In connection with the local elections of 2001 in Ethiopia, the Norwegian Institute of Human has had researchers in the field following up and reporting on the election processes in different regions of the country. These reports are a continuation of the Institute’s research on elections as a part of the democratisation processes in Ethiopia since 1991. The reports from 2001 also constitute an immediate follow up on the findings presented in the NIHR publication on the previous parliamentary elections, “The Ethiopian Elections 2000. Democracy Advanced or Restricted?” edited by Siegfried Pausewang and Kjetil Tronvoll.
The researchers Siegfried Pausewang and Lovise Aalen travelled to the Southern Region to follow the local elections there on 23 and 29 December 2001. The elections were initially to be conducted in July, but were postponed several times. Aalen and Pausewang followed the elections in the Zones of Sidama, Hadyia, Kambata-Alaba-Tambaro and Gedeo. This report is based on Pausewang and Aalen’s findings during their field research.
The report has been edited by Bergljot Hovland. All opinions expressed in the report are the authors’ responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights.
The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights / Nordem
University of Oslo
February 2002
Expectations unfulfilled
Despite the apparently reduced engagement in politics at the local level before and during the local elections, many observers and politicians at the national and regional level expressed high expectations for the upcoming elections. Both representatives from the Ethiopian Human Rights Council and Southern Front leaders at regional and zone level expected strong competition between the ruling party and the opposition. The Southern Coalition leader Dr Beyene Petros was relatively optimistic and expected that the Coalition would field candidates in most of the constituencies for the zonal and woreda elections. He complained, however, that imprisonment and harassment of candidates and a very short time for campaigning had reduced the party’s capacity to compete in the elections. As my descriptions below will show, the competition between the two parties on election day was much less that anticipated, due to large-scale withdrawal of opposition candidates immediately before and during the elections.
Both in written and oral form, ruling party leaders expressed expectations of better electoral performance for the upcoming local polls in the south. One of the main arguments behind these expectations was that the renewal (tehaddso) that allegedly had taken place within the party organisations during 2001 had strengthened the democratic nature of the party organisation. The EPRDF bulletin Tehaddso proclaimed that “The fact that this election follows soon after one of the most important renewal movements gives us great hope in avoiding the repeat of some of the most inexcusable mistakes committed by members of our party.”[9]
The elected leaders at regional and zone level (represented by Haile Mariam Dessalegn, president of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) and Abote Anito, chairman of KAT zone council) were openly discussing the challenges of implementing democracy at the ground level in Ethiopia. They were aware of the necessity of correcting violations conducted by lower party members and of the importance of training of kebele officials and local cadres in democracy and human rights in order to create a conducive atmosphere for fair elections. Nevertheless, the increased awareness of the regional and zonal leaders cannot be seen as a substantial progress in itself unless it leads to a behavioural change of the political actors in the woreda and the kebele. As my descriptions of the pre-election period and the election day will show, the message from above had not reached down to the grass root of the organisation. Although the elections were conducted without severe violence, many members of the lower party organisation and the representatives of local administrative bodies repeated past mistakes. For them, it seemed that the first priority was to prevent the opposition from winning seats like it had done in the 2000 elections. This priority was apparently hard to combine with the stated intentions of the tehaddso movement.
The election campaign
The elections in the south were postponed several times during 2001. This led to uncertainty and a weaker campaigning and mobilisation than in the previous election. Firstly, the elections were postponed from February/March to June because the electoral board needed time to ensure that the mistakes from the May 2000 elections would not be repeated. Secondly, the June elections were rescheduled until November allegedly because of the rainy season’s impact on the board’s logistical capacity. Thirdly, the November date was again altered, partly because the opposition claimed that there should be more time for releasing its political activists from prison before the elections started. Finally, the end of December was decided, despite protests from the opposition that they had too little time for campaigning and registering candidates and that the majority of the peasants in southern region would be pre-occupied with harvesting at this time and did not have time for voting.
Compared to the 2000 elections, there was little public debate about the upcoming polls. Neither Inter Africa Group nor Ethiopian Human Rights Council arranged party debates, and there were no other public arenas for both parties to discuss with each other. But the Southern Front had their own arenas for campaigning, for example evaluation of party candidates in public meetings in the kebele and meetings with regional and national members of parliament who went back to their home areas to propagate for the party. The Coalition also sent members of the national and regional parliaments back to their areas of origin to assist the campaigning, but the party leader Beyene Petros stayed in Addis Ababa. Although many party supporters argued that he had to stay in the capital to co-ordinate their activities and that it might not be safe for him to come to the south, they were also disappointed by his absence. “If he had been here for one single meeting, we would not have suffered from problems of mobilisation. More people would undoubtedly have voted for us if he had been here” stated one of the party leaders in Kambata.
In the local elections in Addis Ababa in February/March 2001, the public debates and mobilisation were also at low ebbs, but nevertheless the voters were subject to increased pressure through door to door campaigns from kebele officials[10]. In the southern elections a similar pattern occurred. Many voters, particularly in Doyogenna area in Kambata, told that kebele officials had come to their homes to register and distribute election cards to the voters. This was interpreted by the voters as undue pressure to participate in the elections and vote for the ruling party. Such practise is against the election regulations, where it is clearly stated that “any registrar who registers voters outside the polling stations […] will be punished according with the penal code.”[11]
Joint committees
Although the tehaddso did not lead to the improvements that the ruling party leaders had proclaimed, there was one achievement in the running of the local elections. This was the establishment of “joint committees” consisting of one representative each from the contesting parties and one from the National Electoral Board. These committees were meant to solve conflicts that arose in the pre-election period and on election day. In places like Shone and Durame they managed to correct some violations, but due to limited capacity and power they were able to intervene only in a small number of cases[12]. One of the achievements the joint committee in KAT zone obtained was that candidates were allowed to hand in their supporting signatures directly to the woreda electoral board instead of to the kebele office. This made the registration of candidates less prone to political manipulation from the ruling party because the opposition felt less threatened by intimidation from the kebele officials. This is an example of how important it is to exclude overzealous kebele officials from the electoral process, and should be followed up by other measures to detach kebele and woreda offices from organising the elections. Nevertheless, in most places the strong power and presence of the kebele and woreda executives in the electoral process made the joint committees inactive or non-existent and generally they played no significant role in solving differences or mediating conflicts during the election.
