The primacy of politics in Africa has led to serious distortions of the historical record. This is no where more evident than in Ethiopian studies. The misrepresentation commenced with the student activism of the 1960s. When one reviews the student literature, one is immediately struck by the passionate and extravagant nature of its prose. Hyperbole is as normal as the Marxist language used to shape the authors’ analyses.
Combat was the organ of the Ethiopian Student Union in North America. The issue about the Union’s 20th Congress arrayed language characteristic of the mentality of the Ethiopian student at home and abroad. The Congress’s “Report” characterized Ethiopia as a “semi-feudal, semicolonial society,” from which “all the evils attending the lives of working people … emanate.” These evils were seen as “class oppression, national oppression, female oppression, separation between city and countryside, separation between mental and physical labor and all other social ills.” In order to destroy the prevailing political economy, a national democratic revolution and the establishment of “a people’s democratic revolutionary republic” was necessary. The latter would satisfy the peasant’s demand for landownership.
Combat also claimed that “The dominant mode of production in Ethiopia is feudalism existing side by side with an embryonic capitalist sector that has little prospect for development and is mostly owned and managed by imperialists.” Of course, by 1974, much of Eastern, Southern, and Western Ethiopia was dominated by landlords who had transformed cultivators into share- and cash-croppers. This phenomenon was hardly feudalism but market-driven capitalist agriculture.
In the north, especially radiating out from Addis Abeba and other urban centers, there was considerable truck-farming. Capitalist agriculture was growing so
significantly that during the late 1960s and up to the 1974 revolution farmers were being displaced from their homesteads, just as tens of thousands had been
removed in the 1940s and 1950s by the development of plantations in the Awash valley. Capitalism was well developed by 1974, so much so that attendant social
pressures are often cited as one of the causes of the revolution. The new farms and the many new factories that opened in Addis Abeba, Asmera, and Dre Dawa
were mostly owned by Ethiopian and resident foreigners. Although there was some outside investment, the Imperial government always complained that it was unable to raise sufficient foreign capital to undertake many desirable development projects.
The divergence between fact and fancy reveal that a significant and influential portion of Ethiopia’s intelligentsia in the 1970s was willing to come to whatever conclusions necessary to destroy the government of Haile Selassie. Even today, otherwise serious thinkers and scholars cannot free themselves of yesterday’s obsolete and rhetorical devices. For example, Dr. Bahru Zewde of Addis Abeba University’s Department of History recently wrote that once Haile Selassie achieved primacy after World War II, his “activities were bereft of social purpose. His political vision more or less ended with the subjugation of the nobility and creation of a centralized state. Thereafter power became an end in itself.”
One might argue, as I did in volume one of my biography of the Emperor that “Haile Selassie’s business was power, a metier curiously derided by his detractors, who have forgotten that the having and holding of authority is the preoccupation of most public men.” In any case, the record after the 1960s, the year of the
abortive coup against the Emperor, shows that the monarch used his power to promote many projects of high social purpose. He established a university,
which even after the brutish years of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s rule, maintains high international standards and an enviable research record. He built Ethiopian Airlines, still one of Africa’s leading airlines. He laid down thousands of kilometers of all-weather roads. He expanded Ethiopia’s educational system, and even though it served only about 10 percent of Ethiopia’s youth, they received a quality education that prepared them for jobs in a growing economy. He also established orphanages, hospitals and self-help institutions.
Throughout his reign, the Emperor had ruled his traditional people as the heir to ancient cultural traditions. As his post-war programs transformed the country, the Emperor avoided introducing any new and secular legitimization based on the universalist values or institutions. The data are clear that his reliance on charismatic themes and on the mystification surrounding the monarchy stemmed from his lack of experience and training in modern economics, public administration and mass politics. Yet he presided over and spurred the growth of capitalist agriculture which began to transform the countryside in the 1940s and was driving peasants off the land by the seventies. In fact, I long have argued that the so-called revolution of 1974 was a reaction to an economic development considered by important student intellectuals as exploitative and unfair.
So the rhetoric leads to a conclusion that is politically charged and baseless; whereas the public record reveals that the last period of the reign of Haile Selassie was not “bereft of social purpose,” but replete with social change forced by the articulation of capitalism.
The idea that Ethiopia and Ethiopians were incapable of independent policies and actions is carried to the absurd in creative writings about the Oromo. Passionately engaged in the Oromo quest for political sovereignty, various authors seek to create a historical nation called Oromia and fabricate a glorious history for the non-existent country. In these renditions, the northern Ethiopians are demonized as little better than devils victimizing innocent and good Oromos. Unable to concede that the Ethiopians could colonize the fictitious Oromia on their own and for their own reasons, the pro-Oromo authors “show how imperialism penetrated the Horn of Africa and created coalitions with the successive Ethiopian colonial ruling classes. This was achieved through the formation and maintenance of the Ethiopian state as a European informal colony, bringing various peoples, including the Oromo, under the logic of capitalism.” In another flight of pseudo- Marxist fancy, we are informed that “The green revolution was introduced by international imperialism to intensify agrarian capitalism and consolidate the colonial Ethiopian ruling class.” The distortions are so gross as to undermine any authority that history might have in helping resolve contemporary problems of Oromo integration into Ethiopia.
A few years ago at a conference, I rehearsed Asmerom Leggesse’s detailed scholarship to explain why the gada system, the Oromo age-graded, socio-political system had not worked well even for traditional Oromo pastorialists. After continuing that gada therefore would be of little use in governing any modern state, I sat down and listened to the rhetoric about the once and future glories of the gada. As I left the room in awe of the certainty expressed within, I was advised by Dr. Mohammed Hassan that I misunderstood the history of Oromo-Ethiopian relations. I puzzled over this strange criticism until I read his recently published work: The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860 (Cambridge, 1990).
Mohammed begins by indicting the now classic study of Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia 1270-1527 (Oxford, 1972), for ignoring the Oromo as a factor in the history of highlands Ethiopia from the 13th to the 16th century. Dr. Mohammed claims to have found in the sources by Dr. Taddesse “conclusive evidence which demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt that some settled agricultural Oromo groups lived in and to the south of … Shoa before the fourteenth century.” His footnote here points, however, to his own dissertation, but he subsequently clarifies by citing linguistic evidence that the Oromo were one of Ethiopia’s primordial peoples: “To consider them as newcomers is a claim which has no historical foundation whatsoever.” He reveals the primordial Oromo as mixed farmers, some of whom became pastorialists when they moved to the lowlands. Never does he explain such a surprising development, rare in world history, but he cites Eike Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens (Stuttgart, 1963) who passed along unsubstantiated Boran and Guji Oromo traditions. In other words, Mohammed has based his analysis on unverified hearsay.
Why make such sweeping claims on the basis of such tenuous material? The answer lies in the politics of ethnic competition in Ethiopia. If the Oromo inhabited the country’s central highlands before their historic invasions of the 17th century, then current politicians can characterize Christian semitic-speakers, whose official culture has long dominated modern Ethiopia, as colonialists. Dr. Mohammed seeks to fabricate what E.J. Hobsbawm characterizes as “retrospective mythology” usually derived from aspects of ethnicity such as the gada system.
In the late-nineteenth century, Menelik II (reigned 1889-1913) restored–or conquered depending on your politics–Solomonic rule in areas overrun by the Oromo in the 17th century. If Mohammed’s “retrospective mythology” is linked to a negative view of northern aggrandizement, then partisans can agitate for an independent Oromia or for a special place within Ethiopia. That negative view was provided in the inventive historical views about Oromos and Oromia now being presented as Gospel truth. Indeed, we are witnessing the creation of a new and poorly based historiography, the facts of which, if repeated often enough, will take on a veracity of their own.
