On Monday 27 June, the Central High Court in Addis Ababa sentenced a medical professor and four other members of an opposition group, the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), to two years’ imprisonment.
“The five convicted prisoners appear to have been imprisoned on the basis of slender and dubious evidence and without direct proof of the alleged conspiracy”, Amnesty International said today. The human rights organization has not yet received the full details of the judgment, but at this stage it seems that the judges relied on prosecution evidence which was not properly corroborated.
This evidence included a written note apparently found by the police at the university and a statement made to the police during the preliminary investigations by a witness who died before the trial. All five men denied the charges of incitement to violence and are appealing to the Supreme Court to overturn the sentences.
Professor Asrat Woldeyes, 65, had been free on bail during the long trial but the other four – Sileshi Mulatu, 61, AAPO’s office manager, Teshome Bimerew, an Addis Ababa University student, former army lieutenant Chane Alamrew and Ambelu Mekonnen, a farmer from Gojjam, had been in prison for over a year. A court had granted them bail but the Supreme Court overruled it. The five men were arrested in July 1993 and charged with holding a meeting in the AAPO office nine months earlier at which they were alleged to have planned violent attacks on the government.
Professor Asrat was previously accused of inciting inter-communal violence in 1992 following an AAPO rally speech in Debre Berhan. He denied these charges and has constantly maintained that AAPO is committed only to non-violent opposition.
The government, however, and the state-controlled news media have persistently accused the organisation of “war-mongering”, although without producing evidence to substantiate this. In a recent interview, the Minister of Defense accused Professor Asrat of “unsuccessfully declaring war against the government for the last three years”. Although the trial of Professor Asrat and his four co-defendants was held in open court and with defense representation, Amnesty International is concerned whether they received a fair trial according to international standards. The human rights organization is continuing its investigation into the case, but so far it believes all five men to be prisoners of conscience who should therefore be immediately and unconditionally released.
The defendants denied any plan of anti-government violence. They said the meeting had been about complaints the AAPO had received of abuses by government soldiers of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and pro-government militias against AAPO supporters and Amharas.
The AAPO, one of many nationality/ethnic-based political groups in Ethiopia, was founded in 1992 to defend the interests of the formerly dominant Amhara nationality (or ethnic group) and to propagate the “unity of Ethiopia”.
The AAPO has reported numerous cases of detentions, “disappearances” and alleged torture and extrajudicial executions of AAPO supporters and Amharas — including some cases in the past month — by government troops and pro-government militias in the central Amhara Region and in other regions where Amharas are a minority. The AAPO, along with all other opposition parties, boycotted the Constituent Assembly elections of 5 June 1994.
Ethiopia made a new start in 1991, but it is yet too early to give an objective assessment of the direction in which it is likely to move. The provisional government is facing a multitude of problems which have to be solved before the country can start on a new path towards development.
Ethiopian society is in a state ofrapid change and the experiences of the period of 1974 to 1992 will have important effects on the direction this takes. A critical look back over the last 19 years of Ethiopian history can help define the issues confronting society today and show how best to make use of the lessons learned.
If issues urgently demanding resolution in so many fields are to be confronted and new pitfalls are to be avoided, it is important to understand the ‘experiment’ of the revolutionary period and its consequences. Most important, following the dissolution of cooperatives and many state farms and the weakening of the authority of peasant associations, the question of land ownership and its redistribution has once again come to the fore. This is a question of tremendous importance for the majority of Ethiopians depending as they do on access to agricultural land for their livelihood; and it raises general issues of policy because it involves having to decide whether to give priority to ensuring efficient production or to feeding the poor. An emphasis on the latter would favour policies that put self-supply, subsistence production, food security and famine preparedness first. In a fast growing population, food security can hardly be achieved unless every family is able to feed itself and keep back whatever reserves are necessary for bad years. Unless population growth can be considerably reduced, there will be a periodic demand for land redistribution and if this demand is not met the number of landless and unemployed poor will inevitably increase. On the other hand, if land is redistributed, farm land will have to be subdivided until a point is reached where plots cease to become available.
Macro-economists may be tempted to seek a way out of the dilemma by placing the emphasis on trying to achieve efficient production on technically advanced modern farms. But, given the present population structure, this is a dangerous path to choose; modern machinery is expensive both to import and to run. It requires foreign currency, which can only be earned through selling to an international market, which in turn offers poor prices for rural products. A policy of increased production through imported technology may result in more being paid for the inputs than can be earned from the sale of the produce, as demonstrated by state farms in the past. Moreover, mechanization will inevitably increase the number of unemployed; thus more efficient food production may end up making those people it was supposed to feed unable to afford the food produced.
Since it is generally accepted that agriculture has a key role to play in stimulating economic growth in Ethiopia, these problems are of prime importance for any future development. Moreover, agricultural development must ensure that the policies that are implemented result in stabilizing the ecological balance and controlling erosion. It would be impossible to sustain agricultural development without curbing ecological deterioration.
The provisional government is also beset by other problems, foremost among which is the question of political reorganization. The issue of nationality has become so central to Ethiopian political life that without the formulation of a clear policy, no new administrative structure seems possible. In order to build up a new system of democracy, it is essential that the different levels of decentralization should be defined and agreed upon.
To be effective, a democracy also needs to control economic forces and interests, which is an inseparable part of making difficult political decisions. The government is under great pressure, both at home and abroad, to establish a market economy, yet at the same time it is conscious of the need to control the key economic factors. Whether a mixed economy is compatible with a balance between free market forces and sufficient political control is open to debate, and the precise content of the mix is no less contentious.
Another key issue, which is sensitive both internationally and internally, is respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, whether ethnic, social, religious or linguistic. There is also a need for new solutions to the problems of public health, education, child welfare, gender, unemployment and internal security – the list could go on almost indefinitely.
As if all of this were not enough, the new government has found itself under strong pressure from the World Bank and international donors to implemenl. a structural adjustment programme. While major economic restructuri:ng is imperative in Ethiopia, this external pressure has put strong restrictions on the possible range of economic decisions, limiting the choices open for government action. It has also limited the scope for implementing different internal policies.
The difficulties facing Ethiopia are grave and have no easy solution. The new government is in a most unenviable position. Given that it has empty treasuries, faces a host of conflicting demands from different social groups within, is being attacked by nationalist resistance groups and an urban elite violently opposing Eritrean independence and lives under the constant tlhreat of confrontations breaking out between the different religious groups, it must be sorely tempted to avoid making decisions wherever possible.
A new start can only have some hope of success and win legitimacy if it is able to provicle a new vision for the future. While the struggle over what new policies to implement remains unresolved, the government has yielded to pressure for structural adjustment and has agreed to devalue the birr. Juriging from the economic reforms so far implemented, the government has shown no sign of being able to deliver any new or credible visiorn of a better future.
For all these reasons it is important to look back at the Mengistu period to try to find an explanation for what went wrong and why. Through such analysis one may hope to arrive at a better understanding of which paths to pursue in future and which to avoid.
