Skip to content

Addis Ababa

Speech by former Ethiopian Prime Minister Akilu Habtewold on Somalia

The following is a speech delivered by Tsehafi Tizaz Aklilu Habtewold, former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, at the first African Summit (May 1963, Addis Ababa) in response to a speech made by the President of Somalia accusing Ethiopia of seizing Somalian territory (Ogaden).

Source: “Ketema Yifru’s Biography,” by Mekonnen Yifru

Your Majesty, Mr. President,

I must apologize for intervening in this state of the debate, but the honorable Head of State of Somalia leaves me no alternative. It is with genuine regret that I intervene, in view of the events of the
last two days, the high standard of debate, the purpose for which the eminent Heads of State have gathered together, this high purpose, this dream that all Africans have been dreaming for
centuries.

At a time when we are about to realize African Unity, I deeply regret that I am obliged to enter into the minor differences between two States. The purpose of our meeting is African unity, collaboration and reconciliation. Our purpose here is not to emphasize our minor differences, but to bring out our points of agreement. In view of the unthinkable accusation made here against my country, I had no other choice than to take the floor. I shall be as brief as possible, and it is not my intention to enter into polemics.

The President of the Republic of Somalia stated that Ethiopia has seized a large part of Somali territory against the will and desire of the Somalia population. It is an outrageous, unthinkable accusation, without any factual basis. The Somalia delegation apparently wishes to apply in all conferences the well known adage “If you throw enough mud, some of it will stick,” but I had not expected him to apply it at this major conference, attended by great Head of States from our continent. Where does this accusation come from? What basis is there for saying that Ethiopia has seized a portion of Somali territory? I shall restrict myself to a few facts only, so that everyone may know the truth for once and for all.

Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation for more than 3000 years. That is a fact. Second fact: the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact: there is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation. That too is a fact. I apologize for stating it. During the 19th century, when European colonialists decided to share our Africa, as eminent heads of States have here pointed out, Ethiopia, though robbed of all its coast line Eritrea, Somalia and so on, resisted as a symbol to our African brothers, a symbol of the will to the independence of Africa. It has resisted alone for centuries.

Fellow Delegates, there is no need to recall here that it was at Adwa, in 1896, that for the first time in history a black African power defeated a white colonialist power. In doing so, it was defending its independence and the independence of our brothers. At the Paris Peace Conference after the Second World War, we obliged the colonialists, and particularly the Italian aggressors who used our Ethiopian coastline of Eritrea and Somalia to carry out attacks against the only independent African country, to abandon their former colonies, and also to abandon their colonies in North Africa and elsewhere.

With our friends from Egypt and Liberia, we struggled alone, the three independent states of Africa, on behalf of the whole continent. Afterwards, I myself was delegated by His Imperial Majesty in 1949, when the future of the Italian colony of Somalia was discussed. Ethiopia was among the first states to support the independence of Somalia. I myself asked for this. There was a proposal to place Somalia under Italian mandate for 25 years. We refused. It was proposed to place Somalia under Italian mandate for ten years. Ethiopia alone said no, and demanded the immediate independence. After a mandate had been granted to Italy, during these last ten years, before Somalia obtained its independence, my Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, invited the Somali Head of State, who is here, to come to Addis Ababa and granted him the honors with which all the Heads of State who are here received two days ago.

Before there was an independent Somali Republic, Emperor Haile Selassie extended a hand to our Somali brothers, offering them economic collaboration, and did every thing possible to reach rapprochement, in spite of frontier questions, because questions of frontier between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic are regulated by international treaty. If the Somali Republic does not recognize the treaty, then the Somali Republic will not even exist. There is an international treaty, but on the ground there is no demarcation. We could spend much time on discussing that demarcation in order to reach agreement.

When the Honorable President came here, he was very satisfied. It was only after Somalia became independent that all these polemics came about. Now, immediately after independence, there was immediately a terrific campaign aiming at territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Ethiopia and Kenya. It is not for me to reply for Kenya. The President of the Somali Republic said “We are not seeking territorial aggrandizement.” Then what is he seeking? What does he base his statement on? On what does he base this territorial claim? On linguistic reasoning or religious reasons?

Even if, as was said in this very Chamber by the eminent Heads of State of Madagascar, of Nigeria, of Ghana, if we are to rewrite the map of Africa on religious, racial, and linguistic, I am afraid, as everyone has said, that many States will cease to exist. It is in the interest of all Africans now to respect the frontiers drawn on the maps, whether they are good or bad, by the former colonizers, and that is the interest of Somalia too, because if we are going to move in this direction, then we too Ethiopians have claims to make: on the same basis as Somalia, and for more on historical and geographical reasons.

Let me say in conclusion, the policy of Ethiopia, as its history shows, while never allowing an inch of territory to be given up, is the following: non-interference in the internal affairs of States; respect for the sovereignty and integrity of every State; a peaceful settlement of disputes on the established basis; co-operation between African brother States in all fields: economics, cultural, and social; and to work actively for African unity. I beg the Government of Somalia to work on the same principles, as I hope it will, for the greater benefit of our two fraternal peoples.”

True disciples of democracy shall be free

By Aie Zi Guo

Once upon a time Ethiopians heard some scanty news about the Wild West. In school they read about Mark Twain and Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet. In colleges they were taught by scholars from Europe and North America whose professional commitment and humanitarian gestures were exemplary. These professors were friendly and unsophisticated. They intermingled with Ethiopians, with adventurism and courage.

Inspired by these foreigners, many students of wisdom and knowledge read novels and political writings of the West. With all naivete many wanted to travel to America and England to learn more about the socioeconomic developments of these countries. Thousands were interested to understand the essence of the Statue of Liberty and the freedoms of Trafalgar Square. Ignoring their sinister and condescending behavior, the innocent believed that the West was destined to spread democracy in Ethiopia. So, graduates from US, Ethiopian and UK universities made unprecedented effort to copycat the ideals of George Washington, Winston Churchill, Martin Luther King and Woodrow Wilson. Mesmerized by the eagerness of these disciples of democracy, U.S. and its allies supported the elite to change the political establishments in Ethiopia. Westerners covertly and overtly used student and trade unions, and the Ethiopian Army to stage coup d’etat. In spite of that, neither a bourgeoisie revolution nor a democratic evolution was achieved.

In the end, socialist revolution took the lives of Ethiopians and military dictatorship was installed in 1974. As the power of the gun roared on the streets of Addis Ababa, print and electronic media controlled, and civic organizations dismantled, freedom of speech curtailed and individual and collective freedom abused to an unimaginable proportion, thousands stood against the revolution. Yet still in the midst of brutal repression
and when the world was divided between East and West, Ethiopians adhered to the doctrines of democracy.

In order to forestall the speared of communism in East Africa, Western powers supported anti-government forces to unseat the military regime in Ethiopia. Even the so called humanitarian organizations like OXFAM, Care and World vision advocated for a change of governance. Assuming that US and Britain would not be interested in replacing one dictator by another, Ethiopians were joyous with the demise of Mengistu’s communism in 1991. Precisely this is the reason that Ethiopians gave the benefit of the doubt to the new TPLF rulers in Addis Ababa. And indeed the struggle to create a free society continued unabated.

Many hoped that with the help of Western nations, a true democratic society with a government by the people for the people would be formed. Unfortunately, soon after the end of communism, Western nations stopped far short from supporting democratic transition in Ethiopia. Instead of building democracy, they helped build great walls on ethnic lines and worked towards the dismemberment of a nation.

Nevertheless, the good disciples of democracy including Hailu Shawel, Bertukan Mideksa, Birhanu Nega, Yakob Hailemariam, Dr. Befekadu Degefe, Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, Muluneh Eyuel, Gizachew Shiferraw, Hailu Araya, Debebe Eshetu, Kifle Tigene, Serkalem Fasil, Eskinder Negga, Sisay Agena, Kassahun Kebede, Daniel Bekele, Netsanet Demessie and dozens of the gallant sons and daughters who are in and outside the country continued their struggle to bring democracy to Ethiopia. These individuals who are now prisoners of consciences were encouraged by the tacit support they received from some Western nations to advance the cause of freedom. Up until they were betrayed by Western teachers of democracy, they tried to bring change often in difficult circumstance peacefully and constitutionally. Sadly, their peaceful struggle was countered by brute force and these courageous disciples are locked up in one of Africa’s most dilapidated prison cells.

Bereft of everything, in the crowded prison cells of Kaliti, the prisoners of conscience shine in the hearts and minds of 70 million Ethiopians. Out of their prison cells they continue to give us the true account of the peaceful democratic struggle they waged in Ethiopia in 2005. By all standards, their courage, wisdom and commitment is exemplary. The selflessness of Prof. Mesfin and Eng. Hailu at old age and, Judge Bertukan Mideksa who is separated from her two year old daughter invigorates the dreams for a democratic Ethiopia. Special salutation goes to Dr. Berhanu Nega who, through his book the Dawn of freedom articulates, his team’s advocacy for democracy and peaceful struggle to change a fearful society to a free society. This book written from Kaliti unmasks the truth between democracy and dictatorship, nationalism and sectarianism, honesty and betrayals, diplomacy and tact, political dodgers and honest brokers, success and setbacks. What was fundamental was his thesis and anti-thesis on individual freedom and collective freedom. He goes on to say that men are born free and they should be free to think and choose what they think is right for them. His eloquent description manifests that the assurance of individual freedom and liberty is the fundamental of a true and sustainable democracy. The absence of it leads to the creation of fearful societies.

Berhanu and his team in prison remained steadfast in their peaceful resolve to bring democracy to Ethiopia. They remained good disciples of Martin Luther King, Windrow Wilson, Nelson Mandela, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Winston Churchill, and Gandhi. True those Western powers lead by George Bush and Tony Blair who promised to give their support to these disciples have failed them in the wee hours of need. Nevertheless, out of your prison cells you ought to be encouraged by the support you garnered from the peoples of Ethiopia, US and Europe. Members of Congress and European parliamentarians have continued their support and advocacy to your noble cause of spreading freedom to Ethiopia. A case in point is HR-5680, the Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006. Rest assured
that honest representatives of the people, Congressmen Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Donald Payne, Rep. Mike Honda and others, are working hard to get HR-5680 passed in Congress. In Europe, Anna Gomes and the European parliamentarians are working tirelessly to advance the cause of democracy in Ethiopia. Rest assured that you have more voices than those who betrayed your struggle. For example, the unfailing and determined members of the Ethiopian Diaspora around the world have intensified the struggle to secure your unconditional release and bring about genuine democracy in Ethiopia, the same cause that you and your loved ones are paying untold personal and collective sacrifices.

More than ever, the Ethiopian people are united behind your cause and dreams. They are showing their opposition to Zenawi’s regime with resilience. This regime which you have asked for national reconciliation is being pressured from all quarters. Its own inquiry commission and kangaroo courts are getting tired and frustrated of lying. Witnesses that were summoned by Meles are testifying against Meles and his judges. It is a system which is terminally ill, a regime that is in the process of disintegration. Members of the commission and senior judges have fled their country to tell the international community the true nature of Zenawi’s leadership. The Meles dictatorship’s frustration brings new types of deception and coercion, for which Ethiopians must be prepared. Rumor has it that Meles Zenawi has the intention of releasing CUD leaders from Kaliti prison should they abandon politics.