Withdrawal and cancellation of opposition candidates
The joint committees were not able to prevent opposition candidates from withdrawing or being cancelled from the elections the week before the woreda and zone election and on polling day. In Kambata, where I did most of the interviews in the pre-election period, opposition candidates withdrawing or being cancelled was relatively widespread. In areas where strong competition was expected, like in Shinshicho and Angacha towns, only the ruling party candidates maintained their candidacy. When I visited those towns I was quite surprised by the absence of the opposition, because I was told by the Coalition that these places would probably be some of the hotspots in the elections. When I arrived, I approached the local authorities to ask them the reason. Members of the ruling party generally explained the absence of the opposition candidates either by the argument that the candidates were not really being members of the Southern Coalition and therefore had been cancelled by the local NEB, or that they had withdrawn voluntarily because they had realised that they did not have enough support from the people. One Southern Front representative in Angacha woreda stated that “many [opposition party] members withdraw because they haven’t been able to keep the promises they made for the last election. People are realising that the Coalition is lying. They promised free fertilisers supply from the party, but they did nothing! Many people withdraw their supporting signatures for the candidates and some even write a public letter stating that they do not support the party anymore.”[13]
When I talked to the ex-members or ex-candidates of Southern Coalition without the presence of the EPRDF cadres, however, they told us that they had abandoned their party membership or candidature because they feared for their family’s security, and not because they rejected the ideas or the programme of the party. Threats concerned i.e. their access to land and community services, imprisonment and threats on their lives. One of them, who had written a public letter telling that he abandoned his involvement, told it in this way: “Some months ago I was a member of the Southern Coalition. In the last election I was campaigning for the party and it won here. But the EPRDF were forcing the Southern Coalition and our members were beaten and imprisoned, especially at the kebele level. So I decided to be neutral and withdraw from politics. At this time I live peacefully and feel happy for that. If I had continued with politics I would probably have been imprisoned now.”[14]
In Shinshicho town in Kachabirra woreda the opposition candidates had apparently withdrawn voluntarily. I was not able to talk to any of the withdrawn candidates, but the opposition party leaders in the zone claimed that the candidates did not want to maintain their candidacy because their complaints to the local electoral board had not been taken seriously. One specific concern was that the local head of the electoral board was a known member of the ruling party, and he had not been replaced by a neutral person despite repeated complaints about him[15]. In Sidama, many SLM candidates withdrew during election day because of alleged election fraud. They claimed that after seeing ballot boxes being stuffed before the polling stations were opened, they had withdrawn because they had realised that there was no chance of being fairly elected[16].
In addition to the “voluntary” withdrawal of candidates there were several reports of opposition candidates being involuntarily cancelled from the lists during election day. Many of the Coalition candidates complained that they had not been issued ID cards, their names were not made public and some candidates were cancelled from the lists during the election day on allegations that they were not qualified candidates. Many of these cancellations were done without any formal decisions from the NEB[17]. It was therefore difficult to trace who actually had done the cancellations and whether it was done on order from the electoral officials or the local kebele and woreda officials. But many opposition candidates claimed that the reason for cancellation was that kebele officials, when checking the validity of the supporting signatures collected, had claimed that they could not be accepted.
The role of armed guards
In the majority of the places I visited on election day, there were several armed guards at the gate and even inside of the polling stations. Some of the armed guards were local police or militia linked to the kebele, while others were demobilised soldiers who had returned to their home areas and were hired by the kebele authorities to take care of the security on election day. According to the election regulations published by NEB, the electoral officers are only allowed to assign the police for security, and persons carrying weapons should stay five hundred metres away from the polling stations (Election Officers Manual, April 2000, Addis Ababa, p. 180). Apart from being a violation of the electoral law, this armed presence had a negative psychological effect on the voters. In many cases, the voters expressed that they perceived the guards as agents of the ruling party and were reminded of the retaliating role played by armed personnel after the 2000 elections in Hadiya and Tambaro. There were also several reports on kebele officials and police shooting gunshots in the air during the counting of the votes, particularly in Angacha woreda (Dinika area). Southern Front members explained this as a way of celebrating the SEPDF victory, while the Southern Coalition saw it as a way of threatening their observers present in the polling stations at that time.
In addition to the kebele militia and the demobilised soldiers was the presence of regular armed forces stationed in many parts of the southern region. According to the regional president Hailemariam Dessalegn, there are six camps of soldiers within the region, located in Wolaita, Awassa, Arbaminch, Hossaina, Shone and the Jinka border area. He claimed that the location of the camps had nothing to do with the elections. The opposition, however, claimed that the armed forces were deliberately placed in some of these areas because they were expected to be contested. Although the armed forces allegedly had been told to stay in their barrack during the elections, the opposition claimed that large groups of soldiers had moved around to provoke and scare the voters, particularly in remote areas at night. During our stay in the region, we did not observe any regular army moving around and we were therefore not able to confirm or refute the opposition’s claim on army activity.
Kebele and woreda officials intervening
In addition to the strong presence of armed guards, the attendance of kebele and woreda officials in the polling stations added to the pressure on voters and the electoral board officials to favour the ruling party. In the majority of the polling stations I visited, kebele and woreda officials were the ones who approached us when we asked for admittance to the sites. In some cases they forwarded us to the electoral board officials, but more often they were the ones who took the decision whether we would be allowed to enter or not. This indicates that the local officials acted as organisers and controllers of the electoral process and intervened in the work, which the NEB officials were supposed to take care of. This is a clear violation of the electoral regulations, which states that members of the administrative bodies and kebele officials can show up at the polling stations only as voters. In the 2000 elections, this issue was raised by the National Electoral Board itself, when NEB urged administrative bodies to stay 500 metres away from the polling stations and prohibited them from appearing at the polling station from six a.m. until the results are officially known[18]. Even EPRDF’s own “code of conduct” for this election clearly states that “during the election period government institutions and law enforcement agents should not be used in support of any political organisation or candidate”.[19]
When I asked the local officials about their role in the elections, many of them told that they were assigned to take care of security issues and to see that everything went smoothly. They were apparently not intending to hide the fact that they played an important role in the conduct of the elections. This shows that the local executive can basically act according to their own interests without taking the electoral regulations into consideration. It also shows that the electoral board is too weak and lacks the independence from the local executive to prevent violations of the regulations, or that they are deliberately allowing the local officials to interfere because they basically share the same interests – those of the ruling party.
