By Abraham Z. Kidane

The dust over part of the Horn of Africa is about to settle. In April, 1993, Eritreans will have a long awaited opportunity to exercise their right of self determination and to tell the world in no uncertain terms what their long and costly struggle has been all about. They will go to the ballot box to cast their votes, and only those who are not in touch with Eritrean affairs will doubt the outcome of the forthcoming referendum. It will be a resounding yes for independence, and Eritrea will go on to enter the membership of sovereign states.

What will linger in the entire Horn of Africa consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan for some time is economic {www:deprivation}. Arguably, this is the poorest and most deprived region of the world. Per capita income, life expectancy, and literacy are among the lowest in the world; and adult and infant mortality and morbidity are among the highest. It is a region where the most basic needs of life — clean water and food — are a luxury to the overwhelming majority of the region’s population. Consequently, millions of people unnecessarily die of hunger, preventable diseases and lack of shelter.

The Horn has been one of the most politically unstable in the world. The world associates the region with endless strife, economic deprivation and sorrow. The fires of war and destruction have raged for too long, and they are still raging uncontrollably in Somalia and Sudan. There are entire generations in the Horn who do not know what peace is all about. In Eritrea where the guns are now silent and peace is being savored, the mere sound of overflying fighter jets prompts women and children to scramble for cover.

It would be easy indeed to dwell at length on past and current miseries of the Horn region. In Eritrea and Ethiopia the legacy of oppressive regimes is evident everywhere and in every aspect of life. Reconstruction and revitalization of their economies and the introduction of democracy will require a great deal of patience and cool determination on the part of citizens and governments alike. It also has to be an awesome responsibility for anyone group including the transitional and provisional governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively, to assume leadership under these conditions and prepare the people who have already suffered too much and for too long for the sacrifices and the hard work needed to build new democratic societies.

One can draw ample lessons from the mistakes of the past. Better yet, one should take advantage of the precious peace that is reigning now, crystallize the issues, and begin to lay the foundations for true democracy and economic prosperity.

The problems facing the Horn nations are of {www:gargantuan} proportions. They are both material and psychological, and there is no quick fix to them. I believe this is the time to shift paradigms. It is time to drop the rancorous and negative debate of the recent past and to adopt a more constructive attitude. It is a time to accentuate the positive, and to start a dialogue toward a broad based agreement for a strategic partnership which can lead to economic and political security in the region.

Eritrea and Ethiopia are relatively in the best position to form the core of a sound and sustainable partnership for peace and prosperity. Shared values and overlapping interests in three key areas serve as the basis for this strategic partnership: socio-cultural, geo- political, and economic.

1. Socio-Cultural: Eritrea and Ethiopia share sufficient social and cultural values emanating from a long tradition of cross border interdependence and common religious practices, especially Christian and Islamic. They have sufficiently similar tastes in such matters as foods, spices, clothes, music, lyrics and literature. The people of Eritrea and Ethiopia should value highly the cultural traits they share and should work to preserve and to enrich them.

2. Geo-Political: The Horn nations are in a sensitive and volatile region where political turbulence has been common and where now a fragile peace prevails. The instability resulted from external and internal factors. First, there have been colonial and imperialist intrusions from outside the region for economic, political and religious dominance. The Portuguese, the Turks, the Italians, the French, the English, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are examples of nations who in one way or another have sought to control or influence events in the region and contributed to instability. There have also been similar acts of aggression and domination form within the region. Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia colonized or otherwise sought domination of Somalia and Eritrea, and consequently de-stabilized the region. Second, economic underdevelopment and the absence of democracy have resulted in internal strife and instability.

Neither the external nor the regional threats have been permanently removed. The region remains to be of strategic interest to the industrialized world. Its proximity to the largest oil deposits of the world, its unconfirmed but probable endowment with vital resources, and its Red Sea and Indian Ocean resources will continue to attract uninvited attention for a long time to come. The long road to democracy and prosperity will also increase the risk of intra-region and domestic instability.

