When it comes to what we eat, men and women really are different according to scientific research presented today at the 2008 International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases in Atlanta.
In general, men are more likely to report eating meat and poultry items and women are more likely to report eating fruits and vegetables.
The findings come from the most recent population survey of the Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet). From May 2006 to April 2007 over 14,000 American adults participated in an extensive survey outlining their eating habits, including high risk foods for foodborne illness.
‘There was such a variety of data we thought it would be interesting to see whether there were any gender differences. To our knowledge, there have been studies in the literature on gender differences in eating habits, but nothing this extensive,’ said Beletshachew Shiferaw, a lead researcher on the study.
Shiferaw and her colleagues found that men were significantly more likely to eat meat and poultry products especially duck, veal, and ham.
They were also more likely to eat certain shellfish such as shrimp and oysters.
Women, on the other hand were more likely to eat vegetables, especially carrots and tomatoes. As for fruits, they were more likely to eat strawberries, blueberries, raspberries and apples.
Women also preferred dry foods, such as almonds and walnuts, and were more likely to consume eggs and yogurt when compared with men.
There were some exceptions to the general trend. Men were significantly more likely to consume asparagus and brussels sprouts than women while women were more likely to consume fresh hamburgers (as opposed to frozen, which the men preferred).
The researchers also looked at reported behavior in regards to consumption of 6 risky foods: undercooked hamburger, runny or undercooked eggs, raw oysters, unpasteurized milk, cheese made from unpasteurized milk and alfalfa sprouts.
Men were significantly more likely to eat undercooked hamburger and runny eggs while women were more likely to eat alfalfa sprouts.
This information is important to public health officials because better understanding of gender differences in eating habits can help them create more targeted strategies for prevention.
‘The reason we looked at consumption and risky behaviors was to see if there was a statistically significant difference between men and women and if there is this information could be used by health educators to target interventions,’ said Shiferaw.
Source: American Society for Microbiology
The International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases is organized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the American Society for Microbiology, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the World Health Organization. More information on the meeting can be found online at www.iceid.org.
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister dictator Meles Zenawi has introduced tough measures to stabilize soaring prices, including a crackdown on what he called “economic criminals,” but he says the African nation’s economy is essentially sound. From Addis Ababa, VOA’s Peter Heinlein reports opposition leaders ridiculed the claim of economic health in a country facing drought and a massive financial scandal.
Meles Tuesday declared war on what he referred to as greedy business people, blaming them for sharp price increases that boosted Ethiopia’s inflation rate to 20 percent. In a speech to parliament, he lashed out at what he called “fraudsters” who recently caused a five to 10-fold increase in the price of salt in a single day.
Meles announced establishment of a task force to prosecute businesses engaging in what he called “persistent illegal exploitative activities.”
“Such greedy and illegal business persons will only respond when each has been identified and punished,” he said. “As a result, the government has decided to completely change its approach toward those committing economic crimes. A task force comprising members of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the federal police and the National Security and Intelligence service has been set up to permanently monitor illicit activities and take prompt legal measures as necessary.”
Meles urged all citizens to cooperate by providing information about those engaging in price gouging.
Meles also announced two other inflation fighting measures; an immediate end to sales taxes on food grains, and sharp restrictions on the growth of the money supply.
At the same time, he described Ethiopia’s economy as “healthy.” He predicted the country’s economic growth rate would top 10 percent for the fifth year in a row.
Opposition leaders questioned the claim of economic health. Lawmaker Temesgen Zewdie pointed to recent reports that nine million Ethiopians are facing drought-induced famine. He called Meles’s response “unacceptable.”
Lidetu Ayelew of the Ethiopian Democratic Party called the report of 10 percent economic growth misleading because the growth does not touch millions of impoverished people.
“There are people who are being left behind. So there’s a problem with distribution, of reaching everyone,” Lidetu said. “Therefore, the economy is not fully healthy. So someone with high blood pressure cannot be seen as fully healthy. He can fall… So if this problem is not resolved, we cannot say the economy is healthy.”
