Ethiopia After Meles
By the International Crisis Group (ICG) | Africa Briefing N°89 22 Aug 2012
OVERVIEW
The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who had not been seen in public for several months, was announced on 20 August 2012 by Ethiopian state television. The passing of the man who has been Ethiopia’s epicentre for 21 years will have profound national and regional consequences. Meles engineered one-party rule in effect for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and his Tigrayan inner circle, with the complicity of other ethnic elites that were co-opted into the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Front promised freedom, democracy and ethnic devolution but is highly centralised, tightly controls the economy and suppresses political, social, ethnic and religious liberties. In recent years, Meles had relied ever more on repression to quell growing dissent. His successor will lead a weaker regime that struggles to manage increasing unrest unless it truly implements ethnic federalism and institutes fundamental governance reform. The international community should seek to influence the transition actively because it has a major interest in the country’s stability.
Despite his authoritarianism and poor human rights records, Meles became an important asset to the international community, a staunch Western ally in counter-terrorism efforts in the region and a valued development partner for Western and emerging powers. In consequence, Ethiopia has become the biggest aid recipient in Africa, though Meles’s government was only able to partially stabilise either the country or region.
Ethiopia’s political system and society have grown increasingly unstable largely because the TPLF has become increasingly repressive, while failing to implement the policy of ethnic federalism it devised over twenty years ago to accommodate the land’s varied ethnic identities. The result has been greater political centralisation, with concomitant ethnicisation of grievances. The closure of political space has removed any legitimate means for people to channel those grievances. The government has encroached on social expression and curbed journalists, non-governmental organisations and religious freedoms. The cumulative effect is growing popular discontent, as well as radicalisation along religious and ethnic lines. Meles adroitly navigated a number of internal crises and kept TPLF factions under his tight control. Without him, however, the weaknesses of the regime he built will be more starkly exposed.
The transition will likely be an all-TPLF affair, even if masked beneath the constitution, the umbrella of the EPRDF and the prompt elevation of the deputy prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to acting head of government. Given the opacity of the inner workings of the government and army, it is impossible to say exactly what it will look like and who will end up in charge. Nonetheless, any likely outcome suggests a much weaker government, a more influential security apparatus and endangered internal stability. The political opposition, largely forced into exile by Meles, will remain too fragmented and feeble to play a considerable role, unless brought on board in an internationally-brokered process. The weakened Tigrayan elite, confronted with the nation’s ethnic and religious cleavages, will be forced to rely on greater repression if it is to maintain power and control over other ethnic elites. Ethno-religious divisions and social unrest are likely to present genuine threats to the state’s long-term stability and cohesion.
The regional implications will be enormous. Increasing internal instability could threaten the viability of Ethiopia’s military interventions in Somalia and Sudan, exacerbate tensions with Eritrea, and, more broadly, put in question its role as the West’s key regional counter-terrorism ally. Should religious or ethnic radicalisation grow, it could well spill across borders and link with other armed radical Islamic groups.
The international community, particularly Ethiopia’s core allies, the U.S., UK and European Union (EU), should accordingly seek to play a significant role in preparing for and shaping the transition, by:
- tying political, military and development assistance to the opening of political space and an end to repressive measures;
- encouraging the post-Meles leadership to produce a clear roadmap, including transparent mechanisms within the TPLF and the EPRDF for apportioning the party and Front power Meles held and within parliament to lead to an all-inclusive, peaceful transition, resulting in free and fair elections within a fixed time; and
- helping to revive the political opposition’s ability to represent its constituencies, in both Ethiopia and the diaspora.
Nairobi/Brussels, 22 August 2012
Challenging Ethnicity as a Free Ride to the Top
Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE)
August 19, 2012
The sudden death of Ethiopian Orthodox Patriarch Abune Paulos, following the disappearance of Prime Minister Meles, and now the rumored illness of General Samora Younis, leaves three unexpected vacuums in the top leadership of Ethiopia. Who will replace them—a tribe or the most qualified leaders?
The death of Abune Paulos on August 16, 2012 has caught many Ethiopians by surprise. The loss of another TPLF/EPRDF top linchpin must be causing increasing anxiety and fear behind the closed doors of the regime. His death only compounds the leadership vacuum created when Meles disappeared over two months ago.