The political future of each nation in the region is unavoidably intertwined with that of the rest of the region. No nation in the region can expect to live or prosper in isolation. In this day and age no country can expect to be insulated effectively from the challenges and problems of other nations, no matter how distant. The events surrounding the recent Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait were a clear demonstration of how an entire region, if not the whole world, can be affected. The tragic events in the former Yugoslavia too are a good example. The troubles there are threatening peace in neighboring countries such as Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cypress, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Turkey. Indeed, they are potentially a threat to the entire world. Instability in one country can easily create instability in another, and peace in one can be helpful in others. Horn nations need to forge a security alliance to repel external aggression whether politically or religiously inspired. They should form a partnership to tackle the problem of refugees, to apprehend common criminals or terrorists who may cross boundaries, and to protect and preserve the fragile environment. They should also enter into agreements to eliminate any possibility of hostile action between them.

Appreciation of the complex external and internal political environments, therefore, renders worthless the outrageous allegations that Eritrea is poised to de-stabilize Ethiopia and to prosper at its expense, or that Eritrea will endanger Ethiopia’s security and sovereignty by allowing Ethiopia’s enemies to enter through its ports and boundaries. There should be no credibility to these kinds of allegations. Ethiopia’s stability and economic prosperity can only benefit Eritrea, and Eritrea cannot be stable and prosperous if neither stability nor prosperity prevail in Ethiopia. The rational assumption should be that there will be a high degree of coincidence of strategic interests between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and that both will identify their interests internationally in roughly similar ways. Accordingly, if we appreciate the common interests of the two countries we will be able to deal with the future relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia in a much healthier and realistic way.

3. Economic: The Eritrean and Ethiopian economies are similar in level of development and structure. They compare too in demand structures including incomes and tastes and preferences. These similarities suggest that their consumers will purchase products characterized by similar degrees of sophistication and quality. They also suggest that the two countries stand to benefit from a free trading partnership leading to larger markets and scale economies.

An example will shed additional light to what is being suggested: If Ethiopia produces a surplus of shammas (a form of cotton shawl), woolen blankets, floor-rugs or teff (a grain from which the staple food, injera, is made). Who is likely to buy these? Not the Swedish, not even the Somalis or the Sudanese. The Swedes are not likely now to find Ethiopian blankets and floor-rugs sophisticated enough for their taste, and they have yet to develop sufficient and sustainable taste for injera. Furthermore, the cost of transporting Ethiopian blankets, shammas and floor-rugs to Sweden will make these products less price-competitive. The neighboring Somalis and the Sudanese too are not likely to have taste for these Ethiopian products and particularly woolen blankets and floor-rugs because of the obvious differences in climate. Clearly, the likely market for such Ethiopian products is Eritrea.

Similarly, if Eritrea produces excess beer, wines, spirits or sweaters, neither Sweden nor Somalia and Sudan are the likely markets for these products. Even if we assume no trade barriers between Eritrea and Sweden, transportation, insurance and handling costs would tend to make Eritrean beer, spirits, and wines uncompetitive in Sweden. And in close-by Somalia and Sudan religious and cultural practices would limit the market for beer, spirits and wines. Clearly, Ethiopia is the logical market for Eritrean products.

Through economic cooperation and useful competition, Eritrea and Ethiopia have a great opportunity for greater efficiency and growth. An economic alliance between the two countries can eliminate abject poverty and increase food security for both of their peoples. Here too, any suggestion that Eritrea would benefit only at the expense of Ethiopia would be outrageous and preposterous. Ethiopia’s economic viability is essential to Eritrea no less than the economic viability of Japan and Germany to their trading partner and competitor — the United States. To allege otherwise would be tantamount to suggesting that modern trade is based on a zero-sum-game theory where one nation’s gains are necessarily the other’s losses. That, obviously, is not the case, and trading partners should benefit simultaneously.

