“We were Christian for over a thousand years before Christ,” Abba Gebremedhin [formerly known as Abba Paulos], the [illegitimate] Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, declared nonplused.
“We have been Christian since Queen Makeda [the biblical Sheba] visited King Solomon in Jerusalem to partake of his wisdom and returned to Ethiopia with the Ark of the Covenant — containing the actual stone tablets of the Ten Commandments God gave Moses,” he explained.
And herein lies the idiosyncrasy of the world’s oldest church, which distinguishes it from all other churches: the antic relic held sacred, and placed in the Chapel of Saint Mary of Zion, in the ancient town of Axum, the cradle of Ethiopian civilisation, the sellata Muse, is a thoroughly Jewish object. Indeed, the Ethiopian Church is perhaps the only Christian temple in the world to claim as its most sacred treasure a Jewish holiest of holies.
Many suspect that the Tabot of Zion (Ark of the Covenant) is hidden in the altar of the Church of Saint Mary of Zion. “Only I, and a select few bishops, actually know its precise whereabouts,” the Ethiopian Patriarch grinned, gently stroking his salt and pepper beard.
Without batting an eyelid, and perhaps sensing my bafflement, Abba Gebremedhin [Abba Paulos] turned to the crux of his faith. “Religion is the belief in the power of the Almighty. He is the Creator of all. He is the Giver of peace, love and happiness.”
According to traditional Ethiopian lore, Philip the Evangelist baptised a treasurer of the Ethiopian Queen Gersamot Hendeke VII. The New Testament’s Acts of the Apostles corroborate this landmark event in Ethiopian history.
Ethiopian monotheism harks back much further in time, though. Abba Gebremedhin [Abba Paulos] was born in the vicinity of Axum, where gigantic stelae, designed to look like multiple-storey houses, testify to the greatness of a civilisation that in antiquity ranked with Rome, Persia and China as one of the four greatest empires in the world. The Axumite accolade was attributed to the Persian prophet Mani, and is indicative of Axum’s power, influence and grandeur.
Before Axum there was Yeha, a stone’s throw away from Axum. Yeha is suspected to be a centre of D’mt, a kingdom now shrouded in the mists of a distant past. All we know today is that its rulers were bestowed the royal title Mukarrib of D’mt and Saba’ — an ancient southwestern Arabian kingdom. The kingdom most likely incorporated Yemen and northern Ethiopia and Eritrea. Yeha, unlike Axum, is dominated by the pagan Temple of the Moon, dedicated no doubt to the Sabaean moon god Al-Maqah.
There are to be found Musnad(South Arabian) inscriptions, characteristic of the Minaeans, the Qatabani, the Himyarite and Hadrami (of Hadramaut, southeast Yemen) civilisations across the Red Sea from D’mt, and rock-cut monumental structures reminiscent of Ma’rib, the celebrated Yemeni wonder of yesteryear. Indeed, Yeha is Ethiopia’s answer to Ma’rib. Through archaeological excavations the precise nature of the relationship between the two neighbouring mountainous and majestic lands may unfold in the years to come. The main thing is: Abba Paulos is proud of his heritage.
This rugged land of his was the birthplace of a literary masterpiece, the Kibre Negast(Glory of the Kings), that has exerted an unparalleled impact on Ethiopian civilisation and culture as both sacred scripture and historical lore. It also profoundly influenced the course of Ethiopian politics from antiquity to mediaeval times. Today, other no less potent forces are at work.
However, perched on precipitous peaks, the churches that dot the Ethiopian highlands continue to be venerated as they have been for millennia. The wondrous craftsmanship of the scrupulously contrived churches of the then imperial city of Roha, constructed by King Lalibela (literally: “The bees recognise his suzerainty”), and hewn out of the bedrock in a remote backwater that now bears the king’s name, bear tangible testament to the solemnity with which Christianity was revered in this remarkable land.
The Torah, or to be more precise the Pentateuch — Five Books in Greek, is replete with references to Ethiopia and Ethiopians. According to the Torah, the wife of Moses was an Ethiopian. And Solomon courted the Queen of the South, presumably Makeda of Ethiopia, the biblical Sheba (Saba’) — or was she Bilquis of Yemen as stated in the Quran? The New Testament, too, makes frequent mention of the Ethiopians.
The early Christianity of Axum was first codified at specific places in northern Ethiopia, at a specific time. “They were documented in the holy language of Ge’ez, which was once the official language of the land,” the Ethiopian Patriarch extrapolates. Ge’ez, the liturgical language of the contemporary Ethiopian Orthodox Church, harks back to the days of D’mt. It is a Semitic language closely related to Arabic and Hebrew. Today, there are numerous Semitic languages in Ethiopia — Amharic (formerly the official court tongue and now lingua franca); Tigrinya (the native tongue of Abba Paulos and Prime Minister Meles Zennawi, widely spoken in the northern Province of Tigray and in neighbouring Eritrea); the Adari of the eastern Ethiopian Muslim city of Harar; and the Gurage of southern Ethiopia; among others.
“Heading the Ethiopian Church is no laughing matter,” he chuckled. “The 50,000 churches around the country serve the 45 million-strong Orthodox flock representing many different ethnic groups. There are some two million priests, monks and deacons dedicated to pastoral work and delivering services. There are 54 bishops, and 44 dioceses,” he muses.
Abba Paulos, the son of a priest, was dispatched to a monastery at the tender age of five. He is steeped in the religion of his forefathers. The oldest of six brothers and sisters, he knew at an early age that he alone among his siblings was to dedicate himself to monastic life.
Tradition ascribes the official introduction of Christianity to Ethiopia to the moment when the Patriarch of Alexandria Athanasius consecrated a Levantine from Tyre, Frumentius, as the first Patriarch of the Ethiopian Church, thereby establishing a tradition whereby the Coptic Pope of Egypt would appoint the Ethiopian Patriarch. Customarily, an Egyptian monk was appointed as the chief bishop of Ethiopia. This tradition was abruptly terminated in 1959 when the first Ethiopian, Abuna Basilios, was selected for the post. He was, however, to begin with, merely a bishop appointed by the Coptic Orthodox Pope of Alexandria and Patriarch of All Africa Cyril VI. Ethiopian nationalism was resurging.
In due course, in May 1971 to be precise, the Egyptian Church received a request from the Ethiopian Church to consecrate an Ethiopian Patriarch (as opposed to a bishop). Even more symbolically significant and without any historical precedent, the Ethiopians also requested that their Patriarch’s consecration take place in Ethiopia and not in Egypt as had been the case for two millennia. Since then, the patriarchs of the Ethiopian Church have been consecrated by an all- Ethiopian Holy Synod, with the umbilical chord that bound the Coptic and Ethiopian churches ruptured for good.