On August 17, 2012, information emerged that General Samora Younis, the top leader of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces was taken seriously ill and rushed out of the country for medical treatment, another shocking development that could weaken the regime’s control of the military. The TPLF/EPRDF faces some difficult and anxious days ahead as the crisis of leadership deepens within their ruling party; all worsened by the growing anger, fear and resentment from Ethiopians towards their 21-year long iron-fisted, one-party, ethnic-apartheid rule.
Who could have predicted such a crisis? Not even Meles himself could have planned for such a time as this or the regime would have been more prepared. Instead, under his leadership, the TPLF/EPRDF has eliminated, killed, imprisoned, suppressed or otherwise destroyed most every alternative or competitor from gaining enough strength to challenge him as the “strongman of Ethiopia.” Every legitimate institution has been brought to its knees, unable to operate under such a hostile climate; replaced by TPLF/EPRDF-controlled, pseudo-institutions of pretense so that Ethiopians would be left without hope for change.
In light of this, we in the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE), a social justice movement of diverse Ethiopians, formed in 2008 to bring about a “New Ethiopia,” where truth, justice, freedom, equality, respect for human rights, opportunity and reconciliation create the foundation for a healthier, more thriving society, urge Ethiopians to embrace the universal God-given values to honor our Creator, to care about our family, neighbor and nation and to act on it in daily life until we see the dawn of light from a transformed Ethiopia rise up over our nation.
Yet, today, Ethiopia is in darkness. Anxiety is plaguing the hearts of most every Ethiopian as no one knows the future. Who will replace these leaders? Will the only contenders be from one tribe from one region or the country or the most qualified candidates? Ethiopians see no hope that the TPLF/EPRDF regime will change its nature as political space remains completely closed, as communication lines are monitored, suppressed or blocked, as crackdowns on the opposition and peaceful Muslim protestors continue, as the independent media is shut down and as land and resource grabs continue to threaten the survival of our vulnerable people.
The disappearance of Meles has only intensified the peoples’ anxieties for the future as a vacuum of leadership, which could have promised opportunity for change, remains unexploited because few, even within the TPLF/EPRDF, are prepared to step in. Meles and the TPLF/EPRDF, controlled by him, his family and his cronies, have worked very hard and successfully to destroy any competition. Even foreign partners who have invested in Meles, counting on his continued tight control of Ethiopia, must be highly concerned regarding Ethiopia’s shaky and uncertain future. Now add to it the death of Abune Paulos, who has been the unpopular leader of millions of Ethiopian Orthodox believers—as well as the absence of General Samora Younis, who has been the force of military power behind Meles—and the levels of anxiety over what might happen next only deepen.
In the same way that some have celebrated rumors of Meles’ death or incapacitating illness, some anti-regime enthusiasts may now be celebrating the death of Abune Paulos, believing he served the interests of the regime as he undermined the witness of the church, as well as the most recent news that General Younis might meet a similar fate; however, we should not gloat over the fall of an enemy.
In the case of Abune Paulos, we know this man has now died. When he was alive, he was part of the system of suppression. Like him, we are all born and destined to die. We enter the world without anything and when we die, we leave our worldly titles and possessions behind. His fate will be decided by God; so for us, it is not a time to celebrate his death. God will make the proper judgment for him in the same way He will for all of us. Instead, we should be talking about the future. What should come next and how can Ethiopians challenge the old system of ethnic entitlement with competency-based inclusiveness? This is the time to challenge ethnicity as a free ride to the top!
We know that under Abune Paulos’ leadership of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the church and its religious leaders were divided because many saw his appointment and authority as Patriarch as illegitimate; leading to the formation of a church in exile. He embraced the TPLF/EPRDF plan of ethnic federalism that not only divided the people by ethnicity, but which created a hierarchy of privilege and preferential treatment that benefited him personally as well as others from his own minority ethnic group. His qualifications were not as a highly capable and esteemed spiritual leader, respected by the people and other leaders in the church; but instead, he had to come from Adwa, be of Tigrayan ethnicity and be willing to support the TPLF above all else, including the church, the people and God. His, like all other key positions in the country, are held by persons belonging to one ethnicity.