It has happened before in the Ethiopian vortex: through vigorous repetition the Eritreans and their fellow travelers have created a new history, turning logic and fact on their heads to prove a political message: Ethiopia had no valid claim to Eritrea but was permitted to rule the colony by the British and the United States; the United Nations denied Eritrea its right to self-determination in 1950s when the Italian colony was federated to Ethiopia; and Eritrea emerged as a nation from its harsh experience with Italian colonialism.
It is important first to recall that the highlands of Eritrea (Hamasen, Akele Guzay, and Seraye) are peopled by Tigrigna-speaking Christian agriculturalists, who are socially identical with inhabitants of Tigray, the adjacent Ethiopian province. As late as 1888, an Ethiopian emperor put up a spirited and successful fight to retain the Eritrean highlands for Ethiopia, though the coastal strip long had been subject to foreign rule. Menelik II, for reasons of realpolitik, that is to safeguard Greater Ethiopia, permitted Rome to stay on the highlands in 1896, even after the definitive Battle of Adwa. A cardinal feature of Haile Selassie’s policy after 1941, after his return from exile, however, was to regain Eritrea for Ethiopia.
The Allied Foreign Ministers who visited Eritrea in 1948 and a UN fact-finding team that surveyed the colony in 1950, found little evidence of either national identity or of a viable economy. In 1948, Ethiopia had shown it had the military strength and the diplomatic subtlety to rid the Ogaden of the British. While the politics were different, the Ethiopians unilaterally could have moved into Eritrea and encountered little resistance. Indeed, in the highlands the Christian population was largely unionist and would have welcomed the Ethiopian troops. The British and the Americans therefore concluded that they should not stand in the way of a federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, especially since the Korean War had proved Addis Abeba to be pro-Western. Nobody gave Ethiopia anything. Haile Selassie’s national policy and diplomacy won Eritrea, and it is demeaning for Addis Abeba to be regarded as merely a pawn in international relations. The logic is reminiscent of
the Oromo view that Ethiopia could not have defeated the Oromo without being allied to international capital.
For most of the colonial period, there were few Italians in Eritrea, and the population continued their very local lives without European interference. True, the Italian population swelled during the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-36, when Rome used Eritrea as its spring-board into the interior. Many young Eritreans were absorbed into the Italian military. That period ended in 1941 when a combined Allied (largely British empire) and Ethiopian force quickly defeated the Italians. From 1942 to 1952, while a British military administration ruled Eritrea, the colony’s Italian population rapidly diminished, the economy eroded, and many Eritreans returned to their local lives. Admittedly, Eritrea’s experience was different than Ethiopia’s, but the latter, as an African survivor of imperialism, had an overriding national interest in regaining access to the sea. If anything led to the Eritrean rebellion, it was Ethiopia’s poor stewardship of the ex- colony after 1952, its determination to destroy the federation, and its intention to absorb Eritrea into the nation simply as province.
Issayas Afeworki, the leader of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, is fond of misstating his new country’s history with, of course, a heroic twist. At the constitutional conference of Addis Abeba in June 1991, he responded to a factual rehearsal of Eritrea’s long-standing relationship with Ethiopia by stating that history had no role to play in resolving the post-Mengistu political crisis. In the most immediate way, he is probably correct, although in a more profound sense, he is wrong. In Ethiopia, history has a knack for reimposing its authority over fragmentation and deconstruction.
The country’s history contains an analytical truth validating the idea of a large, historic, and united state. From time to time, the nation had disintegrated into
component parts, but it never disappeared as an idea and always reappeared in fact. The Axumite Empire may have faded after the seventh century, but the Zagwes
followed in the eleventh century. The succeeding Solomonic dynasty created a state which incorporated at least two thirds of the country’s present space. In the sixteen century, that empire was devastated by Muslim armies waging holy war and sharply contracted as the Oromo successfully invaded the now depopulated highlands in the seventeenth century.
Even as the Solomonic dynasty declined in the eighteenth century, the imperial tradition was validated in Ethiopia’s monasteries and parish churches. The northern peasantry was reminded continuously of Ethiopia’s earlier greatness and exhorted to work toward its renaissance. From 1896 to 1907, Menelik II directed Ethiopia’s return into southern and western regions abandoned in the seventeenth century. There they found the ruins of long-abandoned churches and monasteries but culturally different people, most of whom lived in segmentary societies who practiced animal husbandry or digging stick or hoe agriculture and followed traditional religions of Islam and spoke non-Semitic languages.
To them, the northerners were aliens. Their firearms and more complex social organization gave them a material advantage, but they also were inspired by the idea that they were regaining lands once part of their state. Menelik certainly believed that he and his soldiers would restore Ethiopia to its historic grandeur and size. By the end of the expansionary impulse in 1906, Ethiopia was at its present size, comprising the highlands, the key river systems and the state’s central core surrounded by a borderland buffer zone in low-lying, arid or tropical zones.
From the Axumite period, public history in Ethiopia has moved from north to south, and the 20th century state developed along this well trodden path. Menelik and Haile Selassie ruled Ethiopia’s heterogeneous population largely through accommodation and cooptation. The latter built a centralized state and expanded Ethiopia’s civil society as a counterweight to ethnic forces. He fostered unity through the development of national institutions, and pan-Ethiopian economy, modern communications and an official culture whose main feature was the use of Amharic language in government and education.
As Ethiopia’s economy began to be transformed in the 1960s through the articulation of capitalism, considerable social unrest emerged among the peasantry to undermine loyalty to the national consensus. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the old authorities resorted to police repression to keep Ethiopia intact and used clients to bolster its administration in the Ogaden and in Eritrea. Haile Selassie’s government was replaced in 1974 by an ideologically driven inclusivist state determined to extirpate any competing civil society and/or ethnic activity. Ruthless repression of ideological adversaries led to the growth of nationality movements and
ongoing civil wars.
The military government’s tightly centralized authority imposed land tenure and social policies which undermined the peasant’s historic connection to the state. Resettlement, villagization, mass political organizations and the command economy conspired to alienate the people from their natural allegiance. The state’s inability to compromise politically may have led to the destruction of the nation. Moreover, the present government’s belief that it can build a unitary state on the basis of cooperating ethnicities contradicts longstanding historical experience and such blatant recent events as the breakup of Yugoslavia, the imminent demise of Czechoslovakia and the continuing crisis in Belgium. Yet, if history is to be our guide, such a development will give way inevitably to renewed national unity as the logic of geography, economics and tradition once again come to dominate politics. If there is authority in history, then in the Ethiopian case it suggests that the greater state will reestablish itself, perhaps this time with a new official culture.
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Harold Marcus is a Professor of History at Michigan State University.
Ethiopian Ethnicity
The issue of ethnicity in Ethiopia is not well understood. Tragically, I suspect present rulers misunderstood the problem of ethnicity when they divided the country “along ethnic lines.” For example, when they designated South Eastern Ethiopia an ethnic Somali region “to resolve ethnic conflict,” they ignored the fact that Somalia — populated by Somalis — is destroying itself in ethnic wars. Similarly, they also believe the region they call “Amhara” is inhabited by an ethnic group which is distinct from the ethnic group in the new Tigray. They believe that the Oromo, the Gurage, and the Menze in Shoa do not belong together.