The history of Christianity in Ethiopia has often been one of unintended consequences. Ironically, the famous fables of early Christian Ethiopia are Jewish, rather than Christian per se. There is no record of Jewish rulers of Ethiopia, even though the difference between Christianity and Judaism in Ethiopia is often confusingly blurred. It is perhaps more appropriate to speak of a Judaeo- Christian heritage.
Indeed one influential mediaeval monk, Abba Ewotatewos (1273-1352) urged his Christian followers to observe the Judaic Sabbath alongside the Christian Sunday mass. Even so, the Beta Israel of Ethiopia who practised a non-Talmudic form of Judaism suffered persecution in certain periods of the country’s long history. We know that Jewish kings ruled Yemen: Youssef Asar Yathar of Himyar, for example, who was routed by the Christian King Kaleb of Ethiopia.
Be that as it may, the Christianisation of the Ethiopian state in the fourth century, during the reign of King Ezana of Axum, was a turning point. It is important to stress that Christianity in Ethiopia was a state religion, closely affiliated with the monarchy and the court. Ethiopia, nevertheless, was always multi-religious, multi- cultural, and multi-ethnic. Many of Ethiopians are non-Christians — animists, Jews (the so- called Falasha) or Muslims. Indeed, the Arabic name for Ethiopia, Al-Habasha — from which the English Abbyssinia is derived — means Land of Mixed Races. Christians in Ethiopia have long learned to co-exist (peacefully or otherwise) with their non-Christian compatriots.
This historical legacy has deeply impacted the nature of the Ethiopian Church. From the outset it was a political, as much as a religious, institution. To this day the Ethiopian Church is an extremely politicised body, and this extends not only from domestic to foreign politics.
The split between the Coptic Church of Egypt and its Ethiopian counterpart in the early 1970s, and more recently, the split between the Eritrean and Ethiopian Churches are unpleasantly conspicuous examples of this legacy. The ruling cliques of Ethiopia have long interfered with, even dictated Church politics; and the Ethiopian Church has traditionally been subject to the whims of the country’s political establishment.
For instance, when the Derg usurped power, it promptly arrested Abba Tewophilos in 1976 and executed him in 1979. Tekle Haymanot was hurriedly enthroned by the Derg, and after his death an even more compliant Abba Merkurios was made Patriarch of Ethiopia. He was dismissed by many as a Derg puppet. And with the Derg’s demise Abba Paulos was hastily enthroned. His enthronement, however, was sanctioned by the Coptic Church of Egypt.
The incensed former Patriarch Merkurios fled the country and announced from exile that he was forced to abdicate under duress. His followers, mainly ethnic Amhara, still consider him the legitimate Patriarch of Ethiopia and a breakaway alternative synod was formed in exile. A substantial segment of the Ethiopian diaspora in North America and Europe pay allegiance to Merkurios.
The church, therefore, was seen by many as being systematically subordinate to the powers that be. This, however, is an issue that Abba Paulos vehemently disputes.
“Yes, there are those who grumble and complain deriding us as an instrument of state control. They claim that we are an appendage of the state. But we are not. We are completely free,” Abba Paulos insists.
“I came to Egypt with ten bishops. I didn’t ask the government’s permission who should accompany me.”
The adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, like those of the Coptic Church of Egypt, are staunch Monophysites — that is to say they are convinced that Christ has only one nature. In this they differ from other Eastern Orthodox churches — the Greek, Romanian, Russian, Serbian and other Slavic and East European churches, for example.
In many other respects, the Ethiopian Church is like no other. Few other people in Africa have been so intensely self-conscious of their unique documented history, hybrid identity and direct relationship with the monotheistic religions of the Middle East.
Royal propaganda played a pivotal part in perpetuating this tradition. Succumbing again and again to the lure of the monotheistic religions of the Middle East emerged as a peculiarly Ethiopian heritage. Since time immemorial Ethiopian religious lore was grounded firmly in the mythologies of the ancient Middle East.
However, certain Ethiopian potentates are known to have strayed from the path of devotion to the Jewish, and then Christian God. Some kings, such as Lij Iyasu crowned in 1913, had even toyed with the idea of becoming Muslim. Indeed, several of his wives were Muslim. Lij Iyasu, however, was forced to abdicate because his courtiers suspected that he had embraced Islam.
But Ethiopia is a land of contrasts and contradictions. Small wonder then that many of the Solomonic royals also claimed to be Ashraf(descendants of the Prophet Mohamed). “My forefathers in Axum provided a safe haven for Muslims fleeing persecution in Mecca,” Abba Paulos reminded me. He was referring to the first hijra (exodus), when the Sahaba(the Prophet Mohamed’s Companions) fled Hijaz to Ethiopia around 615 AD.
Landlocked Christian Orthodox Ethiopia was for centuries surrounded by Muslim states and conducted its foreign trade through them. At one point, Imam Ahmed bin Ibrahim Al-Ghazi, better known as Gran(The Left- Handed) threatened to overrun the territories precariously held by the country’s Christian rulers, who were reduced to fugitives with moveable tents for courts. Churches and monasteries were sacked and people abandoned their Christian faith. The unique Solomonic Christianity of Ethiopia was all but extinguished.
Portuguese firearms saved the day. Even as Gran beseeched the Ottomans for support, so the Ethiopian emperors called on their Portuguese co-religionists to come to the rescue. Be that as it may, the Portuguese failed to convert the bulk of Ethiopian Christians to Roman Catholicism.
The Solomonic dynasty of Ethiopia has preserved a substantial body of memories in spite of the fact that for centuries the actual power and prestige of the crown waned. As imperial power abated, the zemana mesafint, the era of the princes, was ushered in. The prestige of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church suffered in consequence. A few Ethiopian emperors, under the influence of Portuguese missionaries, converted to Roman Catholicism. Emperor Susneyos was forced to abdicate in 1632 AD because he embraced Catholicism.
The days of the Solomonic emperors are over, but the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has survived. It has overcome many ordeals. Today it faces new challenges: internal frictions, the growth of Evangelical Christianity and a host of socio-economic calamities.
As the interview draws to a close, Abba Paulos dwells on hellishly controversial subjects, most notably the HIV/AIDS pandemic that is ravishing his country and the rampant poverty that plagues many of his compatriots. His flock includes the impoverished residents of the many slums that cling to the hillsides of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. He insists that poverty eradication and fighting HIV/AIDS, unemployment and homelessness are all part and parcel of the church’s mission. “Words and deeds,” he explains, saying they are as important as preaching. Orthodox Christianity has played a central role in Ethiopian history, culture and society. “And it will continue to do so.”
The Ethiopian Church might vie for the sobriquet of the world’s oldest church, but it is a church very much in the making.
Abba Paulos, Patriarch of the Ethiopia, Archbishop of Axum and Echegue of the See of Saint Tekele Haimanot is an imposing man. Last month, in Cairo at the invitation of Pope Shenouda III of Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Church, he was resplendent in glistening white and equally effulgent headgear. He was in Egypt to mend fences. The two “sister churches” have long had a love-hate relationship. Historically, the Coptic Church insisted on posing as the Mother Church; today it has at last come round to the more modest accolade of sister church.
