Sources at the Ethiopian embassy in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) told the Gulf News that eight female maids had been poisoned by a compatriot maid last Wednesday in an apartment in Sharjah, the largest city in the third largest emirate of the country.
The woman accused of killing the eight domestic workers is said to be held in the emirate’s central jail, but Sharjah police have publicly denied reports of the multiple murders, calling them “just rumors.”
The embassy sources said the police had reported the incident to them, but were still investigating the motive behind the killings.
The sources claimed the bodies of the eight murdered women had been transferred to the morgues at two local hospitals. Officials at both hospitals reported that no bodies had been brought to the morgue, but that it was possible the bodies had been sent for forensic examinations.
The women are understood to have been living together in an apartment in the Abu Shagara neighborhood of the city.
The UAE has received extensive criticism over the years from human rights and labor organizations over the conditions for foreign workers in the country.
Domestic workers, which make up a significant proportion of the UAE’s predominately foreign population, have complained of sub-standard housing, lack of medical care, abuse and non-payment of wages.
The average Emirati household had 10 members in 2008, including domestic workers and drivers. The average monthly wage last year for such a household was the equivalent of about U.S. $12,800.
The government announced new regulations two years ago requiring holiday, medical care and registered salaries for all foreign domestic workers in the country. A conflict resolution unit was also set up to resolve disputes between employees and workers.
“This is a category of workers that are extremely vulnerable because there are no labor laws that apply to them,” Ibrahim Awad, Director of the International Migration Program at the International Labor Organization, told The Media Line. “In most countries migrant domestic workers are not covered by domestic labor laws because their workplace is a household. This presents a very big challenge.”
“International instruments of human rights apply to domestic workers and there are regulations in the UAE that ensure that domestic workers are paid their wages,” Awad continued. “By law, passports and documents cannot be withheld from migrant workers, for example, but the degree of enforcement varies. This presents a particular problem for domestic workers because labor inspectors cannot get access to their workplaces as they work in private homes.”
The International Labor Organization plans to push international standards or labor recommendations for domestic laborers in their annual conference next year.
The United States recently placed the country on a watch list of countries with poor human trafficking records.
Ethiopian women are regularly trafficked via Djibouti, Egypt and Somalia for domestic servitude, particularly to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.
The Ethiopian government banned its citizens from traveling to Lebanon in May last year following the deaths of a number of Ethiopian domestic workers in the country. The ban remains in effect.
The following is an audio record of Ethiopian Review’s worldwide teleconference that was held on Sunday, July 12, 2009, with:
1. Ato Melkie Mengiste, Secretary General of EPPF International Committee
2. Ato Sileshi Tilahun, Organizational Head of EPPF International Committee
3. Ato Demis Belete, Head of EPPF’s Press Office and representative of the EPPF Washington Metropolitan Chapter
Click below to listen:
[podcast]http://www.ethiopianreview.info/audio/eppf-teleconf-07122009.mp3[/podcast]
More than 25 years ago I watched the Johannesburg Sun being built from the window of my orthodontist’s office in Lister Building, then the home of some of Joburg’s top medical specialists. There must be hundreds of now-adults who share this memory, straight teeth, and the image of Dr Chertkow and Lazerson’s shared consulting rooms with those purple and orange vinyl chairs.
Today that part of town bustles with clothing and blanket wholesalers, fruit vendors and minibus taxicabs. The Joburg Sun is now the KwaDukuzu Egoli Hotel and nearby is Blessed Miracle Wholesalers. The walls are plastered with adverts for abortions and for consultations with miracle prophets who hail from Zimbabwe. Finding a parking space is for the brave as the city planning in that part of town was – I am reliably told – shared by two different firms who drew their own street maps and then matched them up after the streets were built resulting in a weird glitch that causes traffic to have to bob and weave to make it across the street.
