Reflections on Ethiopian and Eritrean Relations
By Mesfin Araya
Ethioipan Review, August 1998
In May 1993, multi-ethnic Eritrea emerged as a new state defying the post-colonial African map, long held as sacred by the members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). What has transpired in the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea since then, and what are the prospects? Are there any subjective and objective forces at play, undermining or favoring freer association between the peoples of the two countries?
The answers to such questions require both theoretical and detailed empirical investigation that goes well beyond the self-assessments of the power holders in Asmera and Addis Abeba. In the following reflective outline I will try to identify the disintegrative and integrative forces that are caught in a deadly competition and whose respective future impact remains indeterminate, as it depends much on how the processes of social interaction unfold.
Disintegrative forces
Lacking prior hegemonyin the true sense of Antonio Gramsciwithin their respective civil societies, both the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had to use violence to capture state power; and they remain primarily concerned with defending it, regardless of the economic, historical, and cultural bonds between the societies of the two countries. Let me begin with the disintegrative role of the EPLF.
In the internationally supervised Eritrean referendum of April 23-25, 1993, 99.8% of the population is said to have voted for independence (Report of the Referendum Commissioner of Eritrea). For the first time in the history of that country, Christian and Moslem communities closed ranks to express their collective concern; no other competing group loyaltiesreligious, regional, or urban/rural divideseemed to have any social meaning. Factional politics that had been the hallmark of the country suddenly gave way to the primacy of nationhood; an old Eritrean man in Asmera is said to have described the referendum as a national festival, a carnival. Even Eritreans residing in Addis Abeba did not attempt to conceal their joy. But the question remains: was the outcome of the referendum really an ideological restatement of a much older, enduring phenomenon of Eritrean national identity as we are led to believe by the nationalist leaders and nation-minded scholars?
The truth is there was never an Eritrean nation that traveled around the country awakening people for a national mission. The notion of an independent Eritrean state has long been the private political project of an organized minority nationalist group whose efforts were greatly supported and abetted particularly by the repressive state machinery under Mengistu Hailemariam. The outcome of the referendumas an expression of national consciousnesswas indeed a contingent, a conjectural event.
Eritrean national identity, like other group identities, was not a thing that had prior existence, which was then shaped and developed; on the contrary, it happened and its causes lay in the policy blunder of Mengistu Hailemariam, and the systematic exploitation of that policy blunder by the nationalist group. There were historical opportunities to resolve the Eritrean question. Indeed, if it had not been for the lack of vision and the utter failure to appreciate the historical processes on the part of the political leadership in Ethiopia, it is unlikely that Eritrea would have emerged as an independent state.
In her book, “The Eritrean Struggle for Independence” (published by Cambridge University Press in 1995), Ruth Iyob claims: “The 99.8 % vote for independence, announced on April 27, 1993, dispelled any doubts about the wishes of the population.” Typical of the nation-minded scholars on Eritrea, her statement lacks critical inquiry. Given the long and protracted history of a fragmented nationalismwhich she herself does not denyand the intensity, scope, and duration of the destructive war of Mengistu Hailemariam, the outcome of the referendum might well have been an affirmation of peace rather than a reflection of an enduring national desire for a separate Eritrean state. Peace or an independent Eritrean state? But nationalism is a form of politics, and the Eritrean nationalist group obviously employed the idea of ‘martyr-nation’ to realize its private political project that it had nurtured for so long.
We need to recall that its original referendum proposal, which had three options (EPLF Referendum Proposal, November 22, 1980)full independence, federal association, regional autonomywas reduced merely to a yes or no vote for independence (PGE, Eritrean Referendum Proclamation, No. 22/1992), significantly defining the terms of the public debate in favor of the nationalists’ private project.