The aim of this volume is to attempt such a look ‘back into the future’. In different fields and from different angles our authors (seven of whom are Ethiopiurn) try to draw lessons from the Mengistu past that might have relevance for the future (some go even further back into
Ethiopian history).
On looking through the various contributions to this book, it is noticeable that they all converge on one broad theme, namely a firm preference for decentralized solutions. At first sight this could be taken as a fashionable scepticism concerning (or instinctive aversion from) the strong emphasis that has been prevalent in the recent past on central decisions and a central monopoly of power. On a second reading, however, deeper convergences appear in relief. Though the authors work in different fields, approach their subjects from different angles and employ different methods of analysis, they communicate a similar message: the Ethiopian government should encourage decentralization and place more trust in the practical knowledge of the peasants; it needs to value its local communities and local institutions.
The prospect of being able to rely on the knowledge and initiatives of local people to find solutions to the innumerable and complex problems facing their society is a thesis worthy of close attention. The slogan ‘think globally, act locally’ may have renewed relevance in present day Ethiopia: if a solution is to be found it is likely to come from diverse and decentralized efforts, from a multitude of local initiatives and from the mobilization of the will of the people to improve their collective situation.
For example, the most basic requirement of development is that it should create conditions that allow everybody access to sufficient food for a decent life. A worldwide right to food has been asked for many times, but it has proved to be quite unattainable on a global level. The world community has subsided into helplessness: no international agency could realistically assume the responsibility of feeding all the poor of the world. And even if it could, the massive distribution of food might itself create new problems by spoiling food markets and undermining the economic base of food producers, thus increasing the number of mouths to feed. The right to food is therefore nowhere codified in a way committing any agency to more than a general intention to work for economic conditions that may eventually provide food for all.
Local systems that have for a long time practised an individual right to food are not, however, unknown. They have usually operated within the narrow confines of societies that were much poorer than they are today in terms of the absolute availability of food and food reserves per person. They managed, however, to build up a social security system on the basis of a right to community membership, inseparably linked with an obligation to contribute to the provision of a minimum for all. Being poor, such societies could soon reach their limits; but so long as there was food the obligation to share and the right to receive existed.
A new way of thinking, which starts at the local level and uses the traditional knowledge of the people, has to begin by reactivating systems of mutual help and local co-responsibility. People who work on the land do have experience of keeping stocks for emergencies. Food security and disaster preparedness are traditional parts of rural life. A wealth of knowledge about wild foods that can be collected in times of drought thus allowing people to survive in extreme situations is preserved in many areas.
These traditions must be revitalized so that in times of hardship people can claim food security and access to work from their community and can feed themselves from the land during normal harvests, thus being encouraged to assume responsibility for organizing their own food security within their own community.
This common theme, which has emerged from the views of the different authors, signals a shift in our thinking on Ethiopian development: whereas in the past the responsibility for national development and economic growth was laid squarely at the feet of central government, it seems initiatives are now expected from below and the responsibility for finding appropriate solutions and administering them appears decentralized. Democracy as decentralization thus appears to be a common denominator, whether authors deal with the economy or famine, the environment or education. Development is no longer expected to come from investments from abroad, but from local and individual efforts. It is expected to start not with cooperation between a government and foreign donor nations, but with more influence, power, resources, rights, information and responsibility being given to the people, working through their own institutions.
If it is taken as a democratic principle that although people may have different cultures they are equal in their rights and responsibilities, then mechanisms will have to be found to reverse the rapidly growing differentiation that has been observed over the past 15 years. Differences have been allowed to grow within a state that has monopolized control over economic resources and political decisions. Differences have increased not only in political power, but also (at least as important) in economic influence, social position and the degree to which access is available to information, sources of knowledge and health care. If this trend is to be reversed, then political decisions must inevitably be brought closer to the people and as much responsibility and authority as possible delegated to small local units, to the neighbourhoods, the edir and equb, the debo and maarro, the kebele, the peasant associations and labour unions. Only decision making by people in the small and coherent groups with which they are familiar will allow the optimum mobilization oftheir initiative, expertise and human resources.
The principle that people are different but peers also requires a new orientation for development policies. It demands that more emphasis should be placed on attaining immediate results for the well-being of the majority, especially of those who are less privileged’ It places the well-being of the people at the focal point of development efforts. Even if the ultimate goal, the growth of welfare, is unchanged, the changed emphasis relegates the aims of modernization, economic growth and efficiency to a secondary position. Postponing the immediate consumption of benefits for the sake of future improvement may be a good investment principle for people who can afford it: it becomes meaningless for people who are too poor to save and who would starve before they could reap the benefits of investments paid through their sacrifice.
Local responsibility for administration and development would also go a long way towards defusing the tensions growing out of nationality conflicts in today’s Ethiopia. At a local level, peasants can pursue their particular interests and find specific solutions without violating or questioning their loyalty to their nationality group. Instead of fighting for central power, organizations of nationalities can concern themselves with locally applicable policies, trying to influence local decisions and staking out their position on issues specifically concerning local people. The central government for its part can be concerned with offering support to local demands, rather than controlling and checking the influence of their supposed rivals.
Integrating peasants, irrespective of their nationality, as equals into independent communities that would form integral parts of one nation state would abolish the need to organize nationalities as political parties or pressure groups. From very different starting positions in their respective contributions to this volume both Adhana and Melaku visualize the possibility of an alternative process. They both want to replace the competition between nationalities for political influence with a balanced coexistence in which people are recognized as different but equal entities, as co-responsible for collective development. Adhana detects in the EPRDF programme a chance of creating an Ethiopian nation state that would integrate both peasants and urban professionals of all nationalities as equals into one nation state. Melaku challenges the EPLF to allow equality for all national and political groups and interests in Eritrea. What these authors share is a trust in the collective decisions of independent individuals irrespective of their ethnic or social origins.
Bahru Zewede attempts to locate the historical point at which Emperor Hayla-Sellase might be considered to have changed from a progressive to a reactionary. In his study he analyses the place of educatlon and charts the mutual disillusionment between emperor and student.
In a somewhat different context Randi Balsvik found this same willingness to trust the ingenuity of ordinary people in the student policies of the late Hayla-sellase period. student opposition formed an important starting point for the revolution of 1914 and, by helping peasants organize their associations into local, independent and self-determining decision-making units, students played a significant role in the land reform and its implementation. Their ideals of equal rights were, however, later pushed aside in favour of an Eastern European style of central state authority, a shift of direction requiring explanation.
The common denominator of the historical chapters can thus be seen as a position supporting the equality of all nationalities, social groups and opinions. Their hope for Ethiopia’s future would lie not in chauvinist nationalism, but in independent people of different beliefs, nationalities and professions working together, proud of having equality as peers among equals. whether such a transformation of attitudes can be achieved remains to be seen.
In looking at Ethiopian underdevelopment Eshetu tackles the theme head on. From an economist’s viewpoint he asks why Ethiopian underdevelopment persists despite different theories having been implemented and various prescriptions experimented with over the course of the last 25 years. He refuses to offer an easy answer, but between the lines the reader is able to discern where he feels the openings to change may be located. Though he sees agriculture and industry as interwoven and interdependent, he believes that development should be concentrated predominantly in the rural areas, where it would benefit the majority of the poor.