Imprisonment of opposition activists
A major complaint from the opposition was that their activists were frequently imprisoned on a short-term basis just before and during election day. In Kambata, we observed ourselves that police attempted to arrest an opposition activist after he had approached us to report on violations of the electoral law. My interpreter, who speaks both the local Kambata language and Amharic, was able to read the situation without the knowledge of the involved parties, and did therefore obtain information that was not intended to come through to us. He observed that the police officer that was assigned as a guard outside the polling station threatened the activist to imprison him if he did not keep quiet. When the activist protested, some woreda officials, who also were candidates, intervened and told the police to leave the man until “the guests” had left. In other places where opposition activists were imprisoned during election day, for example in Doyogenna town in Angacha woreda, representatives of the Southern Front claimed that the activists had been illegally campaigning. The opposition representatives, however, argued that the activists had just informed the voters about their symbols, as the ruling party candidates did routinely. This is another example of how the reality is twisted and that two contradictory stories of the same event are told. It is also representative for many of the cases where opposition candidates were kept in prison before and even after the elections started.
One of the most serious cases is the two representatives of the Southern Coalition for the regional parliament who are imprisoned in Durame in Kambata. They were detained in March 2001 after the instability in Tambaro, but were not accused before November 2001. The Coalition has appealed to release the candidates because of their immunity as regional MPs, but to no avail. The chairman of KAT zone, Abote Anito, explained that the two MPs were accused of murder and could not be released on bail. But the actual court charges which we have seen, concern only accusations of having agitated people to resist payment of taxes and fertiliser debts and to use force if payment was demanded – a charge often set forth and hard to disprove. Moreover, the charge is extended to include banditry and an attempt at destabilising the administration and jeopardising peace and security, after the people allegedly upon such agitation forcefully seized a gun from a kebele security guard.
The number of detainees allegedly members of the Southern Coalition seems relatively high in the southern region. Although many were released after the electoral board had proclaimed that political prisoners should be freed in August 2001, we have many reports on party activists still imprisoned. In these cases, two contradictory stories are again produced to explain the detentions. The Coalition claims that they are imprisoned because of political persuasion, and that the court charges in many cases are based on fabrication, while the Southern Front claims that the detainees have committed illegal acts and cannot be released, even if they are members of a political party. Which story is the most credible? We have had no mandate to visit the prisons and talk to the detained themselves, and it is therefore not possible to get their side of the story. A common claim from the ruling party is that many of the supporters of the opposition are ex-soldiers and unemployed youths seeking material benefit from being party activists and are essentially trouble makers. Even if this claim was true, it does not automatically prove that these people are criminals and must be imprisoned. On the other side, it might be in the interest of the opposition to deny that the detainees are ordinary criminals, and they might exaggerate the problem of political detentions. Criminals who are imprisoned might also have the interest of presenting themselves as party activists, so that they have a better chance of being released.
Although the reasons for imprisonment are a matter of speculation, there are certain conditions, which indicate that the process of detention and court decisions is strongly influenced by the interests of the ruling party. It is a general observation that the police and judiciary lack independence from the local executives in the woreda and the kebele and the local party cadres. This is a problem even acknowledged by the ruling party leaders in Awassa. Hailemariam Desselegn, the regional president, admitted that much more had to be done to separate the party from the other administrative bodies and the judiciary[20]. A common statement from the people is that they cannot differentiate between the police, the court and the woreda/kebele authorities, because they all work for the interest of the ruling party. It is clear that the local executives do not have the right to arrest people, but still there is a widespread belief that it is the responsibility of the kebele officials to make detentions. This apparent political influence makes it credible that political detentions on short and long term basis take place.
Opposition withdrawing from the kebele elections
On the 28th of December 2001, the Southern Coalition held a press conference in Addis Ababa, announcing that they would withdraw from the kebele elections on the coming Sunday. They stated that “to expect a democratic election competition from EPRDF is like expecting a pigeon from a snake’s egg”[21] – there was no point in continuing for the kebele elections because the process was rigged. The Coalition denounced further that the result of the woreda and zone elections should be invalidated because of severe irregularities and that re-elections should be conducted. Their major complaints concerned the treatment of their candidates.
In addition to the specific complaints about the irregularities, the statement about the withdrawal contained essentially the same arguments as that issued after the woreda elections in the other parts in the country in February/March 2001[22]. At that time, six different opposition parties behind statement presented a unified front against the EPRDF. Although it was only one party behind the statement this time, there were some signs of internal strain within the Coalition on the issue of withdrawal. The leadership in Addis Ababa decided to withdraw from the kebele elections, but this decision was apparently not co-ordinated sufficiently with all the parts of the organisation. One of its member organisations, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), intended to continue for the kebele elections, and did partly so. The SLM party leader argued that although they knew that the kebele elections would be rigged, their candidates wished to maintain their candidacy for the coming Sunday[23]. These internal differences indicate that there is a need to strengthen the Southern Coalition party organisation and build internal unity and make the internal decision making process more democratic and transparent, in order to continue being an efficient opposition.
Neither the SEPDF/EPRDF nor the electoral board made any public announcements to refute the accusations that the Coalition forwarded on the press conference on the 28th of December. But the local ruling party representatives in Kambata and Badawatchu claimed that the opposition had withdrawn solely because they had lost in the woreda and zone elections. When the results of the elections were announced by NEB, it was however clear that re-elections would be conducted in 15 polling stations of the region where irregularities had taken place, mostly in Hadiya and Sidama zones. At the end of January, the Southern Coalition made another statement where they repeated their complaints. This led the head of the National Electoral Board, Aseffa Birru, to issue a personal attack on the leader of SEPDC, Beyene Petros. Aseffa Birru warned the SEPDC leader to refrain from defaming and insulting the board, otherwise he would be sued in court. The board described all of the Coalition’s complaints as unfounded allegations[24]. But Beyene Petros rejected the warning from Aseffa Birru as illegal and claimed that he had evidence for the accusations that he had made[25]. These incidents illustrate the fundamental lack of trust between the different actors in the electoral process in Ethiopia. There is generally an absence of dialogue between the actors, and if a dialogue takes place, it is essentially about mutual accusations. The opposition’s boycott of the kebele elections could have led to a public discussion on the conduct of the elections, but due to the polarised political climate, mistrust and hostility are nourished and a constructive dialogue is prevented.
Conclusion: elections as a “zero sum game”
The conduct of the local elections in southern region does not lead to any fundamental re-evaluation of the democratic situation in Ethiopia, but rather strengthens our conclusions made for the previous elections in the country. The EPRDF and its member parties do still not allow competition if it threatens its own position. The stated intentions of the tehaddso/renewal movement have not led to any fundamental changes in the behaviour of the local party cadres and administrators, who are still exceeding their mandate to maintain their positions and prevent the opposition from gaining support. Although the participants in the elections continue to give two fundamentally different stories of the events, one largely positive and the other utterly negative, there is no reason to doubt that the electoral conduct in southern Ethiopia must be dramatically improved to give the competitors equal chances of participation.