Of course, these Ethiopians will soon start to believe that they do not belong together, if they are bombarded by such assertions everyday. What a shame! What ethnic group lives in this “Amhara” region — Gojjames, Gonderes, Menzes, or what? The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF’s) answer is, of course, Amharas. The EPRDF refuses to acknowledge that it is creating an ethnic group in this region and forcing an ethnic label on all the people who happen to reside in this region of regions. Small ethnic groups are forced to assume a single ethnic name while they encourage large ethnic groups to separate.
What is the criteria the EPRDF used to divide or unite groups? Certainly not ethnicity as anthropologists know it on the Horn of Africa. Ethnicity, as it manifests itself in Ethiopia, is no simple concept. It includes language, dialect, denomination, clan and region. If one has to slice Ethiopia into regions of ethnic groups, one has to bring together endless subgroups of people, forexample, Amharic speakers of Menze dialect who belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, or Mekane Yesus Church, or adherents of Amharic speakers of Menze dialect who belong to any of the four sects of the religion of Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Hambeli, or Shaffii sects).
According to Aleqa Taye, there are four groups of Muslims in Yifat alone: Argobba, Dobba, Shagura, and Qachino.
Given the countless ways in which Ethiopian ethnicity manifests itself, and the countless potential divisions, I fear that moving toward ethnic politics in Ethiopia is a certain formula for friction. If anyone thinks this fear is unfounded, one need only look at Somalia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, South Africa and at what is already happening in Ethiopia. The recent, intensifying bloodshed in Yugoslavia and between the former republics of the USSR is further proof.
The “Amharas”
I call upon all Amharic speakers to refuse the label “Amharas” and resist the EPRDF’s attempts to lump them together in one region as one ethnic group. Many Ethiopians who consider themselves non-Amharic express bitterness towards Amharic speakers or “Amharas.” These Ethiopians are bitter because they believe that the “Amharas” have robbed them of their political rights and properties. They know that this linguistic group has persecuted them for demanding their right to nurture their own cultures. I do not contend that such mistreatment has not been inflicted upon some Ethiopians by other Ethiopians. My concern is how to convince a group of wretched Amharic speakers from, for example, Menz or Dembiya that they are responsible for these crimes. To the contrary, Amharic speakers of non-Addis Abeba dialects may have identical complaints about the suppression of their regional languages.
Perhaps some see political advantages in blaming the Amharic speakers for Ethiopia’s political, social and economic problems. The facts simply do not support the accusations. Blaming all Amharic speakers for the past is like blaming all Tigreans for what is happening to Ethiopia now at the hands of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
Those who want to rule Ethiopia undemocratically and undermine its territorial integrity are the only potential enemies of Amharic speakers. Amharic speakers support the territorial integrity of Ethiopia because their ethnic name is Ethiopia. “Amhara” is an ethnic name created for them by those who desire “Amhara” enemies, just because they speak Amharic. The Amharic speakers are entitled to defend their ethnic rights, just as any ethnic group defends its ethnic rights. The Amharic speakers I know resent being identified by the names Amhara and/ or Abyssinian as an ethnic name, just as the Oromo resent being called by any other name. They speak Amharic, but they are ethnic or national Ethiopians. Abyssinia is a name of a state that has transformed itself into Ethiopia.
Amharic Speakers are Ethnic Ethiopians
Let me explain my statement that Amharic speakers are ethnic Ethiopians, rather than Amharas or Abyssinians. Ethiopia, as we all know, was (is) a country of many ethnic groups. Historically, one of these groups spoke early Amharic. Its region, somewhere in today’s Wello, was called Amhara. Only those people from Amhara were called Amhara. For unknown historical reasons, the language of the Amharas started to spread outside Amhara, especially into Gonder, Gojjam, Lasta, and northern Shoa (notably Menz, Tegulet, Bulga). All these regions spoke other languages before they were overrun by Amharic.
Amharic’s march into new territories continued unchallenged through the sixteenth century. At that time, a new ethnic group, the Oromo, moved into Ethiopia. Until the sixteenth century, many regions inhabited by ethnic groups who did not speak Amharic gradually adopted Amharic. Their ethnic cultures gave way to the Amharic language and culture, influencing and changing in turn Amharic language and culture. The adoption of Amharic came not by force but through social and economic necessity. Ethiopians of different regions needed to communicate with state officials and to establish contacts with each other. Speaking Amharic became taking membership in, or adopting, pan-Ethiopian or state culture. As a result, the history and makeup of Ethiopia’s population and language resembles that of America’s. No one considers Italian-Americans or African- Americans or German-Americans ethnically English or British just because they speak English.
It is important to remember that language does not always identify one’s ethnic origin or relation. For example, Gonderites feel ethnically closer to Tigeans than to Amharic-speaking Shoans; and Amharic- speaking Shoans feel closer to non-Amharic-speaking Shoans (e.g. Oromo and Gurage) than to Amharic speaking Gonderites. Although there are no statistics, “ethnic Amharas” probably constitute a rather small section of the larger group of Amharic speakers, or ethnic Ethiopians. Nevertheless, now that today’s Amharic speakers have lost their ethnic languages as a result of state formation, some non-Amharic speakers insist that Amharic is their ethnic language.
The Bottom Line
However one presents the history of Amharic, and by whatever name its speakers want to be identified, today Amharic speakers are being made to stand apart from other Ethiopians, their blood relatives. Some of the intellectuals of those ethnic groups which were not absorbed by Amharic culture consider today’s Amharic speakers the allies and supporters of the ruling families which exploited and oppressed the non-Amharic-speaking population throughout Ethiopia’s history. This assertion must be investigated and discussed objectively. In Ethiopian history, Ethiopian rulers have always ruled Ethiopia by playing one individual or ethnic group against another and by exploiting all of the ethnic groups, including those who spoke Amharic. The support the Amharic speakers gave to those exploiters is probably no more or less than that given by any other Ethiopians. Furthermore, the rulers’ attitude towards Amharic speakers was probably not very different from their attitude towards non-Amharic speaking Christians. This history must be told to those whose knowledge of Ethiopian history is limited to events which they have experienced personally.
The ethnic name of the Amharic speakers is Ethiopia. This is not to say that they are more or less Ethiopian than Ethiopians who belong to other linguistic groups. It simply means that Amharic speakers belong to the extended family of Ethiopia. I, therefore, call upon all Amharic speakers to refuse to collaborate with those who want Ethiopia to offer asylum to the policy of apartheid, a policy which no country would welcome. No Ethiopian should permit him- or herself to be labeled to facilitate a carving out of ethnic “homelands” when we are all entitled to lay claim to the whole of Ethiopia.
A Call To Amharic Speakers
I call upon all Amharic-speaking Ethiopians to unite in resisting inapplicable labels. Resist the idea that you are different from your fellow Ethiopians. When today’s politicians call you “the oppressed” and “the glorious Amhara nation,” do not
feel flattered and fall into their barbed trap. Remember your ancestor’s proverbs: “The (disingenuous) sympathizer bakes you bread from butter.” Your glory is your acceptance of every Ethiopian as member of your ethnic group, Ethiopia, and your role to serve as a bridge between ethnic groups. EPRDF wants you to abandon your Ethiopianess and lure you into the deadend street of ethnic mentality. They speak in your name, using the pronoun “we” as if they are one of you. They are not one of you; they belong to an ethnic group which doubts its Ethiopianness. Do not become tools in their plan to disintegrate Ethiopia. You should know them by the way they identify themselves. They are one of you only if they always say, “we Ethiopians.”