A country built on tribal preferences rather than inclusive competency is not only unhealthy and under-served, but it sets into motion a dangerous power-struggle between regime cronies and the excluded “others.” Yet, who is equipped and empowered to intervene to the benefit of all parties? If Ethiopia is deprived of its authentic religious leadership, who will speak to the people about the need for non-violence, repentance, forgiveness, reparations, transparency, accountability, justice, reconciliation, transformation and peace when these same people may be seeking revenge, including violent revenge, after living under the shackles of ethnic-tyranny for the last 21 years? Stealing the legitimate voice of our religious leaders and substituting in its place, ethnic domination, leaves a vacuum of spiritual, ethical and moral leadership when it is most needed.
The age of “one-tribe-take- all” is dying, but it may not end easily until we pull out the life-support of ethnic-based hatred which has been in a coma for the last 21 years. Along with it must go ethnic-based favoritism, ethnic-based entitlement and ethnic-based revenge that run too deeply within us and our society. It must be replaced with the moral and spiritual transformation which comes from souls that seek God’s righteousness. The only thing that will replace the ethnic-based dehumanization of “others” is a pure heart, not bent on revenge, but willing to forgive, to reconcile, to love, to care and to live in harmony with other human beings, all created by the same God.
Ethiopian Orthodox believers and all Ethiopians, including non-believers, who believe in freedom of religion, belief and thought, have a moral, ethical and spiritual duty to not allow another puppet of the TPLF/EPRDF to become the next spiritual head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
Whoever replaces Abune Paulos should not be chosen because of village, family, ethnicity, regional biases or regime loyalty but by qualities of spiritual leadership, enhanced with competency. Now, by what seems to be divinely-orchestrated coincidence, the Orthodox are in the same position as Ethiopian Muslims, all who do not want the TPLF/EPRDF, or any other government—even a good government—to interfere with religious affairs. It is wrong and should be confronted.
Sunday, August 19th is the Muslim holiday of Eid-al-Fitr, one of the most joyous celebrations in Islam, marking the end of Ramadan, where prayers, meals with family and gifts of charity will be given. This year, we are hearing that the Ethiopian Muslims will be peacefully demonstrating on this day, calling for freedom, the release of their religious leaders, the religious freedom to choose their own spiritual leaders and the right to have their voices heard in Ethiopia. We in the SMNE wish them, “Eid Mubarak,” which means “Have a blessed Eid.” Ethiopians of faith should all pray for them that this non-violent, disciplined and peaceful protest will end without violence from government security forces or from anyone else so that no one is harmed or intimidated for exercising their rights.
Orthodox and Muslim believers should stand strong together and Evangelical Christians, Ethiopian Jews and people of other faith backgrounds should join them in demanding freedom from an apartheid government; calling, with unified voice, for a better Ethiopia rather than a beggar Ethiopia—a New Ethiopia grounded on truth, freedom, equality, morality, integrity, civility, reconciliation and the restoration of justice for all Ethiopians. The whole country should demand this change because unless we work for it, it will not be handed over to us. This means whoever comes after Meles should not be from the same ethnic group or controlled as a puppet by tribalists behind the scenes.
For example, if Hailemariam Desalegn, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from Southern Nations, is appointed as the next prime minister or as the transitional prime minister, many believe that the TPLF Central Committee will try to control him from behind the scenes. If in fact he is appointed, let us remind him that he answers to someone who is above all of them—a Sovereign and Almighty God who condemns injustice, oppression, partiality, corruption, bloodshed and hatred. To whose directions will he listen and uphold? Who knows but that God may have put him in this position for such a time as this. If he does not live up to his God-given purposes, God will raise up someone else and he will lose his opportunity!
If God, who is sovereign over nations and their leaders, has removed Meles or others in order to give us a window of opportunity, will we use it rightly? Remember, Meles may be gone, but those who maintained him in power are still there. In the same way, those who maintained and sustained the ethnic divisions between Ethiopians and between Ethiopians and our neighbors are still present. This is our chance as the people of Ethiopia no matter what position we are or are not in. You can change and become part of our society that paves the way to a better future or we can give up the moment through collective passivity.
