ELECTION 2000
A Figment of an Imaginary Democracy
By Petros Toggia, January – February 2000
As we are approaching the May 2000 election in Ethiopia, the recurring issue that we have to address is whether the election would be free and fair. How would the upcoming election in Ethiopia be any different from the previous elections conducted under the prepotency of the TPLF/EPRDF regime? Would the election signify any progress toward representative and participatory democracy? Or would it simply be an episode periodically organized as a facade for a one-party rule?
As much as many opposition groups and international observers are still skeptical about the fairness and openness of the forthcoming election, its process and outcome objectively expose the true colors of the EPRDF. The EPRDF-led government totally controls the electoral process: the selection of a self-serving electoral system, the appointment of all members of the Electoral Commission, the setting of eligibility criteria for electors and candidates, the promulgation of exclusionary electoral laws, harassment and intimidation against independent candidates, the utilization of election funds and state resources, the monopoly of state-controlled national media and so on. In the conspicuous absence of parliamentary opposition groups, the Ethiopian political life would again fall under the diktat of the EPRDF for the next five years. Likewise, the forthcoming election obviously will turn out to be another masquerade for a representative democracy. Therefore, it is self-evident that the upcoming election would be fait accompli in terms of maintaining the supremacy of a one-party political system.
Yet these type of elections are portrayed as a benchmark for democracy for the simple reason that people cast their votes every five year. In the absence of a critical and close examination of the political process and power relations that define the electoral process itself, it would be simply superficial and misleading to identify election with democracy. Thus we hear ad nausea such apologetic adjectives as “fragile,” “transitional,” “fledgling,” and “promising” attached to democracy in characterizing one-party-dominated political systems. We have been witnessing the failure of the so-called transitional democracy, lacking any semblance of a transition from a single-party system to a pluralist democracy for almost a decade. Thus what is so far delivered is denuded promises of a promising democracy. Ironically, this so-called transitional democracy seems to stagnate the political life of the country with a one-party framework, contradicting its own professed constitutional principles.
Obviously, no one should anticipate a full-fledged democracy within a decade even under the most propitious political environment. Thinking this way is not only lackadaisical, but also borders on a utopian vision. Nonetheless, we have not seen any sincere effort on the part of the ruling group that may signal a trajectory toward a representative and participatory democracy.
The salient feature of contemporary politics seems to be the preeminence of images. Contemporary images of political systems and processes assume greater prominence than the substance of what they purport to portray. Production of images has become all-important in establishing political legitimacy and power in our contemporary world. Political images often impute authoritarian states a facade of democracy. These images gloss on the surface of political systems that are structured under the dominance of a single party. For example, the ceremonial rituals surrounding elections are often viewed as attributes of representative democracy.
Western government officials and the media tout Ethiopia’s periodic elections, in and of themselves, as illustrating the exercise of democratic rights and safeguards to representative democracy. Such perfunctory observation is superficial as well as deceptive. According to this view, the formal aspects of political episodes take precedence over the substantive elements of democratic process and system that encompasses constitutional safeguards, freedom of political action, accountability, and transparency. Thus, such a view being heedlessly or purposely extends uncalled-for legitimacy to a nondemocratic political process.
For example, on May 4, 1995, Hubert Kahl of the Deutsche Presse-Agentur wrote the following report about the May 1995 election: “It is as if Ethiopia is waking up from a long dark age. Four years after the collapse of the communist regime, Ethiopians go to the polls on May 7 to elect a parliament in free, democratic elections for the first time.” He wrote these lines a few days before he had even the chance to witness the election. Many like Kahl tend to perfunctorily characterize the election as “free and democratic,” exhibiting lack of minimal objectivity and integrity.
The EPRDF regime unabashedly ascribes its exclusive election system as the single most important criterion to restrict or permit substantive rights such as freedom of political action. According to a recently legislated election law, any registered political organization that abstains from two consecutive elections would be banned from any political activity in the country. Although this law directly applies to those registered parties, it was designed to deprive a freedom of political action to any political organization that resists the restrictive political framework of the ruling EPRDF group. Moreover, the law further attests to the fact that the EPRDF leaders view the election as the benchmark of democracy, as well as a vehicle to legitimize a one-party dominance under the guise of popular mandate.
A noted international jurist, Richard Falk, wrote that we are in an era in which democracy is presented in disguise. Assessing the authoritarian state in Turkey, Professor Falk observes that the Turkish government seems to graciously permit doctors to operate a medical clinic to assist former Turkish political prisoners, providing medical treatment and rehabilitation for people who were victims of state-administered torture. This may sound as a political paradox unique only to a few authoritarian states. Yet we also observe such fictitious democracy in Ethiopia under the EPRDF’s rule in the domain of elections and freedom of press, where people are apparently allowed to exercise their rights coextensive with state repression and persecution.