Amhara People’s Organization
In closing, I wish to make a few observations about the recently established All Amhara People Organization (AAPO). To my mind, the reason the AAPO was established is quite clear. It was formed not in response to TPLF/ EPRDF’s call to organize as a political unit but to take up a particular cause neglected by the
government — the safety of the Amharic speakers. As we all know, non-Amharic speakers have been encouraged to organize themselves as ethnic groups and to turn their anger and frustrations against the Amharic- speaking sector of the Ethiopian population. The reports of the atrocities committed by Ethiopians (non-Amharic speakers) against Ethiopians (Amharic-speakers and other Christians) are shocking.
Nevertheless, I would prefer to call the organization All Ethiopian People Organization and change its third aim from:
Respects the legitimate existence of other political organizations, parties and ethnic movements and fronts. On the other hand, it will strive without delay to see to it that the interests, aspirations, democratic rights and freedom of the Amhara people are respected whereever they are found.
To:
… On the other hand, it will strive without delay to see to it that the interests, aspirations, democratic rights and freedom of minorities and other peoples not organized by ethnicity are respected.
Such a change in name and goal would help us focus on the “Ethiopianness” of all Ethiopians (which is being overlooked or forgotten in the current confusion) and also protect the interests of the Amharic-speaking population. It is our collective responsibility as Ethiopians to safeguard the interests of defenseless minorities. Moreover, to ignore the interests of one group of Ethiopians while paying attention to the interests of another group, would be to replace our Ethiopianness with our linguistic identification, thus playing directly into TPLF/
EPRDF’s hands.
Amharic speakers, a potential major source of supporters of a united democratic Ethiopia, must also remember their responsibility to provide a forum for all who want to work towards creating such an Ethiopia. Ethiopia is blessed with a significant number of non-Amharic speakers who have the same view about Ethiopia as do the majority of Amharic speakers. I have no doubt that they too will join an All Ethiopian People Organization and play important, perhaps leading roles in its success. The important division is not between “Amharas and non-Amharas” but between those who believe in ethnic politics and those who are above it, and between those who want a disintegrated Ethiopia and those who wish to keep it united and strong.
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Professor Getatchew Haile is a specialist in Ethiopian studies. Currently he is a MacArthur Fellow and Cataloguer of Oriental MSS at HMML, St. John’s University in Minnesota.
Is Asfaw Wossen (Atse Amha Selassie) capable of providing any type of leadership in Ethiopia today? To fully address this question, it is necessary to understand Asfaw Wossen’s political history and past activities.
Prior to his death, Atse Menelik designated his son Lidj Iyassu as heir apparent to the throne. This was clearly stated in his will. But Lidj Iyassu would not become king. Dejazmach Teferi Mekonnen (later Haile Selassie) conspired to usurp the throne. Following the Battle of Segele and an epidemic (yehidar beshita) which killed thousands of people, Lidj Iyassu was captured and imprisoned. Woizero Zewditu was crowned Queen and DejazmachTeferi became Crown Prince. Nigest Zewditu did not rule for long. As a result of a successful court intrigue, Zewditu died mysteriously and Teferi Mekonnen (who was by then Ras) was crowned Niguse Negest. Asfaw Wossen was designated Crown Prince.
Until Haile Selassie’s overthrow in 1975, Asfaw Wossen did very little except hang around the palace. He never participated in any meaningful political activity or administration of justice. Even when he was appointed Governor of Wello, he administered by remote control from Addis Abeba. There are few things that he can personally take credit for in Wello. In fact he took little interest in political and social issues in Wello. Historically, of course, Wello has never been a great supporter of Haile Selassie. When Haile Selassie returned from London after the war, the people of Wello were against giving him safe passage. They felt he was a coward for having left the country during the Italian occupation. They also objected to him as an usurper to the throne. They favored and accepted Menelik’s son, Lidj Iyassu, as
the legitimate heir. To this end the people of Wello rose up in arms to prevent him from traveling through Wello.
Haile Selassie also held a grudge against the people of Wello for their role in the Battle of Segele. He felt that they had allied themselves with Negus Mikhael and warred against him. Haile Selassie thus used his army to plunder and destroy Wello. Crown Prince Asfaw Wossen never protested or even pleaded for mercy for the people of Wello. Indeed, he was indifferent and passive, traits that are the hallmark of his political leadership and style. Throughout his political career he has never taken a stand or exerted himself to alleviate indignity or human rights violations committed against the people of Ethiopia. Neither has he ever used his great wealth to help alleviate poverty among his people.
Perhaps the best way to understand Asfaw Wossen’s political record and leadership style is to examine his role during the 1960 coup attempt by Mengistu Neway and his colleagues against Haile Selassie. A plan to remove Haile Selassie was devised by certain civilian and military leaders. These individuals were pained by the sheer poverty and need of the people of Ethiopia. They believed that fundamental changes were necessary. In an extraordinary gesture, they approached Asfaw Wossen with the idea of removing his father and establishing a popular government. He readily
accepted the idea and pledged his full support. He even told them that such a change for the country was his lifelong dream. He shared his regrets that his father had kept him under such tight control for such a long time. He took an oath with these individuals pledging: “If I should desert you, may Ethiopia forever desert me.”
Once the coup planners obtained Asfaw Wossen’s pledge of support, Generals Mengistu Neway and Tsige Dibu, Colonel Workneh Gebeyehu and Ato Germame Neway asked him to take up full leadership. He promptly accepted and preparations were underway to arrest Haile Selassie at the airport as he returned from a visit to Brazil. The plan was to depose him and declare a popular government.
While this plot was being hatched, then Minister of Finance Mekonnen Habte Wold got wind of what was underway. He sent an urgent telegram to Haile Selassie in Brazil. The coded message said: “The patient is dead. Please come back to the funeral.” Haile Selassie understood the message and immediately left for Addis Abeba.
By then the plotters realized that there has been a leak of the planned coup. They decided to accelerate the effectuation of their plan before the scheduled date. Asfaw Wossen then issued a public proclamation which said in part:
In recognition of the fact that the present regime has been a cancer on the Ethiopian people, beginning today I have decided to serve the people of Ethiopia
based on a true constitution and a salary the people determine for me. The new people’s government of Ethiopia is supported by intellectuals, military and civilian leaders and the people at large. Therefore, the decisions that are made by this government shall become valid. People of Ethiopia! You should know that you begin a glorious history today. You can stand proud among the people of the world. You should make your unity stronger than steel.
The recording of this statement is available for verification.
The new people’s government was widely supported not only by the educated elites and military sectors but also by the common people. Asfaw Wossen’s statement was very moving, filled with hope of change and improvements in the meager lives of the Ethiopian people.
The euphoria and ecstasy of the two days of the coup began to wear out as General Mered Mengesha and the Abune of the Orthodox Church, who issued a divine injunction, began to create division in the military. The American Ambassador was also part of this effort. He pretended to play a mediating role while actively working to undercut the coalition among the various branches of the military. As a result, Haile Selassie’s unchallenged return to Addis Abeba became certain.
Asfaw Wossen went to the airport to receive him. The first words exchanged between father and son reflected Haile Selassie’s mood. In contempt, Haile Selassie said: “We would have much preferred attending your funeral than seeing you here in person.”
