, I consider the most dysfunctional to be that noted under B.5 above: the prosecution’s repeated failure to link evidence with specific defendants or charges. Lack of adequate differentiation has been the hallmark of these proceedings from the outset. While the Government appears, at best, to possess hard evidence incriminating one or two individuals of one or two categories of action that are arguably illegal, it has included several dozens of individuals under a broad range of criminal accusations. It is this feature of the proceedings that opened up to ridicule what could and should have been a serious juridical process.
During this period of recess, it would behoove the Ministry of Justice to re-assess those charges more carefully and demonstrate to the world the high level of legal competence that Ethiopians manifest at their best. That would lend greater speed and fairness to the final sessions of this trial and thereby enable Ethiopians to get back to working together to make their beloved land a better place. If such action were to be matched by a willingness of defendants to avail themselves of counsel, that desired outcome would be facilitated even more.
P.S. Since writing the above, I have had the benefit of critical responses from two readers who are highly accomplished Ethiopian academics. One of them faulted my statement for not pursuing the legal issues with more diligence and penetration. He recommended: begin the piece by clarifying your principled stand on the judiciary, judicial process and the trial, what your sense of a fair trial and process is, what your expectations were initially, why you took the principled stand, how you “evolved” to the position you currently hold based on “hard evidence” (notes, analysis) and what you think should happen. Also… stress the fact that your conclusions and evaluations are based on universally recognized values of due process and fairness, and not merely the idiosyncratic conclusions of note takers, analysts, etc.
The other reader faulted me for taking the legal issues too seriously, claiming that such concerns were beside the point since the trial itself must be viewed essentially as a political rather than a legal matter.
The problem with the trials is not inappropriate court procedure. Nor is it about robust defense. Ethiopians do know a lot about Meles’s court system. It was not for lack of good defense that Prof Asrat, Ato Mekonnen Dori, Dr. Taye and numerous others languished in prison for years (and as you well know, it is not good defense that got them out)… The issue about the jailed oppositional leaders is not a legal, but a political one. Focusing on the flaws of the proceedings alone is tantamount to playing into Meles’s game.
Although the two critics proceed in opposite directions, I think they both raise profound issues, which I hope can be discussed further.
By AshenafiAssefa
Media ETHIOPIA Photo Correspondent
I was recently in Arba Minch town some 500km south of Addis, for two weeks fieldwork at the Arba Minch Hospital. You may wonder how the flood is going on up there, as the media is propagating about the heavy rain basically in the south. This is a dry season in and around ArbaMinch, hot and very comfortable compared to the heavy rain and cold in Addis. The summer will begin some where in mid September, we saw few days of rain. However we have encountered two or three damaged bridges on the way to Arba Minch as a result of heavy rain somewhere in the highlands. I would like to pass my heartfelt sympathy and condolences for the huge number of innocent life we have scarified for the heavy rain this summer.
As to our plan to visit the NechSar National park we finalized payment and procedures before one day and on early Sunday morning (August, 27/06) we reach at the park get. The park is located right at the eastern edge of ArbaMinch some five minutes drive from the downtown, Sikala. Unfortunately there was an expected heavy rain on that particular night and the officials advised us to cancel our visit as the rain may have damaged especially the near by roads. This was our last chance to visit the park, we will be back to Addis in few days time, plus our guide convinced us to try and came back otherwise. It was true the road was really slippery and water from the nearby Kulfo River has covered part of the road. After few kilometers drive came the worst, a very big Ficus (Sholla) tree fallen in the night because of the heavy rain blocked the road.
We get time to come out the car and look around, with the birds song and the morning sun through the thick forest it is amazingly beautiful, similar to my perception to heaven in my child hood. When we try to pass by the side of the fallen tree our car get stacked in the mud. After few straggle, help from the scouts and the strong car (hard top Toyota Land Cruiser) we get out of the mud and cross the Kulfo River. Here, every thing starts changing. The road becomes to be dry and relatively comfortable, as we drive up the mountains we left behind the beautiful forest and followed by Acacia woodland. All of a sudden our car was filled with a seriously biting TseTse fly (vector of Trypanosomiasis). Straggling with the flies and the heavy road on the sharp mountains we all were frustrated for not seeing a single animal except the plenty baboons and the many promises of the guide.
