By Messay Kebede
I have read with great interest Jawar’s well thought and skillfully articulated piece on Tigrean nationalism. It has inspired me to present my own view, not so much to contradict Jawar as to present an alternative interpretation. I do not consider this article as a rebuttal because I agree with Jawar’s analysis on several points so that my interpretation can be considered as an invitation to broaden the approach. I no longer believe in the unity and struggle of opposites whereby the one pole triumphs by annihilating the other; instead, debates and differences of ideas mean the search for accommodating alternatives that trigger choices rather than the attempt to dominate.
One undeniable fact is that nothing is more crucial for people engaged in the fight to topple a regime than to know the true nature of the regime. In this regard, Jawar defines Meles’s regime as a “business oligarchy,” both to emphasize that the pursuit of individual interests rather than ethnic commitment is its driving force and to unravel its preferential treatment of one ethnic group as a politics designed to obtain support by instilling fear and insecurity.
Though I find Jawar’s definition clever and useful, I do not quite see why a business oligarchy will engage in or continue to pursue identity politics in a country like Ethiopia. Let me explain. If indeed Meles and his Tigrean associates make up a business oligarchy with no Tigrean bias except to deceitfully coerce Tigreans into supporting them, then Ethiopia is a country that offers them a better alternative to achieve their goal. Of course, I have in mind the undeniable existence of a civic nationalism, which we can define as Ethiopian nationalism. In effect, why would Meles and co. get involved in the muddle of ethnic politics when they could have governed in the name of Ethiopian nationalism and with the help of a de-ethnicized bureaucracy, as did the Derg, for instance?
Jawar’s answer is that Meles and co. need ethnic politics to rally Tigreans: by favoring them economically, they arouse the animosity of other ethnic groups, thereby forcing Tigreans to seek their protection. This reasoning makes sense only if one assumes that Meles and co. had no other option than ethnic politics to get some popular support. And Jawar can think so because for him Ethiopian nationalism has never existed. So that, no other way exists for an oligarchy to rule the country than to appeal to ethnic alignments even if business interests have diluted the ethnic commitment it once had.
But can anyone really believe that Meles and co. would have failed to find some legitimacy if they had espoused Ethiopian nationalism? The latter is still alive, as forcefully demonstrated by the 2005 electoral victory of Kinijit that Meles had to suppress by violent means. Is any of Meles’s decisions and frequent crackdowns intelligible without his resolution to prevent at all cost the rise of a strong pro-Ethiopian political party? Birtukan is in jail because she epitomizes the resurgence of Ethiopianism. It is because Meles is convinced of the resilience of Ethiopian nationalism that he is so persistently at war with whatever seems to reinforce it. Doubtless, then, if Meles had defended Ethiopian nationalism and made some regional concessions to ethnic concerns and expanded the already existing pan-Ethiopian bureaucracy and military apparatus, he would have acquired acceptance and created a solid base, which he would have rewarded with economic advancements.
On the other hand, Jawar reasons as though there is such a thing as “Tigrean nationalism.” He is surprised that the TPLF betrayed that nationalism by involving Tigreans in the untenable situation of new conquerors and oppressors. Thus, he is baffled that the freedom fighter that he once knew ransacked his village. Is not Jawar’s surprise easily explained by the bogus nature of the so-called Tigrean nationalism? The inspiring goal of the leaders of the TPLF has never been the alleged Tigrean nationalism, which they knew not to exist. In light of centuries of unity between Tigreans and Amhara, there is neither political nor cultural justification for arguing in favor of a separate Tigrean national identity. Incidentally, Jawar gives us the foundation of Ethiopian nationalism, and hence of the non-existence of Tigrean nationalism, when he interprets the appointment of a Tigrean as a patriarch of the Orthodox Church as another TPLF’s “intensified effort to make ethnicity more important than religious solidarity.” Is not the necessity of an intensified effort to break the old bonds tying Tigreans to the Amhara a confirmation of the inexistence of Tigrean nationalism?
What the TPLF baptized as “nationalism” is none other than the hatred against the Amhara ruling elite and Ethiopian nationalism. As Aregawi Berhe, one of the founders of the organization, openly admits in his new book (A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front), the inspiring motive of the rebellious Tigrean elite was “resentment” at the sight of Tigray’s economic and political marginalization by the Amhara ruling class. The split of Tigrean students from the pan-Ethiopian orientation of the Ethiopian student movement was the product of elite conflict for the control of state power that the TPLF disguised as Tigrean nationalism. Hostility, first against the Amhara ruling elite and then against the Derg––as a proponent of Amhara hegemony––was systematically disseminated to provide a popular support to the Tigrean educated elite in its competition for the control of state power. Giving this hegemonic goal, is it surprising if, once it seized power, the TPLF has proved to be an instrument of oppression?