In describing the new economic policies tried out in Ethiopia during Mengistu,s last year in power, Stefan Briine concurs with this view and asks what a .mixed economy’ would have looked like and what consequences it would have produced for the rural poor had it been given a longer period to work. Fantu Cheru picks up the thread where Stefan Briine leaves off, suggesting an alternative model of structural adjustment and transformation for the post-Mengistu period. In line with the ECA’s African Alternative Framework, his basic question is, adjustment for whom and by whom? Fantu Cheru offers the Ethiopian government a synopsis of an alternative adjustment policy that uses local resources and peasant knowledge for a new economic start. Jonathan Baker adds another dimension to this argument by insisting that, instead of feeding off the rural population, the small urban centres must be reoriented towards supporting rural development.
Taken as a whole the economic arguments present an alternative vision, a vision in which people are placed at the centre of economic development. From different contexts and in different ways each of the contributors envisages the granting of equal chances to all as a basic pillar of the economy. They expect future vitality and prosperity to stem from a decentralization of economic initiative, power, influence and control. Economic development means decentralized development for and by the small peasants, through the exploitation of their own local resources and initiative.
Two contributions deal with the specific problems of the rural environment. Abebe Zegeye analyses how peasants can find ways to regain control over factors of degradation affecting vegetation, erosion, forestry cover and fuelwood supplies, which even affect weather conditions. He argues that environmental security is absolutely fundamental if improvements in the well-being of peasants are to be achieved and that they themselves must be allowed to be in control of their environment. The experiences of Dessalegn Rahmato show that they have the capacity to expand their traditional preparedness systems for emergencies. He worked for years in drought and famine areas and is impressed by people’s ability to establish their own local famine prevention. He asks for a positive attitude and sympathetic support from society at large to make the task easier.
Famine usually occurs in the rural areas where the food is produced and not in the towns. Peasants cannot afford to eat the crops of their own fields and cannot keep back the necessary reserves before selling what they can do without. Urban groups have always found ways of acquiring food from villages after the harvest, even ii in years of harvest deficits, the villagers are left without any for themselves. Traders are quick to put peasants under pressure to sell, especially if a bad harvest indicates that prices might soon rise. Creditors demand repayment after the harvest and the peasants have little choice but to sell.
Taxes have to be paid and tax collectors know from experience that peasants might not be able to pay if they wait too long after the harvest. Until 1990 the AMC quotas were rigorously collected immediately after the harvest; in fact the peasants themselves would bring their grain to the AMC or cooperative stores because they were afraid that if they did not comply they would be regarded as candidates for resettlement.
Experience in other African countries also shows that urban interest groups almost invariably find ways of securing their supplies from rural areas, even if peasants are left without food reserves for their own use until the next harvest. It seems that the more the signs indicate that a shortage might occur, the more eager are urban traders to fill their stores so as to supply a rising market.
Early warning signals exist and are generally known to peasants. These signals are taken seriously and systematically recorded and used to plan for storage and for the taking of preventive measures. Such signals are locally specific and have to be analysed and utilized within a given locality.
It is a sad fact that local knowledge is appreciated neither by the bureaucracy nor in academic circles. Administrators believe that they are supposed to know what is best; scholars easily take it for granted that a report not written in a scholarly style and not properly documented is shallow and unworthy of serious attention. Occasionally people who have benefited from local practice try to get across the message that local knowledge could be utilized on a wider scale, but they seldom receive the attention they deserve.
Dessalegn Rahmato has documented how peasants in earlier times were accustomed to keeping reserves for emergency situations. These systems broke down when urban interests neglected peasant knowledge, arguing that peasants still had food and that additional burdens could easily be shouldered by them as there were so many to carry them. Such systems are difficult to re-establish once population growth and the fragmentation of plots reduce the productive capacity of each peasant, while burdens and demands from outside increase. However, peasants still have the capacity to organize mutual help systems to combat famines, knowing as they do how to interpret early warning signs and how to plan for storage and distribution.
If peasants are left to determine their own needs and allowed to keep the necessary resources, they may be able to prevent famine or at least mitigate its effects through appropriate action at the local level. It must be borne in mind that there are trade and transport facilities for moving food items from the villages to the urban markets in normal years and that these facilities can be utilized to reverse the flow as well, bringing food reserves into the rural areas in times of drought. If measures are taken in good time there is no reason for expensive international emergency food distribution in remote rural areas. Rather, international solidarity could provide the urban areas with food more cheaply and with the expenditure of much less logistic effort than would be required to deliver it to starving peasants. If international solidarity could guarantee that food would be provided in time, a local early warning system could then make available the marginal supplies to cover the deficit in local production before a state of famine could arise.
Issues of nationality have come to dominate the political arena and Siegfried Pausewang argues that no successor government can win legitimacy without solving the nationality question. The EpRDF tried to tackle it by means of a coalition government; but while the different ethnic resistance movements cooperated in the government coalition in Addis Ababa, the conflict was transferred to the local level, where it emerged as a struggle for local control during the 1992 elections. The rural population is, however, tired of the war and may well be able to restrain local politicians from carrying the conflict further, provided rural people are given more influence in local affairs and local politicians become accountable to their electorate.
Alexander Krylow, who has followed rebel resistance movements for many years, argues that there is no way round ethnic conflicts in present day Ethiopia. He sees great difficulties for any future democratic development and locates these as arising from the danger that any political organization will tend to mobilize the electorate along ethnic rather than political lines. He fears this may be aggravated by the traditional confrontational character of Ethiopian political life. Pausewang also acknowledges the danger, but hopes that peasants will find a way of avoiding the destructive consequences by organizing on different levels: their basic interests should be represented and fought for at a local, not a national, level. They can only win if they follow their interests at different levels: as oromo or Amhara, as Muslims or Christians, as members of their kebele, as sons of Wallaga, Gojjam or Menz, as Ethiopians or as Africans.
If a general conclusion may be detected in the political analysis, it lies in the hope of a renewal of Ethiopian politicar culture through revitalization of the rural communities. The only hope of overcoming the many problems Mengistu left behind for his successors lies in fostering the spirit of local cooperation, in finding practical solutions to perceived problems instead of viewing them in the light of ideological principles and in following the tradition of compromise and of individual rights imbedded in collective responsibility.
These problems are described in Dessalegn Rahmato’s analysis of the reasons for rural unrest and conflict after Mengistu’s fall. From his recent field experience, Dessalegn believes that the three main reasons for peasant frustration and discontent under Mengistu were their insecurity about land, their destabilization through resettlement and villagization, and their impoverishment. He sees peasant unrest as a consequence of ill-conceived policies imposed on them regardless of community participation and initiative.