Just opposite the hotel and one block down on Delvers Street is a building with an entrance that spills onto the pavement, the home of a number of clothing wholesalers, dressmakers and Ethiopian coffee shops. Usptairs above the hustle of the streets in a coffee shop that had no name we ate injera – a traditional Ethiopian bread with a sourdough taste and spongy texture – with a range of small portions of beetroot, cooked spinach, a sweet potato and carrot mix, and some stewed beef.
The patrons all looked local to the place — mini Addis Ababa — and our host couldn’t have been more welcoming or gracious. No doubt he was curious about what had drawn white faces to that part of town, but was too polite to inquire. Having feasted we walked across the way past a restaurant where two men, on noticing us looking at their hot-pot of beef pieces, beckoned us to share it with them. We stopped for a taste and found enough reason to make a return visit.
It’s a perfect way to describe this city – full of unexpected tastes and encounters.
KHARTOUM — The Sudanese government warned Uganda that it must honor the African Union (AU) decision not to cooperate International Criminal Court (ICC) in the apprehension of the Sudanese president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir.
Al-Bashir is wanted by the ICC on seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Last week the ICC prosecutor filed an appeal for the inclusion of genocide charges that were dropped by the judges for lack of evidence.
Last week the African Union (AU) summit in Sirte, Libya adopted a resolution instructing its ICC members not to cooperate in arresting Al-Bashir despite their legal obligations to do so.
Botswana is the only country to publicly dissent from the AU decision saying it will nab Bashir if he reaches its territory.
But on Friday Uganda issued a statement appearing to backtrack from the AU resolution it endorsed.
“As a signatory to the Rome Statute, Uganda Government re-iterates its commitment to the Statute and support to the ICC. This position is shared by the other African States Parties to the Statute who clearly expressed it during the Assembly meeting in Sirte, Libya,” the foreign ministry statement read.
“Uganda Government supports the African Union Assembly Decision….of February 2009 requesting the UN Security Council to defer the ICC indictment for twelve (12) months, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute”.
The statement made no reference to the AU decision taken in Sirte or whether Uganda will adhere to it.
The independent Al-Sahafa newspaper quoted an unidentified Sudanese official who said that any Uganda’s stance will negatively impact the latter more than it affects Sudan.
The official said that all African countries must adhere to AU decisions and any state that doesn’t do that is breaking the African consensus.
The ‘Ultimate Media’ website quoted Ugandan foreign minister Sam Kutesa as telling reporters in Kampala that the decision is viewed by many as “a manifestation of lack of respect and support for the ICC Rome Statute by African leaders”.
Kuteesa said that the AU simply wants an AU deferral to allow African countries “to investigate further on Bashir’s case such that they can give their recommendations on his indictment”.
The independent Sudanese Al-Sahafa newspaper reported that Bashir is scheduled to visit Uganda on July 26 to take part in the Ugandan-Turkish forum.
The Ugandan State Minister for International Affairs Henry Oryem Okello told Daily Monitor newspaper that Bashir will not be arrested during his visit.
Uganda’s stance on Bashir’s arrest warrant has been ambiguous despite backing AU decision criticizing it.
The Ugandan president Yoweri Musievini said last March that he wants neither to “condemn Bashir” nor “condone his actions”.
Bressanone, Italy — The Reporter — World Youth Steeplechase best holder Korahubish Itaa and junior runner Emebet Anteneh will lead Ethiopia’s strong team of fifteen athletes for the 6th IAAF World Youth Championships in Bressanone, Italy (8-12 July 2009).
Ita’a, who improved the World 3000m steeplechase youth best in Huleva, Spain last month, is the star of a large Ethiopian. In addition to her 9:29.52 performance in the Spanish city, Ita’a has enjoyed a much improved season since her fourth place finish in the World Juniors last year with a second place finish behind African champion Zemzem Ahmed in the Ethiopian national championships.
Her performance in Huelva also headed the national lists for the longer event until Sofia Assefa’s 9:19.91 second place finish in Oslo last Friday.
She will be joined in the girls’ 2000m steeplechase by Halima Hassen who has a personal best of 9:35.89 for the 3000m SC.