Our surprise should decrease even more in light of ethnic discourse authorizing oppressive behavior. The clear message of ethnonationalist discourse in Ethiopia is that there is nothing common between Amhara, Oromo, Tigreans, and other groups. They are all different nations that the Amhara state held together by sheer force. Given this image of Ethiopia as a “prison-house of nations,” what can we expect from TPLF fighters when they land in Wollega, Gondar or Wolaita? Obviously, they come as conquerors and occupiers since no bonds exist between them and the indigenous people. In denying the existence of a country called Ethiopia, the TPLF fighter is thereby invited to behave as a foreigner occupying an alien land that he/she will ransack without the slightest hesitation. That is why, unlike Jawar, I am not shocked when such fighters plunder Ethiopian villages.
To downgrade the ethnic equation, Jawar analyses Meles and co. as cold calculators of their interests. He forgets the hatred they nourished for decades toward Ethiopia, a hatred such that it clouds their judgment and prevents them from seeing other options, for instance the alternative of Ethiopian nationalism. Where there is ethnic politics there is also emotional syndromes that are not accountable in terms of interests. Despite serious efforts, scholars have failed to reduce ethnic politics to rationality, that is, to the calculation of interests by elite groups. More often than not, alongside material interests primitive sentiments emerge, such as hatred, fear, mistrust, which elites use to mobilize people and from which violent confrontations often spring.
It seems to me that Meles and co. have become themselves victims of the hatred they generated against Ethiopian nationalism in their quest for power. I remember vividly one of Meles’s interviews to the Ethiopian Television soon after the occupation of Addis Ababa: to the concern that ethnic politics might destroy Ethiopia, he responded by saying that the failure of ethnic federalism would simply mean that Ethiopia was not meant to be. To be sure, the prediction of such ominous end by the head of state of the country did not emanate from a loving concern.
The combination of interests with hatred induces Meles and co. to hurt Ethiopia while exorbitantly taking advantage of its resources. This ambivalent politics explains why they engage in actions that are detrimental to Ethiopia, such as ceding lands to the Sudan or devising increasingly lethal means of division. The animosity they feel toward Ethiopia does not allow them to engage in a politics of sustained progress toward unity, democracy, and equal prosperity; they have to periodically antagonize and hurt so as to vent the enmity that is eating them from inside. Ethiopians would want Meles and co. to be rational calculators of interest, given that they would have easily perceived that their best interest lies in promoting the equal prosperity of all ethnic groups. Alas, deeply engrained emotional thirsts stand in the way of rational politics.
In this respect, nothing is more perilous than to treat Tigray and the Tigrean elite preferentially as the policy does no more than enrage the rest of Ethiopia, thereby turning the achieved prosperity into a precarious acquisition. But this is to forget that enraging Ethiopian nationalism is an integral part of the psychological makeup of Meles and co.: they cannot commit to rational politics owing to the rancor with which they have filled their mind since their student years. This is to say that I do not follow Jawar in his view that the TPLF leadership has but abandoned its ethnic references, which it uses only to scare Tigeans. On the contrary, the references are alive in the deep-seated need to damage Ethiopia. Of all people Ethiopians should never forget the destructive power of resentment: they saw it at work with Mengistu Haile Mariam whose stubborn narcissism brought about the demise of the Ethiopian army and state because some people had called him “baria” in his younger days.
Above all, the resolution to control power indefinitely pushes Meles and co. to continue the politics of divide and rule. Since the implementation of liberal democracy cannot but lead to their demise, what else is left but to force people to vote ethnically so that the resulting political dispersal is used to sustain the hegemony of the TPLF? Meles hangs on to ethnic politics for the simple reason that dispersion is the only way by which a minority can retain power. More than the need to spread fear among Tigreans through the instrumentality of envy caused by preferential treatment, ethnic politics provides an institutional mechanism that allows a minority to rule over the majority. As the workings of the EPRDF illustrate, the mechanism results from the combination of ethnic separation with centralization, which is otherwise known as democratic centralism. By making lower bodies accountable to higher bodies, the principle of democratic centralism counters the ethnic fragmentation by creating a pyramidal power structure that transfers the full control of the state to an ethnic minority elite, just as communist oligarchies ruled the Soviet empire for decades by using the same mechanism of control.
(The author, Prof. Messay Kebede, can be reached at [email protected])
11 thoughts on “The Faking of Tigrean Nationalism”
“…What the TPLF baptized as “nationalism” is none other than the hatred against the Amhara ruling elite and Ethiopian nationalism….” the good professor is on point.