Although the national leaders of Ethiopia have another language than the party cadres and local officials at the grass root in southern region, they essentially tell the same story of why the EPRDF always defeats the opposition. Sebhat Nega, one of the most influential politicians in the EPRDF, claims that EPRDF’s repeated electoral victories are a result of the party’s political programme[26]. My observations in the southern region do not support this explanation. As my findings from Kambata and Tambaro have shown, voters are to a very little extent concerned about party programmes in the selection of candidates. Their choice is more influenced by the decisions made by the elders in the community regarding the involvement in electoral politics. They were very much concerned as to whether their choice of candidates will improve or endanger their personal security and chances of survival. When support for the opposition leads to harassment and imprisonment from local authorities, voters may choose to vote for the ruling party.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi explains EPRDF’s monopolistic position by the fact that the party has based its support on the peasantry, which constitutes 85 per cent of the Ethiopian population. He claims that as long as the population of Ethiopia is as undiversified as this, the support for the party will remain strong[27]. Although my observations in the southern elections do not converge with this view, the Prime Minister’s explanation points at one crucial issue, the relationship between the peasantry and the ruling party. My argument is that as long as the peasants in Ethiopia rely on the state for daily survival, and as long as agents of the ruling party act on the behalf of the state and control their means of survival to the advantage of the party, the people will continue to vote for the EPRDF. As observed in the elections in Ethiopia since 1992, the voters perceive the ruling party as agents of the state and vice versa, materialised through the omnipotent position of the kebele and woreda officials at local level. If the voters do not support the ruling party, they perceive it as an exclusion from essential resources distributed by the state. In connection with the tehaddso within the EPRDF, it has become apparent that leaders of the ruling party are aware of this lack of separation between the different branches of the government. But as the local elections in the Southern Region have illustrated, this awareness is still not present on local level.
One of the explanations on why the allegedly new awareness at higher level has not reached ground is that elections in Ethiopia are still perceived as a “zero sum game” for both the opposition and the ruling party. Electoral victory is seen as a guarantee for survival. If victory is secured, the party in power gains the control of the local administration and thereby the resources distributed by the government. Electoral loss, on the other hand, is perceived as an ultimate exclusion from resources and positions. In the worst case, as experienced by the opposition, the loss means deprived community services, resources and even personal freedom through imprisonment. Evidently, this “zero sum game” makes it very hard to make a conducive atmosphere for fair elections.
[9] Special Issue of the bi-monthly bulletin of the EPRDF “Tehaddso”. [10] See Aalen and Pausewang 2001 “Withering democracy. Local elections in Ethiopia, February/March 2001” Nordem Report, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Working paper 2001/07. [11] See Election Officers Manual, April 2000, Addis Ababa, p.137). [12] Interviews with representatives of HNDO Shone and, SEPDC Durame, 22.12.01 [13] A SEPDC observer interviewed on woreda/zone election day in Angacha woreda. [14] Interviewed in Angacha woreda, on woreda and zone election day [15] Information obtained from SEPDC leader in Kambata. [16] Interview with SLM representative, Awassa, 28.12.01 [17] Interviews with SEPDC candidates in Doyogenna town, Angacha woreda 24.12.01, and Shone town, Badawatchu woreda, 28.12.01 [18] See Walta Information Centre 13. May 2000 [19] Special Issue of the bi-monthly bulletin of the EPRDF “Tehaddso”. [20] Interviewed in Awassa, 21.12.01 [21] The headline of the SEPDC press statement, 28.12.01 [22] See Aalen and Pausewang 2001 “Withering democracy. Local elections in Ethiopia, February/March 2001” Nordem Report, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Working paper 2001/07.
[23] Interview of Jilma Chamola, Awassa, 28.12.01 [24] See Walta Information Center, 6.12.01 [25] See Reporter newspaper, 6.02.02 [26] Personal communication in Addis Ababa, 14.01.02. [27] Recorded interview of Meles Zenawi by Kjetil Tronvoll, Addis Ababa, 16.01.02.
In the 2001 local elections in southern region, Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its southern member party, the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF), won a great majority of the seats for the zone, woreda and kebele councils. In the zonal and woreda election on the 23rd of December, the opposition party Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) was totally outnumbered, even in places where it had swept away the ruling party in the national and regional elections in 2001[1]. For the kebele election on the 29th of December, the opposition withdrew their participation, and the EPRDF was winning without any challengers. Thus, it seems like the southern local elections fit well into the pattern of the local elections conducted in other parts of the country in February/March this year, where exactly the same scenario took place.
Not surprisingly, the participants in the election for the zone and the woreda in the southern region in December 2001 described the elections in two fundamentally different and often contradictory ways. The ruling EPRDF/SEPDF described the elections generally as free and fair. They ascribed the victory of the ruling party to people’s genuine support for their policies and programmes, and accused the opposition for immaturity and lack of political capacity. The opposition party, on the other hand, described the election processes as fraudulent and unfair. According to them, the multiparty elections are just nominal, because the ruling party manipulates the process to such an extent that there is no room for real competition. If the elections had been genuinely fair, they claim that the ruling party would have lost ground because of their unpopularity among the people.
Mutual accusations were widespread. But there was no dialogue between the accusing parties and there were few attempts to refute each other’s accusations. In this report, I will present the two stories told, but will also attempt to see if there are events or statements that do not fit in with the polarised versions of the elections. Although it is difficult to assess the credibility of the two stories, I will evaluate them on the basis of my own observations of the elections. This report is based on interviews conducted in Kambata and Omo Shelokko/Tambaro in Kambata-Alaba-Tambaro (KAT) zone, Awassa in Sidama zone and Badawatchu/Shone in Hadiya zone.
The contestants
Southern region is the most ethnically heterogeneous region in the Ethiopian federation, with more than 50 ethnic groups. It is the only region outside Addis Ababa where the opposition has managed to challenge the ruling party. The governing party is the Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF or Southern Front), a member of the ruling coalition at national level, the EPRDF. The Southern Front has again several member parties, which are based on local and ethnic affiliation, among them the Sidama Peoples Democratic Organisation (SPDO), Kambata-Alaba-Tambaro Peoples Democratic Organisation (KATPDO) and Hadiya Peoples Democratic Organisation (HPDO).
