I read yesterday a report by BBC about the night vigil in Addis Ababa, Anglican church for the release of Ethiopian hostages in Eritrea. In front of Downing Street in London, Ethiopian Diaspora have been holding vigil for the last month or two for the “hostages” or political prisoners held by Melese Zenawi and I have not seen that reported by BBC.
Were the vigil in Addis were bright enough not to be ignored than the one in London, other Europe and American cities? or was the vigil in Addis had abundant Oxygen in the form of Propaganda that BBC participated knowingly or unknowingly?
It is indeed sad when reporters have to ignore major things unfolding and choose what they like and if I am
right such reporting is what is coming from police states like Ethiopia and unfortunately BBC has participated in this made for television propaganda by the Ethiopian regime for the world to forget hundreds of political prisoners held hostages in their own country.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Berhane Kifle GEBRESADIK, Petitioner,
v.
Alberto GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States of America, Respondent.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the petitioner was Phillip F. Fishman of Minneapolis, MN.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the respondent was Lonnie F. Bryan, AUSA, of Minneapolis, MN.
Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
1
Berhane Gebresadik petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition.
I.
2
Gebresadik, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, was born to an ethnic Amhara father and an Eritrean mother. She entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor in March 2000. She remained beyond her authorized stay, and removal proceedings were commenced against her in May 2001. Gebresadik conceded that she was removable, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.
3
Gebresadik’s application was largely based on her claim that she was persecuted by individuals affiliated with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) because of her involvement in the All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), a group she joined on April 16, 1992, so that she could help oppose the persecution of the Amhara people and promote a united Ethiopia. According to Gebresadik’s application and testimony, she served as an organizer of a 200-person AAPO demonstration the day she joined. She also helped collect money and distribute leaflets for the organization. Gebresadik stated that because of her involvement with the AAPO, two EPRDF security agents entered her home on April 25, 1992, arrested her, and took her to jail, where she was tortured and interrogated. The agents reportedly claimed that the donations gathered on April 16, 1992, were used to buy weapons for anti-government activities and demanded that Gebresadik identify other activists. Gebresadik further asserted that on April 30, 1992, two gunmen, who identified themselves as members of “Harnet Tigray” (the freedom fighters of the Tigray people), entered her cell, blindfolded her, and shouted that she was an informant for the AAPO who had betrayed her Eritrean heritage. She said that one of these men then tore her clothes, raped her, and spit on her. Gebresadik also testified that her interrogators accused her of performing intelligence work for Eritreans.
4
According to Gebresadik, she was eventually released from jail on September 15, 1992. She stayed away from all AAPO functions and members thereafter, and the incident was never reported to the AAPO. She left Ethiopia in December 1992 and went to Egypt, where she worked as a servant until her arrival in the United States. Despite Gebresadik’s absence from Ethiopia, her father, who remained in Ethiopia, reported that men have continued to come to his home looking for her.
5
Gebresadik also asserted in her application and testimony that she believed she would face persecution due to her Eritrean heritage if she were to return to Ethiopia. She reported that relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated after she left Ethiopia and that Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were being arrested and deported to Eritrea. Individuals that she alleged had been deported to Eritrea included her mother, who reportedly died shortly after being deported, and Habtemickeal Asnakie, the father of her two children. Gebresadik’s father feared that because of Gebresadik’s Eritrean heritage, she would also be deported if she returned to Ethiopia.
6
Attached to Gebresadik’s application were various documents, one of which was an October 2002 letter from Wondayehu Kassa, the AAPO representative from North America, whom Gebresadik said she had met during the demonstration in 1992. The letter stated that Gebresadik had been subjected to mistreatment and injustices at the hands of EPRDF agents, but did not mention her arrest. Another document was an affidavit from an individual who reportedly knew Gebresadik in Ethiopia. The affidavit recounted the same information listed in Gebresadik’s affidavit regarding her AAPO involvement and arrest. Gebresadik also submitted a copy of her passport, birth certificate, and various reports and articles that contained country information for Ethiopia and Eritrea.
7
On December 23, 2002, the IJ denied Gebresadik’s application. In his decision, the IJ questioned Gebresadik’s credibility and the plausibility of her claims. The IJ noted that Gebresadik had initially testified at the hearing that her AAPO involvement and subsequent arrest took place in March of 1992, but then corrected it to reflect that it had occurred in April. The IJ also stated that Ethiopia and Eritrea were allies in 1992 and that he therefore did not “understand why the respondent would be questioned as to being involved with Eritrean intelligence at that time.” He further thought it “seem[ed] a bit implausible . . . that a person would be given a position of authority, in organizing a demonstration on the very same day the person joined the political organization,” and that it was “just not plausible . . . that Ethiopian authorities would still be looking for the respondent 10 years after her brief period of AAPO involvement.” The IJ also commented on the insufficient corroborating evidence supplied by Gebresadik. He noted that she provided no contemporaneous objective documentation of her joining the AAPO, and he also discounted the value of the letter from the AAPO representative because it did not mention anything about her being arrested and because Gebresadik had testified that she never told the AAPO of the events when they occurred. In addition, the IJ commented that “the evidence regarding respondent’s connections to Eritrea are (sic) quite limited.” For these reasons, the IJ ultimately concluded that Gebresadik had not met her burden of proof.