The attack on the concious of the Amhara is an attack on Ethiopia and Ethiopianism. When the selato italians came, thier main target was the Amhara and its church; they knew they were going to finish Ethiopia, if they annihilate those two first.
Dear belewbe#1,
You are absolutely correct the Amharas have always been the targets for anything that happens in Ethiopia because they are the ones who built, protected, and ran Ethiopia for hundreds of years. I have been trying to advocate the hard work of the Amhara and their immense contributions to Ethiopia, but I have been criticized severely for revealing the truth.
“This reasoning makes sense only if one assumes that Meles and co. had no other option than ethnic politics to get some popular support.” Meles and co. had/have no other option because they mobilized under policy of TPLF Manifesto. TPLF Manifesto directly contradicts Ethiopian nationalism. Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is not Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front. An attempt to replace or mend or correct TPLF Manifesto entails admitting blunder that adds to venerability to loss of comrades support base who have big fear of admitting blunder unforgivable status that triggers additional rejection in psyche of ruled, erosion of support, potential loss of power, and accountability. Out of phobia of loss of power, the TPLF Manifesto continues to be unspoken practice while the constitution is a sham. Maintenance of TPLF as ruling entity and perseverance of Manifesto and manipulation of support base with advantages economic political power had been the only way forward. It is trapped holding state power. It has to protect TPLF. It has to protect TPLF’s ethnic politics. Its ethnic politics diminished the day it divorced from OLF. Its ethnic politics lost value for it created fake PDOs. TPLF is in “catch 22”.
Ethiopians in the diaspora keep getting suckered into ethnic politics trying to justify past and present regimes use of ethnic differences as a tool for domination of those in power at a given time. What Ethiopians need to concentrate on is forming a government that works for unity among the diverse Ethiopian population and get away from glorifying past and present regimes whose only contribution to Ethiopia are dividing people along ethnic lines to stay in power while being completely dependent on foreign largesse to stay in power.
It is high time that those old ways of thinking go out the window and start concentrating on working to unify the Ethiopian people first and foremost, when that goal is achieved those who are lucky enough to have gotten education and developed professions to go back to Ethiopia and build a trully free Ethiopia that is not dependent on charity of western powers. Some Ethiopians may think doing that is an easy undertaking but trust me it is the hardest part of emanicipation from illiteracy, backwardness, disease and hunger.
Successive Ethiopian rulers used the natural ethnic differences among the people of Ethiopia as a tool for staying in power, enriching themselves, slaughterning the people and above all serving foreign interests. That is the lesson every Ethiopian needs to learn, instead of glorifying the contributions of a given ethnic group.
I agree that the two explanations are more or less similar, but of the two Jawar’s explanation seems more plausable.
The “Tigrean Nationlism” is only a mirage for those who do not believe that there is no sub national feelings in Ethiopia. It does exist. If it is bad or good, depends on which side of the fence you put youself.
There are two types of gains, that both of you did not seem to appreciate. There is the material gain that a lot of Tigreans enjoy preferentially, since their “victory”. Since not even their followers can deny. They might make it appear more acceptable by saying that we suffered more and thus we should be rewarded more. But then again even the most despot ruler tries to deny that he has special advantages to him in person or to his followers. In fact he might even describe it as a burden of responsibility that he can’t wait to hand over that responsibility to the next generation or the next qualified person. Only that next person does not seem to arrive forever. But only the simple mind believes this explanation, and there should not be any argument about it.
But the second type of gain, that all o the Tigrean people are enjoying is the Psychological one. The fact that they are from the subduing ethinic members gives them a huge psychological pay. It costs nothing to the government, but it is a huge gain at the expense of the “others” and that is most of us.
If a Tigrean comes to one’s office with a request, you should really have a strong reason before you even think about saying “no” to him. He might not do anything about it, but you can not be sure. Thus you would always err on the side of giving him what he wants, than face their wrath.
Thus I do not agree with the conclusion made by Jawar that TPLF abandoned the interest of the Tigreans. It did not.
Is there a price that they might end up paying for these exceses, yes! Every short sighted action has a consequence that however much you are powerful, it will catch up with you. But trying to say that the people of Tigrai did not benefit or they were abandoned by TPLF is patently false and is a disservice to our struggle.
Now the question is not for us to woo the Tigrean elites or the population in general, by refusing to see their excesses, but for them to be on the right side of the struggle and refuse to participate in this myopic misadventures that are perpetrated against us.