Truth and dawn are thin. However thin they may be, they will shine by the hour, by the day and by the year. Since you are the true disciples of democracy, you shall be free to lead Ethiopians create a fearless society. There will be a day without Birr Sheleko, Didesa, Zewai, and Kaliti mass detention camps. The struggle goes on. Keep hope alive. You will triumph.

The writer can be reached at [email protected].

The Ethnicization of Ethiopian Politics: Origins and Significance

By Messay Kebede

Nota Bene: While reading this paper, which I prepared for the forum on ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in Ethiopia,’ organized by the Ethiopian Students Association at Harvard, I ask the reader to bear in mind that my critical evaluation of ethnic movements does not signify that ethnicity should be ignored or suppressed. However misguided ethnicized politics is, once it is born, it will not go away for the simple reason that it mobilizes strong emotional forces. Instead of confrontation, I maintain that it should be used to activate democratization and economic progress, the only way by which the emotional component can be neutralized. This use of ethnicity presupposes, on the other hand, a clear understanding of its nature, namely, that it is less about the rights of peoples than about elites vying for the control of state power.

The ethnicization of Ethiopian politics since the fall of Haile Selassie’s regime is both an aspect and a consequence of the radicalization of Ethiopian students and intellectuals in the 60s and early 70s. Only when we connect the ethnic discourse with radicalization do we understand that the structural problems inherited from the imperial regime are not enough to explain the birth of ethnonationalism. The latter requires that we pay attention to the cultural developments that brought about an educated elite too prone to radical and polarizing views. True, the reluctance of the imperial regime to make the necessary reforms had polarized the country and created the conditions of class and ethnic confrontations. No scholar can seriously underestimate the impact of state repression and lack of reforms on the radicalization of students. The impatience generated by the long postponement of necessary reforms could not but favor the adoption of radical positions. Still, the whole question is to know whether structural conditions resulting from the lack of reforms fully account for the radicalization of the educated elite.
This paper firmly maintains that the evil structural legacies of Haile Selassie’s long reign do not fully explain the drift of the country into the path of radicalization and ethnic confrontation, since reformist and less oppositional solutions were available. The venture into a revolutionary path is the direct product of the infatuation of Ethiopian students and intellectuals with Marxism-Leninism. This suggests that the ethnicization of Ethiopian politics is directly connected with the ideological hegemony of Marxism-Leninism among Ethiopian students and intellectuals in the 60s and early 70s.

Ethnicity and Radicalization

Some scholars––especially those originating from dominated ethnic groups––see the Ethiopian ethnic problem as the main driving force behind the radicalization of the Ethiopian student movement. They argue that the movement, which intensified in the early 1960s, took a radical turn in the late 60s by adopting the Marxist-Leninist ideology essentially to accommodate the mounting struggles that oppressed ethnics, notably the Eritreans, the Tigreans, the Somali, and the Oromo, waged against Amhara rule. The student movement could not continue its opposition to the imperial regime without addressing the growing demand for the democratization of the Ethiopian state through the dismantling of its imperial structure. For many scholars of oppressed regions, then, the deep cause of the 1974 Revolution was none other than the need to smash the political and economic structure of Amhara hegemony over other ethnic groups. As one such scholar writes:
The longstanding contradictions between the Ethiopian ruling class, state, and imperialism on one hand, and the colonized nations and the Ethiopian masses on the other hand caused two types of crises in 1974: the revolutionary crisis from below and the crisis of the ruling class and the state at the top.

At first, convinced that liberalism provided the necessary solution, the student movement called for a democratic society in which all Ethiopians will have equal rights regardless of their ethnic origin. The great shift occurred when Struggle, the journal of the University Students’ Union of Addis Ababa, published in 1968 Walleligne Mekonen’s famous article stating that Ethiopian ethnic groups are actually nations dominated by the Amhara ruling class. To quote Walleligne:

Ethiopia is not really one nation. It is made up of a dozen nationalities with their own languages, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity. . . . I conclude that in Ethiopia there is the Oromo Nation, the Tigrai Nation, the Amhara Nation, the Gurage Nation, the Sidama Nation, the Wellamo Nation, the Adhere Nation, and however much you may not like it the Somali Nation.

In maintaining that Ethiopia is not yet a nation, the article squarely reduced the Ethiopian polity to the imposition of Amhara culture and interests on conquered nations, even as regards the northern part of the country. Moreover, the use of the concept of dominated nations gave dignity to the resistance against the imperial regime by transforming what so far was belittled as tribalism into national liberation movements. The significant contribution of Walleligne’s article lies in the “conceptual change he introduced into the ongoing political and academic discourse by raising the status of non-Amhara peoples in the Ethiopian empire from ‘tribes to nations and nationalities,” says one Oromo scholar. Consequently, provided they were socialist, Walleligne supported all the uprisings of oppressed groups, including their right to self-determination. Such movements weakened the regime, but most of all they were liberation movements that fought for the empowerment of working people. Not to support their struggles amounted to allying with the imperial regime and, worse yet, to opposing socialism in the name of a nationalism that reflected nothing more than the dominance of the Amhara ruling elite.

What drove Walleligne to write an article that simply called for the dismantling of Ethiopian state and unity? The question becomes all the more perplexing when we note that Walleligne was himself an Amhara from Wollo region. Hardly can we understand this extraordinary self-depreciation outside the influence of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. By depicting the Ethiopian society as a backward and obsolete feudal system, the Marxist-Leninist analysis gave a highly demeaning and gruesome picture of Ethiopia. Is it surprising if, as a result of this reading, Ethiopian students and intellectuals became prey to what an Ethiopian scholar, Hagos Gebre Yesus, called “national self-hatred and nihilism?” Behind the endorsement of ethnonationalism, there is nothing but “national self-hatred and nihilism and . . . attachment to ethnicity and separatist politics based on ethnic, religious exclusiveness,” he contends.

The following quotation taken from Struggle dramatically epitomizes the movement from Marxism-Leninism to national nihilism.

In our Ethiopian context, the true revolutionary is one who has shattered all sentimental and ideological ties with feudal Ethiopia. . . . Our rallying points are not a common history, a feudal boundary, the legendary Solomonic fairy tale, religious institutions, regional ethnic, linguistic affiliations, but the cause of the oppressed classes, who are the ultimate makers of history. That is why we are internationalist, because the masses have no nation, no home.

This unbelievable passage exalts uprootedness and self-denial by offering revolutionism as a substitute for Ethiopianness. Instead of common history and culture, both rejected on account of being feudal, the commitment to an internationalist view championing the unity of the oppressed is suggested as a much more worthy goal. The resolution to eradicate sentimentality and any attachment to Ethiopian characteristics clearly indicates that the rejection of tradition is not based on the examination of its negative and positive aspects. It is the product of a boundless, indiscriminate hatred that targets nothing less than a complete shakeup of Ethiopian society.
This ultimate deconstruction sees Ethiopia as yet to be born, redesigned as it should be around the struggle and the cause of the masses. For such a deconstructive project, nothing of Ethiopia is sacred, untouchable, not even national unity. Thus, Challenge, the journal of the Ethiopian Students Union of North America, takes pride of the position of the Ethiopian Students Union in North America because it “reiterated its unconditional support for the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination including independence.” Once common legacy is rejected, no reason remains to condemn secessionist movements. An equally valid way of getting rid of oppression, however, would have been the struggle for democratization. But since Ethiopia must be redesigned, the recognition of the right to secede to resolve what is but a democratic issue is a forced component of the revolutionary project.

The Imperative of Doctrinal Consistency

The connection with radicalization suggests that, in order to understand the birth of ethnonationlism, we must first inquire into the abandonment of liberal or democratic solutions. And this inquiry means nothing less than the acceptance of the prior nature of the Marxist-Leninist commitment. Far from ethnic problems accounting for the radicalization of Ethiopian students, the prior commitment to Marxism-Leninism explains the abandonment of the liberal approach. If the issue of ethnic equality progressively appeared unsolvable with a liberal approach, the reason is not so much the inadequacy of liberalism as the need to be consistent with the commands of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The more loudly one claimed to be Marxist-Leninist, the harder it became to resist the endorsement of the right to self-determination. In other words, the students’ need for doctrinal consistency, which need authenticated their radical commitment, led them to posit the issue of dominated peoples in terms of dominated nations, even though no historical facts of whatever kind supported their new reading. Their overriding concern was the compliance of their approach with Leninism, which required the socialist solution and endorsed the right to self-determination. Anything short of viewing dominated ethnics as nations and nationalities would have validated the liberal approach. The endorsement of the Marxist-Leninist commitment to internationalism and to the right to self-determination was so categorical that, in the words of Randi Rønning Balsvik, “the feeling was rife that ideology had become more important to the students than the survival of Ethiopia as a state.”

Another major distortion caused by the imperative of doctrinal consistency is the interpretation of the southern expansion of Ethiopia as a colonial conquest. The expansion refers to Emperor Menilik’s forced incorporation of what are today the southern and eastern parts of Ethiopia. According to some scholars, the doubling of the size of the empire through the incorporation of neighboring peoples at the exact time European powers were vying for colonial possessions in Africa was nothing short of a colonial conquest. This colonial interpretation of the southern expansion does no more than confirm the extent to which Ethiopian history and culture are depicted through radical concepts. Once the colonial grid is introduced, the requirement to get rid of the alien ruler is added to oppression and domination and the demand for self-determination overtakes the aspiration for equal rights. The issue is no more the termination of Amhara domination and oppression through democratic changes, but the dismantling of the colonial empire and the accession to independence. Rather than calling for a democratic process of national integration, the colonial reading simply targets the dismantling of Ethiopia.

Another forceful impact of the need of doctrinal consistency is the support that the student movements gave to the Eritrean insurgency. Even if I do not fully follow Tekeste Negash when he says, “it would hardly be an exaggeration to state that it was in response to the Eritrean challenge that the Ethiopian student movement began to develop a strategy for resolving the problems of nation-building,” there is no denying that Eritrean students have significantly contributed to the ethnicization of student politics in Ethiopia. The ethnicization spread first to Tigrean and then to Oromo students, thus forcing the student movement to find a solution to the national problem. Moreover, the Eritrean armed resistance provoked both admiration and the tendency to emulate. Some factions in the student movement began to advocate the creation of a guerrilla movement to overthrow the imperial regime.

The influence of the Eritrean resistance grew with the emergence from within the insurgency of a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla faction, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Not only did the Front become “the vanguard of the radical opposition by its doctrine, its organization and its mobilizing power,” but also radical students could now support the insurgency in the name both of doctrinal consistency and partnership with a fighting ally. To recognize the EPLF was none other than to support the struggle of Eritrean working masses. In addition, given the ideological orientation of the Front, the only way to accommodate Eritrea within the unity of Ethiopia was to initiate a socialist revolution and implement the Leninist solution. Since “the formula, disunite to unite, was behind Ethiopian students’ attempts to work out a stand on the Eritrean matter,” no better proof existed to display the loyalty of the student movement to Marxism-Leninism than to support the Eritrean insurgency.