Before Cairo, Abba Paulos visited the Sudanese capital Khartoum, to foster closer ties between Muslims and Christians in Africa. In his capacity as president of the World Council of Churches — an international body that groups together Orthodox and Protestant Churches — he met Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir. “I feel honoured to have the opportunity to make a deliberation on the most pertinent issue of Muslim-Christian dialogue,” he told the Sudanese president. His express aim, as he explained to his host, was to unveil a roadmap for peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims in Africa generally, and the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin in particular.
Abba Paulos eschews ideological and religious fanaticism, for which Ethiopia is particularly badly prepared. It is surrounded by predominantly Muslim nations like Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. It is also a country that has been ruled by a Christian elite traditionally for at least two millennia, even though roughly half of its 70 million people are Muslim.
The official Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church is according to its adherents the oldest church in Christendom, a claim disputed by some other churches. The Ethiopian Church has long been inextricably intertwined with the fortunes, and catastrophes, of the Ethiopian state. Church and state, down the centuries, have served each other well.
However, Ethiopia has witnessed dramatic upheavals since the once “hermitic empire” was invaded by the forces of the Fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in 1935. Ironically, Ethiopia was conquered by a European power at precisely the moment when the first fruits of modernisation instituted by Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) were beginning to be harvested during the reign of Emperor Haile Sellassie (1930-1974).
A violent, quasi-Marxist revolution, ensued; and the last of a long line of Ethiopian emperors for some 2,500 years was summarily and unceremoniously executed. A military junta (the Derg) ruthlessly ran the country, meddling in Church affairs. Throngs of victims were packed into detention centres where they were routinely tortured; many perished or disappeared without trace.
Abba Paulos was incarcerated, but he managed to flee the country. A resourceful man, he made good use of his exile: he studied theology at Princeton and Yale. His sojourn in the United States abruptly ended when he was hand-picked by the new regime of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zennawi and appointed Patriarch of Africa’s most ancient church. Abba Paulus is acutely conscious that radical changes in his country are currently underway, and that the pace of change is certainly poised to quicken in the 21st Century
The United States should stop supporting the Ethiopian Woyanne government’s aggression against its opposition if there is to be peace in the Horn of Africa region, an official of the Oromo Liberation Front said.
Hassan Hussein, the foreign relations head of the Ethiopian-based OLF, accused the U.S. government of continued collaboration with the Ethiopia’s dictatorMeles Zenawi, despite consistent reports of human rights abuses in that country.
“Zenawi is an enemy of peace, not only inside Ethiopia, but look what’s happening in Somalia, where his troops are killing innocent civilians,” Hussein told a crowd of nearly a thousand people, who gathered outside the State Capitol to demonstrate against Ethiopia’s Woyanne’s treatment of Oromos.
Hussein said time had come for the U.S. government to cease its diplomatic ties with Zenawi’s regime. Instead, Hussein said the Bush administration could play an active role as a mediator between the OLF movement and the Ethiopian government. Hussein appealed to Washington to initiate space for dialogue with the Ethiopian government that would bring the two sides to the negotiating table to meet face to face and talk about ways of resolving their differences peacefully.
The Oromos, who make up an estimated 32 percent of Ethiopia’s 76.5 million people, have been involved in a conflict with the central government for over a decade and a half. One of the major issues of the conflict is the state of Oromo prisoners in Ethiopian prisons and the continued handing down of sentences against Oromo people on what many feel are trumped up charges. Oromos also say their kinsmen in refugee camps around the Horn of Africa live in constant fear of being kidnapped by Ethiopian security agents.
Hussein told the crowd that the Ethiopian population and the government were being led by a person who ruled with “an iron fist.”
The demonstration, which was organized by the International Oromo Youth Organization, brought together hundreds of people from the Oromo ethnic community in the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Dubbed the Annual Oromo Convention, the gathering, according to Damee Ormaa, the immediate vice president of the youth association, was meant to bring the community together.The convention was also aimed at raising funds for several developmental projects in and out of Ethiopia.
The demonstration kicked off at the intersection of Dale Street and University Ave. in St. Paul before snaking through traffic on its way to the State Capitol. Waving placards that condemned torture and illegal detention by Ethiopian security forces, the participants, dressed in traditional Oromo regalia, braved the scorching heat to hear their leaders speak.
“You cant imagine a government functioning like this, rounding up people in a village and taking them to mountains to be shot and their bodies left for hyenas to feed, only because they are suspected to have links with the OLF,” said Ormaa. “It’s against anybody’s imagination”
Ormaa alleged that students from his community were being expelled from schools and universities for engaging in demonstrations against the Ethiopian regime.
The group, under the umbrella of the International Oromo Youth Association, has already written a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Rep. Keith Ellison and Sens. Amy Klobuchar and Norm Coleman to bring to their attention the “trials and tribulations of the parents, relatives and friends in Oromia and other parts of Ethiopia feeling the pain and sufferings of their compatriots who are denied the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness because of their yearning for democratic governance.”
New Exhibit Celebrates One of Ethiopia’s Finest Living Artists
The Loyola University Museum of Art (LUMA) in Chicago,- announces the opening of Painting Ethiopia: The Life and Work of Qes Adamu Tesfaw. On display from Saturday, September 1 to Sunday, November 4, 2007, the exhibition showcases the remarkable paintings of Qes Adamu Tesfaw, which depict the social, political, and religious history of Ethiopia as well as contemporary popular culture.
The exhibition features 36 paintings portraying the richness of both religious and secular life in Ethiopia, along with scenes from important historical events that have shaped the country’s identity. Qes Adamu’s style is infused with a sense of humor that informs the
self-awareness of his art.
Pamela Ambrose, director of LUMA, explains the connection between the exhibit and the Chicago community: “Over the past 20 years, a recent wave of immigration has increased the Ethiopian population here in Chicago, creating a vibrant community of restaurants, shops, and organizations. They are a dynamic ethnic and cultural group, and wehope, through the beauty and narratives of Qes Adamu’s work, to acquaint our museum visitors with the richness of Ethiopian culture.”
The exhibition is curated by Dr. Raymond Silverman, professor of the history of art and Afro-American and African studies at the University of Michigan, and organized by the Fowler Museum at UCLA and the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University.
Dr. Silverman first encountered Qes Adamu’s work in 1991, and eventually met him in 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Visiting the artist’s house, Dr. Silverman found the walls covered with murals of incredible intensity. After 11 years and several visits with the artist, Dr. Silverman has transformed Qes Adamu’s art into an informative exhibition that features almost 2,000 years of culture and history, as seen through the eyes of one fascinating artist.
