United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Gebremaria v. Ashcroft
Petition for review form the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Elizabeth A. Holmes, argued, Bloomington, Minnesota, for petitioner.
Thomas B. Fatouros, argued, Washington, D.C (Timothy P. McIlmail, Washington, D.C. on the brief), for respondent.
Before SMITH, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
1
Kefay Gebremaria (Gebremariam) seeks review of a denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) of her motion to reopen her deportation case. We affirm.
I. Background
2
Gebremaria lawfully entered the United States in April of 1995 as a visitor from Ethiopia. She applied for asylum alleging fear of persecution due to her political activity within Ethiopia. In August 1997, an immigration judge denied Gebremaria’s asylum application following a hearing conducted in September 1996. Gebremaria appealed to the Board, which subsequently dismissed her appeal on December 26, 2001. In May 2003, Gebremaria filed a petition to reopen based on new evidence and evidence of changed circumstances. Specifically, Gebremaria claimed that because of her Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”)1 status she “would face a death sentence” if she were forced to return to Ethiopia. She also claimed that her husband had disappeared in Ethiopia two years earlier after being arrested and jailed by Ethiopian authorities, and that her family thought he had been killed. Lastly, she claimed that her political association with the All-Amhara People’s Organization, (“AAPO”) a political group, placed her in danger of future persecution.2
3
In support of her motion to reopen, Gebremaria submitted a January 2002 letter from her doctor in the United States, stating that he “ha[d] seen [Ms. Gebremaria] since 1997,” and that “[a]t that time she was diagnosed with advanced AIDS.” She also submitted a May 2003 letter from the same doctor stating that Gebremaria “has been followed and treated in the Infectious Diseases Clinic for several years,” and that “[h]er lowest CD4 count has been 74 in August of 1997, well below the 200 cutoff for AIDS.” Finally, Gebremaria submitted a May 2003 letter from her sister in Ethiopia that stated that Gebremaria’s husband had disappeared from jail two years earlier, and that she should not return to Ethiopia.
4
The Board denied Gebremaria’s motion to reopen her case on June 10, 2003. The Board denied the motion upon finding: 1) the HIV/AIDS evidence Gebremaria wanted to present was not “new” evidence and could have been presented at the original hearing in 1997; 2) insufficient evidence existed regarding the circumstances of her husband’s imprisonment and two-year disappearance in Ethiopia to establish a prima facie case of asylum eligibility; 3) Gebremaria failed to establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Gebremaria timely petitioned this court for review.3
II. Analysis
5
On appeal, Gebremaria asks us to reverse and remand to allow an immigration judge to consider her petition for asylum due to her HIV health status and her husband’s disappearance and possible death.4 She also seeks to supplement the record on appeal.
A. Motion to Supplement the Record
6
As an initial matter, we address Gebremaria’s petition to supplement the record on appeal. Gebremaria asks to include an affidavit from a family member who recently reestablished contact with Gebremaria’s husband. The affidavit indicates that the husband escaped from prison and has been in hiding for two years. We deny this request.
7
Before IIRIRA, this and other circuits used 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) to invoke discretionary authority to remand immigration cases in which 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) applied, so that new, non-record evidence could be admitted on appeal and remanded for consideration by the Board. See, e.g., Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1384-86 (8th Cir.1995); Saiyid v. INS, 132 F.3d 1380, 1384-85 (11th Cir.1998); Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000-02 (10th Cir.1987); Bernal-Garcia v. INS, 852 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir.1988); Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223, 226-27 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1002-04 (5th Cir.1977). However, because this is a transitional case,5 the IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(B) directs that “a court may not order the taking of additional evidence under section 2347(c) of title 28.” Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1279 (11th Cir.2001); Altawil v. INS, 179 F.3d 791, 792-93 (9th Cir.1999). Thus, IIRIRA’s prohibition of remanding for the consideration of additional evidence pertains to non-record evidence that is introduced in the first instance before a reviewing court. See Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir.2000) (“Section 2347 concerns a party’s appeal to [this] court [asking permission] to adduce additional evidence, for example, where new evidence about a well-founded fear of persecution is discovered.”).
8
We, as did the court in Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1281-82, interpret IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(B) as eliminating our authority under § 2347(c) to remand to the Board so that an alien can present “additional evidence.” See IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(B); Saiyid, 132 F.3d at 1384 n. 5 (noting, in dicta, that IIRIRA “eliminates § 2347 jurisdiction over motions to reopen”). Under transitional rule § 309(c)(4)(B), we must act within the constructs of § 1105a(a)(4) and may not rely on our § 2347(c) authority. As such, IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(B) is a jurisdictional bar that precludes our consideration of non-record evidence submitted for the first time on appeal. Gebremaria’s motion to supplement is therefore denied.
B. Merits
9
Motions to reopen deportation proceedings, like petitions for rehearing and motions for new trial, are disfavored because of the strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close, and because “[g]ranting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (quotation omitted). In Abudu, the Supreme Court noted at least three independent grounds on which the Board may deny a motion to reopen: failure to establish a prima facie case for asylum; failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence or failure to reasonably explain why asylum was not initially sought; or a determination that the movant would not be entitled to this discretionary relief. Id., 485 U.S. at 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904. The Board’s decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id.; Raffington v. INS, 340 F.3d 720, 722-23 (8th Cir.2003).