Important ideological arguments were added to the need for doctrinal consistency. Radicals had succeeded in convincing many students that the emphasis of liberalism on individual rights was not the right remedy, unable as it was to structurally undermine the Amhara dominance. In the context of the primacy of individual rights, the promotion of individual equality regardless of ethnic belonging is not enough to dismantle an already established dominance. Oppressed ethnics must organize themselves as autonomous groups to conquer and affirm their rights. While the liberal model underscores the rights of the individual, the Leninist formula recognizes group rights. The recognition creates the political reality necessary to tear down the oppressive structure. Let it be added that Western governments’ support to Haile Selassie’s regime made the repudiation of liberalism as an inadequate solution easier. And since without a genuine equality the unity of Ethiopia could not be safeguarded, the recognition of the right to self-determination appeared as the only correct solution.
Because it recognizes the right to self-determination, the doctrinal position advocating unity via disunity stands out as the only way to preserve the Ethiopian unity. Who can deny that equality emanating from the exercise of self-determination alone removes the main motive why people want to secede in the first place? Explaining that revolutionaries do not defend the right to self-determination to promote balkanization, a study published by the Ethiopian Students Union in North America writes:
Revolutionaries strive to create as large a state as possible, for this is to the advantage of the laboring masses; they strive to bring about a rapprochement between nationalities and their further fusion, but they desire to achieve this aim not by violence, but exclusively through free, fraternal union of workers and the toiling masses of all nationalities.

Lastly, the preservation of the unity of students was another cause for the prevalence of the Leninist approach. It was felt that the movement could not maintain its unity unless it took a clear stand against Amhara domination and advocated the promotion of oppressed peoples. No other way existed to preserve the participation of Oromo, Eritrean, Gurage, and Tigrean students in the movement than to concede, in the spirit of genuine equality, the rank of nations and nationalities to dominated ethnic groups. The recognition was all the more crucial because of all ethnic groups Tigrean students were “the most politically active on campus.”

The Lack of Renovated National Ideology

Granted the compelling nature of doctrinal consistency, still the history of the Ethiopian student movement shows that a great number of students dragged their feet in endorsing the Leninist solution to ethnic inequality. Aware of the danger of the Leninist idea of self-determination, some students proposed Ethiopianism as a renovated nationalism. Ethiopianism transcended both Imperial Ethiopia and ethnic loyalty through the assertion of equal rights and the promotion of national integration; it defined Ethiopia as the integrated unity of free and equal citizens. Moving on the offensive, groups of students, including some activist students, denounced the Leninist approach as a promotion of tribalism and national divisions. The offensive proved successful:

The 1967 annual meeting of NUEUS [National Union of Ethiopian University Students] debated the national issue and passed strongly worded resolutions condemning ‘sectarian movements in Ethiopia,’ labeling supporters of the movements petty bourgeois opportunists and reactionary elements that were encouraged by reactionary Arab forces. . . . The meeting declared Eritrea an indivisible part of Ethiopia.

If there was one issue against which the majority of students resisted the pressure of radical students, it was the commitment to the national unity. Many students were willing to follow the radicals all the way except on the question of Ethiopian national unity. So strong was the national sentiment that in the 1968 election the candidate of the radicals, Tilahun Gizaw, lost the presidency to Mekonnen Bishaw, who represented the moderate view. The radicals explained their defeat by the fact that “students were deceived by professional agitators,” who spread rumors suggesting that they were in league with secessionist movements.

The rise of a rival movement, expressly defining itself as “Ethiopianism,” confirms that the safeguarding of Ethiopian nationalism was an important concern, especially among many Amhara and Tigrean students. Moderate students initiated the movement to counter the Marxist-Leninist ideology, all the more so as radical students’ support to the Eritrean secessionist movement had particularly antagonized the nationalist feeling. Observing that the support had weakened the influence of the radicals, moderate students saw the nationalist issue as an opportunity to rally the majority of students. An article published in Struggle under the title “Ethiopia and Ethiopianism” gives the following definition:

Ethiopianism is the concept that transcends personal, tribal, and regional loyalties. It is the belief held by the Ethiopian who thinks in terms of the people as a whole . . . . To him what matters is not his loyalty to one person, religious or tribal groups, but to the development of the people, as a whole. To him, the leader or the government is but the agent for carrying out the development and reforms needed to lessen the misery of the population.

Written by an Ethiopian Muslim, the article visibly avoids Marxist-Leninist jargon, such as class struggle, revolution, self-determination, etc.; instead, it advocates reformism, as it considers “the accumulation of wealth by a few individuals as undesirable, when there are millions struggling for a decent place in the sun.” Reforms pave the way for genuine national integration. They result in the creation of a nation of equal and free individuals through the transcending of linguistic, regional, and religious disparities. That Ethiopianism is proposed as a rival ideology, another article in the same issue makes it quite clear:

Existence of regionalism and tribalism (primitive sentiments) in Ethiopia are realities that we should accept; but what we should not accept is their perpetuation. But they do not die out by evasion and avoidance. They die out only when they are replaced by a higher and progressive ideology, (such as Ethiopianism or Ethiopian Nationalism).

The moderate students who thought of using the ideology of Ethiopianism to counter the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism did not fully realize the extent to which Marxism-Leninism was an even more powerful seducer of nationalism. For one thing, the promotion of the interests of the oppressed and the exploited as a means of creating a truly united nation appeared too remote, given the reluctance of the imperial regime to undertake any serious reform. For another, the Leninist proposal alone was liable to enlist the enthusiastic support of oppressed ethnic groups themselves. Above all, Ethiopianism was unlikely to contradict the influence of Marxism-Leninism because its proposals were not enough to undermine the imperial regime and inspire a movement of opposition. In a word, it was not a renovated nationalism: it neither comprised a clear strategy of economic development, nor reinterpreted the traditional culture so as to make it conformable with modernization.

This is to say that Marxism-Leninism stood for an unrenovated nationalism. Under the imperial regime nationalism was crippled both by the uprooting effect of a Westernized educational system and the lack of reforms necessary to remove the numerous hurdles to socioeconomic growth. It is therefore not contradictory to assume that the frustration of nationalism is one of the reasons why so many young educated Ethiopians turned to Marxism-Leninism in the ’60s and early ’70s. This approach corrects Hagos’s statement: what inspired the student movement was not so much national nihilism as the frustration of nationalism. While in becoming Marxist-Leninists students were going against important features of their legacy, the enchanting promises of socialism made these rejections worthwhile, and so metamorphosed them into an expression of higher fidelity. To the extent that Marxism-Leninism had become the ideology of those driven by “radical nationalism,” it naturally reached an increasing number of students as disillusionments over the imperial regime grew.

Nationalism via Internationalism

An objection comes to mind: How does the assumption that Marxism-Leninism cajoles nationalism agree with the equally important commitment of the theory to internationalism? Enshrined in Marx’s celebrated declaration, “the workingmen have no country,” internationalism is certainly not the kind of thought that encourages nationalist fervor. What is more, Lenin’s recognition of the right to self-determination of oppressed nationalities was a direct challenge to the very unity of Ethiopia. Student publications largely confirm the blindness of radical students to the danger of the Leninist formula. Thus, one editorial of Struggle writes:

A true revolutionary is an internationalist, who has understood the dialectical developments of nature and society and who is above all deeply moved by the injustice humanity is subjected to. Thus, for a revolutionary, there are no regional, linguistic, national or even continental boundaries. The most significant factor is the economic exploitation and subsequent dehumanization of the oppressed classes.

Carefully read, however, student publications reflected a nationalist manifesto rather than national nihilism. The recognition of the right to self-determination was an attempt to preserve the unity of the student movement. In particular, it was supposed to be appealing to those students who were going over to ethnonationalism. The latter had become increasingly attractive to students coming from highly aggrieved ethnic groups, such as Eritrean, Tigrean, Oromo, and Gurage students. By revealing in ethnic oppression the dimension of class exploitation, Marxism-Leninism seemed to give a correct analysis of the existing reality, but even more so to offer a solution that fell short of advocating secession. As such, it proposed a pact between revolutionaries coming from oppressed and oppressing ethnic groups. Activating the sacrificial ethos on both sides, it demanded of Amhara students to give up the traditional hegemony of their ethnic group in exchange of students of marginalized groups abandoning their separatist goal. The mutual sacrifice sealed a new “nationalist” deal based on the common interests of the working masses.

Herein lies the considerable influence of Leninism on nationalist sentiment: it “offered a narrative of how to weld together . . . disparate ethnic groups into a unitary state defined by the boundaries of a previous conquest—by Russians in the Soviet Union and by Amhara and Tigreans in Ethiopia.” Inversely, it was felt that liberalism cannot achieve ethnic equality: the maintenance of the class structure will simply preserve the hegemony of the dominant ethnic group. Only the destruction of the class system can pave the way for the autonomy and equal rights of ethnic groups. Once working people from oppressed groups have exercised their right to self-determination, they will unite freely with their class brothers and sisters of conquering ethnics.

This is exactly what Walleligne had in mind: his diatribes against Amhara domination turn into a calling to “build a genuine national state,” which he defines as “a state where Amharas, Tigres, Oromos, Aderes, Somalis, Wollamos, Gurages, etc. are treated equally . . . where no nation dominates another nation be it economically or culturally.” But what about the support that Walleligne gives to secessionist movements? Here again, his support is conditional on the genuine socialist orientation of the secessionist movements, his argument being that, with an internationalist outlook, “a socialist movement will never remain secessionist for good.” Clearly, the attempt was to strengthen the Ethiopian nation by transcending ethnic attachments through the internationalism of socialist ideology.

Elite Conflict and Ethnicization

Since the original source of ethnicization is the infatuation of Ethiopian students and intellectuals with Marxism-Leninism, a full analysis must discuss the factors that brought about the infatuation. The question of elite radicalization is complex and involves multiple causes. The general consensus among theoreticians of revolution distinguishes five major schools that present an original analysis of the causes of revolutions. They are: (1) the theory of relative deprivation, which gives the central role to the psychological phenomenon of frustration of the working masses; (2) the functionalist-structural approach that focuses on disequilibrium in social systems; (3) the Marxist-Leninist theory with mode of production and class struggle as central concepts; (4) state-centered approaches that put great stress on the breakdown of the state; (5) political conflict theory, which emphasizes elite competition. What constitutes the originality of each school is not so much the discovery of a new causal phenomenon as the emphasis on one variable judged crucial for the eruption of revolutions.
The Marxist theory of class struggle and, in some sense, the theory of relative deprivation bring out the chief role of the masses in the revolutionary process. Marx’s central notion of class struggle underlines that the masses, rather than elites, make history, which history realizes their aspirations in a progressive and goal-oriented fashion. The problem with this approach is that the people who become instigators and leaders of revolutions do not often come from lower classes. Knowing the essential role of leadership, it is very difficult to argue that revolutions are propelled by the demands of the masses. That is why such schools as the functionalist approach or political conflict theory underline the crucial role of elite conflicts. These schools have developed views that replace class struggle by intra-class or intra-elite conflict. For them, in all revolutionary situations, “the conflict and ‘struggles’ were intra-class within the old and emerging new ruling classes, which responded to underlying economic changes. Slave and serf revolts were at best secondary and supplementary.”
The basic assumption that radicalization is a product of intense elite conflicts perfectly applies to Haile Selassie’s regime. The conditions that create elite polarization and conflict were indeed quite active in the imperial regime, given that the blockage of the circulation of elites was a salient feature of the regime. Not only as an aristocratic system it offered no opening to commoners, but also the upper level was dominated by one ethnic group, the Amhara. This does not mean that individuals from humble origin or marginalized ethnic groups did not rise; they did, but they were few in number and had authority only to the extent that they remained Haile Selassie’s protégés. The blockage of social mobility took an acute form as modern educated individuals saw their ambition increasingly thwarted by a closed aristocracy stubbornly defending its traditional privileges. Though modern education was praised and encouraged, educated people had no say in the formulation of policies; they were simply asked to serve a regime that excluded them politically. This exclusion became increasingly intolerable as economic crises drastically narrowed employment possibility for university dropouts and graduates. For the rising educated elite, the situation offered no other way out than a complete overthrow of the old elite.

