Sources at the Ethiopian embassy in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) told the Gulf News that eight female maids had been poisoned by a compatriot maid last Wednesday in an apartment in Sharjah, the largest city in the third largest emirate of the country.
The woman accused of killing the eight domestic workers is said to be held in the emirate’s central jail, but Sharjah police have publicly denied reports of the multiple murders, calling them “just rumors.”
The embassy sources said the police had reported the incident to them, but were still investigating the motive behind the killings.
The sources claimed the bodies of the eight murdered women had been transferred to the morgues at two local hospitals. Officials at both hospitals reported that no bodies had been brought to the morgue, but that it was possible the bodies had been sent for forensic examinations.
The women are understood to have been living together in an apartment in the Abu Shagara neighborhood of the city.
The UAE has received extensive criticism over the years from human rights and labor organizations over the conditions for foreign workers in the country.
Domestic workers, which make up a significant proportion of the UAE’s predominately foreign population, have complained of sub-standard housing, lack of medical care, abuse and non-payment of wages.
The average Emirati household had 10 members in 2008, including domestic workers and drivers. The average monthly wage last year for such a household was the equivalent of about U.S. $12,800.
The government announced new regulations two years ago requiring holiday, medical care and registered salaries for all foreign domestic workers in the country. A conflict resolution unit was also set up to resolve disputes between employees and workers.
“This is a category of workers that are extremely vulnerable because there are no labor laws that apply to them,” Ibrahim Awad, Director of the International Migration Program at the International Labor Organization, told The Media Line. “In most countries migrant domestic workers are not covered by domestic labor laws because their workplace is a household. This presents a very big challenge.”
“International instruments of human rights apply to domestic workers and there are regulations in the UAE that ensure that domestic workers are paid their wages,” Awad continued. “By law, passports and documents cannot be withheld from migrant workers, for example, but the degree of enforcement varies. This presents a particular problem for domestic workers because labor inspectors cannot get access to their workplaces as they work in private homes.”
The International Labor Organization plans to push international standards or labor recommendations for domestic laborers in their annual conference next year.
The United States recently placed the country on a watch list of countries with poor human trafficking records.
Ethiopian women are regularly trafficked via Djibouti, Egypt and Somalia for domestic servitude, particularly to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.
The Ethiopian government banned its citizens from traveling to Lebanon in May last year following the deaths of a number of Ethiopian domestic workers in the country. The ban remains in effect.
The following is an audio record of Ethiopian Review’s worldwide teleconference that was held on Sunday, July 12, 2009, with:
1. Ato Melkie Mengiste, Secretary General of EPPF International Committee
2. Ato Sileshi Tilahun, Organizational Head of EPPF International Committee
3. Ato Demis Belete, Head of EPPF’s Press Office and representative of the EPPF Washington Metropolitan Chapter
Click below to listen:
[podcast]http://www.ethiopianreview.info/audio/eppf-teleconf-07122009.mp3[/podcast]
Former chairman of the Tigran People Liberation Front (TPLF, aka Woyanne), Ato Aregawi Berhe, has just published a new book, “A Political History of the TPLF.” The book is important in understanding how the Woyanne tribal junta came to power, and its historical anti-Ethiopia stand. The chapter about the relationship between the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) and Woyanne is particularly revealing. (The book is available at Tsehai Publishers.) The following are some excerpts from the book.
The TPLF and the EPLF: Cupboard-Love Relationship
Excerpts from A Political History of the TPLF
By Aregawi Berhe
From the beginning, the relationship between the Tigray People Liberation Front and the Eritrean People Liberation Front was an amorphous connection, but on the side of the militant Tigraians, who counted on historical, cultural and kinship ties, it was believed the new relationship with the EPLF would work. There was the perception among TPLF members that the TPLF elite was well-educated and could articulate and extend the long-standing relationship between the two peoples beyond what Italian colonialists had created in the 1880s. However, considering the attitude of the EPLF that transpired in due course, it was by and large external circumstances, i.e., the pressure of a common enemy that propelled the relationship to work. Yet unlike the larger section of the ELF that was from the outset influenced by Islamist lowlanders, the EPLF had a clearer picture about cultural and political developments in Ethiopia in general and in Tigrai in particular, largely because of their affinity and exposure to kin across the Mereb River. Contacts between EPLF activists and militant Tigraians had started much earlier, during the Ethiopian student movement of the early 1970s.