If, instead of being directed against a particular ethnic or economic group, peasant violence were used as an outlet for long suppressed frustrations, then the conclusion may bd strengthened that the revival of rural culture and the support of peasant ingenuity in finding local compromises could go a long way toward offering hope for a renewal of Ethiopian society and political life. Learning from the peasants may indeed be the key to a new start. Tapping local cultures rather than suppressing their defensive resistance against infringements may be the best guiding principle of democratic development and economic progress.
Dawit Abate analyses the antecedents of transition government and the problems facing it. In order to achieve this he considers the relationships between the various liberation fronts and their influence on current politics.
In my last two articles I wrote about the contributions of the Oromo and the Amhara to Ethiopian civilization. This article deals with the contributions of the Tigrean to Ethiopian civilization.
Let me make it clear from the outset that it was by assuming that the people of Tigray are the descendants of the ancient Axumites that I decided to entitle this essay, “Tigre Contributions to Ethiopian Civilization,” for I will be dealing with Axumite Civilization in the following paragraphs. One can probably liken the ancient Axumites and present day Tigreyans with ancient and modern Greeks. It is well-known that Axum was the capital of Tigray and the cradle of Ethiopian civilization. Whatever Axum achieved at the zenith of its civilization, I will, therefore, consider it to be the achievement of the Tigre, and as such, of Ethiopians.
The word Tigre is said to have at least two meanings. One is derived from the River Tigris. According to this version, the Tigreans came from the Tigris river valley located in Mesopotamia. The other meaning of the word Tigre is said to be a trader. This latter meaning makes sense to me. Since the Axumites were involved in extensive commerce, they might have started being called Tigreans gradually.
What we today call the province of Tigray was not only the cradle of Ethiopian material culture, but also the center of her spiritual life. It was in Tigray that two of the world’s important religions, both Judaism and Christianity found their way to Ethiopia. According to the Kebre Negest, it was Queen Sheba who brought Judaism from Jerusalem to Ethiopia.
Whether it was she or not who introduced Judaism to Ethiopia, the Bible testifies that the eunuch who was baptized by Philip, was an Ethiopian whose religion was Jewish. From this and other facts, we can infer that there were numerous followers of Judaism in Tigray and the rest of Northern Ethiopia. Christianity was made the official religion of Ethiopia by Emperor Ezana whose capital was Axum in the 4th Century A.D. The foundation of Semitic Ethiopian civilization is Christianity. It was inspired by Christianity that Ethiopians built magnificent churches, wrote great books, created monumental paintings and composed divine hymns and songs. It was cultivated by both Judaism and Christianity that Ethiopians aspired to have a high level of moral, piety and hospitality. Axsum is a holy city for Christian Ethiopians because it is the place where their religion was born.
Tigray is full of rare monuments, edifices, thrones, statues, gravestones, altars, temples, dams, incense burners, and objects made of bronze and copper which are living testimonies of Ethiopia’s glorious past.
The numerous obelisks at Kaskasse and Axum, those great works of art, have had a profound influence upon Ethiopian architecture. Axum is a home of the tallest stelae in the world (33 meters). The triangular inscription of Ezana is a precious piece of Ethiopian history which Axum has preserved for us. It was in Tigray and the regions North of it, that the Semitic peoples of Ethiopia founded a dynasty that lasted for about 2500 years. This dynasty was perhaps one of the oldest and longest in the world.
The St. Mary of Tsion church, the rock-hewn church of Abreha and Asbeha, the famous church of Debre-Damo, the ruins of the old Axumite building at Matara, the thrones at Hawlti, the statues of the seated ladies at Hawlti and Adi Galamo, the Gulo Makida and Hinzat, the birth place and the tomb of the Queen of Sheba, as well as the tombs of Menelik II, Caleb and Gebremeskel. Various crowns found in different monasteries, the bronze lamp from Matara, the excavated site of Matara itself, the paintings in a number of churches including Abba Yime’ata, Gere’alta, the Melazo altar with geometric Sabaean inscription, the Matara gold crosses, the incense burners with Sabaean inscriptions and crescent and disc from Adi Kweih and Adi Gelemo, the stamps of identity marks with Sabaean letters, the dame of Coloe, the ruins of Coloe, all these, are some of the heritages of the ancestors of the Tigreyans.
Pertaining education, it was in Axum that the Ethiopian church school flourished at least 1400 years ago. Traditional Ethiopian education developed highly in the 6th Century A.D. due to the effort of St. Yared. He was an educator, a fine poet and the greatest Ethiopian composer. The curriculum which he designed
then is still in use in Ethiopia.
St. Yared, moreover, is the father of Ethiopian religious music with its notation which is still valid to this day. He tried his hand at writing and composed a book of hymns. He traveled to Europe and shared his experience with his fellow Ethiopians.
The contribution of St. Yared to Ethiopian civilization was not limited only to education and music. He played an important role in enhancing literature, theology, philosophy and history. In his Digwa, a book of hymns and prose, he demonstrates his knowledge of verification and provides the fundamentals of theology, philosophy as well as history by explaining the nature of God, the importance of the love for wisdom and by laying the corner-stone for early Ethiopian church history.
In the field of philosophy, the Axumites Zere Yacob is the greatest Ethiopian philosopher whose treatise is a contribution to world philosophy. Zere Yacob was born in Axum in 1592 A.D. His parents were farmers. He attended a church school as a child. Being a brilliant student he learned faster than other kids and became an instructor upon graduation. He developed his own methodology of pedagogy and proved to be an excellent teacher. People who were jealous of his intelligence plotted to have him killed by Emperor Susenyos who ruled Ethiopia then. He ran away from Axum and found his way to Shoa. He hid in a cave in Shoa for two years developing his philosophy until the death of the Emperor. He was then hired by Ato Habtu, a rich Amhara from Shoa, to teach his son Woldeheywot. Later, Woldeheywot became Zere Yacob’s follower and a philosopher by his own right. The works of Zere Yacob were published after his death by Woldeheywot for fear of persecution. Thus the two Ethiopian philosophers demonstrated the earliest great bond between Tigrean and Amhara scholars.
Zere Yacob entertained rationalism at least 130 years earlier than European philosophers. His views on religion and the search for truth were too advanced and radical for his age and even for our own time. A living testimony of the power of Zere Yacob rationalism is Abe Gubenga’s political novel, Alewoledem, (I will not Be Born) whose protagonist questions and criticizes the religious practice of his society. Alewoledem was written under the influence of Zere Yacob’s critique of religion. Abe Gubenga was exiled to Gore, the remotest part of Ethiopia and the book was suppressed by Emperor Haile Selassie’s government until 1974 because it was thought-provoking.
Zere Yacob wrote rationally about God and questioned the nature of man, religion, prayer, fasting, truth, the law of God and of man, the nature of knowledge as well as marriage.
Ge’ez, the sacred language of the Ethiopians is also the contribution of the ancestors of the Tigre people. It was in this language that Ethiopia preserved rare books of grammar, literature, poetry, history, philosophy, theology, ethics, medicine, magic, astrology, astronomy and law. We are indebted to the Sabeans, the forefathers of the Tigreyans for the Ge’ez alphabets, of which both Ethiopians and black peoples world-wide are proud.