1. Evidence of HIV/AIDS Status
10
In her first claim for relief, Gebremaria argues that the Board abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen because evidence of her HIV/AIDS status is material evidence that was unavailable at the time of her deportation hearing. In addition, she argues that circumstances in Ethiopia have changed due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in that country. She argues that if she returns to Ethiopia, she will be unable to procure the medication used to control the virus and “she would face a death sentence.” Gebremaria argues that she did not present this evidence to the immigration court or the Board because she only learned of her HIV/AIDS status two months prior to her final hearing, and she had not yet considered the long-term effects of having a life-threatening disease. Gebremaria cites to various reports regarding the epidemic in Ethiopia and Ethiopia’s failure to manage the problem to date. Although Gebremaria notes that she was provided a list of treatment centers in Ethiopia, she argues that the list does not contain information regarding the type of treatment available or whether she would have access to medication at these facilities. She also notes that she suffers from other serious health problems, including a thyroid condition requiring radiation therapy, diabetes mellitus, and high blood pressure. Finally, she argues that, as a known member of the opposition party, she would likely suffer at the hands of a government that controls the treatment centers. And, because she had been imprisoned before for her political views, she likely would be again and suffer greatly because of her medical condition.
11
The government responds that Gebremaria knew of her HIV/AIDS status at the time of her original proceedings but failed to notify the immigration judge of her condition. The government notes that as of August 1997 (when the immigration judge denied her asylum application), Gebremaria knew-but failed to apprise the judge-of her condition. Therefore, the government argues, the Board did not abuse its discretion because the evidence was previously available.
12
Gebremaria’s first deportation hearing occurred on September 19, 1996, and the hearing to determine the merits of her claim occurred on August 13, 1997, after which the judge rendered an oral decision. The medical evidence presented by Gebremaria includes two letters from her treating physician, Dr. David Strike, dated May 6, 2003, and January 14, 2002. The January 2002 letter stated that he had seen Gebremaria since 1997, and at that time she was diagnosed with “advanced AIDS.” The letter did not specify the exact time that Dr. Strike first saw her. The May 2003 letter indicated that Gebremaria’s CD4 count was “well below the 200 cutoff for AIDS” in August 1997. Again, the letter did not specify the date the CD4 count measurement was taken.
13
There is no statutory provision for the reopening of a deportation proceeding, and the regulations do not specify the conditions under which a motion to reopen must be granted. Khalaj v. Cole, 46 F.3d 828, 833 (8th Cir.1995) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 321-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). The applicable regulation indicates that a motion to reopen for additional evidence must state new and material facts that were not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (1994). The Board ruled that the advanced nature of her condition in August 1997 indicated that Gebremaria knew and appreciated the seriousness of her condition. The Board determined that this evidence was previously available at the final hearing, and that she should have presented the information to the immigration judge at that time. Gebremaria was aware of-yet failed to present evidence concerning-her condition prior to the final decision in her case. Due to the deferential nature of our review, we find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Gebremaria’s motion to reopen her deportation case based on her claim of new and material evidence.
B. Prima Facie Case for Asylum
14
Gebremaria next argues that the Board abused its discretion in determining that she could not make a prima facie case for political asylum. She argues that the evidence of her husband’s imprisonment and disappearance, during which time the family believed he was dead, supports her claim that she would suffer future persecution at the hands of the Ethiopian government. She argues that her political connections to the AAPO subjected her to past persecution when she was jailed for a month after participating in a rock-throwing demonstration, and that if she returns to Ethiopia, the same people would persecute her for her political beliefs. She asserts that this danger is even worse now than at the close of her hearing in 1997.
15
To qualify for asylum, an alien must show persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Subjectively, the alien must demonstrate with credible evidence that he or she genuinely fears persecution; objectively, the alien must demonstrate through credible, direct, and specific evidence that a reasonable person in his or her position would fear persecution. Nyonzele v. INS, 83 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir.1996). Although acts of violence against an alien’s family members may demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, absent a pattern of persecution tied to the asylum applicant himself or herself, acts of violence against family members do not necessarily demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Id., 83 F.3d at 983. In Nyonzele, for example, the alien alleged in part that he held a well-founded fear of persecution because his father had been murdered due to his political beliefs and due to the alien’s desertion from his country’s military. We determined, however, that there was no pattern of persecution linked to the alien himself, and that his father’s murder was due to his political beliefs rather than to any action taken by the alien. Id. We also noted that there was no evidence that any family members surviving the alien’s father suffered physical persecution by the government. Id.
16
Gebremaria offers evidence that she presented to the immigration judge and Board in her original asylum petition. That evidence included her past month-long imprisonment following the political demonstration. However, the immigration judge and Board determined that this evidence alone was insufficient to establish a fear of future persecution due to her political beliefs. Therefore, to bolster her claim here, she submitted evidence relating to her husband’s disappearance following his imprisonment in an Ethiopian prison. Gebremaria argues that this evidence indicates that if she returns to the country, she would be subject to the same fate. However, Gebremaria’s evidence is insufficient under our case law to establish a claim for fear of future persecution based on acts against her husband which, without evidence more specific as to Gebremaria, cannot be imputed to her. Nyonzele, 83 F.3d 975. As such, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Gebremaria failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum.
17
Based on the foregoing, we deny Gebremaria’s motion to supplement the record and her petition to review the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen her deportation case.
Notes:
1
HIV is the virus that causes Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or “AIDS.”