About LUMA
The Loyola University Museum of Art, opened in October 2005, is dedicated to the exploration, promotion, and understanding of art and artistic expression that attempts to illuminate the enduring spiritual questions and concerns of all cultures and societies. As a museum with an interest in education and educational programming, LUMA reflects the University’s Jesuit mission and is dedicated to helping men and women of all creeds explore the roots of their own faith and spiritual quest. Located at Loyola University Chicago’s Water Tower Campus, the museum occupies the main floor (street level), second, and third floors of the University’s historic Lewis Towers on Chicago’s famous Michigan Avenue.
Ongoing Film Presentation
A film presentation entitled, “A Conversation with Qes Adamu Tesfaw,” will be shown in the galleries throughout the course of the exhibition.
Stop by LUMA and celebrate the Ethiopian millennium with a day of culture, history, and art! The day includes lectures by Professor Tadesse Tamrat (Addis Ababa University) and Dr. Raymond Silverman (University of Michigan), delicious Ethiopian food, and performances by the Ethiopian Community Children’s Dancing Troupe.
Tuesday, September 25, 6 p.m.
An Artist’s View of Ethiopia: The Paintings of Qes Adamu Tesfaw
This lecture traces the sequence of events that led to the first major exhibition in the U.S. focusing on a single traditional artist from Ethiopia. Raymond Silverman, curator of Painting Ethiopia, will discuss his 11-year collaboration with Qes Adamu Tesfaw during which Silverman learned about painting in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the impact that the commercial art market has had on the work and lives of some of Ethiopia’s finest Church-trained artists.
Tuesday, October 23, 6 p.m.
The Tapestry of Ethiopian Religions
Dr. Donald Levine, professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Chicago, will lecture on the three religions of Ethiopia: Ethiopian Orthodoxy, Judaism, and Islam.
Painting Ethiopia: The Life and Work of Qes Adamu Tesfaw is partially supported by a grant from the Illinois Arts Council, a state agency.
In my previous writing entitled “TPLF and Tigrean Identity Politics” dated May 25, 2007, I expressed a view that Tigrean nationalism is overtly discriminatory, and it is therefore distinguished by negative manifestations of the Ethiopian integrative power. Instead of uniting multi-ethnic Ethiopia, the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership has antagonized them, and as such, it has excluded even Tigreans from mainstream Ethiopian political discourse. In this follow up, necessitated by email feedbacks I received, I intend to provide some evidence without encumbering the reader with too much detail that such data would otherwise require.
My previous argument leads to a conclusion that the negative identity formation in which a group (TPLF) defines itself and also others in terms of what it is not, according to a famous sociologist, tends to lead into a “pathological situation of internal violence.” This has occurred on a large scale in the Balkans, Sri Lanka, or the Middle East. The situation in Ethiopia is an even more fitting example with acutely rising consequences. Tigrean discrimination ignores individual merits based on the victim’s ethnic background, and this serves as a stifling factor for development, killing ideas in a poor country that requires mobilizing all its brain capacities to get rid of the ravaging poverty.
My previous view also suggests that Tigrean discrimination has paradoxically played a very important role of coalescing the discriminated people, pulling together victims who share the same abuse to a united powerhouse capable of undermining or perhaps even toppling the discriminator. Oromos, Somalis, Sidamas, and Amharas, etc. are united in wanting to dethrone the TPLF. In other words, even a negative integration, integration that is achieved for a reason of shared abuse – threats, hatred, tortures, arrests, and killings is integration of some sort. This natural coalition of the oppressed is as strong as it can effectively resist political opportunism as well as TPLF’s corruptive infiltration. There is tangible evidence, that creation of a country-wide united national opposition front to this Tigrean domination is targeted by infiltrators from the TPLF dominated regime. But the creation of a broad-based unity has its own weak points that expose it to such manipulations.
The weakest link
The Ethiopian political intolerance, exceptionally violent and intense in its makeup, is nourished by delusional tradition that borders with compulsive disorder. By and large, it assumes that every human being with opposing opinion, every political group with a dissenting view, is an enemy. This intolerance characterizes the individual activist’s manner so profoundly, that one can observe its manifestations in coffee bar debates, at community gatherings, and even at scholarly meetings. This is in major part the legacy of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the weakest link in the creation of a broad-based opposition against Tigrean domination, i.e., a hazard for political progress in the country.
In a familiarly condescending tone whose authorship must have a thing or two to do with EPRP mentality, one wrote, ‘The theory of the nation which decomposes Ethiopia by weaving the myths (emphasis mine) of Tigreanism, Eritreanism, Oromoism and so on goes counter to the core experience of the people…’
After reclaiming Eritrea and replacing the well established Ethiopian myth with his own, the author attempts to guard the mythical ‘framework’ by delivering another punch to its contents: “There can be no compromise on the Ethiopian and African framework for citizen expression and engagement.”
The author forces all the Ethiopian cultural and ethnic diversities to either become Ethiopians or Africans of his personal definition of certainly chauvinistic preeminence, or face a wrath of his verdict and imagination — no compromise, we are told in no uncertain terms.
So, vaguely articulated malice of EPRP’s ideology still permeates through the deeds and words of the now senior or middle-aged activists who commenced politics in the 70s as infantile children. Their politics never stopped growing, but it grew crook!
In the 1970s, in a bizarre combination of feudal tradition with Marxism, the EPRP offered nothing else to the Ethiopian political roundtable other than winning by killing or dying, even when in its opposition stood a well-armed national army pronouncing its sure demise.
There was no compromise then as now. Blinded by emotional ambition, traits of which are still glaring among its rank and file, the children were too young to fathom the essence of a military balance and too confused to comprehend the impact of a generation’s death.
The military junta was driven insane by their obnoxious and unflinching ambition, and as a result, the junta passed a collective death verdict on the generation.
This in part allowed the military to keep political power for one more decade, leaving behind a scar of historical magnitude.
In this sense, the EPRP and the TPLF have little to distinguish them from Khmer Rouge, except that the TPLF, also a teen army that grew to power without growing to the society, is now terrorizing Ethiopia whereas the EPRP resides in old Diaspora minds as a political paranoia. They do share concealed hate and love for each other; they can’t go against each other, they can’t go for each other either. It is sad to see that neither the politics nor the social evolution of the last thirty years offered any cure to the survivors of the lost generation of Ethiopia that continue diffusing discord throughout all the political establishments of the region.
There is little doubt that most of the destructive vectors and inward fighters in all political fronts and organizations can be traced to this futile ideology in a resistive or adaptive form. Their relentless propaganda for the unity of Ethiopia, on one hand, and equally relentless objection to the unity of Oromos, Amharas, Somalis etc. when not on their own sadistic terms on the other, their objection to the very idea of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD), is a synopsis of their fixation on winning, with extremely poor judgment of their capacity that would enable them to win. By betraying its own mission and stated goals, the EPRP is acclaimed to be the weakest link of the Ethiopian political opposition against Tigrean domination, and therefore the creation of a better tomorrow for the region.