The writing of Ethiopian history was began in Tigray, as evidenced by Sabaean, Ge’ez and Greek inscriptions found on a number of monuments including those of Emperor Ezana. The Axumites documented Ethiopian history and the life history of their emperors and saints on parchments.
Northern Ethiopians were experts in the art of coin making. Compared with peoples who were on the stage of bartering, the Axumite Ethiopians, for instance, were advanced in business transactions and commerce, because money was in circulation amongst them and the peoples with whom they traded, such as the Indians, Romans and the Greeks. During the domination of the world by the Roman empire in the third century, it is said that Northern Ethiopia was the only place in Africa which minted coins. Such coins furnish us with first-hand information about Ethiopian history. The coins of emperors Endybis, Ezana, Ousanas II, and Bete Israel, for example tell us something about the third, fourth, fifth and sixth centuries of Ethiopian history.
Ethiopian numerical, too, were invented by the Axumites. These numericals were applied in mathematics. We use them in our daily lives as well.
Axumite emperors had a strong navy, as well as commercial ships which sailed as far as India. On the other hand, Greek and Roman ships came as close as the Ethiopian port of Adulis. This fact made Ethiopia the center of commerce and culture for Europe and Asia. It exposed Ethiopia to new ideas and inventions. It brought scholars, different skills and books which were translated into Ge’ez from various languages such as Greek, Arabic and Hebrew. Some of these books are still valuable to us.
In the sphere of international diplomacy, the Axumite emperors won a high respect for Ethiopia abroad. As a member of the Christian community of nations, Ethiopia took part in religious conventions in Europe.
Axumite emperors had a good relationship with the Islamic world as well. When the Prophet Mohammed was yet a young man, it was said that he used to listen to Ethiopian preachers preaching the Bible at the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Mecca. As a result, he became well-versed with Christianity and Judaism. He learned many Ge’ez vocabularies and used a number of them in the Kuran. When his followers were persecuted he sent them to Northern Ethiopia. Because of the hospitality which Axumite emperors and their citizens showered upon Mohammed’s family and his followers, Ethiopia was able to enjoy a brotherly relationship with the Muslim world for many years.
The contributions of Tigre to Ethiopian civilization dwindled after the fall of Axum in the 10th Century, but never ceased. The descendants of the Axumites who started being called Amharas later continued and extended the Axumite civilization elsewhere in Shoa, Wello, Wadla and Dilanta, Gonder, and Gojjam. Tigray became important again in the 19th Century during the reign of Emperor Yohannes IV. This Tigreyan Emperor, who rose to power by the might of his sword, strengthened Ethiopian unity, protected Ethiopia from foreign aggressors and died while defending the territorial integrity of his country. His general, Ras Alula, was feared by colonialists. When Asmera consisted of only a few houses, he made it the center of his administration and transformed it into a city. This great military strategist and Ethiopian patriot prophesied the dangers which European colonizers such as the Italians and the British were posing to the territorial integrity of Northern Ethiopia. He warned both Emperors Yohannes and Menelik of the consequences of allowing Italian settlements in Eritrea. He beat the Italians in a number of battles including Dogali and could have chased them to the Red Sea, was he not stopped by both Yohannes and Menelik. Eventually, the Italians took over the northern territory of Ethiopia which they named Eritrea, as Alula feared and the future generations of Ethiopia had to pay dearly for this.
As far as culture is concerned, the peoples of Tigray have enriched Ethiopian music and dance. They have unique dance, melody and drumming system. Their language is rich in vocabulary, proverbs, sayings, idioms, riddles and folk tales which have broadened Amharic language and folklore. Tigreyan writers who compose their works in both Tigregna and Amharic languages have contributed immensely to the development of Ethiopian literature.
In the past two thousand years Tigreyans have played a vital role in Ethiopian history, government, politics, military, economy, commerce, religion, social life, architecture, culture, education, art, music, linguistics, literature and philosophy.
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Fikre Tolossa, Ph.D., is Assistant Dean of Faculty at Columbia Pacific University in San Rafael, CA. He is also Associate Editor of ER.
The dust over part of the Horn of Africa is about to settle. In April, 1993, Eritreans will have a long awaited opportunity to exercise their right of self determination and to tell the world in no uncertain terms what their long and costly struggle has been all about. They will go to the ballot box to cast their votes, and only those who are not in touch with Eritrean affairs will doubt the outcome of the forthcoming referendum. It will be a resounding yes for independence, and Eritrea will go on to enter the membership of sovereign states.
What will linger in the entire Horn of Africa consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan for some time is economic {www:deprivation}. Arguably, this is the poorest and most deprived region of the world. Per capita income, life expectancy, and literacy are among the lowest in the world; and adult and infant mortality and morbidity are among the highest. It is a region where the most basic needs of life — clean water and food — are a luxury to the overwhelming majority of the region’s population. Consequently, millions of people unnecessarily die of hunger, preventable diseases and lack of shelter.
The Horn has been one of the most politically unstable in the world. The world associates the region with endless strife, economic deprivation and sorrow. The fires of war and destruction have raged for too long, and they are still raging uncontrollably in Somalia and Sudan. There are entire generations in the Horn who do not know what peace is all about. In Eritrea where the guns are now silent and peace is being savored, the mere sound of overflying fighter jets prompts women and children to scramble for cover.
It would be easy indeed to dwell at length on past and current miseries of the Horn region. In Eritrea and Ethiopia the legacy of oppressive regimes is evident everywhere and in every aspect of life. Reconstruction and revitalization of their economies and the introduction of democracy will require a great deal of patience and cool determination on the part of citizens and governments alike. It also has to be an awesome responsibility for anyone group including the transitional and provisional governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively, to assume leadership under these conditions and prepare the people who have already suffered too much and for too long for the sacrifices and the hard work needed to build new democratic societies.
One can draw ample lessons from the mistakes of the past. Better yet, one should take advantage of the precious peace that is reigning now, crystallize the issues, and begin to lay the foundations for true democracy and economic prosperity.
The problems facing the Horn nations are of {www:gargantuan} proportions. They are both material and psychological, and there is no quick fix to them. I believe this is the time to shift paradigms. It is time to drop the rancorous and negative debate of the recent past and to adopt a more constructive attitude. It is a time to accentuate the positive, and to start a dialogue toward a broad based agreement for a strategic partnership which can lead to economic and political security in the region.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are relatively in the best position to form the core of a sound and sustainable partnership for peace and prosperity. Shared values and overlapping interests in three key areas serve as the basis for this strategic partnership: socio-cultural, geo- political, and economic.
1. Socio-Cultural: Eritrea and Ethiopia share sufficient social and cultural values emanating from a long tradition of cross border interdependence and common religious practices, especially Christian and Islamic. They have sufficiently similar tastes in such matters as foods, spices, clothes, music, lyrics and literature. The people of Eritrea and Ethiopia should value highly the cultural traits they share and should work to preserve and to enrich them.