After a hard drive we reach on the middle of the mountain were one can see the two lakes side by side. The magnificent site and the kind of natural beauty God has granted to this area amazed us. The land we are now is called the bridge of God (Ye’egzr dildeye) that divides the two lakes Abaya and Chamo by few kilometers.
Abaya is the biggest lake of the Ethiopian rift system brownish in color. Chamo is light green andbiologically productive full of algae thus fishes, crocodile and even hippos. From here beautiful Small Island covered by trees are seen from a distance. No one was ready to leave this area but since we have a long way a head we were forced to drive up the bushy mountain by our guide. When we are done with the mountain every thing has changed again. There happened to be a flat Plato (typical of Ethiopian highlands) surrounded by mountains and the plain covered by a whitish dry grass (Chrysopogonaucheri).
The name of the park itself emanated from this area; NechSar literally means white grass. In this area one fined the Zebras (berchelle zebra) in plenty. They form groups of three to ten, they are not afraid of humans when we try to approach them they just run a little and keep on enjoying the grass. The Zebras are really Donkeys except that they are beautiful, very big and extremely comfortable.
This is another amazing site in the park, we have also saw Gazelles (Yemeda feyel), Koreke, dik dik (Midakoa),bush buck, warthoges and a number of birds. But these once were from a distance and run away when approached by humans. Then we drive up to the eastern foots of mount Amaro, Mome hills. To see small hot spring mainly used by the local people as holly water (Medhanealem Tsebel). Now we remain with two sites one is the crocodile market where one can see plenty of crocodiles enjoying the sun at a particular shore of lake Chamo and the other is the forty springs from which the name of the town Arba Minch derived. We were unable to access the first, as the road is very difficult and damaged. We drive back to the forest to see the springs, by this time the mud has dried and the road is very safe.
The springs are not actually forty they are so many may be more than hundred flow from small holes at bottom of a very big mountain. The guide showed us the cleanness of the water using Godereleaf. The water from the springs is collected and pumped up the mountain for the town consumption, and thus the region water authority protects the area. The remaining water flow to a small pond, the clean ness of the water in the pond is amazing to extent shows you small fishes swimming. Kids from the near by enjoy the pond together with the fishes.
Something funny, still today mothers send kids to the forest just to collect fire woods and fetch few fishes for lunch or dinner. In this area I am more absorbed by the moist underground water forest than the springs. It is not a very thick forest dominated by very big indigenous trees such as Ficus (Ficussycamorous), Dokima(syzigiumguineese), Tikur Enchet (Prunusafricana) and different large lianas. The canopy is totally covered and when you go deeper and deeper in to the forest you will once again be amazed with the beauty of nature. The extreme silence except the melodious sounds of the beautiful birds and monkeys which jumping branch to branch enjoying fruits of the trees, feels your soul with a different joy beyond words to express. Different kinds of monkeys like the black and white colobus (Gureza), grevet and vervet monkey and different apes and baboons are very common.
This extremely beautiful area no doubt will deserve protection and thus established as a national park since 1967. The management was assumed by different governmental bodies such as the Ethiopia Wild Life conservation organization and the local government. However since 2005 the park management is transferred to African Parks Plc with the context of publicprivate partnership based on build, operate and transfer contractual agreement for 25 years, entered by and between the government and African Parks. The problem is the community around wouldn’t yet accept the partnership; they rather felt that the park is sold to a foreigner. Basically, the community in the town complains about the lack of fish and firewood, as fishing and accessing the park for firewood is prohibited by the new management. It is actually true and surprising that the expensive food item in Arba Minch today is fish even compared to Addis.