TPLF’s Strength
Facing a disgruntled Ethiopian opposition forces is the TPLF, an organization that has an exceptional talent in further disgruntling opposition forces. The TPLF has two strong suits that link it to the Ethiopian political power and shape its capacity to destabilize the opposition. They are: a) military, and b) economy.
The military
Strictly speaking, the Ethiopian armed forces are Tigrean no less than the TPLF is Tigrean. The following list makes this argument abundantly clear.
Ministry of Defense
* Commander of Ethiopian armed forces – Melles Zenawi (Tigrean)
* Defense Minister is a non-Tigrean, but this position is constitutionally manned by a civilian, not a military person
* Chief of Staff – Samora (Mohamed) Yunis (Tigrean)
* Department of Training – Major General Taddese Wored- (Tigrean)
* Department of Logistics and Administration – Major General Gezahi Abera – (Tigrean)
* Department of Operations – Brigadier General Gebrzgiabher Mebrhatu (Tigrean)
* Department of Military Intelligence- Brigadier General Yohannes (John) Gebre Meskel – (Tigrean) …. Recently appointed as Deputy Commander of Central Command. This Department will also be commanded by head of operations Brigadier General Gebrezgiabher Mebrhatu (Tigrean).
* Commander of the Air Force – Brigadier Molla H. Mariam (Tigirean)
Under the Ministry of Defense there are 5 Ethiopian Army Commanders.
* Northern Command (HQ Mekele) – Major General Seare Mekonnen (Tigrean)
* North Western Command (HQ Baher Dar) – Brigadier General Abraham Gebre Mariam (Tigrean)
* Special Army Command (HQ Dessie-Bure Front) – Birgadier General Teklai Ashebir (Tigrean)
* South Eastern Army Command (HQ Harar) – Brigadier General Seyum Hagos (Tigrean)
* Central Army Command (HQ Shire Indasilassie) – Major General Taddese Wored (Tigirean – Agaw). Recently, Brigadier General Yohannes G. Meskel also Tigrean.
The Ministry of Defense has 28 Division Commanders.
* All but one are Tigreans
Division Commands have 106 Regiments.
* 98% of the Regiment Commanders are Tigireans
It can be safely argued therefore, that there is no Ethiopian national army but Tigrean.
b) The economy: The Ethiopian economy is controlled by two large conglomerates:
l The Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT)
l The Ethio-Saudi AI-Amudi-family – Midroc Ethiopia
Of interest to my ongoing argument is EFFORT. We will return to Midroc at another opportune time.
In 1978, the TPLF created the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a financial umbrella organization of the TPLF which acted as an NGO despite headed by a TPLF Central Committee member. It collected donations from the international community and channeled it to the TPLF, playing a key role in the survival and ultimate victory of TPLF over the Derg.
After the rise of the TPLF to power in 1991, REST was formally registered with the governmental Relief & Rehabilitation Commission in Ethiopia as an NGO. As the TPLF’s financial backbone, it continued enjoying the state protection, and the restructured organization emerged as the richest “NGO” in the continent. In the summer of 1995, about four years after it took control of central power in Ethiopia, the TPLF established a stronger peer for REST – the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Sources suggest that EFFORT started its business venture with a lofty investment volume of about 2.7 billion birr — then just under US $1 billion (currently $1 US is about 9 birr).
Through EFFORT, the TPLF has considerably diversified its economic activities and expanded its outreach even to foreign countries. The European financial maneuver of the TPLF is based in UK where family members are trained and placed in key areas of Ethiopia’s financial institutions. In some cases, they are assigned to a now growing number of internationalized affiliates co-owned or owned by EFFORT, such as the Tower Trading Company (TTC) – a London-based TPLF owned company mandated with money laundering.
New companies continue to emerge, fully or partly owned by EFFORT through an intricate system of shares and investments. By controlling key growth areas, EFFORT has become the soul of the country’s economy: agriculture (Hiwot Mechanized Agriculture), industry (Almeda Textiles Manufacturing Sc., Mesfin Industrial Engineering SC.), import-export (Guna Trading House), transport (Trans-Ethiopia SC.), insurance (Africa Insurance SC.), mining (Meskerem Investment SC.), communications (Mega-Net Corporation), banking (Wegagen Bank), just to mention some. Clearly, TPLF’s business enterprises cover numerous activities including textile, chemicals, pharmaceutical, and food industries. They also cover major service industries such as banking, insurance, transportation, printing, advertising, land developing, import/export, construction, mining, leather products, and farming.
EFFORT is divided into several sectors directed by members of the TPLF Central Committee, like Abadi Zemo for industrial activities, Arkebe Oqubay Mitiku for construction and transportation, and Tewodros Hagos for mining. The individuals may be moved around, but no non-Tigrean is appointed to EFFORT. In fact, no non-TPLF Tigrean is appointed to the ranks of EFFORT. Strategic positions of the Federal government that generate large amounts of cash are also led by Tigreans of EFFORT who hold multiple offices. For example, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin is chairman of Ethiopian Air Lines, chairman of the Mugher Cement Factory, chairman of the Ambo Water Factory, chairman of EFFORT, and deputy-chairman of the TPLF at the same time. The more trusted individuals are usually offered the more strategic positions.
Although EFFORT is strictly controlled by the TPLF, it is not the only entity owned or controlled by high-ranking TPLF officials or favored Tigrean citizens. For example, although EFFORT controls WEGAGEN Bank, the TPLF encouraged the creation of DEDEBIT Credit and Savings Institution, headquartered in Meqele and administered by the local government of Tigray. The bank has numerous financial links with other TPLF controlled businesses of the country. DEDEBIT, as an extension of Rural Credit Program, acquired a near total monopoly over credit to rural areas, mostly farmers. The financial monopoly over rural Ethiopia has serious political ramifications. In the early 2000s, the main source of the bank was interest from fertilizer. Farmers were identified, registered, and forced to make a down payment of 25% on the price for the amount of fertilizer. The Bank estimated the amount of fertilizer the farmer supposedly needed. A credit agreement was written with each farmer, and after six months, the bank collected the debt from the farmers with 15% interest.
Business in Tigray is completely closed to non-Tigreans, and all walks of Tigrean businesses are exclusively owned by EFFORT or the local Tigrean government. For example, the trading company GUNA has a near monopoly in sesame and incense wholesale in Tigray whereas TRANS Ethiopia carries all goods designated as relief.
The TPLF also benefits EFFORT by ordering free transfer of funds from government accounts, often under a bogus claim of services that TPLF institutions offered to the public. It allows free flow of goods in the name of EFFORT, without customs and taxes, but EFFORT is allowed to compete with for-profit businesses of the country through its tentacle bureaus. Thus, Moseb Cement factory was built with public expenditure at a cost of 1.5 billion birr, and a Textile factory in Adwa at 1.2 billion. However, the incomes from these public investments are fully controlled by the TPLF through EFFORT.