8
The BIA eventually remanded the case to the IJ.1 On remand, Gebresadik was permitted to submit additional evidence, and another hearing was held. During this process, Gebresadik asserted that she had suffered not just one but five sexual assaults during her time in prison. Most of the other evidence presented by Gebresadik was the same as that provided in her original application. The IJ once again denied Gebresadik’s application, specifically incorporating its prior decision and also noting that Gebresadik had “really not offered any new evidence to support her claim” or “offered any corroborating evidence going to her AAPO activities, or to her Eritrean ethnicity.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.
II.
9
Gebresadik contends that the IJ and BIA erred in denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. “We review the IJ’s decision directly where, as here, the BIA adopts and affirms it,” Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir.2007), and will “defer to the IJ’s findings of fact and disposition of the case unless the record evidence is `so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find [the petitioner] eligible for asylum, withholding of deportation, or relief under the Convention Against Torture.'” Onsongo v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir.2004)).
A.
10
To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must show that he or she is a refugee —a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality `because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.'” Berte v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, the fear must be “both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir.2005). A petitioner who is able to establish past persecution is “entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, which can be rebutted by evidence that country conditions have changed.” Lengkong v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir.2007).
11
As recounted above, Gebresadik’s claims of past and future persecution were discounted by the IJ because he questioned her credibility and because of the lack of corroborating evidence. We will uphold an IJ’s adverse credibility determinations as long as “they are supported by specific, cogent reasons for disbelief.” Celaj v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir.2006). Further, “[o]ur court has held that an IJ may properly base a credibility finding on the `implausibility’ of an alien’s testimony, as long as the IJ gives specific and convincing reasons for disbelief.” Mamana v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir.2006). “[A]n IJ’s adverse credibility findings `are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'” Id. (quoting Turay v. Ashcroft, 405 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir.2005)).
12
After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the IJ gave satisfactory reasons for questioning Gebresadik’s credibility, particularly as it pertains to her claim of past persecution. We agree with the IJ’s assertion that it is implausible for the AAPO to have given Gebresadik the authority to organize a 200-person AAPO demonstration on the very day she joined the organization. Moreover, despite the fact that the IJ expressed disbelief on this matter in his initial decision, Gebresadik offered no evidence on reconsideration that would tend to diminish the implausibility of her contention. In addition, and despite Gebresadik’s assertion to the contrary, it was not unreasonable for the IJ to question Gebresadik’s credibility based on her claim that she had been accused during her detention of being an Eritrean spy, as the country reports included in Gebresadik’s application showed that the controlling governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea were in cooperation in 1992.2 We consequently cannot say that it was unreasonable for the IJ to question Gebresadik’s credibility.3
13
We also cannot say that it was unreasonable for the IJ to state that the lack of corroborating evidence is detrimental to Gebresadik’s claim of past persecution. As we have noted, the “lack of corroboration . . . combined with other credibility issues, can provide support for an adverse credibility finding.” Onsongo, 457 F.3d at 855. Gebresadik did not provide any contemporaneous objective documentation regarding her joining the AAPO. In addition, the IJ found the AAPO letter from Kassa to have little value because it did not mention her arrest and because Gebresadik had testified that she had met Kassa only once, on April 16, 1992, and had not seen him since.4 The only other piece of corroborating evidence that Gebresadik provided regarding her AAPO membership or her arrest was an affidavit from an Ethiopian acquaintance. The IJ found the corroborating evidence to be insufficient in this case, and we cannot say that the record compels a contrary finding. The IJ also noted that Gebresadik had failed to offer additional corroborating evidence regarding her AAPO activities or detention during her remand proceeding. While we recognize that “petitioners cannot be expected to get substantial documentation from their persecutors,” Ombongi v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir.2005), we believe that the lack of corroboration here, combined with the credibility issues discussed above, provides a reasonable basis for undermining the credibility of Gebresadik’s claim of past persecution.5
14
We also believe that it was reasonable for the IJ to discount Gebresadik’s claims of future persecution, especially in light of the credibility concerns addressed above. In regard to future persecution based on AAPO membership, the IJ found it implausible that Ethiopian authorities would still be interested in her, because it had been more than ten years since her brief involvement with the AAPO, she had not been politically active since her detention, and she had been given an exit visa to leave Ethiopia. In regard to future persecution based on her Eritrean heritage, the IJ noted that the evidence was rather limited. We cannot conclude that the record compels a contrary conclusion.