Other people around the park will also complaining as their piece of farmland is being claimed by the park management and fishermen loss their substantial income. All this made the community to feel against the park management. On the other hand, since last year, the park condition is improving. The park scouts increased from fifteen to sixty and they are well equipped with communication instruments, vehicles, boats etc and their earning has increased up to 1000 birr a month. As a result, the park vegetation is improving, fish which were about to disappear from Chamo lake has restored the number of animals has increased and the park management is promising to reintroduce back lost animals such as buffaloes from the near by parks.
The roads are improving and the number of visitors has also increased. I have also noted that interference by the community is minimum compared to other parks that I have visited such as Awash, AbjataShalla and Bale national parks. The park management is trying to apply participatory approach, we have been told. There is community education and the park scouts are collected from different communities that border the park. This is to participate the community in the park management and minimize conflict. Some of the scouts complain of their poor guns and very few bullets they have compared with particularly the Kereyu Oromo that live near the border of the park and who are equipped with automatic weapons. Still however some of the scouts want their payment to be from the government pocket fearing the foreign men (Dutch and South Africans) may leave one day for unforeseen reason.
The other thing I have noted is however poaching for fishes, fire wood and grasses is still there .In my free times I have developed a new hobby, fishing (common this is not an easy task, it requires time, patience and concentration). This time, I have noted that poachers with traditional boats come up with plenty of fishes just in a few minutes. I use to buy fish my self from the poachers, on the days that I fell to fetch good fishes, for one thing the big fishes will not come to the shores and the other I am afraid of the crocodile to get in to the water they are always there staring towards me. I have been told the crocodiles at Chamo don’t attack people as that of Abaya.
Reason Chamo is fertile they get employed as a park scout or tourist guide and he replied payment is not attractive. He told me that he earns two hundred to three hundred birr a day by selling a single fish (Koroso) by five birr in the towns. So, the conflict between the community and the park management is still there, on the time we where about to live from Arba Minch we have heard from the park office that the Dutch Millionaire who funded the park management (Mr. Tom) has died of cancer but the effort to fence the park and protect it will continue. Gauss what is going to happen in the new Ethiopian millennium! Who is going to win the park management? The community or they may agree to work together for the protection of the park and the well being of the community? We will pray for the last. And if it worked, it may be exemplary for the other parks in the country currently being threatened.
The recent development in the alliance of forces in Ethiopian politics has initiated hot discussions among Ethiopians. The emergence of AFD has divided Ethiopians into opposite camps. Many Ethiopians see the AFD as the Ethiopian people’s prayer answered. Others have mixed feelings ranging from outright rejection to wait and see attitude. The constituents of all the parties involved have aired their concerns and hopes about the future. The issues of contention and the comments on the Memorandum of understanding from the different stakeholders seem to be minor compared to the monumental issues of democracy, the international alliance of forces, and what the strategy of our united struggle should be to salvage Ethiopia. It is my belief that any political leadership that doesn’t have a vision that defy conventional thinking is not going to succeed in getting the Ethiopian peoples out of this boundless tribulation and lead them to democracy. The steps taken to form the AFD exhibits all the unconventional steps which one would like to see in such an organisation. It is a step that unhitches our minds from the past and invites us to look forward to the future. Who would have expected an alliance between a pan- Ethiopian CUDP and the nationalist organisations OLF, ONLF, SLF would come true based on issues of democracy and freedom? Neither the TPLF nor many Ethiopians had dream of it. The emergence of AFD was a shock that the TPLF and its supporters hadn’t expected would come. It is their worst dreams come true. Their core strategy was anchored on dividing and pitting the Ethiopian people against one another, branding all organisations as either chauvinists or narrow nationalists. The opposition seem to have learned a couple of lessons and above all they seem to have listened to the crying of the Ethiopian people for unity and democracy.
The state of the EPRDF
The pillar of EPRDF’s politics rests on:
*Dividing the Ethiopians according to ethnic lines and keeping them in perpetual antagonism so that it can keep them at bay,
*When it comes to organisations this politics was anchored on two dimensional pillars. Organisations are classified as chauvinistic or narrow nationalistic and thus persecuted according to this criterion as soon as they seem to be a threat the ruling clique, and
*Misleading the international public opinion and giving the semblance of a regime that is democratic, and progressive which stands for the very existence of Ethiopia.