When the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) took power and the Derg[2] evacuated the southern areas in 1991, there was no TPLF-allied southern-based organisation to administer the area. The first administrations were therefore militarily dominated and made up of TPLF-officials. An own southern-based EPRDF member, the SEPDF, was established as late as 1994, with great assistance from the central EPRDF apparatus. Well-known TPLF cadres continued to be present in the region and interfered in regional affairs even after the establishment of the Southern Front. But in the so-called renewal (tehaddso) movement within the EPRDF in 2001, the old leadership of Southern Front and TPLF cadres who had been in the region for a long time were excluded from the party. In some areas, like Sidama, the reshuffle had a dramatic impact on the party organisation. The Sidama Peoples Democratic Organisation’s (SPDO) position in the zone was severely weakened and the opposition party Sidama Liberation Movement, a member of Dr Beyene Petros’ SEPDC, was able exploit the power-vacuum that emerged for their own benefit.
The opposition party, Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition (SEPDC or Southern Coalition), is an umbrella organisation for 15 different ethnically based parties. It was established by Dr Beyene Petros in 1992 and was a part of the transitional government until 1993, when it was thrown out of the cabinet by the EPRDF. Hadiya zone, Dr Beyene’s area of origin, and the neighbouring zone of Kambata-Alaba-Tambaro, have traditionally been the Coalition’s strongholds. For the local elections 2001, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) in Sidama zone apparently also succeeded in mobilising the voters. This organisation was established in 1978 and operated as a guerrilla movement fighting the Derg from its bases in Somalia. When the EPRDF came to power, SLM renounced its violent policies and joined the Southern Coalition of Dr Beyene. But they were not allowed by the National Electoral Board to take part in elections with their own party name until 2001, due to their violent past and that they still had a kalashnikov gun in their party symbol[3].
The Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) attempted to field candidates for the local election 2001 in Sidama zone, but was prevented from participating a few days before the first election day. The National Electoral Board cancelled the EDP candidates on the ground that candidates could not speak the native language of Sidama zone. They claimed that the regulations of the southern region said that any person who took a public office in the region had to speak the local tongue. But according to the constitution of the southern region, every person “without any discrimination based on colour, race, religion, political or other opinion” has the right to be elected to any office at all governmental offices[4]. EDP intended to pursue this issue further, but did not succeed in changing the decision before the elections had started[5].
Elections and the concern for individual and communal safety
In the rural areas of Ethiopia most people live on very small economic margins and the most important priority in daily life is to prevent these margins from being reduced. Any changes that might alter people’s abilities to obtain their daily income are considered as dangerous and might have great impacts on the chances of survival. The understanding of elections should take this fact into consideration. If participation in the elections, on one side or the other, is considered as a threat to people’s livelihood, they may want to disengage from it all. If, on the other hand, taking part in the elections is a precondition for securing the daily bread, peasants are likely to take part.
In most Ethiopian local communities, elders (shimagile) play an important role in conflict management and negotiations. Because of the elders’ status and respect, they are in many instances acting as the communities’ actual leaders, in addition to or instead of the formally elected leaders and judicial bodies. They are in many cases seen as the guardians of the communities’ security and stability, and are expected to make decisions that ensure the wellbeing of the citizens. Elections in the Ethiopian context imply an increased level of conflict and a mobilisation of the population that often leads to communal instability. This has particularly been the case in Southern region, where the opposition has been able to mobilise popular support. During and in the aftermath of parliamentary elections in May 2000, there was great instability in particularly two areas of the region, Hadiya and Tambaro. People were killed and detained, and schools and other public services were closed for a period of time. It is apparent that these incidents endangered people’s security and well being, and in many places also reduced their economic margins dramatically. Many people realised that supporting the opposition would imply at least harassment from the ruling party and the administrative bodies, and at worst imprisonment or death. It seems therefore that the experiences from Hadiya and Tambaro have led communities to re-evaluate their participation in elections.
During the 2001 local elections, it was apparent that whole communities had decided to stay away from politics in general and opposition politics in particular, for example in Omo Shelokko woreda (Tambaro) and Angacha town in KAT zone. Leaders of Southern Front, among them the regional president Hailemariam Dessalegn, claimed that the elders had decided to abandon the Southern Coalition because they had realised that the opposition could not keep its promises and that they were criminals[6]. The leader of the Coalition, Beyene Petros, argued that the people of Tambaro were too scared by the intervention of federal police forces in the previous upheavals to continue supporting the opposition[7]. When I visited Tambaro, I only had the chance to talk to the representatives of the ruling party, and they largely confirmed the regional president’s version of the events. They claimed that the violence was caused by opposition activists attacking the woreda and kebele offices, claiming that they had the right to control all administrative offices because they won the 2000 national and regional elections[8]. After this, the people turned against the opposition, claiming that they only caused problems. The question still remains, however, whether it was the opposition candidates’ acts in themselves which scared off the people, or if it was the acts of the federal police who turned against the people which finally made people go away from the opposition in Tambaro.
[1] One such place is Shone in Badawatchu woreda in Hadiya, where the SEPDC won over the EPRDF in the re-election in June 2000. In the woreda and zone election this year, SEPDC only won in one single kebele (Interview Ato Hussein, NEB Shone, 29.12.01). [2]Derg is the Amharic word for committee and was the name of the former regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991). [3] Interview with Jilma Chamola, acting chairman of SLM, Awassa 28.12.01 [4] The SNNPRS Constitution of 1995, article 39,1. [5] Interview Netsanet Demelash, head of EDP in Awassa, 27.12.01 [6] Interview in Awassa, 21.12.01 [7] Interview in Addis Ababa, 17.12.01 [8] Interview with the chairman and the head of social affairs in Omo Shelokko Woreda, Modula, 26.12.01
Interior Ministry representatives will continue checking the eligibility for aliya of some 3,000 Ethiopian Falash Mura, who claim that under a 2003 government directive they should be allowed to immigrate to Israel, the government announced Sunday.
The decision to continue the flow of immigration from the African nation follows more than a year of high-profile protests from the local Ethiopian community and its supporters after Interior Ministry officials declared that all eligible Falash Mura – Ethiopian Jews whose ancestors converted to Christianity under duress more than a century ago – had been checked and approved for aliya.
In January, the ministry recalled its Gondar-based representative.
Despite claims that aliya from Ethiopia was all but over, local community members, representatives of North American Jewry and a growing number of MKs believe that there are still between 9,000-15,000 Falash Mura who fit the criteria. Over the past year, they have demanded the government continue checking their applications.
Sunday’s decision will allow almost a third of those to at least try proving that they fit the criteria, which includes a maternal link to Judaism and relatives already living in Israel.
In addition, the Interior Ministry will now be obliged to determine an official policy on immigration from Ethiopia.
“We welcome the government’s decision,” said a spokesman for the Public Council for Ethiopian Jews, an impromptu committee consisting of former Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, former Supreme Court justice Menachem Elon, Prof. Irwin Kotler, Ethiopian Rabbi Yosef Adaneh, and other prominent figures, which was set up a year ago to lobby the government to continue bringing Jews from Ethiopia.