15
After considering the record as a whole, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the IJ’s conclusion that because Gebresadik failed to meet her burden of proof, she is not eligible for asylum.6
B.
16
Because Gebresadik has failed to meet the standard for asylum, she also fails to meet the more rigorous standard for withholding of removal. See Turay, 405 F.3d at 667. Furthermore, the conclusions that support a denial of Gebresadik’s asylum and withholding of removal claims also support the denial of her CAT claims. See Ming Ming Wijono v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir.2006).
17
The petition for relief is denied.
Notes:
1
The BIA had initially affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that even if Gebresadik’s testimony was deemed credible and even if she had established past persecution, her claim would fail because there had been a fundamental change in circumstances and internal relocation was appropriate. After a reconsideration of the decision pursuant to Gebresadik’s motion, however, the BIA concluded that it had misinterpreted a Department of State Report that it relied on in its initial affirmance and remanded the case to the IJ
2
The reports reveal that in 1992 Ethiopia and Eritrea were still one country and that the EPRDF and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had just recently ousted former President Mengistu’s regime. A.R. 1320, 1391, and 1548. These reports also show that in 1992 the EPRDF, which headed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, was sympathetic to Eritrean independence and accepted the EPLF as the provisional government of EthiopiaId.
3
Gebresadik additionally asserts that it was erroneous for the IJ to question her credibility based on her initial misstatement of the month of her AAPO involvement and arrest at her first IJ hearing. After a review of the transcript, we agree with Gebresadik that this appears to have been a simple misstatement and does not necessarily support an adverse credibility determination. In any event, this does not appear to have been an essential factor in the IJ’s determination, and we are satisfied that the other credibility issues addressed by the IJ are sufficient to support his credibility assessments
4
The IJ noted that while the AAPO letter did state that Gebresadik was a victim of mistreatment and injustice at the hands of EPRDF Security agents, this information must have been provided to the AAPO representative by Gebresadik in 2002 because she stated that she had not told the AAPO of these events
5
We reject Gebresadik’s argument that the IJ wrongly excluded her alleged physical evidence of torture. At her March 30, 2005, evidentiary hearing, Gebresadik attempted to disrobe and show the IJ a scar that she claimed to have received during her detention in Ethiopia. The IJ prevented her from doing so. This decision was not erroneous, particularly in light of the fact that Gebresadik was permitted to testify about the scar. At the same hearing, Gebresadik also attempted to obtain a continuance to procure expert testimony regarding her scar. This request was also denied by the IJ. As we have previously recognized, we have “no jurisdiction to review an IJ’s purely discretionary decision to deny a continuance of a removal hearing, unless that ruling resulted in such procedural unfairness as to implicate due process,”Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1079, 126 S.Ct. 1793, 164 L.Ed.2d 533 (2006), which Gebresadik does not allege here.
6
At oral argument, Gebresadik asserted that on remand the IJ should have performed an analysis regarding her ability to relocate internally. Because this argument was raised for the first time at oral argument and was not briefed, it is waivedSee Twin Cities Galleries, LLC v. Media Arts Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 598, 602 n. 1 (8th Cir.2007).
A generation of Ethiopian Americans is making its mark on the arts. They are part of a wave of young people whose families fled Ethiopia in the 1970s and who came of age in the United States. Their writing, music and art are adding a new chapter to the epic of American immigration.
Author Dinaw Mengestu teaches
at Georgetown University in
Washington, DC, and lives in
New York City.
[Photo: Blair Fethers]
Author Dinaw Mengestu’s first novel, The Beautiful Things That Heaven Bears (Read an Excerpt), came out this month to warm reviews. At an Ethiopian restaurant near downtown Washington, D.C., Mengestu, 29, is thinking back on the journey that brought him here. Born in Addis Ababa, he left Ethiopia at the age of 2, then spent the next seven years in Peoria, Ill. Now Mengestu teaches at Georgetown University and lives in New York City.
Incongruous as this path may seem, Mengestu says it began with the bloody revolutions that followed the overthrow of Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Tens of thousands of Ethiopians were imprisoned and executed.
Mengestu’s novel follows a character who, after his father is killed, makes his way to the District of Columbia. Mengestu drew on family history to imagine the past of his main character. Sepha Stephanos eventually opens a grocery in a gentrifying D.C. neighborhood and begins a relationship with a white academic and her biracial child.