Be it noted that these adverse structural conditions only established the possibility of political revolution in Ethiopia. The political overthrow of the landed aristocracy was enough to open up the system: neither the complete transformation of the class system nor the adoption of Marxism-Leninism was necessary to give a political representation to the modernizing elite. How then is one to explain the drift toward a radical revolution? For many students of Ethiopia, the question amounts to asking why the excluded educated elite felt the need to speak in the name of the interests of peasants and workers. The overwhelming answer to this question underscores the inability of the educated elite to effectively overthrow the old elite and its imperial state without the support of the masses. It is therefore the need to gain the support of the masses that talked the educated elite into espousing the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

According to Gebru Mersha, for instance, radicalization has to do with the fact that “liberalism as an alternative ideology did not have a strong material base and even as an incipient tendency was already discredited.” The extremely slow economic development and the suppression of political freedom under the imperial regime together with the dominance of foreign capital did not allow the creation of conditions favoring bourgeois forces. The educated elite had no other option than to mobilize the oppressed against the imperial regime by championing their interests. The incapacities induced by the closed society explain the drift toward a radical course.

John Markakis has developed a similar idea. For him, too, the root of the radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie is to be found in the blockage of social mobility, which offered no way out expect through an alliance with the working class and peasants. In default of any possible alliance with upper classes, the petty bourgeoisie had to make common cause with the oppressed. The perceived solidarity of interests between the masses and the petty-bourgeoisie inclined students, teachers, young officers, middle-strata state employees to become responsive to the radical ideology of Marxism-Leninism and to advocate a program of radical social change. This very radicalization propelled them to the leadership of the social protests. What is more, the alliance was not simply circumstantial: beyond the purpose of overthrowing the ancien regime, it included a project of social development beneficial to the petty-bourgeoisie and the masses alike, notably by the prospect of nationalization, which “would bring assets under its [petty-bourgeoisie] control in a greatly expanded state sector.”

This analysis would have been correct if an alliance between the petty bourgeois, the workers, and the peasants had effectively occurred. Unfortunately, students and intellectuals did not see themselves as allies of the working masses; they viewed themselves as their representatives. Alliance maintains the differences so that the representatives of one class do not speak in the name of another class. Instead, the recognition of crucial common interests brings them together against a common enemy, without thereby dissolving their particular interests.

But then, the most consistent alliance would have been the striving for a liberal society through a political rather than a social revolution. In other words, the petty bourgeoisie did not need to adopt the radical ideology of socialism to obtain the support of the working masses. Liberal proposals, such as freedom of expression and organization, free election, government responsible to the parliament, etc., would have mobilized the working masses, all the more so as socialism was not initially a popular demand. The revolutionary ideology of the radical section of the petty bourgeoisie, and not the pressure of working classes, introduced the idea of socialism. Once radicalism is adopted, reformism becomes the expression of opportunism: it opens the system to new elites but gives nothing substantial to the masses. Rejecting categorically reformism Challenge writes: “let us all realize that to bog down oneself in reformism, today, is indeed an exercise in futility. Every good intentioned endeavor to help the people which is not linked to the revolution of the masses will not simply work!”
One important assumption emerges: elites become radicalized, not because they need to represent the masses, but because their rise to power requires the complete overthrow of the old system. Accordingly, social revolution is the ultimate form of political competition, the very one opposing elites whose conflicts over issues have become so critical that they cannot be resolved within the existing political system. It is clear that an exclusive type of elite competition cannot appear in democratic states. Imperial or autocratic regimes alone are liable to systematically marginalize aspiring elite groups, thereby intensifying elite polarization to the point of breakup. Nothing could arouse more elite dissatisfaction than the protracted monopoly of power by Haile Selassie’s autocratic regime. The resentment against the monopoly of power by an old, outdated oligarchy accounts for the generalized disaffection of the educated elite, including the young officers in the army and police.

To the question why the Ethiopian educated elite opted for the radical ideology of socialism when it could have used liberal notions to unseat the regime, the answer is thus obvious: elite polarization created the need for radical, extremist ideologies. To be sure, democratic demands, such as freedom of expression, the right to organize, the rule of law, etc., would have been enough to ideologically undermine Haile Selassie’s autocracy. However, the political overthrow of Haile Selassie would not have been enough to empower the educated elite: the forceful presence of a landed nobility predominantly composed of one ethnic group required a change both in the class structure and the ideology of the imperial regime. Clearly, the association of radical ideology with the conquest of power rather than with class struggle better explains why elites produce or adhere to ideologies that defend the interests of the masses, such as Marxism-Leninism, instead of supporting liberal values and institutions, which are more in line with their elite status. They prefer radical ideologies less to uphold the interests of the masses than to radically undermine the regime that excludes them by putting it under the pressure of massive and far-reaching demands.

The rejection of liberal and traditional values explains, therefore, the ethnicization of the political conflict. For one thing, to the extent that the discourse of the revolutionary elite demeaned national traditions and values, even challenged Ethiopian nationhood, which it identified with imperial oppression, it was bound to revive local identities. The construction of Ethiopia as an empire in which one ethnic group, the Amhara, dominated other conquered and subdued ethnic groups clearly responded to the requirement of marginalized elites competing for power. Marginalized elites could not hope to wage a successful struggle unless they ethnicized their cause. Because liberalism was not enough to question the Amhara political and cultural hegemony, the first weapon to be used against the system was to get rid of the nobility and the imperial state by advocating a socialist society. Once liberal reform was out of the picture, ethnicization stepped in with its unique ability to give local elites the exclusive right to represent their ethnic groups and speak in their name. Indeed, what is characteristic of ethnicity is that it excludes elites belonging to other ethnic groups as strangers, outsiders, thereby giving a monopoly of representation to the elite group that is native of the ethnic group, that claims to have a natural, blood bond with the represented people.

Only the theory of elite conflict explains why the Ethiopian educated elite first identified with Marxism-Leninism and then gave birth to splinter groups advocating ethnicity. In addition to accounting for the ethnic dimension of the conflict, the concept of elite competition explains the active role that individuals from marginalized ethnic groups, such as Tigreans and Eritreans, played in the Revolution. Only by propagating an ethnicized polity could these marginalized elites successfully vie for power. Only as representatives of oppressed ethnic groups rather than of oppressed classes could marginalized elites pursue the political ambition of enthroning regional elites at the expense of the cosmopolitan or Ethiopianized elite. The positioning for elite competition explains why ethnicized groups were satisfied neither by the overthrow of the monarchy nor by the Derg’s radical attempt to end class exploitation. For them, the end of class oppression did not entail the end of the supremacy of Amhara elite.

Ethnicity is thus a construct of disgruntled and marginalized elites whose ambition for political prominence could not be achieved by means of liberal institutions. As a result, they first appealed to Marxism-Leninism to block out liberalism and then asserted their natural and exclusive right to represent oppressed groups by excluding other competing elites. It follows that ethnicity, allegedly rooted in peasant aspiration, is actually a product of elite competition. Alluding to Tigray’s fierce ethnicization, Gebru Tareke rightly writes: “contrary to the TPLF’s claims, the current ‘nationalist’ sentiment has been thrust upon the peasantry by the intelligentsia.” It is also clear that the promise to uphold the interests of ethnic groups is a disguised way of pursuing elite hegemony in the name of oppressed ethnics. As a remnant of the Marxist-Leninist discourse, ethnicization has the proper function of giving a redemptive and disinterested connotation to the drive to power of elitist groups. Our experience both of the Eritrean and the TPLF regimes fully confirms that the liberation from Amhara rule only gave way to elitist political systems whose main function is to exclude other competing elites. And as the totalitarian control of the state is necessary to suppress contending groups, an ethnicized political system does not easily lend itself to democratization.

The revitalization of Ethiopia’s painful memories of the 1970s: The clash of generations

Part I

Before you “my readers” commence reading this article, let me just say a few things about it, its objectives and the complex issues that are assessed.

The writing of the paper was completed in early October 2006, when the political temperature within the Ethiopian Diaspora community was dangerously heated, even explosive; and when a good number of politically active Ethiopians were — as they are still–being intimidated by plans of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD militants and supporters to hunt them down.

For various reasons, including the long-anticipated split of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership into two factions, but mainly due to the Commemoration Day–one year after the jailing of Kinijit leaders –the posting of this paper has been delayed for some weeks.

Because of the length of this article, the paper has been divided into two parts to make for smooth reading. However, to clearly comprehend the complex sources, processes, problems and issues articulated in the article, it is advisable to read parts one and two together.

Apart from examining the on-going destructive roles of the self-installed Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD, and their militant supporters in the politics of Ethiopia, along with their intimidating behaviour, this important paper analyses the many interlinked historical factors and actors that are the immovable sources of our unhealed wounds, divisions and obstacles–obstacles not just to a search for possible solutions to our longstanding and persistent socio-economic and political problems, but even to our living side by side and working together. However, because of the date it was written, this article does not assess either the sources of the most embarrassing of the recent crisis or the division that emerged within the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, which became public after the second week of October, 2006.

The overall purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, to attempt to examine the role of the complex mechanisms used by the Dergue regime to encourage the image formation they wanted in the War Born Generation (defined in more detail in part two; see the section on “Distinguishing the Two Generations and their Socio-economic and Political Conditions” which I see as an important source of the clash of generations. The second purpose is just to share my observations, views and experiences with you–my Ethiopian compatriots and friends of Ethiopia–regarding the increasing and worsening divisions among individuals involved with the many issues of our country, including Ethiopian opposition parties and in the Ethiopian Diaspora community in general. It is, however, not my intention to suggest that the targeted victims, the individual artists, political activists, or other individuals like myself and other Ethiopians, are in need or require your immediate physical, legal, or professional action or assistance.

It is also appropriate to use this opportunity to thank friends and colleagues who have been helpful to me, including those who recorded and sent discussion messages, or passed on statements and written texts from the various paltalk rooms. Thanks also to those who notified me when discussions related to my work were underway in one or more paltalk rooms.

Finally, this paper has been written in memory of my generation–the youth of the Ethiopia of the 1970s, particularly those who were inhumanly exterminated, to their families and to those who managed to survive the ruthless death squads of Ethiopia’s historic enemy, the Dergue, which left irremovable scars on the body of my generation, our country and its people.

Maru Gubena
Nov 24, 2006

One Year After: An Overview of the Rise and Fall of the Ethiopian Resistance

One thing all politically conscious Ethiopians can agree on now is that last year around this time a disproportionately high number of us thought Ethiopians had somehow been united by the processes of the May 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary election, by the election events and indeed by the turmoil that followed the election. It is also true that most Ethiopians at home, as well as those forced by the forces of power, greed and evil to leave their country and go in search of relative freedom, including freedom of self expression, thought “oh, at last, we have managed to come back to our senses” and were ready to collectively engage–not only to directly and indirectly resist, fight and attack as aggressively and progressively as we could against the historical and current enemies of our country and its people, which are directly responsible for the territorial disintegration of our country, for the prolonged internal tensions, armed conflicts – but also to work together in an attempt to assess and reassess the multiple and complex sources of our differences and conflicts, and to go forward with one voice, in a focused and harmonious fashion, with concern, deep involvement and consistency. Many of us thought that we all wanted and had agreed to rise up against our common enemies and do everything in our capacity to build an unbreakable bridge that would be most conducive to enabling our country and its people to test and face the fruits of our resistance and its overall outcome–freedom in a democratic system–a system which means simply, above everything else, living together side by side, peacefully, in a community or society with tolerance and respect for the values and views of one another. These were the desires and wishes we had in mind and the agreements we reached last year, even though unwritten and not officially ratified.