The politics of EPRDF is primitive and backward that it is unprecedented in modern day politics around the world except a few exceptional cases.. In the age of globalisation the world has become a global village. Unfortunately, the EPRDF is working hard to confine Ethiopians from natural cultural and economic intercourse both internally and externally. In countries where democracy and liberty prevail elections are held to confirm existing political regimes or to bring about a change of government. In such a process democratic institutions are strengthened and the general public’s trust on these institutions grows and increases. For EPRDF, democracy is something that one could pay lip service to. It is a means to mislead the international opinion to extract political and financial resources which the beneficiaries are of the ruling clique. It is something one holds mock election every five years to give itself a semblance of democratic government. In the EPRDF’s Ethiopia elections are held as a window-dressing exercise to give itself a semblance of legitimacy. These election exercises have alienated the population from the regime and widened the gap between the rulers and the ruled. This was vividly demonstrated in the May elections. The ruling group had never dreamed that it would lose the elections having the state apparatus, the massive superiority of material and monetary resources. This is a huge testimony to the gap between the ruled and the rulers.
The EPRDF are among the rulers in Africa who are most dependants on foreign aid. Such being the case they were eager to get their credentials renewed as a democratic government by the donor nations. It is thanks to this set up that they had to accommodate, with huge reluctance and massive distress, opposition parties and international election observations and to go along with a more or less free election. This setting gave the Ethiopian opposition the chance to campaign and present their vision of the future Ethiopia and the kind of governance the Ethiopian people deserve and are entitled to. Ethiopians holding election cards in their hand were biding their time. We all know how it went on Election Day. When they got the chance our people went out and voted out the regime they have been dissatisfied with for the last fifteen years. At the same time our people showed to the whole world how civilised and matured they are in exercising their democratic rights.
Now the prayers of Meles Zenawi for a strong opposition were answered. He had never thought that day would come. If such a broad based alliance as the AFD sees the day and can mobilize and stand with the Ethiopian people, this tyrannical ruling group has nothing to justify its rule.
The aspiration of the Ethiopian people, “do they have food in Ethiopia?”
The Ethiopian people have been crying for united struggle to get rid of this horrendous regime for the last fifteen years. The May election is an expression of the peoples resolve for change. Through voting cards Ethiopians made it clear to all political forces that they don’t want and can’t be governed the way the EPRDF governs them. Dividing and pitting them against one another was the melody of the Italian colonialists. One would have expected that this generation should have learned that lesson. But the malicious TPLF group has tried to repeat the act. Fortunately the good students of Italy, the TPLF leadership, has tried and failed precisely as their teachers did thanks to the staunch resistance of the Ethiopian people. People have explicitly shown that the only way to come to power and stay in power is by democratic means. For demanding these inherent natural rights the people are paying a very high price. They are being killed, muzzled, tortured and imprisoned. Under these circumstances the emergence of the AFD is a moral lift and the crowning of our people’s struggle with success provided that the AFD can contribute in a substantial way in enshrining these fundamental rights. What the Ethiopian people are crying for is peace, harmony and the chance to work and feed them selves. The precondition for such a development is democracy and liberty. Ethiopia is the origin of human race, and a symbol of freedom for the black race. Thanks to the mismanagement of subsequent regimes it is now reduced into a laughing stock of the whole world. The other day I saw an American film where the actor invites his darling for a dinner to an Ethiopian restaurant. The feminine actress asks her friend “do they have food in Ethiopia?” He in return answers “we will order empty dishes.” It says it all. The film was supposed to be a comedy but it inflicts a mortal wound on our pride.