We already have that reputation. A western diplomat told SMNE leaders that Ethiopia is an unusual society, different from most any others, because its people are so submissive that the country could function without a leader for months without people rising up—despite living under such horrible conditions. We are not seen as people willing to sacrifice and to sometimes die in order to change the way we live and our legacy of bloodshed and suffering. Instead, this observer felt that despite the absence of leadership, there was nothing to panic about as the country could run in “automatic” even if no one was running country for two months or even longer. Is this true? Are we waiting for someone else to free us? Is this from our feudal past or after TPLF/EPRDF domination or both? Other home-grown observers see it differently and believe some unpredictable factor may force us out of our complacency and into action; particularly if factors like inflation, the lack of availability of hard currency that we are hearing about in the media combine with the leadership crisis.
It is time to prepare for the “unknowns of tomorrow” for when it comes, we must confront it, first as people of shared humanity and then as Ethiopians; not by our differences, but by what unifies us—our homes, the land we all share and the mixed blood of our ancestors that flows in our veins making it impossible to truly identify its sources.
In order to confront our “tomorrow,” we should all be standing together as one family to demand a New Ethiopia where everyone is included; where “my” justice will not come without the justice of my neighbor. As we demand this, let us not miss the bigger picture—our humanity that we share with the Tigrayan. They are our beloved brothers and sisters; valued and treasured by God Almighty who created all of us. They are us! Yes, those who committed crimes of destruction will face justice, but for anyone else, the New Ethiopia will include all our Ethiopian brothers and sisters in a more humane, more God-honoring Ethiopia.
It is time to transform—to forgive, to repent and to be willing to integrate with the people of our country, our neighbors and our fellow global citizens. With this in mind; stay firm, stay strong and let us raise the banner of honor to God and our humanity not our ethnicity. As long as we do and as long as see other Ethiopians as part of our Ethiopian family, we will have a future with hope, purpose and blessing that we can pass on to our descendents.
May God bless Ethiopia and prepare each of us to remain alert and ready to contribute our share to the betterment of each one of us and to Ethiopia as a whole for “no one is free until all are free.
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For more information, including interview requests please contact Mr. Obang Metho, Executive Director of the SMNE E-mail: [email protected]. You can find more about the SMNE through its website at: www.solidaritymovement.org
Alemayehu G Mariam
Last week, The Economist Magazine rhetorically inquired, “What if Mr. Meles goes for good?” Shouldn’t the question be, “Is it not good for Ethiopia if Mr. Meles goes for good?”
Those who know where Mr. Meles has gone are not talking; and those who are talking don’t know where he has gone. But everyone knows dictator Meles Zenawi has completely vanished from public view. He was last seen at the G20 meeting in Mexico on June 19. He looked gaunt and debilitated. On July 18, an Agence France Press report citing “several diplomatic sources” reported that Zenawi is a goner “in a critical state” at a hospital in Belgium and he “might not survive”. Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT), citing an anonymous source at the International Crisis Group (ICG), reported that Zenawi is dead and gone. ICG issued an opaque denial stating that it had “no direct knowledge” of Zenawi’s “health” or death. In a staged interview with party-controlled media on August 1, Zenawi’s spinmesiter and “communication minister”, Bereket Simon, declared “the prime minister’s health is in very good condition.” Last week, Simon said Zenawi will be back before the Ethiopian New Year which is usually celebrated on September 11. In my last commentary, I argued that Zenawi should be declared AWOL and formally removed because he has been gone absent from office without constitutional leave.
It is ironic that absolute silence should be the ultimate fate of the man The Economist described as “‘the voice of Africa’”. For over two decades, the garrulous and bombastic Zenawi used words like a surgical knife to filet, slice, dice and shred his opponents and critics. He tongue-lashed his parliamentarians like a bully at a children’s reformatory school. But the “voice of Africa” has now become voiceless himself just like the 90 million Ethiopians he had rendered voiceless. Pitiful party hacks have become his mouthpieces. They say he will be back in a jiffy. Why doesn’t Zenawi show his face if he is in “very good condition”? How come there is no photo or video of him in “very good condition”? If he cannot be seen, can’t he release a 30-second audio tape sayin’ he awright? Out of sight, out of mind?