At least 22,000 Ethiopians call the District of Columbia home. About half a million live in the United States. Some survived the horrors of the 1970s and 1980, and now their children are trying to make sense both of that period, which they never experienced first hand, and being young and black and African and American here.
Hip-hop musician Gabriel Teodros
lives in Seattle.
Gabriel Teodros, a hip-hop musician who lives in Seattle, is part of a rising movement of young writers, artists, and musicians who are figuring out how to explain the various worlds they traverse and the sometimes odd cultural interconnections they find.
Take, Teodros says, Jamaica’s Rastafarian culture, the trappings of which are popular in the United States. It literally venerates Ethiopia’s former emperor.
“What do Ethiopians think when they come to this country and they see all these people who really don’t have too much knowledge about what’s going on in Ethiopia, like [sporting] Haile Selassie on a shirt or wearing red, yellow and green [the Ethiopian flag colors]? I think for the most part, like when Ethiopians see that, they’re either like flattered, like ‘Wow, these people think Ethiopia’s really cool…’ Or they feel that it’s cultural appropriation. Like, ‘Why do you have the emperor’s face on your shirt?'”
Teodros complains that most Americans just associate Ethiopia with famine. But this generation has the pride of being from a place that remained largely independent while other African countries endured decades of European colonization.
Born in Addis Ababa, artist Julie
Mehretu was brought up in
Kalamazoo, Mich. She has
lived in New York and Senegal.
[Courtesy The Project, New York]
Born in Addis Ababa, painter Julie Mehretu is an art-world star. Her work is coveted by collectors and fetches hundreds of thousands of dollars. Mehretu, 36, was brought up in Kalamazoo, Mich., and has lived in New York and Senegal.
In her huge paintings, Mehretu layers together fragments of maps and architectural drawings into a shattered whole with shapes and markings that seem to have a meaning of their own, says Mik Awake, who covers arts and letters for an Ethiopian-American magazine called Tadias.
“There’s a whole language she’s invented that draws not just from one tradition or another, Ethiopian or American, but it’s just this completely new and ambitious take on the world and the world as a kind of gathering place where all these different symbols divorced of any kind of direct direction meet, converge and separate,” Awake says.
Julie Mehretu’s Stadia II, 2004,
acrylic on canvas, is part of an
exhibit by the artist in Hannover,
Germany. [Kunstverein Hannover]
He says that like every first generation in America that’s preceded them, this one has new answers to the question of who Americans are.
“We strongly urge you to insist the government of Ethiopia to unconditionally release the political prisoners, end arbitrary arrests, hold those security personnel who killed innocent civilians accountable, and institute reform so that history will not be repeated…” – letter Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice [pdf]
1. The political landscape in Ethiopia bristles with an array of groups and forces that have declared themselves to be, in one way or another, friends of Western industrial powers, chiefly the USA and EU, and, as such, subscribing to the values of democracy, the market (capitalist) economy and human rights as defined by those powers. At the same time, each and every one of the groups invariably professes to be the sole custodian of the popular aspirations for freedom, liberty, prosperity and general well-being. In other words, while a reading of their political programmes and manifestoes suggests the existence of broad, common themes that all of them share, none of them is eager to concede that such is the reality or that it is at all possible. The desire to stand alone and appear to be totally independent of others runs so deep that any apparent similarity, even identity, of objectives is vehemently denied.
2. Another major spectacle the political forces in Ethiopia display is the absence of any sense of historical, geographical (spatial) or temporal perspective in their thinking or practice. Reading their literature or listening to them, one will be left with the impression that the world is still in the 17th or 18th centuries, if not earlier. Thus the Oromo Liberation Front has championed, and is constantly calling for, a re-enactment of the wars that the Oromo people lost during the rough and tumble period in Ethiopian history (lasting roughly the second half of the second Millennium) when contests to dominate the Ethiopian state took all manners of shapes and involved forces as disparate as currently arraigned to snatch power from the TPLF/EPRDF. Others too entertain the same views though with diverging emphases and pursuits. The TPLF is increasingly veering towards re-establishing the Tigrayan dynasty that lost the Ethiopian crown to Shoa after Yohannes IV. Naturally, it does not own up to this; it pontificates, instead, on its concoction of ‘revolutionary democracy’ whereby a facade of democracy is maintained (in particular to appease foreign powers who demand it these days even from their puppets) but the role of the state and its institutions have been fashioned in accordance with the whims of a small group at the top and in furtherance of their sectarian goals. Shameless arguments of ‘our time has come’ have even been openly peddled by a few Tigrayan intellectuals to resurrect and support the ascendancy of a Tigrayan aristocracy long considered dead or hopeless. This time, of course, the objective is not to create a landed aristocracy but an industrial-financial one (based it happens on transferring state assets by sheer abuse of power and sometimes under the cover of ‘privatisation’).