Ethiopia has every potential to be a developed nation given an honest and benevolent regime that can give its people a chance to live in peace and harmony. There are a huge natural resources and the human capital necessary for sustainable development. What is lacking is an honest, democratic and accountable government. Surely Ethiopia will reclaim its place in the history books that it deserves sooner or later. No doubt that Ethiopia is mentioned over thirty times in the bible and the Koran. It will be a country that Africans and the black race can again be proud of. On our way to that end we need all kinds of forces who can make a contribution and I would like to believe that the AFD can be one of them.
Democracy in practice
Democracy is in a multidimensional crisis in Ethiopia emanating from the totalitarianism of the regime. Some of the major contradictions which have erupted and erupt now and then among the ruling group have been “solved” by throwing the opponents into jail or by simple physical elimination. The major contradiction that has its source in the totalitarianism of the regime and the concentration of power in the hands of one man is however the contradiction between the ruling elite and the Ethiopian people. This concentration of power in the hands of the dictator and totalitarian elite has been stifling the Ethiopian people politically, culturally and economically since 1991. This is the major democratic crisis that is threatening the country and the rest of Eastern Africa. The May election was the best opportunity lost to solve this crisis. On the contrary, the daylight robbery of the peoples will by the regime has exacerbated this crisis. This major crisis of democracy needs to be resolved in order to salvage our people and country.
Another aspect of the crisis of democracy in our country is the discord, disunity and lack of democratic experience in tackling and resolving political differences and problems among the opposition groups. This problem has been the stumbling block in our struggle for democracy and justice. Thus any attempt for a solution to our problems and contradictions has to include the resolution of the problem of democracy even among the opposition. The emergence of AFD seems to be a good start in resolving this outstanding contradiction. The nature of the organisations that formed the alliance is markedly different from one another. The very attempt to come and work together for the common cause, democracy and freedom, is an achievement. It is a sign of maturity and sign of embracing democracy. To give and take and to agree and work together for a common goal is real democracy in practice. Democracy entails compromise. These organisations that have done that seem to have learned important lessons from past experiences and the May elections.
The international alliance of forces
As we are all aware this horrendous regime can only stay in power thanks to the support of the donor nations. Between 30 and 50 percent of its annual budget is covered by budgetary supplements from the western nations. This generous flow of financial resources and support to the EPRDF has its roots in our past history and the cunning nature of the regime. One of the greatest disservices of the military dictatorship of Mengistu was the annihilation of one generation of young and dynamic Ethiopians. The frustration and demoralisation that emanated from this campaign of annihilation forced the remains of that generation of Ethiopians into exile or passivity. This cleared the way to the TPLF and other forces that worked for the weakening and eventual destruction of Ethiopia as a country. In the late 80s the west in its competition with the communist east was winning the terrain in the whole world. The collapse of communism started with the sacrifice of Ethiopia. It was in one of the summits between the US and the Soviet the fate of Ethiopia was sealed. Soviet Union conceded to leave Ethiopian to its fate while in turn it bought time for an orderly retreat from the rest of its empire. History repeated itself. As Ethiopia was the first victim to be sacrificed to appease fascist Italy in the Second World War, it happened this time again and Ethiopia was sacrificed to appease the west. The first victim of the collapse of communism became Ethiopia. At that point of history Ethiopia stood alone in front the almighty west. Their fate was decided with out their participation. They were dragged out of the mouth of the wolf Mengistu and thrown into the mouth of the hyena Meles.The Albanian communist party oriented TPLF turned itself into a “democratic” TPLF overnight. The ferocious MLLT/TPLF animal and the EPLF coalition presented itself as the best possible alternatives to the Ethiopian problem. This should not be surprising since we all know that deceit and lie is the trade mark or enigma of this clique. But we have to take part of the blame for this development. We could not produce any viable alternative to the TPLF/EPLF coalition at that point of time. After taking power the clique has played it smart.
*They have always aligned their foreign policy to correspond to the interests of the west in general and the US in particular while giving a semblance of democracy while working hard to achieve their aim of a weak and divided Ethiopia.
*The disunity and hostility among the opposition groups has made it easy for these myopic elite to present itself as the guarantor of the existence of Ethiopia as a nation.
