At 10:45 a.m. the rebels intensifies their offensives against the 22nd brigade. The commander of the 604th Core then ordered the 103rd commando division to send one brigade backwards. But the whole division was eventually ordered to retreat backwards. Three brigades did so. The 135th brigade, however, did not receive the order and was subsequently vertically enveloped and destroyed by the rebel forces.
The rebels went on shelling the surrounding area to force the 22nd brigade to move towards the area where their combatants had taken position. The brigade on the way retreating backwards became the target of ambushed TPLF forces and was destroyed. Other government forces left their positions without orders from above. The commanders, political commissariats and military security officers tried to force them to stop retreating with “Zu-23” anti-aircraft guns but failed.
The 75th brigade of the same division was besieged while engaged in a battle on the left flank of the 103rd commando division, but was able to break the encirclement and retreat. Other reserve brigades of the 9th division retreated backwards together with the 103rd commando division. The 142nd
brigade which had been assigned to be on reserve along the right flank of the 103rd division was, however, intercepted and severely attacked by the rebels. Only one battalion of this brigade marched a long way broke the encirclement and saved itself.
During the war fought 8/2/89-10/2/89 government forces were so disorganized, that there was a breakdown in the command and control system. Almost in all directions government forces suffered from successive defeats and considerable losses in manpower and weapons. By 11/2/89 the whole force of the 604th core Army was confined to Salaklaka and Shire Endaslassie.
As the major battles of 8-10/2/89 were lost in favor of the TPLF, Legesse Asfaw, The “Overall Administrator” of Tigray fled to Addis Ababa. More interestingly enough Legesse went on commanding the TRA from Addis Ababa. In a meeting held on 14/2/89 Legesse Asfaw briefed the National Defense and Security council about government failure along the Shire frontline.
TPLF’S OFFENSIVE AND THE WAR AT SALAKLAKA AND SHIRE
After a comparative lull of three days (11-13/2/89) two major and decisive battles were fought at Salaklaka and Shire. According to government reports TPLF’s forces deployed for the Salaklaka confrontation included five divisions, two heavy weapon battalions and some zonal battalions (Zobawi
Shaleka).
On 13/2/89 when the core discovered a planned rebel offensive, it gave orders to the 16th division to station forces on a strategic hill near where its 128th brigade had taken position for it was believed to be a good way for the rebels to approach government forces. Three brigades of the 103rd commando division were put on reserve to the 4th Army Division in the Shire front. Government reports show that despite efforts made to consolidate the defensive line, some key places in the Seleklaka front were not strongly occupied.
During the night of 14/2/89, the TPLF forces started offensive operations along Afgh’gah, Qoyatsa and May Brazio directions. Threatened by continuous rebel offensives in that direction, the core commander and political officer gave orders that two brigades should move to reinforce the Agfah’gah position. However, the rebels moved through the gap created between the 4th and 16th divisions, intercepted the battalion stationed at Qoyatsa, destroyed it and managed to occupy Qoyatsa. From Qoyatsa the rebels effectively shelled the command center of the 120th brigade and controlled the Shire Afgahgah route.
While the war at the Salaklaka was being fought at a higher degree of intensity Colonel Mengistu and some of his top government officials in Addis Ababa seemed to have understood the collapse of government forces at the Shire front and went on working out plans to save other neighboring administrative regions.
Meanwhile developments at the Salaklaka front continued to be in favor of the TPLF. The rebels launched an offensive against the 16th army division, which had been stationed in the defensive zone of Salaklaka. During this time the three brigades of the 9th army division which had been assigned to be reservists to the 16th army division could not accomplish their mission because of the closure of the Afgah’gah rout to Salaklaka. Rather, these forces soon became targets of rebels offensive. Four brigades of this division found themselves besieged and despite fierce fighting in an attempt to break the encirclement and re-open the Afgah’gah route they suffered from serious losses. In the afternoon of that day the rebel forces were not only quite successful in their complete control over the strategic places of Qoyatsa and the Afgah’gah chain of mountains but also started marching towards Shire.
During the war at Salaklaka front heavy weapons and vehicles of government forces were either captured or destroyed by the rebel forces. Almost the whole command of the 16th army division was annihilated and the division came under the command of its Military Police Officer. The 9th army division too lost considerable forces including many of its brigade commanders and leading officers.
On the other hand TPLF’s control of the strategic places ofAfgah’gah and Qoyatsa increased its combat capabilities because it could now easily control the airport of Shire from a distance and also shell government forces stationed at the hills around the town of Shire and successfully defend itself from air raids. … continued on page 6