“However, there are still thousands more Jews in Ethiopia, currently living in appalling conditions, that appear on the initial Efrati list [the official registry of eligible Falash Mura that the government is now following] and should be allowed to come to Israel but who have still not been checked,” the spokesman continued.
“The committee calls on the government to uphold its 2003 commitment and to continue with the aliya until every last Falash Mura that fits the criteria has arrived in Israel.”
The debate over continuing the immigration of the remaining Falash Mura stems from a 1999 census compiled by then Interior Ministry Director-General David Efrati and Rabbi Menachem Waldman, an expert in the field of Falash Mura conversion.
According to that register, 17,500 people were eligible for aliya. Of that initial figure, 16,000 people have already arrived in Israel, while a total of over 20,000 have actually been checked by Interior Ministry officials.
However, in a previous interview with The Jerusalem Post, Waldman said that some people’s names were taken off the list and that “while it is a useful guide, the list should not override the government’s decision to allow people who can prove their Jewish matrilineal lineage to come here.”
Also, community leaders in Israel claim that the list, which was divided into three volumes – Falash Mura in Addis Ababa, Gondar and those living in the outlying villages – was partially lost, and data on people from the villages is therefore not complete.
The government’s most recent decision will see the arrival in Israel each month of 100 families, a fall from the previous quota of 300.
The Jewish Agency for Israel will continue to facilitate the aliya of those who have been approved and will aid in their absorption here following their arrival.
The following information is about the phone and internet communications that are available in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the cost of these services.
Telephone Service
International telephone service in Ethiopia is quite expensive compared to many other countries. Telephone calling cards do not work here and none are issued in Ethiopia. Calling from Addis Ababa to other countries require using the Ethiopian international direct dialing rates.
It is possible to obtain calling cards, issued outside the country for calling into Ethiopia, but the rates, about 35 cents a minute, are more expensive than the calling cards for many other countries. However, this is much cheaper than calling from Ethiopia. Not all calling card providers provide calling cards for Ethiopia.
Mobile Phones
Most out-of-country cellular phone services will not work in Addis Ababa. However, it is possible to obtain mobile phone service here. If you have an unlocked cell phone that uses a SIM card, you can replace the SIM card with one from Ethiopia.
We bought an Ethiopian SIM card from a cell phone shop at the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel and installed it in our unlocked cell phone. The SIM card cost us 368 BIRR ($38 USD) and we had to fill out a one-page application form and provide a copy of my passport. We also paid 100 BIRR ($10.40 USD) for additional air time (this is a prepaid service). The shop lady told us that local calls were .75 BIRR ($.08 USD) per minute, and international calls were 13 BIRR ($1.35 USD) per minute. The local calls worked on our cell phone instantly, but it took a couple of days before we were able to call internationally. We were not able to get the text messaging service to work yet, but other people here with cell phones can text message OK. We were advised by friends that the phone settings may need to be corrected.
If you do not have an unlocked cell phone that uses a SIM card, you may have to buy a cell phone in Addis Ababa. The prices of the Nokia cell phones sold at the cell phone shop range from 750 BIRR ($78 USD) to 3,000 BIRR ($312 USD).
Internet
Internet service in Ethiopia is slow and expensive compared to most other countries. The major hotels have broadband internet service but it does slow down to a crawl during periods of high internet usage.
Houses in Addis Ababa that have internet access use mostly dial-up service. Broadband access is expensive and takes about one year to get it installed. The following are the internet prices.
Type of Service Initial Price Monthly Price
64Kbs ADSL 4,608 BIRR 1,986 BIRR
128Kbs ADSL 7,533 BIRR 3,140 BIRR
256Kbs ADSL 13,925 BIRR 6,096 BIRR
512Kbs ADSL 26,708 BIRR 12,008 BIRR
1Mb ADSL 52,274 BIRR 23,832 BIRR
2Mb ADSL 103,406 BIRR 41,479 BIRR
Dial-UP 156 BIRR 60 BIRR
(Presently 9.6 BIRR = $1 USD)
The above ADSL prices are with leased lines. Shared DSL is not available yet.
Dial-Up monthly price includes 900 minutes free service. Over 900 minutes cost 0.04 BIRR per minute, except on working days from 8:00 am to 6:00 pm which is 0.07 BIRR per minute.
ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) — Two Ethiopian companies said on Monday they will work with Chinese telecoms gear maker ZTE Corp to build the African nation’s first mobile phone assembly plant.
The $5.2 million facility in the northern town of Bhar Dar will be able to produce more than 3,000 handsets a day once it is up and running in 18 months’ time, Janora Technology, one of the two Ethiopian firms, said in a statement.
The other local company is the Organisation for the Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara Region.
Janora said it and TIRET would build the factory, while ZTE would provide the machinery and technological know-how.
Industry sources said ZTE would also set up a CDMA network with capacity for 2.4 million Ethiopian subscribers.
Demand for mobile phones in the Horn of Africa nation has risen sharply following the upgrading of services and the expansion of state-owned Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation.
(Reporting by Tsegaye Tadesse; Editing by Daniel Wallis and David Holmes)
We in the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia want to extend our warmest greetings to our fellow Ethiopians for a Happy New Year.
Only one year ago we Ethiopians celebrated the New Ethiopian Millennium with many hope-filled celebrations that the “turn of the millennium” would bring a “turn around” for Ethiopians. Unfortunately, as most every Ethiopian knows, we have instead experienced worsening conditions in Ethiopia in almost every arena, with little promise that our situation will not continue to decline.
In light of this, do we have reason to expect that the New Year will be different? Yes and no! Yes, if we learn from our past mistakes and no, if do not! That is, our hope for a better year is to a large extent, conditional, that is, it is based on what we Ethiopians do in the next months and throughout the year and our compassion towards others in greater need than ourselves, will make the key difference.
The emphasis must be on our own personal responsibility and personal accountability responding with humanity towards others, as this is where the change must start! This is change that is driven by a change of thinking that comes from leaving behind those attitudes, beliefs, prejudices and ideas that have contributed to the virus that dehumanizes our society that has infected Ethiopia—ethnic hatred, tribal favoritism, selfish ambition, lack of compassion, numbed consciences, the devaluation and abuse of other human beings, violence, pride, deceit, corruption, stirring up division, unhealthy competition, apathy, the expectation of a “hand-out” to take care of one’s own problem or the problems of others rather than taking the initiative and the worship of leaders and demonization of those with whom we disagree.