Since 1991, the ruling group in Asmera has ruled through decrees; and the post-independent Eritrean state, long forged in the mountains of Sahel under a disciplined military fortress, knows no distinction between political party and state, nor between state and society; no society in the Horn of Africa, perhaps in the entire continent, is more penetrated and controlled by the tentacles of state machinery than that of independent Eritrea. The ruling group in Asmera was not, and is not, open to a public debate concerning the costs/benefits of an independent Eritrean state; it is, on the contrary, determined to experiment with its ‘grand vision’ on the powerless population.
The politics of Meles Zenawiformer president and current Prime Minister of Ethiopiaalso needs to be subjected to critical inquiry. As strange as it may appear, he acceptedas Tigreanthe colonial question of Eritrea; and as President of Ethiopia, he gave the green signal for the Eritrean referendum. Through his sustained liberal economic policies, he also bailed out EPLF’s Eritrea; but interestingly there has been no instance where he ever publicly appealed directly to the Eritrean people to reconsider the cultural, historical, and economic bonds that have long tied them to Ethiopia. Some may say his past policy of pampering the leaders of EPLF in Asmera was carefully crafted to foster the gradual association between the two countries. The truth, however, lies elsewhere: in the history and opportunistic character of the TPLF leaders.
For the TPLF, a minority ethnic groupwhich set out to retain power at the center while at the same time selfishly defending its homeland autonomy at the peripheryhaving an EPLF Eritrea as a distant but critical strategic ally was preferable to alienating the Eritrean ruling group, whose country’s independence to begin with was premised on maintaining a pro-Eritrea government in Addis Abeba and on a permanent surveillance of politics and society inside Ethiopia. The reluctance on the part of Meles in the past to engage in any peaceful and legitimate political struggle for Ethio-Eritrean union or to aggressively advance the Ethiopian national interest must, therefore, be seen in the context of the primacy of political concerns over and above everything else.
The military conflict that has erupted since May 6 forcefully dramatizes the disintegrative role of the ruling groups in Asmera and Addis Abeba. The policy choice for a bloody military confrontation could hardly be explained by mere reference to the border dispute or economic policy conflict; the reason seems to lie in the long simmering domestic political crisis that the leaders of EPLF and TPLF have confronted since their victories in 1991.
The ruling group in Asmera may have created an independent Eritrean state, but they have yet to create Eritreans, i.e., widespread Eritrean national identity. Particularly the Eritrean Moslem political faction has for long perceived the EPLF/TPLF relations as an alliance between two Christian highlanders. We ought to recall that it was the combined forces of the two liberation fronts that inflicted a permanent military defeat in 1981 to the largely Moslem-led and supported Eritrean Liberation Front. The war against Melesonce the alliance broke up under the triggers of border dispute and economic policy conflictcould only be intended to consolidate Eritrean nationalism; it is indeed hard to imagine any other reasons behind the bombing of civilians in the town of Mekele! The success of the new EPLF’s strategy, however, is likely to remain questionable as there are several political and economic issues that alienate the Moslem political faction.
On the other hand, the leaders of TPLF were no less under political pressure for their alliance with EPLF. Since his victory in 1991, Meles has been a subject of public talk, depicting him as the elect of Issayas (seyoume Issayas). There is an alleged report that from the beginning there have been powerful elements within TPLF who opposed Meles’ pro-EPLF policy. As the EPLF/TPLF alliance collapsed, those around Meles seemed to have seized the opportunity to prove their Ethiopian nationalism. What else could explain the timing of the public execution of an Eritrean long convicted and sentenced to death for murdering a high ranking military official of TPLF! It will be interesting to see how the contradiction between the TPLF’s newly founded Ethiopian nationalism and its earlier political philosophy of ethnic federalism will unfold. It may entail organizational restructuring within TPLF/EPRDF; certainly, the Oromo Liberation Front is likely to perceive the military conflict as a ‘killil’ problem peculiar to Tigray.
The military conflict only goes to show that the ruling groups in Asmera and Addis Abebarather than focusing on peace and developmentare willing and prepared to draw their societies into a bloody war which couldgiven the prevailing religious, regional, ethnic, conflicts and tensions in the Horn of Africainvolve the countries in the entire region.