2. Geo-Political: The Horn nations are in a sensitive and volatile region where political turbulence has been common and where now a fragile peace prevails. The instability resulted from external and internal factors. First, there have been colonial and imperialist intrusions from outside the region for economic, political and religious dominance. The Portuguese, the Turks, the Italians, the French, the English, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are examples of nations who in one way or another have sought to control or influence events in the region and contributed to instability. There have also been similar acts of aggression and domination form within the region. Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia colonized or otherwise sought domination of Somalia and Eritrea, and consequently de-stabilized the region. Second, economic underdevelopment and the absence of democracy have resulted in internal strife and instability.
Neither the external nor the regional threats have been permanently removed. The region remains to be of strategic interest to the industrialized world. Its proximity to the largest oil deposits of the world, its unconfirmed but probable endowment with vital resources, and its Red Sea and Indian Ocean resources will continue to attract uninvited attention for a long time to come. The long road to democracy and prosperity will also increase the risk of intra-region and domestic instability.
The political future of each nation in the region is unavoidably intertwined with that of the rest of the region. No nation in the region can expect to live or prosper in isolation. In this day and age no country can expect to be insulated effectively from the challenges and problems of other nations, no matter how distant. The events surrounding the recent Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait were a clear demonstration of how an entire region, if not the whole world, can be affected. The tragic events in the former Yugoslavia too are a good example. The troubles there are threatening peace in neighboring countries such as Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cypress, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Turkey. Indeed, they are potentially a threat to the entire world. Instability in one country can easily create instability in another, and peace in one can be helpful in others. Horn nations need to forge a security alliance to repel external aggression whether politically or religiously inspired. They should form a partnership to tackle the problem of refugees, to apprehend common criminals or terrorists who may cross boundaries, and to protect and preserve the fragile environment. They should also enter into agreements to eliminate any possibility of hostile action between them.
Appreciation of the complex external and internal political environments, therefore, renders worthless the outrageous allegations that Eritrea is poised to de-stabilize Ethiopia and to prosper at its expense, or that Eritrea will endanger Ethiopia’s security and sovereignty by allowing Ethiopia’s enemies to enter through its ports and boundaries. There should be no credibility to these kinds of allegations. Ethiopia’s stability and economic prosperity can only benefit Eritrea, and Eritrea cannot be stable and prosperous if neither stability nor prosperity prevail in Ethiopia. The rational assumption should be that there will be a high degree of coincidence of strategic interests between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and that both will identify their interests internationally in roughly similar ways. Accordingly, if we appreciate the common interests of the two countries we will be able to deal with the future relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia in a much healthier and realistic way.
3. Economic: The Eritrean and Ethiopian economies are similar in level of development and structure. They compare too in demand structures including incomes and tastes and preferences. These similarities suggest that their consumers will purchase products characterized by similar degrees of sophistication and quality. They also suggest that the two countries stand to benefit from a free trading partnership leading to larger markets and scale economies.
An example will shed additional light to what is being suggested: If Ethiopia produces a surplus of shammas (a form of cotton shawl), woolen blankets, floor-rugs or teff (a grain from which the staple food, injera, is made). Who is likely to buy these? Not the Swedish, not even the Somalis or the Sudanese. The Swedes are not likely now to find Ethiopian blankets and floor-rugs sophisticated enough for their taste, and they have yet to develop sufficient and sustainable taste for injera. Furthermore, the cost of transporting Ethiopian blankets, shammas and floor-rugs to Sweden will make these products less price-competitive. The neighboring Somalis and the Sudanese too are not likely to have taste for these Ethiopian products and particularly woolen blankets and floor-rugs because of the obvious differences in climate. Clearly, the likely market for such Ethiopian products is Eritrea.
Similarly, if Eritrea produces excess beer, wines, spirits or sweaters, neither Sweden nor Somalia and Sudan are the likely markets for these products. Even if we assume no trade barriers between Eritrea and Sweden, transportation, insurance and handling costs would tend to make Eritrean beer, spirits, and wines uncompetitive in Sweden. And in close-by Somalia and Sudan religious and cultural practices would limit the market for beer, spirits and wines. Clearly, Ethiopia is the logical market for Eritrean products.
Through economic cooperation and useful competition, Eritrea and Ethiopia have a great opportunity for greater efficiency and growth. An economic alliance between the two countries can eliminate abject poverty and increase food security for both of their peoples. Here too, any suggestion that Eritrea would benefit only at the expense of Ethiopia would be outrageous and preposterous. Ethiopia’s economic viability is essential to Eritrea no less than the economic viability of Japan and Germany to their trading partner and competitor — the United States. To allege otherwise would be tantamount to suggesting that modern trade is based on a zero-sum-game theory where one nation’s gains are necessarily the other’s losses. That, obviously, is not the case, and trading partners should benefit simultaneously.
The Horn of Africa nations should join in economic and trade partnership, and Eritrea and Ethiopia should form the nucleus of this alliance. At a Horn of Africa Conference in New York city in May, 1992, I proposed that a Horn of Africa Free Trade Area (HAFTA) consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan be formed as soon as possible. I believe now as I did then that this is a concept whose time has come. Eritrea and Ethiopia should lay the foundation for this form of cooperation and should include the other countries in the region at an appropriate time. It is encouraging to note that the Provisional Government of Eritrea and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia have recently conducted negotiations with a view of fostering economic cooperation between the two countries. This is a step in the right direction and it should be encouraged.
The present anxiety being experienced by some concerning Eritrea’s rights and exercise of self-determination is somewhat understandable. It appears to be rooted in the insecurity of living in a post- separation world, a feeling that the future is dim and grim. Although uncertain, the future need not be dim or grim. Barring a self-fulfilling prophecy, it can be brighter. There is no denying that major and qualitative changes have occurred in the Horn of Africa and particularly in regards to Eritrea and Ethiopia. These changes may be too large and too drastic for some to accept or even to keep up with. But they are irreversible. One can either remain incorrigibly captive of the past or can begin to develop capability for a flexible and rational adaptation to the changing environment.
There is a useful lesson to be drawn from a piece of Scandinavian history which is analogous to the Ethio-Eritrean experience. In 1814 through a treaty of Kiel, a Jean Bernadotte (Napoleon’s marshal) who eventually succeeded to the Swedish monarchy as Charles XIV John forced his sovereignty over neighboring Norway. For no other reason than in appreciation of his stand against his former master Napoleon, the allied great powers gave their support to his policy over Norway. As should be expected, the treaty of Kiel was immediately repudiated by the weak but tenacious Norwegian people who contended that “it violated the principles of international law by purporting to dispose of an entire nation without its consent” and claimed the right to determine their own sovereignty. Bernadotte believed that the poverty and trade depression in Norway which followed the end of the Napoleonic wars, and the severe taxation which was made necessary would weaken the Norwegian resolve for sovereignty. He ignored the wishes of the Norwegians and continued to rule through a viceroy who was generally a Swede. Later in 1836, he arbitrarily dissolved the Norwegian legislature and declared Norway a mere province of Sweden. Over the years, successive monarchs made minor concessions to appease the Norwegians but allowed Swedish influence to predominate where the interests of the two countries differed. This only increased the resolve of the Norwegians to secede. Later attempts to hold on to Norway by promoting unity under the garb of “Scandinavianism” also failed. Early in 1905 the lone but determined Norwegians felt compelled to take matters into their own hands, and decided to hold a referendum. On August 13, 1905 they voted overwhelmingly for severance of the union, and King Oscar of Sweden wisely respected their wishes by immediately relinquishing the crown of Norway.