2
Gebremaria did not claim in her motion that she was entitled to protection pursuant to the United Nations Convention Against Torture. However, the motion noted that Gebremaria would be eligible at some point to adjust her status to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States based upon a Visa petition filed on her behalf by her brother
3
The Board entertained Gebremaria’s petition to reopen her deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The Board’s June 10, 2003, decision denying the motion was a final order of deportation from the United States. Because her deportation proceedings were pending before April 1, 1997, and because she received a final order of deportation from the Board after October 31, 1996, this is a “transitional” case, and we possess jurisdiction to entertain Gebremaria’s petition for review of the Board’s decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994)See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) § 309(c)(1), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-626 (Sept. 30, 1996).
4
Gebremaria waived (by failing to argue on appeal) a final issue regarding her possible future persecution in Ethiopia for her affiliation with the All-Amhara People’s Organization (“AAPO”). In addition, although she now claims that she is entitled to protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture, we lack jurisdiction to hear that claim because she did not raise that in her motion to the BoardAfolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir.2000) (in reviewing decisions of the Board, we lack jurisdiction to review claims that were not presented to the Board in the first instance).
5
Transitional cases are those where a final order of deportation is entered more than thirty days after the September 30, 1996, enactment of IIRIRA and deportation proceedings are begun before April 7, 1997
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Zewdie v. Ashcroft
Petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the petitioner was Phillip F. Fishman of Minneapolis, MN.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the respondent was Paul Fiorino, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC. Appearing on respondent’s brief was Virginia M. Lum.
Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
1
Genet Zewdie petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“Convention”). We affirm the denial of asylum and withholding of deportation, but we remand Zewdie’s claim under the Convention for further proceedings and consideration.
I. Background
2
Zewdie, a citizen of Ethiopia, entered the United States without inspection on August 25, 2000. She applied for asylum in September 2000. After learning of Zewdie’s presence in this country through her application, the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted removal proceedings. Zewdie conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention.
3
Zewdie claims that she was persecuted and tortured prior to leaving Ethiopia and that if she returned she would also be tortured. We begin by explaining from the records and the briefs Zewdie’s history in Ethiopia and the conditions in the country at the time she fled. Zewdie’s father belonged to the Oromo ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, and became an active member in the Oromo Liberation Front (“OLF”). The Oromo people established the OLF in July 1973.1 The OLF supports autonomy or independence for the southern provinces of Ethiopia where most Oromo live. The Oromo possess distinct physical characteristics and have their own language; they live throughout Ethiopia but consider the southern province their heartland. At one time, the OLF supported the current regime headed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (“EPRDF”). However, the OLF withdrew its support after discovering that the EPRDF manipulated the election process. In 1993, the OLF took up arms against the government but lost to the government military force. However, the OLF remains an active clandestine organization in Ethiopia.
4
Since the uprising, the Ethiopian government has prohibited the OLF from political participation. Despite the OLF efforts, government interference with elections still occurs. According to the State Department’s 2000 report, the last election held in the southern region contained numerous irregularities, including fraud, harassment, intimidation, and political assassination. The OLF has not garnered popular support because it has failed “to organize an effective anti-government movement” within Oromo communities. Thomas P. Ofcansky & LaVerle Berry, United States Dep’t of State Ethiopia: A Country Study 247 (1993). The OLF continues to oppose the current government in Ethiopia and refuses to accept the government as a legitimate authority.
5
As a member of the OLF, her father informed the Oromo people of their rights and obligations, criticized the current government, and recruited new members. The Ethiopian government arrested Zewdie’s father and kept him imprisoned for two years for supporting the OLF. The government also captured and detained other members of her family because they supported the OLF.2
6
We now turn to evidence presented by Zewdie to the immigration judge. Zewdie claimed that she did not actively participate as a member in the OLF; however, she admitted to sympathizing with the Oromo people and supporting the work of the OLF. Zewdie testified that the Ethiopian government did not approve of her support of the OLF and retaliated against her by imprisoning her and having her fired from her job.
7
She claimed that her employer of ten years fired her for her connection to the Oromo people and the OLF. In an offer of proof, she submitted a letter from her employer stating that her termination followed the receipt of a letter from Ethiopian government officials. Zewdie believes that the letter from the government informed her employer of her Oromo heritage and her connections to the OLF.
8
Her imprisonment followed a trip to her father’s village in Mojo where she informed the Oromo living in the community of their rights and responsibilities as citizens. During her encounters with the Oromo people in Mojo, she spoke out against the Ethiopian government and encouraged the people to vote in an upcoming election for candidates that best represented the interests of the Oromo people. Members of the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (“OPDO”), an entity set up by the government to undermine the OLF, confronted Zewdie and told her to leave the area.
9
Zewdie alleges that on returning to her home in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian government officers arrested her for her political activities, including educating the Oromo living in Mojo. She testified that the government held her in Maekalawi Prison for twenty-six days before releasing her on bail. During her time in captivity, government officers beat the soles of her feet repeatedly with wire whips and sticks. At the hearing, she removed her shoes and showed the scars on her feet and ankles to the immigration judge. She further testified that after her release, the officers informed her she could not leave Addis Ababa and ordered her to report her activities to them. Zewdie disobeyed and fled Ethiopia.
10
The immigration judge questioned Zewdie’s credibility, but made no specific finding that Zewdie did not tell the whole truth. The immigration judge denied all three claims of relief on October 4, 2001. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and questioned Zewdie’s credibility. Zewdie timely appeals the BIA’s decision to this court.