When the militant Tigraians were confronted in 1974 by an aggressive military force, the Derg, that sought total obedience from everybody, they were in outright defiance and searched for support in order to launch armed insurgency. It was imperative for them to look for such support from the EPLF. But EPLF leaders, on the other hand, were hoping to find an ally in Ethiopia that could cooperate in expanding their theatre of operations. It was a time when the EPLF was badly in need of support from Ethiopian sympathizers in its efforts to dislodge the remaining government forces concentrated in a few towns in Eritrea. The well-publicized news of ELF-TLF joint operations inside Ethiopia in early 1975 must have motivated them to quickly link up with a Tigraian front. These circumstances led the TPLF-EPLF relationship to start before it had had time to conduct formal discussion or agreements. There seemed to be enthusiasm in the EPLF camp for supporting a Tigraian movement at this juncture, which led the forging of working relations between the two fronts.
After the initial connection was established, modalities of cooperation were expected to be set and political positions discussed and agreed upon, but the EPLF instead offered in advance to train as many recruits as the TPLF could mobilize. It was an attractive offer the TPLF could not afford to waste. It focused on seizing the opportunity and on finding recruits to be engaged in fighting the enemy. The formalities that would define the relationship between the two organizations were therefore ignored and informal contact became the defining aspect of the relationship.
Initially the cooperation appeared to go smoothly, but the EPLF’s support for the TPLF did not match the latter’s expectations. Many reasons could be attributed to this shift of attitude on the part of the EPLF: perhaps because the relationship was not based on a formal agreement, or existing relations between the EPLF and EPRP might have created reluctance of the EPLF towards the TPLF, or perhpas supporting a struggle for the self-determination of Tigrai might have set an unwanted precedent for Eritrea.
The EPRP was then considered the strongest revolutionary party and indeed had huge numbers of followers all over Ethiopia. It was also widely believed to assume power sooner or later. The EPLF too seemed to believe this. For the EPLF, its relationship with the EPRP was thus much more important, as the latter claimed to represent the whole Ethiopia. And when compared with the EPRP at that time (1975-76), the TPLF was just a small ethno-nationalist movement with fewer followers. However, there were some sticky political problems for both the TPLF and EPRP regarding Eritrea. While they recognized the struggle for the Eritrean independence as genuine, they had differences as to whether the case was a ‘colonial issue’ or not. Without conducting the necessary study or having appropriate discussions, the TPLF held the view that the Eritrean case was a ‘colonial question.’ as the EPLF wanted it to be. It was probably an opportunistic stand, designed to outflank the EPRP from the privileged position the EPLF offering it. Without understanding the consequences that were to haunt it in the discourse of Ethiopian political history, this position continued to be the stand of the TPLF for years to come.
Another concern of the TPLF was what the removal of the TLF from the scene, which took place as early as November 1975, would mean for the EPLF. The ELF’s wider mobility, supported by the a proxy organization in Tigrai, might have prompted the EPLF to initially look for its own proxy organizations in Tigrai to counter its rival. But once the TLF had been dissolved, the EPLF had less need to worry about the ELF’s activities gaining ground in Tigrai and beyond. That situation appeared to reduce the TPLF’s importance for the EPLF’s and gave more weight to its relations with the EPRP.
Towards the end of 1975, differences between the EPRP and the TPLF surfaced when they were operating in the same territory and trying to mobilize and organize the same people. News of rivalry between the two was also coming from the towns. On the initiative of the TPLF. leaders of both fronts met in Marwa in January 1976 to look into these encounters and consider possible remedies. The TPLF presented a suggestion that it thought would benefit both organizations and avoid them overlapping and clashing. The TPLF requested that the EPRP operate in regions of the country that the TPLF could not reach. By implication, the suggestion was recognition of the TPLF as the viable front that could take care of the struggle in Tigrai against the common enemy, the Derg. As we saw earlier, the demand infuriated EPRP delegates and they broke off the meeting and enmity was created. This was a concern fro EPLF leaders, but their main worry was that a fragmented or ethnically based movement in Ethiopia might weaken a viable future ally — the EPRP. Eventually, TPLF military action, like that launched against the TLF, would deprive the EPLF of an ally expected to seize power in Ethiopia and the anticipated acquiescence to handle the Eritran question would evaporate. The EPLF continued to exert pressure on the TPLF to come to terms with the EPRP and in a letter to the TPLF, the concerns of the EPLF were clearly stated, with an underlying warning note. For strategic purposes, the EPLF stood beside the EPRP and influenced by their leader’s desire to work with the EPRP, EPLF top cadres urged Ethiopians, and especially Tigraians in Eritrea, to join the EPRP and not the TPLF.