3. The absence of perspective has a direct bearing on the activities of political groups. It is virtually impossible to discover a political programme among the political groupings in Ethiopia that offers clear alternatives to the ongoing perpetual decline of the country and the course of self/destruction most of them engage in. The perennial jockeying for power among these groups aims at excluding everyone else and, as a consequence, the politics of the land has turned into a ‘war of all against all’. The fact that practically all of them have signed up to subservience to foreign governments, especially the US and EU, and their policies for countries like ours has not dissuaded them from adopting such a path. In other countries, like-mindedness in programmes would generally persuade groups to merge or, at the very least, work together. Thus, upwards of four groups operate under the umbrella of freedom and liberty for the Oromo people; yet, they have not been able to create a unifying platform among themselves, leave alone solve the problem of freedom for a huge chunk of Ethiopia (Oromia) without freedom for all of it! To cite another example, the Hibret groups (both domestic and foreign-based) stand to all intents and purposes on the same pedestal as that of the Kinjit; nevertheless, they make it appear that they would prefer to work with the devil rather than join forces.
4. To understand these anomalies, one should look beyond the repeated declarations of Ethiopian political groups about their commitments to democracy and justice. The concept of power among most groups is still synonymous with warlordism and fiefdom. They view the role of the general public as one of onlookers and silent supporters–one might add, just as was during the imperial era. They equate the value of democracy and the need to earn the popular mandate to govern as merely peripheral to their pursuit of conquering the state; they consider them to be inconveniences, if they themselves are in power (just as during the reign of Haile Sellasie I, then the Dergue, now the TPLF), or as one of the means of gaining access initially (virtually all groups). In other words, democracy is perceived as a means of confirming one’s claims to hold on to or gain power rather than as a foundation for popular self-rule or self-determination. Very few among the individuals at the helm of the political groups are sworn to live and die by its principles. On occasions when assertion of those principles could have had a profound impact on the political process, many have been found wanting in one respect or another. In recent times, those expelled from the TPLF leadership (Gebru Assrat & Co.) had lacked a grasp of those principles and never asserted (practised) them while they were in positions of power and influence and until after they themselves fell victim to the dictatorship that everybody else but them had witnessed and deplored. To cite another instance, one of the young pretenders who made his name by open denunciations of the autocratic rule of the TPLF and its many misdeeds, Lidetu Ayalew, did not understand, or assert, the roles of those principles in the political process when he was on the ascendancy in the merger with other groups to form the Kinjit. Instead of working out within his own organisation, in an open and democratic manner, the necessity for such a merger and the modality of its implementation, he cried (literally!) foul about the manner of his ouster from the key positions he had apparently desired to gain (a subject of an entire book he wrote) after the fact, namely on his personal defeat, and reneged on his party’s agreement to merge. It is interesting to note that his personal wounds affected all his judgements and post-merger activities leading even his own erstwhile supporters to doubt whether he was a democrat at all, whether he had abandoned fighting against the dictatorship side by side with other groups, including even the Kinjit.
5. The fact of the matter is that, although many would not admit it, the current dominant thinking among the political elite borders on feudal parochialism and autocratism. Clearly, despite the destruction of the aristocracy in Ethiopia, one of the potent consequences of the 1974 Revolution, their sway continues in the ideological and cultural fields. Open debate still trails behind secrecy and gossip, declarations of real beliefs and aims are snowed under by smokescreens and subterfuge, the critique of ideas always takes second place to character assassinations, slander, misrepresentation and the like. It may be instructive to compare two books published in Addis over the last two years in Amharic pertaining to the current conditions and the possible ways out of them. Lidetu Ayalew and Gebre Kidan Desta’s books are remarkable by their exposition of feudal self-adulation and the absence of ideas which seek to take Ethiopia forward. The authors lament, respectively, the real or imagined loss of their personal or group positions. Lidetu screams about the unfairness and devious methods used to dislodge him from his expected top position in the Kinjit without at any moment pointing to the lapse in either the democratic process or the weaknesses, if any, in the democratic cause that the Kinjit sought to champion. If his disagreement was about the lack of a democratic process in effecting the merger or the content of the programme being drawn, then his best option must have been to alert, and appeal to, his own organisation for a suitable solution. In reality, as he has written in his book, he had issues not with any of these but with some of the figures who later became senior leaders of the Kinjit. Gebre Kidan (in his book, ¾ƒÓ^à I´w“ ¾ƒU¡I}™‹ c?^ Ÿƒ“â€ÂÆ’ ÂÂeŸ³_) similarly attacks the views of what he calls the enemy of the Tigray people (the ‘Ankoberites’) simply because those people oppose the TPLF for one reason or another. His denunciations of the Ankoberites is not based on proof that the TPLF has instituted democracy in Ethiopia but on linking them with their apparent support for Emperor Menelik whom he views as a traitor to Emperor Yohannes IV. Curiously, through his vigorous defence of Yohannes IV and denunciation of Menelik and the Ankoberites he projects a historical link between the TPLF and Yohannes IV and some sort of justification for re-establishing the supremacy of the TPLF-led Tigrayan elite over the Ethiopian state lost after Menelik’s ascent to power. Although his exposure of the narrow-mindedness of the present-day ‘Ankoberites’ is generally appropriate, at no point does he seek to subject the TPLF to any criticism for its failure to embrace the values of democracy and its lack of appreciation of what its ascendancy over the Ethiopian state demanded of it. Indeed, Gebre Kidan’s unquestioning loyalty to the TPLF and refusal to take it to task even based on the pleas of the ex-TPLF group of leaders to the Tigray people consign his book to an apology for the feudal parochialism and autocracy that the TPLF has reverted to over the years. It would therefore not be surprising if Gebre Kidan took his tirade to its logical conclusion and recommended the formal crowning of a Yohannes V for Ethiopia today.