The Horn of Africa nations should join in economic and trade partnership, and Eritrea and Ethiopia should form the nucleus of this alliance. At a Horn of Africa Conference in New York city in May, 1992, I proposed that a Horn of Africa Free Trade Area (HAFTA) consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan be formed as soon as possible. I believe now as I did then that this is a concept whose time has come. Eritrea and Ethiopia should lay the foundation for this form of cooperation and should include the other countries in the region at an appropriate time. It is encouraging to note that the Provisional Government of Eritrea and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia have recently conducted negotiations with a view of fostering economic cooperation between the two countries. This is a step in the right direction and it should be encouraged.

The present anxiety being experienced by some concerning Eritrea’s rights and exercise of self-determination is somewhat understandable. It appears to be rooted in the insecurity of living in a post- separation world, a feeling that the future is dim and grim. Although uncertain, the future need not be dim or grim. Barring a self-fulfilling prophecy, it can be brighter. There is no denying that major and qualitative changes have occurred in the Horn of Africa and particularly in regards to Eritrea and Ethiopia. These changes may be too large and too drastic for some to accept or even to keep up with. But they are irreversible. One can either remain incorrigibly captive of the past or can begin to develop capability for a flexible and rational adaptation to the changing environment.

There is a useful lesson to be drawn from a piece of Scandinavian history which is analogous to the Ethio-Eritrean experience. In 1814 through a treaty of Kiel, a Jean Bernadotte (Napoleon’s marshal) who eventually succeeded to the Swedish monarchy as Charles XIV John forced his sovereignty over neighboring Norway. For no other reason than in appreciation of his stand against his former master Napoleon, the allied great powers gave their support to his policy over Norway. As should be expected, the treaty of Kiel was immediately repudiated by the weak but tenacious Norwegian people who contended that “it violated the principles of international law by purporting to dispose of an entire nation without its consent” and claimed the right to determine their own sovereignty. Bernadotte believed that the poverty and trade depression in Norway which followed the end of the Napoleonic wars, and the severe taxation which was made necessary would weaken the Norwegian resolve for sovereignty. He ignored the wishes of the Norwegians and continued to rule through a viceroy who was generally a Swede. Later in 1836, he arbitrarily dissolved the Norwegian legislature and declared Norway a mere province of Sweden. Over the years, successive monarchs made minor concessions to appease the Norwegians but allowed Swedish influence to predominate where the interests of the two countries differed. This only increased the resolve of the Norwegians to secede. Later attempts to hold on to Norway by promoting unity under the garb of “Scandinavianism” also failed. Early in 1905 the lone but determined Norwegians felt compelled to take matters into their own hands, and decided to hold a referendum. On August 13, 1905 they voted overwhelmingly for severance of the union, and King Oscar of Sweden wisely respected their wishes by immediately relinquishing the crown of Norway.

On the outbreaks of World War I (1914) and World War II (1939) Norway and Sweden joined Denmark to proclaim a policy of neutrality primarily designed to preclude any possibility of hostile action between them.

Following separation, and to this date Sweden and Norway have not only co-existed peacefully but also have cooperated closely in economic, political and cultural matters in ways that have made it easier for them to secure one of the world’s highest standards
of living.

In modern times the Scandinavian countries have been associated uniquely with peace and prosperity. They have succeeded in part because of their ability to appreciate sooner than most other countries the values of peaceful coexistence and regional cooperation.

The Horn is fragile. Without peace, the tragedies of the early seventies and eighties can be repeated easily, and most probably in a larger scale. Then, TV screens around the world were filled with the images of death: fly-haunted corpses, skeletal children crouched in pain, emaciated bodies of children, women and men, and frail villagers desperately scratching the scorched land with bare hands for signs of grains. The tragedy that is taking place in Somalia today is a grim reminder of what can easily recur in the entire region. No Horn nation need sustain such tragedies.

The Horn of Africa nations and particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia have an excellent opportunity now to emulate the Scandinavian experience and to initiate cooperation for peace and prosperity. What is needed is a new spirit and a fresh start.

(Abraham Z. Kidane, Ph.D., is a Professor of Economics and Director of International Programs at California State University, Dominguez Hills.)