The TPLF reported to have captured about 20,000 government troops and a considerable number of light and heavy weapons including two B.M. rocket launchers and 10 tanks. The government, on the other hand, lost many of its senior officers posted to the top level of command at the Shire front. Brigadier General Hailu Berawork and Brigadier-General Addis Agilachew TRA’s operation officer and commander of the 604th core respectively were killed at the battle of Shire while Brigadier-General Barata Gomoraw, Second-in-Command of the 604th core was captured by the rebels. Most of the division commanders were killed or captured by the rebels. A considerable number of the prisoners of war included the well-trained and experienced senior officers such as division commanders decided to join the TPLF forces and continued the struggle against the military government. Others were set-free and allowed to go back to government controlled territories.
THE AFTERMATH
After the decisive defeat of government forces at the Shire front government forces which had been stationed in the other parts ofTigray were concentrated in and around the town ofMekelle. These forces were found in a desperate condition owing to great losses at Shire. On the other hand the government in Addis Ababa found it quite difficult to send fresh reinforcements and make efforts to defend even the town of Mekelle and the Dessie-Mekelle road. It soon became clear to Colonel Mengistu’s government that its forces stationed in and outside Mekelle were vulnerable to subsequent rebels attack.
On 23/2/89, that is, four days after the conclusion of the battle of Shire, Colonel Mengistu held an urgent meeting with concerned top government officials including LegesseAsfaw. The meeting decided on the immediate evacuation of government forces from Mekelle. The “tactical retreat” from Mekelle would be southwards to Wello, where the new headquarters of the TRA would be Dessie and the defensive line being Korem. Ironically, Mengistu named the “tactical retreat from Mekelle” Zamacha Kitaw (“Punitive campaign”).
On 24/2/89 Legesse and the Chief of Staff of the armed forces left Addis Ababa for Mekelle. A meeting was soon held at Mekelle involving top government officials where they were briefed about the Zamacha Kitwa. The date for the beginning of the evacuation process was secretly decided to be 27/2/89.
Although there were no threats of rebel offensives at Mekelle nor possible interception on the way to northern Wello, the process of evacuation, contrary to the governments plan, was as disorganized as the dispersal of government forces at the battle of Shire. It was rather more of running away to save life than a tactical retreat.
On the other hand the engineering unit of TRA went on destroying institutions and property beginning from 11:00 a.m. in the morning. As further destruction continued the youth ofMekelle stormed the arms store of the Regional Military Commissariat and took more than 1,000 rifles and a considerable number of bullets. Some starting firing into the open air. The government’s engineering unit then ran away from Mekelle on its way to Wello. The town of Mekelle remained to be a vacuum until its being controlled by the TPLF forces three days after the evacuation of government forces. A few days later the whole ofTigray came under the complete control of the TPLF.
CONCLUSIONS
The decisive victory of the TPLF at the Shire front was owing to various factors which in broad terms could be grouped into two: the strength of the TPLF and the weakness of the government with respect to both political and military aspects. It was a hard reality that the government was both politically and militarily in a weak position before and during the battle of Shire. In the first place the government had no support from the people for various but obvious reasons mentioned elsewhere in this paper. In Tigray, the more the government was repressive and atrocious the larger was the number of individuals willing to join the TPLF rather than yielding to the government.
Secondly, although huge in terms of manpower, possession of weapons and supply, the TRA in general and the 604th Core Army in particular being the product of a corrupt system had a variety of shortcomings from the very beginning with respect to command, organization, intelligence activities, political orientation, discipline, morale etc. Many of the government troops did not seem to have had the dedication, readiness and fighting zeal for different reasons. But, it would be quite incorrect to say that the government army as a whole had not been ready for battle. There were indeed a considerable of them who fought to the end at Shire. Others mentioned above were also forced to go into battles with a line of machine-guns behind them, although they were the first to dessert whenever opportunities allowed them. One could, nevertheless say that the huge government force deployed at the Shire front was an amorphous one in terms of its manpower composition and other factors. Government political and military weaknesses in general counted against itself and paved the way for successful activities of its adversaries.
The main and decisive factor for the TPLF’s victory at the Shire front was its political and military uperhand in the region. All the way through the protracted war the TPLF effectively politicized the people and was particularly able to successfully integrate itself with the rural population. The front was not only able to get popular support in Tigray but also of neighboring regions. TPLF’s multi-faceted propaganda activities indeed resulted in its being politically superior to the government in both Tigray and adjacent regions.
TPLF was equally strong from a military point of view. Its regular force was smaller but more efficient than that of the government. It is true that the government force had the upperhand in possession of weapons. TPLF’s victory at the battle of shire was owing to other strong military qualities, which it had refined through experience accumulated during the protracted war. Its command was efficient. Its forces of different kind were well organized and deployed. It had effective styles, tactics and strategies of warfare. Its gallant combatants were committed to the political cause for which it stood and had mastery over quite invaluable military qualities such as morale virtues of patriotism, self-sacrifice and respect for authority. Moreover, the front coordinated its operations, whenever necessary, with friendly organizations such as the EPLF and EPDM. Its popular support did also contribute not only to the growth in its fighting manpower but also efficient supply and intelligence activities. All these summed up together made its military operations efficient and successful.
It would be quite groundless and ridiculous to say that TPLF’s victory at Shire was because government forces were “unwilling” to fight against the rebel forces. It is equally wrong to argue that the government defeat at Shire was because of its own weakness and not because of the political and military strength of the TPLF. The battle of Shire, indeed, was one of the largest scale battles fought in the history of the protracted war in Ethiopia.
In so far as the Shire front is concerned all of the top commanders including General Officers did their very best to carry out their mission and most of them were either killed at the battle or were captured because conditions did not allow them to escape. Neither the most confidential archives of the previous government nor other sources available prove the validity of the allegation that “some of the corrupt senior officers of the government used to be bribed by the rebel forces so as to prepare conditions for defeats of government forces.” The allegation rather remains to be both unfounded and the government’s deliberate but common means of making army elements scapegoats for defeat.
In the final analysis the battle of Shire appeared to be sudden and unexpected but decisive blow to the government. Events following the battle of Shire, not only dramatically changed the military balance of power to be in favor of the TPLF, subsequently the main component part of the EPRDF, but also drastically shortened the path to final victory over the military government of Ethiopia. After the battle of Shire the EPRDF and EPLF went on coordinating their offensive operations against the government. In the post-Shire war between TPLF and government forces, despite considerable casualties on both sides, all battles were fought at a lower scale making the Shire front to be a landmark in the history of the protracted war in Ethiopia. – END