Meles shrugged off the criticisms. In his rebuttal likened Ethiopia’s economic condition to a common cold. But he acknowledged several setbacks, including a recent discovery that a significant portion of the country’s gold reserves was fake, and the arrest of several people allegedly involved in a black market money-changing scheme.
(Shabait.com) Asmara – Six defecting soldiers who arrived in Eritrea recently disclosed that members of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) regime’s army are abandoning the regime in opposition of its massive round-up of members of the army and its racist policy. They stated that the dire situation in Ethiopia is escalating from bad to worse.
The defecting soldiers further indicated that at a time when the HIV/AIDS epidemic is gaining momentum in the country, especially in the towns of Mekele and Addis Ababa, many officials of the regime have already deposited 15 to 20 million dollars each in different foreign banks. Moreover, the soldiers noted that members of army have been banned from listening to the Eritrean radio Dimtsi Hafash, in particular, and other international media outlets, in general. They went on to say that the army is complaining as to why the regime is not complying with the EEBC ruling that awarded Badme to be sovereign Eritrean territory.
The Ethiopian soldiers who arrived here are Abdu Abamecha Abawaji, Abiot Tsega Buru, Abulu Angaso Hundesa, Gendela Kolalo Keshila, Adnew Takele Gobona, and Kasahun Tora Koira.
They also disclosed that a number of soldiers are in detention in Mekele, Shire-Endasilassie and the Hurso centers, and that the number of deaths is increasing.
The defecting soldiers also pointed out that there exists tension and distrust among members of the army as a result of the regime’s racist policy.
Is there any group that is more terrorist than Woyanne? The fact that the State Department ignores Woyanne’s crimes against humanity, including forced starvation, mass murder of civilians, rape, torture, etc. (all reported by Red Cross and other international organizations), and instead goes after a small Somali militant group shows how misguided and destructive its policy on Africa is. The State Department is the worst representative of American values. It has caused more damage to America’s credibility and image around the world than any one else.
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WASHINGTON (AFP) — The United States has added a group of Somali Islamic militants to the US list of terrorist organizations, the State Department said on Tuesday.
“Al-Shabaab is a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda,” it said in a statement.
“Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,” it added.
The decision, made February 29, blocks any financial support the group and freezes its assets in the United States, the statement said.
The United States said Al-Shabaab “has claimed responsibility for shooting Deputy District Administrators, as well as several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu targeting Ethiopian troops and Somali government officials.”
“Given the threat that Al-Shabaab poses, the designation will raise awareness of Al-Shabaab’s activities and help undercut the group’s ability to threaten targets in and destabilize the Horn of Africa region,” the statement said.
Throughout the 1990s, the international donor community supported Ethiopia as a country that embarked on a democratic path almost after 2 decades of socialist military rule. The country’s achievement, so it was said, was both economic and political. Economically the ‘new government’ has taken some steps towards liberal and market oriented system. Politically, Zenawi fooled the world with his rhetoric and thus naively labelled progressive leader.
International community invested in the regime’s constitution-making process that led to its adoption in 1995. The constitution theoretically set up a number of democratic rights for its citizens. Defiant of the absence of separation of power between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, and omission of the duration of the term of office for the Prime Minster, the constitution has taken a reverse track. Ethiopia today is governed under a system of one-man rule engineered by Meles Zenawi, who has now been in power for the last 17 years by suppressing all forms of democratic voice.
The problem is getting worse by the legacy of international donors’ condone because the regime violates its constitution, bans free press, crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, and rigs national election. By pouring in a huge sum to pay for state spending on military apparatus and infrastructure, these donors has helped the regime to consolidate its power and suppresses the opposition. Moreover, the subsidies from donors allow the regime to direct more of its own revenue into expanding its huge patronage schemes, making Zenawi depend increasingly for his political survival on continued financial and diplomatic support from his foreign donors although his regime has continued dishonouring its promises.