II. Discussion
11
Zewdie first argues that she qualifies for asylum or withholding of deportation. We have considered her claims regarding these issues and agree with the immigration judge that Zewdie does not qualify for either. However, Zewdie’s remaining arguments for relief under the Convention merit further consideration. See Sivakaran v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1028, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (holding that adverse decisions on claims of asylum and withholding of removal do not preclude a Convention claim); Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir.2004) (remanding Convention claim after upholding denial of asylum and withholding of removal claims).
12
We give deference to the BIA’s findings of fact and overturn only if the evidence “was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find” her eligible for relief under the Convention. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); Habtemicael, 370 F.3d at 779; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2004). Here, the evidence compels us to vacate the BIA’s decision; substantial grounds exist for believing that the Ethiopian government would torture Zewdie if she returned. See Sivakaran, 368 F.3d at 1029 (remanding because the BIA conducted insufficient fact-finding to deny the Convention claim); Habtemicael, 370 F.3d at 783 (remanding the Convention claim for further fact-finding). See also Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir.2004) (discussing the increase in reversals of BIA decisions despite the deferential standard of judicial review and criticizing immigration judges for their “systematic failure … to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum”).
13
Both the immigration judge and the BIA failed to credit Zewdie’s testimony and corroborating evidence. In addition, both failed to consider Zewdie’s claims in light of the United States Department of State report on Ethiopia. We remand because the immigration judge failed to articulate a reasoned analysis based on the recorded evidence for denying Zewdie’s claims. In order to put Zewdie’s testimony in context, we begin with an overview of the Convention and the conditions in Ethiopia when Zewdie left.
14
Women and children make up eighty percent of the twenty-seven million individuals displaced from their homes world-wide; of these women, twenty to thirty percent left their homes because they experienced torture in their home countries. Zewdie’s testimony puts her in this category and her treatment falls within the specific purposes behind the Convention.
15
The United Nations enacted Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to combat the use of torture throughout the world.3 The United States ratified the Convention and it went into effect November 20, 1994. Article III of the Convention provides that a signatory country shall not “expel, return or extradite a person to another [country] where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” in that country. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242, Pub.L. No. 105-277 (Oct. 21, 1998); see 22 C.F.R. § 95.1(c) (2004); Habtemicael, 370 F.3d at 780-81. The Convention defines torture as:
16
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as … punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
17
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2004). Torture does not include “pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3).
18
Before the immigration judge, Zewdie submitted the State Department’s 1997 Profile on Ethiopia. The report stated:
19
Authorities detained hundreds of persons without charge during the year, especially in the Oromiya and Somali regions, for supposed involvement with the OLF and ONLF. Many were ultimately released without an appearance before a judge. Such cases often reflect arbitrary actions by local officials, but also result from a shortage of trained and competent prosecutors and judges.
20
United States Dep’t of State, Report on Human Rights Practices, 1997. The report went on to discuss the atrocious conditions of Ethiopian prisons and also stated that “security officials sometimes beat or mistreated detainees.”4
21
With this background, we now turn to Zewdie’s specific claims. The immigration judge and the BIA denied relief under the Convention to Zewdie, a woman who claims to have suffered extraordinary physical pain at the hands of her government. In order to qualify for relief under the Convention, the applicant bears the burden of showing “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). To prove that it is more likely than not that the applicant would be tortured in the country of removal, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). Relevant evidence may include:
22
(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
23
(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;
24
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and
25
(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.
26
Id.
27
The immigration judge and the BIA rejected Zewdie’s claims, finding that she did not meet her burden of proof and questioned her credibility.5 In evaluating credibility determinations we defer to “an immigration judge’s credibility finding where the finding is supported by a specific, cogent reason for disbelief.” Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). An immigration judge can base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony, contradictory evidence, or inherently improbable testimony.
28
During Zewdie’s testimony in front of the immigration judge, she removed her shoes and showed the immigration judge the scars on the bottom of her feet and ankles. She testified, without contradiction, that she received these scars after being beaten repeatedly over a period of twenty-six days with wire whips and sticks. She further testified that government officers threatened her with reprisal if she left Addis Ababa. She also submitted several documents supporting her claim. For instance, she submitted an affidavit from Lulsseged Wolkeba, a former resident of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, stating that Zewdie’s “life and security would be in great danger if she is forced to return to Ethiopia”; she submitted a letter from her brother informing her that after she left Ethiopia, the government seized her husband and took him to an unknown location.
29
Despite Zewdie’s testimony and the evidence she presented, the immigration judge and BIA found Zewdie not credible because she could not offer corroborating evidence that the scars on her feet resulted from beatings and because she did not inform the asylum officer of the beatings.6
30
It is unreasonable to expect Zewdie to meet the extraordinary level of corroborating evidence demanded by the BIA. We highly doubt the Maekalawi Prison keeps records regarding prisoner abuse of the kind suffered by Zewdie and we are doubtful that a tortured person in an Ethiopian prison would have access to a physician to verify the torture. Even if such proof existed, we observe that “[i]t is often impossible for an asylum applicant to obtain corroborating evidence from [her] home country.” Bellido v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir.2004). Corroboration exists for Zewdie’s testimony in the scarring on her feet; nothing more is needed. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (“testimony of [an] applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”). As long as the “applicant’s testimony is generally consistent, rational, and believable,” inconsistencies in the testimony “need not be fatal to credibility, especially if the errors are relatively minor and isolated.”