*Due to the sensitive nature of the East African geopolitical situation and the US perusing its national interest, the fight against terrorism, has appointed TPLF to axel the role of a fighter against terrorism. The TPLF has joyously accepted this role. It is even overexploiting the situation as it is doing now in Somalia. It is surprising that the US is still sticking to this group despite all facts speaking against them. Dictatorship is the mother of terrorism and the TPLF regime is a typical example of that.
Despite all the setbacks, we Ethiopians in the Diaspora are trying to make ourselves heard and present the case of our people to the international public opinion, governments and Human right organisations. From what I observe we are making progress and gaining a lot of powerful friends for the Ethiopian cause and the cause of democracy. The TPLF is exposed and its true nature is being exhibited for the wider world. I believe it is even possible to bring more change in the opinion in the west in favour of the Ethiopian people’s cause provided we work a bit diligently and united. The emergence of the AFD is an important leap in this work. The west has been putting an immense pressure on the opposition to show flexibility and willingness for dialog. If the AFD can prove that it is a strong and reliable partner to do business with, I am convinced that the west is matured and interested to completely change its stance on the question of Ethiopia. In our struggle to show the whole world the intransigency and dictatorial nature of this regime it is pertinent to stand united and the AFD was just the best thing we ever have produced. We have to show the world
*That we are united in the in our struggle for freedom and democracy and we are capable of uniting the Ethiopian people and can shoulder the responsibility of leading our country into a model democratic country.
*We must be able to show that a democratic Ethiopia can be a factor of stability to the whole region.
*That we are flexible and reliable
*We are democratic and respect the rules of democracy.
*The problem of Ethiopia and the region as a whole can only be solved when the EPRDF accepts the will of the people.
*We should prove beyond all doubt that we are not the weak and the extremist groups as the EPRDF is trying to portray us in the face of the whole world.
Concluding remarks
In the ideal world the best solution for all of us, even the EPRDF, would have been the solution of the May elections. Ethiopians went out and exercised their inherent right and voted for the party of their choice. Unfortunately that ideal did not materialise as the ballot was rigged and election results hijacked by the EPRDF. From now the struggle for democracy and freedom must start afresh. Next time when freedom and democracy is achieved we should make sure that it works and pass the tradition for generations to come. It is in this context that the AFD must play a prominent role to achieve this goal.
The reason beyond my many ifs and mays is the bitter experience I have had from the Ethiopian political struggle. The Ethiopian opposition has not proved itself to be consistent and democratic, that is willing to wage an inner struggle in a democratic way and stay and work together to achieve the goal of democracy. This time around, if we fail to materialise the goal of a united struggle we will be giving the best gift we ever have given the EPRDF and we would have done the biggest damage we could have inflicted to the struggle of the Ethiopian people. I hope that
*We all democratic and humane Ethiopians would like to see our country as a democratic and a land of righteousness where nobody is wronged for his ideas and convictions.
*We would like to see a country where organisations are free to work and mobilise the people to their idea and win political power by the means of ballot box.
*We would like to see a country that is blooming with economic development and freed from the shackles of famine and starvation.
*We would like that our ancient country reclaims its right place as the cradle of the human race and as a symbol of black pride.
One anticipates that the AFD will be relevant in building a democratic Ethiopia. It is in this hope I raise my voice to support this incipient organisation. I hope this organisation will work in a dynamic and prudent way and mobilise its supporters for the cause of unity. I hope this organisation will speak loud and clear the principles of one man one vote and the alienable rights of the Ethiopian people to decide their own destiny. I hope the AFD will show in practice that it has drawn the necessary conclusions from the May elections and it will respect the will of the people. Finally I hope the AFD will be transparent and open to accommodate constructive opinions which flow from different direction.
The name of the park itself emanated from this area; NechSar literally means white grass. In this area one fined the Zebras (berchelle zebra) in plenty. They form groups of three to ten, they are not afraid of humans when we try to approach them they just run a little and keep on enjoying the grass. The Zebras are really Donkeys except that they are beautiful, very big and extremely comfortable.