A good number Ethiopians, including myself, have strongly and convincingly been arguing throughout the past eleven or more months that without first engaging in a confidence and trust building process among ourselves; without cultivating convincing and immovable common grounds–as a cardinal foundation for our resistance and unity; without revitalizing the feelings of patriotism, respect and love our ancestors had for each other; and without nurturing a relatively tolerant and harmonious Diaspora community, the perceptions, convictions and wishes outlined above, which most of us had last year around this time could not take root. Much to our dismay and regret, this has come true. Although we are the children of a single mother, we have failed to travel on the same track and the same road, because a few among our compatriots have chosen to advance their socio-political and economic position within the Ethiopian Diaspora community undemocratically and forcefully, based upon the feudalistic ways of thinking and the cultural logic traditional in our country, before our unity and resistance (see also Sharing the Sources of my Anxiety.)

Yes, indeed, quite contrary to the perceptions and convictions Ethiopians had last year around this time, something more, something unthinkable, undesired and very disturbing, at least under the international standards, norms and values and contrary to the wishes and desires of the general public of Ethiopia, is in the making within the politics of the Ethiopian Diaspora community. It is also undeniably true that most Ethiopians, especially those of my generation who are residing in the Western world after experiencing the unforgettable, painful periods of Mengistu’s era, have never in our wildest dreams thought that the nightmarish terror of Mengistu Hailemariam’s era would follow our footsteps as far as to our countries of asylum and immigration, coming to haunt us–to terrorize us once again–after the long period of three decades. But however unbelievable, shocking and terrifying we may find it, the nightmarish events of the 1970s, which forced my generation to be the first victims of other Ethiopians in the long history of our country, are again coming to the fore within the Ethiopian Diaspora community.

Indeed, instead of engaging those individuals with views critical of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and its big brother – the OLF dominated Alliance for Democracy and Freedom (AFD)–in discussions in the spirit of our jailed leaders, of the original political path, ideological thinking and political programme of Kinijit itself, and in a democratic and civilized fashion, the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, in collaboration with OLF and its militant media outlets and paltalk rooms, have chosen to openly and publicly intimidate, scare, terrorize, and aggressively attack those democratically-minded, peace-loving and highly concerned Ethiopians who reside throughout the international community, simply because of their differing views and because they decline to agree and accept the recently founded Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD, who have wanted to impose their ideas upon us by force. Those individuals who have sacrificed their entire lifetime, energy, financial resources, resisting repressive regimes whenever and wherever they could, using all available means at their disposal, who have lived with little or no attention to themselves, and have been forced by the conditions of the struggle–combined with a feeling of guilt and responsibility–to lead a solitary life, without even creating the sort of family they deserve and without having a single child of their own, have not only been denied the right to express their democratic rights: we have been denied access to the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD controlled media outlets, so we have been unable to add our voices to the heated discussions and debates around the issues and problems that have faced our people for decades, including the future geopolitical face of our country, and have been told to be silent–not to write articles and not to give interviews even to other media outlets interested in our work, or to those who have views that differ from the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and their militant supporters. Serious suggestions to the Ethiopian “pro-democracy” media outlets and websites to impose a permanent gag upon those individuals with views critical to the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD have been submitted and, in fact, some of them have already been published. An article authored by “Gemechu Megersa,” which I take to be the pseudonym of an AFD and OLF activist, posted on the Ethiomedia website on the 12th of September, 2006, is a case in point.

What is shocking, appalling above everything else, is the engagement, involvement and cooperation of former Ethiopian journalists who left their country of origin in search of individual freedom, freedom of self-expression, and to maintain respect and independence for their voices, who with the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, AFD and their militant supporters are actively participating in the process of silencing–making voiceless–those actively involved, innocent and concerned Ethiopian artists, political activists and political leaders. It is particularly disturbing, even embarrassing to observe the limited or non-existent self-respect and sense of independence of journalists among Ethiopian Diaspora websites, such as Ethiomedia, Ethiopian Media Forum (EMF) and Addis Voice, who have openly and publicly shown their intoxication and affiliation with the OLF and the Kinijit Diaspora’s futureless and fruitless partnership under the name of the recently founded AFD. The submission of those with backgrounds in journalism to the wishes and destructive strategies and policies of the OLF/AFD–including the decision not to include the highly respected and loved voices, views and writings of a good number of highly devoted and hardworking Ethiopians, just because our views differ from those of the anti-Ethiopian OLF and the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, and because our work includes terms and paragraphs that stress and signify “Ethiopian Unity” and “Ethiopia’s territorial integrity”–is most astonishing and indeed depressing. Such behaviour from Ethiomedia, EMF and Addis Voice directly contradicts not only the principles of “fair journalism,” but also the motives those involved had for leaving their country of origin.

The saddest and possibly most damaging of all that we have been forced to observe is the recent creation of red or green dividing lines between the Ethiopian pro-democracy outlets, simply on the basis of their association and affiliation with the Ethiopian political parties and with those engaged in armed confrontation against the unelected regime of Meles Zenawi. The ugliest aspect of these dividing lines is that one gets the impression (especially since the OLF has managed to convince and control Kinijit Diaspora leadership members, supporters and media outlets) that the division suggests an increase in tensions between the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and OLF/AFD – who are making every effort to avoid the phrase “Ethiopian unity” – and those who would like to see our country, Ethiopia, as intact as it was before May 1991, who would like to stress the terms “Ethiopian unity” and “Ethiopia’s territorial integrity” as often as possible.

For example, in formulating and producing texts for an announcement, fliers or folders to be distributed to the Ethiopian Diaspora community, calling them to come in mass to demonstrate and collectively challenge the tyrannical TPLF leader, Meles Zenawi, during his appearance at United Nations Assembly in New York on the 22nd of September 2006, representatives of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership were worried and uncertain about the reactions of OLF; this made them reluctant to work cooperatively with other political and civic organizations who wanted to produce flier texts in the spirit of Ethiopianess, or “Ethiopiawinet.” Consequently and most embarrassingly, for a single objective–to demonstrate–two different fliers were produced. The one from the representatives of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership was written in the spirit, political ideology and strategies of OLF and AFD, and does not include any sense of Ethiopianess. The text produced by Kinijit representatives was posted on AFD controlled websites, such as Ethiomedia and EMF.

In contrast, the other fliers, written in the spirit of Ethiopiawinet and including the phrase “Ethiopia’s territorial integrity” couldn’t be posted on Ethiomedia and EMF. These fliers were posted only on the Debteraw and Ethiolion websites. Isn’t this extremely depressing? Was this really necessary? Does this reflect the spirit of Kinijit and its jailed leaders? Why do we need such divisions? Why and again why? We have also been receiving information about serious and unpleasant confrontations in New York between the predominantly OLF/AFD and EPPF supporters on one side and those representing other political parties on the other, along with those who just came to support the Ethiopian people in the fight against the unelected regime of Meles Zenawi.”


The Revitalization of Ethiopia’s Tragic, Painful Memories of the Dergue Era

As part of the fruitless, ineffectual attempts of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and their blindly militant supporters to silence highly concerned and involved Ethiopians and make them voiceless by boycotting their work, direct warnings and threats have also been reaching our e-mail boxes. Some frustrated and irresponsible individuals have even been doing their best to intimidate us, with the single objective of keeping those with views different from their own silent and isolating us both from the issues that we find most important and from Ethiopians, whether the mass of the Ethiopian Diaspora community or elsewhere. Sometimes this is done directly, by making phone calls, sometimes with the pretext of “journalism”–saying they would like to interview their victims, just to induce us to start talking with them on the telephone. Within a few seconds, however, the real purpose of these “interviewers” who are inspired by the Kinijit Diaspora leadership or who are AFD militants becomes more than obvious. The Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD radical militants who are currently so sleeplessly engaged in the process of revitalizing our most tragic, nightmarish and painful memories of the appalling years of the 1970s and the early 1980s move immediately from their original stated purpose of fixing a date and a precise time for an interview to a direct confrontation with their victims, questioning the integrity of the very person they initially said they wanted to interview, giving repeated warnings and threats, asking us to stay away from any political activities and issues related to our country, or join hands with their militant surrounded camps–the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD–immediately, before something undesired, unpleasant and ugly occurs to their victims. A few of the victims of such intimidation by the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD radical militants have already reported their experiences to law enforcement authorities in their respective locations, with evidence in their hands. The publicly made complaint of artist Solomon Tekalign during the interview he gave to the “Ethiopians in the Diaspora Discussion Forum” on Monday, the 18th of September and Saturday the 7th of October 2006 and his report to law enforcement authorities in the area where he resides is a case in point.

Much to the dismay and disappointment of both the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and a few AFD founders, and more particularly their actively militant paltalk rooms known as the “Ethiopian Current Affairs Discussion Forum” and the “Ethiopians in Switzerland Discussion Forum,” together with “Negat radio” and “Radio Kaliti,” however, the individual Ethiopian victims have continued to resist, arguing and even striking back as boldly and aggressively as they can by employing every media opportunity they can find to publish or post their articles and giving powerful interviews to media outlets of a democratic mind, saying that they cannot so simply be intimidated, silenced and prevented from exercising their democratic rights by threats and warnings from the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and their radical supporters. In the articles they have posted and their interviews with various Ethiopian Diaspora outlets, these victims have insisted, arguing eloquently, that they would prefer to die rather than end the role they are playing and their engagement with the issues due to threats and the cold war being waged against them by some individuals seeking revenge, who were directly or indirectly affected by the changes of power either in May 1991 or thereafter, following the removal of the dictator Mengistu Hailemariam’s regime from power and the complete disintegration of the Ethiopian armed forces due to the rebel forces of Ethiopia’s enemies–the EPLF and TPLF.

The victims of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and their media outlets and militant supporters have included well-known artists, intellectual politicians, academics and others who have been working hard with the aim of witnessing relative freedom and democracy taking root in our country of origin–Ethiopia–in our lifetime. Going beyond defending themselves and taking some urgently required measures conducive to protecting themselves and their family members, both at home and within the Ethiopian Diaspora community, the victims of the self-installed Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD militants have accused the two organizations and their supporters not only of being undemocratic and feudalistic in their thinking and self-centred in their behaviour, but also potentially dangerous to the future image and peace of Ethiopia and to its territorial integrity. In responding to the many attempts of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and their militant media outlets to inflict untold damage on their political and personal reputations, some of the well known victims have further accused the two self-installed organizations, the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and its other rebel partners–who are said to be the creation of, and supported morally and assisted financially and militarily by Ethiopia’s historical and current enemies, OLF and Shabia–of lacking a legal basis for their existence, and being not only uninterested in helping Ethiopians cultivate the habit and culture of democracy in their country and enabling them to test the fruits of freedom and democracy and face its challenges, but instead concerned only with the immediate removal of the unelected tyrannical regime of the TPLF leadership and its replacement by themselves–by another unelected Dergue-type regime. Their critics, on the other hand, find it essential to begin now to create tools and mechanisms that will be conducive to changing and democratizing our attitudes and habits.