31
Zewdie’s failure to mention her beatings to the asylum officer or indicate them on her asylum application should not be dispositive of her credibility, given the obvious translation difficulties revealed in the record.7 Such a communication failure does not rationally outweigh the overwhelming significance of the evidence presented to the immigration judge. The record is clear, the scarring on Zewdie’s feet and ankles came from being beaten. No reason exists in this record to disbelieve Zewdie.
32
We hold that the BIA failed to rationally assess Zewdie’s credibility on the torture issue. In light of the evidence presented by Zewdie, no reasonable fact finder could fail to find Zewdie eligible for relief. The evidence of past torture coupled with Zewdie’s testimony that the Ethiopian government threatened reprisal if she fled the country and the State Department’s report outlining the human abuses present in Ethiopian prisons provide substantial grounds for believing that it is more likely than not Zewdie will be tortured if forced to return to Ethiopia. For these reasons, we must overturn the BIA’s decision. On remand, we direct the BIA to assess all of the evidence and come to a reasoned conclusion based on a thorough analysis of the evidence.
III. Conclusion
33
We affirm the BIA’s determination regarding the asylum claim and the withholding of deportation claim. We vacate the BIA’s order denying relief under the Convention and remand for further consideration in accordance with this opinion.
Notes:
1
Partly taken from United States Dep’t of State,Report on Human Rights Practices, 2000; Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (8th Cir.1995).
2
The government allegedly killed her father’s brother for his OLF activities. Government officials took her brother, possibly because he was sympathetic to the OLF, and after Zewdie arrived in the United States, her mother and Zewdie’s husband, who remained in Ethiopia, have disappeared
3
The United Nations has reported wide-spread patterns of torture and ill treatment by government officials in seventy countries, making torture a worldwide problem. Torture occurs not merely in developing countries; the use of torture has become disturbingly legitimized even in industrialized nations facing a perceived threat
4
The immigration judge all but ignored the State Department’s report, only acknowledging that the report stated that “the OLF is an illegal organization in Ethiopia, and it advocates the violent overthrow of the government.” The BIA made no mention of the report
5
Neither the immigration judge or the BIA explicitly found Zewdie not credible
6
The immigration judge in his oral opinion stated in reference to the Convention claim that:
The Court acknowledges that this is a difficult case. The respondent demonstrated some injuries to her feet. However, there is no medical report to indicate whether these injuries are consistent with the type of abuse that the respondent testified to …. In this particular case, considering all of the evidence presented by the respondent … and considering the overall lack of meaningful corroboration in this case, the Court believes the respondent has not met her burden of proof.
App. at 22-23.
The BIA’s order echoed this language:
[Zewdie] has also submitted no evidence to establish that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured in Ethiopia.
The respondent appears to contend that it should be sufficient that she has scars on her feet and that she showed the scars to the Immigration Judge. However, we agree with the Immigration Judge that given the lack of any doctor’s statement or other corroborating evidence concerning the origin of the scars, coupled with the respondent’s failure to indicate in her written application or to the asylum officer that she was beaten on her feet, the fact that she has scars is not sufficient to establish her claim.
App. at 3 (emphasis added).
7
Zewdie did not have counsel during her interview with the asylum officer. Further, the translator had difficulty translating both the asylum officer’s questions and Zewdie’s responses. In addition, during oral argument, Zewdie’s counsel noted Zewdie’s cultural differences regarding her bodily scarring
Ethiopian women are accustomed to abuses and have little redress within their government. See United States Dep’t of State, Report on Human Rights Practices, 2000. Recognizing that women are less willing to discuss abuses they suffer, the Office of International Affairs issued a memorandum instructing asylum officers on how best to interview women seeking asylum. See Memo. from Phyllis Coven, Immgr. & Naturalization Serv. Dir. of Off. of Intl. Affairs, to All INS Asylum Officers, Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (May 26, 1995). However, such interviewing techniques are, unfortunately not required and some have suggested asylum officers have not consistently adhered to the interviewing techniques. See Danette Gomez, Last in Line: The United States Trails Behind in Recognizing Gender Based Asylum Claims, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 959, 963 (Summer 2004). We do not suggest, by implication or otherwise, that the approved interview techniques were not applied in Zewdie’s case.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Gemechu v. Ashcroft
1
Taddese Lencho Gemechu (“Gemechu”) seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that found Gemechu was not credible and that he failed to meet his burden of proof for establishing that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country of Ethiopia.
I. Procedural Background
2
Gemechu entered the United States on August 29, 1998 on a student visa with authorization to remain in the country until May 31, 2000. On August 2, 2000, Gemechu filed for asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In an October 2, 2000 Notice to Appear, the INS charged Gemechu with being subject to removal for overstaying his visa. At an initial hearing, Gemechu admitted the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear and conceded removability. However, Gemechu requested asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture.
3
The IJ held hearings on the merits on January 17, 2001 and March 12, 2001. In an order dated March 12, 2001, the IJ found Gemechu failed to provide sufficient credible evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution and denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ granted Gemechu sixty days to voluntarily depart the United States. The IJ also found Gemechu ineligible for asylum for failure to file his asylum application within one year of entering the United States.
4
On March 30, 2000, Gemechu filed a timely appeal with the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s credibility finding and ultimate conclusion that Gemechu was not eligible for asylum, but declined to adopt the IJ’s findings on timeliness.