Although, we are told, the two governments had peacefully disagreed since 1993, they never disclosed their disagreements to their respective public nor sought international mediation. Meles, for example, is on public record defying urban rumor on the impending conflict as baseless and futile wishful thinking. Indeed, the lack of public accountability, debilitating secrecy, and an incorrigible penchant for employing violence as a method of conflict resolution, have long been the defining qualities of the ruling groups in the two countries.
Integrative forces
If there is anything that is historically givenas an enduring structural force which may be difficult to restructure without grave consequencesit will be the economic relations between the two countries.
Ethiopia and Eritrea have constituted a single economic region with a long and enduring history that goes back to pre-modern times. In the past, Eritrea provided Ethiopia with the sea outlet, and after 1952 served as an industrial base. Ethiopia, on the other hand, has been a bread basket for Eritrea which has never been self-sufficient in food production; it has also provided employment and business opportunities, especially for the densely populated highland Eritrea.
Although temporarily disrupted by war conditions in the past, the economic imperative has reasserted its power. According to a report by African Business (May 1997), almost 90% of Eritrean exports go to Ethiopia. The significant skilled Eritrean population residing in Ethiopia seems to have declined to return to its “newly found homeland.”
Certainly that reality poses a nationalist discomfort; it is also, in a sense, a critique of the Eritrean nationalists’ private political project. If it were not for the nationalist politics that obstructs the free mobility of capital and labor, Eritrean private business, and especially the densely populated Christian highlanders would surely like to try their luck southward; they know or have heard of success stories among Eritreans residing in Ethiopia. There are alleged reports that Eritreans continue to enter Ethiopia in search of jobs, some of them masquerading as Tigrean Ethiopians.
The economic reality had to force even the nationalist leaders in Asmera to use the Ethiopian currency. The introduction of the new Eritrean currency, naqfa, only manifests the underlying tug of war between what the economic reality dictates and what the nationalists desire; as African Business magazine of April 1998 quotes from the government newspaper, Eritrean Profile, the new currency “In the long run… will de-mystify the man-made beliefs of the unviability of the economy of Eritrea.” The economic reality, however, seems to assert itself sooner than the nationalists had expected.
The underlying economic reality that I tried to outline as an integrative force, however, does not mechanically shape social behavior. It is, instead, mediated through the processes of social interaction. The key to future Ethiopian and Eritrean relations, therefore, remains in the political field. As long as the public remains outside the political process, the disintegrative forces will continue to have the upper hand. There is a need, therefore, to embark on a tireless struggle for the democratization of Eritrean and Ethiopian societies.
Rather than rushing to rally around Eritrean or Ethiopian nationalismas some socially irresponsible political elements, especially in exile, are doingwe ought to listen to the voices of ordinary people for whom peace, development, and democracy, have for too long been rare commodities. In Asmera, according to Reuters report of June 7, 1998, “privately many residents say no solution is in sight because both Issayas… and Meles Zenawi are far too proud [and I may add, too deceitful and authoritarian] to accept any blame for the crisis;” and from the Tigrayan capital of Mekele, here is what a motherwatching her seriously injured 4 year old child in the local hospitalhad to say: “I do not dislike the Eritrean people, I dislike very much the people who planned to bomb us. I dislike war” (The Washington Post 6/8/98). Indeed, we ought to be committed to building democratic societies in the region around such remarkable and constructive perception that sees a clear distinction between rulers and the ruled.
The views privately expressed by Asmera residents and those by the mother in Mekelewhose faith in humanity seems to grow stronger as her personal suffering unfoldsmust, indeed, be our point of departure. Whose Nation? Whose State? I have no doubt that a free public debate could foster a freer association between the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia, lending political expression to the economic imperative.
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Mesfin Araya, Ph.D., teaches on Africa at York College, the City University of New York. He is writing a book on the 1993 Eritrean Referendum.