Asfaw Wossen tried to explain away his role. He said he was “forced” to say the things he said and that they gave him no choice. Haile Selassie ordered a wide
investigation and arrest of all who directly and indirectly participated in the coup attempt. Some of the coup leaders such as Col. Workneh Gebeyehu and Shambel Telahun Baye fought to the end and died. Haile Selassie ordered the hanging of their corpses. General Mengistu Neway was caught seriously wounded. He was summarily executed by hanging.
The fate of those who were spared from the hangman’s noose was not much better. They were tortured in prison. Interrogators strung water filled bottles on
their genitals to extract information. They were beaten senseless and all signed confessions about their guilt. The chairman of the investigation committee,
Ras Asrate Kassa traveled from prison to prison spitting on the prisoners and calling them disgusting names. He ordered corporal punishment for the prisoners often accomplished by lashing. Many of these prisoners living today still carry the scars of those lashes.
Does Asfaw Wossen remember his acts of chicanery in this affair? Will he say he knows nothing about this shameful and sordid affair?
Haile Selassie’s government became worse after the coup. A terrible famine overtook the country. It became critical in Wello. Neither Haile Selassie nor Asfaw Wossen took any serious interest or action to address the problem. But much effort was made to conceal the magnitude of the problem from the Ethiopian people and the international community. Amid this famine, cakes and champaign were being imported from England for lavish royal weddings.
Finally, the Wello famine became the bane of Haile Selassie and his family. Nonetheless, the Derg’s killing of Haile Selassie is to be condemned and those responsible must be brought to justice.
Asfaw Wossen left for England just before the military takeover. When the Derg took power and led the country on a path of endless wars, famine and destruction, Asfaw Wossen did not make a single protest. He was living in comfort and luxury and enjoying the hospitality of the British government. There is not an instance I know of when he registered a protest or appeal to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity or any other international body during the 17 years of Derg rule.
What is so sad is not just that he remained silent about what was happening in the country. It is his collusion with the Derg to divide up Haile Selassie’s foreign bank accounts that is most reprehensible. This agreement was reported in the Italian newspaper Domenica del Cornie in an article entitled “Even the Son Sold Out His Father.”
What did Asfaw Wossen do with his share of the money? Did he share his wealth with the starving children of Ethiopia? Did he do anything for his people who were dying from famine, natural catastrophes and the Derg’s atrocities? Of course not! He gave nothing nor did he do anything meaningful to help his people. Instead, he arranged to have himself coronated as Amha Selassie I. He gave a lavish party to the English royal family and other stateless royalty. The expenses incurred on this day could have saved thousands of Ethiopians dying from starvation.
History seems to have a way of repeating itself. During the Italian occupation Asfaw Wossen’s father went to England and spent five years there in the lap of luxury. He returned “triumphantly” without ever fighting the enemy. Now his son, Asfaw Wossen, is trying to do the same after he forgot and disowned his people for seventeen years and divided up the peoples’ wealth with the Derg regime.
He now has the drums beating: “Moa Anbessa! I am here. I am your symbol of unity. Receive me with adulation.” He conveniently forgets his treachery and
chicanery and the corpses he left behind. He just wants to become king! It should be remembered that because of his inaction and treachery, the coup attempt
by General Mengistu Neway and others failed and that his father tyrannically ruled Ethiopia for the next fourteen years. Asfaw Wossen is living testimony to the fact that those who claim divine power to rule have no conscience. He is now cynically trying to take advantage of the people’s current adversity by offering to replant the yoke of monarchical rule.
Only true democracy can help achieve true unity. Where there is freedom and when the people’s rights are secured, then our future in unity will have been guaranteed. Indeed, some might try to exploit the lack of political sophistication of the people. However, they should never forget that the Ethiopian people have learned from hard experience the virtues of self-rule. They will not accept “Moa Anbessa, elect of God.”
The Crown rule was started and ended in blood. If Asfaw Wossen truly has the people’s interest at heart, he should remain wherever he is and not go back. He is old in age and in very poor health. He should ask for the forgiveness of the Ethiopian people. They are forgiving. They will allow him the honor of being buried on Ethiopian soil. Otherwise, it is both folly and vain to ask the people he deserted yesterday to embrace him with love and gratitude today. Asfaw Wossen is not needed to keep the country’s unity.
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Ato Getachew Garedew was one of the participants in the failed coup against
Haile Selassie in 1962 led by General Mengistu Neway. He continued his opposition against Haile Selassie’s government after he went to exile in Somalia and later in Frankfurt, Germany where he currently resides.
This article is translated from Amharic by ER staff.
There are enough indications to suggest that Ethiopia is once again headed towards a civil war. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times which painted a bleak picture of the possibility of peace disturbed many Ethiopians in America. A civil war involving the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) will have far-reaching effects on the entire country since the Oromo regions are the bread basket of Ethiopia.
Despite the Charter’s explicit endorsement of the concept of regional autonomy or even a federal system, Ethiopia’s ethnic rivalry still remains to be a source of unrest.
The root cause of this animosity is a deep rooted mistrust between the OLF and the EPRDF. The OLF claims that the EPRDF is, like its predecessors, an organization of Amhara-Tigrean coalition seeking to dominate and exploit the fertile Oromo lands. An Oromo friend recently told me that Oromos, who make up 40% of the entire population, are fighting for control of their territory.
The issue of territorial control surfaced when in 1989 the EPRDF captured from the Derg several garrisons and towns in the rich western province of Wellega where most of the OLF leadership comes from. This move angered Oromo leaders and ultimately resulted in a bitter confrontation between the two. A prominent Oromo intellectual, Dr. Nukria Bulcha of the University of Upsala, Sweden blasted the EPRDF as an arrogant organization with an Amhara-Tigrean ideology. Again, a conference which the two held in Europe in 1990 resulted in nothing but further confrontation.
As far as the EPRDF is concerned, all the Oromo organizations, including the OLF–a major partner in the transitional government–are poorly organized to run the administration of their regions. Also, the EPRDF claims that the Charter empowers it to ensure the stability of the country and safety of non-Oromos in Oromo regions. To accomplish this, the EPRDF, with the collaboration of Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), a member of its coalition, has established its presence in Oromo regions within the last nine months.
Any keen observer of Ethiopian affairs would see some merit in the competing positions. For example, it is no secret that the EPRDF would like to see Ethiopia minus Eritrea as a united states with the EPRDF coalition at the helm of power. Recent arrests of Somalis in Jijiga, Dirdaba, Kabridahar and Godie was a brazen effort by the government to establish its authority in this chaotic region. On the other hand, its move to reconcile warring Somali clans in the region is seen by many as a positive step. But Oromo organizations seem to resent any similar intervention from the EPRDF, even when non-Oromos, like Amharas, Hararis and Somalis are facing life threatening dangers from Oromo groups.
A case in point is the recent massacres by Oromos in Dirdaba, Arsi, and Harer which targeted innocent non-Oromo civilians in these Oromo regions. Although the OLF officially renounced these acts, such massacres are understood by many as the implicit policy of Oromo organizations which seek to drive non-Oromos out of the land the OLF calls the state of “Biya Oromia.”
Most Oromo organizations are discomforted by the idea that the EPRDF is a national organization. Nonetheless, Oromo organizations, far from being an alternative to the claim of the EPRDF, proved to be incapable of guaranteeing the security of citizens in their regions. Furthermore, the destruction of badly needed infrastructures upon which the food aid supply for over a million Somali returnees in the Ogaden and Bale is a repugnant act of terrorism.