In the first half of 1976, the TPLF unexpectedly had released its controversial manifesto, better known as Manifesto 68. In this handwritten document, the TPLF declared that its struggle was for Tigrai’s independence from Ethiopia, which was basically the same claim the Eritrean fronts had put forward for their region. Earlier, this position had been entertained by the TLF, but it was vehemently rejected by the TPLF on the grounds that there was no historical or political justification for it. It was a surprise to many fighters to see their organization come up with such an unwarranted claim. The EPLF also opposed the TPLF manifesto for independence on the grounds that Tigrai was an inegral part of Ethiopia and there was no justification for secession from Ethiopia. At this time, the EPLF was reluctant to support separatist movements in Ethiopia, not just as a matter of princople but for various other motives as well… [more excerpts will be posted later]
Addis Ababa — Aba Gebremedhin (formerly known as Aba Paulos), the Woyanne cadre who is installed as the patriarch of Ethiopia’s Orthodox Tewahdo Church, has been stripped of most of his administrative duties by the Synod, the Church’s executive body, according to the Addis Ababa-based newspaper Awramba Times.
The Synod decided to take such measures against Aba Gebremedhin in an emergency meeting after he arbitrarily suspended Addis Ababa bishop Abune Samuel.
There has been much talk recently about the possible “retirement” of the über-boss in Ethiopia. Reuters reported that “… Meles Zenawi wants to step down after 18 years running sub-Saharan Africa’s second most populous country.” Apparently, the dictator is “bored” with the racket he has been running for the past 18 years, or at least nagging questions about when he will be calling it quits. The dictator says he needs the permission of La Famiglia, “his ruling party before he can leave.” Reuters rhetorically asked: “So when might he go? And what will happen if he does?”
According to Reuters’ guessing game, the dictator could “get permission to leave” at the party congress in September, but that is unlikely “a year before Ethiopia has its next national election due in June 2010.” He could be ousted as a result of an opposition win, but that “would be a shock. The 2005 elections ended in violence when Meles claimed victory, the opposition shouted fraud and about 200 protestors were killed by police and soldiers.” He “wins in 2010 and the opposition cries foul… But despite Ethiopia’s close relations with the West, allegations of fraud or violence would be more difficult for the international community to take a second time and the country could see its aid slashed, plunging it deeper into poverty.” The dictator’s party “wins the election, there is no violence and Meles will probably resign within two years and be replaced by a party loyalist who will continue his domestic, economic and foreign policies.” Or the dictator “serves another 5-year term and runs again.”
The dictator is dismissive of these speculations. He says he wants to relinquish power, go into retirement and “have a long good rest.”
To Chuckle or to Guffaw?
We have listened to the amusing blather about staying or leaving office for the past several years. We are never sure whether to chuckle or guffaw every time we hear it recycled through the propaganda machine: “I will resign. I will leave office at the end of my term, but only if my party allows me to. I will stay in office as long as my party demands it of me. I will leave office, but I won’t tell you when. I will leave office when I leave office. Oh! Questions about when I will leave office bore me.” Indeed, the whole affair has become a recurrent farcical comic opera. International journalists ask the dictator when he plans to leave, and he feeds them the same crock of ambiguous, opaque and enigmatic answers in his usual doublespeak and pretentious phraseology. The journalists draw up their own fanciful speculations about what he will do, and the charade goes on and on. But the climax of this bizarre jabber is always the same: “May be I will go. May be I won’t. It’s for me to know, and for the rest of you to speculate about and play guessing games.”
The Solipsistic Logic of Dictators
The question is never whether any dictator will stay or go. We know from Gandhi’s axiom that all dictators eventually go: “There have been tyrants and murderers and for a time they seem invincible but in the end, they always fall — think of it, ALWAYS.” The question about when a tyrant will fall is solipsistic (has special meaning only to the tyrant) and reveals much about the tyrant’s egoistic self-absorption and self-indulgence with power. The tyrant’s choice of the word “boring” to dismissively respond to questions about the timing of his departure is quite curious. Boredom and anxiety are states of mind on a psychological continuum. Could it be that giving a date certain for leaving office creates in the mind of the tyrant deep angst about unclinging from power and the potential consequences that could follow?
For the critical observer, the question of when the tyrant will leave office is a rhetorical tautology (that is, the question is incapable of producing a truthful answer that can be verified or falsified). In other words, any response by the dictator to the question is unlikely to produce or convey truthful or useful information regardless of how many times it is asked. The response will always be hedged and interwoven in a fabric of deceit and absurd contingencies such as obtaining permission from the party, new leaders taking over, democracy being institutionalized and so on. Consider the following muddled and transparently evasive response:
My personal position is that I have had enough. I am arguing my case and the others are also arguing their case. I hope we will come up with some common understanding on the way forward that would not require me to resign from my party that I have fought for all my life. We are not talking about Meles only. We are talking about the old generation. The party needs to have new leadership that does not have the experience of the armed struggle…. It would be very important for everybody, particularly for the fledgling democratic institutions of this country…. The party is in the process of dialogue, and sooner or later it will make its decision, and that will be it… We have a large leadership pool, any one of whom could take the mantle… [The ethnic background of his replacement] is not a prime consideration. The party has gone beyond that…”
It is not clear from the foregoing statement why the dictator can not leave office immediately or on a date certain, or what argument he is presenting for or against leaving office. But the dictator’s uncompromising conclusory statement “I have had enough.” objectively indicates that he has reached a final and irreversible psychological state on his tenure in office. Simply stated, the dictator is completely disgusted and bored with what he is doing. He does not want to do the job anymore. But he quickly qualifies his expression of disgust by pleading to stay in power so that he “would not [be] require[d] to resign from my party that I have fought for all my life”. He feigns humility by claiming that his staying or leaving office is not about him at all. It is really about the old guards passing the baton to the new generation of leaders and so on. He hedges by implying that he can not leave office until the generational transfer of power is complete. The whole self-contradictory response reflects the solipsistic narcissism of a megalomaniacal dictator who seeks to tether not only the fate of his party to himself, but also the country’s destiny.