EFFORT also makes extensive use of the credit opportunities offered by the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and other financial institutions controlled by the government. The generous provision of credits by CBE to EFFORT is clearly politically influenced and based upon directives issued by the TPLF controlled government of Ethiopia. When EFFORT defaults in the payment of loans CBE provides relieving credit, obviously upon directives from the Ethiopian government. In some cases, millions of birr loans obtained by EFFORT are unlawfully delayed or even cancelled. In a widely publicized case a few years ago, the Vice-Governor of CBE overruled an earlier decision by the credit department of CBE not to grant 40 million birr credit to SUR Construction, a subsidiary of EFFORT. There is no way escaping the conclusion that the loan was made possible by political intervention from the TPLF regime.
As an almost sole beneficiary of state contracts, EFFORT’s income continues to grow exponentially. For example, during the Ethio-Eritrean war, EFFORT became the financial wing of the war. MESFIN Engineering supplied water, fuel, and vehicles. TRANS-Ethiopia supplied trucks, and SELAM Bus was in charge of transporting militia. The income from the war propelled these companies to powerful monopolies of the country in their respective business domains.
EFFORT has now become a self-contained economic state operating on the call of the official government, formally serving the personal appetite of state officials, a phenomena witnessed nowhere in the world. Its assets are protected federally, and its under-the-table contracts are enforced by TPLF’s iron fisted militias. It has a favored access to government as well as to foreign aid contracts with profitable niches, dominating joint ventures with domestic and foreign investors. One of the strategic alliances is with Amoudi’s Midroc which supplies the TPLF with billions of birr through investments. Midroc buys natural resources of the South including gold and other precious stones from the TPLF with cash, and service contracts at these sites go back to EFFORT.
At a policy level, the Financial Sector Steering Committee (FSSC) serves as an umbrella institute for justification of fund transfers, creating the legal framework for supporting even poorly performing EFFORT auxiliaries, or channeling funds to the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) cash institutes. EPRDF is a bogus amalgam of Fronts populated with non-Tigrean renegades, created and dominated by the TPLF. FSSC defines policies and strategies for banks, appoints board of directors and executives for the banks, and routinely monitors their operations. Thus, the FSSC oversees all government banks, and has full power over their activities. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi chairs this committee. It is a public knowledge that he personally mandated EPRDF companies: Guna, Ambassael, Dinsho, and Wando to take over the sugar company when the plant was privatized. Interestingly Ato Sebhat who owns Guna, Ato Bereket who owns Ambassel, Ato Girma who owns Dinsho, and Ato Kassu who owns Wando are members of FSSC, and some of these same individuals seat on the Board of CBE that financed these companies. As a result, all privately owned enterprises competing for the privatization of the plant, Star, Abeba co. etc. were shut out of the competition.
The EFFORT companies are reported to owe billions of birr to Ethiopian banks. In fact, most of the EFFORT companies would not survive without government protection. In one case, CBE, the Construction and Business Bank, and the Ethiopian Development Bank collectively loaned 1.7 billion birr to EFFORT. According to insiders, the loan has not been paid to date. The 1.7 billion birr was distributed to Adigrat Pharmaceutical Factory, Adwa Textile Factory, Dashen Brewery, and Mesebo Cement Factory. These and other EFFORT or EPRDF affiliates including TESCO, Tikure Abay, Dansho Transport are constantly in deep financial crisis.
Although the main focus of this paper is private business ventures of the TPLF, it must be noted that Tigray, the TPLF’s home region has inequitably benefited from federal funds. For example, a recently published paper presents comparative welfare analysis of four Ethiopian regions: Oromia, Amhara, Southern States, and Tigray. A 2001/2002 data of these regions shows that 42% of children in Tigray are fully vaccinated, where as the percentage is – 10% for Oromia, 15% for Amhara, and 11% for Southern States. Population to physician ratio is 28,600 for Tigray. This jumps to 60,800 for Oromia,, 60,700 for Amhara, and 44,000 for Southern States. Secondary education enrollment for Tigray is about 25% (a six-fold increase in just a decade), but Oromia has 11.6%, Amhara 9%, and Southern States 11%. According to World Bank report “Ethiopia Public Expenditure review” the Federal government never transferred more than 6% of the country’s cash revenue to the states, which leaves more than 94% of the federal budget at the discretion of the TPLF, appropriation of which is apparent from the above numbers.
In conclusion, the TPLF has clearly violated international business rules and practices, and as a ruling political party, it not only owns large amounts of properties and engages in commercial and trading activities whereby it places competing private sectors in a hopeless situation, but it also uses this economic dominance to incarcerate, harass, dominate, and control political opposition forces to stay in power. This injustice justifies continued armed struggle of the people against the TPLF domination, and rejection of foreign expeditions to exploit natural resources of the country on behalf of the TPLF.
The Chinese News Agency, Xinhua, reports that the Woyanne regime claims to have stopped the Oromo Liberation Front from carrying out attacks against the regime. Read the news below >>>
This latest attempt was targeted at bombing infrastructures and public institutions and assassinating figures, including the president ofAdama University, located in Ethiopia’s second largest city of Nazareth, said a statement released from the federal police anti-terrorism taskforce.
The statement said police apprehended the coordinators of and those given missions in the foiled acts of terror as well as arms, including 9 explosives, 12 fuses and klashnikov rifles.
The OLF terror ring had its hardware house in Mojo (a town about 70 km southeast of the capital Addis Ababa), its exchange spot in Nazareth and its mission targets mainly in Addis Ababa, it said.
The statement accused neighboring Eritrea of orchestrating this latest attempt of terrorism.
In January this year, a similar terror ring was dismantled by the taskforce, including one targeted against the Eighth AU Summit, held in Addis Ababa.
The OLF evolved from a political party into an armed movement 10 years ago, claiming that the rights of the Oromo people, who make up almost 40 percent of Ethiopia’s 70 million, were not being respected.
The OLF are now fighting Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government for the independence of the Oromo region from the rest of Ethiopia.
By James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
4th International Conference on Ethiopian Development Studies
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 4, 2007
As Delivered
Good afternoon, and thank you, professor for inviting me to join you in Kalamazoo. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in the Horn of Africa. You have assembled an impressive and distinguished group of panelists for this important conference.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
As all of you know, the Horn of Africa is a rough neighborhood. At least one conflict – and frequently more – has raged in the region continuously since 1960. Inter-state conventional wars. Guerrilla-style liberation struggles. Coups. Revolutions. The Horn has seen them all.
It is also a region that has suffered historically from poor governance — from the brutal excesses of Ethiopia’s Derg, to authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, to the lawlessness of the failed state of Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre. Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. And this historically unstable political and security climate has been a profound impediment to economic development.
The Horn ranks near the bottom in the world – and indeed below the rest of Africa – on Human Development indicators. The region is ecologically and economically fragile. Its peoples face the challenges of overwhelming dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as regular droughts trigger cyclical famines.