As to resolving the contradiction between these two giants, there are only two roads to follow — war or peace. To know which road is best for the peoples of the region, one needs to speak to Khadija Said, a distant relative of mine whom I do not recognize but managed to call me collect from the border town of Moyale in Kenya and explained to me how she and her four sons are starving after her husband died in one of the regional wars. In a desperate and fading voice, she told me that she is in a position to cook a dead donkey for her kids if she can find one. With tears in my eyes, I promised her to send money through Nairobi. Concepts such as “national freedom” or “democracy”, as inalienable as they may be, are at the moment elusive to Khadija and thousands of people in the region. Bread and peace are not.
If the OLF leaders think that by disrupting the food aid supply to these people, particularly to the Ogaden, will hurt the EPRDF, well, they are dead wrong and their actions are unforgivable. Neither would the EPRDF be exonerated if it behaves like its predecessors and uses fire power to quell Oromo or any other insurgency. If both parties are interested in establishing a democratic system, they should do it peacefully. To resolve their differences through another civil war is certainly inexcusable.
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Faisal Roble is a City Planner for the City of Los Angeles.
We began our journey north on the highway leading out of Addis Abeba. Sultan Ali Mirha, the septegenerian leader of the Afar people had agreed to grant us an interview. As we left Addis Abeba we witnessed the scars of war on the rural landscape. Tanks and various other military vehicles destroyed in the Derg’s
unsuccessful campaigns littered the countryside. It was a pathetic sight!
We arrived at Debre Birhan after several arduous hours of driving. The town appeared deserted. There was little activity but we spent the night there. From Debre Birhan we planned to travel to Dufti, the main assembly point for the Afar people. This leg of the journey was exceptionally difficult. The temperature was extremely hot. We had limited supply of water and other necessaries.
Upon arriving at Dufti we sent a message to the Sultan asking to be granted an audience. He was ready to see us and without delay we proceeded to his residence with escorts.
Sultan Ali Mirha is the religious and traditional leader of the Afar people. At age 70 he is in remarkably good physical shape. He lives in a traditional house which is surrounded by a stone wall. Traditional Afar emblems are displayed on the walls. Guards were also posted outside carrying rifles and proudly displaying the traditional Afar dagger from the waistline.
We were ushered into the receiving room. The Sultan was seated on a throne-like chair clad in traditional attire. He had an imposing presence. We exchanged greetings and after a short while began the interview.
We began by talking about the geographical boundaries of the Afar area. The Sultan paused reflectively and began his description: “Indeed, while the land of the Afar people has certain geographic boundaries, it should be noted that these boundaries are meaningful only in the larger context of a united Ethiopia. To clarify, when we speak of a united Ethiopia, we are talking about national unity in a democratic society in which the principles of equality are observed.
“Having said this, let me say that the land of the Afar people is bounded as far as Massawa (to the northeast) and Harer (to the southeast). The Afar people have struggled to keep their land with their blood. They have made great sacrifices. No one can take their land away from them. The Afar people have every right to self-determination.”
The Sultan has been a powerful force in directing the energies of the Afar people towards national unity and local self-improvement. In fact, in a major conference of the Afar people held in Dufti several months ago, Afar leaders passed resolutions pledging allegiance to Ethiopian unity and the strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the various peoples of Ethiopia. The conference also condemned ethnic division and resolved to struggle against any form of dictatorship.
I followed up with another question asking what the people of Afar thought of Ethiopian unity. The Sultan smiled broadly and said: “Certainly, the people of Afar have no desire to infringe upon any other group or territory. However, the people of Afar are determined to do their part and struggle against anyone who seeks to break up the country. Some self-appointed leaders in our community are seeking disunity but they are acting outside the will and desires of the Afar people. They do not have the best interests of our people.”
This view was echoed by Sultan Ali Mirha’s son, Ato Hanfre Ali Mirha who is the Chairman of the Afar Liberation Front. Last July Ato Hanfre publicly stated that the representatives of the Afar people were participating in the Conference on the basis of Ethiopian unity. He also stated that the people of Afar will continue struggle to maintain the unity and integrity of Ethiopia.
Sultan Ali Mirha has recently undertaken considerable efforts to avoid division among the people of Afar and provide unifying leadership to his people. When asked about his role in maintaining unity among the people of Afar, the Sultan said: “The people of Afar like any other Ethiopians are proud of their heritage and history. We are one with all Ethiopians. No one can make excuses and take this identity from the Afar people. Our people will never accept a separate identity. Only those forces who are anti-Afar people will make claims of separation. We will not hesitate to expose them for what they are. This must be done for the unity of our Ethiopian people.” The Sultan regards the Afar leadership installed by the Derg as artificial and irrelevant. He points out that with the fall of the Derg also fell its lackeys in the Afar.
Sultan Ali Mirha has been leading the Afar people for fifty years. He is a man with a keen sense of history and a vision of Ethiopia. He spoke softly but there was solemnity and sincerity in his words. He was reflective and thoughtful. He exhibits a unique appreciation of the larger social and political processes. His words express deep concern for the future of Ethiopia and the people of Afar. He is open minded and willing to consider alternative viewpoints. His words aim to develop consensus and cooperation. But his resolve was undoubtable. He urges the ways of peace than war. He pleads for reasoned communication and avoidance of confrontation. He wants to build bridges for people to know and understand each other. The Sultan pleaded, “leaders must help forge the bonds of unity, cooperation and respect between peoples. Only when these conditions are present that Ethiopia will live in peace and prosperity.”
The Sultan related his frustrations about the poverty and hardship his people face everyday: “The people of Afar are pastoralists. In the past we have been unable to build cities or modern institutions. We have no factories or industries. We don’t even have schools.
“But the past should not dictate our future. Indeed, the past imperial and military governments have largely ignored us. They have done little to bring modernization to the people of Afar. The tragedy has been that the Afar people have been misdirected from enjoying the benefits of modernization and forced to choose a life of war and hate. This can never be forgotten.
“On the other hand, there are some now agitating for division among the Afar people. These individuals want to create animosity and confrontation with other Ethiopians living in the area. Many Amharas, Oromos, Somalis and others have lived
among us. There is no reason why they should not continue to live with us.
“It is a fact that the imperial government overtaxed us and the Derg tied us up in slogans. Today, we have nothing and still live in poverty. Our people lack food and shelter. Even when nature turned against us, no one bothered to help us and many of our people had to become refugees. Our people perished from famine and starvation rather than beg. Many did not even reach their destination. When their camels died they tried to cross on foot. They did not have a chance.”
Despite these words, Sultan Ali Mirha remains remarkably optimistic about the future. He continued: “Things must change for the better. Our land which stretches from Massawa to Harerghe must be developed and improved with roads and modern facilities to bring about a basic change in the lives of our people. Let it be clearly understood that our land is not just ours but the whole of Ethiopia. Its development benefits all of Ethiopia.
“Of course, our economic problems are two numerous to list. But the basic ones must be addressed. Today, most of the world benefits from advances in medicine and technology. Most of the people of Afar do not even know about the existence of these wonderful medicines let alone use them. We have no clinics or even the most basic health care services.
“This cannot go on much longer. Within our resources and limitations means must be found to give our people basic services. To achieve this we must use everything from our camels to the natural resources that are hidden in our soil. Our rivers that pour out into the sea should be harnessed for agricultural development. Roads must be built and communications improved.