Yet there is a ray of hope in this seemingly hopeless situation. The regime’s corruption, violence and vast patronage ate away economic resources. This undermined its ability to function properly in the long term because it destroyed the economic foundations of the regime’s political survival. To date the regime has been saved from this grim prospect by foreign aid donors. If the international donors pulled the plug, the regime could no longer be shielded from the consequence of its own mischief, and would have to bend to democratic pressure.
The regime has established all-round strategy to personalize its power at the expense of the Ethiopian people. The adoption of structural adjustment—liberalization, deregulation, devaluation, and privatization in the 1990s blatantly served the interest of the regime not of the people. It has created surrogate institutions that appeared to represent private sector, but in reality remained subservient to the regime. As Zenawi’s antidemocratic sentiment gathered momentum, the business class has mostly become a bystander and left the struggle for democracy aside. Such oblivious nature of private sector only leads to personalization of power. As a result, the regime has become the largest owner of industries and businesses as well as its biggest employer. Investment is consolidated in the hands of the regime so much so that the best way to get into business and be part of the looting is to deal with the regime itself. Virtually, the praised programs — liberalization, privatization, devaluation and devolution are all remained on paper without practice. The reality is that public access to basic social services is significantly diminishing; unemployment is rising, inequality is being widened thus making the poor poorer, and the regime richer.
The educated middle class, instead of opposing the regime like other middle class citizens in other parts of the world, has chosen to flee the country, leaving Zenawi largely unopposed as he consolidated his personal rule. Other professionals who remained in the country are integrated into his patronage network. Some others are employed in NGOs, which is highly censored by the regime too.
Why has this been happening? The answer lies in the regime’s use of force and intimidation on the one hand and its manipulation of patronage on the other. Zenawi has always sought to use the army to build his personal political base. He employs violence sparingly and selectively – as a tacit instrument when the political process fails to yield before his requirements or the opposition appears to need whipping into submission. For instance, the regime waged hefty war with Eriteria from 1998 – 2000, which was responsible for about 70,000 lives and wastage of billions of dollars. The same massacres were extended into Oromia, Gambella, Sidama, and sovereign state–Somalia. Furthermore, Zenawi’s success in consolidating his power and stifling democracy emanates from his knack for integrating large chunks of the ‘political’ class into his vast patronage empire. Patronage, typically in the form of government contracts, tenders, and jobs, to bribe business communities, low skilled personnel and bilateral corporations at the expense of the nation.
In an effort to direct the attention of international donors, Zenawi’s government promised to hold a free and fair election with multiparty political competition in 2005. Nonetheless, many international election observers have proved that the opening of multiparty contest was just the icing on the cake. The government had long been engaged in practices both official and unofficial that rendered constitutional guarantees impotent. The election was rigged and manoeuvred by the incumbent party and its cronies, which revealed the true nature of the regime. The point of change was to strengthen the Prime Minister while enfeebling the institutions that might act as a check upon him. The government manoeuvred the election result by such fraudulent means as bribery, blackmail, naked intimidation, and use of excessive forces. With the skids thus greased, the re-election of constituencies filed for supposed irregularity glided through easily, opening the door for the ruling party to hammer aggressively the democratic voices. Election, in Ethiopia – as in most of Africa – are invariably marred by the executive, and the fact that no definite term is fixed in the constitution for the prime Minster’s term of office, the future of democracy looks bleak.
After his attempt to mislead the world community by holding the so-called free and fair election, the regime launched another weapon to divert the world leaders – ‘robust economic growth as proof that poverty is declining in the country because of good governance’. However, the statistics by which indicators of such economic growth derived were far from being credible. In addition to ignoring social and environmental degradation from the equation, the statistics failed to address the long-term problems.