II. Factual Background
5
Gemechu testified to the following facts. Gemechu was born on November 21, 1971 in Ghinchi, Ethiopia. His ethnicity is Oromo. His father died in about 1977 after being taken by the government. Gemechu’s mother lives in Ghinchi. She works by brewing and selling beer. She also receives pension checks from the government because Gemechu’s father was a police officer. Gemechu has two brothers and two sisters. Gemechu’s minor sisters live with Gemechu’s mother. Gemechu’s brother, Alemu, has a master’s degree in plant pathology and has worked at an agricultural research institute. Gemechu’s other brother, Melaku, was in school but then went into hiding.
6
Gemechu testified that he fears returning to Ethiopia because of his involvement in the Oromo Liberation Front (“OLF”). Gemechu has been a member of the OLF since 1989. The OLF became an illegal organization in 1992 when it withdrew from the government. At that time, Gemechu burned his OLF identification card.
7
Gemechu testified that he taught Oromo history in Ghinchi at a school during a summer break. He stated he was arrested and detained for over one month because of his teachings.
8
Gemechu attended college tuition-free and graduated first in his class from the Addis Ababa University in 1995. He then worked at the Ministry of Justice as a clerk for two months, then as a lecturer at the government-run Ethiopian Civil Service College for approximately two and a half years. Gemechu became a member of the Senate at the Ethiopian Civil Service College and was elected secretary of the Senate. During some of his time at the Ethiopian Civil Service College, Gemechu also served as a part-time lecturer at Addis Ababa University. Gemechu claims that he was secretly involved in the OLF during this time. In 1998, Gemechu received a scholarship to the University of Michigan Law School. The Ethiopian government offered him a scholarship to the Civil Service college instead. Gemechu rejected the Civil Service scholarship and was fired from his position at the College.
9
Gemechu came to the United States to pursue a graduate degree at the University of Michigan Law School. In Michigan, Gemechu had some contact with Oromos, but did not attend OLF meetings. Gemechu graduated in June 1999. He then went to live with Habtamu Birhanu Awetu (“Awetu”) in Minnesota for a year. Awetu, who testified at the March 12, 2001 hearing, stated that he knew Gemechu beginning in 1991 and that they are both members of the OLF. Gemechu testified that he was a member of the foreign relations office in the Oromo community center while living in Minnesota. During this time, he was employed in the mail room of Norwest.
10
Gemechu testified that in March 2000 he received a letter from his brother about an incident at Ambo, Ethiopia. In the letter, Melaku stated he had been beaten and detained by the government. Melaku said he was released, but is currently in hiding in Ethiopia. Melaku stated that Gemechu’s other brother Alemu was imprisoned and was possibly still imprisoned. Melaku also said that the government asked Gemechu’s family members about Gemechu’s whereabouts, though Gemechu admitted on the stand that it was “normal” for the government to ask about people. Gemechu testified that he was planning to return to Ethiopia to teach until he received this letter and became fearful that he would be persecuted should he return.
III. Statutory Background
11
“The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien … if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1). A refugee is “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality … who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
12
The petitioner has the burden of showing refugee status. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(a) (2004). To show a well-founded fear of persecution, the petitioner “must demonstrate a fear that is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. For an alien’s fear of persecution to be objectively reasonable, the fear must have basis in reality and must be neither irrational nor so speculative or general as to lack credibility.” Perinpanathan v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted).
IV. Standard of Review
13
The BIA’s decision is the final agency decision and the subject of our review. To the extent that the BIA adopted the IJ’s findings, we review those IJ findings as part of the final agency decision. Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir.2004).
14
“The BIA’s determination that an alien is not eligible for asylum or withholding of deportation is reviewed for substantial evidence, and may not be overturned unless `the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.'” Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597 (quoting Feleke v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.1997)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary.”). In our analysis, we consider “whether, based on the record considered as a whole, the BIA’s decision was supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597 (internal quotations omitted).
15
“It is well settled that `an immigration judge is in the best position to make credibility findings because he [or she] sees the witness as the testimony is given.'” Mayo v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Hartooni v. I.N.S., 21 F.3d 336, 342 (9th Cir.1994)). We therefore “defer[ ] to an immigration judge’s credibility finding where the finding is `supported by a specific, cogent reason for disbelief.'” Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597 (quoting Ghasemimehr v. I.N.S., 7 F.3d 1389, 1391 (8th Cir.1993)).
V. Discussion
16
The IJ concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that Gemechu failed to prove he has a well-founded fear of future persecution should he return to Ethiopia. While the IJ found Gemechu’s testimony about his education and employment credible, she found his testimony about his brother’s detentions and his own membership in the OLF implausible and not credible. The IJ gave several specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving the testimony, so we must defer to the IJ’s credibility finding.
17
Among the reasons the IJ gave for not believing Gemechu’s testimony were the following. First, Gemechu failed to present any objective evidence of his membership in the OLF. He failed to present any documentation connecting him to the OLF, though Awetu was able to procure a letter corroborating his own OLF involvement in Awetu’s asylum proceeding.
18
Second, Gemechu failed to present any documentation that his brothers were detained by the government, although resources exist that could substantiate the alleged detainments. Gemechu presented one letter from his brother, Melaku, dated March 20, 2000 that claimed that Melaku, Alemu, and Gemechu’s mother had been arrested, and that Alemu had not yet been released. However, Awetu testified that Gemechu had received between five and seven letters from his brother during the time Gemechu and Awetu lived together. Gemechu failed to produce these letters that apparently would have substantiated his claims that Alemu remained in prison.