7. The serious question that needs to be tackled today consequently is whether there are any political forces with a sufficient depth of grasp of, and firm commitment to, democratic values that can single-handedly or in cooperation take hold of the state and transform it into a democracy? It may come as no surprise to the reader that we do not find even a single force that qualifies currently for such a historical task. Although elements of democratism may be found among many groups, they do not express themselves on all occasions or fully. The secretive nature of discourse among and within Ethiopian political groups makes it extremely difficult for the democratic elements to assert themselves and gradually overtake the rampant feudal-parochial thinking that remains dominant within those groups. To be sure, the rise of Jacobins or Young Turks is not conditioned on the prior existence of a full-fledged democratic movement as they are supposed to spring into action from the moment they grasp the necessity for change. However, at least during the post-War Ethiopian historical period, the Patriots followed by the reformists and the revolutionaries did not mange to stamp their authority on the rising wave of opposition to imperial rule. The lack of an organisation to spearhead their aspirations always left them vulnerable to the powers that be. Even when, finally, organisations started to emerge in the 70s and 80s, the dominant group (EPRP) was seized by the obsession to snatch power from the ‘illegitimate’ Dergue and sacrificed everything else to that objective; its resort to ‘urban guerrilla tactics’ and total shutdown of any internal democracy (including the killing of some of the leaders and an emerging opposition) led to widespread state reprisals and the decimation of the same group and other democratic forces. The resulting demise of the Jacobins in Ethiopian history has left a gap that remains unfilled to this day.
8. In our view, the drawbacks of the currently sprawling groups in grasping democracy and practising it can be overcome in one of three ways. The first path is that of democratising them gradually, by effecting an internal transformation. Such an attempt has been in evidence in respect of the OLF and the Kinjit. Though not much is known of what is transpiring within the OLF, various sources suggest that it has had many internal upheavals and changes. Berhanu Nega’s personal account of the events and circumstances that led to the merger of the various groups into Kinjit and its participation in the 2005 elections as well as pitfalls indicates the existence of a similar process within Kinjit. Though couched as personal experiences and a political manifesto of sorts, the book represents a systematic exposition of alternative views to those held and practised by the governing party. Considering the internal dissonances and disarray that the Kinjit manifested in the period before the incarceration of its entire leadership (covered in an earlier article by the author, “Post-Election 2005 Ethiopia–A Sketch of Political Trends and Follies”), the book provides a programmatic guide for its unification and growth. One would have to wait and see whether it will serve as a tool for consolidation and resurgence of the Kinjit in the direction that Berhanu has charted. It is not difficult to judge at this stage that, in the conditions of the grip of feudal-parochial, sometimes also fascist, sentiments and thinking that prevails among the broadest membership, such a transformation will be, at the very least, long and arduous. The manner in which the internal squabbles over legitimacy within the ‘Kinjit International Leadership’ has been, or failed to be, dealt with portrays the persistent nature of the problem. No movement can become democratic virtually through a public pronouncement alone unless it begins to breathe and practise its principles. The Kinjit also has the unenviable task of proving to ALL Ethiopians that they should not fear from its prominence, that all its members subscribe to complete equality and non-discrimination. In particular, it needs to weed out, first from its leading ranks then from everywhere, persons who preach and promote plain racism under the guise of fighting the TPLF dictatorship (or the moronically phrased ‘TPLF Tigrayans’) or ‘ethnic politics’.