To improve his chance for success, Zenawi also exploited local councils to build its oppressive organizational infrastructure, cajoled leaders from opposition parties to join its own gambling polity. The decentralization of the budget to a district level to a certain degree gave the local officials an economic reason to work for Zenawi although, armed coercion made them fearful of what would happen if they broke with Zenawi’s agenda of power usurpation.
In conclusion, the worst obstacle to democratic development in Ethiopia has been the personalization of state power. The military and economic aids from abroad were used to selectively suppress dissents. The money sluices through a massive patronage machine that Zenawi uses to recruit support, reward loyalty, and buy off actual and potential opponents. In his effort to personalize the state further, Zenawi has skilfully undermined formal institutions of governance, preferring as he does to use highly arbitrary and informal methods of recruiting and rewarding officials. Above all, the absence of clear separation between the branches of government allowed the emergence of a very strong and an out of control executive resulting in such tyrant one-man regime. The way out could be building institutions that democracy requires, reworking the constitution, and then encouraging mass-political participation and unfettered electoral competition. This demands however, backing and stand staunchly with determined political oppositions as they struggle to empower the people, who should be the sovereign authority in Ethiopia, not the elite that came to power by force and is staying on it against their will by force. When elections are held in an institutional wasteland like Ethiopia, say in 2010 political competition typically coalesces around and entrenches the ethnic and sectarian divisions created by Zenawi as usual. The implication is that, not only is the one- man rule legitimized, but also subsequent efforts to democratize the country will be more difficult and more violent than ever.
Four articles — Andargatchew, Daniel, Girma and Bertukan. Andargatchew advocates for a violent form of struggle while Bertukan stands diametrically opposed to the thesis. Daniel supports a form of struggle similar to that of ANC; but he is doubtful whether Andargatchew’s definition of violence matches his understanding of ANC’s form of struggle.
I don’t see any conflict between Andargatchew’s and Daniel’s articles, at least up to this moment, as Andargatchew hasn’t yet clarified the specific forms this ‘violence’ will be taking. In fact, leaving his supposition about the definition of Andargatchew’s term ‘Amets’, the positive contribution of Daniel’s article to the discussion is with regard to giving definitive forms to Andargatchew’s reference to Amets.
Girma Kassa’s is a bit difficult to follow. On the one hand, he lauds Tegbar League’s actions and yet denounces violence. In fact, he advocates even wider and coordinated simultaneous sets of actions similar to those of Tegbar League’s, which would cover the country so as to make governance by TPLF impossible. Here is where I lose Girma. Is this not what in simple language called insurrection? What would happen when the uprising in a certain woreda amasses the capability to kick out the agents of the state, but the agents become unwilling to relinquish their position and start shooting at the crowd? Will you be using violence to smoke them out or retreat in observance of Bertukan’s oath to Ephrem Yitshak? If you are supporting the throwing of stones at city buses, what on earth can be wrong about blowing a T-45 that comes to demolish whole villages? Or, to be prepared to stop Agazi killers from marching on school children?
I find Girma’s position logically untenable. If he is to be consistent, he should subscribe to either Daniel’s or Bertukan’s line. Mixing the two doesn’t help to clarify the situation. If he is saying that he stands against protracted warfare, it is understandable on the merits of the multitude of views of the commentators on EMF’s website. But, this immediately reduces Girma to Daniel’s view — protracted armed struggle is not a viable option. Apart from these, the remaining choice becomes only that of Bertukan’s line — the irreversible marriage to the peaceful struggle, presumably meaning also avoidance of any actions that lead to loss of life and hence confrontation with the state.
Girma’s questioning the morality of supporting violence from diaspora is also unclear. I cannot understand what makes his support for Tegbar League morally justifiable in contradistinction to Andargatchew’s advocacy for uprising. I don’t think Girma was standing at the head of the school children who were throwing stones at city buses when he lauded Tegbar League’s actions.