On the outbreaks of World War I (1914) and World War II (1939) Norway and Sweden joined Denmark to proclaim a policy of neutrality primarily designed to preclude any possibility of hostile action between them.
Following separation, and to this date Sweden and Norway have not only co-existed peacefully but also have cooperated closely in economic, political and cultural matters in ways that have made it easier for them to secure one of the world’s highest standards
of living.
In modern times the Scandinavian countries have been associated uniquely with peace and prosperity. They have succeeded in part because of their ability to appreciate sooner than most other countries the values of peaceful coexistence and regional cooperation.
The Horn is fragile. Without peace, the tragedies of the early seventies and eighties can be repeated easily, and most probably in a larger scale. Then, TV screens around the world were filled with the images of death: fly-haunted corpses, skeletal children crouched in pain, emaciated bodies of children, women and men, and frail villagers desperately scratching the scorched land with bare hands for signs of grains. The tragedy that is taking place in Somalia today is a grim reminder of what can easily recur in the entire region. No Horn nation need sustain such tragedies.
The Horn of Africa nations and particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia have an excellent opportunity now to emulate the Scandinavian experience and to initiate cooperation for peace and prosperity. What is needed is a new spirit and a fresh start.
(Abraham Z. Kidane, Ph.D., is a Professor of Economics and Director of International Programs at California State University, Dominguez Hills.)
(The New Yorker) — ANNALS OF POLITICAL TERROR about political prisoners in Ethiopia. Tells about the rise, in 1974, of a revolutionary party known as the Derg, led by Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, a 5’3″ ordnance officer known as the Black Stalin of Africa: he was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands–perhaps millions–of his countrymen. The central part of Haile Selassie’s empire–the old kingdom of Abyssinia–is a high plateau, towering some ten thousand feet above sea level and marked by isolated valleys and deep volcanic rifts. A light-skinned, thin-lipped ethnic group known as the Amhara dominated the highlands–and the courts of the empire–for hundreds of years. They were in the minority, but they presided over a disparate collection of what were, in effect, principalities: desperately poor regions populated by some eighty ethnic and linguistic groups, all consisting mostly of peasants, living amid their goats and cattle in conical mud-and-thatch huts. The kingdom’s mountain fastness and its altitude had to a large extent guaranteed its isolation, and for centuries it remains an impregnable feudal realm. Tells how the problems of land tenure, reform, and famine, when coupled with the oil price shock of 1973, caused a revolution in Ethiopia. Power shifted to a complete unknown–Mengistu Haile Mariam. He was later known as the Black Stalin of Africa. He held power for 17 years, during which he organized innumerable massacres. [read the full text here]
Ethiopia has not always been ruled by “pure” Amhara and Tigre Monarchs. The fact is that some Oromo blood did indeed flow in the veins of Ethiopian monarchs since the 18th Century. By then the Oromo had already {www:consolidate}d their power after their rise in the 16th Century.
I will indicate in this paper some of the personalities of Oromo descent who {www:exert}ed extraordinary influence on Ethiopian history and governments. The Oromo were important figures throughout the last four hundred years. Crowned as emperors and empresses and granted military and nobility titles, they directed many of the historical events of Ethiopia.
The first close contact between the Oromo and the Ethiopian monarchy occurred when Prince Susenyos, born in 1571, was captured in his youth by the Boren tribe in a battle. This was the beginning of a relationship that marked the political and historical future of Ethiopia.
Prince Susenyos learned the Oromo language and grew up in accordance with the Oromo culture. The Oromo treated him amicably as a prince amongst them.
He joined his relatives at the age of eighteen when he was retrieved in exchange for Oromo captives. When Atse Sertse Dengel died in 1597, some people who feared that Susenyos would ascend to the throne tried to kill him; and he returned to his old friends, the Oromos, for protection and shelter. They welcomed him as a prince once again, and even made him their leader. With the help of his Oromo soldiers, he fought many battles against the Amhara who took over the throne. He was crowned in Gojjam in 1604. He garrisoned two Oromo regiments, Ilmana and Denssa in Gojjam, and made his Oromo soldiers Chewawoch (equivalent to Neftegnoch) over the Amhara peasants. Ilmana Denssa exists to this day as the name of an area in Gojjam.
Atse Susenyos trusted only his time-tested Oromo soldiers. He promoted a number of them to high ranks and filled his palace with them. At times he was so busy with his Oromo friends that he hardly found time to see the Amharas. Inspite of this, some of his Oromo followers who had seen him as their leader felt betrayed when he became an Amhara emperor and left to fight him. The rest remained loyal to him and served him until the end. Even though the Oromo became part of the ruling class during the reign of Atse Susenyos, it was not until the first three decades of the 18th Century that they were able to sit on the Ethiopian throne directly.
The first Oromo empress of Ethiopia was Wabi, whose throne name was Welete-Bersabeh, the daughter of an Oromo chieftain from Wollo. She joined the Solomonic Dynasty when she married Emperor Iyasu Berhan- Seged who ruled Ethiopia from Gonder between 1723 and 1747 Ethiopian Calender. After the death of her husband, Empress Bersabeh’s son, Iyoas, became the emperor of Ethiopia.
Emperor Iyoas appointed Oromos to higher positions like Emperors Susenyos and Iyasu did. He preferred his Oromo kinsmen from Wollo to the Gondere relatives of his grandmother, Empress Mentewab. He brought his Oromo uncles Lubo and Birele from Wollo, and made Lubo his inderasse (viceroy), and appointed Birele as a dejazmach and governor of Begemdir. This was the third time in Ethiopian history when the Oromos and their language dominated the court of an Ethiopian emperor.
A Yejju Oromo chieftain by the name of Ali Gwangul, popularly known as Ali The Great, defeated Atse Tekle-Giorgis I, Emperor of Ethiopia in 1784 and became the ruler of Ethiopia without crowning himself. After his death in 1788 his brother Ras Aligaz succeeded him and ruled Ethiopia for three year.
Around 1802, another Yejju Oromo named Grazmach Gugssa, later called Gugssa The Great, became Ras and reigned over Gojjam, Lasta, Begemdir, Semen, Yejju and Wollo from his capital city Debre Tabor. Upon his death in 1825, his son Ras Imam or Yemam succeeded him and reigned over Ethiopia for three years. His brother Ras Mareeye succeeded him in 1828 and ruled until 1831. Ras Mareeye was succeeded by his brother Ras Dori in 1831. In the same year he marched to Tigrai, took over Axum and defeated Dejazmach Sabagadis, the ruler of Tigrai at the Battle of May Islamay. Before Ras Dori succeeded his brother, he was the governor of Damot. When he left his governorship of Damot, another Oromo by the name Ras Gobena ruled Damot.