Ethiopia also boasts strong medal hopes in the girls’ 3000m, where Emebet Anteneh, seventh in the junior race at the 36th IAAF World Cross Country Championships in Amman, Jordan in March this year, is expected to be one of the top contenders. The 16-year old’s surprise third place at the national cross country trials behind established names likes Genzebe Dibaba and Sule Utura was the biggest surprise of the trials and earned her a first trip outside the country for competition.
Anteneh was surprisingly beaten to second place by Genet Yalew as the duo took the top two places at the East African Youth Championships held in Addis Ababa in April this year. Yalew, the Ethiopian 10,000m regional record holder and former champion, is also expected to be among the top contenders.
The top entrant in the boys’ team is steeplechaser Desta Alemu, who hopes to follow on from Legesse Lemiso, the first Ethiopian to win a global title over the steeplechase when he emerged victorious in Ostrava two years ago. (Elshadai Negash for the IAAF)
Ethiopian Team
Boys
800m: Fekadu Dejene
1500m: Girma Bekele, Zebene Alemayehu
2000m SC: Desta Alemu, Berhanu Sheferaw
3000m: Fekru Feyisa
Former chairman of the Tigran People Liberation Front (TPLF, aka Woyanne), Ato Aregawi Berhe, has just published a new book, “A Political History of the TPLF.” The book is important in understanding how the Woyanne tribal junta came to power, and its historical anti-Ethiopia stand. The chapter about the relationship between the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) and Woyanne is particularly revealing. (The book is available at Tsehai Publishers.) The following are some excerpts from the book.
The TPLF and the EPLF: Cupboard-Love Relationship
Excerpts from A Political History of the TPLF
By Aregawi Berhe
From the beginning, the relationship between the Tigray People Liberation Front and the Eritrean People Liberation Front was an amorphous connection, but on the side of the militant Tigraians, who counted on historical, cultural and kinship ties, it was believed the new relationship with the EPLF would work. There was the perception among TPLF members that the TPLF elite was well-educated and could articulate and extend the long-standing relationship between the two peoples beyond what Italian colonialists had created in the 1880s. However, considering the attitude of the EPLF that transpired in due course, it was by and large external circumstances, i.e., the pressure of a common enemy that propelled the relationship to work. Yet unlike the larger section of the ELF that was from the outset influenced by Islamist lowlanders, the EPLF had a clearer picture about cultural and political developments in Ethiopia in general and in Tigrai in particular, largely because of their affinity and exposure to kin across the Mereb River. Contacts between EPLF activists and militant Tigraians had started much earlier, during the Ethiopian student movement of the early 1970s.
When the militant Tigraians were confronted in 1974 by an aggressive military force, the Derg, that sought total obedience from everybody, they were in outright defiance and searched for support in order to launch armed insurgency. It was imperative for them to look for such support from the EPLF. But EPLF leaders, on the other hand, were hoping to find an ally in Ethiopia that could cooperate in expanding their theatre of operations. It was a time when the EPLF was badly in need of support from Ethiopian sympathizers in its efforts to dislodge the remaining government forces concentrated in a few towns in Eritrea. The well-publicized news of ELF-TLF joint operations inside Ethiopia in early 1975 must have motivated them to quickly link up with a Tigraian front. These circumstances led the TPLF-EPLF relationship to start before it had had time to conduct formal discussion or agreements. There seemed to be enthusiasm in the EPLF camp for supporting a Tigraian movement at this juncture, which led the forging of working relations between the two fronts.
After the initial connection was established, modalities of cooperation were expected to be set and political positions discussed and agreed upon, but the EPLF instead offered in advance to train as many recruits as the TPLF could mobilize. It was an attractive offer the TPLF could not afford to waste. It focused on seizing the opportunity and on finding recruits to be engaged in fighting the enemy. The formalities that would define the relationship between the two organizations were therefore ignored and informal contact became the defining aspect of the relationship.