When Girma attempts to elevate the discussion to theoretical generalisation, he starkly commits the sins he was trying to accuse Andargatchew about. After misreading Andargatchew to have said that democracy is required in order to conduct peaceful struggle, he continues to tell us that no pre-condition is required to conduct peaceful struggle. Regrettably, I would like to refer him back to paragraph 3 under section 5 on page 18. According to my reading of Andargatchew’s article, I cannot find any place where he put the institutionalisation of a democratic system as a pre-condition for peaceful struggle. He has explicitly stated for this not to be the case when he wrote:
When we look at democratic systems from this angle, we find them to be the best and most capable of all currently existing systems with respect to accommodation and management of differences. Even though a given system may not be democratic, it can be capable of accommodating political difference. But, for this to happen certain conditions like…
This for me says only one thing: the best system that manages political conflicts is a democratic system. No more! In fact, when Andargatchew cites the need for the prevalence of those things like law, morality, monarchy, God etc… poised higher in a society than the conflicting parties, it is a clear indication of his endeavour to find preconditions that clearly fall far short of the scale of institutionalisation of a democratic system.
If Girma truly wants to engage in constructive discussions along these lines, what he should answer primarily is whether peaceful struggle could have been possible in Hitler’s Germany or Idi Amin’s Uganda or for that matter in Mengistu’s Ethiopia? If he is to answer ‘yes’ to the above question, I rest my case and am willing to sit and learn ‘how’. But, if he may answer in the negative, he should also make efforts to find out what conditions should have been in place there for peaceful forms of struggle to have been possible? By asserting his statement about the redundancy of pre-conditions for peaceful struggle on the basis of mis-quotes from Andargatchew, Girma can only be seen as having constructed suitable premises which make his pre-held conclusions plausible.
Most interesting is Bertukan’s — not least because of her position as a leader of a movement. Firstly, I am astounded by the speed at which she sprung for the rebuttal. This, from a movement whose best achievement during the last 8 months since its leaders were released from prison is only tearing itself into shreds over matters matured children even would contemptuously ignore. Regrettably, this can only be seen as a testimony to our worst fears about the capability of Kinijit’s leaders to live up to the trust invested in them by their followers and supporters.
Why hasn’t she released press releases in all these times against the machinations of Woyane and its electoral board when her movement’s ‘V’ sign and organisation name is snatched away from her? Why hasn’t she requested for the resignation of the Government of the day when the bullions in the national bank turned ‘Ballestra’? Or, denounced the sky rocketing life expenses for the ordinary Ethiopian, which even Lidetu had something to say about? Bertukan’s priorities are at best misplaced.
The following line from Bertukan’s letter is also significant on the merits of its undertones:
Based on the pretext of Kinijit leaders prolonged incarceration and EPRDF’s anti-democratic stance, a few supporters of Kinijit in the diaspora are raising questions against the peaceful form of struggle.
I think this is a complete miss of the cause that gave Kinijit’s leaders the prominence they have enjoyed for far too long: Ethiopians want change and Kinijit leaders put themselves forward as viable agents. Nothing more! The Kinijit leaders will enjoy their prominence so long as they can be seen to deliver. The interest of the need for change on the part those Ethiopians supporting Kinijit is paramount. It is not the other way round. The trust given to Kinijit’s leaders can be prolonged only so far as they are advancing the paramount interest of the followers’ need for change. This trust is a contract not a fief for life.
It would have been more appropriate for Kinijit’s leaders to start from true reflection on their past experiences. I believe such a reflection would convince Bertukan about the lack or failure of leadership on Kinijit’s part to be the cause for Andargatchew’s proposal for another option. The direction her movement is trudging on at the moment wouldn’t put her politically on any elevated platform than those of Lidetu or Beyene or Bulcha. Attainment of such a position requires much more than past glory. At least, Bertukan needs to tell us in what ways her form of struggle may be different from the parliamentarian opposition’s.