19
Third, the IJ found it implausible that the government would be searching for Gemechu because the government was aware that Gemechu had accepted a scholarship to study in the United States.
20
Fourth, the IJ considered the country conditions in Ethiopia and found it unlikely Gemechu would be persecuted for his alleged membership in the OLF. The U.S. Department of State 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Ethiopia states that while membership in the OLF is illegal, the government draws a distinction between OLF leaders and mere members, and mere membership is not itself a cause for arrest. See Gebrehiwot v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 2004) (The “IJ reasonably may rely upon the State Department’s assessment of current country conditions as they relate to the likelihood of future persecution, given the Department’s expertise in international affairs.” (internal quotations omitted)) The IJ also noted that Oromos are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, making up about thirty-five percent of the population.
21
Fifth, the IJ found that Gemechu had excelled in Ethiopia. He attended college tuition-free and graduated at the top of his class. He gained prestigious positions of employment with the government, and was elected to the Senate at the University at which he worked. Gemechu’s achievements undermine his claims that the government would persecute him in the future.
VI. Conclusion
22
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that Gemechu failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Since Gemechu has not met the standard for asylum, it follows that he has failed to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. See Zakirov v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 541, 547 (8th Cir.2004). Gemechu has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured should he return to Ethiopia. He is therefore not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture. Id.
23
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Uduak J. Ubon, argued, Washington DC, for petitioner.
Robbin K. Blaya, argued, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, MAGILL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Lulseged Gebrehiwot petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming without opinion an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we affirm the BIA’s order of removal.
2
Gebrehiwot is a citizen of Ethiopia. He is ethnically Amhara and was raised in a region of Ethiopia consisting primarily of ethnic Oromos and Somalis. Gebrehiwot first came to the United States in 1981; he completed a master’s degree in Agronomy at the University of Georgia and returned to Ethiopia in 1983. Upon his return, he worked for the Mengistu government as a division head at the National Institute of Agricultural Research from 1983 to 1988 and from 1989 to 1990. Though he worked for the government, Gebrehiwot testified he did not belong to a political party, and apparently does not fear persecution based on his work for the Mengistu government. He returned to the United States in 1990 to obtain his Ph.D. in Agronomy. The terms of his program provided that he was to spend at least two years in Ethiopia following its completion so that his country might share in the benefit of his education. While Gebrehiwot was in the United Sates, the government of Ethiopia changed control during a violent period in the early 1990’s, and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (“EPRDF”) took power. The EPRDF renewed Gebrehiwot’s passport and never demanded that he return to Ethiopia. Gebrehiwot completed the Ph.D. program at the University of Missouri in 1994. He testified that agronomists are in demand in Ethiopia; however, instead of returning, Gebrehiwot applied for asylum based on a fear of persecution due to his ethnicity and political beliefs.
3
Gebrehiwot testified to no political involvement while living in Ethiopia. Rather, his fear springs from his membership in various groups in the United States which protest the ethnic policies and human rights abuses of the EPRDF. To this end, Gebrehiwot became a member of the following groups: the All-Amhara Relief and Development Association, which is the Western version of the Ethiopian All-Amhara People’s Organization (“AAPO”); the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces; and the Ethiopian National Congress.
4
Gebrehiwot does not claim that he has ever been persecuted in Ethiopia. He argues instead that the EPRDF is hostile to Amharas, and will persecute him because of his ethnicity and criticism of its divisive ethnic policies. In support of his persecution claim, Gebrehiwot cites the following factors: in 1991, his family was forced from their land by armed members of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization who gave the land to ethnic Oromos; in 1992, his half brother was arrested and detained for three months because he was Amhara; in 1994, his cousin was killed by government forces because he was Amhara and a member of the AAPO; his brother and sister were fired because they are Amhara; in 1995, his property, which he had not visited in more than five years, was confiscated by the government without compensation because he was considered a chauvinist Amhara and a defector; his wife, Azeb Yigalem, was arrested and imprisoned by the government because of her AAPO activities in 1993, twice in 1995, and in 1997.1
5
The IJ denied Gebrehiwot’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. It relied heavily on a Department of State Country Report (“Report”) and a Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions (“Profile”) in holding that Gebrehiwot had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution.
6
Because the BIA affirmed the IJ without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision directly as the final agency action. Melecio-Saquil v. Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir.2003). We will affirm an IJ’s denial of asylum if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 918-19 (8th Cir.2003). In order to overturn the IJ’s findings, we would have to conclude “not only that a persuasive case has been made for the opposite position, but that any reasonable fact-finder would be persuaded by it.” Id. at 918; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”).
7
Gebrehiwot bears the burden of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his ethnicity or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Any such fear must be objectively reasonable, meaning that he was required to present “credible, direct, and specific evidence of facts that show a reasonable person in [his] position would fear persecution if returned to” Ethiopia. Ghasemimehr v. INS, 7 F.3d 1389, 1390 (8th Cir.1993).