Dembia and Quara, the birth place of Emperor Tewodros II in Gonder, were ruled by another Oromo, Dejazmach Alula, the eldest son of Ras Gugssa.
After the death of Ras Alula, his son Ras Ali ruled Gonder. His widowed mother was Weyzero Menen, the daughter of Liben Amede, an Oromo ruler of Wollo. When Atse Yohannes III married her she became Itege, and as such, and Ethiopian empress.
When Atse Tewodros subdued all the Ethiopian princes in his effort to unite Ethiopia, his wife, Itege Tewabech, who was one of the daughters of Ras Ali II and the grand daughter of Itege Menen, became an Oromo empress of Ethiopia.
Ras Gugssa’s grandsons, Merso and Betul (The father of Empress Taitu, Emperor Menelik’s wife), were important noblemen of Oromo descent. When Ras Ali was defeated by Ras Wube, Merso and Betul captured Wube. As a result, Ras Ali rewarded Merso with the governorship of Semen. As the brothers were heading for Semen, Ras Ali changed his mind and arrested the brothers for a while. After a short while he reconciled with them and made them governors of some districts in Gojjam.
Ras Betul had a son named Wele. Emperor Menelik II favored Wele so much that he promoted him to Ras and appointed him to be the governor of Gonder and Yejju. Ras Wele Betul was one of the heroes of the Battle of Adwa. Ras Wele’s son, Ras Gugssa married Queen Zewditu, the daughter of Emperor Menelik, who became the empress of Ethiopia a few years after the death of her father. Upon her ascension to the throne she divorced Ras Gugssa Wele. He retreated to Gonder which he continued to govern.
Negus Mikael of Wollo, whose name had been Muhamed Ali before he was converted to Christianity, was the Oromo king of Tigre and Wollo respectively. His son, Lij Iyasu, who was the grandson of Emperor Menelik, reigned over Ethiopia without crowning himself for three years (1913-1916.) Lij Iyasu’s mother, Woizero Shewarega Menelik is said to be half Oromo through her mother Desta, who was supposed to be an Oromo from Wollo.
An Ethiopian empress of Oromo descent who played a vital role in Ethiopian politics and history in the 2nd half of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century was Taitu Betul, the wife of Emperor Menelik II. It is true to say that she reigned with Menelik in that unforgettable era of Ethiopian history. She was Menelik’s counselor, as well as policy maker in many state affairs. As a matter of fact, it was she who encouraged Menelik to fight the Battle of Adwa against the Italians, in order to save Ethiopia from European colonization and humiliation. She herself fought at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. She was brilliant and her determination discouraged the Europeans who had colonial {www:scheme}s for Ethiopia.
Dejazmach Wolde-Mikael Gudissa was another great nobleman of Oromo descent who ruled Gola, near Ankober in Shoa. Negus Sahle-Selassie, the great king of Shoa, was his grand father. Emperor Menelik was his cousin.
The Oromo also functioned as military and administrative leaders. Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis Dinegede, was an Oromo who was raised to noblehood by Emperor Menelik II who esteemed his merit very highly. He became a counselor in the government and commander-in-chief of the Ethiopian army in 1896 at the end of the Battle of Adwa. Even though many prominent Amharas, including Liqe-Mequas Abate, wished to be in that post, Menelik appointed Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis.
Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis was known for being a wise statesman who played a vital role in Ethiopian politics. It is true to say that it was because of his influence that Lij Iyasu was replaced by Tefferi Mekonen (Haileselassie I). Had he not been loyal to Emperor Menelik, he had the power and influence to crown himself after the overthrow of Lij Iyasu.
Dejazmach Balcha Aba Nefsso was another great Oromo general who fought in the Battle of Adwa. He ruled Sidamo and Harer and died at the age of eighty fighting against the fascist Italians in 1936.
Ras Gobena Dachi was one of Emperor Menelik’s highly revered generals. As the commander Menelik’s army, he participated in several military campaigns to the south. He was famous for being a great military strategist. He is the most controversial figure among Oromo intellectuals. Some Western-educated Oromos do not even want to hear his name blaming him for conquering the south. Others defend him stating that, after all, he was a great soldier who believed in Ethiopian unity, and who acted in a fashion appropriate for his time to achieve that goal.
The most recent example of Oromo {www:genealogy} involves Empress Menen Asfaw and her husband Emperor Haile Selassie. The last Oromo Empress of Ethiopia, Itege Menen Asfaw was the granddaughter of Ras Mikael of Wollo and the niece of Lij Iyasu. Crown Prince Asfawossen, is her son.
A leader of an Oromo descent who reigned over Ethiopia longer than any monarch was, believe it or not, Emperor Haile Selassie I, whose given name was Teferi Mekonen. His father Ras Mekonen was the son of Dejazmach Wolde-Mikael, the governor of Gola, near Ankober, who was the son of (Ato?) Gudissa. Teferi Mekonen was reputed for being fluent in the Oromo language, even though he spoke it only when the need arose. I believe his mother Yeshimebet Ali, too, was an Oromo whose father was a Muslim. The name of her mother is said to be Wolete-Giorgis. It seems that HaileSelassie was not interested in having the genealogy of his mother revealed for reasons known only to himself. Maybe, it was to conceal the fact that his maternal grandfather was a Muslim. That could be one reason why his biographers, when he was still alive, mentioned only his mother’s first name dropping her father’s name.
There was a rumor that she was a Gurage. However, as I pondered upon the name of her father Ali, I suspected that Ali was an Oromo from Wollo, as there were a number of Alis from there who played a vital role in Ethiopian history. As I posed this question to an elderly lady who happens to be a relative of Emperor Haileselassie, she informed me: “I have heard that Ali was an Oromo from Wore Ilu, Wollo, where my relatives come from. The mother of Yeshimebet was indeed Wolete-Giorgis. She had a half-sister by the name of Mamit Balcha. Balcha was an Oromo.”
From all these facts we can see that those leaders who ruled Ethiopia during the past 250 years were not “pure” Amharas or Tigreans. They were nobles of Oromo descent. Some pseudo-historians do not accept these leaders as Oromos arguing that the mentality and ways of life of these leaders were the same as the Amhara rulers. Others {www:refute} this argument saying that all rulers, regardless of their ethnic background, are the same. It is the nature of power which determines their mentality, behavior and ways of life and not their ethnic identity. Still others assert that Emperor Iyoas, Ali The Great, and Ras Aligaz at least, ruled in a purely Oromo fashion, if there was ever such a fashion.
In spite of these arguments, one fact still remains unchallenged. Ethiopia was also ruled by people of Oromo descent. The Oromos, both nobility and commoners, have influenced the Amhara in a number of ways as evidenced by linguistic, cultural and religious assimilation for the past 400 years.
(Fikre Tolossa, Ph.D., is Assistant Dean of Faculty at Colombia Pacific University in San Rafael, CA and Associate Editor of Ethiopian Review.)