9. A second path for grasping democracy and practising it is to create a ‘Young Turk’ movement from scratch. Understandably, the demise of the first true attempt to create a democratic movement in Ethiopia has left behind many negative experiences. The idea of a radical transformation of society is being shunned in favour of either foreign tutelage or electoral democracy and the operation of market forces. Both options in the end count on incremental changes that might drag Ethiopia out of the morass it finds itself in–in effect along the lines of what has happened to many an African nation. However, the results of such a process have been all too familiar in those nations: unending decay, social and economic dislocation, disease and poverty. Leaving Ethiopia to the global economic and political forces and whatever they might bring about will end in the same way. Thus the adoption of novel or, better still, smart solutions to get it out of the current rot will be in urgent demand. Therein lies the rationale for the emergence of a ‘Young Turk’ movement, or shall we say, a ‘Young Ethiopia’ movement. Its objectives would be the renewal of that historical nation by installing a democratic regime and introducing radically new solutions to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
10. A third path for democratising Ethiopia is through the creation of the broadest consensus and convergence among the currently active political forces and groups. It has been argued above that there is no single force capable of spearheading democracy in Ethiopia, nor do we see a forceful expression of the values of liberty, justice and self-rule among any section or group within them. Where individuals have set out such objectives for the political forces to embrace (an example is the ‘Citizens Charter’), there still remains the absence of a forum for disseminating and critiquing them through debate and open political exchanges. Clearly, because weaknesses span groups and individuals engaged in the political process, it would be ideal to bring them all (especially the groups) together in the interest of the broadest section of the population and to try to paper over cracks in democratic thinking and practice. The alternative would be to engage in the spectacle of perennial somersaults of political groups in their pursuit to take over power from each other even with the full knowledge that none is more legitimate or mass-based than the rest. Ethiopians should not be exposed to the danger of one power-hungry group or another masquerading as democrats or liberators taking over from the TPLF only to discover the morning after that the rule of the gun has again won the day.
11. The call for consensus and convergence among political groups becomes all the more necessary because of the global forces arraigned against such nations as Ethiopia with a view to harnessing their natural and human potentials for the former’s economic and technological progress. While such forces represent a veritable danger for a total decline, even wipe out, of the entire country (not to mention that of sections that myopically seek to secede), only a unified political movement and solidly constructed national objectives can withstand their onslaught. Where, as it currently stands, political groups are allied to one foreign power or another and profess all kinds of wild dreams (Ogadenia!), the chances of rebuilding the economy will remain theoretical, forget the need to democratise the state. A by-product of creating the broadest consensus among political forces is the provision of space for alternative views and the growth of a new political culture. The remains of the Jacobins and any newly emerging ‘Young Ethiopia’ movement would have all the room they will desire to grow and supply leaders for the nation.
12. It would seem completely proven that the era of cyclical power plays in Ethiopia must come to a close if those devoted to its people and wishing to initiate a revival of the nation are to succeed. The creation of the broadest alliance of political movements and groups will be absolutely indispensable not only to take over from the TPLF but also to prevent any future repeat of decades-long dictatorship where the nation’s resources are squandered, freedom and democracy are mere smokescreens for dictatorial rule and society sinks further and further into poverty, disease and total decline. Finally, it must be noted that only such a power shift will equip Ethiopia to meet the challenges that globalisation throws at her. Any other formula will not disable the currently rife factional/fractional politics from continuing to endanger her standing presently and in the future.
The author would like to dedicate this piece to the memory of Yohannes Petros who died suddenly last week in London, England.
By Ethiopians and Ethiopian-Americans for a Democratic Ethiopia
On March 5, 2007, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is set to hand down his kangaroo court ruling on one group of his political victims, the leaders of CUD – Kinijit. It is likely that he will once again ignore the pleas of the Ethiopian people and the international community to release these “Prisoners of Conscience†from his prison. If that is what he is determined to do, then Ethiopians, Ethiopian-Americans and their friends have to gird themselves for a long hot summer of an all out and intensive lobbying and political campaign across the world. If the prime minister once again refuses to release the prisoners and resolve the political impasse he himself has created in a round table negotiation, then all bets on our part should be off for a final assault on one of the worst dictatorships on the African continent.
The campaign will primarily focus on exposing the tyranny, corruption, and inhumanity of the regime, as well as isolating its key leaders from the world community. We will, as never before, show the entire world the lies, cunning and malfeasance of the TPLF leadership who have become the “lords of poverty†in an impoverished land. The campaign will target the leaders of the regime along with their families to be made international pariahs unwelcome anywhere in the world. Their bank accounts shall be frozen and their travels restricted, and be held accountable for their crimes against humanity.
The above actions will be taken not out of revenge to punish the corrupt dictatorship but out of respect for our heroes who are fighting for democracy, unity and economic wellbeing on behalf of the millions in our fellow citizens. Our fight will not be against individuals, but against a system that has bondaged our people to unspeakable poverty, disease, civil strife, division and unremitting subjugation. We have to stop the 15-year old and still continuing killings, tortures, imprisonments, beatings and muzzling of the people by tyrants whose systematic lies and cunning have never been seen before in Ethiopian history.