To say a little bit on Dr Messay’s argument about the possibility of Meles and Co joining the Ethiopian Nationalism and continuing the same crime, is an insult to the intelligence of the Tigaian elites as well as those of us who believe in Ethiopian nationalism. Thinking that we will continue working with a racist mob that is called TPLF with in the the Ethiopian nationalist movement and yet again allowing them to achieve this criminal and heartless goal, is unthinkable. I would not try it if I were Meles, and he knows better than that.
So let’s not absolve the criminals, and murderers and try to find an acceptable reason why they did it. The only reason they have and it is a strong one, is that we are their war trophies and they could do anything they want. Let’s fight and stop it!!
The tplf is a tribalist group that brainwashed the Tigreans into beleiving the Amhamras oppressed them. First of all, the Amaharas didn’t rule Ethiopia for centuries to advance one ethnic group’s interest. During the nation building process, the Amharas might have played a major role in the top leadership, but it was the entire Ethiopian people from all ehtnic groups who built the present day Ethiopia. From the reigns of Teodros to Mengistu, the Ethiopian administration was composed of all the ethnic groups including Eritreans. Ofcourse the administration was flaud, because it didn’t try to advance the interests of the majority, instead it oppressed them specially those in the country side. All the ethnic groups were marginalized and neglected by the succesive regimes.
Dr. Messy once again you either misunderstood or misconstrue the topic of discussion. The topic is not about Jawar,
yours is “The Faking of Tigrean Nationalism” this is the Amhara elites shortcoming in display when Ethiopia
they envision does not go well with reality.
Thanks Yashe.
The negativity of Messay is unbelievable. The topic is Meles not Jawar. We can not move ahead with this type of mentality.
Largely Jawar’s analysis seems to me closer to the truth although Messay’s comment has some reflection of the facts also.
I believe Jawar must have made a through thinking about it and presented it superbly. Keep it up.
I have recently visited the Tigrean controlled Ethiopia. From the time I arrived at the air port until I left the country, I felt as if I was in “The Rpublic Of Tigray” not in Ethiopia I know. They have almost replaced 95% of the Non-Tigrean government employees, buisnessmen, police, etc. by Tigreans. Now they are on the move to replace the Non-Tigrean dwellers of Addis by Tigreans. In the name of development they have started to remove the Non-Tigrean dwellers of Addis and replace them by armed Tigreans (you see that in the Lideta and in Merkato areas).If these Tigreans control the government, the police, the army, the church and now replace the Non-Tigrean city dwellers by armed Tigreans, then they are set to rule the country for a long time. Replacing the Non-Tigreans by armed Tigreans will continue in all major cities of the country to strengthen their power base. Because they know that they have no base in the other population group other than their own. These are the throphies the Tigreans won when they defeated the Derg and now the will fight to the last Tigre to defend these Trophies.
I am a Tigrean who hates TPLF. But I am certain the scenario in this article only marginally applies to a very small portion of the population that have been subjected to TPLF propaganda in the 1980’s, which was not at all nationalistic. It was rather based on getting even for grievances. It was all about ethnic self determination with “we can do it, it’s our turn” mentality originating from intensive military training in Sudan and Eritrea and easy supply of advanced weapon to fighters. Those who fought or shared camps together shared strong bond to each other. But the vast majority of the adult Tigrean population interprets this as nationalism. This extends to people who were living any where in Ethiopia or abroad. Since almost everyone has a relative or a close friend who participated in the struggle it has somehow become a safety net. Tigreans never had homogeneous affiliation. Changes in border, administration, land ownership, invasion in the extreme east and west, have changed loyalties. But now they are attached to their local goto guy or woyane relative who is in turn attached to an ideology not based on nationalism but common purpose. Together they form a self serving whole, kind of like a parallel unofficial local representative system based on cronyism. As the new generation moves into the system more and more tentacles grow forming a chain like blood vessels. When the person goes up in hierarchy and starts helping others the nationalism is quickly replaced by self importance, material gain and corruption. Overtime those growing tentacles crowd out everyone else grabbing every desirable job, piece of land, etc. And they have a strong interest in protecting the system. This creates (and has already created) a grass root control system that localizes any opposition. Literally every Tigrean is unpaid informant. In such a system a few people can strangulate a much larger population subjugating them forever or at least until ethnic assimilation makes the system obsolete. Until then among ordinary Tigreans their ethnic nationalism stays. It is obvious and undeniable. It is their only means of getting preferential benefit in the face of grinding poverty. For those in power there is negligible, if any, nationalist feeling. For them it’s money, power and self importance. If you are non-Tigrean living in Ethiopia my advice ‘run away if you can’ there is no solution except the passage of time, which is likely to be generations long.