The evidence that “Mr. Meles is gone for good” is compelling and unrefuted. Other than empty assurances by Zenawi’s spinmeisters, substantial evidence is lacking to prove Zenawi is alive or sentient. Rene Lefort in a recent article noted, “The widespread conviction shared by most diplomats and experts is that, whether Meles is dead or alive, he is no longer in charge and never will be again, so the candidacy for his succession is open.” For all practical purposes, Mr. Meles is gone or he is just as good as gone!
But so “What if Mr. Meles goes for good?” Or comes back? Or stays? Or whatever? Tin pot dictators come and go in Africa and the Middle East like the plague. Over the past year and half, people have been asking, “What if Gadhafi, Ben Ali, Mubarak, Ali Saleh, Gbagbo… are gone for good?” Well, they are all gone for good and life has gotten better every day they have been gone. What if Bashar al-Assad, Robert Mugabe… are gone for good? What happened after Charles Taylor, Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Idi Amin, Mengistu Hailemariam … were gone?”
“What if Mr. Meles is Gone for Good?”
For some time now, I have been wrestling with the question, “What if African dictator X is gone?” In January 2011, in a commentary entitled, “After the Fall of African Dictatorships”, I noted that I did not know what happens the day African dictators are gone, but was reasonably sure what happens the day after they are gone: “The fact is that the morning after the fall of Africa’s dictators, the people will be stuck with a ransacked economy, emptied national banks, empty store shelves, torture chambers full of political prisoners and dithering and power-hungry opposition leaders jockeying for position in the middle of political chaos.” This past April I cautioned, “The chaos that occurs on the transitional bridge from dictatorship to democracy [in Ethiopia] creates the ideal conditions for the hijacking of political power, theft of democracy and the reinstitution of dictatorship in the name of democracy.”
Over the past two decades, Zenawi accumulated power by fermenting a toxic brew of ethnic politics, corruption and repression. He transformed an oligarchic authoritarian system (so-called collective leadership) into a ruthless neopatrimonial personal dictatorship (those directly hooked into Zenawi’s power grid) by continuously and systematically purging those he suspected of disloyalty and opposition. He cunningly wiped out many of his comrades-in-arms who did the heavy lifting and bush fighting to bring him to power. He surrounded himself with new allies, friends, business partners and party members who made it possible for him to survive and prevail without much internal or external challenge. At the time of his disappearance, Zenawi had become invincible, Il Duce Supremo (“The Supreme Leader”).
But like all dictators, Zenawi never thought he would be “gone”. He likely believed he would rule with an iron fist for one-half century like Fidel Castro or at least 30 plus years like Mugabe. If he had to go, he likely believed he would go on his own time, terms and in grand style. From time to time, he titillated the public by hinting he might step down (in 2015 if his party lets him), but he fully expected to be the grand puppet master behind the throne pulling the strings for decades to come. If the hubristic Zenawi ever thought he would be gone from office, it was likely that he believed the cause would a mass uprising. Little did he understand one of the fundamental laws of dictatorships: When dictators go, they go pretty damn quick. Ben Ali of Tunisia was gone in days. Hosni Mubarak in weeks. Gadhafi in months. A whole slew of African dictators over the past six years were gone in a flash from a variety of illnesses.
Zenawi never considered grooming a successor and risk being upstaged. No dictator worth his salt would groom his replacement and unloose his rivals and opponents. Designating a successor is the most dangerous thing any dictator could do because doing so could stir the pot and agitate the beehive. But it is the very absence of an heir apparent or a successor that has plunged Zenawi’s ruling party in a jam now. The shadowy power brokers are in deep political turmoil today as they try to choose Zenawi’s replacement. But regardless of whether Zenawi goes or stays, his neopatrimonial system is crumbling and doomed. As a result, his friends, cronies, party leaders and members, supporters, bureaucrats and generals are in a state of panic and high anxiety.
“What if…?”