While many Ethiopian political dissidents and journalists are prosecuted by the state for alleged political offenses, the EPRDF regime never fails to charge credit for the politicized administration of justice in its adjunct courtrooms. Ironically, freedom of expression is restricted in Ethiopia by the Press Law in order to protect the ruling group from criticism by the private media. According to universally accepted constitutional principles, constitutional rights such as freedom of expression were essentially framed to protect the citizens from the powerful and expansionist state. Nonetheless, the ruling group maintains the self-serving political machinery under the guise of constitutional state and the rule of law. What is manifested in freedom of the press, freedom of political action, and free election is the veneer of democracy with state-managed ostentatious political discourse, duplicitous propositions, and affectation for democracy. Hence, we are forced to tune a monotonous political hymn under the mantra of democracy and justice.
The TPLF/EPRDF leaders often issue statements indicating the objective for the elections is to maintain the political status quo. For example, in a press release following the June 1992 election, Meles Zenawi stated that “we have set an important precedent for the future.” What the ruling party has set as a “precedent for the future” is self-evident from Meles’s statement that we should not anticipate any significant departure from a one-party control over future elections. Whether this precedent is set for a free and open elections under the EPRDF remain to be seen. Or would this be obviously a precedent set as a window-dressing for a de facto one-party dominance as in the previous two elections?
We should not seek further for the answer than reading Meles’s assessment of the June 1992 election. The Prime Minister notes that his government ensures a “more effective elections in the future.” The meaning for such “effective election in the future” needs no clarification. The term “effective” in a utilitarian sense is a quest for achieving a political objective, i.e., a political dominance as a desired outcome of numerous elections. Once Nietzsche observes that “in the end one loves one’s desire and not what is desired.” This aphorism illustrates EPRDF’s parochial organizational interest vis-a-vis building an accommodating democratic system.
Furthermore, Meles expects uncritical cooperation with the international community in advancing his sectarian party interest in the upcoming elections. He asserted: “the international community will join with and assist us to achieve our goals.” The EPRDF leaders had unequivocally stated that the past election would serve as “precedent for future elections.” They also indicated that their primary interest is to “achieve their goals” in organizing “effective” election. Interestingly, they are flippant to assert that the international guests of honor qua election observers “will join” them to witness the election of EPRDF cadres, and to report the “land-sliding victory” over the control of 96 percent to 98 percent seats in the national and regional assemblies.
However, a few observers are trenchant in assessing EPRDF’s past elections. For example, Gilbert Kulick, a member of the International Observers’ Group, observed the election in Bale region between June 11 and 21 in 1992. He reported: “Notwithstanding the cooperativeness of the authorities, it became evident with each passing day that the election preparations were being consistently and systematically manipulated by EPRDF/OPDO.” Similarly, observers of the African American Institute also reported that they have witnessed intimidation and harassment of independent candidates, night-time visits by armed men and cadres, presence of armed guards at polling stations, state media monopoly, control of election funds, unlimited utilization of state resources by EPRDF government officials who are most of the candidates in the elections.
Yet, as paradoxical as it may sound, with the exclusion of opposition groups, reports by some other observers reflect less irregularities as the field was absolutely monopolized by the EPRDF election officials and candidates. For example, the 81-member observer group of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) noted its great satisfaction with the completion of the May 1995 election. The OAU observer team expressed its acclamation for the successful completion of the election “without any significant irregularities.” OAU’s satisfaction about the election certainly feeds the complacency of the imperious EPRDF leaders. Meles would interpret such superficial though congratulatory report as an indisputable proof for the “effectiveness” of the election. Interestingly enough, EPRDF’s political formula for its elections upholds an “effective result,” showing “less irregularities” with such manipulable variables as exclusion of contending political groups and open invitation of foreign observers.
Interestingly enough, a clause entitled “Cases Constituting Grave Irregularities” in the Election Review Board Proclamation of July 27, 1992, states the following as a serious violation: “where the electoral process was under strict control of a single political organization to the deliberate exclusion of other political organizations.” (Article15/6). This Proclamation also imposes a sanction for any one acting in violation of this law in accordance with the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957. According to Article 460 to 470 of the Ethiopian Penal Code, penalties for such violation include fines and imprisonment up to 10 years. This is one more interesting feature of a paradoxical state that excels in negating its own proclamations under the facade of the rule of law.
The EPRDF government often demands that opposition parties should abide by the rules of the game. Hence, the opposition is generally blamed for not participating in the elections. As a matter of fact, EPRDF leaders brusquely dismiss any criticism concerning the systematic exclusion of and restriction against contending organizations. The opposition is generally characterized as abstentionist, lacking any goodwill to participate in the election. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has repeatedly demanded that the opposition groups must play in accordance with the “rules of the game.” Meles seems to be extremely fond of using the reference, i.e., the “rules of the game,” though his literal Amharic usage (ye’chewataw hig) is quite ludicrous. Nevertheless, the ruling group has not fairly been accommodative within its power analogous with its declarations.