Each one of us should make a solemn pledge to do our part to contribute to the struggle for democracy, unity and freedom in our homeland. Every one of us who believe in the sufferings of the oppressed people and prisoners should pledge that we will support the struggle in any capacity we can. To wage our struggle for democracy, unity and freedom, we shall utilize tried and true tactics used by such successful movements as that of South Africa’s.
Apartheid South Africa and Present-day Ethiopia
The fight against tyranny, division and corruption in Ethiopia should be modeled after the struggle that abolished apartheid in South Africa, because both present-day Ethiopia and apartheid South Africa have a lot in common. Consider the following:
1. Ethiopia is divided into tribal homelands as racist South Africa was during the days of apartheid.
2. Both regimes used age-old divide and rule tactics to rule over their subjects indefinitely by recruiting local stooges like Buthelezi who cow-tow to their whims. In return the cohorts enjoyed the regime’s largesse and lived in comfort and corruption while holding down the masses under them.
3. Just like apartheid South Africa, the Ethiopian dictators use the bulk of their budgets and foreign donations to finance their extensive network of informants, security and military apparatus.
4. Both regimes made adventurous military forays into their neighboring states presumably to fight against insurgents. In South Africa – Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia, the so-called frontline states, were the targets, while in Ethiopia, it is Somalia now, and who knows where it would be next.
5. The South African government squandered millions of tax dollars on lobbying Washington and Europe just as the despotic regime in Ethiopia does now.
6. Both regimes had the United States government behind their backs to give them diplomatic, military and financial support. You may recall President Reagan’s shameful support of apartheid South Africa in the 1980’s ostensibly to counter Soviet expansionism. He even had a name for his South African policy called “constructive engagement.†Today, the Bush Administration uses a similar policy in Ethiopia with a different name called “counter terrorism.†Once again the administration is on the wrong side of history. The Reagan administration made a mockery of justice and democracy by supporting a ruthless and corrupt apartheid system. Consequently the administration’s misguided policy helped galvanize the collective conscience of the American people for justice. Universities and churches played a key role in helping the American people to stand up against the South African tyranny. Congress, state houses and cities passed laws to help freedom fighters and human rights advocates incarcerated in South Africa prisons. We can do the same to raise the consciousness of the American people and the international community to take the side of democracy in Ethiopia.
This is just an example of what Ethiopians in the Diaspora can do to help fellow countrymen and women overcome the dictatorship that is suffocating our people. All we need are organization, know-how and determination which we have in abundance. We don’t even need to match the all-out South African campaign for freedom because the European Union is already on record condemning the Ethiopian dictatorship and the support of the American administration for the incompetent and half-baked former Marxists in Addis Ababa is lukewarm at best. Most of all, the regime is rejected and despised by every sector of the Ethiopian community including by its own tribal community of origin.
Today the parasitic regime lives off international handouts and donations. Early in 2006, it was widely reported that the regime’s military and security apparatus were in disarray or crumbling because the European Union and the World Bank had suspended their financial assistance in protest of the regime’s abuse of the human and civil rights of its citizens. What is still needed now to bring the regime in Addis Ababa to its knees is to once again turn off the tap of its international financial and diplomatic support. In short, our action plans include:
1. Organizing campaign and lobbying groups in cities states, universities and churches.
2. Work to get the World Bank and the international community to refrain from propping up the regime with their financial assistance.
3. Identifying the key leaders of the regime and expose their crimes.
4. Persuading the United States and European countries to restrict travel privileges of the key leaders and their families.
5. Seeking the assistance of the international community to find the bank accounts of the leaders and persuade them to freeze their assets.
6. Campaigning for the boycott of the businesses of the leaders and their associates.
It is important to know that history is on our side. The world is sick and tired of dictatorships and the poverty, strife, dislocation and human misery they cause. Today, the international community is well aware of the human rights abuse, political turmoil and the attendant misery in Ethiopia. We have lots of conscientious, determined and capable fellow citizens prepared to lead this campaign to free our people from one of the worst dictatorial regimes in the world. It is sad we have to resort to such extreme measures that may also impact the reputation of our country in the long run. However, we hope against hope that the Meles regime will see the potential damage such a wide range and worldwide protest would engender and come to its senses. If not, then fellow Ethiopians, we have our work cut out for us. Let us get on with it and pledge ourselves to do our part and contribute whatever we can to bring democracy to our long-suffering fellow citizens and gain the release of the elected representatives of the people.
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Ethiopians and Ethiopian-Americans for a Democratic Ethiopia (EEDE) [email protected]