According to inside sources, recorded discussions and interviews given to the militant paltalk rooms of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the entire intention and most fervent desire of this leadership–whose members and supporters have personally and directly been affected by the unelected leadership of TPLF, both during the armed struggle and after the defeat of the Dergue regime in May 1991–is to mobilize and redirect every resource they can find to provide money and manpower for the warfront in a war that is in preparation, which is to be waged under the leadership of OLF, with the supervision and cooperation of the regime of Eritrea. This will have a single objective: not to free Ethiopians, but to use every available means to revenge the members of the entire leadership of TPLF before they die by immediately removing the TPLF regime from power. It does not matter what follows, or what happens to the people of Ethiopia. They simply want to instantly–today rather than tomorrow–remove the unelected regime of Meles Zenawi. That is why they are not doing the sort of planning and political programme that takes into consideration the future face of Ethiopia and the safety and security of its people.

A further remark, which should be stressed and articulated as effectively and often as possible, is in regard to the overall outcome of the short-lived–and, to any conscious and concerned Ethiopian, tragic, saddening and extremely hurtful–marriage committed between the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and its boss, the OLF. This marriage was celebrated from 19 to 22 May, 2006, in the city of Utrecht, the Netherlands–but with no invited witnesses and guests. As has already been stated in my previous article, Holding Back Sobbing Children at their Mother’s Untimely Death and Not Explaining what Happened is both Wrong and Unfair, posted in the first two days of September 2006, the marriage between these two organizations –which are totally unequal and have no common ground or common vision at all, and whose overall objectives towards the future geopolitical face of Ethiopia are entirely remote from one another and irreconcilable in all respects, except in their efforts and campaigns to force their undemocratic desires and strategies upon the Ethiopian Diaspora community–the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and AFD, together with their radical militant supporters and paltalk rooms, have managed not only to destroy the motivation, energy, morale and relative unity that existed among the Kinijit Diaspora community last year around this time, and with this the many vitally important activities and projects that were expected to be carried out in support and on behalf of our jailed leaders, the political programmes and generally the broadening and strengthening of the forces of the Ethiopian resistance, but also they have revitalized the complex mechanisms that were previously employed by the most hated and cruel regime of Mengistu Hailemariam as indispensable tools to hunt down and annihilate the youth of Ethiopia–a good portion of my generation, which the Dergue saw as its potential enemy.

Due to their increasing frustration and inability to either convince the Ethiopian Diaspora community to accept and support them, or to silence and isolate their most outspoken and well-known critics, these two self-installed organizations, the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD, have embarked on a horrifying plan: they are organizing and assigning a large number of individuals among their militant members and supporters as undercover agents, who are to engage in the heavy task of following in the daily footsteps of those with critical views of the Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD or unwilling to give moral and financial support to their objectives and activities. This is taking place not in Ethiopia, but, shockingly, in our countries of asylum and immigration–on European and American soil, in the cities, towns and villages where we work and live. Some of the main tasks of the undercover agents are to be physically present in the areas where we live and work, to observe our physical appearance, movements, family members, our educational background, and the kind of job we engage in. Moreover, they are to make a complete list of our names. According to statements of some individual members of the two political organizations in meetings and discussions held around the end of August and in early September, 2006 on the two extremely vocal and militant paltalk rooms mentioned above, the overall purpose of the undercover agents in collecting names of actively involved individual members of the Ethiopian Diaspora community is to charge those listed of treason and see them convicted, with charges as harsh as possible, by new judges who are yet to be appointed and by new courts that are to be established when the Kinijit Diaspora leadership (Ato Andargachew Tsigie) and the OLF, together with other small rebel groups such as EPPF, ONLF and SLF, succeed in intensifying the war under the leadership of AFD, defeats the unelected regime of Meles Zenawi, and establishes a new government in Adds Ababa and throughout the rest of Ethiopia. When that would take place, no one knows.

Ideas and measures like those broadly discussed above have been undertaken by the Kinijit Diaspora leadership, the AFD and certain Ethiopian Diaspora media outlets, including their militant paltalk rooms, with the aim of intimidating and silencing a good number of innocent hard working Ethiopians who are themselves an indispensable part and parcel of the Ethiopian Diaspora community, and who could be an important contributing force to activities beneficial to the well-being of our community. These actions are not only divisive and dangerous to Ethiopians–who are generally peaceful and peace loving–and to the activities of the Ethiopian resistance against our common enemy, but are also horrifying. Such ideas and measures should immediately be denounced and condemned by all Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia.

It is probably healthy and even wise to convey to you–to my readers–a positive reverse side of the coin that could be very comforting to those targeted victims: the two political organizations and their militant paltalk rooms will not be able to hurt any of us, since their power bases have continuously been and continue to become weaker and weaker, and all of the individuals involved have empty hands–no guns and no bombs, nor any other tools to harm any of us directly. And, even though the radical militants may not like to hear it and will possibly not accept it, it is also true that the leaders of the two organizations, their members and supporters will soon be disappointed, because these organizations will soon cease even holding their usual empty, arrogant talks with one another. This is especially likely given the limited or non-existent common ground and common agenda, to say nothing of the lack of political power and capacity within the two organizations. They lack not only military power but also organizational structures, including leadership, feasible policies and viable strategies.

It is on the other hand true, that despite their limitations with respect to political and organizational structures, the socio-political and psychological damage the two organizations and their militant supporters have inflicted, including the divisions, fears and anxieties they have caused among the Ethiopian Diaspora, in particular for politically active Ethiopians, cannot and should not be underestimated; it will have an enormous impact on the community for at least some years, and will not be easy to reconcile and redress. The damages and divisions inflicted by these two organizations is already having an effect. For example, the enormous difficulties being experienced today by the community and the Ethiopian opposition parties in attempting to successfully move H.R. 5680 (the Ethiopian Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights Advancement Act) from the hands of certain powerful individual(s) to the floor of the U.S. Congress for a final vote is a clear sign of the problem; it is a direct repercussion from the antagonisms and animosities that permanently smolder in our minds and hearts, increased by the tensions, anxieties divisions among us that have recently emerged and are growing day by day.

As has often been observed, millions of Ethiopians–those who torment themselves with the heaviest questions, such as why do we Ethiopians seem to be incapable of working and living in relative peace with each other? Why is it that we behave so disrespectfully, so destructively–as we have been doing and still do–towards one another, as if we have been born to be detrimental, not just to others but to ourselves as well? Remember that if one conspires to eliminate others, they will definitely do everything possible to conspire in turn and strike back. Further, what might be the sources of our deep-rooted animosities and hostilities?

Also, as we have often been told, a good number of Ethiopians appear to be well aware of the historical reasons behind our most tragic enemy: divisions and lack of confidence between and among ourselves. Unfortunately, however, many of us persist in arguing that the causes–especially the sources of our resentments and animosities, which have been created and expanded by the propaganda machines and the well crafted traditional mechanisms such the institution of the family, the media and, since the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, our educational system–are too sensitive and difficult to discuss. The big, unavoidable question then becomes: when the effects of such enemies are comparable to a huge foreign force coming towards us, armed with complex and highly advanced weapons, how long can we simply keep them inside our hearts and minds, without attacking them as aggressively and progressively as we can, without debating them or going in search of possible solutions? How long can we do this? Further, apart from asking about the causes, whether historical or recent, of our current sickness and deep-seated animosities, we need to think about whether there may be the logical reasons behind what has happened to some of my compatriots, who have become disinterested, unwilling and even allergic to the idea of joining in intellectual discussion on ways to tackle the most damaging repercussions of the Ethiopian revolution, the effects it has inflicted upon Ethiopians and inculcated deep in the minds and hearts of the ” Dergue Generation”–a generation born some five years before and after the ousting of the aging Emperor Haile Selassie on 12 September 1974. What can these reasons be? And what were the roles and contributions of the then military regime and its propaganda machine in moulding its “newly born” generation, which I will call the “War Born Generation,” so that it became so resentful and hateful – a persistent enemy of the previous generation, to which I will refer as the “Golden Period Generation?” More explanation regarding these two generations will be provided in the subsequent pages.

Finally, why is it that we Ethiopians continue to be, and even seem addicted to, establishing associations, organizations and political parties, while knowing how good we are in making them ineffective; while knowing perfectly well that we are people who live side by side, but without a sense of confidence or trust in each other; and while we clearly know that the organizations we quite often want to establish never become functional and operational, due also to our confrontational and suspicious behaviour towards one another, as well as our habits and cultural orientations–orientations that are predominantly centred on ourselves, our families and our groups?

While I will make every possible effort to examine and assess the questions raised above, I may not be able to cover the extremely complex and indeed sensitive factors involved in the clash between the two generations, including the historical sources, as effectively as many of my readers would like and expect. Therefore I sincerely hope some of you will help me in responding to them, since in recent times these questions have become a source of persistent concern and anxiety not only to me and a few of my generation, but to a large number of other Ethiopians as well.

Reviewing historical causes behind Ethiopia’s Painful Memories: The clash of generations

Even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak with confidence, and even though the 1950s, 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s could be characterized as “golden periods”–relatively stable and peaceful, compared to the periods Ethiopians were later forced to experience–I would boldly argue, and I believe that Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia of my generation, including a good portion of the generation of my parents, will not hesitate to agree, that in the early years of the 1970s there were growing needs and fervent desires among the majority of Ethiopians for new socio economic and political changes, including a change of leadership. Again, this was despite the fact that the territorial integrity of Ethiopia was intact and respected by all of Ethiopia’s neighbours and the international community at large. It is also true that the international community and world leaders respected and loved Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Entry or travel visas were not required for Ethiopians to Israel and to certain European countries. The periods were also marked with a sense of Ethiopianess and Ethiopian nationalism among Ethiopians and indeed, with relative respect and love among Ethiopians.

Further, it would not be wrong to insist that as in many African countries the need for political and leadership changes in Ethiopia were concentrated in Ethiopia’s major cities, particularly in Addis Ababa. As far as my recollections go, from the stories and jokes told in family get-togethers and around coffee tables, from educational institutions and from the Ethiopian media outlets of the period, the needs and demands of the Ethiopian urban population for a change of leadership began in the 1950s. The December 1960 military coup d’etat launched by the Officers of the Imperial Guard, led by their Commander, Lt. General Mengistu Newaye, and his brother, Girmame Newaye, was a result. Regrettably, however, due to three or more critically important mistakes in the planning of the coup, which is nostalgically remembered and referred to as the “December 1960 coup d’etat,” was soon put down by the forces loyal to Emperor Haile Selassie.