But the dictator’s definitive statement invites further query: He has “had enough” of what exactly? Massive violations of human rights? Kangaroo court justice? Systemic corruption? Lies? Perhaps, he has had enough of THE TRUTH!?
All of this farcical talk about leaving office does have a not-so-hidden strategic purpose. It is intended as a trial balloon to divert attention from the already-won 2010 election. The dictator hopes to fool, confuse and confound the opposition and international donors by titillating them with the possibility of his leaving office. We will predict that the dictator and his gang will be shoveling loads of propaganda between now and the already-won election of 2010 in a futile effort to distract public attention and convince donors that they are the only viable democratic alternative.
We should refrain from playing a guessing game of who will replace the dictator. We know for a fact that replacing Tweedledee with Tweedledum from another ethnic group (or replacing the old guard from the days of the armed struggle with a newer generation of their clones) will not amount to a hill of beans. The problems that have been festering in Ethiopia for the past two decades can not be cured by the departure of a bored, jaded, dispirited and weary dictator, or by his replacement clone. The problems are structural and viral in the system of dictatorial mis-governance over the past 18 years. Let’s be crystal clear: The dictator’s “retirement”, “resignation” or whatever nonsense he is talking about will not mean the beginning of the rule of law and it will not mean the end of massive human rights violations. His retirement will not end arbitrary arrests and imprisonments; the independent media will not function freely because he goes; the bantustans of ethnic federalism he created to divide and rule will not vanish immediately, and corruption will not stop. There is only one way to bring about fundamental change: Replace the one-man, one-party dictatorship with a genuine multiparty system.
No Rest for the Wicked!
There is not a single instance in the history of modern dictatorships where dictators voluntarily packed up and left power one fine morning. Dictators are to power as bloodsucking ticks are to a cow. Neither can survive without its life-giving force. There are many reasons why dictators will not leave power voluntarily. In Ethiopia, the reason is that the dictators will never outplay themselves at their own zero sum game. For them leaving power means losing everything. EVERYTHING! It means being held accountable for their monstrous crimes; losing their privileged positions in society; giving up their ill- gotten gains and the absolute power they wielded for nearly two decades.
Old dictators never fade away; they just cling to power like bloodsucking tics on a cow, until they inevitably fall. Sometimes they do run, but they can never hide. As for a “long good rest,” it is written in the Book of Isaiah (57:20, 21), that “the wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.”
Addis Ababa — The power shortage in Ethiopia is affecting many areas of service. Addis Ababa and large urban centers experience blackouts for three or four nights a week.
Mehret Debebe, the CEO of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation says the outages will continue through July. Urban neighborhoods are without water, health facilities are without light and water, factories have shut down, shelves in many stores are empty and a growing number of people are without jobs.
The price of candles, lanterns and kerosene are rising every day, according to some residents.In some communities, residents complain that they are being billed for the electric power they haven’t used. The power outages frequently interrupt classes in schools, colleges and universities in many regions in Ethiopia where students follow lessons on large-screen plasma television monitors and perform research on computers. Evening classes are often plunged into darkness and cancelled.
“Because the country is going through a transforming economic growth, we are experiencing power shortages,” Mehret said. “Industries are booming, trade and the rate we are bringing electricity to rural towns created the shortage.
“We saw a 24 percent increase in demand. The problem persisted because our planned commissioning of two hydro-electric generating projects was postponed.
Minister of Energy and Mines Alemayehu Tegenu says upon completion of projects, Ethiopia not only will cover its electricity demand, but also, plans are already in place to export power to neighboring countries. “We are completing the construction of power cables that connect our hydro-electric power stations to neighboring countries,” he said.
Prime Minister Ethiopia’s tribal junta leader Meles Zenawi said, “The country is unable to curb the problem of power shortage on time, because our development partners didn’t provide us the support they had promised earlier. The shortage and the untimeliness of rain in Ethiopia is also another major factor that contributed to the problem.”