Zenawi (does not) returns? Those who know where Zenawi has gone are not talking; and those who are talking don’t know. Seeye Abraha, former defense minister and co-founder of the liberation front that brought Zenawi to power recently implied Zenawi is gone for good when he noted that Zenawi “will be leaving very big boots that cannot be filled by anyone else.” Seeye is right. In a 2009 weekly commentary, I described Zenawi as “a dictator with a thousand faces”. No one in the ruling party has Zenawi’s combination of Machiavellian cunning and craftiness, defiant willpower, stony cold-bloodedness or bottomless capacity for intrigue and chicanery. As the old saying goes, one has to give the devil his due. No one in Zenawi’s party can match his intelligence, intellectual agility, shrewdness or plain street smarts. Zenawi stayed in power for 21 years by outwitting, outfoxing, outsmarting, outmaneuvering, outpoliticking, outtricking, outfinessing and outplaying not only every one of his opponents but also rivals in his own party. But he had his own contradictions. He had sharp intellect but lacked insight; he had ideas but lacked vision; he was smart but not judicious; he was shrewd but not perceptive; he was single-minded in his goals but pursued them obtusely. He was driven but lacked conscience or compassion. He pursued politics with depraved indifference. He was a man of many vices and few virtues. He suffered the character flaws of those malignant and vengeful Shakespearean characters “consumed with venomous malice”, addicted to “unmitigated villainy” and deaf-mute to every appeal of humanity.
The fact remains that it really does not matter if Zenawi is gone for good (or for bad), comes back temporarily or whatever. Zenawi has been “gone” for good since May 18 at the G8 Food Security Conference in Washington D.C. That day, with his head bowed and his spirit totally crushed, the last ounce of fight left in Zenawi left him. If he should return, he will be merely a shell of the former Zenawi. The old cocky, self-absorbed and snarly Zenawi is gone forever. The recycled Zenawi, if there is one, will be a defeated, defanged, declawed, debeaked and decrowned version of the old Zenawi. That is just a fact. Zenawi’s handlers may fool themselves into believing that “absence makes the heart grow fonder”; but in Zenawi’s case, absence has made him irrelevant. Any fantasies about his return to power with his former glory is ludicrous, pointless, senseless and mindless. The odds are Zenawi ain’t never coming back! He is gone for good!
The “status quo” continues. Spinmeister Simon in his last press statement said, “The status quo is maintained – there is no change and there will be no change in the near future.” Simon talks much but says nothing. It was not clear what he meant by “status quo” but the current situation is murky: There is an AWOL “prime minster”. The “deputy prime minister” is invisible. There is a shadowy group of power brokers scheming behind the scenes to find Zenaiw’s replacement. The power and leadership vacuum is manifest. There is total confusion and cynicism in the country about who is minding the store. The only silver lining in the dark cloud shrouding Zenawi’s disappearance is the public euphoria that the two decade-old one-man, one-party dictatorship nightmare could have ended with Zenwai gone. As the charade of “collective leadership” is played out in Zenawi’s circle of power, the “status quo” continues.
In February 2010, Eskinder Nega (my friend and personal hero), the ultimate symbol of press freedom in Ethiopia, using as a backdrop the May 2010 “election” in which Zenawi’s party won by 99.6 percent, crystal-balled the inevitable implosion of the ruling “EPDRF” party and sketched out the qualifications of the motley crew of droll characters standing in line as Zenawi’s heirs-apparent to the throne (I strongly recommend Eskinder’s article [Click here] to anyone interested in grasping the current palace intrigue in Ethiopia; last month Zenawi jailed Eskinder, winner of the prestigious PEN America Freedom to Write Award for 2012, and arguably the most outstanding journalist of his generation, for 18 years):
Scratch beyond the surface and the EPRDF is really not the monolithic dinosaur as it is most commonly stereotyped. If what defines an organization is the unique amalgam of its history, quality of leadership, cohesion, grass root presence, vision, and perhaps even its luck, then the EPRDF, fast approaching its twentieth year, has evolved in to a coalition of four distinct phenomenon: the increasing confusion of the dominant TPLF; the acute cynicism of the ANDM; the desperate nihilism of the OPDO and the inevitable irrelevance of the incongruent SEPM…
A nasty, but so far bloodless, backstage interplay of these dynamics in what is now a battle to succeed Meles Zenawi has inaudibly developed in to a real threat to the cohesion of the EPRDF, arguably more dangerous than the electoral threat posed by its opponents. We now know that disaster was only averted this year with the extension of Meles’ term in office—-something he had always counted on, according to diplomats—-but this has yet to result in the much anticipated—-or rather, hoped for—ceasefire between two bickering claimants to the throne—OPDO and ANDM….