Initially the cooperation appeared to go smoothly, but the EPLF’s support for the TPLF did not match the latter’s expectations. Many reasons could be attributed to this shift of attitude on the part of the EPLF: perhaps because the relationship was not based on a formal agreement, or existing relations between the EPLF and EPRP might have created reluctance of the EPLF towards the TPLF, or perhpas supporting a struggle for the self-determination of Tigrai might have set an unwanted precedent for Eritrea.
The EPRP was then considered the strongest revolutionary party and indeed had huge numbers of followers all over Ethiopia. It was also widely believed to assume power sooner or later. The EPLF too seemed to believe this. For the EPLF, its relationship with the EPRP was thus much more important, as the latter claimed to represent the whole Ethiopia. And when compared with the EPRP at that time (1975-76), the TPLF was just a small ethno-nationalist movement with fewer followers. However, there were some sticky political problems for both the TPLF and EPRP regarding Eritrea. While they recognized the struggle for the Eritrean independence as genuine, they had differences as to whether the case was a ‘colonial issue’ or not. Without conducting the necessary study or having appropriate discussions, the TPLF held the view that the Eritrean case was a ‘colonial question.’ as the EPLF wanted it to be. It was probably an opportunistic stand, designed to outflank the EPRP from the privileged position the EPLF offering it. Without understanding the consequences that were to haunt it in the discourse of Ethiopian political history, this position continued to be the stand of the TPLF for years to come.
Another concern of the TPLF was what the removal of the TLF from the scene, which took place as early as November 1975, would mean for the EPLF. The ELF’s wider mobility, supported by the a proxy organization in Tigrai, might have prompted the EPLF to initially look for its own proxy organizations in Tigrai to counter its rival. But once the TLF had been dissolved, the EPLF had less need to worry about the ELF’s activities gaining ground in Tigrai and beyond. That situation appeared to reduce the TPLF’s importance for the EPLF’s and gave more weight to its relations with the EPRP.
Towards the end of 1975, differences between the EPRP and the TPLF surfaced when they were operating in the same territory and trying to mobilize and organize the same people. News of rivalry between the two was also coming from the towns. On the initiative of the TPLF. leaders of both fronts met in Marwa in January 1976 to look into these encounters and consider possible remedies. The TPLF presented a suggestion that it thought would benefit both organizations and avoid them overlapping and clashing. The TPLF requested that the EPRP operate in regions of the country that the TPLF could not reach. By implication, the suggestion was recognition of the TPLF as the viable front that could take care of the struggle in Tigrai against the common enemy, the Derg. As we saw earlier, the demand infuriated EPRP delegates and they broke off the meeting and enmity was created. This was a concern fro EPLF leaders, but their main worry was that a fragmented or ethnically based movement in Ethiopia might weaken a viable future ally — the EPRP. Eventually, TPLF military action, like that launched against the TLF, would deprive the EPLF of an ally expected to seize power in Ethiopia and the anticipated acquiescence to handle the Eritran question would evaporate. The EPLF continued to exert pressure on the TPLF to come to terms with the EPRP and in a letter to the TPLF, the concerns of the EPLF were clearly stated, with an underlying warning note. For strategic purposes, the EPLF stood beside the EPRP and influenced by their leader’s desire to work with the EPRP, EPLF top cadres urged Ethiopians, and especially Tigraians in Eritrea, to join the EPRP and not the TPLF.
In the first half of 1976, the TPLF unexpectedly had released its controversial manifesto, better known as Manifesto 68. In this handwritten document, the TPLF declared that its struggle was for Tigrai’s independence from Ethiopia, which was basically the same claim the Eritrean fronts had put forward for their region. Earlier, this position had been entertained by the TLF, but it was vehemently rejected by the TPLF on the grounds that there was no historical or political justification for it. It was a surprise to many fighters to see their organization come up with such an unwarranted claim. The EPLF also opposed the TPLF manifesto for independence on the grounds that Tigrai was an inegral part of Ethiopia and there was no justification for secession from Ethiopia. At this time, the EPLF was reluctant to support separatist movements in Ethiopia, not just as a matter of princople but for various other motives as well… [more excerpts will be posted later]