“The cotton farms at Tendaho are a good example. These farms support the textile industry in Ethiopia. Similar projects can be developed in our area to improve the lives of our people.
“The natural resources buried in the soil should be examined by modern methods and technology. The land in which the Afar people live in is traversed by the Great Rift Valley. With modern technology and methods it may be possible to extract oil and other resources and help improve the lives of our people. There is also plenty of potash that can be exploited. In fact this resource can be exported to provide immediate support for our people. Wise use of resources can bring modernity and progress to our people. They will help us overcome ignorance, disease and poverty.
“There is another important dimension to all this. At a time when the popular slogan declares `The people of Afar have the right to self- determination,’ many things can be done. On our coastline which extends from Massawa to Djibouti, we can develop a fishing industry on the Red Sea. This can produce substantial revenues and help in other areas of growth and development. In this regard, self-determination becomes a mechanism for local growth and development.
“Of course, when we say this, it should be understood that the Afar people will not benefit separated from Ethiopia. This is not and can never be. Our unity will remain as it always has. It just means that resources locally available will be used for local projects. But it also means that we can share our growth and development with all of Ethiopia as a single united nation.
“Unity is our collective strength and no artificial lines can be drawn to split us apart. To be sure, our unity cannot even be questioned! We, the people of Afar, have as our cherished hope the unity and stability of Ethiopia in which the people of Ethiopia hold for each other love, caring, respect and concern. We will never stop struggling for this goal. We are confident that this goal will be achieved.”
Despite the Sultan’s remarkable optimism and foresight, he is also deeply saddened by the seventeen years of Marxist misrule and the resulting social dislocation in Ethiopia. He finds nothing redeeming about the Derg’s economic and social programs. He attributes his people’s impoverishment and social breakdown on the Derg’s misguided policies and futile efforts to restructure Afar society in the ways of socialism. He is particularly critical of the Derg’s attempts to install Afar leader’s who neither have the support of the people nor have any basis in traditional authority to play leadership roles. The Sultan points to the fall of Derg appointed Afar leaders last year after the fall of Mengistu as evidence of their lack of support in the Afar community.
The Sultan says that he never had any contact with the Derg officials. Apparently, the Derg did not also seek to enlist his support.
The Sultan is far more charitable to the present regime. He appears to be satisfied with developments to date. He does not have specific policy differences with the regime although he is quick to underscore his views on Ethiopian unity and the need for democratic institutions to insure peace, stability and progress in Ethiopia. In the abstract he is not particularly against the ethnic apportionment although he does not wish to see Ethiopian unity thwarted by ethnocentric politics.
In evaluating the transitional government’s performance over the past year, Sultan Ali Mirha is cautiously optimism. He credits the government for striving to bring peace to the country and for attempting to introduce and maintain democratic institutions particularly in the context of the last seventeen years. But he advises that a great deal remains to be done and that the leadership in and out of government must cooperate to establish peace and begin the task of national reconstruction and reconciliation.
Sultan Ali Mirha says that his people have not been under military pressure from the new government. The government has also not attempted to politically interfere in internal Afar matters. He says he has not faced any governmental opposition in his efforts to organize the Afar people for national political participations. The government has not kept him from disseminating his views among the Afar people or other Ethiopians. He also says he has no problem getting access to the government controlled media.
The Sultan says that he has received only limited aid from the government to aid the Afar people. But he also cautions that the government itself is financially strapped. He foresees increased assistance once the economy revives and foreign assistance becomes available.
The Sultan also appeared to be conciliatory towards the EPLF. He says the EPLF has not placed him under military, economic or other pressures. He says he is in contact with EPLF leaders and does not foresee any significant problems. He hopes that relations will improve with time and regards any strains that may exist between himself and the EPLF as “misunderstanding”. He says he will do everything to overcome these misunderstandings.
On the question of Eritrean secession and the possible reaction of the Afar people, the Sultan says it is premature to comment now. He says the most important questions involve unity and equal rights for all individuals regardless of ethnicity. He says our collective aim should be unity with stability. The Sultan does see dangers that can interrupt the movement towards democracy and perhaps even rekindle another civil war. But he is optimistic that all Ethiopians will opt to avoid war and work for peace. He reflects: “Indeed, history offers the best lessons. The history of Armenia is an object lesson. So is the history of our neighbors the Yemenis. The people of Yemen who had lived together in peace for generations were divided by those self-interested leaders who pitted Yemeni against Yemeni and shed a lot of unnecessary blood.
“Fighting brings only death and destruction and never understanding and love between people. We must make every effort to eliminate hate. We must always strive to promote respect for each other, observe each other’s rights and work to strengthen our traditions.
“The foundation of democracy is for leaders to embrace the people and for the people to embrace and trust their leaders. In this regard, the people of Afar know their leaders and the leaders know and respect the people. The leaders abide by the people’s wishes and decisions.
“When we say the Afar leaders respect the people, we also mean that they respect Ethiopian unity and all those who promote better understanding and cooperation among the peoples of Ethiopia. Our people stand for Ethiopian unity and they
will shed their blood to insure that.
“In African history, the name Ethiopia has great historical significance. Ethiopia is a great symbol of freedom for all of Africa. All of you young educated people should do everything in your powers to find ways and means to teach the people about the values of unity and the power of the people.”
With these words of encouragement, Sultan Ali Mirha ended the interview. I left completely overwhelmed by this great leader. Here is a man of vision and deliberation, a leader with foresight!
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Reported by ER special correspondent in Addis Abeba. Additional information compiled by ER staff in the U.S.
Economic recovery or development in an environment of conflict, insecurity and fear is virtually impossible. The coalition government of Ethiopia therefore must impartially and peacefully mediate between the warring parties in order to create a peaceful atmosphere throughout Ethiopia so that economic rehabilitation can get underway. Force cannot be a mechanism for democratizing a society. Force may temporarily silence a people but it cannot bring about genuine peace and stability.
It may be useful to mention that an effective way to stop war in Ethiopia today is to let the various nationalities be responsible for their own local affairs over political, economic, social and cultural issues. That was why there was great optimism among the subjugated peoples of Ethiopia when the Charter of July 1991 affirmed the exercise of self- determination by the nationalities.
This analysis assumes that there will be peace and security in the country to earnestly launch an emergency economic rehabilitation program. But can we begin to rebuild an economy that is profoundly distorted and utterly impoverished? Agriculture stands out as the most promising sector to recover with relatively modest investment obtained in the form of development assistance from multilateral and regional financial institutions and friendly donor countries. Agriculture is the dominant sector of the Ethiopian economy accounting for about 45% of GDP, 85% of export revenue and provides livelihood for 85% of the people. Ethiopia must produce enough food itself and stop its reliance on international donations. This is urgent not only to ensure food security but also to reverse the psychologically corrosive effect of “begging” on the self-esteem of Ethiopians. Furthermore, economic rehabilitation measures produce the quickest results in the agricultural sector, since farmers react quickly to various incentives and the production period for crops is short. This of course is the case in regions where there is sufficient annual precipitation. In regions where soil erosion and drought threaten agricultural production, the ongoing cooperative effort, with donors assistance, to conserve soil and water must be greatly strengthened along with the use of drought- resistant grain varieties. Maximum effort to attain food self-sufficiency through increasing investment in agriculture must be made in the western, central and southern regions.
Higher prices have proven to be one of the most effective ways of increasing agricultural production. Higher prices should be paid to producers when government agencies buy agricultural commodities. Farmers should be allowed to sell their products on the open market. Except in those cases where a government agency purchases commodities in competition with the private sector, agricultural marketing should be largely the domain of the private sector.