We have developed a culture of victims and perpetrators that continues to be recycled into new victims and perpetrators, regardless of who is in power—on the small scale—in our homes, communities, businesses and on the streets of our cities, and also on the national scale between those in power and those who suffer the consequences from the actions of those in power.
If we stubbornly refuse to admit the truth and to make the necessary changes, we will only add to our misery; however, if we use our individual and collective failure(s) to push us to become more compassionate and healthy individuals and thereby, a more compassionate and healthy society that can work together, we have much reason to have hope for our future and for the future of our children. The more of us that do this, the greater the impact we will collectively have on our society.
This cannot happen unless Ethiopians work together in solidarity based on shared principles of freedom, justice, equality, human rights and civility as its foundation and compassion as the thread that connects all of these principles together within our society.
Before we talk about what we want for the next year, let us openly address the serious problems that have developed over the last year. We are reminding people that this “better year” for which we are hoping, will not be possible without our commitment to making such changes. In fact, without such changes, Ethiopia faces the possibility of implosion and disintegration.
We must face the fact that right now, Ethiopia is dying—literally, as a people, and figuratively, as a nation. If we do not face the desperate urgency of our crisis, we will be so disconnected from reality that we will be unwilling or unmotivated to take action to save the life of this people and nation!
What is the evidence of our dying people?
Let us first look at our people. The conditions under which the vast majority live are so difficult that many Ethiopians must concentrate all their energy on merely surviving. Pervasive hunger, malnutrition and death—of not only children, but also adults in the rural areas as well as the cities—from starvation is worsened by rising prices, drought, floods and the overall mismanagement by the government in genuinely dealing with this crisis. Why should the cost of one chicken have doubled in the last months to now cost 100 birr ($10)? Why should a middle class working Ethiopian man be picked up on the streets because he collapsed into unconsciousness because he had not eaten for days due to giving all the food to his children.
These are only two examples of a widespread problem affecting countless millions some who say Ethiopians are even too weak to get angry, to protest, to rally or even to think. Without food, not only does the body stop working, the brain will not function properly either. As a result, there is no way of counting how many are dying such silence.
Our hope in our TPLF government in taking remedial action is less than ever. For instance, how can we hope that Meles will take steps to resolve this food crisis when he and his government deny the magnitude of the problem or while they actively contribute to the problem by displacing Ethiopians and destroying their homes, livestock and crops in such places as the Ogaden?
How can we hope that Meles will help enhance the productivity of farmers, while refusing to move from feudalistic or socialistic models of government owned land where the land cannot be used as capital, but can only be leased by subsistence farmers? Reports indicate that these small farmers are so hungry that they are eating their seed and selling their farm tools just to survive.
Those Ethiopians who are being “given” opportunities to manage more efficient and large-scale farms are almost entirely those within the small group of “favored” Woyane supporters whose food may be destined for other countries like Saudi Arabia rather than Ethiopia or who are using thousands of hectares of land to raise flowers for export to Europe at this time of crisis where there is not enough food to cover the needs of Ethiopians. If the profits from the flowers would not be destined for the pockets of only a few, there might be some rationale in this economic endeavor.
The list of additional negative things that plague our people and threaten their lives are countless; to name a few—the lack of clean water, lack of education, lack of employment for even the educated where they are forced to beg in the streets, lack of health care for pregnant mothers, children and those with HIV/AIDS.
What is the evidence of a “dying nation?”
Let us also look at the evidence that, without intervention, Ethiopia is “dying” as a nation. The repression of freedom has worsened in the last year. Political parties within the country are so controlled that they have little chance of representing the huge mass of Ethiopians who are profoundly dissatisfied with the current regime.
During the local elections in April, the government made it so difficult to run for office that they were almost exclusively, the only ones to run throughout the country, assuming different names of parties in different places, but no one is fooled and everybody knows it is the TPLF.
The repression of the media is almost complete. Our people are blocked from knowing what is going on in Ethiopia or in the outside world. On the other hand, no information can easily get out of the country either. As a result, Ethiopians are screaming in silence due to fear of reprisals if they are audibly heard.
The territorial integrity of Ethiopia is being violated as well. Meles is giving our land away to the Sudan or to Djibouti without our permission. Our economy benefits only the few “elite” in power and rumblings among numerous armed groups threaten violence while the Meles regime continues its divide and conquer ethnic politics as if hoping that the country will break into pieces so that the individual parts are “more manageable!” Some outsiders seem to have their own hidden agendas for a broken-up Ethiopia that would also make Ethiopia less of a threat to their interests.
For most of us, the millennium year has been one of the most difficult, despairing years we have faced, even worse than the previous few years. After the joy subsided from the Ethiopian Millennium celebrations of a year ago, today, we have sunk into a greater pit of despair, only made worse by the division of Kinijit and of most of the other political parties. Today, the future we were reaching for seems crushed. We are more fragmented than ever before. This includes not only the political parties, but also the armed groups like the OLF, the faith organizations and civic organizations. Right now, we have no one institution that is bringing hope to us.
A society that loses its compassion towards others loses its humanity
Societies without compassion for others are societies that will be unstable, conflict ridden and devoid of the joy, peace and deeper happiness that bring meaning to life and nation.
What makes people human is emotion. When you don’t have emotion, you do not feel or respond to the pain or suffering of others. A society that loses its compassion towards others loses its humanity and everyone suffers as a result. It becomes the survival of the fittest where you trust no one and only care about those closest to you. You will play favorites with these few while at the same time, cover for them and not hold them accountable because you cannot trust “outsiders.”
This is what is going on with the TPLF right now. This is one important reason that we are not seeing most of our Tigrayan brothers and sisters speaking up or rallying with other Ethiopians right now despite the fact that we know the majority of Tigrayans are not really benefitting under the TPLF. It is also their moral obligation to speak out like the rest of Ethiopians.We also know that Woyane are not only Tigrayan, but there are also Anuak Woyane, Amhara Woyane, Oromo Woyane, Ogedeni Woyane, Woyane Christians and Woyane Muslims. Without all of these Woyane from other ethnic groups and religions, the TPLF would not survive.
It is a “dog-eat-dog” society and one where the rule of law becomes the “law of the most powerful dog!” In Ethiopia, Meles is “top dog”, but there are countless layers of underlings who must be catered to in such a system who become the “victims.” Any of these victims are threats or “unimportant” to their survival and are dehumanized so no one cares about their suffering and the injustice perpetrated against them. They become “forgotten and neglected people.” In the eyes of too many, most of our society comes under this category.