By contrast, the EPRDF is clearly a hierarchal organization with a singular power at the top in Meles Zenawi and subsequent levels of delegated power beneath him. Though collective leadership is formally acknowledged, it has no relevance in practice…
But the question remains if the prestige and power of EPRDF’s chairperson will endure after Meles. Both the OPDO and the ANDM are betting on it, but none of the EPRDF’s four constituent members have been able to come up with a political heavyweight remotely capable of ensuring a seamless transition…
Bereket Simon, whose support is generally deemed critical to the eventual successor, was instrumental in marshaling pressure for Meles’ term extension, but his considerable influence is expected to wane once Meles eventually leaves the limelight. His health notwithstanding, Bereket is still, along with Meles, EPRDF’s dynamo, his clear genius for intrigue a cause of much resentment both inside and outside the EPRDF…
The enigma of this drama is the role of Sebhat Nega, the king maker two of decades ago whose backing was vital for Meles’ accession to the helm of the TPLF. The side he chose at the climax of the fallout between Meles and Seye Abraha et al was no less crucial for the final outcome. Sebaht has chosen to leave TPLF’s politburo but remains a member of the CC. But both count for much less since the departure of Seye Abraha et al, his continued influence has more to do with his access and the propensity of Meles to listen to him. Most pundits are puzzled about his stance on the succession issue, but almost all agree that the side he chooses will be considerably emboldened..
An apparatchik or party hack is installed as “prime minister”. It is likely that the palace intriguists could broker a deal and install a relatively benign party hack who could serve, defend and protect their interests. The names of the party apparatchiks that have been leaked as part of a trial balloon are pitiful. They all lack political experience, professional competence, charisma and leadership qualities and are unlikely to appeal to members in their own party let alone have national appeal. Regardless, if a replacement for Zenawi is chosen from the ranks of the inner closed circle of the ruling party, that person will be selected for his unquestioning loyalty to the shadowy power brokers, and not for his competence or leadership qualities. But such dilemma is a common and inherent problem in all dictatorships. The pattern of leadership recruitment in dictatorships overemphasizes loyalty over competence which makes transition and succession difficult and chaotic.
An emergency is contrived and martial law declared. As the internal structure of the ruling party inevitably fractures, it will likely create ideal conditions for mass resistance and uprisings. The evidence so far shows that the regime is aggressively using its police and paramilitary forces to crush citizens demanding an end to state interference in religious affairs. As the regime faces more organized and defiant and potentially violent opposition, it will use the military to deal with such threats. The power brokers could just as easily trigger a war with a neighboring country to consolidate power. But use of the military could ultimately prove to be a double-edged sword. Dependence on a multiethnic, multi-religious army could backfire. The very military that enables a dictatorial regime to suppress its opposition could easily turn against the dictatorship itself.
The current “deputy prime minister” is elected as “prime minster” (PM). As I have demonstrated in a previous commentary, under Article 75 of the Ethiopian Constitution, the deputy prime minister is a political puppet of the PM. The DPM cannot constitutionally succeed the PM temporarily or permanently. The best bet for the power brokers is to orchestrate the “election” of the current “DPM” as “PM” because it’s only through him that they have any hope of maintaining their chokehold on power. The current DPM simply does not have a sufficient support base in the party structure, bureaucracy, military, civic society, economic structure, etc. to be able to act independently. He is the only viable lifeline the scheming power brokers and palace intriguists have to power.
Begin a national dialogue for power sharing and transition to democracy. In one of my commentaries in April, I predicted the foreseeable end of dictatorship and the beginning of a democratic transition in Ethiopia (though I did not expect Zenawi to be “gone” so quickly) and called for an immediate national dialogue on specific issues:
We need to plan for the inevitable, inescapable and unstoppable transition of Ethiopia from dictatorship to democracy. Dictatorship will end in Ethiopia. It is only a matter of when. Democracy will also rise in Ethiopia. It is a matter of how and what type. The point is that it necessary to begin a purposeful dialogue and plan ahead about theprerequisites for an effective and smooth transition to democratic governance now, not when the dictatorship falls. I believe dialogue needs to begin now on at least four major issue areas: 1) how to engage and increase the capacity of key stakeholders in identifying potential triggers of violence during political transitions and preventing them; 2) identifying and devising strategies and opportunities for reducing ethnic, religious and communal tension and conflict in anticipation of a transition; 3) enhancing the role of civil society institutions in facilitating public engagement and interaction during the transitional period, and 4) anticipating critical constitutional issues that could significantly impair the transitional process.