Yet, despite these longstanding challenges, in most of the region we see signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections; its port has become an economic hub; and the government has become a partner in counterterrorism efforts. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government offers the best hope for peace and stability in the last 20 years. Ethiopia has made progress on democratic governance with the release of political party detainees and parliamentary discussions on electoral and media reform. Kenya, which has been spared the conflicts that have impeded the development of its neighbors, has become an economic powerhouse, has made tremendous strides to consolidate democracy, and plays a lead role in complex regional peace initiatives. Moreover, all of these countries and governments are increasingly close partners of the United States in the Horn of Africa.
The glaring exception to this favorable story is of course Eritrea, which openly abuses its population and serves as a destabilizing force in the region. I’ll come to that later.
While progress is fitful, and additional diplomatic and aid resources will be necessary to sustain success, the overall trajectory of the Horn is positive.
In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of Transformational Diplomacy, United States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while promoting regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes and institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of basic services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations.
The Horn is a region where Muslims and Christians coexist and intermingle, and where the cultures of ancient Ethiopia, of traditional Africa, and of the Arab-influenced coastal regions have combined in different ways to create unique national and regional identities. It is a region in which all of our Embassies and their officers are working to demonstrate our respect for different faith traditions and to promote our commitment to religious tolerance, political rights, and gender equality.
While our Embassies are the U.S. Government’s principal platforms for promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable development, we also have a great asset in the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti. This U.S. military initiative provides a vehicle for outreach to vulnerable communities in the region and for contributing to the professionalization and effectiveness of armed forces in the Horn.
So let me now discuss current developments and some of the key U.S. interests and policies in each of the countries of the Horn.
DJIBOUTI
I’ll begin with Djibouti – which rarely gets top billing in a discussion of the Horn, but will today — and then move clockwise through the region. Djibouti, which celebrated the 30th anniversary of its independence in June, in many ways epitomizes both the progress and the challenges we see on the Horn.
With the end of the conflict with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in the 1990s, and the return of the Front’s leader to Djibouti in 2000, Djibouti has moved beyond violent conflict. General elections in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, despite a boycott by the major opposition coalition. Some opposition members are represented in local and regional councils. More needs to be done to open up political space and ensure that all citizens have a voice in government decisions. But the transition from armed combat to political competition is a positive step.
On the economic front, Djibouti remains a poor country with per capita income below $1000. Yet it has a vision for development of its key assets – its port and strategic location along major sea-transport routes. Port tonnage – which tripled after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which cut access to Assab – has increase 30 percent per year between 2002 and 2004 under new management of Djibouti port. And Djibouti aspires to become an international hub for transit cargo serving not only the horn of Africa hinterland, but a much wider worldwide clientele.
The United States, which has long had good relations with Djibouti, has seen this partnership further deepen in recent years. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted the only permanent U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, (CJFF-HOA)… We also value Djibouti’s diplomatic role in the region, as a bridge among other countries in the Horn and between African and Arab states.
So in Djibouti, we see a country that has ended a protracted violent conflict, begun important steps toward greater political openness, developed a vision for its economic future, and engaged in a close partnership with the United States.
SOMALIA
Now let me turn to Somalia – a country that, for all its problems, has perhaps the best opportunity in nearly two decades to overcome its status as a failed state. Somalia is a priority for the United States in Africa. U.S. policy is designed to promote stability in Somalia – including by preventing Somalia from again becoming a safehaven for terrorists, as it was under the Council of Islamic Courts – to support humanitarian and development needs, and to foster inclusive democratic institutions.
The key to Somalia’s success will be national reconciliation to ensure inclusive representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and in the organizations that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.
The National Reconciliation Congress, which opened in Mogadishu on July 15 and is still ongoing, provides an opportunity for all Somalis to achieve suitable representation in the TFIs and formulate a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period, in the run-up to national elections in 2009. In support of the National Reconciliation Congress, the United States has provided financial assistance of $1.25 million, in coordination with other international donors. Our Ambassador in Nairobi and our Special Envoy for Somalia are in frequent contact with congress organizer Ali Mahdi Mohamed, with Transitional Federal Government leaders, with clan elders, with civil society leaders, and a wide array of other stakeholders to encourage support for this process.
We believe it is important for the Somali people to focus on the future, moving forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather than focusing only on the current composition of the Transitional Federal Government and Institutions. While imperfect, the Transitional Federal Institutions provide a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following the transitional process. We are steering clear from Somali politics and focusing on a clear message of inclusion and accommodation to all actors in Somalia.
To help stabilize Somalia and create conditions for national reconciliation, the United States strongly supports the African Union’s peace support mission in Somalia. The mission currently has a lead contingent of approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the beginning of the year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million was used to provide equipment and airlift to assist the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support AMISOM.
AMISOM is important not only to help create conditions for national reconciliation, but also to permit the reduction in presence of Ethiopian forces and their eventual departure. We, the Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to insecurity in Somalia. For there to be lasting security, there must be political dialogue and accommodation among Somalis, improvements in Somali government capacity, and training and deployment of a competent and respected Somali security force.
The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and has provided more than $102 million in humanitarian and development assistance this year. We also coordinate closely with other international partners diplomatically and on our international assistance programs. We were founding members of the International Contact Group on Somalia in June 2006, and also are active in the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC).
In short, there is an international consensus that we must seize this moment of opportunity in Somalia. The United States is a leader on both the diplomatic front and in our humanitarian and economic response.
KENYA
Next let me say just a few words about Kenya, which is not always discussed as part of the Horn of Africa, but lies on its southern edge and is an important regional player. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-Saharan Africa, and we cooperate with the Kenyans on a wide array of both bilateral and regional programs. Our bilateral assistance program is more than $500 million in 2007. Total resource flows from the U.S. to Kenya each year from all public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion.
Kenya’s peaceful, credible democratic elections in 2002 represented an important step on Kenya’s path to becoming a fully functional democracy. The next elections, scheduled for December 2007 offer an opportunity to consolidate those gains. The U.S. is providing election-related training to civil society organizations, political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the work of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to ensure that these elections are free, fair, and transparent.
Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its enviable regional reputation for stability, openness, and tolerance. Economic growth has increased to more than 6 percent in recent years, as Kenya capitalizes on its role as a major regional hub. While important challenges remain – specifically in combating corruption, moving away from tribalism, and promoting gender equity – there is a palpable sense of energy and optimism among the Kenyan people. Kenya is clearly a country on the move in a positive direction.
We have worked closely with the Kenyans diplomatically on the North-South peace agreement in Sudan and on Somalia issues, through the International Contact Group as well as bilaterally. In its capacity as President of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya continues to occupy a leadership role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. We look forward to continued close partnership.