Although there is little or no recorded, verifiable evidence in our hands or on our bookshelves, a good number of my compatriots argue that the 1974 Ethiopian revolution should be seen as an extension of the failed December 1960 attempted coup d’etat. Even though the resignation of Aklilu Habte-Wold’s cabinet was sudden and unexpected, the ousting of Emperor Haile Selassie was a relatively gradual process. The 1974 Ethiopian revolution was began as a people’s revolution, despite that it was forcefully snatched by the Ethiopian armed forces. There were increasingly intense and growing opposition from the Ethiopian left, especially students and youth in general, who were in the forefront in challenging the uninvited, unexpected emergence of the fascistic enemy of the military regime known as the Dergue or Committee, which came to be known as the Provisional Military Administrative Council and became the uncontested and most ruthless ruler of my country and the oppressor of my people. Therefore there was soon not only, for the first time in the history of Ethiopia, the most appalling urban bloodshed, with indiscriminate executions of hundreds of thousands, mostly of my generation, in their own houses, in offices and in the streets, day and night, without any charge or trial; accompanied by a forced mass exodus of Ethiopians into neighbouring countries in all directions, using all available means of transportation, whether cars, horses, donkeys or of course, on foot; but also the regime was fully engaged in fashioning a new propaganda machine, with mechanisms intended to create and expand hostilities and animosities among Ethiopians. This propaganda machine included the “Zemecha” programme, a programme purposefully constructed to disperse all politically conscious Ethiopians, including the entire body of Ethiopian students, throughout the rural Ethiopia, to avoid the continuous direct challenges faced by the Dergue from the politically conscious urban student population. The Zemecha programme was intended to teach the Dergue philosophy, inculcating it into the minds and hearts of the rural people of Ethiopia as well as those forced into the countryside or remaining in urban areas. The Dergue’s cruel propaganda mechanisms rapidly and forcefully imposed its programme on every household, family, school, college, university and on the Dergue controlled media, to help remodel the minds and thinking of the “Golden Period Generation”–those who resented and hated the rule of the Dergue, who were challenging it and demanding immediate resignation. Extremely hostile political propaganda and all available channels were used to carry out the process of implementing the political ideologies of the Dergue in an accelerated fashion. These who appeared to be reluctant or unwilling to be oriented, reoriented and remolded to accommodate the fascistic ideas and ideologies of the Dergue regime were automatically and mercilessly executed by the cadres of the Dergue–cadres who are living with us today as members of the Ethiopian Diaspora community and who are active leaders and members of Kinijit Diaspora leadership and the AFD. Others among the Golden Period Generation were forced to leave their country and go into exile, leaving their loved ones behind.

Then came the “War Born Generation,” born from families who either were an inseparable part of the Dergue regime, worked with or were indoctrinated by it. They are the main victims of the dramatic campaign, the imposition of the ideologies and hateful propaganda of the cruel and hated Ethiopian enemy–the Dergue. Apart from being directly responsible for making our country a battlefield among various rebel groups and for the disintegration of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, this is the worst remnant that the Dergue regime left behind: this generation–the War Born Generation–which was molded to think and envision the world in exactly the same way as the former members of the Dergue regime and its cadres, and who are therefore convinced that the regime of Mengistu Hailemariam did nothing wrong to Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Consequently, the ever-growing clashes and tensions between the two generations–the Golden Period Generation and the War Born Generation–continue to be not only a source of daily conflict, but more worryingly are a potential obstacle to the resistance against the tyrannical regime of Meles Zenewi. As will be clear in part two of this article, it is the War Born Generation, together with those who served the regime of Mengistu Hailemarim, who have skillfully and successfully managed to paralyze all of the engagement planned by the Kinijit Diaspora and Kinijit itself.


Dr. Maru Gubena, from Ethiopia, is a political economist, writer and publisher. Readers who wish to contact the author can reach me at [email protected]

Outsourcing the Somali war to a Tigrean warlord

By Haile Kassahun

War in the Horn of Africa appears imminent. If large-scale violence breaks out, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and the Bush administration will bear major responsibility for the ensuing chaos and human suffering.

Zenawi, who already has at least 8,000 troops in Somalia, just declared his readiness to widen the war.

There is a marriage of convenience between Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and the Bush Administration. Zenawi is desperate to divert attention from his internal troubles and human rights abuses. An over-extended Bush administration finds it cost-effective and expedient to outsource the Somali war to an eager, yet repugnant local tyrant.

Zenawi is a polished Tigrian warlord in an Armani suit. He is an Albanian-style Marxist turned Christian crusader, a ruthless megalomaniac perfectly willing to burn down the neighborhood to stay in power.

Ethiopia’s ruling Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) has devised a grand internal and external strategy to stay in power. Creating Christian-Moslem conflict is the weapon to be used on the domestic front. This is designed to create a wedge between regime opponents who have united without regard to religion or ethnicity.

The recent religious violence that took the lives of some 19 people in the South West of the country appears to be the work of regime agents.

There is an active domestic propaganda campaign about the danger of jihadists and Islamic extremists. The campaign aims to confuse the issues, to hoodwink the country’s Christian population and to garner its support. Such a situation will create a Christian-Moslem rift, virtually assuring the continuing rule of the ruling minority group. Sadly, such poison is being introduced to a population that has had unprecedented religious tolerance.

The bond between Christians and Moslems goes back to the beginnings of Islam. The prophet Mohammed sent his followers to Ethiopia when they fled persecution in Arabia. Ethiopia’s Christian king received Mohammed’s followers as honored guests and treated them with civility.

Although there were periods of contention, the early history of tolerance created a precedent for mutual respect and coexistence. It will therefore be an unforgivable crime to introduce religious conflict to an otherwise harmonious society.

Zenawi’s external survival strategy depends on currying favor with the United States. Towards that end, he continues to fabricate intelligence reports about the danger Somali Islamists pose to Ethiopia and the United States.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister says the Somali Islamic Courts Union (ICU) is a terrorist organization that has to be stopped in its tracks. He provides no proof beyond accusations and name calling.

“I think the U.S. government panicked. They saw Islamic group; they said, ‘Taliban is coming,” said Herman Cohen, former Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, in a recent interview with Margaret Warner of PBS.

Cohen continued, “also, there are friends in the region, like the Ethiopians, who probably are feeding false intelligence about terrorists being hidden and that sort of thing…. So they want to keep the Islamists out of power, and they will bring the U.S. into it, if they can.”

Ironically, this same grandstanding Zenawi and his organization were classified as terrorists by the United States not long ago. (See, for example, US Homeland Security’s database of terrorist organizations. See also.)

Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union poses a “clear and present danger,” Ethiopia’s strong man said during a recent, carefully-orchestrated speech to his rubber-stamp parliament. Again, he provided no proof.

Many Ethiopians would beg to disagree. What poses a “clear and present danger” is a homegrown rogue minority regime that refuses to respect election results, shoots opponents at will, throws tens of thousands in jail without respect for due process of law. The “clear and present danger” comes from the ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front that runs away from solving domestic post-election problems, pimps the country for political gain, and starts an unprovoked war with a neighboring country.

No matter how much one disagrees with the religious bent of the Islamic Courts Union, they have brought a modicum of stability to Mogadishu and other areas they control.

This is in contrast to the incompetence of the so-called Transitional Government of Somalia which has failed to show any popular support. President Abdullahi Yusuf has little credibility with his own people, spending most of his time in Ethiopia. It is reported that he has been in the service of Ethiopian security forces going at least as far back as a decade. Even his kidney operation a few years ago was paid for by Ethiopia.

A Bush administration preoccupied with Iraq appears to have decided to let Ethiopians do the fighting. US policy in Ethiopia and Somalia has been relegated to low-level, inexperienced officials.

It’s the same folks who lent American support to unsavory Somali warlords, leading to an embarrassing foreign policy debacle in June. The public face of this rookie team is Jendayi Frazer, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Frazer is reportedly close to the Zenawi regime and relies heavily on the EPRDF’s self-serving intelligence feed.

Incidentally, some of the pro-US warlords may be among those responsible for the killing of US rangers during the “Blackhawk” incident.

According to a Washington Post dispatch of May 17, 2006, some of the warlords “reportedly fought against the United States in 1993 during street battles that culminated in an attack that downed two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters and left 18 Army Rangers dead.”

These warlords continue to spend a great deal of time in Addis Ababa, chewing the narcotic Khat, driving expensive cars, guzzling top-shelf whiskey and frequenting whorehouses — all courtesy of the American tax-payer.

Zenawi is eager to keep the focus away from his domestic troubles at all costs. In the past, he had no qualms sacrificing at least 50,000 Ethiopian troops during the Ethio-Ertrean war of 1998 -2000. The war was allegedly fought over a barren border area called Badme. Incomprehensibly, he was quick to give up Badme–land over which so much blood was shed. When ceding territory became domestically unpopular, he began backtracking and flip flopping, making border demarcation a permanent thorny issue that continues to this day.

Zenawi also had no problem giving orders for the shooting of civilians protesting the stealing of the 2005 elections. Over 193 civilians were murdered in broad daylight and upwards of 30,000 jailed in a post-election reign of terror, according to a commission established by the regime. Among those arrested are almost all elected leaders of the opposition party, including the mayor of Addis Ababa, human rights advocates, journalists and civic society leaders.

There is no rule of law or an independent judiciary to dispense justice. Prisoners are guilty until proven innocent. Even when the court releases prisoners the security forces rearrest them. Long imprisonment without any evidence–sometime lasting as long as 10 or 15 years-–is common.

Beyond imprisonment, the autocrat’s 15-year rule has been marred by a systemic pattern of human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings.

A few additional examples of the regime’s violent rule include the following:

At least 30 helpless prisoners in Kaliti were shot dead last year;

424 ethnic Anuaks war massacred by the Ethiopian army in 2003 to make way for oil exploration by a Malaysian company;

66 protesters were gunned down in Awassa and Addis Ababa in 2002;

40 students were murdered in 2001;

and another group of 19 students were killed in Addis Ababa in 1993.

Widespread killings and mass arrests have been common in regions inhabitted by the majority Oromos. Some 15,000 to 20,000 people have been killed in the Oromia region alone, according to a former judge who recently defected to the West. This disturbing information was revealed in a recent interview the judge, Teshale Abera, gave to the Mail and Guardian newspaper. According to the judge, Ethiopia’s current regime is as bad as the Mengistu regime it replaced.

Ethiopia is also gripped by an economic crisis, contrary to the government’s Orwellian propaganda. Regime cadres are increasingly squeezing peasants. Urban unemployment is still upwards of 50 percent. The cost of living has skyrocketed, making life unbearable for the ordinary person.

Upwards of four million Ethiopians need ongoing international food handouts. Over three million are infected with HIV/AIDS. (The only sector doing well is party-owned businesses and the few parasites that benefit from ethnic patronage.) Add to that mass arrests and the continuing intimidation of all opponents. A state of fear pervades the country. All is not well behind the façade of a few high rises that have cropped up on Bole Road.

The Bush administration has made a Faustian bargain with the Zenawi regime. It has downplayed widespread killings and egregious human rights violations in exchange for Zenawi’s services in the war against terror.

The same administration that has refused to speak up against the massacre of Ethiopians wants Ethiopia to sacrifice its sons and daughters fighting Somalis in pursuit of a big power’s muddled, questionable strategic goal.

U.S. troops stationed in Djibout and Camp Hurso in Ethiopia appear to be directly involved in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The US has also been actively spreading disinformation that demonizes the Islamic Council while creating sympathy for the Ethiopian invasion. For example, the dubious document recently leaked to the media and purportedly prepared by UN experts has all the markings of a US disinformation campaign to justify a war against the Islamic Courts.

Ethiopia and Somalia are among the poorest countries in the world. Both people have experienced tremendous suffering in the last thirty years.

Where’s the morality in pitting one poor African country against another? Where is justice? Where is the morality in coddling a tyrant once labeled terrorist by the United States? Why is it acceptable for the United States to ally with a murderous regime that has massacred at least 193 civilians and arrested over 30,000 in secret concentration camps? Why is such immorality being perpetrated in the name of the war against terror?