During surplus periods, farmers need protection by means of price stabilizing marketing mechanism. Surplus production usually results in depressed commodities prices. A price stabilization policy is necessary to protect farmers so that they don’t have to sell their produce when market is oversupplied and prices are falling.
Another urgent measure that should be taken to rehabilitate the economy is to make credit available to farmers. There is adequate institutional structure (AIDB) to intensify credit operation in rural areas. Since the farmer needs the money for buying seeds, tools, fertilizers, etc., the provision of such materials instead of cash will serve the same purpose as credit.
It is a waste of resources to continue sinking funds in large-scale state farms which are among the most wasteful legacies of the Derg. These farms must be broken up and distributed among the farmers of the regions at reasonable prices payable over a period of, say, ten years. The most desirable solution would be to form voluntary production cooperatives which could own and operate such farms. It would be socially unjust and politically unwise to sell large-scale state farms to wealthy urban investors or to persons exogenous to the region, because they would only hire local people and pay them low wages, given the absence of competition in the labor market.
It seems that the next important step to take is in the area of exchange and trade regime. In the area of trade, priority should be given to importing essential drugs, chemicals, raw materials for industry, spare parts and other intermediate goods. In view of the scarcity of foreign exchange, the government should continue to allow traders to import what the country urgently requires by using the so-called “own funds” or “franco valuta” (F.V.). Such funds usually originate from personal remittances of expatriates. F.V. is now indispensable given the fact that the Derg has totally depleted the nation’s foreign exchange reserve and donor- provided funds. Available information on Ethiopia indicate that factories, most of which are agri-based, operate at 20 to 25 percent capacity, due to lack of raw materials and spare parts. Indeed, some have been closed down.
Another advantage of F.V. is that its users pay customs duties to the government often with surcharge. F.V. operation should be made profitable for traders who would abandon the mechanism if it is not financially attractive. The government, however, should issue guidelines regarding the modality of its use and categories of goods that can be imported with F.V. It must of course be kept in mind that F.V. is a stop gap measure and should not be a permanent feature of the economy. Foreign exchange is the nation’s resource and should normally be managed by the National Bank. An undesirable aspect of F.V. is that it encourages smuggling and a parallel- market.
Further liberalization of trade should also be given priority to bring about early economic recovery. Export retention schemes often ignite quick reaction on the part of potential or actual exporters. If exporters are allowed to retain a certain percentage of the exchange which their exports earn, many people would scramble to export. In many countries, export retention schemes have stimulated traders’ ingenuity to develop new and innovative exports such as handicrafts (on large scale), semi-precious stones, food items, horticulture, spices, certain fine quality textile and leather products. Traders should be allowed to use the portion of foreign exchange which they have retained for more essential imports. The present transaction tax on export, however small, should be removed forthwith.
Exchange rate adjustment is another economic measure which would correct distortions in the economy and quickly stimulate exports. Most people do not realize the advantages of exchange rate adjustment and tend to exaggerate its disadvantages. Exchange rate adjustment can benefit producers of traditional exports such as coffee, hides and skins, oil seeds, spices, civet, livestock, tchatt, etc. As is well known, it is really the exporters who earn foreign exchange that accrues to a country, although they have to surrender it to the National Bank. But when the National Bank gives the exporters “birr” for their export earnings, the rate at which the exporter is paid is 2.07 birr, for example, to the U.S. dollar. In the black or parallel market, however, birr is discounted to 25% of its official value, which means about 7 birr to the U.S. dollar. If we say that usually the parallel market reflects the economic value of the birr, the farmer/exporter loses a significant amount of money when he is paid at the official exchange rate. At the same time, if someone wants to import a stereo, a reconditioned car, a VCR or a television set, he/she buys foreign exchange from the National Bank at a relatively cheap price, i.e. at only 2.07 birr to the dollar. Therefore, the farmer/exporter loses about 5 birr to the U.S. dollar and the importer gains the same amount because, had he gone to the parallel market, he would have had to pay 7 birr to the U.S. dollar. It is quite obvious that there is a clear case of misallocation of resources. Who is subsidizing whom? Should the peasants subsidize urban dwellers?
Government economists who oppose exchange rate adjustments, argue that it would fuel inflation, increase government external debt payment, etc. There is no doubt that exchange rate adjustment or devaluation can cause these problems. However, the proponents of a dynamic exchange rate assert that the resulting inflation and increase in the nation’s debt repayment does not usually offset the advantages of exchange rate adjustment. In any case, in the particular case of Ethiopia, rigidity in exchange rate policy has undoubtedly been hurting the economy for a long time.
It might be useful to mention here that a two-tier exchange rate can be adopted so that government and the private sector can use different exchange rates. An appropriate exchange rate can also be attained through public bidding for available foreign exchange rather than an outright devaluation. Bidding usually succeeds when the government is sure of making the foreign exchange regularly available to the bidders.
A word may be appropriate about an aspect of the government’s new economic policy because it is key to the recovery of the economy. Much has been said about the need and appropriateness of privatizing the financial sector. Most free market economists, including myself, support a mixed-economy principle which is that the government, in competition with the private sector, can own and operate insurance companies and banks, especially if the sector is dominated by foreign investors. In any case, reform action in this sector is urgent because the financial sector usually attracts foreign investment if the policy is auspicious and assures investors of sufficient return on their investment.
A clear policy as regards land ownership is also vital to rapid economic reconstruction. Government insistence that land should remain in the public domain and non-transferable has given rise to some debate among economists and the donor community. There is no real reason to object to this position of the government, at least as regards rural lands. According to those that support non- transferability of land, land users can be confident that they can always keep the land allocated to them as long as they use it. If they wish to relinquish the use of the land, they can always sell whatever is on the land (buildings, trees, water wells,
and so on). If the buyer likes the particular piece of land, he/she can pay an attractive price for the houses and trees. Thus, the fact that land is non-transferable does not impede economic development as some people assert. The risk of allowing the transferability of land is greater than keeping it in the public domain.
Urgent action should be taken to rehabilitate roads and bridges that link centers of consumption with regions of production. After years of war and neglect, the nation’s roads and highways have become almost unusable. Unless there are all-weather roads, the farmers cannot sell their products and consumers are forced to pay exorbitant prices for the limited amount of agricultural products that manage to arrive near urban areas.
The mineral sector has potential for quick development to earn foreign exchange. Ethiopia currently produces a very modest amount of gold (less than 900 kgs.. per annum). A significant investment has already been made so that production can soon reach the estimated three tons per annum with potential to increase to ten tons in a few years. This exploitation should be undertaken without delay since it would represent a significant amount of foreign exchange.
In conclusion, it should be said that the poverty level in Ethiopia is unacceptably low even by African standards. Among the group of countries categorized as “least developed countries” by the United Nations, Ethiopia stands out as an absolutely impoverished economy with a population over 50 million continuously living on the verge of starvation.
This state of affairs is undoubtedly directly attributable to a the Derg’s corruption and incompetence. Economics and politics being two sides of the same coin, a bad government cannot enrich its people. This is particularly true of a government that relentlessly waged war against the majority of the people and sought to eliminate the professional and intellectual class by political persecution. The lesson is clear: The peoples of Ethiopia must learn to rebel against a repressive government.
Ato Bulcha Demeksa is former Executive Board Member of the World Bank representing 17 African countries.