8
The record does not contain sufficient evidence to compel a conclusion contrary to that reached by the IJ. Nor can we say that the evidence in the record which supports the IJ’s determination is insubstantial. The IJ considered Gebrehiwot’s testimony concerning the reasons he feared persecution in light of the State Department documents and found the latter more convincing. We have previously held that an IJ” `reasonably may rely upon the State Department’s assessment of current country conditions as they relate to the likelihood of future persecution, given the Department’s expertise in international affairs.'” Navarijo-Barrios v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 561, 564 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir.2002)); see also Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235-37 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that a Country report provided substantial evidence for affirming a denial of asylum based on fear of future persecution because of ethnicity); Gonahasa v. United States INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir.1999) (“In most cases, a State Department report provides such substantial evidence. Absent powerful contradictory evidence, the existence of a State Department report supporting the BIA’s judgment will generally suffice to uphold the Boards’ decision.”).
9
The State Department documents were in many instances directly contrary to Gebrehiwot’s thinly supported claims that Amhara supporters of the AAPO are being persecuted. The Profile states “we have seen no evidence that the [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] would harm or harass such persons as long as they renounce violence as a means of gaining their ends.” R. at 512. The Profile similarly notes that members of the AAPO in Ethiopia are not arrested based on their membership alone, and are allowed to demonstrate and publish material. R. at 515. It contradicts Gebrehiwot’s fear that, despite the value of his education to the country, the Ethiopian government is willing to persecute him because of his political activities abroad:
10
Adjudicator’s may wish to bear in mind that the FDRE has consistently demonstrated its willingness to accept, without major repercussions, those members of COEDF … or other exile groups who renounce their affiliation with these groups and the violent aims of these groups. Almost all Ethiopian asylum applicants claim membership in one or the other of these exile groups … there are no reports in recent years of members of exile groups facing a trial or conviction solely for anti-government activities conducted overseas upon returning to Ethiopia.
11
R. at 510. Moreover, the government has encouraged expatriates to return to Ethiopia and participate in its political process should they renounce violence. R. at 509. The Profile similarity contradicts Gebrehiwot’s claim of ethnic persecution: “there is no evidence that the FDRE is targeting ethnic Amharas for mistreatment, as is often alleged by applicants.” R. at 514. In light of the speculative nature of Gebrehiwot’s fear, the bareness of many of his supporting allegations, and the State Department documents, we find that the IJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.2
12
Accordingly, we deny the petition.
Notes:
1
We know little more about these alleged events than the bare bones we state here. Gebrehiwot’s brief and hearing transcript do not flesh out the facts
2
Our holding on Gebrehiwot’s asylum claim dooms his withholding of removal claim. An applicant must show eligibility for withholding by a clear probability, a higher standard than must be met for asylumSee, e.g., Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir.2004).
McLean, VA – “The Healing Conscious” tells the story of an Ethiopian immigrant boy on his fascinating journey to America and adulthood. Author Kifle Bantayehu, a 23 year-old second-generation Ethiopian immigrant, recounts this poignant tale in poetic format. His inspirational collection of poems reflects the final words and thoughts of a dying man who traveled across the world, raised a family and became successful-finally fulfilling the American dream.
These poems, written in a uniquely modern style, reflect a journey of sacrifice, courage and strength. “The ideals of cultural preservation, respect and love intertwine with each person encountered along the narrator’s journey and serve as inspiration to all people, regardless of race religion or sex,” states the introduction of the book.
Bantayehu says there have been very few work works of poetry written and published by Ethiopian authors. And he feels as though he’s breaking new ground for this genre of literature by combining the English language with Ethiopian culture.
“The Healing Conscious” is available for pre-order at Borders and Barnes & Noble. It’s also available online at Amazon.com and books.lulu.com at discounted pricing.
Part of the proceeds from book sales will be donated to Ethiopian Children’s and Orphans’ Association, Inc. (ECOA), 46664, Africare, the African AIDS Initiative and other organizations working to promote HIV awareness and helping those affected in Sub-Saharan and East Africa.
Bantayehu says he wrote the book-which is based on the lives of his parents- to tell the compelling story of an immigrant, who through much pain and sacrifice, was able to leave his homeland of Ethiopia with an equally-strong and motivated woman, and raise four children in the best possible environment for education, opportunity and happiness.
“Although, there are many wonderfully unique stories and novels depicting the lives of immigrants in America of backgrounds ranging from Italian, Irish, Chinese, and English, there has been little said of the sacrifices and contributions of the Ethiopian immigrant community residing in the United States,” Bantayehu said, explaining his motivation. “Not only do we, as Ethiopians, possess over 2,000 years of a rich, cultural heritage, but we are a loving, caring and hard working people from whom the values of family, sacrifice, respect and camaraderie can be learned.”
“The Healing Conscious” is meant to inspire immigrants and others to have faith in their dreams because anything is possible. It also seeks to stir cultural consciousness and sensitivity. Many people and the world community at large, don’t take the time to understand a culture or society other than their own, Bantayheu says. And stereotypes, misconceptions, and hatred arise from our lack of knowledge.
“Whether Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim or any other ethnic or religious background, we all breathe the same air, feel fear, feel joy, shed tears, laugh, and love,” he says. “Those innate qualities make us human.”
Given the fears and prejudices that have arisen from the September 11 tragedy, “The Healing Conscious” promotes important principles for the entire global community to embrace and practice.
For more information about the book, please contact Kifle Bantayehu via phone / fax at (703) 628-3229 / (703) 448-0515 or email at [email protected] Additional information may be located at the following website: www.thehealingconscious.com.
Kifle Bantayehu is a second-generation Ethiopian born in the United States in 1980. He grew up in Mexico, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and the United States. In 2002, he received his B.A. Degree from the University of Virginia and currently resides in Virginia, USA. He is a Distinguished Member of the International Society of Poets. [email protected]