Much of the burden should have been primarily placed on the group in power that single-handedly claims to institute a democratic framework in Ethiopia. It is also important to understand that goodwill is conceivable only in the context of power relations, not in a vacuum. No matter how one has goodwill in abundance, without a political leverage or a negotiating power, there will hardly be a chance to succeed in bringing the desired tolerance and mutual accommodation. To put it differently, tolerance and mutual accommodation presuppose an exercise of power. In this respect, the group in power, first and foremost, can make a significant difference by demonstrating a goodwill commensurate with its declarations.
The problem, however, is that the EPRDF has explicitly laid the “rules of the game” as its own terms of conditions, and has dictated the political process since the imposition of the Transition Charter in July 1991. Neither the rules nor the game is democratic; the referee has not been neutral as well. It is further hypocritical to expect others to play a fair game under such unpropitious conditions. In an article entitled, “Ethiopia’s Troubled Course to Democracy,” John Harbeson cogently notes: “the lasting outcome of these elections was the de facto single-party state that continues today.” Furthermore, assessing the constitutional framework and the outcome of the previous elections in Ethiopia, Professor Harbeson writes: “These legal foundations of a democratic state have carried only limited significance, since they rest not on the foundations of multi-party consensus but only on the military and political hegemony of the EPRDF.”
I can point to three areas of focal concerns for this problem, revealing the characteristic features of the EPRDF rule and the political disposition of its leaders. First, EPRDF’s political program divulges that it represents all the ethnic groups in Ethiopia, featuring its octopus-like organizational structure that encompasses a few self-styled ethnic-based organizations. To put it differently, the EPRDF views itself the mirror-image of the multi-ethnic Ethiopian society. Or it is perhaps the other way around, as some of the EPRDF leaders dangerously perceive their organization in a self-aggrandizing manner. We will be facing this riddle that exemplifies Plato’s simulacrum during EPRDF political rule. Thus it is an arduous task to challenge the political premise of this programmatic assertion that fundamentally claims a full representation of Ethiopian society concocted as the ethnic federal state.
Second, EPRDF leaders strongly feel that only they are privileged to wield state power as a prize for their armed struggle and sacrifice. Accordingly, they jealously guard this power from being challenged in any form, as well as being strongly opposed to any power-sharing arrangement.
Third, the EPRDF leaders conceive democracy as a form of gratis from the charitable state. In a press release in July 1992, Meles stated in a self-congratulatory note: “it was the EPRDF which made the elections possible.” According to the world-view of EPRDF leaders, the notion of democracy is egotistically conceived to perpetuate the idea of specific state power associated with a specific group. And this idea seems like a lingering element of its “revolutionary democracy,” as incorporated in EPRDF’s January 1991 political program. It is nonetheless a short-sighted view that discounts the future of the nation and the interest of the people to the present sectarian single-party interest. This parochial view fails to appreciate democracy as a continuing process and an institution-building that transcends a specific reign of any party or coalition. William Winter observes: “Even when free and fair elections were held, substantive and sustainable democracy also depended on building institutions of popular participation. Without that, “democracy” would be a game of elites.
The prime characteristic of political rule under the EPRDF exemplifies the perpetuity of this game. The government held a conference with selectively invited leaders of the opposition groups in early November 1999. Opposition leaders of the Coalition Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE), the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), the Oromo National Congress, the Southern Ethiopia Democratic Union attended the conference. The conference was designed to allure a few of the opposition groups to participate in the forthcoming election. The government officials promised a fair election and access to state media. However, the attending opposition leaders and many others are skeptical about the sincerity of the government’s promise. The lack of trust is still looms large because of such empty promises in the recent past.
As Professor Gudina noted in the November conference, the EPRDF should have positively responded to numerous proposals for peace and reconciliation by various coalition of opposition groups. The November Conference demonstrates how the EPRDF leaders are often disposed to circumvent the process. They always bent to regiment the political course primarily to maintain the status quo, arresting any development for free competition.
The TPLF/EPRDF regime masters the art of prevarication in order to legitimize its actions, especially with the fast approaching election in May 2000. The EPRDF leaders were unwilling to meet even reasonable demands from interested opposition groups in the 1995 election. The opposition then demanded reasonable time frame to prepare for the election, equitable allocation of election funds, equal media access, guarantees for fairness, freedom of movement and free campaign. Yet I will still be more than generous to give the EPRDF leaders the benefit of the doubt. They increasingly will face challenges based on their own set of promises. A power filled with paradoxes will sooner or later be forced to seek answers for its own riddles.
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Petros Toggia, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Social Work at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania. He is also an Associate Editor of ER.
A news and opinion journal on Ethiopia
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