Ultimately, the question should be not be, “What if Mr. Meles goes for good?” but rather, “Is it not good — just great — for Ethiopia if Mr. Meles is gone for good?” But the best question is, “How can we make Ethiopia better after Mr. Meles is gone for good?”
Amharic translations of recent commentaries by the author may be found at: http://www.ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/category/al-mariam-amharic and http://ethioforum.org/?cat=24
Previous commentaries by the author are available at:
http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/ and www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/
Ethiopian’s profit plunges by 40 percent
The Reporter
August 11, 2012
The net profit of Ethiopian Airlines in the 2011/2012 fiscal year has tumbled by 40 percent to 732 million birr year-on-year. In the 2010/2011 fiscal year Ethiopian earned a net profit of 1.23 billion birr, which dropped by 500 million birr. In the 2011/2012 fiscal year, which ended on June 30, Ethiopian hauled 4.6 million passengers, a 25 percent surge in comparison to that of the previous year. The airline generated an operating revenue of 33.8 billion birr, up 37 percent. Operating expense increased by 35 percent to 5.7 billion birr. The airline made an operating profit of 1 billion birr and its net profit stood at 732 million birr.
Ethiopian said the unaudited figures for the fiscal year show that despite the challenges faced by the airline during the year, it finished the year in black with strong overall performance and is set to continue its growth to achieve goals set in its Vision 2025. At a press conference held yesterday Ethiopian CEO, Tewolde Gebremariam, said that the just ended fiscal year was the most challenging year.
“The fuel price hike was a daunting challenge. For the first time the price of fuel stayed high for a long time. It was above USD 120 per barrel for a year-and-half. The European economic crisis reduced the demand for air travel and the economic growth of China and other Asian countries stalled,” Tewolde told reporters at his office. “All these have affected the profitability of the global airline industry. As you have heard Kenya Airways has started laying off employees. And a number of major international airlines have registered loss. Despite all the challenges we are profitable. We made an annual salary increment of 6-8 percent.”
An official at Ethiopian told The Reporter that the 20 percent devaluation of the Ethiopian currency against the US dollar in September 2010 inflated the net profit the airline made in the 2010/2011 fiscal year. “One of the contributing factors for the surge in profit in that fiscal year was the devaluation. And it is unfair to compare the profit made in 2010/2011 to the 2011/2012 fiscal year,” the official said.
The airline introduced a six percent salary increment for employees earning a monthly salary of 4000 birr and above, seven percent for those who earn between 2000-4000 birr and six percent for those who earning 2000 birr and below. At an annual internal meeting with employees held on Wednesday at the African Union Assembly Hall the management of Ethiopian management briefed them about the challenges the airline faced during the fiscal year.
It was a tough year for the global airline industry. Last March IATA forecast that the global airline industry would make a profit of USD 3 billion. However, IATA said African airlines would lose a total of USD 100 million. South Africa Airways, which is currently in the red, is receiving subsidy from the government. Royal Air Marroc, the national flag carrier of Morocco, which declared bankruptcy, is laying of employees.
Tewolde said Ethiopian is in the third year of the Vision 2025 (a 15-year development strategy) adding that the airline is growing according to schedule. “We are growing at an annual rate of 25-30 percent. We are on the right track,” the CEO said.
He added that the airline plans to build a new cargo terminal and maintenance hangar.
Ethiopian has set up a second hub in West Africa in Togo where its affiliate airline ASKY is based. ASKY was established by the private sector in 2007 and became operational in 2009. Tewolde said that ASKY, which is in its third year of operation, has managed to achieve a rapid growth.
The CEO disclosed his management’s plan to establish two regional hubs in southern and central Africa. Under Vision 2025 Ethiopian anticipates to increase its fleet to 120 from the existing 47, the number of destination to 90, the volume of passengers to 80 million and its employees to 17,000.
Currently, the airline is expanding its aviation academy at a cost of 42 million dollars.