ETHIOPIA
Now, Ethiopia, which has been the subject of your conference. With more than 70 million people, bordering all of the other Horn countries, Ethiopia is the giant of the region. Ethiopia is an important strategic partner for the United States in the Horn of Africa. We collaborate on a wide range of development objectives and in efforts to promote regional stability. We share a commitment to address threats by transnational extremist groups.
We are also eager to see progress in democratic institutions. As you know, the run-up to the May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and competitive political campaign period in all of Ethiopian history. Never before had opposition candidates had so much access to coveted constituencies and the ability to convene rallies and openly campaign against ruling party opponents.
Opposition candidates’ access to the press, including state-owned and operated media, was unprecedented. Never before had the electorate seen live, televised debates between government Ministers and their opposition challengers.
Unfortunately, this spirit was lost in the contentious aftermath of the vote, in bloody confrontations in the streets, in detention of political leaders, and in strident and uncompromising positions that for too long dominated the political leadership. As we consider the democratic challenges facing Ethiopia today, we recognize that sentiment has been so bitter precisely because of the heightened expectations prompted by two decades of political reform.
With the release of 38 detainees, and anticipated release of the remaining Coalition for Unity and Democracy leadership, and anticipated release of the remaining CUD leadership, following lengthy mediation by respected elders, Ethiopia’s political leaders have committed themselves to a new collaborative relationship for the good of the country. In Addis Ababa, U.S. foreign assistance programs are bringing together leaders from across the political spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence.
We are again seeing a cautious, yet engaged host of political parties that are committed to institutionalizing the advances of March and April 2005. That ruling and opposition parties today gather around the negotiating table to debate the relative merits of reforms of democratic institutions is extremely positive.
We must all encourage this process. As stakeholders in Ethiopia’s stability, democracy, and prosperity – we urge all parties to remain engaged, so that we can regain the advances of early 2005 and build upon them for the people of Ethiopia.
Meanwhile, we continue a robust program of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance for Ethiopia. We have contributed more than $160 million in humanitarian assistance this year to help the Ethiopian people break the cycle of famine and mitigate the impact of drought and natural disasters. With over $300 million in assistance to the health care system in Ethiopia this year alone, we help ensure that clinics reach into previously underserved regions including Afar and the Ogaden.
With respect to the Ogaden, we are concerned that insecurity and impediments to commercial sales of commodities put the population of this fragile region at further risk. We are currently working with the government to ensure that humanitarian assistance and the more important commercial shipments can flow to the Ogaden. We note that rains have been relatively good this year, which should ease the economic hardship faced by the pastoralist population.
In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from diverse communities during periods of calm, in order to build bridges of understanding and prevent potential conflicts from erupting. We are working with local administrations to build their capacity to govern for the people and to promote transparency. We are working with the Ethiopian military to transform that organization into a professional and apolitical defense force for the nation. The challenges are many, but the objectives merit the tremendous scope of the resources, time, and commitment that we have focused on them. We are confident that through partnership with local stakeholders, together we will contribute to making Ethiopia more secure, more democratic, and more prosperous for the next generation.
A STEP BACKWARD: ERITREA
Now, let me turn to Eritrea. While the rest of the Horn of Africa is making political, economic, and social advances and seizing opportunities — albeit with periodic important setbacks — the opposite is true for Eritrea.
Eritrea has experienced economic decline and a lack of freedoms, for the press and political expression. There is widespread and arbitrary conscription. The government has worked to destabilize its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Somalia.
Given the American penchant for supporting the underdog, it is disheartening to see what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence and produced a praiseworthy constitution. President Isaias Afwerki has become increasingly tyrannical and megalomaniacal. He has actively sought to destabilize the Horn, fueling regional insurgencies and supporting groups affiliated with terrorists.
Eritrean Government policies have also choked the Eritrean economy and consolidated political power among a small cadre of cronies, who are distinguished only by their unwavering loyalty to the President.
The government has actively blocked humanitarian assistance from international donors. It initiated the border war with Ethiopia that cost tens of thousands of lives.
The Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans’ patriotism into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea.
As you know, the reality is atrocious. Youth are sent to camps for indoctrination. Citizens in the prime of their lives are forced into national service; anyone who refuses is beaten. If you flee, your family is imprisoned. Those who fail to espouse officially sanctioned opinions languish in metal shipping containers.
As in the former Soviet Union, the Eritrean government controls both the message and the medium. There are no opposition political parties, no non-governmental organizations, no private media. Any senior government official who dares to speak out puts himself at risk. The brave individuals known as the G-15, who challenged Eritrea’s path back in the spring of 2001, are missing.
Elsewhere in the region, Eritrea has chosen to support extremist elements, including the al-Qaida affiliated al Shabaab militia in Somalia, in an effort to undermine the political process. While the rest of the region and the international community have united behind a common strategy for achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia, Eritrea has opted to support terrorists and spoilers while encouraging continued violence. There is no justification for such actions. The ruling cabal is – to our great regret — leading Eritrea along the path toward increased domestic repression and hardship, and regional and international isolation.
BOUNDARY DISPUTE
Since the border dispute with Ethiopia serves as the pretext for Eritrea’s domestic authoritarianism, let me say a final few words about how the U.S. sees this issue. This impasse has been a long-festering flashpoint between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it is of course symptomatic of deeper divisions between the two countries.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) issued its delimitation decision in 2002. Yet, the two parties have still not cooperated on demarcation of the boundary. Both appear comfortable with the status quo. Ethiopia avoids painful domestic political decisions, while Eritrea uses the unresolved issue to goad Ethiopia and deflect attention from a deteriorating domestic situation.
The United States government fully supports the “final and binding” decisions of the EEBC and has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the EEBC and meet their commitments in the Algiers Agreements. We work closely with the other Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements — including Algeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations — and other interested governments.
The level of urgency has increased, as the situation has recently deteriorated. Both parties remain wedded to their positions and may have hardened them. Eritrea has moved about 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer zone between the parties, and restricted the activities of UNMEE, a UN peacekeeping force. Eritrea maintains a further 120,000 troops in the vicinity, while Ethiopia has deployed about 100,000 troops along the border.
We believe it is essential for the parties to discuss directly how to implement a workable boundary regime, consistent with the decisions of the EEBC, and to address the fundamental issues that divide them. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has offered to engage the parties, and we support his initiative. The Ethiopian Government has agreed to participate in this initiative, and we urge the Eritrean government to do so as well. We will continue our efforts and support those of others to resolve this issue and remove one flash point in an already unstable region and bring the parties closer to a normalized relationship.
So, in conclusion, this is a tough neighborhood, economically fragile, with a history of violent conflict and of uncompromising politics. Huge challenges remain. Yet, overall, there is reason to be hopeful about the Horn. Progress may not be uniform, but with the exception of Eritrea, we are working in partnership with local governments toward a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.
Thank you again for inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
____
Released on August 9, 2007
“We were Christian for over a thousand years before Christ,” Abba Gebremedhin [formerly known as Abba Paulos], the [illegitimate] Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, declared nonplused.