Human beings are “used” or “abused” to advance one’s own interests instead of being viewed as fellow human beings, created in the image of God. This devaluation of others becomes especially true if they are from a devalued or opposing ethnic group, political group, religious group, from a different region, gender, class or educational level or from a category of people like “separatists,” “unemployed youths,” street people (beggars, homeless or prostitutes) or orphans.
Have you lost your sense of compassion towards other Ethiopians who have been devalued and dehumanized in this society? We lose touch with our own humanity as we do this. The more this happens, the more it becomes a societal problem that affects every Ethiopian because if “I can devalue you, you can devalue me!” It is a vicious cycle of dehumanization.
So, the question is, how can we expect to have a better year ahead if we fail to treat each other with respect and care? The future of Ethiopia depends on how we will treat each other, especially the most weak and vulnerable in our society. If you agree that this is a problem, what can we do to change?
The strength of our Ethiopian backbone is being tested
“Having backbone” is an expression commonly used to describe someone with strength of character, someone who does the “right” thing even when it is difficult or when it is at odds with others.
Right now, the strength of our “Ethiopian backbone” is being tested. Are we willing to make the New Year a better one for the Ethiopian people by stepping out with moral courage and conviction in order to bring compassion back into our society? We have been wounded by fear and abuse and have substituted survival for compassion. As more and more Ethiopians suffered, we looked away, not wanting to feel, but to escape. What small but practical steps can we now take to reverse this direction?
As each of you who were able, celebrated the New Year at home, eating with your family or going out for supper or as you bought gifts for someone special, remember those who do not have anything in Ethiopia.
Remember the homeless, dirty child with no clothes, walking barefoot and sleeping with no blanket in the streets. Remember the young girls who are selling their bodies in Addis Ababa and towns in our country in order to buy food. Remember the other beggars on the streets, all with their own stories and emotions. Each one of them is precious in God’s sight. They are unemployed youths, elderly widows, disabled veterans of the military, disabled or sick with HIV or some other disease. Many came from the rural areas, seeking employment or a better life and found nothing.
Think of the victims of the flood in Gambella, some who died and many others who are displaced and their crops are ruined. Think of the Ethiopian women who are daily being trafficked to the Middle East to be prostitutes or forced servants. Remember those who died trying to make it by boat across the Red Sea to Yemen, who could have made it except their boat was stolen and they were forced to swim at gunpoint.
Remember the mothers who just buried their children in the last few months because they had no food. Remember those parents who are inwardly suffering as their children are too weakened by hunger to cry out any longer for food. Remember the young child who is taking care of his or her younger siblings because their mother and father have died of HIV/AIDS.
Remember the victims of terror such as the young girl or mother who has been raped in the Ogaden by the same soldiers who are supposed to protect them. Remember those whose fathers and brothers have been killed, beaten or tortured as they were trying to protect their mothers and sisters from such assaults. Think about the families displaced from homes simply because they live near natural resources that others want and those others are willing to take their land by force.
Remember the mother, whose activist children were killed during the protests after the 2005 election. Remember the family members of those activists who are still waiting for the release of their children so they might come home. Remember these activists and the thousands of freedom fighters like them who are still behind bars, in the dark cells of prisons throughout Ethiopia the country—including journalists, artists and musicians like Teddy Afro who did nothing but speak out for what was right.
Remember the children who are not getting the opportunity to go to school because their father was killed. Remember the homeless who were evicted from their homes—later to be bulldozed down—because another Ethiopian from the West, with money, went to Ethiopia and leased their land from the government.
Remember the orphans who have such a fragile future. Remember the disabled who cannot walk, see, hear or is mentally disabled, but in this society, no one is taking care of them. Remember the soldier who lost both legs and cannot take care of himself.
This is not only limited to Ethiopians in the country. Think of the refugees from Ethiopia in foreign countries, in the Sudan, in Eritrea, in Kenya, in Egypt and even those in the west who are having a difficult time surviving away from family and home simply because they are trying to seek safety or a better opportunity in a foreign country.
Please, as you celebrate with joy, put yourselves in the shoes of those fellow Ethiopians who have nothing in terms of worldly possessions—who have been viewed as discardable people by their own government and by many within our society. Refuse to promote the devaluation of these human beings. These are our people. May God restore our compassion and our humanity.
If we are to be a caring people and a healthy society, we should see these Ethiopians as part of our family. God wants us to see them as our people, but we are not living up to what God expects of us. As we celebrate this day, think of the Ethiopians in pain, in misery, in sorrow, in loneliness and in hopelessness for “we are our brother’s keeper.”
For those in America, Canada and Europe, when you return to Ethiopia, do not treat the other Ethiopians—like the homeless and the disabled—as if they were not your own people. Do not consider yourself to be a tourist for you are one of them. Eat with the maid who is cooking the food. Be a Good Samaritan to those who have nothing. We should feel their pain and attempt to relieve their suffering, giving them the boost, wherever and whenever possible, that might enable them to survive or to become independent.
May the Next Year Be Known as the Year Ethiopians Showed Such Great Compassion that they Changed the Direction of Ethiopia!
If we are wishing for a better life and year, we have to change. If we are to improve the future for Ethiopia, we ought to do our part by caring for each other. Our actions should not be only limited to those who are privileged and educated, but it should be extended to the people who have nothing at all—which is the case for the majority of Ethiopians. This will require those who have more, to share, especially those Ethiopians who live in the western countries. They should share not only with their families, but also with other Ethiopians who are part of their greater family.
This New Year celebration should not be a year of wishing for something better, but a year of action towards the betterment of our people. Let this to be a year when we put our humanity before our ethnicity, a year when we can act on the belief that unless all Ethiopians are free, none of us will be free. Until we all have the basics to survive, we must share what we have.
Let this year be the year to forgive and heal the bitter divisions between the people. Let this year be the year when the divided political parties can see that there is something bigger than their own political party and that is God first, then our humanity and then our country. Let this be the year when people will work together for the common good despite our differences.
We hope that next year will become known as the pivotal year when Ethiopians came together in solidarity of purpose, becoming a society known for its compassion towards others. We in the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia hope you will join us in preparing the way for a better year and future.
We cannot avoid looking at the truth of what is at the heart of our failure—we have lost our compassion for others. A society that loses its compassion, loses its humanity. A society that loses its humanity loses its soul. A society that loses its soul, dies.
Listen and you will already hear the cries of a dying Ethiopia. Let us urgently call on God to help revive the soul of Ethiopia—that He might help us recover our soul, our humanity and our compassion before it is too late to save this nation and people!
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The author can be reached at [email protected]
or The Committee for the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia
E-mail: [email protected]