In my view, her reaction to Andargatchew’s article has put Bertukan on an inferior platform than Beyene and Bulcha albeit rhetorically. To the credit of the two parliamentarians, unlike Bertukan, I haven’t seen them missing opportunities to point their fingers at Woyane’s repression as the main culprit for encouraging violence in the country, rather than attacking their potential allies or second level differences, under similar circumstances.
If I recall correctly, one of the eight negotiation points Kinijit proposed as a way forward back in 2005 included the independence of the Ethiopian defence and security forces from the tutelage of EPRDF. Wouldn’t it be most appropriate for a leader of a movement to reiterate one of its cardinal points whenever the opportunities arise, as the reason to write the letter may be, well before making calls to armed opposition movements to lay their arms and join the “peaceful struggle”?
The interest of the movement would have advanced if Bertukan used her three pages letter to tell us about what the leadership has mapped out for the furtherance of the peaceful struggle. Are they planning to continue the struggle through their representatives in the parliament? Or are they entertaining calls for defiance actions that may lead to confrontation with the security forces? What will they do when the state bans them from exercising their constitutional rights to peacefully demonstrate in public or organise? Will they stand up to the security forces even if that may lead to violent confrontations or retreat? Or enter a plea to Ephrem Yishak or that woman in US state department? How are they organising the movement — publicly and openly or clandestinely? These are questions which Kinijit’s leaders should have answered to, well over eight months ago, on the day of their release from prison. This shouldn’t have waited for a solemn request from Kinijit’s believers or provocation from radical rebels.
Let us not forget that this is a cause for which hundred died, tens (if not hundreds) of thousands languished in Woyane’s prisons or lost their living or were exiled, another thousands were expropriated unlawfully and families separated. For a leader of a movement this should be much burden that wouldn’t allow a day’s peaceful sleep, let alone allow the squandering of such a length of precious time as eight months are.
I can’t therefore help raising an eyebrow while reading references to moral superiority interspersed in various places in Bertukan’s letter. In my view, Andargatchew can be seen here to have a higher moral stance than Bertukan and co., because of his endeavour to keep the movement going by looking at other options at the time when Bertukan’s “marriage with the peaceful struggle” was seen to be vacuous.
The three summarised points given as reasons for denouncing armed struggle are also vacuous. For the sake of completeness, I summarise and translate the core points as follows:
1. armed struggle doesn’t result in anything other than hatred, poverty and sufferings;
2. the use of arms is incompatible with the empowerment of citizens to freedom and integrity;
3. the use of force against oppressors is not morally superior to use of force for oppression.
To me, none of the above three make any sense at all, if they mean what they say—general truths. I am completely at a loss how resistance could be equated to oppression? By what reason or logic could one put Ethiopia’s patriotic fighters resistance on the same moral footing with the Italian fascist occupiers; or ANC’s resistance with apartheid rule? Hasn’t ANC’s resistance delivered equality to the black majority of South Africa; or our patriotic forbears’ resistance freedom to Ethiopians from racist fascist rule? The history of anti-colonial struggles during the second half of the last century is full of examples where armed resistance delivered freedom, prosperity, social justice and restored human integrity.
Needless to say, the horrors of war should be avoided as much as possible. If there are other means leading to the desired goals, no sane person, let alone, those claiming to champion the betterment of peoples’ living conditions, would opt for it. But modern day political reality is a bit convoluted to be captured by Aristotelian reasoning only.
People may be thrown into situations whereby they will be confronted with uncomfortable choices only — living under unacceptable suffering or take up arms with full responsibility for the consequences of there actions. Under such circumstances, it can’t be anyone’s prerogative to moralise against the person’s choice to take up arms unless you are to deliver him from his sufferings. The fact that the terms of the suffering may be acceptable for you cannot be an argument against the other party’s choice for raising arms. The reference to the latter’s choice as backward and uncivilised would also be at best unjustified and unfair. Sadly, the rhetoric is indicative of the chronic malaise that caused the cannibalisation of Kinijit.
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The writer of this article can be reached through [email protected]