Congressman Donald Payne said the following during a recent briefing on the situation in Ethiopia: “…During the Cold War, United States supported dictators like Mobutu and never really condemned South Africa’s apartheid government because they were anti-communists, and we were fighting the communists in the U.S. And so we’re not going to repeat those mistakes,” Payne said.

Thousands will die, tens of thousands will be maimed and millions will be made refugees. Just as in Iraq, when the mess gets to be too much to handle, the US will walk away under one pretext or another, leaving the local people holding the bag. There will be so much suffering that no amount of international handout will make a dent.

The ICU has invited the US to come to Mogadishu to engage in dialogue and observe first hand the situation on the ground. This is a good gesture that the United States and Ethiopia should take advantage of. The parties need to resolve all issues through dialogue. The misery and mayhem a new war brings, nor matter what the pretext, is not worth the cost to the people on the receiving end.

It’s still not too late to stop this madness.

The author can be reached at [email protected]

COMMENTS

U.S Congress: Briefing on human rights in Ethiopia

Text of Presentation by Judge Wolde-Michael Meshesha, Vice-Chairman of the Inquiry Commission on Post-Electoral Violence

Mr. Chairman, I would have liked to come and make my presentation in person. I regret that I could not have made it.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you the work of the Inquiry Commission, which was set up to investigate the 2005 post-electoral violence in Ethiopia. I am particularly grateful for Congressman Donald Payne who initiated this briefing which I believe would help Members of Congress and friends of Ethiopian to understand the process which the Inquiry Commission followed to reach to its conclusions. It is also important what happened once the Commission completed its work. The Government of Ethiopia first attempted to suppress and then to revise the conclusions of the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to tell you about my background so that you understand that members of the Commission came from different profession. I am a judge and Vice President of the Federal First Instant Court. The political crisis, which Ethiopia faced after the May 2005 parliamentary and regional elections, was marred by violence. There were protests, which resulted in violence in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country in June and November 2005.

As a result of the post-electoral crisis, many lives were lost, property was damaged and thousands of people were rounded up and detained in several remote places (military camps) without proper legal procedures. The manner in which the government handled the post election crisis was criticized. There was indeed intense international pressure on the government to set up an independent inquiry commission to look into the reaction of the security forces and the police. In response to internal and external pressures, the government enacted a law (Proclamation 478/2005), which established an independent inquiry commission. According to the proclamation, the Inquiry Commission was mandated to identify:

Whether the force used by the security forces was excessive or not;

Whether human rights in matters related to the problem was conducted in accordance with the constitution and the rule of law; and

Damage caused to life and property.

Moreover, in accordance with the proclamation, eleven members, including the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman, were appointed by Parliament as members of the commission. I joined initially the Commission as an ordinary member but after the resignation of the Deputy Chairman, I was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, The Commission, which was given this important task, faced serious problems before it even started its functions. Four out of the eleven members of the Commission tendered their resignation on the ground of health problems. This indeed shows the tense condition in which the Commission started its function. The remaining seven members of the Commission began their investigation at the end of January 2006. As the Commission found it difficult to pursue its task, it requested parliament to appoint new individuals in order to replace those who resigned. The newly appointed five members joined the Commission in March 2006.

The Commission, which earnestly began its activities after overcoming these hurdles, adopted code of conduct for members of the commission; voting procedure and a work plan. These were meant to help the Commission execute its tasks in an effective, transparent, and an impartial manner. The Commission also hired its own six investigators and twenty support staff, despite the suggestion of the Speaker of the House to use investigators who will be assigned to the Commission by the executive.

At the start of its work, the Commission gave a press conference and called upon the members of the general public, civil society institutions, the press and other institutions to provide any information relating to the violence. More importantly, the Commission called upon victims and families who lost their loved ones to come forward and give their testimonies. The Commission also approached different local communal institutions, which organize funeral services for urban dwellers to testify what they know about the post election violence. Moreover, the Commission interviewed those government officials who had direct and indirect connection with the incidents. Moreover, Commission members visited different prisons/military camps, which were used as detention centers during the crisis, and government hospitals. After a laborious effort, the Commission successfully concluded its investigation in June 2006.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, The next important task of the Commission was compiling and categorizing the data, which it collected as provided in the proclamation. At this stage of the work of the Commission there were some signs of uneasiness of some government officials. There was pressure on members of the Commission who were government employees. In order to minimize government intervention and pressure, the Commission decided to hold its final deliberations and decisions out of Addis Ababa. The Commission was thus moved to Awassa, which is the capital of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR). In Awassa, the Commission used the office premises of the Supreme Court of the SNNRP. This was facilitated through the Chairman of the Commission, Frehiwot Samuel, who was also then the President of the SNNPR Supreme Court. In Awassa the Commission prepared the list of people who lost their lives (196) and those who were injured (763). It also confirmed from the data gathered the violation of the human rights of thousands of people who were rounded up from different regions.

After establishing the facts, i.e. death and injuries; and damages to property, the next task of the Commission was to decide on the crucial question of whether the government used excessive force. On the basis of the procedure of voting which we adopted initially when the commission started functioning, abstention was precluded. Before voting on the issue of excessive force every member of the Commission was required to comment on the findings of the Commission. Finally a vote was taken on the question of excessive force. The members of the Commission decide d eight to two (8-2) that the government used excessive force to control the protests. Because of the national and international significance of the investigation and also the demonstrated uneasiness of government officials about the findings of the Commission, members of the Commission agreed to document their findings on video and audio. Retrospectively speaking, putting on record the deliberations of the Commission and the voting was one of the wise decisions of the Commission. The video record clearly shows the decision of each member on the question of excessive force. In my humble opinion, this is a clear testimony of every thing that went wrong with the promises of rule of law; independence of the judiciary, and democracy in

Ethiopia. One can imagine the pressure in which members of the Commission were subjected to so that they would suppress the true findings of the Commission and present an illegal report to the Ethiopian people at the end of October 2006.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

After the Commission gave its final verdict on the question of excessive force on Monday July 3, 2006, the Commission proceeded to transcribe its deliberation on paper and write its final report. The Commission had in fact decided to present its findings to the last session of parliament on July 7, 2006 before the beginning of summer recess. This was communicated to the Speaker of the House and the presentation of the findings of the Commission was tabled as an agenda item for the last session of the Parliament.

The next day, July 4, 2006 , members of the Commission began to write the final report on a computer on the premises of the SNNPR Supreme Court. The writing of the report, however, only proceeded till midday. After a lunch break the same day, electricity was shut off in the entire town of Awassa so that we would not continue to process the report on a computer and the compound of the SNNPR Supreme Court was swarmed by plain clothed security personnel. The effort of the Chairman of the Commission to use the standby generator in the compound of the court was not successful obviously because of the intervention of the security personnel. While we were stranded on the premises of the court, the Chairman of the Commission, Ato Frehiwot Samuel was summoned to the office of the President of the Southern Region to meet some ministers who were sent from the office of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The rest of us had to go to our hotel. Upon our return to the hotel in which we stayed for few days we learnt that it was also swarmed by plain clothed security personnel like the premises of the Supreme Court of the Southern Region.

The next day members of the Commission were told by the Chairman of the Commission that he was told by the representatives of the Prime Minister that we should not publish the report and if we proceed to publicize our findings we would face serious consequences. He also informed us that we were told to see Prime Minister Meles Zenawi at his office in Addis Ababa on July 06, 2006. Members of the Commission aware of the danger they were in, returned to Addis Ababa on July 05, 2006. On July 6, 2006 members of the Commission met the Prime Minister in his office. Mr. Zenawi who was obviously enraged by the conclusion of the Commission report sternly instructed members of the Commission to reverse their decision. He lectured us about our failure to consider the context in which force was used and ˜advised us to use the report of the Gambella Inquiry Commission as a template.

The Prime Minister also told us that if the Commission publishes its findings without revision, it would have serious implications for the country. As we were going to the meeting with the Prime Minister, we learned that the Speaker of the House, Mr. Teshome Toga had adjourned Parliament before the official date for the beginning of parliamentary recess, i.e. July 7, 2006 though the agenda for the presentation of the findings of the commission had already been published. The closing of the Parliament without receiving any report from the Commission was a deliberate contravention of the law as all the deadlines, which were given to the Commission by the Parliament, would have expired after July 2006. The action of the Prime Minister who ordered the members of the Commission to revise their report and the Speaker of the Parliament who prevented the submission of the report to Parliament not only violated the sanctity and legality of the Commission but also show the mismatch between the practices and the promises of Mr. Zenawi’s government about rule of law, transparency, and accountability.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The mandate of the Commission, which ended at the beginning of July 2006, could only be renewed by another parliamentary decision. The members of the Commission who were faced with these great difficulties contacted the Speaker of Parliament about their mandate. The Speaker told us to continue our work, revise the original decision on the basis of the instruction of the Prime Minister.

The members of the Commission who initially believed that the government was committed to the investigation process were left with two difficult choices, i.e. to revise the findings of the commission or flee the country and bring the genuine findings of the Commission, which the government was seeking to suppress to the world. Moreover, any activity of the Commission after July 7, 2006 was illegal as the Commission’s mandate has expired.

At this stage, I had known that I had to make a difficult choice. At the personal level the choice was between betraying my own conscience and fleeing out of the country with the genuine report by endangering my family and myself. After several nights of soul searching, I decided not to betray my own conscience and also the trust of several hundreds of people (victims and families of victims) who despite intense scepticism in the general public about the independence of the Commission gave their testimonies and shared their agonies sometimes by endangering themselves. That is why, despite all the risks it involved, I decided to flee, leaving my family behind in order to bring the findings of the Commission to the Ethiopian people and the international community.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Commission has overwhelmingly decided in its July 3, 2006 meeting that the security forces of the government used excessive force. The so-called report, which was released at the end of October, 2006 accused the victims for their own suffering is not only illegal but also shows the true nature of the regime in Addis Ababa. I am a judge by profession. There is one good legal principle which applies to the report which was officially released in Addis Ababa any evidence which solicited by force is inadmissible as evidence in a court of law and as such the report produced in Addis Ababa cannot be taken seriously, as the members of the Commission even those who voted on the July 3, 2006 deliberations were forced to sign on the report and appear before Parliament. The official report is indeed a clear testimony about the problem of rule of law and independence of the judiciary in my country.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before the formation of the Commission, I was working as Vice-President of the Federal First Instant Court in Addis Ababa. I worked as a judge for 14 years believing that things would improve and the supremacy of the rule of law would gradually take root in my country whose people have suffered for many decades from lack of rule of law and state violence. But my experience as a member of the Commission starkly showed me not only the brutality in which the security forces of the government deal with any opposition but also utter lack of respect to the rule of law by officials of the government beginning from the very apex of the system.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

For Ethiopia to move forward from the present standoff and to pave the way for rule of law and respect for human rights, those who were responsible for the unnecessary death of more than 196 people and the wounding of 763 people, should be held accountable. The members of the Commission, despite all the difficulties and believing that the work of the commission make important contribution to national reconciliation among the many political actors in Ethiopia. I also hope that the commission’s findings could lead to a serious reconsideration by the government about its methods of dealing with protestors and its political opponents. I still do hope that friends of Ethiopia who would like to see stability, peace, and reconciliation, and democratization would put the necessary pressure on the government in Addis Ababa for the official publication of the suppressed report and also seek ways in which those who were responsible for the death, injury and detention of innocent civilians would be held responsible.

I thank you for your attention.

Wolde-Michael Meshesha